Industrial Policy Memo
This summer, National Economic Council Director Brian Deese articulated a new vision for a robust and equitable U.S. industrial policy. The strategy seeks to help us reach the full potential of American competitiveness while delivering justice, equity, and prosperity to all citizens.
To inform the Administration’s new strategy, we pulled together a curated set of ideas from our extensive portfolio of nonpartisan, actionable ideas in science and technology policy. These ideas were diversely sourced from more than 300 Day One contributors — including students, academics, activists, industry leaders, local and international government officials, and more.
Our letter addresses each of the industrial strategy’s core pillars:
Pillar I: Supply-Chain Resilience
Pillar II: Targeted Public Investment
Pillar III: Public Procurement
Pillar IV: Climate Resilience
Pillar V: Equity
We hope that these ideas help advance the vision of a modern industrial policy that benefits all Americans.
What Is the Sole Purpose of U.S. Nuclear Weapons?
Read the full report PDF here.
Summary
- Prior to assuming office, President Biden indicated that he would establish that “the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal is to deter—and, if necessary, retaliate for—a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies.”
- Sole purpose should be understood as a central component of an integrated deterrence strategy that can effectively manage the risk of nuclear escalation in a limited conflict as well as the rising stability risks from nonnuclear weapons.
- Sole purpose could significantly reduce the risk of unintended escalation and increase the credibility of more flexible and realistic nonnuclear response options in a range of importance contingencies.
- In order to attain its intended benefits, declaratory policy must be reflected in force structure and planning.
- The president’s existing language on sole purpose provides considerable flexibility for the administration to define the doctrine, but does not itself provide clear guidance for strategy, force structure, or for related declaratory policies like “no first use.”
- Defining sole purpose is a critical task for the administration’s defense policy review.
- As a central component of an integrated defense policy that will strengthen US deterrence and assurance credibility, sole purpose should be defined at the level of the NDS.
- A sole type definition would state that the United States would consider nuclear use in response to a certain type of attack, having modest effects on a narrow set of plans but few effects on force structure.
- A sole function definition would define what is and what is not a requirement of deterrence, potentially removing certain strategic or nonstrategic roles of nuclear weapons.
Depending on how it is defined, sole purpose could have transformational effects on nearly every aspect of nuclear weapons policy or relatively modest effects. It could accommodate or incorporate a range of related policy options, like a deterrence-only posture or no first use.
- Fully implementing a sole purpose policy is critical to attaining its benefits.
- A simple declaratory statement is not a complete sole purpose policy. Because any statement is likely to be ambiguous, sole purpose should also consist of a set of presidential directives that determine how the policy will be affect force structure and planning.
- By eliminating one or more of the requirements that structure US nuclear forces, a sole function definition could potentially have significant effects on a range acquisition decisions and plans.
- If the president concludes that sole purpose has implications for force structure or force posture, the administration should ensure that these changes are made before the presidential term is concluded.
- Following a decision to adopt sole purpose, civilian officials should review existing operational plans and concepts to ensure that they comport with the president’s guidance for escalation management of a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary.
- Embedding the policy in plans, force structure, and allied consultations is critical to achieving its benefits and reducing the risk that it is reversed by a future president, which would be highly risky.
- If defined, implemented, and communicated as a part of an effective integrated deterrence posture, sole purpose could strengthen assurance of allies.
- Some allies will be understandably apprehensive about any shift in US nuclear weapons policy in the current environment.
- Allies should be consulted closely as sole purpose is being defined, as it is released, and as it is being implemented.
In January 2021, President Biden assumed office after having made unusually explicit commitments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. In his primary articulation of his campaign’s foreign policy, Biden declared that “the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack.”1 Since assuming office, Biden has not repeated the pledge, though his initial national security guidance and his Secretary of State have reiterated the goal of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.2 As the Pentagon begins its review of nuclear weapons policy, Biden and his national security officials will have to determine whether to adopt sole purpose and, if so, what it means. The established language on sole purpose offers the administration considerable latitude in how it chooses to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Depending on how sole purpose is defined and implemented, it could have transformative consequences for nuclear force structure and strategy, or it could end up as a rhetorical commitment that has few practical effects at all.
Though the language dates back decades, there has never been a precise or agreed definition of sole purpose. The first published use of the phrase is in a piece Albert Einstein related to the eminent journalist Raymond Swing that was published in the Atlantic in 1947. Einstein argued while the United States must stockpile the bomb, it should forswear its use. “Deterrence should be the only purpose of the stockpile of bombs.” If the United Nations were granted international control over atomic energy, as President Truman had proposed, it should be “for the sole purpose of deterring an aggressor or rebellious nations from making an atomic attack.”3 Since the idea was popularized in the 1960s, sole purpose has become a persistent staple in ongoing debates about the role of nuclear weapons, but it has rarely been attached to a precise definition or a plan to implement it.
