Iran Sanctions

Updated July 23, 2020
Iran Sanctions

Successive Administrations have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran’s behavior. U.S. sanctions on Iran, which are primarily “secondary sanctions” on firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran, have adversely affected Iran’s economy. The sanctions arguably have not, to date, altered Iran’s pursuit of core strategic objectives including its support for regional armed factions and its development of missiles. Arguably, sanctions did contribute to Iran’s decision to enter into a 2015 agreement that put limits on its nuclear program – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

During 2011-2015, global economic sanctions contributed to the shrinking of Iran’s economy as its crude oil exports fell by more than 50% and it could not access its foreign exchange assets abroad. In accordance with the JCPOA, the Obama Administration waived relevant sanctions and revoked relevant executive orders (E.O.s), and U.N. and European Union sanctions were lifted as well. Remaining in place were U.S. sanctions on direct trade with Iran and on Iran’s support for regional armed factions, its human rights abuses, and on its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, kept in place an existing ban on its importation or exportation of arms (until October 18, 2020) and a non-binding restriction on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (until October 18, 2023). The sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly pre-sanctions levels, regain access to its foreign exchange funds, and order some new passenger aircraft.

On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA, and it reimposed all secondary sanctions by November 6, 2018. Sanctions have since been at the core of Trump Administration policy to apply “maximum pressure” on Iran, with the stated purpose of compelling Iran to negotiate a revised JCPOA that takes into account U.S. concerns beyond Iran’s nuclear program. The policy has caused major companies to exit the Iran market, and Iran’s economy has fallen into severe recession. Iran’s oil exports have decreased dramatically, particularly after the Administration in May 2019 ended sanctions exceptions for the purchase of Iranian oil. The Administration has also sanctioned several senior Iranian officials as well as pro-Iranian militia figures in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Despite the sanctions, Iran has continued to develop its missile capabilities force and to provide arms and support to a broad array of armed factions operating throughout the region, while refusing to begin talks with the United States on a revised JCPOA. The European Union and other countries have sought, unsuccessfully, to keep the economic benefits of the JCPOA flowing to Iran in order to persuade Iran to remain in the nuclear accord. Since mid-2019, Iran has responded to the increasing sanctions by decreasing its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and by conducting provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq.

The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted international criticism, including from some in Congress, that U.S. sanctions on Iran might be hindering Iran’s response to the outbreak. Iran has reported more cases and more deaths from the illness than any other country in the region. Numerous accounts indicate that sanctions have hindered Iran’s ability to finance the purchase of medical equipment, even though U.S. sanctions do not apply to humanitarian transactions. In March 2020, the Administration revised public sanctions guidance to prompt foreign companies to proceed with sales of humanitarian items to Iran. The Administration offered assistance to help Iran deal with COVID-19, but Iran has refused the U.S. aid. Iran has applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $5 billion loan.

Contents

Overview ................................................................................................................................. 1
Blocked Iranian Property and Assets .................................................................................. 1
   Executive Order 13599 Impounding Iran-Owned Assets ................................................. 3
Sanctions for Iran’s Support for Militant Groups .............................................................. 3
   Sanctions Triggered by Terrorism List Designation ......................................................... 4
   Exception for U.S. Humanitarian Aid ............................................................................... 4
   Sanctions on States “Not Cooperating” Against Terrorism ........................................ 5
   Executive Order 13224 Sanctioning Terrorism-Supporting Entities ............................. 5
      Implementation of E.O. 13224 ......................................................................................... 6
   Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designations ......................................................... 6
   Other Sanctions on Iran’s “Malign” Regional Activities ................................................ 6
      Executive Order 13438 on Threats to Iraq’s Stability ................................................. 6
      Executive Order 13572 on Repression of the Syrian People ..................................... 7
   Hezbollah-Specific Financial Sanctions ........................................................................... 7
Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment with Iran ................................................................. 7
   What U.S.-Iran Trade Is Allowed or Prohibited? ............................................................... 8
   Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms .......................................................... 10
Sanctions on Iran’s Energy Sector .................................................................................... 11
   The Iran Sanctions Act ..................................................................................................... 11
      Key Sanctions “Triggers” Under ISA ........................................................................... 11
      Mandate and Time Frame to Investigate ISA Violations .......................................... 14
      Interpretations of ISA and Related Laws .................................................................... 16
      Implementation of Energy-Related Iran Sanctions ....................................................... 17
   Oil Export Sanctions: FY2012 NDAA Sanctioning the Central Bank ............................ 18
      Implementation/SREs Issued and Ended ..................................................................... 19
      Waiver and Termination ............................................................................................... 20
   Iran Foreign Account “Restriction” Provision ................................................................. 20
Sanctions on Arms and Weapons-Related Technology Transfers .............................. 21
   Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and Iraq Sanctions Act ........................................ 22
      Banning Aid to Countries that Aid or Arm Terrorism List States: Anti-Terrorism and
      Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ........................................................................... 22
      Proliferation-Related Provision of the Iran Sanctions Act ....................................... 23
      Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act ............................................................. 23
      Executive Order 13382 on Proliferation-Supporting Entities .................................... 23
   Arms Transfer and Missile Sanctions: The Countering America’s Adversaries through
      Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) ................................................................... 24
      Foreign Aid Restrictions for Named Suppliers of Iran ............................................... 24
      Sanctions on “Countries of Diversion Concern” .......................................................... 24
Financial/Banking Sanctions ........................................................................................... 26
   Targeted Financial Measures .......................................................................................... 26
   Ban on Iranian Access to the U.S. Financial System/Use of Dollars ......................... 26
      Punishments/Fines Implemented against Some Banks .............................................. 26
   CISADA: Sanctioning Foreign Banks That Conduct Transactions with Sanctioned
      Iranian Entities ............................................................................................................. 27
      Implementation ............................................................................................................ 28
Domestic Political Effects .................................................................................. 51
Economic Effects .............................................................................................. 51
   Iran’s Economic Coping Strategies ................................................................. 53
Effect on Energy Sector Development ............................................................... 54
Human Rights-Related Effects .......................................................................... 55
Humanitarian Effects .......................................................................................... 55
   U.S. COVID Response ...................................................................................... 55
   Air Safety ........................................................................................................... 56
Post-JCPOA Sanctions Legislation ..................................................................... 56
114th Congress ................................................................................................... 57
   Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17) ........................................ 57
   Visa Restriction ................................................................................................ 57
   Iran Sanctions Act Extension .......................................................................... 57
   Reporting Requirement on Iran Missile Launches ........................................... 58
   114th Congress Legislation not Enacted ......................................................... 58
The Trump Administration and Iran Sanctions Legislation ............................... 59
   The Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) ....................................................................................... 59
Legislation in the 115th Congress Not Enacted ................................................ 59
116th Congress ................................................................................................... 60
Other Possible U.S. and International Sanctions ................................................. 60

Figures
Figure 1. Economic Indicators .......................................................................... 54

Tables
Table 1. Iran Crude Oil Sales .............................................................................. 21
Table 2. Major Settlements/Fines Paid by Banks for Violations ............................ 27
Table 3. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231) ................................................................. 38

Table D-1. Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382 (Proliferation) ................................................................. 71
Table D-2. Iran-Related Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities) ................................................................. 75
Table D-3. Determinations and Sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act ............... 78
Table D-4. Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Nonproliferation Act or Executive Order 12938 for Iran-Specific Violations ................................................................................. 79
Table D-5. Entities Designated under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 ................................................ 81
Table D-6. Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438 (July 17, 2007) ................................................................................. 81
Table D-7. Iranians Designated Under Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers (September 29, 2010) ................................................................. 82
Table D-8. Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13572 for Repression of the Syrian People (April 29, 2011) ........................................................................................................ 83
Table D-9. Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13606 (GHRAVITY, April 23, 2012)) .............................................................................................................................. 83
Table D-10. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13608 Targeting Sanctions Evaders (May 1, 2012) ........................................................................................................ 83
Table D-11. Entities Named as Iranian Government Entities Under Executive Order 13599 (February 5, 2012) ........................................................................................................ 83
Table D-12. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13622 for Oil and Petrochemical Purchases from Iran (July 30, 2012) .................................................................................. 85
Table D-13. Entities Sanctioned under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA, P.L. 112-239) .................................................................................................................... 85
Table D-14. Entities Designated as Human Rights Abusers under Executive Order 13628 (October 9, 2012, pursuant to ITRSHRA) ................................................................................. 85
Table D-15. Entities Designated under E.O. 13645 on Auto production, Rial Trading, Precious Stones, and Support to NITC (June 3, 2013) ............................................................... 86
Table D-16. Entities Designated under Executive Order 13581 on Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011) ................................................................. 86
Table D-17. Entities Designated under Executive Order 13694 on Malicious Cyber Activities (April 1, 2015) ................................................................. 87
Table D-18. Entities Designated under E.O.13846 Reimposing Sanctions (August 6, 2018) ................................................................................................................................. 87
Table D-19. Executive Order 13871 on Metals and Minerals (May 8, 2019) .................................................................................................................. 88
Table D-20. Entities Designated as Gross Human Rights Violators under Section 7031(c) of Foreign Aid Appropriations ........................................................................................................ 88
Table D-21. Entities Designated under E.O. 13876 on the Supreme Leader and his Office (June 24, 2019) .................................................................................................................. 88
Table D-22. Executive Order 13818 Implementing the Global Magnitsky Act (December 20, 2017) ................................................................................................................................. 89

Appendixes
Appendix B. Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector ....................................................... 64
Appendix C. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N. Resolutions and EU Decisions ....................................... 68
Appendix D. Entities Sanctioned under U.S. Laws and Executive Orders .............................................. 71

Contacts
Author Information .............................................................................................................................. 89
Overview
Sanctions have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, a U.S. ally. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran’s strategic power in the Middle East more generally. After the mid-2000s, U.S. and international sanctions focused largely on trying to persuade Iran to agree to limits to its nuclear program. Still, sanctions have had multiple objectives and sought to address multiple threats from Iran simultaneously.

This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. CRS cannot independently corroborate whether any individual or other entity might be in violation of U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The report tracks implementation of the various U.S. laws and executive orders, some of which require the blocking of U.S.-based property of sanctioned entities. No information has been released from the executive branch indicating the extent, if any, to which any such property is currently blocked.

The sections below are grouped by function, in the chronological order in which these themes have emerged.

Blocked Iranian Property and Assets

Post-JCPOA Status: Iranian Assets Still Frozen, but Some Issues Resolved
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, in the form of executive orders issued by President Jimmy Carter blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the United States.1

U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal
The Algiers Accords that resolved the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis established a “U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal” at the Hague that continues to arbitrate government-to-government cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran’s assets. All of the 4,700 private U.S. claims against Iran were resolved in the first 20 years of the Tribunal, resulting in $2.5 billion in awards to U.S. nationals and firms. The major government-to-government cases involve Iranian claims for compensation for hundreds of foreign military sales (FMS) cases that were halted in concert with the rift in U.S.-Iran relations when the Shah’s government fell in 1979.

On January 17, 2016 (the day after the JCPOA took effect), the United States announced it had settled with Iran on additional FMS cases that were frozen when the Shah’s government fell. Iran had been depositing its FMS payments into a DoD-managed “Iran FMS Trust Fund,” and, after 1990, the Fund had a balance of about $400 million.2 Under the 2016 settlement, the United States sent Iran the $400 million balance, plus $1.3 billion in accrued interest (paid from the Department of the Treasury’s Judgment Fund.) In order not to violate U.S. regulations barring

---

1 The Orders included E.O. 12170 of November 14, 1979, blocking all Iranian government property in the United States, and E.O 12205 (April 7, 1980) and E.O. 12211 (April 17, 1980) banning virtually all U.S. trade with Iran. The latter two orders were issued just prior to the failed April 24-25, 1980, U.S. effort to rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages held by Iran. President Jimmy Carter also broke diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. The trade-related orders (12205 and 12211) were revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981, following the “Algiers Accords” (hereafter: “Accords”) that resolved the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis.

2 In 1990, $200 million was paid from the Trust Fund to Iran to settle some FMS cases. In 1991, the United States paid $278 million from the separate Treasury Department Judgment Fund to settle some additional FMS cases.
direct U.S. dollar transfers to Iranian banks, the funds were remitted to Iran in foreign hard currency from the central banks of the Netherlands and of Switzerland. Some remaining claims involving the FMS program with Iran remain under arbitration.

**Other Iranian Assets Frozen**

Iranian assets in the United States remain blocked under several provisions, including Executive Order 13599 of February 2010.

- About $1.9 billion in blocked Iranian assets are bonds belonging to Iran’s Central Bank, in a Citibank account in New York belonging to Clearstream, a Luxembourg-based securities firm. In 2008, Clearstream allegedly improperly allowed those funds to access the U.S. financial system. Clearstream transferred $1.67 billion to its accounts in Luxembourg and those proceeds have been deemed by Luxembourg courts as outside U.S. jurisdiction.

