B-2 Stealth Bomber To Carry New Nuclear Cruise Missile
By Hans M. Kristensen
The U.S. Air Force plans to arm the B-2A stealth bomber with a new nuclear cruise missile that is in the early stages of development, according to Air Force officials and budget documents.
The B-2A bomber, which is designed to slip through air defenses undetected, does not currently have a capability to deliver nuclear cruise missiles, a role reserved exclusively for B-52H bombers.
Under the Air Force’s plans, however, the new nuclear cruise missile – known as the Long-Range Standoff Weapon – will arm three nuclear bombers: the B-2A, the B-52H, and the next-generation Long-Range Strike Bomber.
Recent Statements
The disclosure that the new nuclear cruise missile will be carried on the B-2A, B-52H, as well as the next generation bomber has emerged in recent Air Force testimony to Congress, the Air Force’s FY2014 budget request, and in a little notice interview in Air Force Magazine.
Maj. Gen. Garrett Harencak, assistant chief of staff for Air Force strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, informed Congress last week that the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile “will be designed at its outset to be compatible with B-52, B-2, and the LRS-B” (Long-Range Strike-Bomber).
Lieutenant General James Kowalski, the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, confirmed: “The LRSO will be the follow-on to the aging ALCM and will be compatible with the B-52, B-2 and LRS-B.”
The Air Force budget request for FY2014 reveals that integration on the B-2 is already underway as part of a program known as Flexible Strike:
B-2 armament upgrades integrate new and/or advanced weapons on the B-2 to address a wider array of target sets, to include moving targets, and hardened, deeply buried targets. The Flexible Strike Phase 1 program — formerly known as Stores Management Operational Flight Program re-host — will recombine and rehost the current B-2 stores management software onto a new integrated processor, providing the processing and bandwidth to handle advanced digital weapons such as B61-12 or Long Range Stand Off (LRSO).
Production and fielding of the Flexible Strike Phase 1 program is planned for FY2016-FY2017, in time to receive the new guided B61-12 bomb in 2019 and the LRSO cruise missile in the mid/late-2020s.
An Expensive New Nuclear Weapon
In the public debate about the cost of nuclear weapons modernizations, it is often said that the new long-range strike bomber is not a significant nuclear cost because most of its mission is non-nuclear. But that ignores the expensive nuclear payloads (B61-12 and LRSO) that are intended to arm the new bomber.
The full cost of the new nuclear cruise missile is not known yet, because it will not become operational until the mid/late-2020s. But the budget projections in the FY2014 budget request indicate that it will be a very expensive weapon system.
Over the next five years alone, design and development costs for the missile are expected to reach more than $1 billion. Costs will presumably continue to accumulate significantly through the mid/late-2020s as full-scale production and delivery of the weapon get underway.
In addition to the cost of the missile itself, the production of the nuclear warhead will add even more. Rather than a new warhead, the Air Force plans to use a life-extended version of an existing warhead: W80-1, W84, or the B61. If other life-extension programs are any indication, then the LRSO warhead program can be expected to cost several billion dollars.
The Mission
The B-2A bomber is designed to penetrate air defenses undetected. So why would the Air Force want to add a nuclear cruise missile to its mission? The answer appears to be that expected improvements in enemy air defense systems by 2030 will make the stealth bomber less stealthy and that a standoff capability therefore is needed for the nuclear strike mission.
When deployed on the B-2A, the LRSO will give the stealth bombers a nuclear standoff capability to carry out missions in heavy air defense environments, according to Billy Mullins, the associated director of strategic deterrence and nuclear integration on the Air Staff.
But that doesn’t quite explain why the Air Force has decided to make the new cruise missile compatible with all three bombers. After all, the B-52H already provides a standoff capability. Perhaps the LRSO will be dual-capable (although this has not been stated) or that the Air Force has simply decided to add a new nuclear cruise missile to all three bombers to provide maximum flexibility.
The new nuclear cruise missile will probably have extended range and stealth features similar to or better than the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) that the Air Force retired in 2007. The Air Force states that LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”
Expanding Nuclear Capabilities
Since the B-2A does not currently carry nuclear cruise missiles, which are exclusively for B-52H bombers, but only gravity bombs (B61-7, B61-11, and B83-1), adding the LRSO will significantly increase the military capability of the B-2A weapon system.
Moreover, adding LRSO capability to all three bombers would be a significant expansion of the nuclear cruise missile capacity of the U.S. bomber fleet. Currently, some 528 ALCMs are assigned to 44 B-52H bombers in four squadrons of the 2nd and 5th Bomb Wings. In the future, also the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB would also receive nuclear cruise missiles, as would the bases that receive the next-generation bomber.
Most important in term of capability, perhaps, is the transition of nuclear cruise missiles onto stealth platforms (B-2A and LRS-B) that have a much better penetration capability than the current cruise missile carrier (B-52H). This will significantly change where and when in a conflicts nuclear cruise missiles can be used, an enhancement that will be boosted even further by the fact that the LRSO cruise missile probably will be more advanced than the ALCM it replaces.
It seems a bit strange, though, to spend money adding LRSO capability to the B-52H because that bomber is scheduled to retain the ALCM to 2030 and retire only 10 years later. The ALCM is currently undergoing refurbishment to ensure that it can remain in service through the 2020s.
Overall, the nuclear capability of the bomber force is expected to change significantly over the next couple of decades as older weapons are retired and new ones added. In addition to the new LRSO, this includes the new guided B61-12 bomb and the possible retirement of the B61-7 and B83-1 bombs.
Eventually, both the B-2A and B-52H (as well as the non-nuclear B-1B) will be replaced by a fleet of 100 Long-Range Strike Bombers. Probably not all of them will be nuclear-capable, though, but perhaps half equipped with the B61-12 and LRSO nuclear weapons.
Implications and Recommendations
The implications of adding nuclear cruise missile capability to the B-2A stealth bomber are many. They include improved military capabilities, extensive costs, and the international perception of what U.S. nuclear arms control policy is in the 21st century.
If one believes that a nuclear cruise missile is still needed, a better and less expensive alternative would be to only add LRSO capability to the next-generation bomber and phase out the nuclear capability of B-52H when the current ALCM retires around 2030.
Either way, deploying an improved nuclear cruise missile on improved stealthy bombers appears to challenge the Obama administration’s promise to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and not to add military capabilities during life-extension programs.
The United States is not alone in the continued modernization of nuclear weapons. Russia is also building a new nuclear cruise missile for its bombers, and China is adding cruise missiles to some of its intermediate-range bomber (although there is no indication yet that they are nuclear). France has just introduced a new nuclear cruise missile on its fighter-bombers, and Pakistan is working on two nuclear cruise missiles for its aircraft.
These are only a fraction of the nuclear modernizations underway in all the nuclear weapons states. All hold speeches about ending nuclear arms competition, reducing the numbers and role of nuclear weapons, and pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons, yet all continue to do what they have always done: building and deploying new nuclear weapons.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
Chinese ICBM Force Leveling Out?
