Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress

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Summary

The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the following, all of which relate to China and/or Russia:

- grand strategy and the geopolitics of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
- organizational changes within DOD;
- nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
- the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments;
- U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
- U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
- new U.S. military service operational concepts;
- capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
- maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
- innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
- mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
- supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
- capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.

The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to renewed great power competition with China and Russia, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.
### Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Background ............................................................................................................. 1
Shift to Renewed Great Power Competition ....................................................... 1
Overview of Implications for Defense ................................................................. 3
  Grand Strategy and Geopolitics of Great Power Competition ......................... 3
  Organizational Changes within DOD ................................................................. 5
  Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, and Nuclear Arms Control ............... 5
  Global Allocation of U.S. Military Force Deployments ..................................... 6
  U.S. and Allied Capabilities in Indo-Pacific Region ....................................... 9
  U.S. and NATO Capabilities in Europe ............................................................ 10
New Operational Concepts ................................................................................... 11
  Capabilities for High-End Conventional Warfare ......................................... 12
  Maintaining U.S. Superiority in Conventional Weapon Technologies ............ 13
  Innovation and Speed of U.S. Weapon System Development and Deployment ... 13
  Mobilization Capabilities for Extended-Length Conflict ............................... 15
  Supply Chain Security ...................................................................................... 17
  Capabilities for Countering Hybrid Warfare and Gray-Zone Tactics .............. 17
Issues for Congress ............................................................................................... 18

### Appendixes

Appendix A. Shift from Post-Cold War Era to Renewed Great Power Competition .... 21
Appendix B. Articles on Shift to Renewed Great Power Competition ..................... 28
Appendix C. Articles on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics ..................................... 33
Appendix D. Readings on Supply Chain Security ............................................... 42
Appendix E. Articles on Russian and Chinese Irregular, Hybrid, and Gray-Zone Warfare .... 47
Appendix F. Congress and the Late 1980s/Early 1990s Shift to Post-Cold War Era .... 54

### Contacts

Author Information ................................................................................................. 56
Introduction

This report provides a brief overview of implications for U.S. defense of great power competition with China and Russia. The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to renewed great power competition, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.

This report focuses on defense-related issues and does not discuss potential implications of renewed great power competition for other policy areas, such as foreign policy and diplomacy, trade and finance, energy, and foreign assistance.

Background

Shift to Renewed Great Power Competition

The post-Cold War era of international relations—which began in the early 1990s and is sometimes referred to as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power)—showed initial signs of fading in 2006-2008, and by 2014 had given way to a fundamentally different situation of renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.\(^1\)

The renewal of great power competition was acknowledged alongside other considerations in the Obama Administration’s June 2015 National Military Strategy.\(^2\) It was placed at the center of the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS)\(^3\) and January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS),\(^4\) which formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia. The Biden Administration’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance states that “we face a world of rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, and a technological revolution that is reshaping every aspect of our lives,” and that protecting the security of the American people “requires us to meet challenges not only from great powers and regional adversaries, but also from violent and

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1 The term international order is generally used to refer to the collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, and norms that are intended to organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period. Key features of the U.S.-led international order established at the end of World War II—also known as the liberal international order, postwar international order, or open international order, and often referred to as a rules-based order—are generally said to include: respect for the territorial integrity of countries; the unacceptability of changing international borders by force or coercion; a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use or threat of use of force or coercion; strong international institutions; respect for international law and human rights; a preference for free markets and free trade; and the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and (more recently) cyberspace as international commons. For additional discussion, see CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke and Michael Moodie.


criminal non-state actors and extremists, and from threats like climate change, infectious disease, cyberattacks, and disinformation that respect no national borders.”

The document further states (emphasis as in original):

We must also contend with the reality that the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats. China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to check U.S. strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world. Regional actors like Iran and North Korea continue to pursue game-changing capabilities and technologies, while threatening U.S. allies and partners and challenging regional stability. We also face challenges within countries whose governance is fragile, and from influential non-state actors that have the ability to disrupt American interests. Terrorism and violent extremism, both domestic and international, remain significant threats. But, despite these steep challenges, the United States’ enduring advantages—across all forms and dimensions of our power—enable us to shape the future of international politics to advance our interests and values, and create a freer, safer, and more prosperous world.

Defending America also means setting clear priorities within our defense budget. First and foremost, we will continue to invest in the people who serve in our all-volunteer force and their families. We will sustain readiness and ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces remain the best trained and equipped force in the world. In the face of strategic challenges from an increasingly assertive China and destabilizing Russia, we will assess the appropriate structure, capabilities, and sizing of the force, and, working with the Congress, shift our emphasis from unneeded legacy platforms and weapons systems to free up resources for investments in the cutting-edge technologies and capabilities that will determine our military and national security advantage in the future. We will streamline the processes for developing, testing, acquiring, deploying, and securing these technologies. We will ensure that we have the skilled workforce to acquire, integrate, and operate them. And we will shape ethical and normative frameworks to ensure these technologies are used responsibly. We will maintain the proficiency of special operations forces to focus on crisis response and priority counterterrorism and unconventional warfare missions. And we will develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions. We will prioritize defense investments in climate resiliency and clean energy. And we will work to ensure that the Department of Defense is a place of truly equal opportunity where our service members do not face discrimination or the scourge of sexual harassment and assault.

Taken together, this agenda will strengthen our enduring advantages, and allow us to prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation. The most effective way for America to out-compete a more assertive and authoritarian China over the long-term is to invest in our people, our economy, and our democracy. By restoring U.S. credibility and reasserting forward-looking global leadership, we will ensure that America, not China, sets the international agenda, working alongside others to shape new global norms and agreements that advance our interests and reflect our values. By bolstering and defending our unparalleled network of allies and partners, and making smart defense investments, we will also deter Chinese aggression and counter threats to our collective security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.

At the same time, revitalizing our core strengths is necessary but not sufficient. In many areas, China’s leaders seek unfair advantages, behave aggressively and coercively, and

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undermine the rules and values at the heart of an open and stable international system. When the Chinese government’s behavior directly threatens our interests and values, we will answer Beijing’s challenge.6

Department of Defense (DOD) officials have identified countering China’s military capabilities as DOD’s top priority.7

For additional background information and a list of articles on the shift from the post-Cold War era to renewed great power competition, see Appendix A and Appendix B.