- About $50 million of Iran’s assets frozen in the United States consists of Iranian diplomatic property and accounts, including the former Iranian embassy in Washington, DC, and 10 other properties in several states, and related accounts.3

- Among other frozen Iranian assets are real estate holdings of the Assa Company, a UK-chartered entity, which allegedly was maintaining the interests of Iran’s Bank Melli in a 36-story office building in New York City and several other properties around the United States (in Texas, California, Virginia, Maryland, and other parts of New York City). An Iranian foundation, the Alavi Foundation, allegedly is an investor in the properties. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York blocked these properties in 2009. The Department of the Treasury report avoids valuing real estate holdings. In June 2017, the United States won control over the New York City office building through litigation.

**Use of Iranian Assets to Compensate U.S. Victims of Iranian Terrorism**4

Nearly $50 billion in court awards have been made to victims of Iranian terrorism. These include the families of the 241 U.S. soldiers killed in the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. U.S. funds equivalent to the $400 million balance in the DOD account (see above) have been used to pay a small portion of these judgments. The Algiers Accords apparently precluded compensation for the 52 U.S. diplomats held hostage by Iran from November 1979 until January 1981. The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (Section 404 of P.L. 114-113) set up a mechanism for paying damages to the U.S. embassy hostages using settlements paid by various banks for concealing Iran-related transactions, and proceeds from other Iranian frozen assets.

Other past financial disputes include the errant U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States paid Iran $61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248 Iranians killed. The United States did not compensate Iran for the airplane itself, although


4 For details on these issues, see CRS In Focus IF10341, Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act: Eligibility and Funding, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10104, It Belongs in a Museum: Sovereign Immunity Shields Iranian Antiquities Even When It Does Not Protect Iran, by Stephen P. Mulligan; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10140, Iran’s Central Bank Asks Supreme Court to Consider Whether the Bank’s Assets Abroad are Immune from Attachment to Satisfy Terror Judgments, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
officials involved in the negotiations told CRS in November 2012 that the United States later arranged to provide a substitute used aircraft to Iran.

**Executive Order 13599 Impounding Iran-Owned Assets**

Executive Order 13599 (February 5, 2012) blocks U.S.-based assets of entities determined to be “owned or controlled by the Iranian government.” The order was issued to implement Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) that imposed secondary U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank. The order requires that U.S. banks block U.S.-based assets of the Central Bank of Iran or any Iranian government-controlled entity. The order goes beyond the regulations issued pursuant to the 1995 imposition of the U.S. trade ban with Iran, in which U.S. banks are required to refuse such transactions. Even before the issuance of the order, successive Administrations had designated many entities as “owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.”

Numerous designations have been made under Executive Order 13599, including the June 4, 2013, naming of 38 entities (mostly oil, petrochemical, and investment companies) that are components of an Iranian entity called the “Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order” (EIKO). The Department of the Treasury characterizes EIKO as an Iranian leadership entity that controls “massive off-the-books investments.”

**Implementation of the JCPOA.** To implement the JCPOA, many 13599-designated entities (in JCPOA “Attachment 3”) were “delisted” from U.S. secondary sanctions (no longer considered “Specially Designated Nationals,” SDNs) in early 2016 and instead referred to as “designees blocked solely pursuant to E.O 13599,” a characterization that permits foreign entities to conduct transactions with the listed entities but bars U.S. persons from conducting transactions with them. In concert with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, virtually all of the 13599-designated entities were relisted as SDNs on November 5, 2018.

**Civilian Nuclear Entity Exception.** Among those entities “relisted” as Iranian owned entities were the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and 23 of its subsidiaries. However, the Administration did not relist these entities as subject to secondary sanctions (SDNs) under E.O. 13382, in order to facilitate continued international work with Iran’s permitted civilian nuclear program. The subsequent ending of most sanctions waivers for nuclear technical assistance to Iran prohibits work almost all work with AEOI entities.

**Sanctions for Iran’s Support for Militant Groups**

After about five years during which no U.S. sanctions were imposed on Iran, the United States imposed sanctions for Iran’s support for regional groups committing acts of terrorism. The Secretary of State designated Iran a “state sponsor of terrorism” on January 23, 1984, following the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah. The designation triggers substantial sanctions. None of the laws or executive orders in this section were waived or revoked to implement the JCPOA, and no entities discussed in this section were “delisted” from sanctions.

---


6 For entities designated under E.O. 13599, see: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/13599/13599list.pdf.

7 U.S. diplomatic “non-paper” provided to CRS.
Sanctions Triggered by Terrorism List Designation

The U.S. naming of Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism”—commonly referred to as Iran’s inclusion on the U.S. “terrorism list”—triggers several sanctions. The designation was made under the authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as amended), sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of international terrorism. The sanctions triggered by the designation are as follows:

- **Restrictions on sales of U.S. dual use items.** The Export Administration Act, as superseded by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (in P.L. 115-232), requires a presumption of denial of any license applications to sell dual use items to Iran. Enforcement is through Export Administration Regulations (EARs) administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Commerce Department.

- **Ban on direct U.S. financial assistance and arms sales to Iran.** Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act, FAA (P.L. 87-95) and Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended) bar U.S. foreign assistance (U.S. government loans, credits, credit guarantees, and Ex-Im Bank loan guarantees) to terrorism list countries. Successive foreign aid appropriations laws since the late 1980s have banned direct assistance to Iran, and with no waiver provisions. Under the FY2012 foreign operations appropriation (Section 7041(c)(2) of P.L. 112-74), the Ex-Im Bank cannot finance any entity sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act.

- **Requirement to oppose multilateral lending.** U.S. officials are required to use the country’s “voice and vote” to oppose multilateral lending to any terrorism list country by Section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118, as amended [added by Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132)]). The law provides waiver authority, for example to support an international loan in humanitarian circumstances.

- **Withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell arms to terrorism list countries.** Under Sections 620G and 620H of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as added by Sections 325 and 326 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold foreign aid from any country that aids or sells arms to a terrorism list country. Waiver authority is provided. Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a crime for a U.S. person to conduct transactions with terrorism list governments.

- **Withholding of U.S. Aid to Organizations That Assist Iran.** Section 307 of the FAA (added in 1985) names Iran as unable to benefit from U.S. contributions to international organizations, and require proportionate cuts if these institutions work in Iran. For example, if an international organization spends 3% of its budget for programs in Iran, then the United States is required to withhold 3% of its contribution to that international organization. No waiver option is provided.

**Exception for U.S. Humanitarian Aid**

The terrorism list designation, and other U.S. sanctions laws barring assistance to Iran, do not bar U.S. disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of two earthquakes in Iran in 1997; $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June 2002, earthquake; and $5.7 million in assistance for victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, which killed 40,000. The U.S. military flew 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam. The Trump
Administration has offered Iran assistance, via the World Health Organization, to help it battle the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020, but, as of mid-April 2020, Iran has refused the aid.

**Requirements for Removal from Terrorism List**

Terminating the sanctions triggered by Iran’s terrorism list designation would require Iran’s removal from the terrorism list. The Arms Export Control Act spells out two different requirements for a President to remove a country from the list, depending on whether the country’s regime has changed.

*If the country’s regime has changed:* the President can remove a country from the list immediately by certifying that regime change in a report to Congress.

*If the country’s regime has not changed:* the President must report to Congress 45 days in advance of the effective date of removal. The President must certify that (1) the country has not supported international terrorism within the preceding six months, and (2) the country has provided assurances it will not do so in the future. In this latter circumstance, Congress has the opportunity to block the removal by enacting a joint resolution to that effect. The President has the option of vetoing the joint resolution, and blocking the removal then requires a veto override.

### Sanctions on States “Not Cooperating” Against Terrorism

Section 40A to the Arms Export Control Act (added by Section 330 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132)) prohibits the sale or licensing of U.S. defense articles and services to any country designated (by each May 15) as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.” The President can waive the provision upon determining that a defense sale is “important to the national interests” of the United States.

Every year since this was enacted, Iran has been designated as a country that is “not fully cooperating” with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. However, the provision is largely redundant with other laws that prohibit U.S. defense sales to Iran.

### Executive Order 13224 Sanctioning Terrorism-Supporting Entities

Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) mandates the freezing of the U.S.-based assets of, and a ban on U.S. transactions with, entities determined by the Administration to be supporting international terrorism. E.O. 13224, issued two weeks after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, targeted Al Qaeda, but it has subsequently been used to also target Iran. On September 10, 2019, the Administration amended E.O. 13224 to authorize barring from the U.S. financial system any foreign bank determined to have “conducted or facilitated any significant transaction” with any person or entity designated under the order.

**CAATSA Application to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**

Section 105 of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44, August 2, 2017), mandates the imposition of E.O. 13324 penalties on the IRGC and its officials, agents, and affiliates by October 30, 2017 (90 days after enactment). The Treasury Department made the designation of the IRGC as a terrorism-supporting entity under E.O. 13224 on October 13, 2017.

---

8 The Order was issued under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code.

9 For text of the amendments to the Order, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-modernizing-sanctions-combat-terrorism/
Implementation of E.O. 13224

Successive Administrations have used the Order extensively to sanction Iran-related entities, including members of Iran-allied organizations, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and entities involved in financing or facilitating Iran’s regional operations. The Iran-related entities designated under E.O. 13224 are shown in the tables later in the report. The Trump Administration has used the Order to sanction Iranian economic entities that furnish funds for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its regional activities. No entities designated under E.O. 13224 were delisted to implement the JCPOA.

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designations

The State Department has authority under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8.U.S.C. 1189) to designate an entity as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The designation carries penalties similar to those of E.O. 13224, but also subjects any U.S. person (or person under U.S. jurisdiction) who “knowingly provides material support or resources to an FTO, or attempts or conspires to do so to “fine or up to 20 years in prison.” A bank that commits such a violation is subject to fines.

Implementation: The following organizations have been designated as FTOs for acts of terrorism on behalf of Iran or are organizations assessed as funded and supported by Iran:

- **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).** Designated April 8, 2019. On April 22, 2019, the State Department guidelines for implementing the designation indicating that it would not penalize routine diplomatic or humanitarian-related dealings with the IRGC by U.S. partner countries or nongovernmental entities.10
- **Lebanese Hezbollah.**
- **Kata’ib Hezbollah (KAH).** Iran-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia.
- **Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq (AAH).** Iran-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia (designated Jan. 3, 2020)
- **Hamas.** Sunni, Islamist Palestinian organization that essentially controls the Gaza Strip.
- **Palestine Islamic Jihad.** Small Sunni Islamist Palestinian militant group.
- **Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade.** Secular Palestinian militant group.
- **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).** Leftwing secular Palestinian group based mainly in Syria.
- **Al Ashtar Brigades.** Bahrain militant opposition group.

Other Sanctions on Iran’s “Malign” Regional Activities

Some sanctions have been imposed to try to curtail Iran’s destabilizing influence in the region.

Executive Order 13438 on Threats to Iraq’s Stability

- Issued on July 7, 2007, the order blocks U.S.-based property of persons who are determined by the Administration to “have committed, or pose a significant risk of committing” acts of violence that threaten the peace and stability of Iraq, or

---

undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction or political reform in Iraq. The order extends to persons designated as materially assisting such designees. Persons sanctioned under the order include IRGC-Qods Force officers, Iraqi Shiite militia-linked figures, and other entities, some of which play prominent roles in Iraq’s parliament and political structure.

Executive Order 13572 on Repression of the Syrian People.
- Issued on April 29, 2011, the order blocks the U.S.-based property of persons determined to be responsible for human rights abuses and repression of the Syrian people. The IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), IRGC-QF commanders, and others are sanctioned under this order.

Hezbollah-Specific Financial Sanctions
- The Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (P.L. 114-102) and Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-272). The latter Act was signed on October 23, 2018, the 25th anniversary of the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut. The original law, modeled on the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (“CISADA,” see below), excludes from the U.S. financial system any bank that conducts transactions with Hezbollah or its affiliates or partners. The 2018 amendment also authorizes the blocking of U.S.-based property of and U.S. transactions with any “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” that conducts joint operations with or provides financing or arms to Lebanese Hezbollah. These latter provisions target Iran, but are largely redundant with other sanctions on Iran.

Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment with Iran
In 1995, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) banning U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. The order superseded and broadened Executive Order 12957, which was issued two months earlier (March 15, 1995), which barred U.S. investment in Iran’s energy sector. The March 1995 order accompanied President Clinton’s declaration of a “state of emergency” with respect to Iran. E.O 13059 (August 19, 1997) added a prohibition on U.S. companies’ knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined for Iran. Each March since 1995, the Administration in power has renewed the “state of emergency” with respect to Iran.

Section 103 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) codified the trade ban and reinstated the full ban on imports that had earlier been relaxed by April 2000 regulations. That relaxation allowed importation into the United States of Iranian nuts, fruit products (such as pomegranate juice), carpets, and caviar.

---

11 The executive order was issued not only under the authority of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; IEEPA) but also the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9) and §301 of Title 3, United States Code. IEEPA gives the President wide powers to regulate commerce with a foreign country when a "state of emergency" is declared in relations with that country, and to alter regulations to license transactions with Iran—regulations enumerated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian Transactions Regulations, ITRs).