By Hans M. Kristensen
The size of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force appears to be leveling out instead of increasing.
During Thursday’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Current and Future Worldwide Threats, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn told the lawmakers:
China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited CSS-3 (DF-3) [sic*].
The force level of 50-75 ICBMs is the same as the U.S. Defense Department reported in 2012 and 2011, slightly up from a medium estimate of 55-65 ICBMs reported in 2010 and rising since the DF-31 and DF-31A first started deploying in 2006-2008. But instead of continuing to increase, the force level estimate has been steady for the past three years at a medium estimate of about 63 ICBMs.
Of the 50-75 ICBMs reported for the past three years, “less than 50” can reach the continental United States, according to DIA. Twenty of those are the silo-based DF-5A. That means that China has deployed fewer than 30 DF-31As, six years after it first started fielding the new missile. DOD stopped providing detailed breakdowns of the Chinese missile force in 2011, but the actual DF-31A number might only be around 20 (2-3 brigades) because the total ICBM estimate also includes DF-4 and DF-31, neither of which can reach the continental United States from their deployment areas in China.
This year’s DIA assessment does not include the prediction from previous years that the number of Chinese ICBMs that can strike the continental United States “probably will more than double…by 2025” to around 100 missiles. This estimate has continued to slide. In 2001 CIA predicted deployment of 75-100 ICBMs “deployed primarily against the United States” by 2015, a prediction that seems in doubt if the the current trend continues.
This year’s DIA threat assessment is also interesting because it doesn’t mention the fabled DF-41, a possible MIRVed ICBM that was rumored to have been test-launched in August 2012. Nor are any of the other new potential launchers identified.
Finally, introduction of China’s new Jin-class SSBN continues to slide; DIA projects the ballistic missile submarine “may reach initial operational capability around 2014,” or four-seven years later than the intelligence community predicted in 2006. Apparently, there have been problems with the Julang-2 missile.
* Note: The designation “DF-3” for the CSS-3 is a typo. It should have been DF-4, for the ageing 5,400-km liquid-fueled ICBM. The DF-3 is an intermediate-range, liquid-fueled ballistic missile that is being retired. Neither the DF-3 nor the DF-21, a more modern medium-range ballistic missile, is mentioned in the testimony.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
Better Understanding North Korea: Q&A with Seven East Asian Experts, Part 2
Editor’s Note: This is the second of two postings of a Q&A conducted primarily by the Federation of American Scientists regarding the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. Developed and edited by Charles P. Blair, Mark Jansson, and Devin H. Ellis, the authors’ responses have not been edited; all views expressed by these subject-matter experts are their own. Please note that additional terms are used to refer to North Korea and South Korea, i.e., the DPRK and ROK respectively.
Researchers from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) asked seven individuals who are experts in East Asia about the the recent escalation in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Is North Korea’s recent success with its nuclear test and satellite launch evidence that it is maturing? Is there trepidation in Japan over the perceived threat of North Korea attacking Japan with a nuclear weapon? Has North Korea mastered re-entry vehicle (RV) technology? Is there any plausible way to de-nuclearize North Korea?
This is the second part of the Q&A, featuring Dr. Yousaf Butt, Dr. Jacques Hymans and Ms. Masako Toki. Read the first part here. (more…)
Better Understanding North Korea: Q&A with Seven East Asian Experts, Part 1
Editor’s Note: This is the first of two postings of a Q&A conducted primarily by the Federation of American Scientists regarding the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. Developed and edited by Charles P. Blair, Mark Jansson, and Devin H. Ellis, the authors’ responses have not been edited; all views expressed by these subject-matter experts are their own. Please note that additional terms are used to refer to North Korea and South Korea, i.e., the DPRK and ROK respectively.
Researchers from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) asked seven individuals who are experts in East Asia about the the recent escalation in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Is North Korea serious about their threats and are we on the brink of war? What influence does China exert over DPRK, and what influence is China wiling to exert over the DPRK? How does the increase in tension affect South Korean President Park Guen-he’s political agenda?
This is the first part of the Q&A featuring Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, Dr. Balbina Hwang, Ms. Duyeon Kim and Dr. Leon Sigal. Read part two here.
$1 Billion for a Nuclear Bomb Tail
The U.S. Air Force plans to spend more than $1 billion on developing a guided tailkit to increase the accuracy of the B61 nuclear bomb.
The cost is detailed (to some extent) in the Air Force’s budget request for FY2014, which shows development and engineering through FY2014 and full-scaled production starting in FY2015.
The annual costs increase by nearly 200 percent from $67.9 million in FY2014 to more than $200 million in FY2015. The high cost level will be retained for three years until the project decreases after production ceases in FY2018. Some additional funding is needed after that to complete the integration and certification on (see graph).
Production of the guided tailkit is intended to match completion of the first new B61-12 bomb in 2019, a program that is estimated to cost more than $10 billion. Although the number is a secret, it is thought that the U.S. plans to produce roughly 400 B61-12s.
The expensive guided tailkit is needed, advocates claim, to make it possible to use the 50-kiloton nuclear explosive package from the tactical B61-4 bomb in the new B61-12 against targets that today require the 360-kiloton strategic B61-7 bomb. By increasing accuracy, the B61-12 becomes more useable because it significantly reduces the amount of radioactive fallout created in an attack.
Once deployed in Europe, the B61-12 will also be able to hold at risk targets that the B61-3 and B61-4 bombs currently deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey cannot target.
The B61-12 program will maintain compatibility on all five current B61-capable aircraft (B-2A, B-52H, F-16, F-15E and PA 200). In 2015, integration, design and testing will begin on the new stealthy F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. The Air Force budget request shows that B61-12 integration is scheduled for Block 4A and Block 4B aircraft in 2015-2021 with full operational capability in 2022 – three years after the first B61-12 is scheduled to be delivered (see table).
The combination of the new and more accurate guided B61-12 on the stealthy F-35A will significantly increase the capability of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear posture in Europe. This development is out of tune with U.S. and NATO pledges to reduce the role and reliance on nuclear weapons, and will make it a lot easier for hardliners in the Russian military to reject reductions of Russia’s larger inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
US Nuclear War Plan Updated Amidst Nuclear Policy Review
![](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/oplan8010-121.jpg)
At the same time the White House is finishing a review of nuclear weapons policy, U.S. Strategic Command has quietly put into effect a new strategic nuclear war plan.
The new plan, which entered into effect in July 2012, is called OPLAN 8010-12 Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment. It replaces an earlier plan from 2008, that was revised in 2009.
A copy of the front page of OPLAN 8010-12 was obtained from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) under the Freedom of Information Act.
OPLAN 8010-12 is the first strategic nuclear war plan update made since the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2010. The administration has completed another review of nuclear targeting policy but not yet issued new presidential guidance, so the new war plan probably does not incorporate changes resulting from the review.