Sole purpose is more ambiguous than other declaratory policy proposals (such as no first use) because it purports to define, or constrain, the purpose of nuclear weapons. Depending on how the terms of the statement are defined and how the statement is implemented in practice, its effects could be broad, narrow, restrictive, permissive, or ambiguous. For example, President Biden’s sole purpose language could be construed to proscribe nuclear weapons from performing a wide range of functions or from being used in wide ranges of contingencies. Slight variations in the wording of a sole purpose declaration can produce dramatically different policies and be perceived differently by allies and adversaries, who will examine the policy closely. Depending on how sole purpose is defined and implemented, sole could reduce or eliminate requirements for each piece of the triad or for nuclear use in a variety of different contingency plans.
Sole purpose is one potential option in declaratory policy, that aspect of nuclear weapons policy that publicly communicates when and why the United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons. It can be combined with or can subsume a range of other potential declaratory policy options. Because the president has sole authority to order the use of a nuclear weapon, only the president can set limits on that power. Though changes in declaratory policy should consider the views of civilian national security officials, uniformed military officials, members of Congress, US allies, and the American public, the president should provide clear guidance on how to modify US declaratory policy. Like all presidents, President Biden should provide clear guidance to the officials conducting the national defense strategy about nuclear declaratory policy.
Because sole purpose could potentially be defined in many different ways, some definitions will be better or worse. Advocates or opponents should be clear about what constitutes a better or worse definition. The administration should not accept the argument that a good definition is one that preserves existing force structure or plans, maintains ambiguity for its own sake, or comports with the preferences of certain allies or services. This piece argues that a good definition of sole purpose is one that assists with the development and implementation of a credible, integrated posture by which the United States and its allies deter aggression and nuclear use; reflects the president’s preferences about how to manage escalation in limited conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries as well as his assessment of the requirements of deterring a major strategic attack; reduces the risk of misperception and adversary nuclear first use incentives; and can be implemented in force structure and plans so that it is resilient to leadership changes in the United States. Because the president has expressed a preference to reduce the nation’s reliance on nuclear weapons, a good definition of sole purpose should help to do so in ways consistent with his preferences.
This piece examines the range of options available to officials working to define sole purpose and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. It explores the practical implications of different definitions of sole purpose and the steps necessary to ensure that they are implemented in a way that is responsible, effective, and most likely to endure over time. There are two central arguments. First, sole purpose should not be understood as a nuclear declaratory policy but as critical component in an integrated deterrence strategy. Understood in this way, sole purpose is not only a valuable means of reducing the risk of nuclear escalation and of meeting US commitments to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons but because it is a substantive judgment about how US nuclear and nonnuclear forces can best manage escalation in a limited conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. Second, an effective sole purpose policy cannot simply be a sentence in a paragraph on nuclear declaratory policy. If the administration is serious about attaining the benefits of sole purpose, the policy should be comprised of the declaratory statement, additional language to clarify and contextualize the policy, and a set of directives that communicate the president’s guidance for how the policy should affect force structure and plans.
Each of these arguments is critical for attaining the benefits of sole purpose and for maintaining an effective deterrence posture. Sole purpose will be a contentious idea under any circumstances. Allied governments, advocates of various aspects of the current nuclear weapons policies, and political opponents are understandably concerned about the president’s statements. Clearly defining the policy, articulating how it will strengthen an integrated deterrence policy, and moving forward with implementation will help to convince allies and many deterrence experts that sole purpose will increase rather than decrease deterrence credibility.
What Is the Sole Purpose of U.S. Nuclear Weapons?
Summary
- Prior to assuming office, President Biden indicated that he would establish that “the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal is to deter—and, if necessary, retaliate for—a nuclear attack against the United States and its allies.”
- Sole purpose should be understood as a central component of an integrated deterrence strategy that can effectively manage the risk of nuclear escalation in a limited conflict as well as the rising stability risks from nonnuclear weapons.
- Sole purpose could significantly reduce the risk of unintended escalation and increase the credibility of more flexible and realistic nonnuclear response options in a range of importance contingencies.
- In order to attain its intended benefits, declaratory policy must be reflected in force structure and planning.
- The president’s existing language on sole purpose provides considerable flexibility for the administration to define the doctrine, but does not itself provide clear guidance for strategy, force structure, or for related declaratory policies like “no first use.”
- Defining sole purpose is a critical task for the administration’s defense policy review.
- As a central component of an integrated defense policy that will strengthen US deterrence and assurance credibility, sole purpose should be defined at the level of the NDS.
- A sole type definition would state that the United States would consider nuclear use in response to a certain type of attack, having modest effects on a narrow set of plans but few effects on force structure.
- A sole function definition would define what is and what is not a requirement of deterrence, potentially removing certain strategic or nonstrategic roles of nuclear weapons.
Depending on how it is defined, sole purpose could have transformational effects on nearly every aspect of nuclear weapons policy or relatively modest effects. It could accommodate or incorporate a range of related policy options, like a deterrence-only posture or no first use.
- Fully implementing a sole purpose policy is critical to attaining its benefits.
- A simple declaratory statement is not a complete sole purpose policy. Because any statement is likely to be ambiguous, sole purpose should also consist of a set of presidential directives that determine how the policy will be affect force structure and planning.
