During a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on March 16, Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the ranking member of the committee, said that U.S. Strategic Command had failed to convince her that the United States needs to develop a new nuclear air-launched cruise missile; the LRSO (Long-Range Standoff missile).

“I recently met with Admiral Haney, the head of Strategic Command regarding the new nuclear cruise missile and its refurbished warhead. I came away unconvinced of the need for this weapon. The so-called improvements to this weapon seemed to be designed candidly to make it more usable, to help us fight and win a limited nuclear war. I find that a shocking concept. I think this is really unthinkable, especially when we hold conventional weapons superiority, which can meet adversaries’ efforts to escalate a conflict.”

Feinstein made her statement only a few hours after Air Force Secretary Deborah James had told the House Armed Services Committee on the other side of the Capitol that the LRSO will be capable of “destroying otherwise inaccessible targets in any zone of conflict.”

Lets ignore for a moment that the justification used for most nuclear and advanced conventional weapons also is to destroy otherwise inaccessible targets, what are actually the unique LRSO targets? In theory the missile could be used against anything that is within range but that is not good enough to justify spending $20-$30 billion.

So Air Force officials have portrayed the LRSO as a unique weapon that can get in where nothing else can. The mission they describe sounds very much like the role tactical nuclear weapons played during the Cold War: “I can make holes and gaps” in air defenses, then Air Force Global Strike Command commander Lieutenant General Stephen Wilson explained in 2014, “to allow a penetrating bomber to get in.”

And last week, shortly before Admiral Haney failed to convince Sen. Feinstein, EUCOM commander General Philip Breedlove added more details about what they want to use the nuclear LRSO to blow up:

“One of the biggest keys to being able to break anti-access area denial [A2AD] is the ability to penetrate the air defenses so that we can get close to not only destroy the air defenses but to destroy the coastal defense cruise missiles and the land attack missiles which are the three elements of an A2AD environment. One of the primary and very important tools to busting that A2AD environment is a fifth generation ability to penetrate. In the LRSB you will have a platform and weapons that can penetrate.” (Emphasis added.)

Those A2/AD targets would include Russian S-400 air-defense, Russian Bastion-P coastal defense, and Chinese DF-10A land-attack missile launchers (see images).

Judging from Sen. Feinstein’s conclusion that the LRSO seems “designed candidly to make it more usable, to help us fight and win a limited nuclear war,” Admiral Haney probably described similar LRSO targets as Lt. Gen. Wilson and Gen. Breedlove.

After hearing these “shocking” descriptions of the LRSO’s warfighting mission, Senator Feinstein asked NNSA’s Gen. Klotz if he could do a better job in persuading her about the need for the new nuclear cruise missile:

Sen. Feinstein: “So maybe you can succeed where Admiral Haney did not. Let me ask you this question: Why do we need a new nuclear cruise missile?”

Gen. Klotz: “My sense at the time, and it still is the case, is that the existing cruise missile, the air-launched cruise missile, is getting rather long in the tooth with the issues that are associated with an aging weapon system. It was first deployed in 1982. And therefore it is well past it service life. In the meantime, as you know from your work on the intelligence committee, there has been an increase in the sophistication and capabilities as well as proliferation of sophisticated air- and missile-defenses around the world. Therefore the ability of the cruise missile to pose the deterrent capability, the capability that is necessary to deter, is under question. Therefore, just based on the ageing and the changing nature of the threat we need to replace a system we’ve had, again, since the early 1980s with an updated variant….I guess I didn’t convince you any more than the Admiral did.”

Sen. Feinstein: “No you didn’t convince me. Because this just ratchets up warfare and ratchets up deaths. Even if you go to a low kiloton of six or seven it is a huge weapon. And I thought there was a certain morality that we should have with respect to these weapons. If it’s really mutual deterrence, I don’t see how this does anything other…it’s like the drone. The drone has been invented. It’s been armed. Now every county wants one. So they get more and more sophisticated. To do this with nuclear weapons, I think, is awful.”

Conclusion and Recommendations

Senator Feinstein has raised some important questions about the scope of nuclear strategy. How useful should nuclear weapons be and for what type of scenarios?

Proponents of the LRSO do not seem to question (or discuss) the implications of developing a nuclear cruise missile intended for shooting holes in air- and coastal-defense systems. Their mindset seems to be that anything that can be used to “bust the A2AD environment” – even a nuclear weapon – must be good for deterrence and therefore also for security and stability.

While a decision to authorize use of nuclear weapons would be difficult for any president, the planning for the potential use does not seem to be nearly as constrained. Indeed, the nuclear LRSO anti-A2AD mission that defense officials describe raises some serious questions about how soon in a conflict nuclear weapons might be used.

Since A2AD systems would likely be some of the first targets to be attacked in a war, a nuclear LRSO anti-A2AD mission appears to move nuclear use to the forefront of a conflict instead of keeping nuclear weapons in the background as a last resort where they belong.

And the nuclear LRSO anti-A2AD mission sounds eerily similar to the outrageous threats that Russian officials have made over the past several years to use nuclear weapons against NATO missile defense systems – threats that NATO and US officials have condemned. Of course, they don’t brandish the nuclear LRSO anti-A2AD mission as a threat – they call it deterrence and reassurance.