Triggering Plan Changes
Details of OPLAN 8010-12 are highly classified and it is yet unclear why a new plan has been issued at this point instead of awaiting the results of the administration’s targeting review. Minor adjustments are made to war plans all the time but new plan numbers are thought to reflect more significant changes.
Plan updates can be triggered by several factors: changes in the adversaries that are targeted by the plan; changes to the U.S. nuclear force structure (introduction, modification, or retirement of nuclear weapon systems); or promulgation of new military or political guidance. Since the previous plan change in 2009, several important developments have occurred that could potentially have triggered production of OPLAN 8010-12 (see table).
The formal reason for the new plan was probably the update of the Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (CJCSI 3110.04B) that was issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 2011. The document, known as JSCP-N (formerly Annex C), provides nuclear planning guidance to combatant commanders in accordance with the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense. This probably eliminates strike scenarios involving the recently retired nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N).
Over the same time period, the number of Russian ICBMs declined by approximately 80 missiles, most of them silo-based SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, a change that potentially would allow a reduction of at least 160 warheads from the U.S. war plan.
Plan Context
OPLAN 8010-12 is the nuclear combat employment portion (known as SIOP during the Cold War) of a wider plan also known as OPLAN 8010 (but without the update year). OPLAN 8010 is a “base plan” with annexes, one of which is OPLAN 8010-12. The annexes consist of plans for different elements of national power that span the entire spetrum of STRATCOM missions: nuclear forces; conventional strike options; non-kinetic (incuding cyber operaitons); misssile defense; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance; and counter-WMD.
The base plan (OPLAN 8010) is thought to be directed against six potential adversaries: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, and WMD attacks by non-state actors.
OPLAN 8010-12 replaces the previous nuclear war plan from 2008 (OPLAN 8010-08), which was most recently updated in February 2009. The current plan is the 18th major plan update since the end of the Cold War (see table).
![](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/oplan8010-12tb21.jpg)
OPLAN 8010-12 is produced, maintained, and – if so ordered by the president – executed by the Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS), a 430-people unit located at STRATCOM at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. JFCC-GS is responsible for not only nuclear plans but for the full spectrum of kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic effects.
The Name Game
The new plan has a new name: Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment. The previous plan from 2009 was called Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike, changed from the original Global Deterrence and Strike in 2008.
- OPLAN 8010-08 Revision (December 1, 2008): Global Deterrence and Strike
- OPLAN 8010-08 Change 1 (February 1, 2009): Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike
- OPLAN 8010-12 (July 30, 2012): Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment
Three names in five years indicate a plan in evolution. The frequent name changes probably reflect an ongoing search for a name that more accurately captures the essense of the plan. Global Strike might have caused confusion with the non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike mission.
Guiding Further Reductions
As mentioned above, the Obama administration has completed an internal review of U.S. nuclear targeting policy, but has yet to issue formal presidential guidance to the military for how this will affect future revisions of OPLAN 8010-12. Yet indications are that important changes might be forthcoming.
While defense hawks lament the administration’s intension to reduce U.S. (and Russian) nuclear forces, the military has already concluded that nuclear forces can be reduced without undermining national or extended deterrence commitments:
- The Pentagon’s February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that “new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures…make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”
- The Pentagon’s February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated: “Against nuclear-armed states, regional deterrence will necessarily include a nuclear component (whether forward-deployed or not). But the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in these regional deterrence architectures can be reduced by increasing the role of missile defenses and other capabilities.”
- The Pentagon’s April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report concluded that the United States can deter potential adversaries and reassure allies and partners “at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons” while “working to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving step-by-step toward eliminating them…”
- The Pentagon’s January 2012 strategy Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense concluded that, “It is possible that out deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” (Emphasis in original).
Underpinning these decisions is that only small nuclear forces are needed for contingencies against regional adversaries such as North Korea and Iran, which can better be addressed with conventional forces. But even against Russia (and increasingly China), which continues to dominate U.S. nuclear planning, the Pentagon and the Intelligence Community have concluded that “a disarming first strike [against the United States] will most likely not occurr,” and that Russia would “not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or break-out scenario under the New START Treaty…”
These changes have allowed reductions of nuclear forces and strike scenarios in the past, leaving a stockpile of roughly 4,650 warheads. But although very different from the SIOP, OPLAN 8010-12 is still thought to be focused on nuclear warfighting scenarios using a Cold War-like Triad of nuclear forces on high alert to hold at risk and, if necessary, hunt down and destroy nuclear (and to a smaller extent chemical and biological) forces, command and control facilities, military and national leadership, and war supporting infrastructure in a myriad of tailored strike scenarios.
In Prague four years ago, President Obama said: “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security…” Doing so takes more than trimming limited scenarios against small regional adversaries but changing the core mission against Russia and China.
So when President Obama signs his new Presidential Policy Directive in the near future, it is important that it directs the military to change OPLAN 8010-12 in such a way that it actually puts an end to Cold War thinking. This will be his last chance to do so.
Other background: Reviewing Nuclear Guidance: Putting Obama’s Words Into Action (Arms Control Today, 2011) | Obama and the Nuclear War Pan (FAS 2010) | From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence (FAS/NRDC 2009)
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
New START Data: US Reductions Finally Picking Up; Russia Flatlining
By Hans M. Kristensen
After two years of stalling, the latest New START Treaty aggregate data released today by the State Department indicates that U.S. warhead reductions under the treaty are finally picking up.
Russia, which is already below the treaty limit, has been more or less flatlining over the past year.
Seen in perspective, however, the warhead reductions achieved under New START so far are not impressive: since the treaty entered into effect in February 2011, the world’s two largest nuclear weapons states – with combined stockpiles of nearly 10,000 warheads – have only reduced their deployed arsenals by a total of 203 warheads!
The data for the United States shows a reduction of 68 warheads compared with September 2012. Fourteen of those are probably “fake” warheads attributed to B-52G bombers that are counted as deployed under the treaty, although they are neither deployed nor nuclear tasked anymore. The remaining 54-warhead reduction probably reflects downloading of the remaining MIRVed ICBMs (and some fluctuations in SLBM loadings of SSBNs in refit). Another 104 warheads will have to be reduced over the next five years to meet the treaty limit of 1,550 deployed accountable warheads by 2018 (although many of those will come from reducing bombers that are not actually assigned nuclear weapons).
Russia, which has been below the ceiling of 1,550 deployed accountable strategic warheads for the past year, appears to be flatlining. It is counted with a 19-warhead reduction compared with September 2012. But that number is too low say whether it reflects real reductions due to retirement of missiles or just fluctuations in SLBM loadings on SSBNs in refit. Russia increased its delivery vehicles slightly due to deployment of the first new Borei-class SSBN.
What’s most striking about the data, though, is the significant asymmetry in delivery vehicles: the United States has 300 deployed delivery vehicles more than Russia, a disparity that causes Russia to deploy more warheads on each delivery vehicle and fuels worst-case military planning and paranoia about treaty break-out plans.
A clear objective for the next arms control agreement between the United States and Russia will have to be to reduce the U.S. delivery vehicles and Russian warhead loading to improve stability of the postures.