Overview of Implications for Defense

The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the topics discussed briefly in the sections below, all of which relate to China and/or Russia.

Grand Strategy and Geopolitics of Great Power Competition

The renewal of great power competition has led to a renewed emphasis on grand strategy8 and the geopolitics9 of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs. A November 2, 2015, press report, for example, stated the following:

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6 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, pp. 7-8, 14-15, 20. For more on the document, see CRS In Focus IF11798, The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, by Kathleen J. McInnis.


For more on China’s military modernization effort, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report R44196, The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Ian E. Rinehart.

8 The term grand strategy generally refers to a country’s overall strategy for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national tools at its disposal, including diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools (sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME).

9 The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or strategy relating to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads, railways, and waterways.
The resurgence of Russia and the continued rise of China have created a new period of great-power rivalry—and a corresponding need for a solid grand strategy, then-U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work said Monday at the Defense One Summit in Washington, D.C.

“The era of everything [i.e., multiple international security challenges] is the era of grand strategy,” Work said, suggesting that the United States must carefully marshal and deploy its great yet limited resources.  

For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues. From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world’s people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography, U.S. policymakers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. Although U.S. policymakers do not often state explicitly in public the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S. military operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—appear to have been carried out in no small part in support of this goal.

The goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to deploy from the United States, cross broad expanses of ocean and air space, and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival in Eurasia or the waters and airspace surrounding Eurasia. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships, and underway replenishment ships.

The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, though long-standing, is not written in stone—it is a policy choice reflecting two judgments: (1) that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and (2) that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.

A renewal of great power competition does not axiomatically require an acceptance of both of these judgments as guideposts for U.S. defense in coming years—one might accept that there has been a renewal of great power competition, but nevertheless conclude that one of these judgments or the other, while perhaps valid in the past, is no longer valid. A conclusion that one of these judgments is no longer valid could lead to a potentially major change in U.S. grand strategy that could lead to large-scale changes in U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs. By the same token, a renewal of great power competition does not by itself suggest that these two judgments—and the consequent U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia—are not valid as guideposts for U.S. defense in coming years.

11 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, by Ronald O'Rourke.
For a list of articles pertaining to the debate over U.S. grand strategy, see Appendix C.

Organizational Changes within DOD

The renewal of great power competition has led to increased discussion about whether and how to make organizational changes within DOD to better align DOD’s activities with those needed to counter Chinese and, secondarily, Russian military capabilities. Among changes that have been made, among the most prominent have been the creation of the U.S. Space Force and the elevation of the U.S. Cyber Command to be its own combatant command.12 Another example of an area of potential organizational change within DOD is information operations.13

Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, and Nuclear Arms Control

The renewal of great power competition has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s reassertion of its status as a major world power has included, among other things, recurring references by Russian officials to Russia’s nuclear weapons capabilities and Russia’s status as a major nuclear weapon power. China’s nuclear-weapon capabilities are much more modest than Russia’s, but China is modernizing and increasing its nuclear forces as part of its overall military modernization effort. The increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence comes at a time when DOD is in the early stages of a multiyear plan to spend scores of billions of dollars to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces.14 DOD, for example, currently has plans to acquire a new class of ballistic missile submarines15 and a next-generation long-range bomber.16

The renewal of great power competition has also led to a focus in discussions of U.S. defense on nuclear arms control.17 The topic of nuclear weapons in a context of great power competition was a key factor in connection with the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.18 The Trump Administration invited China to be a third participant, along with the

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13 For additional discussion regarding information operations, see CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer: Information Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary; CRS Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, by Catherine A. Theohary; CRS In Focus IF11292, Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare, by Catherine A. Theohary and John R. Hoehn; CRS Report R43848, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary.


15 CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.


18 For additional discussion, see CRS Insight IN10985, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.
United States and Russia, in negotiations on future limitations on nuclear arms,\(^\text{19}\) but China reportedly has refused to join such negotiations,\(^\text{20}\) unless the United States agrees to reduce its nuclear forces to China’s much-lower level.\(^\text{21}\)

**Global Allocation of U.S. Military Force Deployments**

The renewal of great power competition has led to increased discussion about whether and how to change the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments so as to place more emphasis on deployments for countering Chinese and, secondarily, Russian military capabilities, and less emphasis on deployments that serve other purposes.

The Obama Administration, as part of an initiative it referred to as strategic rebalancing or the strategic pivot, sought to reduce U.S. force deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part to facilitate an increase in U.S. force deployments to the Asia-Pacific region for countering China.\(^\text{22}\) The Trump Administration stated that a planned reduction of U.S. military personnel in Germany was intended, at least in part, to facilitate a reallocation of additional U.S. forces to what U.S. officials now refer to as the Indo-Pacific region.\(^\text{23}\) In addition, President Trump expressed a desire to reduce U.S. military deployments to the Middle East, and Trump Administration officials stated that the Administration was considering reducing U.S. military deployments to Africa and South America, in part to facilitate an increase in U.S. force deployments to the Indo-Pacific region for countering China.\(^\text{24}\)

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\(^\text{22}\) For more on the Obama Administration’s strategic rebalancing initiative, which included political and economic dimensions as well as planned military force redeployments, see CRS Report R42448, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia*, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin, and CRS In Focus IF10029, *China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia*, by Susan V. Lawrence.


\(^\text{24}\) See, for example, Glen Carey, “U.S. Pentagon Chief Wants to Reallocate Forces to Indo-Pacific,” *Bloomberg*,
On February 4, 2021, President Biden announced that “Defense Secretary Austin will be leading a Global Posture Review of our forces so that our military footprint is appropriately aligned with our foreign policy and national security priorities. It will be coordinated across all elements of our national security, with Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken working in close cooperation.” A DOD news report the next day that

The global posture review will examine the U.S. military’s footprint, resources and strategies. “This review will help inform the secretary’s advice to the commander-in-chief about how we best allocate military forces in pursuit of our national interests,” [Pentagon Press Secretary John F.] Kirby said.

The global posture review will be led by the acting undersecretary of defense for policy in close coordination with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

U.S. officials will consult often with allies and partners around the world as they perform the review, Kirby said. The review should be finished by mid-year.