12 Imports were mainly of artwork for exhibitions around the United States, which are counted as imports even though
Section 101 of the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293) codified the ban on U.S. investment in Iran, but gave the President authority to terminate this sanction with notification to Congress.

JCPOA-Related Easing and Subsequent Reversal. In accordance with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA, the ITRs were relaxed to allow U.S. importation of the Iranian luxury goods discussed above (carpets, caviar, nuts, etc.), but not to permit general U.S.-Iran trade. U.S. regulations were also altered to permit the sale of commercial aircraft to non-sanctioned Iranian airlines. In concert with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the easing of the regulations to allow for importation of Iranian carpets and other luxury goods was reversed on August 6, 2018.

What U.S.-Iran Trade Is Allowed or Prohibited?

The following provisions apply to the U.S. trade ban on Iran as specified in regulations (Iran Transaction Regulations, ITRs) pursuant to the orders and laws discussed above. The regulations are administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

- **Energy Transactions.** U.S. transactions with Iran in energy products are banned. The 1995 trade ban (E.O. 12959) expanded a 1987 ban on imports from Iran that was imposed by Executive Order 12613 of October 29, 1987, which was authorized by Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9). The 1987 Order barred the importation of Iranian oil into the United States but did not ban the trading of Iranian oil overseas. The 1995 ban prohibits that activity explicitly, but provides for U.S. companies to apply for licenses to conduct “swaps” of Caspian Sea oil with Iran. These swaps have been prohibited in practice, beginning with the denial of a Mobil Corporation application to do so in April 1999. The regulations do not ban the importation, from foreign refiners, of gasoline or other energy products in which Iranian oil is mixed with oil from other producers, because such refined oil is considered to be a product of the country where it is refined.

- **Transshipment and Brokering.** The regulations prohibit U.S. transshipment of prohibited goods across Iran, and ban any activities by U.S. persons to broker commercial transactions involving Iran.

- **Shipping Insurance.** Iran requires shipping insurance in order to transport its exports. A pool of 13 major insurance organizations, called the International Group of P & I (Property and Indemnity) Clubs, dominates the shipping insurance industry and is based in New York. The U.S. location of this pool renders it subject to the U.S. trade ban, but waivers of Sections 212 and 213 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA) were issued to enable numerous insurers to give Iranian ships insurance during the period of U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. This waiver ended on August 6, 2018.

---

13 The text of the guidance is at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf.

14 Shipping insurers granted the waiver included Assuranceforeningen Skuld, Skuld Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Ltd. (Bermuda), Gard P and I Ltd. (Bermuda), Assuranceforeningen Gard, the Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, The North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association Ltd., the Shipowners’ Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg), the Standard Club Ltd., the Standard Club Europe Ltd., The Standard Club Asia, the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Bermuda), the Swedish Club, United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association Ltd. (Bermuda), United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Association
• **Civilian Airline Sales.** The regulations have always permitted the licensing of goods related to the safe operation of civilian aircraft for sale to Iran and spare parts sales have always been licensed periodically.\(^\text{15}\) However, from June 2011 until JCPOA implementation in 2016, Iran’s largest state-owned airline, Iran Air, as well as other Iranian airlines were sanctioned under Executive Order 13382 and 13224, rendering sales of spare parts impermissible. In accordance with the JCPOA, the United States relaxed restrictions to allow for the sale to Iran of finished commercial aircraft, including to Iran Air, which was “delisted” from sanctions.\(^\text{16}\) A March 2016 general license was issued to permit those sales. Pre-existing licensing restrictions went back into effect on August 6, 2018. Sales of some aircraft spare parts (“dual use items”) to Iran also require a waiver of the relevant provision of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, discussed below.

• **Personal Communications, Remittances, and Publishing.** The ITRs permit personal communications (phone calls, emails) between the United States and Iran, personal remittances to Iran, and Americans to engage in publishing activities with entities in Iran (and Cuba and Sudan).

• **Information Technology Equipment.** CISADA exempts from the U.S. ban on exports to Iran information technology to support personal communications among the Iranian people and goods for supporting democracy in Iran. In May 2013, OFAC issued a general license for the exportation to Iran of goods (such as cell phones) and services, on a fee basis, that enhance the ability of the Iranian people to access communication technology.

• **Food and Medical Exports.** Since April 1999, sales to Iran by U.S. firms of food and medical products (humanitarian items) have been generally permitted, although in many cases a specific license issued by OFAC is required. In October 2012, OFAC permitted the sale to Iran of specified medical products, such as scalpels, prosthetics, canes, burn dressings, and other products, that could be sold to Iran under “general license” (no specific license required). This list of general license items list was expanded in 2013 and 2016 to include more sophisticated medical diagnostic machines and other medical equipment. Licenses for exports of medical products not on the general license list are routinely expedited for sale to Iran, according to OFAC. The regulations have a specific definition of “food” that can be sold to Iran (excludes alcohol, cigarettes, gum, or fertilizer).

• **Humanitarian and Related Services.** Donations by U.S. residents directly to Iranians (such as packages of food, toys, clothes, etc.) are permitted, but U.S. relief organizations operating in Iran are required to obtain a specific OFAC license to work there. On September 10, 2013, General License E was issued that allows relief organizations to conduct activities (up to a value of $500,000 in one year) without a specific licensing requirement, including (1) providing Iran services for health projects, disaster relief, wildlife conservation; (2) conducting human rights projects there; or (3) undertaking activities related to sports matches and events. The policy allows importation from Iran of services related to sporting activities, including sponsorship of players, coaching, referees, and

---

\(^{15}\) (§560.528 of Title 31, C.F.R.),

\(^{16}\) “Exclusive: Boeing Says Gets U.S. License to Sell Spare Parts to Iran,” Reuters, April 4, 2014.
training. In the cases of earthquakes in Iran in 2003 and the 2012, OFAC has issued blanket temporary general licensing for relief work in Iran.

- **Payment Methods, Trade Financing, and Financing Guarantees.** U.S. importers are allowed to pay Iranian exporters for approved imports, but the payment cannot go directly to Iranian banks, and must instead pass through third-country banks. Regulations provide that transactions that are *incidental* to an approved transaction are allowed, meaning that financing (“letter of credit”) for approved transactions are normally approved (as long as there is no involvement of an Iranian bank). Title IX of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387) bans the use of official credit guarantees (such as the Ex-Im Bank) for food and medical sales to Iran and other countries on the U.S. terrorism list, except Cuba, although allowing for a presidential waiver to permit such credit guarantees. The Ex-Im Bank is prohibited from guaranteeing any loans to Iran because of Iran’s presence on the terrorism list.

### Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms

The regulations do not ban foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary is not “controlled” by the parent company. Most foreign subsidiaries are legally considered foreign persons subject to the laws of the country in which the subsidiaries are incorporated. Section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158) holds “controlled” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to the same standards as U.S. parent firms, defining a controlled subsidiary as (1) one that is more than 50% owned by the U.S. parent; (2) one in which the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of Directors of the subsidiary; or (3) one in which the parent firm directs the operations of the subsidiary. There is no waiver provision.

During the U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, the United States licensed “controlled” foreign subsidiaries to conduct transactions with Iran through “General License H: Authorizing Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person.” The President has authority under IEEPA to license transactions with Iran, the ITRSHRA notwithstanding. The Trump Administration revoked General License H and restored the pre-JCPOA licensing policy (“Statement of Licensing Policy,” SLP) on November 6, 2018.

---

17 Text of 31 CFR 598.405: Transactions incidental to a licensed transaction. Any transaction ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction and necessary to give effect to the licensed transaction is also authorized by the license.

18 The text of General License H can be found at Treasury Department: Archive of Revoked and Expired General Licenses. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/general_license_archive.aspx#iran
Sanctions on Iran’s Energy Sector

In 1996, Congress and the executive branch began to pressure Iran’s energy sector, with the stated aim of denying Iran the financial resources to support terrorist organizations and other armed factions or to further its nuclear and WMD programs. Iran’s oil sector is as old as the petroleum industry itself (early 20th century), and Iran’s onshore oil fields are in need of substantial investment. Since 2011, Iran has been reducing its dependence on oil and gas revenues, to the point where Iran’s 2020-2021 budget assumes minimal revenue from oil sales.

The Iran Sanctions Act

This section includes sanctions triggers under the Act that were added by subsequent laws.

The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) has been a pivotal component of U.S. sanctions against Iran’s energy sector. Since its enactment in 1996, ISA’s provisions have been expanded and extended to other Iranian industries. ISA sought to thwart Iran’s 1995 opening of the sector to foreign investment in late 1995 through a “buy-back” program in which foreign firms gradually recoup their investments as oil and gas is produced. It was first enacted as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA, P.L. 104-172, signed on August 5, 1996) but was later retitled the Iran Sanctions Act after it terminated with respect to Libya in 2006. ISA was the first major “extra-territorial sanction” on Iran—a sanction that authorizes U.S. penalties against third country firms.

Key Sanctions “Triggers” Under ISA

ISA consists of a number of “triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA’s provisions. (All triggers were waived during JCPOA implementation and reinstated in 2018, unless specified below.)

Trigger 1 (Original Trigger): “Investment” To Develop Iran’s Oil and Gas Fields

The core trigger of ISA when it was first enacted was a requirement that the President sanction companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment” of more than $20 million in one year in

---


20 Basic data on Iran’s energy sector, including reserves, exports, pipeline projects, and related issues can be found in: Energy Information Agency. Background Reference: Iran. January 7, 2019.

Iran’s energy sector. As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195) and P.L. 107-24, the definitions of sanctionable activity under ISA includes: construction of pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects; sales of energy-related equipment to Iran (if such sales are structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures); equity and royalty arrangements and any contract that includes “responsibility for the development of petroleum resources” of Iran; and additions to existing investment. CISADA also clarified that the definition of energy sector includes liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG.

**Trigger 2: Sales of WMD and Related Technologies, Advanced Conventional Weaponry, and Participation in Uranium Mining Ventures**

The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, September 30, 2006) added Section 5(b)(1) of ISA, subjecting to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to have sold to Iran (1) “chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies” or (2) “destabilizing numbers and types” of advanced conventional weapons. Sanctions can be applied if the exporter knew (or had cause to know) that the end-user of the item was Iran. The definitions do not specifically include ballistic or cruise missiles, but those weapons could be considered “related technologies.”

The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158, signed August 10, 2012) created Section 5(b)(2) of ISA subjecting to sanctions entities determined by the Administration to participate in a joint venture with Iran relating to the mining, production, or transportation of uranium.

**Implementation:** This provision of ISA was not waived under the JCPOA. No ISA sanctions have been imposed on any entities under this provision.

**Trigger 3: Sales of Gasoline to Iran**

Section 102(a) of the CISADA (mentioned above) amended Section 5 of ISA to sanction Iran’s importation of gasoline. Its enactment followed legislation, such as P.L. 111-85, that prohibited the use of U.S. funds to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with products from firms that sell gasoline to Iran; and P.L. 111-117 that denied Ex-Im Bank credits to any firm that sold gasoline or related equipment to Iran. The section sanctions:

- Sales to Iran of over $1 million worth in a single transaction (or $5 million in multiple transactions a one-year period) of gasoline and related aviation and other fuels. (Fuel oil, a petroleum by-product, was not defined as sanctionable.)
- Sales to Iran of equipment or services (same dollar threshold as above) which would help Iran make or import gasoline. Examples include equipment and services for Iran’s oil refineries or port operations.

---

22 Under §4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. P.L. 111-195 set the threshold investment level at $20 million.
Trigger 4: Provision of Equipment or Services for Oil, Gas, and Petrochemicals Production

Section 201 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHA, P.L. 112-158, August 10, 2012) codified an Executive Order, 13590 (November 21, 2011), by adding Section 5(a)(5 and 6) to ISA sanctioning firms that:

- Provide to Iran $1 million or more in a single transaction (or a total of $5 million in multiple transactions in a one-year period) worth of goods or services that Iran could use to maintain or enhance its oil and gas sector. This subjects to sanctions, for example, transactions with Iran by global oil services firms and the sale to Iran of energy industry equipment such as drills, pumps, vacuums, and oil rigs.

- Provide to Iran $250,000 in a single transaction (or $1 million in multiple transactions in a one-year period) worth of goods or services that Iran could use to maintain or expand its production of petrochemical products.23

Trigger 5: Transporting Iranian Crude Oil

Section 201 of the ITRSHRA amends ISA by sanctioning entities the Administration determines:

- owns a vessel that was used to transport Iranian crude oil. The section also authorizes but does not require the President to prohibit a ship from putting to port in the United States for two years, if it is owned by a person sanctioned under this provision (adds Section 5[a][7] to ISA). This sanction does not apply in cases of transporting oil to countries that have received exemptions under P.L. 112-81 (discussed below).

- participated in a joint oil and gas development venture with Iran, outside Iran, if that venture was established after January 1, 2002. The effective date exempts energy ventures in the Caspian Sea, such as the Shah Deniz oil field (adds Section 5[a][4] to ISA).

Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA): ISA sanctions on shipping insurance, Iranian bonds, and dealings with the IRGC

Separate provisions of the ITRSHRA Act—which do not amend and were not formally incorporated into ISA—require the application of ISA sanctions (five out of the 12 sanctions on the ISA menu) on any entity that:

- provides insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) (Section 212).

- purchases or facilitates the issuance of sovereign debt of the government of Iran, including Iranian government bonds (Section 213).

- assists or engages in a significant transaction with the IRGC or any of its sanctioned entities or affiliates. (Section 302). This section was not waived to implement the JCPOA.

- Section 312 of ITRSHRA required an Administration determination, within 45 days of enactment (by September 24, 2012) whether NIOC and NITC are IRGC agents or affiliates. The determination would subject financial transactions with NIOC and NITC to CISADA sanctions (see below).

**Implementation.** On September 24, 2012, the Department of the Treasury determined that NIOC and NITC are affiliates of the IRGC. On November 8, 2012, the Department of the Treasury named NIOC as a proliferation entity under Executive Order 13382—a designation that, in accordance with Section 104 of CISADA, bars any foreign bank determined to have dealt directly with NIOC (including with a NIOC bank account in a foreign country) from opening or maintaining a U.S.-based account. NIOC and NITC were delisted under the JCPOA, but they were “relisted” on November 5, 2018.

**Executive Order 13622/13846: Sanctions on the Purchase of Iranian Crude Oil and Petrochemical Products, and Dealings in Iranian Bank Notes**

**Status:** 13622 (July 30, 2012) revoked (by E.O. 13716, January 2016) but was put back into effect by E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018

Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012) imposed specified sanctions on the ISA sanctions menu, and bars banks from the U.S. financial system, for the following activities:

- the purchase of oil, other petroleum, or petrochemical products from Iran.
- transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO).

E.O. 13622 also blocked U.S.-based property of entities determined to have

- assisted or provided goods or services to NIOC, NICO, the Central Bank of Iran. This sanction was reinstated as of November 6, 2018.
- assisted the government of Iran in the purchase of U.S. bank notes or precious metals, precious stones, or jewels. (The provision for precious stones or jewels was added to this order by E.O. 16345 below.) This sanction was reinstated by E.O. 13846, effective as of August 7, 2018.

E.O. 13622 sanctions do not apply if the parent country of the entity has received an importation exception under Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81, discussed below. An exception also is provided for pre-existing projects that bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey.

**Mandate and Time Frame to Investigate ISA Violations**

In the original version of ISA, there was no firm requirement, and no time limit, for the Administration to investigate potential violations and determine that a firm has violated ISA’s provisions. The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added a provision recommending, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination.25 CISADA (Section 102[8][5]) mandated that the Administration begin an investigation of potential

---


25 Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-laundering for use to further WMD programs.
ISA violations when there is “credible information” about a potential violation, and made mandatory the 180-day time limit for a determination of violation.

ITRSHRA defines “credible information” needed to begin an investigation of a violation to include a corporate announcement or corporate filing to its shareholders that it has undertaken transactions with Iran. It also says the President may use as credible information reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service. Section 219 of ITRSHRA requires that an investigation begin if a company reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it has engaged in activities that would violate ISA (or Section 104 of CISADA or transactions with entities designated under E.O 13224 or 13382, see below).

**Oversight**

ITRSHRA added several mechanisms for Congress to oversee whether the Administration is investigating ISA violations. Section 223 of that law required a Government Accountability Office report, within 120 days of enactment, and another such report a year later, on companies that have undertaken specified activities with Iran that might constitute violations of ISA. Section 224 amended a reporting requirement in Section 110(b) of CISADA by requiring an Administration report to Congress every 180 days on investment in Iran’s energy sector, joint ventures with Iran, and estimates of Iran’s imports and exports of petroleum products.
ISA Sanctions Menu

For companies that the President determines violated ISA, the original version of ISA required the imposition of two of a menu of six sanctions on that firm. The Iran Freedom Support Act added three new possible sanctions and required the imposition of at least three out of the nine against violators. CISADA added three more sanctions to the ISA menu and required imposition of at least 5 out of the 12 sanctions. Executive Orders 13590 and 13622 provide for exactly the same penalties as those in ISA. The 12 available sanctions against the sanctioned entity, from which the Secretary of State or the Treasury can select, are as follows:

1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity (original ISA)
2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity (original ISA)
3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year to the entity (original ISA)
4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts as one sanction) (original ISA)
5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity (original ISA)
6. prohibition on transactions in foreign exchange by the entity (added by CISADA)
7. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution (added by CISADA)
8. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-based property which the sanctioned entity has a (financial) interest in (added by CISADA)
9. restriction on imports from the sanctioned entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701) (original ISA)
10. a ban on a U.S. person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a sanctioned person (added by ITRSHRA)
11. exclusion from the United States of corporate officers or controlling shareholders of a sanctioned firm (added by ITRSHRA)
12. imposition of any of the ISA sanctions on principal offices of a sanctioned firm (added by ITRSHRA).

Mandatory Sanction: Prohibition on Contracts with the U.S. Government

CISADA (§102[b]) added a requirement in ISA that companies, as a condition of obtaining a U.S. government contract, certify to the relevant U.S. government agency that the firm—and any companies it owns or controls—are not violating ISA. Regulations to implement this requirement were issued on September 29, 2010.

Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011 and E.O. 13628 of October 9, 2012, specify which sanctions are to be imposed. E.O. 13574 stipulated that, when an entity is sanctioned under Section 5 of ISA, the penalties to be imposed are numbers 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9, above. E.O. 13628 updated that specification to also include ISA sanctions numbers 11 and 12. The orders also clarify that it is the responsibility of the Department of the Treasury to implement those ISA sanctions that involve the financial sectors. E.O. 13574 and 13628 were revoked by E.O. 13716 on Implementation Day, in accordance with the JCPOA. They were reinstated, and superseded, by E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018, which mandated that, when ISA sanctions are to be imposed, that the sanctions include ISA sanctions numbers 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12.

Interpretations of ISA and Related Laws

The sections below provide information on how key ISA provisions have been applied.

Application to Energy Pipelines

As noted above, ISA’s definition of “investment” has been consistently interpreted by successive Administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran because pipelines help Iran develop its petroleum (oil and natural gas) sector. In March 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton clarified that the Obama Administration interpreted the provision to be applicable from the beginning of pipeline construction.26

Application to Crude Oil Purchases/Shipments

ISA does not sanction purchasing crude oil from Iran, but other laws, such as the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA, discussed below) and executive orders, do. No U.S. sanction requires any country or person to actually seize, intercept, inspect on the high seas, or impound any Iranian ship suspected of carrying oil or other cargo subject to sanctions. However, as discussed further below, in August 2019, the Trump Administration began using various terrorism-related provisions to sanction some Iranian oil shipments and persons involved in shipping Iranian oil. The Administration has argued that the shipments were organized by and for the benefit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On September 4, 2019, the OFAC updated its sanctions guidance to state that “bunkering services” (port operational support) for Iranian oil shipments could subject firms and individuals to U.S. sanctions.

Application to Purchases from Iran of Natural Gas

ISA and other laws, such as IFCA, exclude from sanction purchases of natural gas from Iran or natural gas transactions with Iran. However, construction of gas pipelines involving Iran is subject to ISA sanctions. And, sanctions on financial transactions with Iran impede implementation of purchase agreements for Iranian gas.

The effective dates of U.S. sanctions laws and orders exclude long-standing joint natural gas projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and related pipelines in the Caspian Sea. Iran’s NICO holds a passive 10% share in Shah Deniz, which also includes BP, Azerbaijan’s natural gas firm SOCAR, Russia’s Lukoil, and other firms. NICO is a sanctioned entity under ISA and other provisions, but an OFAC factsheet of November 28, 2012, stated that the Shah Deniz consortium, as a whole, is not determined to be “a person owned or controlled by” the government of Iran and transactions with the consortium are permissible.

Application to Iranian Liquefied Natural Gas Development

The original version of ISA did not apply to the development by Iran of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capability. Iran has not developed an LNG export capability to date. CISADA specifically included LNG in the ISA definition of petroleum resources and therefore made subject to sanctions LNG investment in Iran and supply of LNG tankers to Iran.

Application to Private Financing but Not Official Credit Guarantee Agencies

The ISA definition of investment includes financing for investment in Iran’s energy sector, or for sales of gasoline and refinery-related equipment and services. However, the definitions of financial institutions are interpreted not to apply to official credit guarantee agencies, such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes. These credit guarantee agencies are arms of their parent governments, and ISA does not provide for sanctioning governments or their agencies.

Implementation of Energy-Related Iran Sanctions

Entities sanctioned under the executive orders or laws cited in this section are listed in the tables at the end of this report. As noted, some of the orders cited provide for blocking U.S.-based assets of the entities designated for sanctions. OFAC has not publicly reported on the accounts, if any, that have been blocked under the orders or laws discussed in this section, and the entities sanctioned likely do not have a financial presence in the United States.
**Oil Export Sanctions: FY2012 NDAA Sanctioning the Central Bank**

In 2011, Congress sought to reduce Iran’s exportation of oil by imposing sanctions on financial transactions with Iran’s Central Bank, which receives Iran’s oil payments worldwide. President Obama, in his signing statement on the bill, indicated he would implement the provision so as not to damage U.S. relations with U.S. partner countries, many of whom were purchasers of Iranian oil. Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 112-81, December 31, 2011):

---

27 This termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293 formally removed Libya from the act. Application of the act to Libya terminated on April 23, 2004, with a determination that Libya had fulfilled U.N. requirements.
• Requires the President to prevent a foreign bank from opening an account in the United States—or impose strict limitations on existing U.S. accounts—if that bank is determined to have conducted a “significant financial transaction” with Iran’s Central Bank or with any sanctioned Iranian bank.

• The provision applies to a foreign central bank only if the transaction with Iran’s Central Bank is to pay for oil purchases.

• **Significant Reduction Exception (SRE):** The law provides incentive for Iran’s oil buyers to reduce purchases of Iranian oil by providing for an exception (exemption) for the banks of any country determined to have “significantly reduced” its purchases of oil from Iran. To maintain the SRE, countries are required to reduce their oil buys from Iran relative to the previous 180-day period. The law lacks a precise definition of “significant reduction” of oil purchases, but a January 2012 letter by several Senators to the then-Treasury Secretary set that definition at an 18% purchase reduction based on total paid for the Iranian oil (not just volume reduction). The banks of countries given an SRE may continue to conduct any transactions (not just for oil) with the Central Bank or with any sanctioned Iranian bank.

• Sanctions on transactions for oil apply if: the President certifies to Congress every 90 days, based on a report by the Energy Information Administration, that the oil market is adequately supplied, and, an Administration determination every 180 days that there is a sufficient supply of oil worldwide to permit countries to reduce purchases from Iran. The required EIA reports and Administration determinations have been issued at the prescribed intervals.

• **Humanitarian Exception.** Paragraph (2) of Section 1245 exempts transactions with Iran’s Central Bank that are for “the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran” from sanctions. However: the Central Bank’s designation as a terrorist entity under E.O. 13224 on September 20, 2019, voided that exception. In February 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic affected Iran greatly, the Treasury Department issued a General License to permit transactions with Iran’s Central Bank for the purchase of humanitarian items.

**Implementation/SREs Issued and Ended**

The Obama Administration used the FY2012 NDAA to pressure Iran without causing economic difficulty to U.S. allies, other Iran policy partners, or the global oil market. The table below indicates cuts made by major customers compared to 2011. SREs were issued as follows:

- March 20, 2012: Japan
- September 2012 (following a July 2012 EU Iran oil purchase embargo): 10 EU countries - Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Britain
- December 2012: China, India, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Taiwan.

---

28 ITRSHRA amended Section 1245 such that any country that completely ceased purchasing oil from Iran entirely would retain an exception.

29 Text of letter from Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez to Secretary Geithner, January 19, 2012.

SREs Ended in May 2019 and Results

The January 2016 waivers issued to implement the JCPOA suspended the requirement for a country to cut oil purchases from Iran in order to maintain their SREs, and Iran’s oil customers quickly resumed buying Iranian oil. The provision went back into effect on November 5, 2018 in concert with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.31 Eight countries were given SREs and continued to buy Iranian oil: China, India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey.

On April 22, 2019, the State Department announced that no more SREs would be granted after May 2, 2019.32 The Administration indicated that the decision would “apply maximum pressure on the Iranian regime until its leaders change their destructive behavior, respect the rights of the Iranian people, and return to the negotiating table.”33 Senior U.S. officials added that the move sought to drive Iran’s oil exports as close to zero as possible. Entities sanctioned are in the tables at the end of this report. In March 2020, Treasury Department officials warned oil traders of U.S. penalties if they continued to conduct “ship-to-ship” transfers and other mechanisms to conceal trading in Iranian oil.34

Waiver and Termination

The law provides for the President to waive the sanctions for 120 days, renewable for successive 120-day periods, if the President determines that doing so is in the national security interest. This provision was waived to implement both the interim nuclear accord (January 2014 – January 2016), which allowed Iran’s oil customers to maintain purchases level at 1.1 million barrels per day) and to implement the JCPOA. The Trump Administration renewed the waiver for the last time, on January 12, 2018. The law went back into effect on November 5, 2018.