Moreover, with only 203 deployed warheads cut since the New START Treaty entered into effect more than two years ago, and nearly 10,000 nuclear warheads remaining in their stockpiles combined, there is clearly a need for the United States and Russia to speed up implementation of the treaty and agree to significant additional reductions.
[Details about the reductions are murky because the aggregate data only includes overall numbers, and does not specify how many of each delivery system are counted. A more detailed analysis will follow when the full detailed U.S. data becomes available in a few weeks.]
Background: See previous New START Treaty data analysis
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
New Report Analyzing Iran’s Nuclear Program Costs and Risks
Iran’s quest for the development of nuclear program has been marked by enormous financial costs and risks. It is estimated that the program’s cost is well over $100 billion, with the construction of the Bushehr reactor costing over $11 billion, making it one of the most expensive reactors in the world.
The Federation of American Scientists and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have released a new report, “Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks” which analyzes the economic effects of Iran’s nuclear program, and policy implications of sanctions and other actions by the United States and other allies. Co-authored by Ali Vaez and Karim Sadjadpour, the report details the history of the program, beginning with its inception under the Shah in 1957, and how the Iranian government has continue to grow their nuclear capabilities under a shroud of secrecy. Coupled with Iran’s limited supply of uranium and insecure stockpiles of nuclear materials, along with Iran’s desire to invest in nuclear energy to revitalize their energy sector (which is struggling due to international sanctions), the authors examine how these huge costs have led to few benefits.
The report analyzes the policy implications of Iran’s nuclear program for the United States and its allies, concluding that economic sanctions nor military force cannot end this prideful program; it is imperative that a diplomatic solution is reached to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful. Finally, efforts need to be made to the Iranians from Washington which clearly state that America and its allies prefer a prosperous and peaceful Iran versus an isolated and weakened Iran. Public diplomacy and nuclear diplomacy must go hand in hand.
FAS Symposium Provides Recommendations to Next Administration on Catastrophic Threats
On November 9, 2012, FAS hosted the Symposium on Preventing Catastrophic Threats at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. The symposium consisted of three panels that explored catastrophic threats to national and international security, including those posed by nuclear and radiological weapons; biological, chemical, cyber, and advanced conventional weapons; and threats to energy supply and infrastructure.
Distinguished panelists at the symposium offered recommendations to the Obama administration on dealing with these challenges. The following summary offers a glimpse of the issues raised and points made throughout the day. A more detailed account that includes each speaker’s memo to the president is also available in FAS’s symposium report, Recommendations to Prevent Catastrophic Threats.
Nukes, Nukes, and More Nukes
The first panel of the symposium addressed a complex set of problems regarding nuclear weapons. Mr. David Hoffman of the Washington Post served as moderator of the panel.
Dr. Sidney Drell, Deputy Director Emeritus of SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, began by arguing for a reduction in the nuclear stockpiles leftover from the Cold War, renewed talks for data exchange, and increased transparency. Drell proposed reducing nuclear weapons to 1,000 or fewer. Also, he recommended that the United States and Russia create a Joint Data Exchange Center, which would foster cooperation between the two nuclear powers and provide added protection against conflict resulting from misinterpreted data. In the end, he questioned if the United States could escape the “nuclear deterrence trap.”
Dr. Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus of the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, commented that nuclear weapons are a threat more than a tool, since just one nuclear explosion would cause massive destruction and death. Among the known concerns of bloated stockpiles and Pakistan’s nuclear program, Garwin addressed the possibility of improvised nuclear explosives of a “yield comparable with that of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs.” He said the administration should discuss several topics together, including the role of nuclear weaponry in U.S. military forces and the managing the risks and rewards of technology built around nuclear fission. Garwin recommended that the United States remove B-61 bombs from Europe and spoke against the tendency to focus on only those issues deemed to have the highest priority, arguing the United States had enough resources to work on all of these issues at once.
Mr. Charles P. Blair, Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threats at FAS, described a new paradigm for countering the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism. He cautioned against presupposing that all violent non-state actor groups represent a potential nuclear threat. The counter-nuclear terrorism paradigm predicated on this assumption is costly, inefficient, and, ultimately, cannot be sustained. Blair explained that ideology indicates whether a terrorist organization would seek out and use nuclear weapons. Some terrorists might be more likely to seek a nuclear weapon given their unlimited objectives and belief in divine orders. Others will have different aims. He recommended more robust efforts to understand terrorist ideology and also their behavior after acquiring a nuclear weapon, including their likely command and control structure.
Dr. Robert S. Norris, Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy at FAS, recommended that the Obama administration eliminate all but one mission for nuclear weapons: deterrence, narrowly defined as preserving the means for retaliation if anyone uses nuclear weapons against the United States or certain allies. Norris questioned whether the changes to U.S. nuclear policy were real or illusory, and noted the ability of bureaucracies to maintain the status quo. However, changes are necessary, Norris argued, especially with U.S. nuclear war planning – only this will allow for reductions of nuclear stockpiles.
Mr. Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at FAS, concluded the panel by analyzing the current world nuclear force structure. He argued that Russia has already moved below the New START upper limits, and they will go lower. A similar response by the U.S. would indicate our cooperation. Obama said that the U.S. needed to move away from “Cold War thinking.” Kristensen recommended reductions in the nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. One recommendation included reducing the ICBM force from 450 to 300 missiles.
The panelists addressed the nuances of nuclear weapons. All called for greater comprehension of the complexity of the problem by Obama’s administration rather than restrictive labels that indicate maintaining the status quo.
Biological, Chemical, Conventional and Cyber Threats
The second panel at the symposium discussed the threats posed by biological, chemical, conventional, and cyber weapons. Ms. Siobhan Gorman, Intelligence Reporter at the Wall Street Journal, moderated the discussion.
Mr. Matt Schroeder, Director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at FAS, began by describing the complexity of conventional threats, choosing to focus on the subcategory of small arms and light weapons (SALW). He explained that SALW posed the “most immediate, multi-faceted threat to U.S. interests abroad.” Mr. Schroeder argued that the United States needed to include parts, accessories, and ammunition in its definition of SALW when discussing arms control. “Without ammunition,” he said, “small arms and light weapons are useless.” Mr. Schroeder explained how SALW pose a threat because they are the “weapons of choice” for transnational forces. In particular, transnational forces favor MANPADs (man-portable air-defense systems); they are easily transportable and can do significant damage to aircraft. He recommended that the United States expand the stockpile security and destruction aid programs, targeting surplus arsenals of MANPADs that can easily be sold on the black market.