The review will use American defense strategy and look where service members are based, and if this is the best place to be based. This will, of course, take into consideration any treaty or agreement. Commitments — like the rotational forces in Poland and Korea — will be considered and those deployments will continue even as the review goes on. President Biden said the movement of U.S. forces from Germany will stop until the review is completed.

It is not just forward-deployed land or air forces that will be considered. Naval forces and where they operate will be part of the equation, Kirby said.

In April and June 2021, it was reported that the Biden Administration had decided to withdraw certain U.S. forces, including fighter squadrons and Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense batteries, from the Middle East, so that some of them could be redeployed elsewhere.

Developments in the Middle East affecting U.S. interests are viewed as complicating plans or desires that U.S. leaders might have for reducing U.S. force deployments to that region.


Trump Administration’s proposals for reducing force deployments to Africa and South America became a subject of debate, in part because they were viewed by some observers as creating a risk of leading to increased Chinese or Russian influence in those regions. The benefits, costs, and risks of forward-deploying U.S. forces in Europe and the Western Pacific for purposes of deterring and responding to Russian or Chinese aggression forms another element of this discussion. Although it is not yet clear in what ways or to what degree there will be a global reallocation of U.S. military force deployments, the discussion of the potential benefits and risks of such a reallocation is now substantially influenced by the renewal of great power competition.


30 See, for example, Billy Fabian, “Overcoming the Tyranny of Time: The Role of U.S. Forward Posture in Deterrence and Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 21, 2020. See also CRS In Focus IF11280, U.S. Military Presence in Poland, by Andrew Feickert, Kathleen J. McNinis, and Derek E. Mix.
U.S. and Allied Capabilities in Indo-Pacific Region

The emergence of great power competition with China has led to a major U.S. defense-planning focus on strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussion in the December 2017 NSS of regions of interest to the United States began with a section on the Indo-Pacific, and the unclassified summary of the January 2018 NDS mentioned the Indo-Pacific at several points. Strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific was a key component of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which was the Trump Administration’s overarching policy construct for that region. The Biden Administration’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that “our vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere,” and that “as we position ourselves to deter our adversaries and defend our interests, working alongside our partners, our presence will be most robust in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.”

As one service-oriented example of DOD actions to strengthen U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, the Navy has shifted a greater part of its fleet to the region; is assigning its most capable ships, aircraft, and personnel to the region; is conducting increased operations, exercises, and warfighting experiments in the region; and is developing new weapons, unmanned vehicles, and other technologies that can be viewed as being aimed primarily at potential future operations in the region. As another example, the Marine Corps’ current plan to redesign its forces, called Force Design 2030, is driven primarily by a need to better prepare the Marine Corps for potential operations against Chinese forces in a conflict in the Western Pacific.

DOD activities in the Indo-Pacific region include those for competing strategically with China in the South and East China Seas. They also include numerous activities to help strengthen the military capabilities of U.S. allies in the region, particularly Japan and Australia, and also South Korea, the Philippines, and New Zealand, as well as activities to improve the ability of forces

35 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
36 For additional discussion, see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives, by Andrew Feickert. See also CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, and CRS Report R46374, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
37 For more on this competition, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
from these countries to operate effectively with U.S. forces (referred to as military interoperability) and activities to improve the military capabilities of emerging security partners in the region, such as Vietnam.

Much of the conversation about strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region revolves around the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), which is a term used to refer to a collection of DOD investments that DOD officials and policymakers have identified as important for bolstering U.S. military capabilities in the region. The PDI is broadly modeled after the European Deterrence Initiative (or EDI—see the next section). Some PDI items are new initiatives, while others are existing DOD programs. Some have been funded or are requested for funding in the Administration’s proposed FY2022 defense budget, while others have not yet been funded or had funding requested for them in the Administration’s proposed FY2022 budget (but might have been included in DOD’s FY2022 unfunded priority lists [UPLs]).

As noted earlier, DOD officials have stated that strengthening U.S. military force deployments in the Indo-Pacific region could involve reducing U.S. force deployments to other locations.

**U.S. and NATO Capabilities in Europe**

The renewal of great power competition with Russia, which was underscored by Russia’s seizure and announced annexation of Ukraine in March 2014 (which the United States does not recognize) and Russia’s subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine, has led to a renewed focus in

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38 UPLs are lists of programs that DOD officials submit to Congress in conjunction with each year’s defense budget submission to show what additional programs those officials would like to see funded, if additional funding could be made available.

Regarding the origin of the PDI, in April 2020, it was reported that Admiral Philip (Phil) Davidson, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), had submitted to Congress a $20.1 billion plan for investments for improving U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Davidson submitted the plan, entitled Regain the Advantage, in response to Section 1253 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019), which required the Commander of INDOPACOM to submit to the congressional defense committees a report providing the Commander’s independent assessment of the activities and resources required, for FY2022-FY2026, to implement the National Defense Strategy with respect to the Indo-Pacific region, maintain or restore the comparative U.S. military advantage relative to China, and reduce the risk associated with executing DOD contingency plans. Davidson’s plan requested about $1.6 billion in additional funding suggestions for FY2021 above what the Pentagon was requesting in its proposed FY2021 budget, and about $18.5 billion in investments for FY2022-FY2026. Observers used the term Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) or Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (IPDI)—a Pacific or Indo-Pacific analog to the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) discussed in the next section—to refer to proposals for making various investments for strengthening U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Pacific region.


39 The State Department states that “the United States does not, and will never, recognize Russia’s purported annexation of Crimea.” (State Department, “Crimea Is Ukraine,” press statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, February 25, 2021.)
U.S. defense planning on strengthening U.S. and NATO military capabilities for countering potential Russian aggression in Europe.\(^\text{40}\) Some observers have expressed particular concern about the ability of the United States and its NATO allies to defend the Baltic members of NATO in the event of a fast-paced Russian military move into one or more of those countries.