Nor do LRSO proponents seem to ask questions about redundancy and which types of weapons are most useful or needed for the anti-A2AD mission. The A2AD targets that the military officials describe are not “otherwise inaccessible targets,” as suggested by Secretary James, but are already being held at risk with conventional cruise missiles such as the Air Force’s JASSM-ER (extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Missile) and the navy’s Tactical Tomahawk, as well as with other nuclear weapons. The Air Force doesn’t have endless resources but must prioritize weapon systems.

Gen. Klotz defended the LRSO as if it were a choice between having a nuclear deterrent or not. But, of course, even without a nuclear LRSO, US stealth bombers will still be armed with the new B61-12 guided nuclear bomb and the US nuclear deterrent will still include land- and sea-based long-range ballistic missiles as well as F-35A stealthy fighter-bombers also armed with the B61-12.

The White House needs to rein in the nuclear warfighters and strategists to ensure that US nuclear strategy and modernization plans are better in tune with US policy to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” and enable non-nuclear weapons to “take on a greater share of the deterrence burden.” Canceling the nuclear LRSO would be a good start.

The research for this publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation, and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

While China has received growing attention for modernizing and expanding its strategic offensive nuclear forces over the last ten years, little attention has been paid to Chinese activities in testing and developing ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Motivated to understand the strategic implications of this testing and to learn Chinese views, Adjunct Senior Fellow and Professor, Bruce MacDonald and FAS President, Dr. Charles Ferguson, over the past twelve months, have studied these issues and have had extensive discussions with more than 50 security experts in China and the United States. Ever since the end of the Cold War, U.S. security policy has largely assumed that only the United States would possess credible strategic ballistic missile defense capabilities with non-nuclear interceptors. This tacit assumption has been valid for the last quarter century but may not remain valid for long. Since 2010, China has been openly testing missile interceptors purportedly for BMD purposes, but also useful for anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

A full PDF version of the report can be found here.

New and updated publications from the Congressional Research Service obtained by Secrecy News include the following.

The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress, September 18, 2015

Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, updated September 18, 2015

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, updated September 15, 2015

Guatemala: President Pérez Resigns; Runoff Presidential Election on October 25, CRS Insight, September 17, 2015

Russian Deployments in Syria Complicate U.S. Policy, CRS Insight, September 18, 2015

Extreme Weather Events and Government Compensation, CRS Legal Sidebar, September 22, 2015

Third Circuit Affirms the FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Security as an Unfair Trade Practice, CRS Legal Sidebar, September 21, 2015

Credit Union’s Plan to Serve the Marijuana Industry Goes Up in Smoke, CRS Legal Sidebar, September 21, 2015

Is There a Gap in Insider Trading Coverage for Hacking?, CRS Legal Sidebar, September 18, 2015

Vulnerable Youth: Employment and Job Training Programs, September 16, 2015

Insurance Regulation: Background, Overview, and Legislation in the 114th Congress, September 16, 2015

Copyright Law Restrictions on a Consumer’s Right to Repair Cars and Tractors, CRS Legal Sidebar, September 18, 2015

China’s military research and development program is organized around 16 “national megaprojects” that are intended to advance and transform that country’s capabilities in core technology areas including electronics, aerospace, clean energy, and so on. Three of the 16 national projects are classified and have not been officially acknowledged.

But in a recently published US Army War College volume, China specialists Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska identified “three prime candidates” for the classified Chinese programs: 1) a laser fusion program; 2) a navigational satellite system; and 3) a hypersonic vehicle technology project.

The Shenguang (Divine Light) laser is an experiment in inertial confinement fusion. The project reportedly aims to achieve ignition and plasma burning by 2020. “Shenguang has two strategic implications: it may accelerate China’s next-generation thermonuclear weapons development, and advance China’s directed-energy laser weapons programs,” wrote Bitzinger and Raska, who are based at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

The Beidou 2 satellite system is a network of hardened navigational satellites, which potentially “eliminates China’s dependency on the U.S. GPS and Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation systems that could be deactivated in select areas in times of conflict,” they wrote.

Finally, “there are signs that China is developing conceptual and experimental hypersonic flight vehicle technologies such as hypersonic cruise vehicles (HCV) capable of maneuvering at Mach 5.”

See Capacity for Innovation: Technological Drivers of China’s Future Military Modernization by Ricard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska, in The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 2025 (Roy Kamphausen and David Lai, eds.), published July 2015 by the Strategic Studies Institute and the US Army War College Press.

“Although China’s military innovation lagged behind that of Western powers, China’s ‘latecomer advantage’ has enabled it to skip various phases of development,” the volume editors wrote. “As a latecomer, the PLA has been able to identify and absorb key foreign civil and military technologies.”

A recently updated report from the Congressional Research Service discusses China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States, September 11, 2015.

The U.S. Air Force last week issued updated guidance both to foster and to limit contacts with Chinese military personnel, based in part on classified Defense Department directives.

“With the rise of PRC influence in the international community and the increasing capabilities of the Chinese military, Air Force military-to-military relationship with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is becoming more crucial than before,” the Air Force document stated.