- By eliminating one or more of the requirements that structure US nuclear forces, a sole function definition could potentially have significant effects on a range acquisition decisions and plans.
- If the president concludes that sole purpose has implications for force structure or force posture, the administration should ensure that these changes are made before the presidential term is concluded.
- Following a decision to adopt sole purpose, civilian officials should review existing operational plans and concepts to ensure that they comport with the president’s guidance for escalation management of a conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary.
- Embedding the policy in plans, force structure, and allied consultations is critical to achieving its benefits and reducing the risk that it is reversed by a future president, which would be highly risky.
- If defined, implemented, and communicated as a part of an effective integrated deterrence posture, sole purpose could strengthen assurance of allies.
- Some allies will be understandably apprehensive about any shift in US nuclear weapons policy in the current environment.
- Allies should be consulted closely as sole purpose is being defined, as it is released, and as it is being implemented.
In January 2021, President Biden assumed office after having made unusually explicit commitments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. In his primary articulation of his campaign’s foreign policy, BJoseph R. Biden, “Why American Must Lead Again: Rescuing US Foreign Policy after Trump,” Foreign Affairs 99 (2020): 64.iden declared that “the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack.”1 Since assuming office, Biden has not repeated the pledge, though his initial national security guidance and his Secretary of State have reiterated the goal of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.2 As the Pentagon begins its review of nuclear weapons policy, Biden and his national security officials will have to determine whether to adopt sole purpose and, if so, what it means. The established language on sole purpose offers the administration considerable latitude in how it chooses to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Depending on how sole purpose is defined and implemented, it could have transformative consequences for nuclear force structure and strategy, or it could end up as a rhetorical commitment that has few practical effects at all.
Though the language dates back decades, there has never been a precise or agreed definition of sole purpose. The first published use of the phrase is in a piece Albert Einstein related to the eminent journalist Raymond Swing that was published in the Atlantic in 1947. Einstein argued while the United States must stockpile the bomb, it should forswear its use. “Deterrence should be the only purpose of the stockpile of bombs.” If the United Nations were granted international control over atomic energy, as President Truman had proposed, it should be “for the sole purpose of deterring an aggressor or rebellious nations from making an atomic attack.3 Since the idea was popularized in the 1960s, sole purpose has become a persistent staple in ongoing debates about the role of nuclear weapons, but it has rarely been attached to a precise definition or a plan to implement it.
Sole purpose is more ambiguous than other declaratory policy proposals (such as no first use) because it purports to define, or constrain, the purpose of nuclear weapons. Depending on how the terms of the statement are defined and how the statement is implemented in practice, its effects could be broad, narrow, restrictive, permissive, or ambiguous. For example, President Biden’s sole purpose language could be construed to proscribe nuclear weapons from performing a wide range of functions or from being used in wide ranges of contingencies. Slight variations in the wording of a sole purpose declaration can produce dramatically different policies and be perceived differently by allies and adversaries, who will examine the policy closely. Depending on how sole purpose is defined and implemented, sole could reduce or eliminate requirements for each piece of the triad or for nuclear use in a variety of different contingency plans.
Sole purpose is one potential option in declaratory policy, that aspect of nuclear weapons policy that publicly communicates when and why the United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons. It can be combined with or can subsume a range of other potential declaratory policy options. Because the president has sole authority to order the use of a nuclear weapon, only the president can set limits on that power. Though changes in declaratory policy should consider the views of civilian national security officials, uniformed military officials, members of Congress, US allies, and the American public, the president should provide clear guidance on how to modify US declaratory policy. Like all presidents, President Biden should provide clear guidance to the officials conducting the national defense strategy about nuclear declaratory policy.
Because sole purpose could potentially be defined in many different ways, some definitions will be better or worse. Advocates or opponents should be clear about what constitutes a better or worse definition. The administration should not accept the argument that a good definition is one that preserves existing force structure or plans, maintains ambiguity for its own sake, or comports with the preferences of certain allies or services. This piece argues that a good definition of sole purpose is one that assists with the development and implementation of a credible, integrated posture by which the United States and its allies deter aggression and nuclear use; reflects the president’s preferences about how to manage escalation in limited conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries as well as his assessment of the requirements of deterring a major strategic attack; reduces the risk of misperception and adversary nuclear first use incentives; and can be implemented in force structure and plans so that it is resilient to leadership changes in the United States. Because the president has expressed a preference to reduce the nation’s reliance on nuclear weapons, a good definition of sole purpose should help to do so in ways consistent with his preferences.
This piece examines the range of options available to officials working to define sole purpose and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. It explores the practical implications of different definitions of sole purpose and the steps necessary to ensure that they are implemented in a way that is responsible, effective, and most likely to endure over time. There are two central arguments. First, sole purpose should not be understood as a nuclear declaratory policy but as critical component in an integrated deterrence strategy. Understood in this way, sole purpose is not only a valuable means of reducing the risk of nuclear escalation and of meeting US commitments to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons but because it is a substantive judgment about how US nuclear and nonnuclear forces can best manage escalation in a limited conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary. Second, an effective sole purpose policy cannot simply be a sentence in a paragraph on nuclear declaratory policy. If the administration is serious about attaining the benefits of sole purpose, the policy should be comprised of the declaratory statement, additional language to clarify and contextualize the policy, and a set of directives that communicate the president’s guidance for how the policy should affect force structure and plans.