As a result of this renewed focus, the United States has taken a number of steps in recent years to strengthen the U.S. military presence and U.S. military operations in and around Europe. In mainland Europe, this has included steps to reinforce Army and Air Force capabilities and operations in central Europe, including actions to increase the U.S. military presence in countries such as Poland.\(^\text{41}\) In northern Europe, U.S. actions have included presence operations and exercises by the Marine Corps in Norway and by the U.S. Navy in northern European waters. In southern Europe, the Mediterranean has re-emerged as an operating area of importance for the Navy. Some of these actions, particularly for mainland Europe, are assembled into an annually funded package within the overall DOD budget originally called the European Reassurance Initiative and now called the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).\(^\text{42}\)

Renewed concern over NATO capabilities for deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe has been a key factor in U.S. actions intended to encourage the NATO allies to increase their own defense spending levels. NATO leaders since 2014 have announced a series of initiatives for increasing their defense spending and refocusing NATO away from “out of area” (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself.\(^\text{43}\)

### New Operational Concepts

The renewal of great power competition has led to a focus by U.S. military services on the development of new operational concepts—that is, new ways of employing U.S. military forces—particularly for countering improving Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) military forces in the Indo-Pacific region. These new operational concepts include Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) for the Army and Air Force, Agile Combat Employment for the Air Force, Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for the Navy and Marine Corps, and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) for the Marine Corps.\(^\text{44}\)

These new operational concepts focus on more fully integrating U.S. military capabilities across multiple domains (i.e., land, air, sea, space, electromagnetic, information, and cyberspace), employing U.S. military forces that are less concentrated and more distributed in their architectures, making greater use of networking technologies to tie those distributed forces together into integrated battle networks, and making greater use of unmanned vehicles as part of the overall force architecture.

\(^{40}\) See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11130, *United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues*, by Kathleen J. McInnis.

\(^{41}\) See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11280, *U.S. Military Presence in Poland*, by Andrew Feickert, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Derek E. Mix.

\(^{42}\) For further discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10946, *The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview*, by Paul Belkin and Hibbah Kaileh.

\(^{43}\) For additional discussion, see CRS Report R45652, *Assessing NATO’s Value*, by Paul Belkin. See also CRS Report R46066, *NATO: Key Issues Following the 2019 Leaders’ Meeting*, by Paul Belkin.

\(^{44}\) For more on EABO and DMO, see CRS Report RL32665, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Capabilities for High-End Conventional Warfare

The renewal of great power competition has led to a renewed emphasis in U.S. defense planning on capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare, meaning large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated conventional warfare against adversaries with similarly sophisticated military capabilities.\(^{45}\) Many DOD acquisition programs, exercises, and warfighting experiments have been initiated, accelerated, increased in scope, given higher priority, or had their continuation justified as a consequence of the renewed U.S. emphasis on high-end warfare.

Weapon acquisition programs that can be linked to preparing for high-end warfare include (to mention only a few examples) those for procuring advanced aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)\(^{46}\) and the next-generation long-range bomber,\(^{47}\) highly capable warships such as the Virginia-class attack submarine\(^{48}\) and DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer,\(^{49}\) ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities,\(^{50}\) longer-ranged land-attack and anti-ship weapons, new types of weapons such as lasers,\(^{51}\) new ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities, military space capabilities,\(^{52}\) electronic warfare capabilities, military cyber capabilities, hypersonic weapons, and the military uses of robotics and autonomous unmanned vehicles, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence (AI).\(^{53}\) Preparing for high-end conventional warfare could also involve making changes in U.S. military training and exercises\(^{54}\) and reorienting the missions and training of U.S. special operations forces.\(^{55}\)


\(^{46}\) For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.


\(^{48}\) For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^{49}\) For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^{50}\) See, for example, CRS Report R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, by Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, and Susan V. Lawrence, and CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^{51}\) See, for example, CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

\(^{52}\) See, for example, CRS In Focus IF10337, Challenges to the United States in Space, by Steven A. Hildreth and Clark Groves.

\(^{53}\) See, for example, CRS Report R43848, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary.


Maintaining U.S. Superiority in Conventional Weapon Technologies

As part of the renewed emphasis on capabilities for high-end conventional warfare, DOD officials have expressed concern that U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies has narrowed or in some cases even been eliminated by China and (in certain areas) Russia. In response, DOD has taken a number of actions in recent years that are intended to help maintain or regain U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, including increased research and development funding for new militarily applicable technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous unmanned weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed-energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology.56

Innovation and Speed of U.S. Weapon System Development and Deployment

In addition to the above-mentioned efforts for maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, DOD is placing new emphasis on innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment, so as to more quickly and effectively transition new weapon technologies into fielded systems. The 2018 NDS places states

Deliver performance at the speed of relevance. Success no longer goes to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather to the one that better integrates it and adapts its way of fighting. Current processes are not responsive to need; the Department is over-optimized for exceptional performance at the expense of providing timely decisions, policies, and capabilities to the warfighter. Our response will be to prioritize speed of


For more on U.S. special operations forces, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert, and CRS In Focus IF10545, Defense Primer: Special Operations Forces, by Barbara Salazar Torreon and Andrew Feickert.

delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. We must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful applications of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly risk-averse thinking that impedes change. Delivering performance means we will shed outdated management practices and structures while integrating insights from business innovation.

The individual military services have taken various actions in recent years to increase innovation and speed in their weapon acquisition programs. Some of these actions make use of special acquisition authorities provided by Congress in recent years that are intended in part to reduce the time needed to transition new weapon technologies into fielded systems, including Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and what is known as Section 804 Middle Tier authority.

On January 23, 2020, DOD released a new defense acquisition framework, called the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, that is intended to substantially accelerate the DOD’s process for developing and fielding new weapons. In previewing the new framework in October 2019, DOD described it as “the most transformational acquisition policy change we’ve seen in decades.”

Some observers argue that DOD is not doing enough or moving quickly enough to generate and implement innovations in response to renewed great power competition, and have proposed steps for doing more or moving more quickly.

A January 2020 GAO report on weapon system reliability in defense acquisition, however, states

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58 See, for example, CRS Report R45521, Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters; Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions:


DOD has taken steps to accelerate weapon system development, and decision-making authority has been delegated to the military services. In an environment emphasizing speed, without senior leadership focus on a broader range of key reliability practices, DOD runs the risk of delivering less reliable systems than promised to the warfighter and spending more than anticipated on rework and maintenance of major weapon systems.  