See Conduct of USAF Contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Government of the Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC, Air Force Instruction 16-118, August 5, 2015.

The Instruction provides a framework for conducting reciprocal US-PRC visits to each other’s military installations.

“The success of these visits, whether US or PRC-led, directly affects relationships between the US and the PRC, as well as our relationships with our allies and partners, and is thereby important in support of national and regional politico-military objectives.”

But the Instruction also identifies numerous topical areas that are likely to be off-limits for USAF-PRC military contacts.

“[P]rohibited contacts… may involve: force projection operations, nuclear operations, advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations, advanced logistical operations, chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, joint war-fighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare, military space operations, other advanced capabilities of the armed forces, arms sales or military-related technology transfers, release of classified or restricted information, and access to a DoD laboratory.”

The new USAF Instruction implements two classified DoD Instructions, which have not been released: Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) C-2000.23, Conduct of DoD Contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and DoDI S-2000.24, Conduct of DoD Contacts with the Government of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC.

The Congressional Research Service produced a related report on U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, updated October 27, 2014.

Updated below

In 2013, the Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army of China issued a revised edition of its authoritative, influential publication “The Science of Military Strategy” (SMS) for the first time since 2001.

“Each new edition of the SMS is closely scrutinized by China hands in the West for the valuable insights it provides into the evolving thinking of the PLA on a range of strategically important topics,” wrote Joe McReynolds of the Jamestown Institute.

A copy of the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy — in Chinese — was obtained by Secrecy News and is posted on the Federation of American Scientists website (in a very large PDF).

“The availability of this document could be a huge boon for young China analysts who have not yet had the chance to buy their own copy in China or Taiwan,” said one China specialist.

An English translation of the document has not yet become publicly available.

But an overview of its treatment of nuclear weapons policy issues was provided in a recent essay by Michael S. Chase of the Jamestown Institute.

“Compared to the previous edition of SMS, the 2013 edition offers much more extensive and detailed coverage of a number of nuclear policy and strategy-related issues,” Mr. Chase wrote.

In general, SMS 2013 “reaffirms China’s nuclear No First Use policy…. Accordingly, any Chinese use of nuclear weapons in actual combat would be for ‘retaliatory nuclear counterstrikes’.”

With respect to deterrence, SMS 2013 states that “speaking with a unified voice from the highest levels of the government and military to the lowest levels can often enhance deterrence outcomes. But sometimes, when different things are said by different people, deterrence outcomes might be even better.”

SMS 2013 also notably included the first explicit acknowledgement of Chinese “network attack forces” which perform what the U.S. calls “offensive cyber operations.”

In a separate essay on “China’s Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy,” Joe McReynolds wrote that the SMS authors “focus heavily on the central role of peacetime ‘network reconnaissance’ — that is, the technical penetration and monitoring of an adversary’s networks — in developing the PLA’s ability to engage in wartime network operations.”

On July 28, the Congressional Research Service updated its report on China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress.

Update: The Union of Concerned Scientists has published a detailed review of the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, including translations of some key passages.

By Hans M. Kristensen

The biggest surprise in the Pentagon’s latest annual report on Chinese military power is the claim that China’s ICBM force now includes the “multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5).”

This is (to my knowledge) the first time the US Intelligence Community has made a public claim that China has fielded a MIRVed missile system.

If so, China joins the club of four other nuclear-armed states that have deployed MIRV for decades: Britain, France, Russia and the United States.

For China to join the MIRV club strains China’s claim of having a minimum nuclear deterrent. It is another worrisome sign that China – like the other nuclear-armed states – are trapped in a dynamic technological nuclear arms competition.

A Little Chinese MIRV History

There have been rumors for many years that China was working on MIRV technology. Some private analysts have even claimed – incorrectly – that China had developed MIRV for the DF-31 ICBM and JL-2 SLBM.

Fifteen years ago, CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate on foreign missile developments concluded that “China has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for 20 years. If China needed a multiple-RV (MRV) capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31-type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) for the CSS-4 in a few years.” (For a review of earlier information and assessments, see here.)

The Pentagon echoed this conclusion in July 2002, when it stated that any Chinese multiple warhead capability will “most likely [be] for the CSS-4.”

Chinese MIRVing of a mobile ICBM such as the DF-31 “would be many years off” the CIA told Congress. This was also the conclusion of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate in 2001, which concluded that “Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be costly.”

In an exchange with Senator Cochran in 2002, CIA’s Robert Walpole explained that MIRVing a mobile ICBM would require a much smaller warhead and possibly require nuclear testing:

Sen. Cochran. How many missiles will China be able to place multiple reentry vehicles on?

Mr. Walpole. In the near term, it would be about 20 CSS-4s that they have, the big, large ICBMs. The mobile ICBMs are smaller and it would require a very small warhead for them to put multiple RVs on them.

Sen. Cochran. … [D]o you think that China will attempt to develop a multiple warhead capability for its new missiles?

Mr. Walpole. Over time they may look at that. That would probably require nuclear testing to get something that small, but I do not think it is something that you would see them focused on for the near term.