Each of these arguments is critical for attaining the benefits of sole purpose and for maintaining an effective deterrence posture. Sole purpose will be a contentious idea under any circumstances. Allied governments, advocates of various aspects of the current nuclear weapons policies, and political opponents are understandably concerned about the president’s statements. Clearly defining the policy, articulating how it will strengthen an integrated deterrence policy, and moving forward with implementation will help to convince allies and many deterrence experts that sole purpose will increase rather than decrease deterrence credibility.
Unleashing international entrepreneurs to help the U.S. economy recover from the pandemic
In 2014, then-Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Jeh Johnson issued a memo (The 2014 memo) recommending “policies supporting U.S. high-skilled businesses and workers.” DHS offered a range of policies for updating the employment-based immigration system to encourage economic development. We propose that DHS issue a follow-up memo now focused specifically on international entrepreneurs to help the U.S. economy recover from the pandemic.
Siloed Thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
“Siloed Thinking,” authored by Research Associate Matt Korda, reviews the fundamental role of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in US nuclear strategy and examines the Pentagon’s justifications for pursuing an ICBM replacement program.
The report ultimately suggests that these justifications were based on flawed assumptions, and many have since been deprioritized. The report also suggests that the initial outcome favoring a brand-new ICBM replacement program was largely predetermined by arbitrary force requirements and timelines that have little 21st century strategic rationale.
These conclusions suggest that the Pentagon’s case for the ICBM replacement program, known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) needs to be reevaluated in light of cost escalation and surrounding budgetary pressures.
Download the report here.
A More Responsible Digital Surveillance Future
At a time when democratic rule of law and human rights have weakened globally, emerging digital surveillance technologies have made the authoritarian model more accessible, stable, and competitive than ever before.
Read the report here.
Alternatives to the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
This policy memo suggests that the Biden administration should immediately launch a National Security Council-led strategic review examining the role of ICBMs in US nuclear strategy, and presents four alternative policy options that the Biden administration could pursue in lieu of the current GBSD program of record.
Download the report here.
![](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Alternatives-to-the-GBSD-FAS-Report.jpg)
Public Perspectives on the US Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force
This report features the results of an October 2020 poll on US nuclear policy conducted by ReThink Media on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists.
Download the report here. View the polling as a webpage here.
![](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/FAS-GBSD-Polling-Cover-Page.jpg)
An Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture
The primary deterrence challenge facing the United States today is preventing aggression and escalation in limited conventional conflicts with a nuclear-armed adversary. It is a difficult conceptual and practical challenge for both conventional and nuclear strategy—but existing Pentagon strategy development processes are not equipped to integrate these tools to meet the challenge.
At the conceptual level, two strategy documents guide U.S. deterrence policy. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) described how multiple layers of conventional forces can help to deter aggression by nuclear-armed adversaries while the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) proposed new nonstrategic nuclear options to enhance deterrence of aggression and nuclear use. The two documents each present a strategy for deterring nuclear-armed adversaries in regional conflicts and serve as valuable public diplomacy tools to explain U.S. strategic thinking and intentions to allies and partners, potential adversaries, the public, and Congress.
However, it is not clear how the strategies described in the NDS and the NPR relate to each other. What is the respective role of nuclear and conventional weapons in managing escalation in a limited conflict? How can conventional weapons deter and respond to an adversary’s limited nuclear employment? As nuclear forces consume an increasing proportion of Pentagon procurement budgets, how should the services balance competing nuclear and conventional priorities? While these questions of national policy go unanswered, commands are also struggling with a number of practical challenges with operating conventional forces under the shadow of nuclear escalation. Are combatant commands prepared to conduct nuclear signaling and employment operations during a limited conventional conflict, given complex logistical and strategic challenges? How can conventional forces operate effectively in an environment that may be degraded by nuclear use?
Congress Just Authorized USCIS to Raise Over $1 Billion in Fees from Business Users
How long will the immigration agency leave this money on the table?
Background
As the primary federal agency responsible for legal immigration, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is almost entirely funded by user fees rather than appropriations from Congress. In May 2020, USCIS claimed that, due to a lower volume of fee collections caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the agency would have to furlough over 13,000 of its employees absent a $1.2 billion bailout. Analysis of public documents by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), however, demonstrated that USCIS was on the path to insolvency long before the COVID-19 pandemic, as a result of questionable management and policy choices.
Rather than accepting USCIS leadership’s demand for $1.2 billion in appropriated funds recoupable against an across-the-board 10% user fee increase, Congress opted to expand the agency’s ability to collect “premium processing” fees from those users willing to pay for faster service. For the better part of the past two decades, USCIS has provided a guaranteed 15-day turnaround for most employment-based green card petitions (Form I-140) and temporary work status petitions (Form I-129), in exchange for a special $1,440 premium processing fee. These extra fees could only be spent on the premium processing program itself, or on “infrastructure improvements in the adjudications and customer-service processes”—typically large information technology (IT) projects. In recent years, USCIS has enjoyed more than $600 million of extra cash on hand thanks to its premium processing program.