DOD officials and other observers argue that to facilitate greater innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment, U.S. defense acquisition policy and the oversight paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs will need to be adjusted to place a greater emphasis on innovation and speed as measures of merit in defense acquisition policy, alongside more traditional measures of merit such as minimizing cost growth, schedule delays, and problems in testing. As a consequence, they argue, defense acquisition policy and the oversight paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs should place more emphasis on time as a risk factor and feature more experimentation, risk-taking, and tolerance of failure during development, with a lack of failures in testing potentially being viewed in some cases not as an indication of success, but of inadequate innovation or speed of development.

### Mobilization Capabilities for Extended-Length Conflict

The renewal of great power competition has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense on U.S. mobilization capabilities for an extended-length conflict. The term mobilization is often used to refer specifically to preparations for activating U.S. military reserve force personnel and inducting additional people into the Armed Forces. In this report, it is used more broadly, to refer to various activities, including those relating to the ability of the industrial base to support U.S. military operations in a larger-scale, extended-length conflict against China or Russia. Under this broader definition, mobilization capabilities include but are not limited to:

- Inducing and training additional military personnel to expand the size of the force or replace personnel who are killed or wounded;

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64 See, for example, Hal Brands, “Win or Lose, U.S. War Against China or Russia Won’t Be Short,” *Bloomberg*, June 14, 2021.
• producing new weapons to replace those expended in the earlier stages of a conflict;
• repairing battle damage to ships, aircraft, and vehicles;
• replacing satellites or other support assets that are lost in combat; and
• manufacturing spare parts and consumable items.

Some observers have expressed concern about the adequacy of U.S. mobilization capabilities, particularly since this was not a major defense-planning concern during the 20 to 25 years of the post-Cold War era, and have recommended various actions to improve those capabilities.\(^{65}\) On April 24, 2019, the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, a commission created by the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016),\(^{66}\) held two hearings on U.S. mobilization needs and how to meet them.\(^{67}\) DOD officials are now focusing more on actions to improve U.S. mobilization capabilities.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{66}\) See Sections 551 through 557 of S. 2943/P.L. 114-328.

\(^{67}\) The commission’s web pages for the two hearings, which include links to the prepared statements of the witnesses and additional statements submitted by other parties, are at https://inspire2serve.gov/hearings/selective-service-hearing-future-mobilization-needs-nation (hearing from 9 am to 12 noon) and https://inspire2serve.gov/hearings/selective-service-hearing-how-met-potential-national-mobilization-needs (hearing from 1 pm to 4 pm).

Supply Chain Security

The shift to renewed great power competition, combined with the globalization of supply chains for many manufactured items, has led to an increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on supply chain security, meaning (in this context) awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on components, subcomponents, materials, and software from other countries, particularly China and Russia. An early example concerned the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, which was incorporated into certain U.S. space launch rockets, including rockets used by DOD to put military payloads into orbit. More recent examples include the dependence of various U.S. military systems on rare earth elements from China, Chinese-made electronic components, software that may contain Chinese- or Russian-origin elements, DOD purchases of Chinese-made drones, and the use of Chinese-made surveillance cameras at U.S. military installations. A November 5, 2019, press report, for example, states:

The US navy secretary has warned that the “fragile” American supply chain for military warships means the Pentagon is at risk of having to rely on adversaries such as Russia and China for critical components.

Richard Spencer, [who was then] the US navy’s top civilian, told the Financial Times he had ordered a review this year that found many contractors were reliant on single suppliers for certain high-tech and high-precision parts, increasing the likelihood they would have to be procured from geostrategic rivals.

Mr Spencer said the US was engaged in “great power competition” with other global rivals and that several of them—“primarily Russia and China”—were “all of a sudden in your supply chain, [which is] not to the best interests of what you’re doing” through military procurement.

In response to concerns like those above, DOD officials have begun to focus more on actions to improve supply chain security.

On February 24, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order on strengthening the resilience of U.S. supply chains. The executive order directs a “complete a review of supply chain risks,” to be completed within 100 days of the date of the executive order, and several sectoral supply chain assessments to be submitted within one year of the date of the executive order, to be followed by reports “reviewing the actions taken over the previous year and making recommendations” for additional actions.

For a list of articles and reports on this issue, see Appendix D.

Capabilities for Countering Hybrid Warfare and Gray-Zone Tactics

Russia’s seizure and purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Russia’s information operations, have led to a focus among policymakers on how to counter Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare tactics. China’s actions in the South and East China Seas have similarly

prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China’s so-called salami-slicing or gray-zone tactics in those areas. For a list of articles discussing this issue, see Appendix E.

**Issues for Congress**

Potential policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

- **March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance.** Does the March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance correctly describe or diagnose renewed great power competition in the context of other U.S. national security concerns? As a strategic guidance document, does it lay out an appropriate U.S. national security strategy and national defense strategy for responding to renewed great power competition?

- **Defense funding levels.** In response to renewed great power competition, should defense funding levels in coming years be increased, reduced, or maintained at about the current level?

- **U.S. grand strategy.** Should the United States continue to include, as a key element of U.S. grand strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another? If not, what grand strategy should the United States pursue? What is the Biden Administration’s position on this issue?

- **DOD organization.** Is DOD optimally organized for renewed great power competition? What further changes, if any, should be made to better align DOD’s activities with those needed to counter Chinese and Russian military capabilities?

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73 See also CRS In Focus IF10771, *Defense Primer: Information Operations*, by Catherine A. Theohary.

74 For additional discussion relating to this issue, see CRS In Focus IF11798, *The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, by Kathleen J. McInnis.

75 One observer states that this question was reviewed in 1992, at the beginning of the post–Cold War era:

> As a Pentagon planner in 1992, my colleagues and I considered seriously the idea of conceding to great powers like Russia and China their own spheres of influence, which would potentially allow the United States to collect a bigger “peace dividend” and spend it on domestic priorities. Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region,” which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post–Cold War era. (Zalmay Khalilzad, “4 Lessons about America’s Role in the World,” *National Interest*, March 23, 2016.)


76 The *Interim National Security Strategy Guidance* states that “at its root, ensuring our national security requires us to ... Promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions....” (White House, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, March 2021, p. 9.)
Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress

- **Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.** Are current DOD plans for modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and for numbers and basing of nonstrategic (i.e., theater-range) nuclear weapons, aligned with the needs renewed great power competition?