What makes the Pentagon’s report on the MIRVed DF-5A payload noteworthy is that it was not included in several other intelligence assessments published in the past few months: the prepared threat assessment by the Director of National Intelligence; the prepared threat assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and STRATCOM’s prepared testimony.

Nor were a MIRVed DF-5A mentioned in the Pentagon’s report from 2014 or the Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) report from July 2013.

The Pentagon report also repeats an earlier assertion that “China also is developing a new road-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), possibly capable of carrying MIRVs.” STRATCOM commander Admiral Cecil Haney also mentioned this, saying China is “developing a follow-on mobile system capable of carrying multiple warheads.”

“Possibly capable of” and “capable of” are not equal assessments; the first includes uncertainty, the second does not. Assuming CIA’s prediction from 15 years ago is correct, the DF-5 MIRV payload might consist of three warheads developed for the DF-31/31A.

Whatever the certainty, the MIRVed version of the DF-5 – which I guess we could call DF-5B – is not thought to be loaded with warheads under normal circumstances. In a crisis, the warheads would first have to be brought out of storage and mated with the missile.

Moreover, The Pentagon lists two versions of the DF-5 deployed: the DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) and the new DF-5 MIRV (CSS-4 Mod 3). So only a portion of the 20 missiles in as many silos apparently have been equipped for MIRV.

Why Chinese MIRV?

The big question is why the Chinese leadership has decided to deploy MIRV on the silo-based, liquid-fuel DF-5A.

Chinese officials have for many years warned, and US officials have predicted, that advanced US non-nuclear capabilities such as missile defense systems could cause China to deploy MIRV on some of its missiles. The Pentagon report repeats this analysis by stating that China’s “new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.”

Conclusions

Chinese MIRV on the DF-5 ICBM is a bad day for nuclear constraint.

Seen in the context of China’s other ongoing nuclear modernization programs – deployment of several types of mobile ICBMs and a new class of sea-launched ballistic missile submarines – the deployment of a MIRVed version of the DF-5 ICBM reported by the Pentagon’s annual report strains the credibility of China’s official assurance that it only wants a minimum nuclear deterrent and is not part of a nuclear arms race.

MIRV on Chinese ICBMs changes the calculus that other nuclear-armed states will make about China’s nuclear intensions and capacity. Essentially, MIRV allows a much more rapid increase of a nuclear arsenal than single-warhead missile. If China also develops MIRV for a mobile ICBM, then it would further deepen that problem.

To its credit, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is still much smaller than that of Russia and the United States. So this is not about a massive Chinese nuclear buildup. Yet the development underscores that a technological nuclear competition among the nuclear-armed states is in full swing – one that China also contributes to.

Although it is still unclear what has officially motivated China to deploy a MIRVed version of the DF-5 ICBM now, previous Chinese statements and US intelligence assessments indicate that it may be a reaction to the US development and deployment of missile defense systems that can threaten China’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons.

If so, how ironic that the US missile defense system – intended to reduce the threat to the United States – instead would seem to have increased the threat by triggering development of MIRV on Chinese ballistic missiles that could destroy more US cities in a potential war.

The deployment of a MIRVed DF-5 also raises serious questions about China’s strategic relationship with India. The Pentagon report states that in addition to US missile defense capabilities, “India’s nuclear force is an additional driver behind China’s nuclear force modernization.” There is little doubt that Chinese MIRV has the potential to nudge India into the MIRV club as well.

Indian weapons designers have already hinted that India may be working on its own MIRV system and the US Defense Intelligence Agency recently stated that “India will continue developing an ICBM, the Agni-VI, which will reportedly carry multiple warheads.”

If Chinese MIRV triggers Indian MIRV it would deepen nuclear competition between the two Asian nuclear powers and reduce security for both. This calls for both countries to show constraint but it also requires the other MIRVed nuclear-armed states (Britain, France, Russia and the United States) to limit their MIRV and offensive nuclear warfighting strategies.

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen

Is China increasing production of nuclear ballistic missile submarines?

Over the past few months, several US defense and intelligence officials have stated for the record that China is planning to build significantly more nuclear-powered missile submarines than previously assumed.

This would potentially put a bigger portion of China’s nuclear arsenal out to sea, a risky proposition, and further deepen China’s unfortunate status as the only nuclear-armed state party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation that is increasing it nuclear arsenal.

US Projections For Chinese SSBNs

China does not provide information about how many nuclear submarines it plans to build, but US government officials and agencies occasionally give projections.

The most recent comes from the commander of US Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Samuel Locklear, who in his prepared testimony to the US Congress earlier this month stated that in addition to the three Jin-class SSBNs currently in operation, “up to five more may enter service by the end of the decade.”

National Intelligence Director James Clapper was a little less specific in his testimony to the Senate in February when he predicted that China “might produce additional Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.”

The Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military issues from June 2014 stated that three Jin-class SSBNs (Type-094) were operational and that “up to five may enter service before China proceeds to its next generation SSBN (Type-096) over the next decade.” That projection was not seen as implying that five additional SSBNs would be produced but that a total of five might be built. But in hindsight it could of course be seen as similar projection as the latest PACOM statement.