Dr. Kennette Benedict, Executive Director of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, followed by reiterating the Obama administration’s principles for cyber security, emphasizing the need for adequate defenses for the private sector. She said that the administration currently does not outline rules for cyber-attacks on other countries’ infrastructure. Dr. Benedict pointed out that current U.S. policy views cyber-attacks by another government as an act of war, allowing the United States to respond with military means. However, if a non-state actor employs a cyber-attack, then it is a criminal act. Dr. Benedict noted the difficulty in finding the origin of a cyber-attack; in fact, an individual can assume the identity of a state for a cyber-attack. She recommended that a “good defense is a good offense,” yet it could have unintended effects. Moreover, she stressed the importance of pursuing a deeper level of understanding of the relationship between cybersecurity operations to protect infrastructure and other efforts to ensure the availability and usability of cyberspace for communication, commerce, and free speech.
Ms. Marina Voronova-Abrams, Program Associate at Global Green USA, began the discussion on chemical and biological threats. She reminded the panel that several states are not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, including Syria and North Korea among others such as Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, Somalia, and South Sudan. Ms. Abrams called for more inspections, yet calculated the enormous number needed given that there are 4,913 declared dual-use industrial facilities across the globe. She highlighted the importance of the United States completing the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile and then turned to the issue of biosecurity threats in the former Soviet Union. Though the threat has decreased and there is little possibility of someone using a bioweapon inside the former USSR, Ms. Abrams explained how terrorists could use their contacts in the former Soviet Union to gain access to bioagents.
Dr. David Franz, Senior Advisor to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, quoted Dr. Joshua Lederberg who stated that “there is no technical solution to the problem of biological weapons […] but would an ethical solution appeal to a sociopath?” Excessive regulatory requirements can hinder productivity and creativity in the life sciences, but it is the risk that the United States has been willing to take to address the insider threat. However, looking abroad he emphasized the importance of the human dimension to biosecurity and the personal relationships among scientists, which allow not only for early warning of natural or accidental outbreaks of diseases but also for sustained, collaborative efforts that extend beyond the initial engagement phase of international outreach. Dr. Franz explained how the United States cannot lead with security in these relationships; rather, an emphasis on public health is more appropriate for tackling biosecurity challenges collaboratively. This is especially important for countries whose concern with their existing disease burdens greatly exceeds their concern for what the United States deems “especially dangerous pathogens.” Hence, Dr. Franz proposed policies that foster relationships between scientists.
Energy and Infrastructure
The symposium concluded with a panel on the issues surrounding energy and infrastructure. Mr. Miles O’Brien, Science Correspondent at PBS NewsHour, moderated the panel.
Dr. John Ahearne, former NRC Commissioner and the 2012 recipient of FAS’s Richard L. Garwin Award, began the discussion by analyzing the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. He explained how risk analysis recommended a higher wall against tsunamis given events in the area one thousand years ago. Yet, decision makers chose a study using events in Chile in regards to earthquakes to use as the basis of their safety designs. Thus, the plant chose to build a 20-foot wall rather than the 50-foot wall proposed by the former study. He argued that this is not a lesson against nuclear power, but the problem of regulators and operators. Dr. Ahearne advised against the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assuming the role of global regulator; rather, regulation is a national duty. However, he also noted that regulation is not the only solution; states must ensure that operators take on ensuring safety as their duty.
Dr. Steven Koonin, Director of the Center for Urban Science and Progress at New York University, argued that energy policy “success” is achieved mostly through appropriate structures and processes. He called for the establishment of a Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) process to guide energy policy. He also asserted that, ultimately, changes to the energy structure are “in the hands of the private sector.” It requires a mix of business regulations and technology development with attention paid to private sector considerations. Dr. Koonin recommended that energy policy separate stationary from transport sectors, something that is done practically yet not in policy legislation. As a result, he argued that energy policy focuses too much on stationary research and development given the importance of transportation and oil.
FAS President Dr. Charles D. Ferguson, concluded the panel by discussing international science partnerships and their role in national security. For example, FAS’s pilot project in Yemen, the International Science Partnership, is a science diplomacy initiative that brings scientists and engineers from the United States together with their counterparts from countries of security concern to solve critical water and energy security issues. Dr. Ferguson recommended specifically that the Obama administration should ensure that there are a sufficient number of scientists and engineers in government, especially in agencies such as USAID and the Department of State to facilitate science diplomacy.
Meggaen Neely was an intern communications at the Federation for American Scientists during the Fall 2012 semester, and is currently interning at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She coordinated authors for the Up for Debate project, worked on the Did You Know Campaign and wrote accounts of events hosted by FAS. Neely is pursuing a Master of Arts in security policy studies at The Elliott School at George Washington University. She comes to Washington, DC with a Masters of Public Policy and Administration and a Bachelor of Arts in political science from Baylor University.
Photography by Monica Amarelo.
CNN Publishes Map Based on FAS Research
FAS supplied the data for a new interactive web site published by CNN. The site enables you to get a quick overlook of the nuclear arsenals of the world’s nine nuclear weapon states. Check it out here.
Update (April 17, 2013): CNN told me that the site had just under 2 million page views, with average time spent of well over 3 minutes per visit. “That’s really good,” they said.
Q&A Session on Recent Developments in U.S. and NATO Missile Defense with Dr. Yousaf Butt and Dr. George Lewis
Dr. Yousaf Butt, a nuclear physicist, is professor and scientist-in-residence at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The views expressed are his own.
Dr. George N. Lewis is a senior research associate at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University.
Researchers from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) asked two physicists who are experts in missile defense issues, Dr. Yousaf Butt and Dr. George Lewis, to weigh in on last week’s announcements on missile defense by the Obama administration.
Before exploring their reactions and insights, it is useful to identify salient elements of U.S. missile defense and place the issue in context. There are two main strategic missile defense systems fielded by the United States: one is based on large high-speed interceptors called Ground-Based Interceptors or “GBI’s” located in Alaska and California and the other is the mostly ship-based NATO/European system. The latter, European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is designed to deal with the threat posed by possible future Iranian intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel, and allies in Europe – and eventually attempt to protect the U.S. homeland.
The EPAA uses ground-based and mobile ship-borne radars; the interceptors themselves are mounted on Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Two land-based interceptor sites in Poland and Romania are also envisioned – the so-called “Aegis-ashore” sites. The United States and NATO have stated that the EPAA is not directed at Russia and poses no threat to its nuclear deterrent forces, but as outlined in a 2011 study by Dr. Theodore Postol and Dr. Yousaf Butt, this is not completely accurate because the system is ship-based, and thus mobile it could be reconfigured to have a theoretical capability to engage Russian warheads.
Indeed, General James Cartwright has explicitly mentioned this possible reconfiguration – or global surge capability – as an attribute of the planned system: “Part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.”
In the 2011 study, the authors focused on what would be the main concern of cautious Russian military planners —the capability of the missile defense interceptors to simply reach, or “engage,” Russian strategic warheads—rather than whether any particular engagement results in an actual interception, or “kill.” Interceptors with a kinematic capability to simply reach Russian ICBM warheads would be sufficient to raise concerns in Russian national security circles – regardless of the possibility that Russian decoys and other countermeasures might defeat the system in actual engagements. In short, even a missile defense system that could be rendered ineffective could still elicit serious concern from cautious Russian planners. The last two phases of the EPAA – when the higher burnout velocity “Block II” SM-3 interceptors come on-line in 2018 – could raise legitimate concerns for Russian military analysts.
