Having developed and utilized unmanned aerial systems (UAS, or drones) for surveillance, targeting and attack, the US military now finds itself in the position of having to defend against the same technology.

The US Army last week issued a new manual on Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques (ATP 3-01.81, April 13, 2017).

“UASs have advanced technologically and proliferated exponentially over the past decade,” the manual notes. “As technology has progressed, both reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to the point where UASs represent a significant threat to Army, joint, and multinational partner operations from both state and non-state actors.”

The unclassified Army document describes the nature of the threat and then considers the options that are available for dealing with it. These range from various forms of attack avoidance (“Operate at night or during limited visibility”) to active defense, such as surface-to-air weapons.

“Defending against UAS is a difficult task and no single solution exists to defeat all categories of the… threat,” the manual says.

Last week, the Islamic State released video footage of one of its drones dropping a bomb on an Iraqi target, Newsweek reported.

Disclosing classified information to foreign government personnel is ordinarily forbidden, and may constitute espionage. But sometimes it is permitted, even to non-allies.

“National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) policy prohibits the release of classified information [to] a foreign government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an information sharing agreement,” explained VADM James D. Syring, director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, in response to a congressional question last year.

Such Exceptions are occasionally requested, however, and granted.

“The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) submitted three requests for Exception to United States National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) from 2007–2011 seeking authority to disclose classified information to the Russian Federation (RF) relating to three ballistic missile defense flight test events,” VADM Syring said.

“In each case, authority granted by the NDPC was limited to oral and visual disclosure only under controlled conditions. The RF sent attendees to two of the three test events (in 2007 and 2010). No invitations were extended for the third event (in August 2011), and no disclosure occurred. MDA has not submitted any further requests for ENDP for the RF.”

“MDA has not sought ENDP [Exceptions] for release of any information to the People’s Republic of China,” he added.

The exchange between VADM Syring and Rep. Mike Rogers appeared in a newly published hearing volume on The Missile Defeat Posture and Strategy of the United States — The Fiscal Year 2017 President’s Budget Request, House Armed Services Committee, April 14, 2016 (at pp. 118-119).  The same volume notably includes discussion of “left of launch” approaches to countering ballistic missile threats.

At its best, congressional oversight can be a powerful engine of disclosure that matches or exceeds what the Freedom of Information Act or other mechanisms can offer. (The FOIA does not permit requesters to ask questions, only to request records.) Hearings of the House Armed Services Committee regularly generate new information on military policy, especially in the published hearing records.

Another newly published HASC hearing containing some nuggets of interest is National Security Space: 21st Century Challenges, 20th Century Organization, September 27, 2016.

There may be some US Air Force personnel who are dismayed by the rising number of civilian casualties caused by US air strikes in Syria and Iraq. Others may consider the dropping of a 22,000 pound bomb in Afghanistan yesterday — announced by press release — to be mindless or vulgar.

But of course such critical sentiments, if they exist, would not be sufficient to qualify those who hold them as conscientious objectors (COs). That requires categorical opposition to any and all military action.

“The Air Force does not consider members who believe they can choose the war in which they will participate as COs under the law. The objection must be to all wars rather than to a specific war,” according to an Air Force policy that was updated last week.

On the other hand, a sense of internal conflict is not necessarily inconsistent with conscientious objector status.

Likewise, “A belief in a theocratic or spiritual war between the powers of good and evil does not constitute a [disqualifying] willingness to participate in war within the meaning of this instruction,” the new Air Force policy said. See Procedures for Applying as a Conscientious Objector, Air Force Instruction 36-3204, April 6, 2017.

It could not immediately be learned how many, if any, members of the US Air Force currently have conscientious objector status.

In the absence of a compulsory draft, it is unclear why anyone who is opposed to all wars would enlist in the Air Force in the first place. But the new policy allows for the possibility of conscientious objector beliefs that “crystallized after receipt of an induction notice.”

The superiority of the US military in cyberspace, which once could be taken for granted, is gradually eroding, says an Army Field Manual published this week.