PACOM’s projection of “up to five” additional Jin-class SSBNs is a doubling of the projection of “4-5” SSBNs that the Office of Naval Intelligence made in 2013. That projection followed the first estimate from late-2006 of “a fleet of probably five” submarines.

Production of five additional SSBNs by the end of the decade would require fielding one SSBN per year for the next five years, a production pace that China has yet to demonstrate. The first three Jin SSBNs took more than a decade to complete and a fourth boat is rumored to have started sea trials in 2014. The fourth SSBN might be the one seen on commercial satellite images in the dry dock at Huludao in October 2013.

Google Earth images from 2014 and 2015 do not show SSBNs at Huludao, only attack submarines. However, unassembled 10-meter diameter hull sections seen at the shipyard in December 2014 indicate that construction of additional Jin SSBN hulls may be underway (see image below).

Although no Jin-class SSBN has been visible at Huludao shipyard on Google Earth since October 2013, possible Jin-class hull sections seen later indicate additional construction. Click on image to see full size.

Potential Effect on Nuclear Arsenal

Construction of additional Jin SSBNs obviously would have implications for the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. With each submarine capable of carrying 12 Julang-2 (JL-2) long-rang ballistic missiles, the low- and high-end projection of a fleet of 4-8 submarines would be able to carry 48-96 missiles with as many warheads. (Despite occasional claims on the Internet that the JL-2 carries MIRV, the US Intelligence Community assigns only one warhead to each missile.)

We estimate that China has a stockpile of approximately 250 nuclear warheads of which nearly 150 are for land-based missiles, 48 for submarines, and perhaps 20 for bombers. Some have speculated that China might have several thousand nuclear weapons, but former USSTRATCOM Commander General Kehler in 2012 rejected this saying that “the Chinese arsenal is in the range of several hundred” nuclear weapons. If China builds eight Jin SSBNs, it would presumably have to produce more warheads for their additional missiles. This could increase the stockpile to around 300 warheads (see table below).

Other weapon systems have also been rumored to have nuclear capability, although status is uncertain: The DH-10 ground-launched land-attack cruise missile is listed by Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) as “conventional or nuclear”; the DH-20 (CJ-20) air-launched cruise missiles was listed in 2013 by US Air Force Global Strike Command the DH-20 (CJ-20) as nuclear-capable; and a CIA intelligence memorandum in 1993 concluded that China “almost certainly has developed a warhead” for the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile and predicted that deployment of a nuclear-armed DF-15 would start in 1994. A nuclear test in January 1972 was with a small bomb delivered by a fighter-bomber (Q-5), although it is uncertain if the capability was ever operationalized and fielded.

SSBN Operational Questions

If China is indeed building significantly more Jin SSBNs, as the statement by PACOM implies, then it is a surprise that raises a number of questions.

The first question is whether it is accurate. The PACOM projection is above and beyond the estimate of 4-6 SSBNs projected by the Office of Naval Intelligence in 2013. The Jin-class is a work in progress and the submarines are noisier than Soviet Delta III SSBNs developed in the 1970s. Presumably the Chinese navy is working hard to make the Jin SSBNs survivable, but up to eight would be an expensive experiment. And China appears to be designing a newer SSBN type anyway, the Type-096. Projections such as these often prove too much too soon, so only time will tell.

But if China were to deploy up to eight Jin SSBNs with up to 96 missiles, it would be a significant shift in China’s nuclear posture, which up till recently was almost entirely focused on land-based nuclear weapons. And this is odd. Why, after having spent significant sources on building mobile ICBMs to hide in forests and caves across China’s vast territory to protect its nuclear deterrent from a first strike, would the Chinese government chose to deploy a significant portion of its nuclear warheads on noisy submarines and send them out to sea where US Navy attack submarines can sink them?

A more important question is how China would actually operate the SSBNs. The Central Military Commission (CMC) does not normally hand out nuclear weapons to the military services but the whole point of having SSBNs is to hide nuclear weapons in the oceans as a secure retaliatory capability. It would be a significant change for Chinese nuclear policy if the CMC loaded warheads on the submarines and deployed them outside Chinese territory. Perhaps they will not be continuously deployed in peacetime but serve as a surge capability in a crisis.

And China does not have much (if any) experience in operating SSBNs on lengthy deterrent patrols. It has only recently started operating nuclear-powered attack submarines on lengthy patrols, including into the Indian Ocean, but the SSBNs have yet to conduct one. PACOM predicted the first would happen last year, but that didn’t happen. Now they predict it will happen this year. We’ll see.

As a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant increase of the SSBN fleet would further deepen China’s unfortunate status as the only nuclear-armed state part to the treaty that is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal.

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

President Obama this week transmitted to Congress the text of a proposed agreement with the People’s Republic of China concerning cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Known as “123 agreements” based on section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, such accords are intended to regulate international traffic in nuclear materials and technology. The agreements generally provide for physical safeguards on subject materials, require consent for transfers of materials or technology to third countries, and impose restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing.

As of early last year, there were 23 agreements under Section 123 in effect.

“We want other nations to enter into 123 agreements with the United States because our [nuclear safeguards] standards are the highest in the world,” said Daniel B. Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy, at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing last year. “In our view, the more 123 agreements that exist in the world, the stronger the nonproliferation controls that will apply to all nuclear commerce.” (The record of that January 2014 hearing entitled “Section 123: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements” was published last month.)