- **Global allocation of U.S. military force deployments.** Should the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments be altered, and if so, how? What are the potential benefits and risks of shifting U.S. military force deployments out of some areas and into others? Should the Biden Administration’s proposals for changing the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments be approved, rejected, or modified?

- **U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.** Are the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region taking appropriate and sufficient steps for countering China’s military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region? To what degree will countering China’s military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region require reductions in U.S. force deployments to other parts of the world?

- **U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe.** Are the United States and its NATO allies taking appropriate and sufficient steps regarding U.S. and NATO military capabilities and operations for countering potential Russian military aggression in Europe? What potential impacts would a strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have on DOD’s ability to allocate additional U.S. forces to the Indo-Pacific region? To what degree can or should the NATO allies in Europe take actions to strengthen deterrence against potential Russian aggression in Europe?

- **New operational concepts.** Are U.S. military services moving too slowly, too quickly, or at about the right speed in their efforts to develop new operational concepts in response to renewed great power competition, particularly against improving Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces? What are the potential merits of these new operational concepts, and what steps are the services taking in terms of experiments and exercises to test and refine these concepts? To what degree are the services working to coordinate and integrate their new operational concepts on a cross-service basis?

- **Capabilities for high-end conventional warfare.** Are DOD’s plans for acquiring capabilities for high-end conventional warfare appropriate and sufficient? In a situation of constraints on defense funding, how should trade-offs be made in balancing capabilities for high-end conventional warfare against other DOD priorities?

- **Maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies.** Are DOD’s steps for maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies appropriate and sufficient? What impact will funding these technologies have on funding available for nearer-term DOD priorities, such as redressing deficiencies in force readiness?

- **Innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment.** To what degree should defense acquisition policy and the paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs be adjusted to place greater emphasis on innovation and speed of development and deployment, and on experimentation, risk taking, and greater tolerance of failure during development? Are DOD’s steps for doing this appropriate and sufficient? What new legislative authorities, if any, might be required (or what existing provisions, if any, might need to be
amended or repealed) to achieve greater innovation and speed in weapon development and deployment? What implications might placing a greater emphasis on speed of acquisition have on familiar congressional paradigms for conducting oversight and judging the success of defense acquisition programs?

- **Mobilization capabilities.** What actions is DOD taking regarding mobilization capabilities for an extended-length conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia, and are these actions appropriate? How much funding is being devoted to mobilization capabilities, and how are mobilization capabilities projected to change as a result of these actions in coming years?

- **Supply chain security.** To what degree are Chinese or Russian components, subcomponents, materials, or software incorporated into DOD equipment? How good of an understanding does DOD have of this issue? What implications might this issue have for the reliability, maintainability, and reparability of U.S. military systems, particularly in time of war? What actions is DOD taking or planning to take to address supply chain security, particularly with regard to Chinese or Russian components, subcomponents, materials, and software? What impact might this issue have on U.S.-content requirements (aka Buy America requirements) for U.S. military systems?

- **Hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.** Do the United States and its allies and partners have adequate strategies for countering Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine, Russia’s information operations, and China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in the South and East China Seas?
Appendix A. Shift from Post-Cold War Era to Renewed Great Power Competition

This appendix presents additional background information on the shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power competition. For a list of articles on this shift, see Appendix B.

Previous International Security Environments

Cold War Era

The Cold War era, which is generally viewed as lasting from the late 1940s until the late 1980s or early 1990s, was generally viewed as a strongly bipolar situation featuring two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—engaged in a political, ideological, and military competition for influence across multiple geographic regions. The military component of that competition was often most acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theater nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.

Post-Cold War Era

The post-Cold War era is generally viewed as having begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the disbanding of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliance in March 1991, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into Russia and the former Soviet republics in December 1991, which were key events marking the ending of the Cold War. Compared to the Cold War, the post-Cold War era generally featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states.

The post-Cold War era is generally viewed as having tended toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world’s sole superpower. Neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to either the United States’ status as the world’s sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (aka 9/11), the post-Cold War era was additionally characterized by a strong focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant non-state actors, particularly Al Qaeda.

Era of Renewed Great Power Competition

Overview

The post-Cold War era of international relations showed initial signs of fading in 2006-2008, and by 2014—following Chinese actions in the South and East China Seas and Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea—the international environment had shifted to a fundamentally different

77 For discussions of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.

78 For discussion Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt, and CRS In Focus IF10552, U.S. Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict, by Cory Welt, Rebecca M. Nelson, and Dianne E. Rennack.
situation of renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.

Some Key Features

Observers view the era of renewed great power competition not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar situation (like the post-Cold War era), but as a situation characterized in substantial part by renewed competition among three major world powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Key features of the current situation of renewed great power competition include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

- the use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military, paramilitary, information, and cyber operations—sometimes called hybrid warfare, gray-zone operations, ambiguous warfare, among other terms, in the case of Russia’s actions, and salami-slicing tactics or gray-zone warfare, among other terms, in the case of China’s actions;
- renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy in Russia, China, and other countries;
- the promotion by China and Russia through their state-controlled media of nationalistic historical narratives, some emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;
- challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international order, including the principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a routine or first-resort measure for settling disputes between countries, and the principle of freedom of the seas (i.e., that the world’s oceans are to be treated as an international commons); and
- additional features alongside those listed above, including
  - continued regional security challenges from countries such as Iran and North Korea;
  - a continued focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that have emerged as significant nonstate actors (now including the Islamic State organization, among other groups); and
  - weak or failed states, and resulting weakly governed or ungoverned areas that can contribute to the emergence of (or serve as base areas or sanctuaries for) nonstate actors, and become potential locations of intervention by stronger states, including major powers.

The December 2017 NSS states the following:

Following the remarkable victory of free nations in the Cold War, America emerged as the lone superpower with enormous advantages and momentum in the world. Success, however, bred complacency.... As we took our political, economic, and military advantages for granted, other actors steadily implemented their long-term plans to challenge America and to advance agendas opposed to the United States, our allies, and our partners....

The United States will respond to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world.