In the past decade, “U.S. forces dominated cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) in Afghanistan and Iraq against enemies and adversaries lacking the technical capabilities to challenge our superiority in cyberspace.”

“However, regional peers have since demonstrated impressive capabilities in a hybrid operational environment that threaten the Army’s dominance in cyberspace and the EMS,” according to the new Field Manual.

“Rapid developments in cyberspace and the EMS will challenge any assumptions of the Army’s advantage in this domain. While it cannot defend against every kind of intrusion, the Army must take steps to identify, prioritize, and defend its most important networks and data.”

The underlying principles of US Army operations in cyberspace were described in the new Field Manual 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations, 11 April 2017 (unclassified, 108 pages).

When government officials consider whether to classify national security information, they should not aim for perfect security, according to new guidance from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Instead, classifiers should seek to limit unnecessary vulnerabilities, while keeping broader mission objectives in view.

“A Risk Avoidance strategy — eliminating risk entirely — is not an acceptable basis for agency [classification] guides because it encourages over-classification, restricts information sharing, [and] hinders the optimal use of intelligence information in support of national security and foreign policy goals,” the ODNI document said.

Rather, “All agencies should reflect in their classification decisions a Risk Management strategy — mitigating the likelihood and severity of risk — in protecting classified information over which they have [classification authority], including clear descriptions in their classification policies of how the strategy is used when making classification determinations.” See Principles of Classification Management for the Intelligence Community, ODNI, March 2017.

This risk management / risk avoidance dichotomy in classification policy has been batted around for a while. It was previously discussed at length in in the thoughtful but not very consequential 1994 report of the Joint Security Commission on Redefining Security in the post-cold war era.

“Some inherent vulnerabilities can never be eliminated fully, nor would the cost and benefit warrant this risk avoidance approach,” the Commission wrote. “We can and must provide a rational, cost-effective, and enduring framework using risk management as the underlying basis for security decision making.”

In short, it is only realistic to admit that some degree of risk is unavoidable and must be tolerated, and classification policy should reflect that reality.

But the risk management construct is not as helpful as one would wish. That is because its proponents, including the Joint Security Commission and the authors of the new ODNI document, typically stop short of providing concrete examples of information that risk avoiders would classify but that risk managers would permit to be disclosed. Without such illustrative guidance, risk management is in the eye of the beholder, and we are back where we started.

Meanwhile, there is persistent dissatisfaction with current secrecy policy within the national security bureaucracy itself.

Classifying too much information is “an impediment to our ability to conduct our operations,” said Air Force Gen. John Hyten of U.S. Strategic Command at a symposium last week (as reported by Phillip Swarts in Space News on April 6).

“We have so many capabilities now,” Gen. Hyten said. “There are all these special classifications that I can’t talk about, and if you look at those capabilities you wonder why are they classified so high. So we’re going to push those down.”

Federal laws and regulations underlying the U.S. government’s approach to climate change, and litigation regarding their scope and implementation, are discussed in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See U.S. Climate Change Regulation and Litigation: Selected Legal Issues, April 3, 2017.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, updated April 7, 2017

Invoking Cloture in the Senate, updated April 6, 2017

The Value of Energy Tax Incentives Across Energy Resources: Trends over Time, CRS Insight, April 6, 2017

Smith v. Obama: A Servicemember’s Legal Challenge to the Campaign Against the Islamic State, CRS Legal Sidebar, updated April 4, 2017

Military Pay: Key Questions and Answers, updated April 3, 2017

Latin America and the Caribbean: Fact Sheet on Leaders and Elections, updated April 6, 2017

Federal Disaster Assistance: The National Flood Insurance Program and Other Federal Disaster Assistance Programs Available to Individuals and Households After a Flood, April 6, 2017

FirstNet’s Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network Moves Forward, CRS Insight, April 4, 2017

What Constitutes “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” For Immigration Purposes?, CRS Legal Sidebar, April 6, 2017

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, updated April 7, 2017

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated April 6, 2017

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, updated April 6, 2017

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated April 6, 2017

Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated April 6, 2017

Last week a bill was introduced in the Senate “to require the Secretary of Defense to declassify certain documents related to incidents in which members of the Armed Forces were exposed to toxic substances.”