A Russian news report sums up the Russian concerns: “[Russian foreign minister] Lavrov said Russia’s agreement to discuss cooperation on missile defense in the NATO Russia Council does not mean that Moscow agrees to the NATO projects which are being developed without Russia’s participation. The minister said the fulfillment of the third and fourth phases of the U.S. ‘adaptive approach’ will enter a strategic level threatening the efficiency of Russia’s nuclear containment forces.” [emphasis added]
With this background in mind, FAS’ Senior Fellow on State and Non-State Threat, Charles P. Blair (CB), asked Dr. Yousaf Butt (YB) and Dr. George Lewis (GL) for their input on recent developments on missile defense with eight questions.
Q: (CB) Last Friday, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that the U.S. will cancel the last Phase – Phase 4 – of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense which was to happen around 2021. This was the phase with the faster SM-3 “Block IIB” interceptors. Will this cancellation hurt the United State’s ability to protect itself and Europe?
A: (YB) No, because the “ability” you mention was always hypothetical. The Achilles’ Heel of all versions of the SM-3 (Block I A/B and Block II A/B) interceptors — indeed of “midcourse” missile defense, in general, is that it is straightforward to defeat the system using cheap decoy warheads. The system simply does not have a robust ability to discriminate a genuine warhead from decoys and other countermeasures. Because the intercepts take place in the vacuum of space, the heavy warhead and light decoys travel together, confusing the system’s sensors. The Pentagon’s own scientists at the Defense Science Board said as much in 2011, as did the National Academy of Sciences earlier this year.
Additionally, the system has never been successfully tested in realistic conditions stressed by the presence of decoys or other countermeasures. The majority of the system would be ship-based and is not known to work beyond a certain sea-state: as you might imagine, it becomes too risky to launch the interceptors if the ship is pitching wildly.
So any hypothetical (possibly future) nuclear-armed Middle Eastern nation with ICBMs could be a threat to the Unites States or Europe whether we have no missile defenses, have just Block I interceptors, or even the Block II interceptors. Since the interceptors would only have offered a false sense of security, nothing is lost in canceling Phase 4 of the EPAA. In fact, the other phases could also be canceled with no loss to U.S. or NATO security, and offering considerable saving of U.S. taxpayer’s money.
Q: (CB) What about Iran and its alleged desire to build ICBMs? Having just launched a satellite in January, could such actions act as a cover for an ICBM?
A: (YB) The evidence does not point that way at all. It points the other way. For instance, the latest Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Iran’s missile program observes: (emphasis added)
“Iran also has a genuine and ambitious space launch program, which seeks to enhance Iran’s national pride, and perhaps more importantly, its international reputation as a growing advanced industrial power. Iran also sees itself as a potential leader in the Middle East offering space launch and satellite services. Iran has stated it plans to use future launchers for placing intelligence gathering satellites into orbit, although such a capability is a decade or so in the future. Many believe Iran’s space launch program could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the United States if Iran achieved an ICBM capability of at least 10,000 km. ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes inherent in a space launch program, but it seems clear that Iran has a dedicated space launch effort and it is not simply a cover for ICBM development. Since 1999, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has assessed that Iran could test an ICBM by 2015 with sufficient foreign assistance, especially from a country such as China or Russia (whose support has reportedly diminished over the past decade). It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by 2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary, Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical components and materials because of sanctions, and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.”
Furthermore, the payload of Iran’s space launch vehicles is very low compared to what would be needed for a nuclear warhead — or even a substantial conventional warhead. For instance, Omid, Iran’s first satellite weighed just 27 kg [60 pounds] and Rasad-1, Iran’s second satellite weighed just 15.3 kilograms [33.74 pound], whereas a nuclear warhead would require a payload capacity on the order of 1000 kilograms. Furthermore, since launching an ICBM from Iran towards the United States or Europe requires going somewhat against the rotation of Earth the challenge is greater. As pointed out by missile and space security expert Dr. David Wright, an ICBM capable of reaching targets in the United States would need to have a range longer than 11,000 km. Drawing upon the experience of France in making solid-fuel ICBMs, Dr. Wright estimates it may take 40 years for Iran to develop a similar ICBM – assuming it has the intention to kick off such an effort. A liquid fueled rocket could be developed sooner, but there is little evidence in terms of rocket testing that Iran has kicked off such an effort.
In any case, it appears that informed European officials are not really afraid of any hypothetical Iranian missiles. For example, the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, once made light of the whole scenario telling Foreign Policy, “If the mullahs have a target list we believe we are quite low on it.” As if to emphasize that point, the Europeans don’t appear to be pulling their weight in terms of funding the system. “We love the capability but just don’t have the money,” one European military official stated in reference to procuring the interceptors.
Similarly, the alleged threat from North Korea is also not all that urgent.
It seems U.S. taxpayers are subsidizing a project that will have little national security benefits either for the United States or NATO countries. In contrast, it may well create a dangerous false sense of security. It has already negatively impacted ties with Russia and China.
Q: (CB) Isn’t Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program a big concern in arguing for a missile defense? Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel said Iran may cross some red-line in the summer?
A: (YB) Iran’s nuclear program could be a concern, but the latest report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) says Iran has not even decided to make nuclear weapons yet. Building, testing and miniaturizing a warhead to fit on a missile takes years – after a country decides to do so. In any case, no matter how scary that hypothetical prospect, one would not want a missile defense system that could be easily defeated to address that alleged eventual threat. Even if you believe the threat exists now, you may want a system that is effective, not a midcourse system that has inherent flaws.
Incidentally, the DNI’s report explicitly states: “we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU [weapons grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.” As for the red-line drawn by Prime Minister Netanyahu: his track-record on predicting Iranian nuclear weaponization has been notoriously bad. As I point out in a recent piece for Reuters, in 1992 Mr. Netanyahu said Iran was three to five years from a bomb. I assess he is still wrong, more than 20 years later.
Lastly, even if Iran (or other nations) obtained nuclear weapons in the future, they can be delivered in any number of ways- not just via missiles. In fact, nuclear missiles have the benefit of being self-deterring – nations are actually hesitant to use nuclear weapons if they are mated to missiles. Other nations know that the United States can pinpoint the launch sites of missiles. The same cannot be said of a nuclear device placed in a sailboat, a reality that could precipitate the use of that type of device due to the lack of attribution. So one has to carefully consider if it makes sense to dissuade the placement of nuclear weapons on missiles. If an adversarial nation has nuclear weapons it may be best to have them mated to missiles rather than boats.
Q: (CB) It seems that the Russians are still concerned about the missile defense system, even after Defense Secretary Hagel said that the fourth phase of EPAA plan is canceled. Why are they evidently still concerned?
A: (YB) The Russians probably have four main concerns with NATO missile defense, even after the cancellation of Phase 4 of EPAA. For more details on some of these please see the report Ted Postol and I wrote.