China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence. At the same time, the dictatorships of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran are determined to destabilize regions, threaten Americans and our allies, and brutalize their own people. Transnational threat groups, from jihadist terrorists to transnational criminal organizations, are actively trying to harm Americans. While these challenges differ in nature and magnitude, they are fundamentally contests between those who value human dignity and freedom and those who oppress individuals and enforce uniformity.

These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.

Three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners. Although differing in nature and magnitude, these rivals compete across political, economic, and military arenas, and use technology and information to accelerate these contests in order to shift regional balances of power in their favor. These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies.

China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reach of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders. The intentions of both nations are not necessarily fixed. The United States stands ready to cooperate across areas of mutual interest with both countries.

The United States must consider what is enduring about the problems we face, and what is new. The contests over influence are timeless. They have existed in varying degrees and levels of intensity, for millennia. Geopolitics is the interplay of these contests across the globe. But some conditions are new, and have changed how these competitions are unfolding. We face simultaneous threats from different actors across multiple arenas—all accelerated by technology. The United States must develop new concepts and capabilities to protect our homeland, advance our prosperity, and preserve peace.

Since the 1990s, the United States displayed a great degree of strategic complacency. We assumed that our military superiority was guaranteed and that a democratic peace was inevitable. We believed that liberal-democratic enlargement and inclusion would fundamentally alter the nature of international relations and that competition would give way to peaceful cooperation.

In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.  

The unclassified summary of the January 2018 NDS states the following:

Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.

China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors. As well, North Korea’s outlaw actions and reckless rhetoric continue despite United Nation’s censure and sanctions. Iran continues to sow violence and remains the most significant challenge to Middle East stability. Despite the defeat of ISIS’s physical caliphate, threats to stability remain as terrorist groups with long reach continue to murder the innocent and threaten peace more broadly....

The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions....

Another change to the strategic environment is a resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order.... China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road.”

Rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or sponsorship of terrorism...

Challenges to the U.S. military advantage represent another shift in the global security environment. For decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace....

The security environment is also affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war....

States are the principal actors on the global stage, but non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, cyber hackers and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. There is a positive side to this as well, as our partners in sustaining security are also more than just nation-states: multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and strategic influencers provide opportunities for collaboration and partnership. Terrorism remains a persistent condition driven by ideology and unstable political and economic structures, despite the defeat of ISIS’s physical caliphate.

It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. America is a target, whether from terrorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious cyber activity against personal, commercial, or government infrastructure; or political and information subversion....

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its
efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.81

One observer has argued that the concept of great power competition, though valid in some respects, is too narrow a concept around which to organize U.S. foreign policy.82

Markers of Shift to Renewed Great Power Competition

The sharpest single marker of the shift from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power competition arguably was Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which represented the first forcible seizure and annexation of one country’s territory by another country in Europe since World War II. Other markers of the shift—such as Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe since March 2014, China’s economic growth and military modernization over the last several years, and China’s actions in the South and East China Seas over the last several years—have been more gradual and cumulative.

The beginnings of the shift from the post-Cold War era to renewed great power competition can be traced to the period 2006-2008:

- Freedom House’s annual report on freedom in the world for 2019 states, by the organization’s own analysis, that countries experiencing net declines in freedom have outnumbered countries experiencing net increases in freedom for 13 years in a row, starting in 2006.83
- In February 2007, in a speech at an international security conference in Munich, Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized and rejected the concept of a unipolar power, predicted a shift to multipolar order, and affirmed an active Russian role in international affairs. Some observers view the speech in retrospect as prefiguring a more assertive and competitive Russian foreign policy.84
- In 2008, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic of Georgia without provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies.85 Also in that year, the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with China’s ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are seen by observers as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or

triumphalism. China’s assertive actions in the South and East China Seas can be viewed as having begun (or accelerated) soon thereafter.

Other observers trace the roots of the shift to renewed great power competition further, to years prior to 2006-2008.  

**Comparisons to Past International Security Environments**

Some observers seek to better understand the era of renewed great power competition in part by comparing it to past international security environments. Each international security environment features its own combination of major actors, dimensions of competition and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A given international security environment can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences, including, potentially, one or more features not present in any other international security environment. In the early years of a new international security environment, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, not yet apparent, or subject to evolution. In attempting to understand an international security environment, comparisons to other ones are potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full understanding of a given international security environment’s characteristic features, particularly those that differentiate it from previous ones.

Some observers described the era of renewed great power competition as a new Cold War (or Cold War II or 2.0). That term may have some utility in referring specifically to U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Chinese relations, because the era of renewed great power competition features competition and tension with Russia and China. Considered more broadly, however, the Cold War was a bipolar situation with the United States and Russia, while the era of renewed great power competition is a situation that also includes China as a major competing power. The bipolarity of the Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas in contrast, neither Russia nor China today lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups was not nearly as significant during the Cold War as it has been since 9/11.

Other observers, viewing the renewal of great power competition, have drawn comparisons to the multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century and the years prior to World War I. Still others, observing the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, have drawn comparisons to the 1930s. Those two earlier situations, however, did not feature a strong focus on countering globally significant transnational terrorist groups, and the military and other technologies available then differ vastly from those available today. The current era of renewed great power competition may be similar in some respects to previous situations, but it also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct observation and identification of its key features.

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86 See, for example, Howard W. French, “China’s Dangerous Game,” *Atlantic*, October 13, 2014.

Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress

Naming the Current Situation

Observers viewing the current have given it various names, but names using some variation of great power competition or renewed great power competition appear to have become to most commonly used in public policy discussions. As noted earlier, some observers have also used the term Cold War (or New Cold War, or Cold War II or 2.0), particularly in reference to the U.S.-China relationship. Other terms that have been used include competitive world order, multipolar era, tripolar era, and disorderly world (or era).

Congress and the Previous Shift

The previous major change in the international security environment—the shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the DOD and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reexamination that had occurred. In general, the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military, and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. For additional discussion of Congress’s response to the shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, see Appendix F.


89 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states the following:

In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reexamine all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.


Appendix B. Articles on Shift to Renewed Great Power Competition

This appendix presents citations to articles about the shift from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power competition.

Citation from 2007


Citations from Late-2013 and 2014


Citations from January through June 2015


Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress


Citations from July through December 2015


Citations from January through June 2016


Citations from July through December 2016

Lauren Villagran, “Former Defense Secretary Describes ‘New World Order,’” Stars and Stripes, September 14, 2016.