On August 22, 2020, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the Emergency Stopgap USCIS Stabilization Act, which was later included in the fiscal year (FY) 2021 Continuing Appropriations Act signed into law on October 1. This update to Section 286(u) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(u)) gives USCIS the authority to take three major revenue-raising actions:
Immediately raise the premium processing fee for most I-140 and I-129 petitions from $1,440 to $2,500 (which USCIS has proceeded to do, effective Oct. 19, 2020).
Immediately extend premium processing services to employment-based green card petitions for multinational executives (Form 140 for EB-1C), employment-based green card petitions for individuals of exceptional ability with with a National Interest Waiver (Form 140 for EB-2 with “NIW”), applicants for a change or extension of nonimmigrant status (Form I-539), and applicants for an employment authorization document (Form I-765). (USCIS has declined to take such actions thus far.)
Issue new regulations to extend premium processing services to “any other immigration benefit type that the Secretary [of Homeland Security] deems appropriate.” (USCIS has not announced any such rulemaking plans thus far.)
These authorized fee and service changes are summarized in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Changes in Authorized Fees, Timeframes, and Eligibility for Premium Processing
n addition, the new law allows USCIS to use premium processing revenue for much more than just IT projects, including “the provision of information and services to immigration and naturalization benefit requestors,” reducing backlogs, and “otherwise offset[ting] the cost of providing adjudication and naturalization services.” (See Appendix B for the full text of the legislation.)
This means that USCIS immediately has extra funds available to mitigate its fiscal issues.
Expected Revenue from Premium Processing Expansion
If USCIS expanded its premium processing services only to the extent authorized by Congress for immediate execution, without the need for new regulations, the agency could increase its annual revenue by some $685 million to $1.06 billion.
Figure 2 below demonstrates that $300–434 million of this annual revenue increase could come from the action USCIS has already taken to raise premium processing fees on forms that have been included in the program for years (Forms I-140 and I-129).
USCIS could raise an additional $385–626 million in annual revenue by expanding premium processing to only those forms authorized for immediate eligibility by Congress. Most of this additional revenue would come from applications to change or extend nonimmigrant status (Form I-539) and applications for employment authorization by international students who have recently graduated and seek on-the-job training through the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program (Form I-765).
These forecasts are based on publicly available data and informed estimates about how many users would opt to take advantage of expanded premium processing, as explained in detail in the Methodology section below (Appendix A).
Note that Congress has also authorized USCIS to expand premium processing to users above and beyond the employment-based immigration system (e.g. family-based immigration and naturalization), but such changes would require new regulations and “a detailed methodology supporting the proposed premium fee amount.”
Figure 2: Expected Revenue Increase for USCIS from Expanded Premium Processing
Higher fees for already eligible forms |
Total form volume |
|
|
Fee change |
Lower bound (status quo utilitization) |
|
|
Upper bound (always-on premium processing) |
||||
Form |
(FY) 2019 |
2018 |
2017 |
2016 |
Average |
Net fee increase |
Exp. utilitization |
Est. premium volume |
Add’l revenue |
Exp. utilitization |
Est. premium volume |
Add’l revenue |
I-140 (except EB-1C and EB-2 NIW) |
114,634 |
109,913 |
112,312 |
118,762 |
113,905 |
$1,060 |
45% |
50,733 |
$53,776,481 |
65% |
73,514 |
$77,924,383 |
I-129 (H-2B) |
7,460 |
6,148 |
6,112 |
6,527 |
6,562 |
$60 |
45% |
2,923 |
$175,353 |
65% |
4,235 |
$254,094 |
I-129 (R) |
8,908 |
8,481 |
8,366 |
8,207 |
8,491 |
$60 |
45% |
3,782 |
$226,896 |
65% |
5,480 |
$328,782 |
I-129 (excluding H-2B and R) |
534,833 |
536,392 |
511,957 |
494,902 |
519,521 |
$1,060 |
45% |
231,391 |
$245,274,239 |
65% |
335,295 |