Iran Foreign Account “Restriction” Provision

Section 504 of the ITRSHRA, which went into effect in February 2013, impedes the ability of Iran to repatriate hard currency to its Central Bank, including U.S. dollars that are the primary form of payment for oil. The provision amended Section 1245 of the FY2012 NDAA (adding “clause ii” to Paragraph D[1]) to require that any funds paid to Iran as a result of exempted transactions (oil purchases, for example) be credited to an account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign bank making the transaction. Iran can therefore only use the funds to buy the products of the countries where the funds are held.

The September 25, 2019, designation of the Central Bank as a terrorist entity under E.O. 13224, restricted Iran’s ability to use its Central Bank accounts abroad to pay for imports of humanitarian items because the terrorism designation does not carry a humanitarian exception. The Administration eased that restriction with the February 27, 2020 General License that Iran’s Central Bank accounts could be used for humanitarian transactions (see above).

Waiver

The waiver under the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) applies to the foreign bank account restriction provision, in six month periods. To implement the JCPOA, a waiver was issued under P.L. 112-81

31 Department of State. Background Briefing on President Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from the JCPOA. May 8, 2018
32 See CRS Insight IN11108, Iran Oil Sanctions Exceptions Ended, by Kenneth Katzman.
33 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Decision on Imports of Iranian Oil, April 22, 2019.
(Section 212 and 213) to allow Iran to receive some hard currency from ongoing oil sales in installments, but Iran remained unable to repatriate funds from its accounts abroad. During U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, Sections 212(d)(10 and 2134(b)(1) of ITRSHRA were waived and Iran was able to access the hard currency it received from oil sales. The waiver was last renewed on January 12, 2018, and the restriction went back into effect on November 5, 2018.

**Table 1. Iran Crude Oil Sales**

(average daily volumes, in barrels per day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>520,000 +</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(particularly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, Spain, Greece)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>838,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td>354,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asia</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Unknown (Iraq and UAE swaps, other)</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>negligible</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (mbd)</strong></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Bloomberg News, Reuters, and other press articles. Information on actual Iranian exports is often preliminary and incomplete, and might not reflect activities by Iran and various oil customers to conceal purchases or avoid tracking of oil tankers. Figures do not include purchases of condensates, which are light petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas production. South Korea was a large customer for Iranian condensates and, as of August 2018, it ended its purchases of that product from Iran to zero.

**Note:** mbd = million barrels per day.

### Sanctions on Arms and Weapons-Related Technology Transfers

Several laws and executive orders seek to prevent Iran from obtaining arms and weapons-related technology. Sanctions on Iran’s exportation of arms are discussed in the sections above on sanctions for Iran’s support for terrorist groups. No sanctions in this section were eased to implement JCPOA.
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and Iraq Sanctions Act

The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Title XIV of the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 102-484, signed in October 1992) imposes a number of sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”

Advanced conventional weapons are defined as:

1. such long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low observability aircraft, other radar evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites, electromagnetic weapons, and laser weapons as the President determines destabilize the military balance or enhance the offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways. The definition is generally understood to include technology used to develop ballistic missiles.
2. such advanced command, control, and communications systems, electronic warfare systems, or intelligence collections systems as the President determines destabilize the military balance or enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways; and
3. such other items or systems as the President may, by regulation, determine necessary for the purposes of this title.

Sanctions to be imposed: Sanctions imposed on violating entities include: (1) a ban, for two years, on U.S. government procurement from the entity; (2) a ban, for two years, on licensing U.S. exports to that entity; and (3) authority, but not a requirement, to ban U.S. imports from the entity. If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are: (1) a one-year ban on U.S. assistance to that country; (2) a one-year requirement of a U.S. vote against international loans to it; (3) a one-year suspension of U.S. coproduction agreements with the country; (4) a one-year suspension of technical exchanges with the country in military or dual use technology; (5) a one-year ban on sales of U.S. arms to the country; and (6) an authorization to deny the country most-favored-nation trade status; and to ban U.S. trade with the country.

Section 1603 of the act amended an earlier law, the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586G(a) of P.L. 101-513), to provide for a “presumption of denial” for all dual use exports to Iran.

Waiver: Section 1606 of the act provides a presidential waiver for its provisions, and for sanctions imposed pursuant to the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, if the President determines that it is “essential to the national interest.”

Implementation: A number of entities were sanctioned under the act in the 1990s, as shown in the tables at the end of this paper, but the designations have all expired.

Banning Aid to Countries that Aid or Arm Terrorism List States:

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Another law reinforces the authority of the President to sanction governments that provide aid or sell arms to Iran (and other terrorism list countries). Under Sections 620G and 620H of the Foreign Assistance Act, as added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold foreign aid from any

---

35 The act originally only applied to advanced conventional weapons. The extension to WMD, defined as chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons-related technology was added by the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106).
country that provides to a terrorism list country financial assistance or arms. Waiver authority is provided. Section 321 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act also makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons to conduct financial transactions with terrorism list governments. No foreign assistance cuts or other penalties under this law have been announced.

**Proliferation-Related Provision of the Iran Sanctions Act**

As noted above, Section 5(b)(1) of ISA subjects to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to have sold to Iran (1) technology useful for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or (2) “destabilizing numbers and types” of advanced conventional weapons. This section, and Section 5(b)(2) pertaining to joint ventures to mine uranium, are the only provisions of ISA that were not waived to implement the JCPOA. As noted earlier, no sanctions under these sections have been imposed.

**Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act**

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, signed in March 2000) became the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) after the enactment of laws expanding its provisions to North Korea and to Syria. INKSNA authorizes sanctions—for two years unless renewed—on foreign persons (individuals or companies, not governments) that are determined in a report by the Administration to have assisted Iran’s WMD programs. Sanctions imposed include (1) a prohibition on U.S. exportation of arms and dual use items to the sanctioned entity; and (2) a ban on U.S. government procurement and of imports to the United States from the sanctioned entity under Executive Order 12938 (of November 14, 1994). INKSNA also banned U.S. extraordinary payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space station unless the President certified that the agency had not transferred any WMD or missile technology to Iran within the year prior.

 Entities that have been sanctioned under this law are listed in the tables at the end of the report. Designations more than two years old are no longer active. The JCPOA required the United States to suspend INKSNA sanctions against “the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA.” No INKSNA sanctions were waived.

**Waiver and Termination.** Section 4 gives the President the authority to not impose sanctions if the President justifies that decision to Congress. Section 5 provides for exemptions from sanctions if certain conditions are met, including that the government with jurisdiction over the entity cooperates to stop future such transfers to Iran. There is no automatic sunset or expiration, or stipulated conditions under which an Administration could terminate its application.

**Executive Order 13382 on Proliferation-Supporting Entities**

Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code. The Executive Order 13382 on Proliferation-Supporting Entities

---

36 The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
numerous Iranian or Iran-related entities sanctioned under the order are listed in the tables at the end of this report. Entities delisted and which were to be delisted in accordance with the JCPOA (in October 2023) are in italics and boldface type, respectively. Virtually all entities delisted to implement the JCPOA were relisted on November 5, 2018.

**Arms Transfer and Missile Sanctions: The Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44)**

CAATSA (August 2, 2017) mandates sanctions on arms sales to Iran and on entities that “materially contribute” to Iran’s ballistic missile program.

- Section 104 references E.O. 13382 (see above) and mandates that the same sanctions as in E.O. 13382 be imposed on entities determined by the Administration to be assisting Iran’s ballistic missile program or any system capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The section also requires an Administration report every 180 days on persons contributing to Iran’s ballistic missile program.

- Section 107 mandates the same sanctions as those contained in E.O. 13382 on any person that the President determines has sold or transferred to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran: the weapons systems specified as banned for transfer to or from Iran in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. These include most major combat systems such as tanks, armored vehicles, warships, missiles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The imposition of sanctions is not required if the President certifies that Iran no longer poses a significant threat to the United States or U.S. allies; and that the Iranian government no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

*Implementation.* The CAATSA provisions have been implemented through additional designations for sanctions (SDNs) under the executive orders referenced in CAATSA, primarily E.O. 13382.

**Foreign Aid Restrictions for Named Suppliers of Iran**

Some past foreign aid appropriations have withheld U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. The provision applied to the fiscal year for which foreign aid is appropriated. Because U.S. aid to Russia generally has not gone to the Russian government, little or no funding was withheld as a result of the provision.

**Sanctions on “Countries of Diversion Concern”**

Section 303 of CISADA authorizes the President to designate as a “Destination of Diversion Concern” a country allows substantial diversion of goods, services, or technologies characterized in Section 302 of that law to Iranian end-users or intermediaries. The technologies include any goods that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear or WMD programs, as well as goods listed on the Commerce Control List or Munitions List. For any country designated as a country of diversion concern, there would be prohibition of denial for licenses for U.S. exports to that country of the goods that were reexported or diverted to Iran. To date, no country has been designated a “Country of Diversion Concern.” Some countries, such as the UAE, have adopted or enforced anti-proliferation laws apparently to avoid designation.
Waiver and Termination. The President may waive sanctions on countries designated as of Diversion Concern for 12 months, and additional 12-month periods, pursuant to certification that the country is taking steps to prevent diversions and re-exports. The designation terminates on the date the President certifies to Congress that the country has adequately strengthened its export controls to prevent such diversion and re-exports to Iran in the future. The JCPOA makes no reference to this sanction.

### Summary of Sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Numerous sanctions target Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and none was waived or terminated to implement the JCPOA. The IRGC plays a role in both internal and external defense, supports pro-Iranian movements in the region, and owns or controls economic entities in Iran that account for as much as 20% of Iran’s economic output. Many of the IRGC’s subordinate units, such as the IRGC Qods Force and the Basij militia, have been designated for sanctions under various Executive Orders, as have corporate entities owned or controlled by the IRGC, such as the large engineering firm Khatam ol-Anbia.

- The IRGC has been named as a proliferation-supporting entity under Executive Order 13382, a human rights abuser under E.O. 13553 and, in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44), it was named a terrorism-supporter under E.O. 13224 (October 13, 2017). The IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the unit of the IRGC that assists pro-Iranian movements abroad, is named as a terrorism-supporting entity under Executive Order 13324 and a repressor of the Syrian people under E.O. 13572. Hundreds of IRGC-linked entities—companies, facilitators and financial partners, and commanders—are designated for sanctions under those and other orders, as noted in the tables at the end of this report.

- IFCA (Section 1244) mandates that any entity that knowingly conducts transactions with a designated Iranian entity is subject to having its U.S.-based assets blocked.

- ITRSHRA (Section 302) imposes at least 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions on persons that materially assist, with financing or technology, the IRGC, or assist or engage in “significant” transactions with any of its affiliates that are sanctioned under Executive Order 13382, 13224, or similar executive orders—or which are determined to be affiliates of the IRGC. Section 302 did not amend ISA.

- ITRSHRA (Section 311) requires a certification by a contractor to the U.S. government that it is not knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with the IRGC, or any of its agents or affiliates that have been sanctioned under several executive orders discussed below. A contract may be terminated if it is determined that the company’s certification of compliance was false.

- ITRSHRA (Section 301) requires the President to identify “officials, agents, or affiliates” of the IRGC and to impose sanctions in accordance with Executive Order 13382 or 13224. Some of these designations, including of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), were made by the Treasury Department on November 8, 2012.

- ITRSHRA (Section 303) requires the imposition of sanctions on agencies of foreign governments that provide technical or financial support, or goods and services to sanctioned (under U.S. executive orders or U.N. resolutions) members or affiliates of the IRGC. Sanctions include a ban on U.S. assistance or credits for that foreign government agency, a ban on defense sales to it, a ban on U.S. arms sales to it, and a ban on exports to it of controlled U.S. technology.

- Section 104 of CISADA sanctions foreign banks that conduct significant transactions with the IRGC or any of its agents or affiliates that are sanctioned under any executive order. It also sanctions any entity that assists Iran’s Central Bank efforts to help the IRGC acquire WMD or support international terrorism.

- In October 2018, 20 economic entities, including a steel company and acid and zinc mining firms, were sanctioned under E.O 13224 for providing revenue to the Basij militia, an arm of the IRGC.

- On April 8, 2019, the Trump Administration named the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 819). In addition to the sanctions above, the FTO designation provides for criminal penalties for U.S. persons or any bank that knowingly provides “material support” to an FTO (ex. donations, facilitation of its activities).

- On September 4, 2019, U.S. officials announced that they are using the State Department’s “Rewards for Justice” program that provides reward money for information about potential terrorist plots for Iran. The reward monies are to be used to disrupt Iran’s oil shipments and obtain information on the IRGC’s financial operations. The basis for the Administration use of that program, as well as related sanctions designations in August and September 2019, was an asserted linkage between the IRGC and Iran’s oil exportation.
Financial/Banking Sanctions

U.S. efforts to shut Iran out of the international banking system were a key component of the 2010-2016 international sanctions regime.