The bill (S. 726), introduced by Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS) and Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT), generally requires declassification of all “documents related to any known incident in which not fewer than 100 members of the Armed Forces were exposed to a toxic substance that resulted in at least one case of a disability that a member of the medical profession has determined to be associated with that toxic substance.”

The bill is the latest example of congressional action to initiate, prioritize or override executive branch policy on declassification of national security records.

The new bill grants an exception from the declassification requirement “if the Secretary [of Defense] determines that declassification of those documents would materially and immediately threaten the security of the United States.” This is a notably narrower exemption than that provided by the Freedom of Information Act, which deems records properly classified and therefore exempt if their disclosure would simply cause “damage” to national security.

The bill would not provide any new funding for declassification. So it would presumably be implemented at the expense of current declassification programs.

The Moran-Tester bill may or may not advance through the legislative process. But numerous other congressional declassification initiatives have been enacted into law over the years.

In a report last week, for example, the Senate Intelligence Committee recalled that it had successfully legislated “a requirement that the DNI complete a declassification review of information on the past terrorist activities of detainees transferred or released from Guantanamo, [and] make resulting declassified information publicly available.”  See SSCI Report on activities during the 114th Congress, S.Rpt. 115-13, March 29.

Would the Trump Administration’s defense budget proposals comply with the current Budget Control Act limits on defense spending?

“No,” answered the Congressional Research Service CRS in a new report, which was authored by CRS specialist Pat Towell and analyst Lynn M. Williams. See The Trump Administration’s March 2017 Defense Budget Proposals: Frequently Asked Questions, April 3, 2017.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice, updated March 28, 2017

FY2017 Defense Appropriations Fact Sheet: Selected Highlights of H.R. 5293, S. 3000, and H.R. 1301, updated March 28, 2017

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), updated March 31, 2017

The Army’s Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM), CRS Insight, March 31, 2017

Votes on Measures to Adjust the Statutory Debt Limit, 1978 to Present, updated March 30, 2017

Keystone XL Pipeline: Development Issues, CRS Insight, March 30, 2017

Expiring Funds for Primary Care, CRS Insight, March 30, 2017

Overview of CEQ Guidance on Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change, CRS Insight, updated March 30, 2017

The Civil Service Reform Act: Due Process and Misconduct-Related Adverse Actions, March 29, 2017

A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial Review, updated March 27, 2017

Major Disaster Assistance from the Disaster Relief Fund: State Profiles, updated March 29, 2017

Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues, Challenges, and U.S. Responses, March 21, 2017

Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, updated March 29, 2017

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, updated March 28, 2017

Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Policy: In Brief, March 30, 2017

Iran Sanctions, updated March 31, 2017

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, updated March 29, 2017

The US Air Force should practice an information policy of “maximum disclosure, minimum delay,” says a newly revised Air Force directive. See Air Force Instruction 35-107, Public Web and Social Communication, 15 March 2017.

“The free flow of information between the government and the public is essential to a democratic society. It is also essential that the government minimize the federal paperwork burden on the public, minimize the cost of its information activities and maximize the usefulness of government information,” the Instruction said.

Information that is classified, inaccurate, or obscene is not to be posted. But Air Force websites should maintain online reading rooms for information “that has been requested via FOIA or could be requested via FOIA [emphasis added].”

Furthermore, “the Air Force views personal Web sites and weblogs positively, and it respects the right of Airmen to use them as a medium of self-expression.”

By itself, the new policy does not mean that the Air Force is now practicing maximum disclosure or that it will necessarily do so in the future. The policy is not self-enforcing.

Still, it represents an official statement of Air Force values, and it therefore provides a point of leverage that can be used by anyone, in the service or among the public, who would seek to uphold those values in practice.