$355,412,691 |
Total |
665,835 |
660,934 |
638,747 |
628,398 |
648,478 |
288,827 |
$299,452,969 |
418,523 |
$433,919,951 |
|||
New fees for newly eligible forms |
Total form volume |
|
|
|
|
Fee change |
Lower bound (status quo utilitization) |
|
|
Upper bound (always-on premium processing) |
||
Form |
(FY) 2019 |
2018 |
2017 |
2016 |
Average |
New fee |
Exp. utilitization |
Est. premium volume |
Add’l revenue |
Exp. utilitization |
Est. premium volume |
Add’l revenue |
EB-1C (I-140) |
22,688 |
21,753 |
22,228 |
23,505 |
22,543 |
$2,500 |
45% |
10,041 |
$25,101,670 |
65% |
14,549 |
$36,373,376 |
EB-2 NIW (I-140) |
5130 |
4919 |
5026 |
5314 |
5,097 |
$2,500 |
45% |
2,270 |
$5,675,570 |
65% |
3,290 |
$8,224,140 |
I-539 (extend/change status) |
221,566 |
230,975 |
233,430 |
214,785 |
225,189 |
$1,750 |
35% |
78,816 |
$137,928,263 |
55% |
123,854 |
$216,744,413 |
I-765 (employment auth) for: |
||||||||||||
Post-completion OPT |
151,200 |
157,488 |
166,418 |
158,026 |
158,283 |
$1,500 |
45% |
70,498 |
$105,747,107 |
75% |
118,712 |
$178,068,375 |
STEM OPT |
61,963 |
65,119 |
57,214 |
51,809 |
59,026 |
$1,500 |
45% |
26,290 |
$39,434,779 |
75% |
44,270 |
$66,404,531 |
Pre-completion OPT |
2,119 |
2,693 |
3,345 |
3,636 |
2,948 |
$1,500 |
45% |
1,313 |
$1,969,693 |
75% |
2,211 |
$3,316,781 |
H-4 (spouses of H-1B) |
62,148 |
54,945 |
52,253 |
42,040 |
52,847 |
$1,500 |
45% |
23,537 |
$35,306,157 |
75% |
39,635 |
$59,452,313 |
L-2 (spouses L-1) |
29,337 |
27,803 |
27,266 |
26,008 |
27,604 |
$1,500 |
45% |
12,294 |
$18,441,591 |
75% |
20,703 |
$31,053,938 |
J-2 |
10,905 |
10,244 |
9,996 |
10,091 |
10,309 |
$1,500 |
45% |
4,592 |
$6,887,328 |
75% |
7,732 |
$11,597,625 |
E-1/E-2 spouses |
9,876 |
9,840 |
9,229 |
8,884 |
9,457 |
$1,500 |
45% |
4,212 |
$6,318,283 |
75% |
7,093 |
$10,639,406 |
G dependents |
2,310 |
2,442 |
2,295 |
2,485 |
2,383 |
$1,500 |
45% |
1,061 |
$1,592,056 |
75% |
1,787 |
$2,680,875 |
A dependents |
1,236 |
1,300 |
1,329 |
1,707 |
1,393 |
$1,500 |
45% |
620 |
$930,648 |
75% |
1,045 |
$1,567,125 |
Total |
580,477 |
589,521 |
590,029 |
548,290 |
577,079 |
235,545 |
$385,333,145 |
384,880 |
$626,122,897 |
|||
Grand total |
1,246,312 |
1,250,455 |
1,228,776 |
1,176,688 |
1,225,558 |
524,373 |
$684,786,114 |
803,403 |
$1,060,042,847 |
Conclusion
USCIS should take full advantage of its newly expanded premium processing authority as soon as possible. This course of action would allow the agency to more quickly dig itself out of its self-imposed fiscal hole, while providing a valuable service to many of its users.
In fact, boosting revenue through expanded premium processing is fiscally superior to the alternatives previously proposed by the agency. If Congress had authorized USCIS to impose an indiscriminate 10% across-the-board fee increase, this would have raised only about $400 million per year (given that USCIS’ annual non-premium fee collections are about $4 billion.)
Separately, USCIS has attempted to finalize a new fee schedule that would impose unprecedented burdens on applicants for naturalization, permanent residence, asylum, and many other users, both by dramatically raising fees and effectively eliminating fee waivers for lower-income applicants. Even stipulating that USCIS requires an extra $1 billion in annual revenue to stay solvent—a claim made in the fee rule that does not withstand empirical scrutiny, as discussed at a recent House Judiciary Committee hearing—the agency would almost certainly not generate that level of revenue by seeking to extract it from those least able to pay. Although USCIS protested in its final rule that the agency “does not know the price elasticity of demand for immigration benefits,” it stands to reason that dramatic fee increases on price-sensitive users will lead to lower-than-expected volume.
Congress has handed USCIS a golden opportunity to generate a significant amount of new revenue in exchange for the provision of valuable new services. The agency should quickly proceed with the authorized non-regulatory expansion of premium processing to all employment-based users who want it. This would enable USCIS to alleviate its insolvency crisis, remove the threat of a furlough from its embattled employees, and fund better services for all those who rely on the legal immigration system.
Appendix A: Methodology
This methodology section makes frequent reference to the following form types and immigration statuses.