Targeted Financial Measures

During 2006-2016, the Department of the Treasury conducted a campaign - which it termed “targeted financial measures” - to persuade foreign banks to cease dealing with Iran. During the outreach campaign, Treasury officials briefed bank officials on Iran’s use of the international financial system to fund terrorist groups and acquire weapons-related technology. According to a GAO report of February 2013, the Department of the Treasury made overtures to 145 banks in 60 countries, and convinced at least 80 of them cease handling financial transactions with Iranian banks. During the period of U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, the Treasury Department instead sought to encourage foreign banks to conduct normal transactions with Iran.

Ban on Iranian Access to the U.S. Financial System/Use of Dollars

There is no blanket ban on foreign banks or persons paying Iran for goods using U.S. dollars. But, U.S. regulations (ITRs, C.F.R. Section 560.516) ban Iran from direct access to the U.S. financial system. The regulations allow U.S. banks to send funds (including U.S. dollars) to Iran for allowed (licensed) transactions, but U.S. dollars cannot be directly transferred to an Iranian bank, and instead must be paid through a third country bank. Section 560.510 of the Iran regulations allows for U.S. payments to Iran to settle or pay judgments to Iran, but the prohibition on dealing directly with Iranian banks applies.

On November 6, 2008, the Department of the Treasury barred U.S. banks from any transaction with a foreign banks on behalf of an Iranian bank (“U-turn transactions”). Under that regulation, a foreign bank or person that pays Iran for goods in U.S. dollars cannot access the U.S. financial system (through a U.S. correspondent account) to acquire dollars for that transaction. This ban remained in effect during JCPOA implementation, and Iran argued that the restrictions deterred European and other banks from reentering the Iran market because of the difficulty in paying Iran with U.S. dollars. In 2016, the Obama Administration reportedly considered licensing transactions by foreign clearinghouses to acquire dollars that might facilitate transactions with Iran, but the Administration did not take that step.

Punishments/Fines Implemented against Some Banks.

The Department of the Treasury and other U.S. authorities have announced financial settlements with various banks that violated U.S. regulations in transactions related to Iran (and other countries such as Sudan, Syria, and Cuba). The amounts were reportedly determined, at least in part, by the value, number, and duration of illicit transactions conducted, and the strength of the evidence collected by U.S. regulators. (As noted above, the FY2016 Consolidated

37 For text of the OFAC ruling barring U-Turn transactions, see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/fr73_66541.pdf.
Appropriation, P.L. 114-113, provided for use of the proceeds of the settlements above to pay compensation to victims of Iranian terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount Paid</th>
<th>Violation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UBS (Switzerland)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$100 million</td>
<td>Unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars to Iran and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABN Amro (Netherlands)</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>$80 million</td>
<td>Failing to fully report financial transactions involving Bank Melli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Suisse (Switzerland)</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>$536 million</td>
<td>Illicitly processing Iranian transactions with U.S. banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ING (Netherlands)</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>$619 million</td>
<td>Concealing movement of billions of dollars through the U.S. financial system for Iranian and Cuban clients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Chartered (UK)</td>
<td>August 2012</td>
<td>$340 million</td>
<td>Settlement paid to New York State for processing transactions on behalf of Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearstream (Luxembourg)</td>
<td>January 2014</td>
<td>$152 million</td>
<td>Helping Iran evade U.S. banking restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of Moscow (Russia)</td>
<td>January 2014</td>
<td>$9.5 million</td>
<td>Illicitly allowing Bank Melli to access the U.S. financial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP Paribas</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>$9 billion</td>
<td>Amount forfeited for helping Iran (and Sudan and Cuba) violate U.S. sanction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Chartered (UK)</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
<td>$639 million</td>
<td>Dubai branch of Standard Chartered processed Iran-related transactions to or through Standard Chartered - New York.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicredit AG (Germany, Austria, Italy)</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
<td>$1.3 billion</td>
<td>For illicitly processing transactions through the U.S. financial system on behalf of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkbank</td>
<td>October 2019</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Justice Department filed charges against Halkbank for allegedly helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various press reports.

CISADA: Sanctioning Foreign Banks That Conduct Transactions with Sanctioned Iranian Entities

The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was enacted to try to limit Iran’s access to the international financial system and to reduce the ability of Iran’s import-export community (referred to in Iran as the “bazaar merchants” or “bazaaris”) from obtaining “letters of credit” (trade financing) to buy or sell goods. Section 104 of CISADA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid U.S. banks from opening new “correspondent accounts” or “payable-through accounts” (or force the cancellation of existing such accounts) for:40

40 Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system. The Department of the Treasury determines the amount money that constitutes a “significant” financial transaction.
• Any foreign bank that conducts a significant financial transaction with an entity that is sanctioned by Executive Order 13224 or 13382 (see above). No humanitarian exception is provided for. A full list of sanctioned entities is at the end of this report, and entities “delisted” are in italics.
• Any foreign bank determined to have facilitated Iran’s efforts to acquire WMD or delivery systems or provide support to groups named as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the State Department.
• Any foreign bank that facilitates “the activities of” an entity sanctioned under a U.N. Security Council resolution.
• Any foreign bank that transacts business with the IRGC or any of its affiliates designated under any executive order.

Section 1244(d) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act, IFCA, applies the CISADA sanctions to any foreign bank that does business with Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL. The provision was not an amendment to CISADA itself. The IFCA provision was waived to implement the JCPOA, but was reinstated as of November 5, 2018.

Implementation

Some sanctions have been imposed under Section 104 of CISADA. On July 31, 2012, the United States sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq under Section 104 of CISADA. On May 17, 2013, the Department of the Treasury lifted sanctions on Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq, asserting that the bank had reduced its exposure to the Iranian financial sector and stopped providing services to the Export Development Bank of Iran.

Section 104 was not waived to implement the JCPOA, but many entities with which transactions would have triggered sanctions under Section 104 were “delisted” as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), as provided by the JCPOA. The entities were relisted on November 5, 2018.

Waiver and Termination

Under Section 401(a) of CISADA, the Section 104 sanctions provisions would terminate 30 days after the President certifies to Congress that Iran (1) has met the requirements for removal from the terrorism list, and (2) has ceased pursuit, acquisition, or development of, and verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons and other WMD programs.

The Secretary of the Treasury may waive sanctions under Section 104, with the waiver taking effect 30 days after the Secretary determines that a waiver is necessary to the national interest and submits a report to Congress describing the reason for that determination.

Iran Designated a Money-Laundering Jurisdiction

On November 21, 2011, the Obama Administration identified Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A), based on a determination that Iran’s financial system constitutes a threat to governments or financial institutions that do business with Iran’s banks. The designation imposed additional requirements

on U.S. banks to ensure against improper Iranian access to the U.S. financial system. On October 25, 2019, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a final rule barring the U.S. financial system from any transactions with Iranian banks or foreign banks acting on behalf of Iranian banks.\footnote{Treasury and State Announce New Humanitarian Mechanism to Increase Transparency of Permissible Trade Supporting the Iranian People. October 25, 2019.}

In October 2018, the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) issued a warning to U.S. banks to guard against likely Iranian efforts to evade U.S. financial sanctions. Earlier, in January 1, 2013, OFAC issued an Advisory to highlight Iran’s use of 
\textit{hawalas} (traditional informal banking and money exchanges) in the region to circumvent U.S. financial sanctions.

**Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

In 2016, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multilateral body that shares best practices to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), named Iran a “High Risk Jurisdiction.” In June 2016, the FATF welcomed an “Action Plan” filed by Iran to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and suspended “countermeasures”—mostly voluntary recommendations of increased due diligence with respect to Iran transactions—pending an assessment of Iran’s implementation of its Action Plan. The FATF continued the suspension of countermeasures until 2020.

In June 2019, the FATF stated that Iran still had not adequately criminalized terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism;” identified and frozen terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; or ensured an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime. The FATF continued the suspension of countermeasures, but called on members to require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran.\footnote{Statement by the Financial Action Task Force, June 19, 2019.} On February 21, 2020, the FATF stated that: “given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19” – a determination that subjects Iran’s financial system to increased scrutiny by banks worldwide.\footnote{Statement by the Financial Action Task Force, February 21, 2020.}

**“SWIFT” Electronic Payments System**

Section 220 of the ITRSHRA required reports on electronic payments systems, such as the Brussels-based SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), that process transactions for Iranian banks. That law also authorizes, but does not mandate, sanctions against SWIFT or against electronic payments systems.

**Sanctions on Iran’s Non-Oil Industries and Sectors**

Successive Administrations and Congresses have expanded sanctions on several significant non-oil industries and sectors of Iran’s economy. The targeted sectors include Iran’s automotive

\textit{Iran Sanctions}

Congressional Research Service

29
production sector, which is Iran’s second-largest industry (after energy), its mineral exports, which account for about 10% of Iran’s export earnings, and various light manufacturing sectors.

The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA)
The Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA, Subtitle D of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (P.L. 112-239, January 2, 2013) sanctioned several Iranian economic sectors simultaneously. IFCA’s provisions on Iran’s human rights practices are discussed below. Most IFCA sections were waived during JCPOA implementation (2016-18).

- Section 1244 of IFCA mandates the blocking of U.S.-based property of any entity (Iranian or non-Iranian) that provides goods, services, or other support to any Iranian entity designated by the Treasury Department as a “specially designated national” (SDN). The tables at the end of this report show that hundreds of Iranian entities are designated as SDNs under various executive orders. The Iranian entities designated for civilian economic activity were “delisted” to implement the JCPOA, but were relisted on November 5, 2018.

- Section 1247 of IFCA prohibits from operating in the United States any bank that knowingly facilitates a financial transaction on behalf of an Iranian SDN. The section also specifically sanctions foreign banks that facilitate payment to Iran for natural gas unless the funds owed to Iran for the gas are placed in a local account. The section provides for a waiver for a period of 180 days.

Several sections of IFCA impose ISA sanctions on entities determined to have engaged in specified transactions below. (The provisions apply ISA sanctions but do not amend ISA.)

- **Energy, Shipbuilding, and Shipping Sector, and Iranian Port Operations.** Section 1244 (1) blocks the U.S.-based assets; and (2) mandates the imposition of five out of 12 of the ISA menu of sanctions (see above) on entities that provide financial, material, technological, or other support, or provide goods or services to Iran’s energy, shipbuilding, and shipping sectors, or port operations in Iran. **The sanctions do not apply when such transactions involved purchases of Iranian oil by countries that have SREs (see above) or to the purchase of natural gas from Iran.** E.O. 13846 of August 6, 2018 contains blocking of U.S.-based assets.

- **Dealings in Precious Metals or Materials for Iran’s Missile, Nuclear, or Military Programs.** Section 1245 imposes five out of the 12 sanctions on the ISA menu on entities that provide precious metals to Iran (including gold) or semi-finished metals or software for integrating industrial processes. Section 1245 also sanctions the supply to Iran of any material determined to be used in connection with Iran’s nuclear, missile, or military programs. The section mandates the exclusion from the United States of any foreign bank that facilitates any stipulated transaction. **There is no exception for countries that receive the SRE.**

- **Insurance for Related Activities.** Section 1246 imposes five out of 12 sanctions on the ISA menu on entities that provide underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance for any transactions sanctioned under any executive order on Iran, ISA, CISADA, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, INKSNA, other IFCA provisions, or any other Iran sanction, as well as to any Iranian SDN. **There is no exception for countries that receive the SRE.**
• *Exception for Afghanistan Reconstruction.* Section 1244(f) of IFCA provides a sanctions exemption for transactions that provide reconstruction assistance for or further the economic development of Afghanistan. See JCPOA waivers below.

**Implementation**

The entities designated for sanctions under E.O. 13224, 13382, and other orders – which are listed in the tables at the end of the report - trigger the IFCA sanctions discussed above. Some sanctions have been imposed for transactions with the Iranian sectors stipulated in IFCA, as shown in the tables at the end of the report.

**Waiver and Termination**

Sections 1244 and 1245 of IFCA provide for a waiver of sanctions for 180 days, if such a waiver is determined to be vital to U.S. national security. Sections 1244(i), 1245(g), 1246(e), and 1247(f) of IFCA were waived to implement the JCPOA on January 18, 2017, and that waiver was last renewed on January 12, 2018. All sections of IFCA went back into effect in 2018 in concert with the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.

**Executive Order 13645/13846: Iran’s Automotive Sector, Rial Trading, and Precious Stones**

Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013, as superseded by 13846 of August 6, 2018:

- Imposes ISA sanctions on firms that supply goods or services to Iran’s automotive (cars, trucks, buses, motorcycles, and related parts) sector, and blocks foreign banks from the U.S. market if they conduct transactions with Iran’s automotive sector.
- Blocks U.S.-based property and prohibits U.S. bank accounts for foreign banks that conduct transactions in Iran’s currency, the rial, or hold rial accounts. This provision mostly affects banks in countries bordering or near Iran. The order would presumably apply to any digital currency that Iran might develop that is backed by or tied to the rial.
- Expands the application of Executive Order 13622 (above) to helping Iran acquire precious stones or jewels (see above).
- Blocks U.S.-based property of a person that conducts transactions with an Iranian entity listed as a Specially Designated National (SDN) or Blocked Person. As noted earlier, all SDNs were “relisted” on November 5, 2018.