1. The first is geopolitical: the Russians have never been happy about the Eastward expansion of NATO and they see joint U.S.-Polish and U.S.-Romanian missile defense bases near their borders as provocative. This is not to say they are right or wrong, but that is most likely their perception. These bases are to be built before Phase 4 of the EPAA, so they are still in the plans.
2. The Russians do not concur with the alleged long-range missile threat from Iran. One cannot entirely blame them when the Polish foreign minister himself makes light of the alleged threat saying, “If the mullahs have a target list we believe we are quite low on it.” Russian officials are possibly confused and their military analysts may even be somewhat alarmed, mulling what the real intent behind these missile defense bases could be, if – in their assessment – the Iran threat is unrealistic, as in fact was admitted to by the Polish foreign minister. The Russians also have to take into account unexpected future changes which may occur on these bases, for instance: a change in U.S. or Polish or Romanian administrations; a large expansion of the number or types of interceptors; or, perhaps even nuclear-tipped interceptors (which were proposed by former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about ten years ago).
3. Russian military planners are properly hyper-cautious, just like their counterparts at the Pentagon, and they must assume a worst-case scenario in which the missile defense system is assumed to be effective, even when it isn’t. This concern likely feeds into their fear that the legal balance of arms agreed to in New START may be upset by the missile defense system.
Their main worry could be with the mobile ship-based platforms and less with the European bases, as explained in detail in the study Ted Postol and I did. Basically, the Aegis missile defense cruisers could be placed off of the East Coast of the U.S. and – especially with Block IIA/B interceptors –engage Russian warheads. Some statements from senior U.S. officials probably play into their fears. For instance, General Cartwright has been quoted as saying, “part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.” To certain Russian military planners’ ears that may not sound like a limited system aimed at a primitive threat from Iran.
Because the mobile ship-based interceptors (hypothetically placed off of the U.S. East Coast ) could engage Russian warheads, Russian officials may be able claim this as an infringement on New START parity.
Missile defenses that show little promise of working well can, nevertheless, alter perceptions that the strategic balance between otherwise well-matched states is stable. Even when missile defenses reveal that they possess little, if any technical capabilities, they can still cause cautious adversaries and competitors to react as if they might work. The United States’ response to the Cold War era Soviet missile defense system was similarly overcautious.
4. Finally, certain Russian military planners may worry about the NATO EPAA missile defense system because in Phase 3, the interceptors are to be based on the SM-3 Block IIA booster. The United States has conducted research using this same type of rocket booster as the basis of a hypersonic-glide offensive strike weapon called ArcLight. Because such offensive hyper-glide weapons could fit into the very same vertical launch tubes – on the ground in Poland and Romania, or on the Aegis ships – used for the defensive interceptors, the potential exists for turning a defensive system into an offensive one, in short order. Although funding for ArcLight has been eliminated in recent years, Russian military planners may continue to worry that perhaps the project “went black” [secret], or that it may be resuscitated in the future. In fact, a recent Federal Business Opportunity (FBO) for the Department of the Navy calls for hypersonic weapons technologies that could fit into the same Mk. 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes that the SM-3 missile defense interceptors are also placed in.
To conclude, advocates of missile defense who say we need cooperation on missile defense to improve ties with Russia have the logic exactly backward: In large part, the renewed tension between Russia and the United States is about missile defense. Were we to abandon this flawed and expensive idea, our ties with Russia — and China — would naturally improve. And, in return, they could perhaps help us more with other foreign policy issues such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria. As it stands, missile defense is harming bilateral relations with Russia and poisoning the well of future arms control.
Q: (CB) Adding to the gravity of Secretary Hagel’s announcement , last week China expressed worry about Ground-Based Interceptors, the Bush administration’s missile defense initiative in Poland discarded by the Obama administration in 2009, in favor of Phase 4 of the EPAA. Why is there concern with not only the Aegis ship-based system, but also the GBIs on the West Coast?
A: (YB) Like the Russians, Chinese military analysts are also likely to assume the worst-case scenario for the system (ie. that it will work perfectly) in coming up with their counter response . Possessing a much smaller nuclear arsenal than Russia or the United States, to China, even a few interceptors can be perceived as making a dent in their deterrent forces. And I think the Chinese are likely worried about both the ship-based Aegis system as well as the West Coast GBIs.
And this concern on the part of the Chinese is nothing new. They have not been as vocal as the Russians, but it is evident they were never content with U.S. and NATO plans. For instance, the 2009 Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission pointed out that “China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.” Such stockpile increases, if they are taking place, will probably compel India, and, in turn, Pakistan to also ramp up their nuclear weapon numbers.
The Chinese may also be looking to the future and think that U.S. defenses may encourage North Korea to field more missiles than it may originally have been intending – if and when the North Koreans make long range missiles – to make sure some get through the defense system. This would have an obvious destabilizing effect in East Asia which the Chinese would rather avoid.
Some U.S. media outlets have also said the ship-based Aegis system could be used against China’s DF-21D anti-ship missile, when the official U.S. government position has always been that the system is only intended only against North Korea (in the Pacific theater). Such mission creep could sound provocative to the Chinese, who were told that the Aegis system is not “aimed at” China.
In reality, while the Aegis system’s sensors may be able to help track the DF-21D it is unlikely that the interceptors could be easily modified to work within the atmosphere where the DF-21D’s kill vehicle travels. (It could perhaps be intercepted at apogee during the ballistic phase). A recent CRS report was quite explicit that the DF-21D is a threat which remains unaddressed in the Navy: “No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s trajectory,’ Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy ‘has not budgeted for any study, development, acquisition or production’ of a DF-21D target, he said.”
Chinese concerns about U.S. missile defense systems are also a source of great uncertainty, reducing Chinese support for promoting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). China’s leaders may wish to maintain the option of future military plutonium production in response to U.S. missile defense plans.
The central conundrum of midcourse missile defense remains that while it creates incentives for adversaries and competitors of the United States to increase their missile stockpiles, it offers no credible combat capability to protect the United States or its allies from this increased weaponry.
Q: (CB) Will a new missile defense site on the East Coast protect the United States? What would be the combat effectiveness of an East Coast site against an assumed Iranian ICBM threat?
A: (GL) I don’t see any real prospect for even starting a program for interceptors such as the [East Coast site] NAS is proposing any time soon in the current budget environment, and even if they did it probably would not be available until the 2020s. The recent announcement of the deployment of additional GBI interceptors is, in my view, just cover for getting rid of the Block II Bs, and was chosen because it was relatively ($1+ billion) inexpensive and could be done quickly.
The current combat effectiveness of the GBIs against an Iranian ICBM must be expected to be low. Of course there is no current Iranian ICBM threat. However, the current GMD system shows no prospect of improved performance against any attacker that takes any serious steps to defeat it as far out in time, as plans for this system are publicly available. Whether the interceptors are based in Alaska or on the East Coast makes very little difference to their performance.
Q: (CB) There were shortcomings reported by the Defense Science Board and the National Academies regarding the radars that are part of the system. Has anything changed to improve this situation?