Figure 3: Glossary of Premium Processing-Eligible Forms and Immigration Statuses
Form | Immigration status | Definition |
I-129 | Petition for a nonimmigrant worker | |
H-2B | Temporary non-agricultural workers | |
R | Person who works in a religious occupation (also includes spouses and dependents) | |
I-140 | Immigrant petition for foreign workers | |
EB-1C | First preference employment-based permanent residency for certain multinational managers or executives | |
EB-2 with or without NIW | Second preference employment-based permanent residency, with or without a National Interest Waiver | |
I-539 | Application to extend or change nonimmigrant status | |
I-765 | Application for employment authorization | |
A | Ambassadors, public ministers, career diplomats, consuls, and immediate family | |
E-1 | Individuals or employees from countries with which the U.S. maintains commerce treaties who carry out international trade (including spouses and dependents) | |
E-2 | Individuals or employees from countries with which the U.S. maintains commerce treaties who invest a substantial amount of money in a U.S. business (including spouses and dependents) | |
G | Diplomats, government officials, and international organization employees visiting the U.S. for a governmental purpose (including immediate family and attendants or servants) | |
H-4 | Spouse or child of an H-1B, B-1, C, H-2A, H-2B, or H-3 visa holder | |
L-1 | Intracompany transferee, including executive, managerial, or specialized personnel continuing their employment in the U.S. with an international firm or corporation | |
Post-completion OPT | Optional Practical Training after the completion of an undergraduate or graduate degree | |
Pre-completion OPT | Optional Practical Training prior to the completion of an undergraduate or graduate degree | |
STEM OPT | Optional Practical Training extension for graduates with a science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) degree |
The first section of our model (see Figure 2) estimates the expected revenue generated by increasing fees for forms that were already eligible for premium processing. This includes I-140s (except for EB-1C and EB-2 NIW) and I-129s. The total annual volume for these forms was derived from both USCIS data (2019–2016) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lawful permanent resident data tables (Table 7d 2018–2016). The net premium processing fee increase for these forms types is based on the fee summary in Figure 1.
The precise percentage of forms that use premium processing versus regular processing is not publicly available. In its most recent Federal Register notice to increase the premium processing fee last year, however, USCIS published the annual volume of Form I-907 (Request for Premium Processing Service). On average between FY 2016–2018, it appears that 45% of eligible I-140 and I-129 filers also filed an I-907. As a lower bound, it seems reasonable to expect that 45% of I-140 and I-129 filers will continue to opt into premium processing, given that business users are relatively price-inelastic.
The actual utilization rate may end up significantly higher, however, given that Congress has now constrained USCIS’ ability to turn off premium processing services. Over the past several years, USCIS has periodically suspended premium processing when the volume of forms in the program became too great for the agency to adjudicate within the required 15 calendar days. The length and frequency of these suspensions has been difficult to predict. In a world of always-on premium processing, more users are likely to take advantage of the program. While it is impossible to predict this upper bound with certainty, we added an additional 20 percentage points, for a maximum utilization rate of 65%.
The second section of our model (again, see Figure 2) estimates the expected annual revenue generated from new forms that USCIS has the authority to bring into the premium processing program immediately, without issuing a new regulation. These forms include I-140 for EB-1C and EB-2 NIWs; I-539; and I-765. We make the assumption that the main users who would take advantage of premium processing for employment authorization are those in the categories of pre- and post-completion Optional Practical Training (OPT); J-2; spouses of H-1B (H-4), L-1 (L-2), E-1, and E-2 visa holders; and dependents of G and A visa holders.
The total annual volume for these forms was derived from both USCIS data (2019–2016) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lawful permanent resident data tables (Table 7d 2018–2016). The new premium processing fees for these forms types are based on the fee summary in Figure 1.
For EB-1C and EB-2 NIW petitions, we made the same assumptions of a 45–65% utilization rate as described above.
For I-539 applications, we assumed that both the lower- and upper-bound utilization rates would be 10 percentage points lower (35–55%), given that a comparable proportion of filers are in a humanitarian status category (e.g. U or T), and are less likely to be able to afford premium processing fees.
For I-765 applications, we assumed that the upper-bound utilization rate would be higher (75% rather than 65%), because the need for employment authorization is often acutely time-sensitive.
Appendix B: Premium Processing Expansion from FY 2021 Appropriations Act
SECTION 4102. EXPANSION OF PREMIUM PROCESSING.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 286(u) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(u)) is amended to read as follows:
‘‘(u) PREMIUM FEE FOR CERTAIN IMMIGRATIONBENEFIT TYPES.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized
to establish and collect a premium fee for the immigration benefit types
described in paragraph (2). Such fee shall be paid in addition to any other
fees authorized by law, deposited as offsetting receipts in the Immigra-
tion Examinations Fee Account established under subsection (m), and
used for the purposes described in paragraph (4).
‘‘(2) IMMIGRATION BENEFIT TYPES.—Subject to reasonable condi-
tions or limitations, the Secretary shall establish a premium fee under
paragraph (1) in connection with—
‘‘(A) employment-based nonimmigrant petitions and associated
applications for dependents of the beneficiaries of such petitions;
‘‘(B) employment-based immigrant petitions filed by or on behalf of
aliens described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 203(b);
‘‘(C) applications to change or extend nonimmigrant status;
‘‘(D) applications for employment authorization; and
‘‘(E) any other immigration benefit type that the Secretary deems
appropriate for premium processing.
‘‘(3) AMOUNT OF FEE.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph (C), with respect to
an immigration benefit type designated for premium processing by
the Secretary on or before August 1, 2020, the premium fee shall be
$2,500, except that the premium fee for a petition for
classification of a nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (H)(ii)
(b) or (R) of section 101(a)(15) shall be $1,500.