**Executive Order 13871 on Iran’s Minerals and Metals Sectors**

On May 8, 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13871 sanctioning transactions involving Iran’s minerals and industrial commodities. The announcement stated that Iran earns 10% of its total export revenues from sales of the minerals and metals sanctioned.\(^{45}\) The order:

---

\(^{45}\) Statement by President Trump Imposing Sanctions on Iron, Steel, Aluminum and Copper Sectors of Iran, May 8, 2019.
blocks U.S.-based property of any entity that conducts a significant transaction for the “sale, supply, or transfer to Iran” of goods or services, or the transport or marketing, of the iron, steel, aluminum, and copper sectors of Iran;

- authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to bar from the U.S. financial system any foreign bank that conducts a financial transaction for steel, steel products, copper, or copper products from Iran;
- bars the entry into the United States of any person sanctioned under the order.

**Executive Order 13902 on the Construction, Mining, Manufacturing, and Textiles Sector**

On January 10, 2020, as a stated response to the Iranian missile strikes on an Iraqi air base used by U.S. forces several days earlier (Iran’s response to the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani), President Trump issued Executive Order 13902 expanding the Iranian industrial sectors subject to U.S. sanctions. The order:

- **Blocks U.S. based property of persons determined by the Administration to “operate in” or to have knowingly engaged in a significant transaction with the construction, mining, manufacturing, or textiles sectors of Iran’s economy (such as the vibrant carpet industry), “or any other sector of the Iranian economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State.”**
- **Blocks U.S. property of persons determined to have assisted (financed, supplied technology) persons sanctioned under the order.**
- **Bars from the U.S. financial system any foreign bank that conducts transactions with these Iranian economic sectors or with persons that supplied goods or services to those sectors.**
- **Persons sanctioned under the order are banned from travel to the United States.**

*Related State and Treasury Determination:* E.O. 13902 followed an October 31, 2019, determination by the State and Treasury Departments that the construction sector of Iran is controlled by the IRGC and that, therefore, the supply of raw or semi-finished metals, graphite, coal, and industrial software to Iran are sanctionable under Section 1245 of IFCA (see above). The two agencies also determined that the sale to Iran of the following are sanctionable as useful to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and military programs: stainless steel 304L tubes; MN40 manganese brazing foil; and stainless steel (chromium, nickel, 60% tungsten, titanium, electro-slag remelting, and vacuum remelting).46

**Executive Order 13608 on Sanctions Evasion**

Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012, gives the Department of the Treasury the ability to identify and sanction (cutting them off from the U.S. market) foreign persons who help Iran (or Syria) evade U.S. and multilateral sanctions.

Several persons and entities have been designated for sanctions, as shown in the tables at the end.

Sanctions on Cyber and Criminal Activities

The Trump Administration has used executive orders issued during the Obama Administration to sanction Iranian entities determined to be engaged in malicious cyberactivities or in transnational crime. Separately, the Justice Department has prosecuted some Iranian entities for such activity. Entities sanctioned under the two orders below are listed in the tables at the end of the report.

Executive Order 13581

Executive Order 13581 (July 25, 2011) blocks the U.S.-based property of entities determined (1) to be a foreign person that constitutes a significant transnational criminal organization; (2) to have materially assisted any person sanctioned under this order; or (3) to be owned or controlled by or to have acted on behalf of a person sanctioned under the order.

Executive Order 13694

Executive Order 13694 (April 1, 2015) blocks U.S.-based property of foreign entities determined to have engaged in cyber-enabled activities that (1) harm or compromise the provision of services by computers or computer networks supporting in the critical infrastructure sector; (2) compromise critical infrastructure; (3) disrupt computers or computer networks; or (4) cause misappropriation of funds, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for financial advantage or gain.

U.S. State-Level Sanctions

Some U.S. laws require or call for divestment of shares of firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran. A divestment-promotion provision was contained in CISADA, providing a “safe harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector at levels that would trigger U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act. Section 219 of the ITRSHRA of 2012 requires companies to reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission whether they or any corporate affiliate has engaged in any transactions with Iran that could trigger sanctions under ISA, CISADA, and E.O 13382 and 13224. Numerous states have adopted laws, regulations, and policies to divest from—or avoid state government business with—foreign companies that conduct certain transactions with Iran.

Sanctions Supporting Democracy/Human Rights

U.S. policy and legislation since the June 12, 2009, election-related uprising in Iran has sought to support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to communicate and to sanction Iranian officials and institutions, such as the IRGC, that commit human rights abuses or engage in corruption. Individuals and entities designated under the executive orders and provisions discussed below are listed in the tables at the end of this report. For those provisions that ban visas to enter the United States, the State Department interprets the provisions to apply to all members of the designated entity.47

Expanding Internet and Communications Freedoms

Some laws focus on expanding Internet freedom in Iran or preventing the Iranian government from using the Internet to identify opponents.

- **Subtitle D of the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the “VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship) Act, contained several provisions to increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify to Congress companies that are selling Iran technology equipment that it can use to control Internet usage by Iranians.**

- **Relevant CISADA Provisions.** Section 106 of CISADA prohibits U.S. government contracts with foreign companies that sell technology that Iran could use to monitor or control Iranian usage of the Internet. The provisions were directed, in part, against Nokia (Finland) and Siemens (Germany) for reportedly selling Internet monitoring and censorship technology to Iran in 2008.\(^48\) The provision was derived from the Reduce Iranian Cyber-Suppression Act (111th Congress, S. 1475 and H.R. 3284). Section 103(b)(2) of CISADA exempts from the U.S. export ban on Iran the sale of equipment to help Iranians communicate via the Internet.

- **Executive Order 13606 (April 23, 2012) sanctions persons who commit “Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology (GHRAVITY).”** The order blocks the U.S.-based property and essentially bars U.S. entry and bans any U.S. trade with persons and entities listed in an Annex and persons or entities subsequently determined to be (1) operating any technology that allows the Iranian (or Syrian) government to disrupt, monitor, or track computer usage by citizens of those countries or assisting the two governments in such disruptions or monitoring; or (2) selling to Iran (or Syria) technology that enables them to carry out such actions.

- **Section 403 of ITRSHRA sanctions (visa ban, U.S.-based property blocked) persons/firms determined to have engaged in censorship in Iran, limited access to media, or—for example, a foreign satellite service provider—supported Iranian government jamming or frequency manipulation.**

- **Executive Order 13628 (October 9, 2012) implemented ITRSHRA Section 403 by blocking the property of entities determined to have committed censorship, limited free expression, or assisted in jamming communications. The order specifies the sanctions authorities of the Department of State and of Treasury.**

- **Regulations Changes by Treasury/OFAC.** On March 8, 2010, the Iran Transactions Regulations were amended to allow for a general license for providing free mass market software to Iranians.\(^49\) On March 20, 2012, the regulations were amended to permit several additional types of software and information technology products to be exported to Iran under general license, provided the products were available at no cost to the user.\(^50\) The items included personal communications, personal data storage, browsers, plug-ins, document

---


\(^{49}\) The regulations change required a waiver of the provision of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1606 waiver provision) discussed above.

\(^{50}\) *Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran*, March 20, 2012.
Iran Sanctions

readers, and free mobile applications related to personal communications. On May 30, 2013, the regulations were amended to allow for the sale, on a cash basis (no financing), to Iran of equipment that Iranians can use to communicate (e.g., cellphones, laptops, satellite internet, website hosting, and related products and services).

Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses/Promote Civil Society

Some Iran-specific legislation and administrative action has sought to sanction regime officials involved in suppressing the domestic opposition in Iran or in human rights abuses more generally.

- Section 105 of CISADA bans travel and freezes the U.S.-based assets of those Iranians determined to be human rights abusers. Section 105 terminates if the President certifies to Congress that Iran has (1) unconditionally released all political prisoners detained in the aftermath of the June 2009 uprising; (2) ceased its practices of violence, unlawful detention, torture, and abuse of citizens who were engaged in peaceful protest; (3) fully investigated abuses of political activists that occurred after the uprising; and (4) committed to and is making progress toward establishing an independent judiciary and respecting human rights.

- Executive Order 13553 (September 29, 2010) implements Section 105 of CISADA by sanctioning Iranians determined to be responsible for or complicit in post-2009 Iran election human rights abuses.

- The CAATSA law (see above) expanded Section 105 of CISADA by authorizing (but not mandating) sanctions on Iranian human rights abuses generally—not limited to those connected to the June 2009 uprising. The CAATSA law defines as sanctionable extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights against Iranians who seek to expose illegal activity by officials or to defend or promote human rights and freedoms in Iran. The persons to be sanctioned are those named in a report provided 90 days after CAATSA enactment (by October 31, 2017) and annually thereafter. Additional Iranian human rights abusers were designated under E.O. 13533 by an October 31, 2017, CAATSA deadline.

- Sanctions against Iranian Profiteers. Section 1249 of IFCA amended Section 105 of CISADA by imposing sanctions on any person determined to have engaged in corruption or to have diverted or misappropriated humanitarian goods or funds for such goods for the Iranian people. The measure targets Iranian profiteers who use official connections to corner the market for vital medicines. This provision codified a similar provision of Executive Order 13645.

- Sanctions against Iranian Government Broadcasters/IRIB. Section 1248 of IFCA (Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239) mandates inclusion of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the state broadcasting umbrella group, as a human rights abuser. IRIB was designated as an SDN on February 6, 2013, under E.O. 13628 for limiting free expression in Iran. On February 14, 2014, the State Department waived IFCA sanctions under Sections 1244, 1246, or 1247, on any entity that provides satellite services to IRIB. The waiver has been renewed each year since.

- Executive Order 13846 (August 6, 2018). The Executive Order that reimposed pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran contained provisions sanctioning Iranian human rights abusers and corrupt officials. No sanctions imposed for such behaviors...
were suspended to implement the JCPOA. Section 7 of the Order blocks the U.S.-based property of persons that (1) engaged after January 2, 2013 in corrupt diversion of goods intended for the Iranian people; (2) sold (after August 10, 2012) Iran goods or technologies or provided services used by the Iranian government to commit serious human rights abuses; (3) engaged in censorship or limited free expression in Iran (after June 12, 2009); or (4) provided goods or services to any person sanctioned under the Order.

- **Sanctions on Sales of Anti-Riot Equipment.** Section 402 of the ITRSHRA amended Section 105 of CISADA by imposing visa bans on and blocking the U.S. property of any person or company that sells the Iranian government goods or technologies that it can use to commit human rights abuses. Such goods include firearms, rubber bullets, police batons, chemical or pepper sprays, stun grenades, tear gas, water cannons, and like goods. In addition, ISA sanctions are to be imposed on any person determined have sold such equipment to the IRGC.

- **Separate Visa Bans.** Since 2011, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on over 100 Iranian officials for participating in political repression in Iran, but it has not named them, on the grounds that visa records are confidential. The action was taken under the authorities of Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which renders inadmissible to the United States a foreign person whose activities could have serious consequences for the United States. On September 25, 2019, President Trump issued a proclamation denying entry into the United States of senior Iranian officials and immediate family members.51

- **High Level Iranian Visits to the United Nations.** There are certain exemptions in the case of high level Iranian visits to attend U.N. meetings in New York. Under the U.N. Participation Act (P.L. 79-264), because the United States hosts the United Nations headquarters in New York, visas are issued to heads of state and their aides attending these meetings. In some cases, the State Department has refused visas for Iranian officials on the grounds that they were involved in past acts of terrorism or human rights abuses.

### Non-Iran Specific Human Rights Laws

The Trump Administration has utilized global human rights laws to sanction Iranian violators.

- **Global Magnitsky Act.** The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 2017; P.L. 114-328; December 23, 2016), authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions and deny entry into the United States to any foreign person he identifies as engaging in human rights abuse or corruption. Executive Order 13818, providing for sanctions on persons determined to have engaged in the activity outlined in the Act, was issued on December 20, 2017.

- **Section 7031(c) of the State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriation.** For the last few years, successive foreign aid appropriations laws have contained a section (7031c) that makes persons determined to have committed gross violations of human rights ineligible for entry to the United States. For FY2020, this provision is in: P.L. 116-94, division G (H.R.1865)

Sanctions on Iran’s Leadership

The Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on some members of Iran’s civilian leadership. Any Iranian official that is named an SDN is subject to a freezing of their U.S.-based property and there are secondary sanctions (noted throughout) on third parties that deal with those entities. Section 103(b)(3) of CISADA also provides for the freezing of assets of any “family member or associate acting for on behalf of the person” that is named as an SDN.

Executive Order 13876

On June 24, 2019, in the context of heightened U.S.-Iran tensions, President Trump issued Executive Order 13876, imposing sanctions on the assets of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and his top associates. The Order

- Blocks the U.S.-based property or assets of the Supreme Leader and his office, any Iranian appointed by him to an official position, or any person that materially assists the Supreme Leader or his office.
- Bars from the U.S. financial system any bank determined to have conducted or facilitated a financial transaction with a Supreme Leader-related or Supreme Leader-appointed official.