The new version of the Instruction contrasts with the previous version of AFI 35-107 that was released in 2009 and that took a notably less upbeat and more restrictive approach to public disclosure of Air Force information.

Sometimes eating bugs may be the right thing to do.

“When food is limited and insects are available, they can become a valuable food source.”

That bit of practical wisdom comes from a new US Air Force Handbook on Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) Operations that was published this week.

However, “Caterpillars with hairs should be avoided. If eaten, the hairs may become lodged in the throat causing irritation or infection.”

More promisingly, “The praying mantis. . . contains 58 percent protein, 12 percent fat, three percent ash, vitamin B complex, and vitamin A. The insect’s outer skeleton is an interesting compound of sugar and amino acids.”

The Air Force Handbook addresses the needs of an Air Force individual who has been captured or otherwise isolated by accident or operational mishap. Whatever his or her mission may have been before, the new mission immediately becomes to “return to friendly control without giving aid or comfort to the enemy, to return early and in good physical and mental condition.”

The 652-page Handbook provides detailed guidance on how, with good fortune, that might be accomplished.

The military SERE program became somewhat notorious in recent years because early post-9/11 CIA interrogation techniques such as water-boarding were derived in part from SERE training. The new Air Force SERE Handbook makes only passing reference to torture and interrogation and does not mention water-boarding.

Former President Barack Obama “is gearing up to throw himself into the wonky and highly partisan issue of redistricting, with the goal of reversing the electoral declines Democrats experienced under his watch,” the Washington Post and other news outlets reported this week.

The legal framework governing redistricting is discussed in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See Congressional Redistricting Law: Background and Recent Court Rulings, March 23, 2017.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Pipeline Security: Recent Attacks, CRS Insight, updated March 21, 2017

A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense–Issues for Congress, updated March 23, 2017

State and Local “Sanctuary” Policies Limiting Participation in Immigration Enforcement, March 23, 2017

Stafford Act Assistance and Acts of Terrorism, March 22, 2017

The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview, updated March 23, 2017

Issues with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, March 24, 2017

Commercial Truck Safety: Overview, March 21, 2017

Collective Bargaining and the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute: Selected Legal Issues, March 21, 2017

An Overview of Accreditation of Higher Education in the United States, updated March 23, 2017

Budget Actions in 2017, March 22, 2017

Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, updated March 24, 2017

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, updated March 22, 2017

Navy Columbia Class (Ohio Replacement) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated March 22, 2017

Most people are not going to read a book-length study of nuclear weapons command and control, and they shouldn’t have to. But those who need a quick sketch — whether they are reporters, students, or regular citizens — can now find a concise, two-page introduction to the topic from the Congressional Research Service. See Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, CRS In Focus, December 1, 2016.

This document is part of a series of some three dozen “defense primers” that were prepared lately by CRS for new members of Congress in order to explain “key aspects of the Department of Defense and how Congress exercises authority over it.” The reports can serve the same purpose for interested members of the public.

The CRS primers naturally will not turn readers into experts. But they generally do an excellent job of presenting complex or obscure matters in clear language that almost anyone can understand, while identifying key policy issues, and introducing the essential vocabulary used to address them. The fact that CRS has no particular institutional stake in those issues enhances the credibility of the reports and makes them useful to readers of any persuasion, and to those who don’t yet know what to think.

Among the titles in the series are these:

Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations, CRS In Focus, December 30, 2016

Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces, CRS In Focus, December 29, 2016

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, CRS In Focus, December 13, 2016

Defense Primer: Ballistic Missile Defense, CRS In Focus, December 12, 2016

Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, CRS In Focus, December 8, 2016

Defense Primer: Legal Authorities for the Use of Military Forces, CRS In Focus, December 7, 2016

Defense Primer: Congress’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, CRS In Focus, December 7, 2016

Defense Primer: Budgeting for National and Defense Intelligence, CRS In Focus, December 5, 2016

Defense Primer: The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), CRS In Focus, November 16, 2016

Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, CRS In Focus, October 14, 2016

Every report in the CRS defense primer series is available on the FAS website here.