‘‘(B) OTHER IMMIGRATION BENEFIT TYPES.—With respect
to an immigration benefit type designated for premium processing
but not described in subparagraph (A), the initial premium fee shall
be established by regulation, which shall include a detailed method
ology supporting the proposed premium fee amount.
‘‘(C) BIENNIAL ADJUSTMENT.—The Secretary may adjust a pre-
mium fee under subparagraph (A) or (B) on a biennial basis by the
percentage (if any) by which the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers for the month of June preceding the date on
which such adjustment takes effect exceeds the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers for the same month of the second
preceding calendar year. The provisions of section 553 of title 5,
United States Code, shall not apply to an adjustment authorized
under this subparagraph.
‘‘(4) USE OF FEE.—Fees collected under this subsection may only be used
by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to—
‘‘(A) provide the services described in paragraph (5) to premium
processing requestors;
‘‘(B) make infrastructure improvements in adjudications processes
and the provision of information and services to immigration and
naturalization benefit requestors;
‘‘(C) respond to adjudication demands, including by reducing the
number of pending immigration and naturalization benefit re-
quests; and
‘‘(D) otherwise offset the cost of providing adjudication and natu-
ralization services.
‘‘(5) PREMIUM PROCESSING SERVICES.—The Secretary—
‘‘(A) may suspend the availability of premium processing for des-
ignated immigration benefit requests only if circumstances prevent
the completion of processing of a significant number of such re-
quests within the required period; and
‘‘(B) shall ensure that premium processing requestors have direct
and reliable access to current case status information as well as the
ability to communicate with the premium processing units at each
service center or office that provides premium processing ser-
vices.’’.
(b) EXPANSION TO NEW BENEFIT REQUESTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the requirement to set a fee by regulation
under section 286(u)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1356(u)(3)(B)), as amended by subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity may set a fee under that section without regard to the provisions of section
553 of title 5, United States Code, if such fee is consistent with the following:
(A) For a petition for classification under section 203(b)(1)(C) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(1)(C)), or a petition for
classification under section 203(b)(2) involving a waiver under section
203(b)(2)(B) of such Act, the fee is set at an amount not greater than
$2,500 and the required processing timeframe is not greater than 45 days.
(B) For an application under section 248 of the Immigration and Nation
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1258) to change status to a classification described in
subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of such Act (8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15)), the fee is set at an amount not greater than $1,750 and the
required processing timeframe is not greater than 30 days.
(C) For an application under section 248 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1258) to change status to be classified as a dependent
of a nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (E), (H), (L), (O), (P), or
(R) of section 101(a)(15) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)), or to extend
such classification, the fee is set at an amount not greater than $1,750 and
the required processing timeframe is not greater than 30 days.
(D) For an application for employment authorization, the fee is set at an
amount not greater than $1,500 and the required processing timeframe is
not greater than 30 days.
(2) CLARIFICATION.—The required processing timeframe for each of the
applications and petitions described in paragraph (1) shall not commence until
the date that all prerequisites for adjudication are received by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
(c) OTHER BENEFIT REQUESTS.—In implementing the amendments made by subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop and implement processes to ensure that the availability of premium processing, or its expansion to additional immigration benefit requests, does not result in an increase in processing times for immigration benefit requests not designated for premium processing or an increase in regular processing of immigration benefit requests so designated.
Appendix C: List of Sources for Data Model
Over the Line: The Implications of China’s ADIZ Intrusions in Northeast Asia
When China established its first ADIZ in the East China Sea on November 23, 2013, the move was widely seen as a practice run before establishing one in the South China Sea to strengthen its controversial territorial claims. However, examining China’s use of its ADIZ the way its treatment of those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan has evolved over the past seven years reveals that China’s East China Sea ADIZ has effectively given China new latitude to extend its influence in Northeast Asia.
Since 2013, China has committed more than 4,400 intrusions into the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Often, Chinese forces violate multiple countries’ ADIZs on their flights, flying routes that consecutively transgress South Korea’s and Japan’s ADIZs or Taiwan’s and Japan’s. While each country has so far managed the issue in its own way by scrambling jets, discussing the issue with China in bilateral meetings, and publicizing some information about the intrusions, the issue has become a regional one impacting all three countries.
This report uses data gathered from multilingual sources to explore China’s motivations behind these intrusions as well as the implications for Japanese, South Korean, Taiwanese, and U.S. forces operating in Northeast Asia.
Temporary Work Visa Holders in the United States, By the Numbers
The Trump administration is expected to unveil an executive action in the near future that would significantly restrict temporary (“nonimmigrant”) work visa categories. While there are multiple public data sets available from the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State relevant to these visa categories, they are unfortunately not sufficient to answer these basic questions with great precision: How many individuals enter the country each year, for the first time, using each of these visa categories? How many individuals are already in the United States at any given moment, having previously entered using each of these visa categories?
The goal of this report is to synthesize the relevant data and clearly present what it can—and cannot—reveal about the number of individuals potentially impacted by work visa restrictions. You can read the full report here.
You can learn more about the Technology and Innovation Initiative here.