In practice, the picture is a bit murkier, as such agreements by definition facilitate international transfers of nuclear materials and technology with long-term consequences that cannot always be foreseen. Beneficiaries of prior 123 agreements that subsequently lapsed include pre-revolutionary Iran, Israel, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

The U.S. and China previously reached an agreement on nuclear cooperation in 1985, though its implementation was blocked until 1998. For detailed background, see U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Congressional Research Service, updated April 20, 2015.

That existing agreement with China expires this year, hence the President’s submission this week of a new proposed text. Among several proliferation-related issues likely to be considered in finalizing the pending agreement are Chinese missile technology exports and its nuclear support to Pakistan.

“China’s expanding civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan raises serious concerns and we urge China to be more transparent regarding this cooperation,” the State Department’s Thomas Countryman told the Foreign Relations Committee last year.

Meanwhile, Iran is reportedly discussing its research on neutron transport and nuclear modeling with officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency. An extensive bibliography of nuclear research published by Iranian scientists including neutron transport problems and many other topics was prepared by researcher Mark Gorwitz in 2010.

“To destroy the other, you have to destroy part of yourself.

To deter the other, you have to deter yourself,” according to a Chinese nuclear strategy expert. During the week of February 9^th, I had the privilege to travel to China where I heard this statement during the Ninth China-U.S. Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics in Beijing. The Dialogue was jointly convened by the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies (CFISS) and the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). While the statements by participants were not-for-attribution, I can state that the person quoted is a senior official with extensive experience in China’s strategic nuclear planning.

The main reason for my research travel was to work with Bruce MacDonald, FAS Adjunct Senior Fellow for National Security Technology, on a project examining the security implications of a possible Chinese deployment of strategic ballistic missile defense. We had discussions with more than a dozen Chinese nuclear strategists in Beijing and Shanghai; we will publish a full report on our findings and analysis this summer. FAS plans to continue further work on projects concerning China-U.S. strategic relations as well as understanding how our two countries can cooperate on the challenges of providing adequate healthy food, near-zero emission energy sources, and unpolluted air and water.

During the discussions, I was struck by the gap between American and Chinese perspectives. As indicated by the quote, Chinese strategic thinkers appear reluctant to want to use nuclear weapons and underscore the moral and psychological dimensions of nuclear strategy. Nonetheless, China’s leaders clearly perceive the need for such weapons for deterrence purposes. Perhaps the biggest gap in perception is that American nuclear strategists tend to remain skeptical about China’s policy of no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. By the NFU policy, China would not launch nuclear weapons first against the United States or any other state. Thus, China needs assurances that it would have enough nuclear weapons available to launch in a second retaliatory strike in the unlikely event of a nuclear attack by another state.

American experts are doubtful about NFU statements because during the Cold War the Soviet Union repeatedly stated that it had a NFU policy, but once the Cold War ended and access was obtained to the Soviets’ plans, the United States found out that the Soviets had lied. They had plans to use nuclear weapons first under certain circumstances. Today, given Russia’s relative conventional military inferiority compared to the United States, Moscow has openly declared that it has a first-use policy to deter massive conventional attack.

Can NFU be demonstrated? Some analysts have argued that China in its practice of keeping warheads de-mated or unattached from the missile delivery systems has in effect placed itself in a second strike posture. But the worry from the American side is that such a posture could change quickly and that as China has been modernizing its missile force from slow firing liquid-fueled rockets to quick firing solid-fueled rockets, it will be capable of shifting to a first-use policy if the security conditions dictate such a change.

The more I talked with Chinese experts in Beijing and Shanghai the more I felt that they are sincere about China’s NFU policy. A clearer and fuller exposition came from a leading expert in Shanghai who said that China has a two-pillar strategy. First, China believes in realism in that it has to take appropriate steps in a semi-anarchic geopolitical system to defend itself. It cannot rely on others for outside assistance or deterrence. Indeed, one of the major differences between China and the United States is that China is not part of a formal defense alliance pact such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the alliance the United States has with Japan and South Korea. Although in the 1950s, Chairman Mao Zedong decried nuclear weapons as “paper tigers,” he decided that the People’s Republic of China must acquire them given the threats China faced when U.S. General Douglas MacArthur suggested possible use of nuclear weapons against China during the Korean War. In October 1964, China detonated its first nuclear explosive device and at the same time declared its NFU policy.

The second pillar is based on morality. Chinese strategists understand the moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence. On the one hand, a nuclear-armed state has to show a credible willingness to launch nuclear weapons to deter the other’s launch.  But on the other hand, if deterrence fails, actually carrying out the threat condemns millions to die.  According to the Chinese nuclear expert, China would not retaliate immediately and instead would offer a peace deal to avert further escalation to more massive destruction. As long as China has an assured second strike, which might consist of only a handful of nuclear weapons that could hit the nuclear attacker’s territory, Beijing could wait hours to days before retaliating or not striking back in order to give adequate time for cooling off and stopping of hostilities.