**Citations from January through June 2017**


**Citations from July 2017 through December 2017**


Citations from January 2018


Appendix C. Articles on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics

This appendix presents citations to articles discussing grand strategy and geopolitics for the United States in a context of renewed great power competition.

Citations from 2012 through 2014

Aaron David Miller, “The Naiveté of Distance,” Foreign Policy, March 31, 2014.

Citations from January through June 2015

Citations from July through December 2015


Citations from January through June 2016


Citations from July through September 2016


**Citations from October through December 2016**


Citations from January through June 2017


Citations from July 2017 through December 2017


David Haas and Jack McKechnie, “U.S. Peacetime Strategy with China,” EastWest Institute, August 11, 2017.


Citations from January 2018 through June 2018


Citations from July 2018 through December 2019


Citations from January 2020 through December 2020


Micah Zenko and Rebecca Lissner, “This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020.


Citations from January 2021


Appendix D. Readings on Supply Chain Security

This appendix presents citations for further reading on the issue of supply chain security.

Executive Branch Documents and Documents Produced for the Executive Branch


GAO Reports

GAO has issued several reports over the years addressing supply chain issues, including supply chain security. Examples include the following:


Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress


**CRS Reports**

Some examples of CRS reports discussing aspects of the issue include the following:

CRS In Focus IF10920, *Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management: An Introduction*, by Chris Jaikaran.


CRS In Focus IF11259, *Trade Dispute with China and Rare Earth Elements*, by Wayne M. Morrison.


**Press Reports and Other Readings**


Robert Morgus and John Costello, “What the Biden Administration Gets Right and Wrong on ICT in the New Supply Chain Executive Order,” *Lawfare*, March 18, 2021. (ICT is information and communications technology.)

Appendix E. Articles on Russian and Chinese Irregular, Hybrid, and Gray-Zone Warfare

This appendix presents citations to articles discussing Russian and Chinese irregular, hybrid, and gray-zone warfare tactics and possible U.S. strategies for countering those tactics.

Citations from July through September 2015


Citations from October through December 2015

Jan Joel Andersson and Thierry Tardy, Hybrid: What’s In a Name?, European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2015, 4 pp.


Citations from January through June 2016


Andreas Umland, Russia’s Pernicious Hybrid War Against Ukraine, Atlantic Council, February 22, 2016.


Eerik-Niiles Kross, “Putin’s War of Smoke and Mirrors,” Politico, April 9, 2016.


Citations from July through December 2016


Martin N. Murphy, Understanding Russia’s Concept for Total War in Europe, Heritage Foundation, September 12, 2016.


Max Boot, “How to Wage Hybrid War on the Kremlin,” Foreign Policy, December 13, 2016.

Citations from January through June 2017


Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress


Citations from July 2017 through December 2017


Susan Landau, “Russia’s Hybrid Warriors Got the White House. Now They’re Coming for America’s Town Halls,” Foreign Policy, September 26, 2017.


“Baltics Battle Russia in Online Disinformation War,” Deutsche Welle (DW), October 8, 2017.

Reid Standish, “Russia’s Neighbors Respond to Putin’s ‘Hybrid War,’” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2017.

Max Boot, “Russia Has Invented Social Media Blitzkrieg,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2017.


Dan Lamothe, “In Finland, Mattis Backs Creation of a Hybrid Warfare Center Focused on Russia,” Washington Post, November 6, 2017.
Citations from January 2018 through June 2018


Dan Mahaffee, “We’ve Lost the Opening Info Battle against Russia; Let’s Not Lose the War,” *Defense One*, February 23, 2018.


Abigail Tracy, “‘A Different Kind of Propaganda’: Has America Lost the Information War,” *Vanity Fair*, April 23, 2018.


Citations from July 2018 through December 2019


**Citations from January 2020 through December 2020**


Sean McFate, “Irregular Warfare with China, Russia: Ready or Not, It’s Coming—If Not Already Here,” *The Hill*, October 11, 2020.


**Citations from January 2021**


Appendix F. Congress and the Late 1980s/Early 1990s Shift to Post-Cold War Era

This appendix provides additional background information on the role of Congress in responding to the shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era.

This shift prompted a broad reassessment by the DOD and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reexamination that had occurred. In general, the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military, and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Through both committee activities and the efforts of individual Members, Congress played a significant role in the reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs that was prompted by the end of the Cold War. In terms of committee activities, the question of how to change U.S. defense plans and programs in response to the end of the Cold War was, for example, a major focus for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in holding hearings and marking up annual national defense authorization acts in the early 1990s.

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92 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states

In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.


94 See, for example, the following:

the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 102-352 of July 31 (legislative day, July 23), 1992, on S. 3114), pp. 7-12;
In terms of efforts by individual Members, some Members put forth their own proposals for how much to reduce defense spending from the levels of the final years of the Cold War, while others put forth detailed proposals for future U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending. Senator John McCain, for example, issued a detailed, 32-page policy paper in November 1991 presenting his proposals for defense spending, missions, force structure, and weapon acquisition programs.

Perhaps the most extensive individual effort by a Member to participate in the reassessment of U.S. defense following the end of the Cold War was the one carried out by Representative Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In early 1992, Aspin, supported by members of the committee’s staff, devised a force-sizing construct and potential force levels and associated defense spending levels U.S. defense for the new post-Cold War era. A principal aim of Aspin’s effort was to create an alternative to the “Base Force” plan for U.S. defense in the post-Cold War era that had been developed by the George H. W. Bush Administration. Aspin’s effort included a series of policy papers in January and February 1992 that were augmented by press releases and speeches. Aspin’s policy paper of February 25, 1992, served as the basis for his testimony that same day at a hearing on future defense spending before the House Budget Committee. Although DOD and some other observers (including some Members of Congress) criticized Aspin’s analysis and proposals on various grounds, the effort arguably proved...

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98 These policy papers included the following:


consequential the following year, when Aspin became Secretary of Defense in the new Clinton Administration. Aspin’s 1992 effort helped inform his participation in DOD’s 1993 BUR. The 1993 BUR in turn created a precedent for the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process (renamed Defense Strategy Review in 2015) that remained in place until 2016.

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