A: (GL) With respect to radars, the main point is that basically nothing has happened. The existing early warning radars can’t discriminate [between real warheads and decoys]. The only radar that could potentially contribute to discrimination, the SBX, has been largely mothballed.
Q: (CB) Let’s say the United States had lots of money to spend on such a system, would an East Coast site have the theoretical ability to engage Russian warheads? Regardless of whether Russia could defeat the system with decoys or countermeasures, does the system have an ability to reach or engage the warheads? In short, could such a site be a concern for Russia?
A: (YB) If you have a look at Fig 8(a) and 8(b) in the report Ted Postol and I wrote you’ll see pretty clearly why an East Coast site might be a concern for Russia, especially with faster interceptors that are proposed for that site. Now I’m not saying it necessarily should be a concern – because they can defeat the system rather easily – but it may be. Whether they object to it or not vocally depends on other factors also. For instance, such a site will obviously not be geopolitically problematic for the Russians.
![Figure 8: The two panels (a) above and (b) below show different views of the same engagements: if warheads are launched on lofted trajectories from Russia in an attempt to limit the possible early intercept capabilities of the seabased SM-3 interceptors, then these warheads will be easier to engage with GMD interceptors deployed in Alaska and California. Notice that the GMD interceptors can engage the lofted Russian warheads much further (in projected distance along the ground) from the continental U.S. as compared to the unlofted trajectories.](/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/Figures8a8b.png)
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) from the FAS Special Report Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, by Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol (p. 27).
US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile
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The U.S. Navy has quietly removed the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missile from its inventory, a new Secretary of the Navy Instruction shows.
By Hans M. Kristensen
Although the U.S. Navy has yet to make a formal announcement that the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) has been retired, a new updated navy instruction shows that the weapon is gone.
The evidence comes not in the form of an explicit statement, but from what has been deleted from the U.S. Navy’s instruction Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons Responsibilities and Authorities (SECNAVINST 8120.1A).
While the previous version of the instruction from 2010 included a whole sub-section describing TLAM/N responsibilities, the new version published on February 15, 2013, contains no mentioning of the TLAM/N at all and the previous sub-section has been deleted.
The U.S. Navy is finally out of the non-strategic nuclear weapons business. The stockpile has declined and a substantial number of TLAM/N warheads (W80-0) have already been dismantled. [Update 21 Mar: FY12 Pantex Performance Evaluation Report states (p.24): “All W80-0 warheads in the stockpile have been dismantled.” (Thanks Jay!)].
The End Of An Era
The retirement of the TLAM/N completes a 25-year process of eliminating all non-strategic naval nuclear weapons from the U.S. Navy’s arsenal.
In 1989, diligent researchers using the Freedom of Information Act discovered that the navy planned to unilaterally retire three of its non-strategic nuclear weapons.
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Retirement of the TLAM/N comes two decades after the U.S. Navy retired the SUBROC, ASROC, and Terrier. |
The first to go was the SUBROC, a submarine-launched rocket introduced in 1965 to deliver a 5-kiloton nuclear torpedo against another submarine. The SUBROC was widely deployed on attack submarines for 24 years and retired in 1989.
The ASROC was next in line, a ship-launched rocket introduced in 1961 to deliver a 10-kiloton depth bomb against submarines. The ASROC was widely deployed on cruisers, destroyers, and frigates for 29 years and retired in 1990.
The third non-strategic nuclear weapon to be unilaterally retired was the nuclear Terrier, a ship-launched surface-to-air missile introduced in 1961 to deliver a 1-kiloton warhead against aircraft. The nuclear Terrier was retired in 1990 after 29 years.
These weapons had little military value but huge political consequences when they sailed into ports of allied countries whose governments were forced to ignore violation of their own non-nuclear policies to avoid being seen as disloyal to their nuclear-armed ally.
The Regan administration planned to replace all of these weapons with new types: the SUBROC would be replaced by the Sea Lance rocket; the ASROC would be replaced with the Vertical ASROC; and the Terrier was to be replaced by the Standard 2 missile. But all of these replacement programs were cancelled. The Harpoon cruise missile was also intended to have a nuclear warhead option, but that was also canceled. Originally 758 TLAM/Ns were planned but only 350 were built, and 260 were left when the Obama administration decided to retire the weapon.
After the unilateral retirement of the SUBROC, ASROC, and Terrier missiles, the navy was left with B61 and B57 bombs on aircraft carriers and land-based anti-submarine aircraft, as well as the TLAM/N. Work initially continued on the B90 NSDB (nuclear strike and depth bomb) to replace the naval B61 and B57, but in September 1991 president George H.W. Bush unilaterally cancelled the program and ordered the offloading and withdrawal of all non-strategic nuclear weapons.
The Clinton administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review followed up by denuclearizing the entire surface fleet, leaving only TLAM/N for some of the navy’s attack submarines. The missiles were stored on land, however, and never made it back to sea.
In the early part of the George W. Bush administration, the navy wanted to retire the TLAM/N, but some officials in the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense insisted that the weapon was needed for certain missions in defense of allied countries. As a result, the TLAM/N survived the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, and up through 2005 the navy continued to test launch the missile from attack submarines.
Some official and lobbyists tried to protect the TLAM/N during the 2009 Congressional Strategic Posture Commission process, but they failed. The Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review determined that the TLAM/N should finally be retired because it was redundant.
Implications
More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, and tens of millions of dollars and countless of navy personnel hours wasted on retaining the TLAM/N, the weapon has finally been retired and the navy is out of the non-strategic nuclear weapons business altogether.
This is monumental achievement and marks the end of a long process. In 1987, the U.S. Navy possessed more than 3,700 non-strategic nuclear weapons for use by almost 240 nuclear-capable ships and attack submarines in nuclear battles on the high seas. Today the number is zero.
Submarine crews can finally focus on real-world operations without the burden of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and government officials from the United States and its Pacific allies can finally begin to think about how to structure extended deterrence without clinging to the Cold War illusion that it requires tactical naval nuclear weapons.
I only wish the Obama administration and its allies were not so timid about the achievement. The unilateral elimination of naval non-strategic nuclear weapons is an important milestone in U.S. nuclear weapons history that demonstrates that non-strategic nuclear weapons have lost their military and political value. Russia has partly followed the initiative by eliminating a third of its non-strategic naval nuclear weapons since 1991, but is holding on to the rest to compensate against superior U.S. conventional naval forces.
But why not propose to Russia that they follow the TLAM/N retirement by retiring their nuclear land-attack cruise missile, the SS-N-21, and stop building new ones? The land-attack cruise missiles have nothing to do with compensating for naval conventional inferiority. Highlighting the retirement of the TLAM/N, moreover, might even help undercut some of the North Korean Generals’ rhetoric about a U.S. nuclear threat. Milk the TLAM/N retirement for all it’s worth!
Documents: SECNAVINST 8120.1 (2010) | SECNAVINST 8120.1A (2013) | Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (FAS, May 2012)
This publication was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.