Because China has not promised to provide extended nuclear deterrence to other states, Chinese leaders would also not feel compelled to strike back quickly to defend such states. In contrast, because of U.S. deterrence commitments to NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, Washington would feel pressure to respond quickly if it or its allies are under nuclear attack. Indeed, at the Dialogue, Chinese experts often brought up the U.S. alliances and especially pointed to Japan as a concern, as Japan could use its relatively large stockpile of about nine metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium (which is still weapons-usable) to make nuclear explosives. Moreover, last July, the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced a “reinterpretation” of the Article 9 restriction in the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits Japan from having an offensive military. (The United States imposed this restriction after the Second World War.)  The reinterpretation allows Japanese Self-Defense Forces to serve alongside allies during military actions. Beijing is opposed because then Japan is just one step away from further changing to a more aggressive policy that could permit Japan to act alone in taking military actions. Before and during the Second World War, Japanese military forces committed numerous atrocities against Chinese civilians. Chinese strategists fear that Japan is seeking to further break out of its restraints.

Thus, Chinese strategists want clarity about Japan’s intentions and want to know how the evolving U.S.-Japan alliance could affect Chinese interests. Japan and the United States have strong concerns about China’s growing assertive actions near the disputed Diaoyu Islands (Chinese name) or Senkaku Islands (Japanese name) between China and Japan, and competing claims for territory in the South China Sea. Regarding nuclear forces, some Chinese experts speculate about the conditions that could lead to Japan’s development of nuclear weapons. The need is clear for continuing dialogue on the triangular relationship among China, Japan, and the United States.

Several Chinese strategists perceive a disparity in U.S. nuclear policy toward China. They want to know if the United States will treat China as a major nuclear power to be deterred or as a big “rogue” state with nuclear weapons. U.S. experts have tried to assure their Chinese counterparts that the strategic reality is the former. The Chinese experts also see that the United States has more than ten times the number of deliverable nuclear weapons than China. But they hear from some conservative American experts that the United States fears that China might “sprint for parity” to match the U.S. nuclear arsenal if the United States further reduces down to 1,000 or somewhat fewer weapons.¹ According to the FAS Nuclear Information Project, China is estimated to have about 250 warheads in its stockpile for delivery.²Chinese experts also hear from the Obama administration that it wants to someday achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. The transition from where the world is today to that future is fraught with challenges: one of them being the mathematical fact that to get to zero or close to zero, nuclear-armed states will have to reach parity with each other eventually.

The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China describes continued broad modernization and growing reach of Chinese military forces and strategy.

There is little new on the nuclear weapons front in the 2014 update, however, which describes slow development of previously reported weapons programs. This includes construction of a handful of ballistic missile submarines; the first of which the DOD predicts will begin to sail on deterrent patrols later this year.

It also includes the gradual phase-out of the old DF-3A liquid-fuel ballistic missile and the apparent – and surprising – stalling of the new DF-31 ICBM program.

Like all the other nuclear-armed states, China is modernizing its nuclear forces. China earns the dubious medal (although not in the DOD report) of being the only nuclear weapons state party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that is increasing it nuclear arsenal. Far from a build-up, however, the modernization is a modest increase focused on ensuring the survivability of a secure retaliatory strike capability (see here for China’s nuclear arsenal compared with other nuclear powers).

The report continues the Obama administration’s don’t-show-missile-numbers policy. Up until 2010, the annual DOD reports included a table overview of the composition of the Chinese missile force. But the overview gradually became less specific in until it was completed removed from the reports in 2013.

The policy undercuts the administration’s position that China should be more transparent about its military modernization by indirectly assisting Chinese government secrecy.

The main nuclear issues follow below.

Land-Based Nuclear Missile Developments

The DOD report formally identifies the new road-mobile ICBM under development as the DF-41, rumored at least since 1997 to be in development. The missile might “possibly [be] capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV),” according to DOD. That obviously doesn’t mean that the DF-41 will carry them; the DF-5A has also been assessed for years to be capable of carrying MIRV without ever doing so.

The report lends some support to the assessment – although not explicitly – that deployment of the DF-31 ICBM has ceased after only 5-10 launchers deployed in a single brigade.

Instead, the focus of the road-mobile ICBM modernization appears to have shifted to the DF-31A ICBM, of which the DOD report predicts that more will be deployed by 2015.

The liquid-fuel DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM is not mentioned in the 2014 report, an indication that the 3.3-megaton weapon system has finally been retired after 42 years in service. The last DF-3A-equipped Second Artillery brigade – the 810 Brigade north of Dalian in the Liaoning province – was seen in May 2014 to have been converted to the solid-fuel medium-range DF-21 MRBM.

The only other transportable liquid-fuel ballistic missile, the DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM, is still operational with 10-15 launchers deployed in one or two brigades. But the missile is expected to be retired soon. When that happens, the only liquid-fuel ballistic missile left in the Chinese arsenals will be the 20 silo-based DF-5As (CSS-4 Mod 1) ICBM, which are still being ungraded.

The report also mentions conventional ballistic missiles under development, including several medium-range versions. That includes that anti-ship version of the DF-21 (CSS-5) – the DF-21D, which the report designates as the CSS-5 Mod 5. That suggests that other conventional MRBMs may also be under development.

Sea-Based Nuclear Missile Developments

The DOD report states that three Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs have been delivered and that two more are in various stages of construction. One of these was seen at the Bohai shipyard in October 2013. After the Jin-program is completed, DOD expects that China will proceed to its next-generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next decade.

The report makes the prediction that “China is likely to conduct its first nuclear deterrence patrols with the JIN-class SSBN in 2014,” assuming that the JL-2 SLBM will finally become operational.

The prediction of the upcoming nuclear deterrent patrols is controversial given that the Chinese leadership so far has been very reluctant to hand over nuclear weapons to the military under normal circumstances. China has never conducted a SSBN deterrent patrol before and a Jin SSBN deploying with nuclear warheads loaded on its SLBMs would constitute a significant change in Chinese nuclear operational policy. It would also constitute the first-ever deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons outside the land-territory of China.

Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile Developments

The DOD report does not explicitly attribute nuclear capability to China’s growing inventory of land-attack cruise missiles. Yet the 2013 NASIC report designates the DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile as “conventional or nuclear,” the same designation given to the Russian AS-4 and the Pakistani Ra’ad and Babur cruise missiles, weapons widely assumed to be nuclear-capable.

There are widespread rumors on Chinese Internet sites that the DH-10 has been modified for delivery by the H-6K intermediate-range bomber. It is unknown if that includes the apparently nuclear-capable version.

In addition, US Air Force Global Strike Command last year attributed the CJ-20 air-launched cruise missile with nuclear capability, but neither NASIC nor the DOD does so.

Additional background: FAS Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013

This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund and New Land Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen

One of the last Chinese Second Artillery brigades with the old liquid-fuel DF-3A intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile appears to have been upgraded to the newer DF-21 road-mobile, dual-capable, medium-range ballistic missile.

A new satellite image posted on Google Earth from May 4, 2014, reveals major changes to what appears to be a launch unit site for the Dengshahe brigade northeast of Dalian by the Yellow Sea.

The upgrade apparently marks the latest phase in a long and slow conversion of the Dengshahe brigade from the DF-3A to the DF-21.

The 810 Brigade base appears to be located approximately 60 km (36 miles) northeast of Dalian in the Liaoning province (see map below). The base is organized under 51 Base, one of six base headquarters organized under the Second Artillery Corps, the military service that operates the Chinese land-based nuclear and conventional missiles.

The launch unit appears to be using a remote site with four launch pads for training approximately 17 km (10 miles) south of the brigade base. A new commercial satellite image, dated May 4, 2014, and made available by Digital Globe via Google Earth, shows significant upgrades at the site since 2006.

This includes construction of new launch pads that in shape and size appear to match those recently seen at the 807 Brigade base launch unit near Qingyang (Anhui) and the 802 Brigade base at Jianshui (Yunnan).

The satellite image is particularly interesting because it was taken on a day when the launch unit was using the site for a launch training exercise. Three of the four pads are in use with what appears to be DF-21 launchers deployed on the 45-meter paved strip and support vehicles near by. Other vehicles are positioned near the fourth launch pad (see image below).

The relatively poor quality of the high-resolution satellite image makes it hard to positively identify the launchers. But at approximately 14 meters (46 feet) they appear to match the nuclear DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1/Mod 2), which has a 10-11 meter (33-36 feet) missile canister on a trailer pulled by the motorized drivers section. The launchers do not appear to be the DF-21C, the conventional version, where the missile canister and drivers section are mounted on the same frame and the tip of the missile canister extends forward over the driver cabin (see here for images of such a unit).

A road-mobile launch unit has a large fingerprint because the launchers need a significant number of different support vehicles and personnel to operate. This includes command and control vehicles, cranes and other repair vehicles, trucks and busses. The Dengshahe launch unit image shows part of the large backup encamped immediately north of the launch pad sites (see image below).

Conversion to DF-21 at Dengshahe has been a long and slow process. DF-3A training levels dropped from five to eight months per year in the late-1980s to four months per year in the mid-1990s. Since then, the 810 Brigade shrunk to only five-ten launchers. The final phase has happened since 2006.

The range of the DF-21 is less than the range of the DF-3A (2,150 km versus 3,000 km), but the DF-21 system is much more capable than the DF-3A. Unlike the liquid-fuel, transportable DF-3A, the DF-21 is a solid-fuel missile carried on a road-mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL). As such, the DF-21 TEL can move around the landscape much more freely and can set up and fire its missile quicker than the DF-3A system. The DF-21 is also more accurate, which is reflected in a smaller warhead – 200-300 kilotons versus 3,300 kilotons for the DF-3A warhead.

From the launch pads north of Dalian, the DF-21 would able to target all U.S. military bases on the Japanese mainland as well as on Okinawa.

The conversion from the DF-3A to the DF-21 is also reflected in significant reconstruction at the 810 Brigade base. Since 2006, this has included replacement of one of two high-bay garages with what are possibly garages for the DF-21 road-mobile launchers. A second high-bay garage has been significantly modified, and the support vehicle technical area has been upgraded (see image below).

Background information: Chinese nuclear forces, 2013

Previous blogs about Chinese nuclear forces

This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.