Implementation: Supreme Leader Khamene’i and his office are sanctioned by the order itself. Subsequently, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and other senior Iranian officials and commanders were designated under the order, as shown in the tables at the end of the report.

U.N. Sanctions


Resolution 2231 and U.N. Sanctions Eased

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015 contained the provisions below. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA did not change the status of Resolution 2231. The resolution

- Endorsed the JCPOA, superseded all prior Iran-related resolutions as of Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), and lifted U.N. sanctions on Iran. Under Paragraph 6(c) of Annex B of Resolution 2231, entities sanctioned under Resolutions 1737 (and subsequent resolutions) and named in an attachment to the Annex (mostly persons and entities connected to permitted aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and its civilian economy) were immediately “delisted” on Implementation Day. Those not listed on the attachment continue to be

52 Security Council resolutions that reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter represent actions taken with respect to threats to international peace and acts of aggression. Article 41 of that Chapter, in general, provides for enforcement of the resolution in question through economic and diplomatic sanctions, but not through military action.
sanctioned until Transition Day (October 18, 2023). One notable person for whom U.N. sanctions was to end on Transition Day is IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani, but his death from U.S. strike in January 2020 renders this listing moot. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International PLC, were delisted on Implementation Day by separate Security Council action. Paragraph 6(c) provides for the Security Council to be able to delist or list any entity at any time.

- “Called on” Iran not to develop ballistic missiles “designed to be capable” of delivering a nuclear weapon for a maximum of eight years from Adoption Day (October 18, 2015). The restriction expires on October 18, 2023.
- Requires Security Council approval for Iran to export arms or to purchase any arms (major combat systems named in the resolution) for a maximum of five years from Adoption Day (October 18, 2020). See CRS In Focus IF11429, U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers, by Kenneth Katzman.

Table 3. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>Required Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, to suspend construction of the heavy-water reactor at Arak, ratify the “Additional Protocol” to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement. (1737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assets frozen of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the resolutions, and countries required to ban the travel of named Iranians. (Initial list in Resolution 1737, and additional designations in subsequent resolutions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran prohibited, except for use in light-water reactors (1737 and 1747). Resolution 2231 delegates to a Joint Commission the authority to approve Iran’s applications to purchase dual-use items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>Prohibited Iran from exporting arms. Resolution 2231 requires Iran to obtain Security Council approval to export arms for a maximum of five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Prohibited Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology, and prohibits Iran from developing/testing, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1929 mandated that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, but did not bar sales of missiles that are not on the U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms. Resolution 2231 makes arms sales to Iran and exportation of arms from Iran subject to approval by the U.N. Security Council, for a maximum of five years from Adoption Day (until October 2020).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1929 called for restraint on transactions with Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution called for “Vigilance” (but not a ban) on making international lending to Iran and providing trade credits and other financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Called on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered. Resolution 2231 requires continued enforcement of remaining restrictions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior to JCPOA implementation, a Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, monitored implementation of all Iran sanctions and collected and disseminated information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned activities. A “panel of experts” was empowered by Resolution 1929 to assist the sanctions committee in implementing all Iran resolutions and to suggest ways to be more effective.

Iran Compliance Status

Until August 2019, U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency reports after the JCPOA began implementation stated that Iran was complying with its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA. Since mid-2019, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA on the grounds that the United States has reimposed secondary sanctions on Iran.

U.N. reports on Iranian compliance with Resolution 2231 have noted assertions by several U.N. Security Council members, including the United States, that Iranian missile tests have been inconsistent with the resolution. U.S. officials have called some of Iran’s space and medium-range missile launches as violations of the resolution. Iran has repeatedly violated the U.N. ban on exportation of arms, as analyzed in CRS Insight IN11429, Capital Markets, COVID-19, and Federal Government Emergency Facilities, cited above.

Sanctions Application under Nuclear Agreements

The following sections discuss sanctions relief provided under the November 2013 interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPoA) and the JCPOA.

Sanctions Eased by the JPoA

U.S. officials said that the JPoA provided “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible” easing of international sanctions. Under the JPoA (in effect January 20, 2014-January 16, 2016):

- Iran’s oil customers were not required to further reduce their oil purchases from Iran, in accordance with waivers of Section 1244c(1) of IFCA, ITRSHRA, and ISA. The European Union amended its regulations to allow shipping insurance for ships carrying oil from Iran.
- A waiver of Section 1245(d)(1) of IFCA allowed Iran to receive directly $700 million per month in hard currency from oil sales and $65 million per month to make tuition payments for Iranian students abroad (paid directly to the schools).
- Executive Orders 13622 and 13645 and several provisions of U.S.-Iran trade regulations were suspended, and several sections of IFCA were waived, to enable Iran to sell petrochemicals and trade in gold and other precious metals, and to conduct transactions with foreign firms related to automotive manufacturing.
- Executive Order 13382 and certain U.S.-Iran trade regulations were suspended to allow for U.S. aircraft and spare parts sales to Iran Air.

Sanctions Easing under the JCPOA and U.S. Reimposition

In accordance with the JCPOA, international sanctions relief occurred at Implementation Day (January 16, 2016). U.S. secondary sanctions were waived or terminated, but most sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade remained. The secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation included (1) sanctions that limited Iran’s exportation of oil and sanction foreign sales to Iran of gasoline and energy sector equipment, and which limit foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector;

---

54 The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm.
(2) financial sector sanctions; and (3) sanctions on Iran’s auto sector and trading in the *rial*. The EU lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; and Iranian banks were readmitted to the SWIFT electronic payments system. All U.N. sanctions were lifted. All of the U.S. sanctions that were eased went back into effect by November 5, 2018, in accordance with the Trump Administration’s withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA.

The laws below were waived to implement the JCPOA:

- **Iran Sanctions Act.** The energy/economic-related provisions of ISA. The one WMD-related provision of ISA was not waived.
- **FY2012 NDAA.** Section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81) imposing sanctions on foreign banks of countries that do not reduce Iran oil imports.
- **Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act** (P.L. 112-158). Sections 212 and 213—the economy-related provisions of the act. Human rights-related provisions were not waived.
- **Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act.** Sections 1244, 1245, 1246, and 1247 of the Act sanctioning transactions with SDNs and with named economic sectors.
- **Executive Orders:** 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 were revoked outright by Executive Order 13716.
- The core provision of CISADA (P.L. 111-195) that sanctions foreign banks was not waived to implement the JCPOA, but most listed Iranian banks were “delisted” to implement the JCPOA.
- The United States delisted the specified Iranian economic entities and personalities listed in Attachment III of the JCPOA, enabling foreign companies/banks to resume transactions with those entities without risking being penalized by the United States. The tables at the end of the report depict in italics those entities delisted.
- The JCPOA required the U.S. Administration, by “Transition Day,” (October 2023, eight years after Adoption Day) to request that Congress lift virtually all of the sanctions that were suspended under the JCPOA. No outcome is mandated.
- The JCPOA terminates U.N. sanctions on persons and entities still designated for U.N. sanctions on Transition Day. All U.N. sanctions are to terminate by “Termination Day” (October 2025, ten years after Adoption Day).

In implementing its decision to exit the JCPOA and apply “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy, sanctions were reimposed. The sanctions that went back into effect on August 7, 2018 (90-day wind-down period), were on:

- The purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes by Iran; Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals; transactions in the Iranian *rial*; activities relating to Iran’s issuing of sovereign debt; and transactions with Iran in graphite, aluminum, steel, coal, and industrial software.
- Importation of Iranian luxury goods to the United States.
- The sale to Iran of passenger aircraft (and aircraft with substantial U.S. content).

The sanctions that went back into effect on November 5, 2018, were on:

- Petroleum-related transactions with Iran; and port operators and energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors; and
- Transactions by foreign banks with Iran’s Central Banks (including the provision that restricts Iran’s access to hard currency held in banks abroad).
Entities that were delisted from sanctions were all relisted, with selected exceptions (such as the AEOI and 23 subsidiaries). The continued de-listing of the nuclear entities was in order to allow European and other U.S. partners to continue providing civilian nuclear assistance to Iran as permitted under the JCPOA.

Even though it has reimposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran, the Trump Administration has issued some exceptions that are provided for under the various U.S. sanctions laws:

- As noted above, eight countries were given the SRE to enable them to continue transactions with Iran’s Central Bank and to purchase Iranian oil. However, on May 2, 2019, the SREs were terminated.
- At least initially, the Administration kept in place seven waivers under IFCA that enable foreign entities to remove Iran’s LEU that exceeds the 300kg allowed stockpile, to buy Iran’s heavy water, and expand the Bushehr civilian nuclear power reactor. However, the Administration ended six of the seven waivers gradually during 2019-2020.
- The Administration has continued to waive Section 1247(e) of IFCA to enable Iraq to continue paying for purchases of natural gas from Iran. The waiver term can be as long as 180 days, but the Administration has been providing waivers for shorter periods.
- The Administration has issued the permitted IFCA exception for Afghan reconstruction to enable India to continue work at Iran’s Chahbahar Port.
- The Administration has renewed the licenses of certain firms to enable them to continue developing the Rhum gas field in the North Sea that Iran partly owns.

**U.S. Sanctions that Remained in Place under the JCPOA**

The JCPOA did not commit the United States to suspend U.S. sanctions related to terrorism, proliferation, arms transfer, or human rights abuses, or suspend the ban on U.S.-Iran direct trade (with the selected exceptions discussed above). The sanctions below remained in place during JCPOA implementation:

- E.O. 12959, the ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran;
- E.O. 13224 sanctioning terrorism entities, any sanctions related to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor or terrorism, and any other terrorism-related sanctions. The JCPOA did not commit the United States to revoke Iran’s placement on the terrorism list;
- E.O. 13382 on proliferation;
- the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act;
- the Iran-North Korea-Syria Non-Proliferation Act (INKSNA);\(^{56}\)
- the section of ISA that sanctions WMD- and arms-related transactions with Iran;
- E.O. 13438 on Iran’s interference in Iraq and E.O. 13572 on repression in Syria;
- Executive Orders (E.O. 13606 and E.O. 13628) and the provisions of CISADA, ITRSHRA, and IFCA that pertain to human rights or democratic change in Iran;

---
\(^{56}\) The JCPOA committed the United States to terminate sanctions on some entities designated under INKSNA.
• all sanctions on the IRGC, military, proliferation-related, and human rights- and terrorism-related entities, which were not “delisted” from sanctions; and
• regulations barring Iran from access to the U.S. financial system.

Other Mechanisms to “Snap-Back” Sanctions on Iran
Sanctions might have been reimposed by congressional action in accordance with President Trump’s withholding of certification of Iranian compliance with the JCPOA, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17). Certification was withheld in October 2017 and January and April of 2018, but Congress did not reimpose sanctions.57

The JCPOA (paragraph 36 and 37) and Resolution 2231 (paragraphs 10-13) contain a mechanism for the “snap back” of U.N. sanctions if Iran does not satisfactorily resolve a compliance dispute. According to the JCPOA (and Resolution 2231), the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council) would have been able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran’s refusal to resolve the dispute. In that case “…the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be reimposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.”

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserts that Resolution 2231 allows the United States to trigger the snap-back because it remains legally a “participant,” and that it will take that step unless the Annex B ban on arms transfers to and from Iran is extended. The other JCPOA parties dispute that the United States has the right to trigger the snap back because it withdrew from the JCPOA.58

International Implementation and Compliance
During 2010-2016, converging international views on Iran’s expanding nuclear program produced global consensus to pressure Iran through sanctions. All the JCPOA parties publicly opposed the U.S. decision to exit the JCPOA in 2018 and have sought to continue to provide its economic benefits to Iran. A comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions is contained in the Appendix.59

European Union (EU)
After the passage of Resolution 1929 in 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran became nearly as extensive as those of the United States. This contrasted with earlier periods, when the EU countries refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade ban on Iran, EU countries rescheduled $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally, and EU and Iran held talks on a trade agreement during 2002-2005.60 Under the JCPOA, EU sanctions that were imposed in 2012 were lifted, including:
• A ban on oil and gas imports from Iran; including on insurance for shipping oil or petrochemicals from Iran and a freeze on the assets of Iranian shipping firms.

57 For more information, see CRS Report R44942, U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen.
58 “U.S. Calls for Indefinite Arms Embargo of Iran, but Finds No Takers.” New York Times, June 30. 2020
60 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups on the trade agreement terms, proliferation, human rights, Iran-sponsored terrorism, counternarcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
• A ban on trade with Iran in gold, precious metals, diamonds, and petrochemicals.
• A freeze of the assets of Iran’s Central Bank (except for approved civilian trade).
• A ban on transactions between European and Iranian banks and on short-term export credits, guarantees, and insurance.
• A ban on exports to Iran of graphite, semi-finished metals, industrial software, shipbuilding technology, oil storage capabilities, and flagging or classification services for Iranian tankers and cargo vessels.
• A large number of entities that had been sanctioned by EU Council decisions and regulations over the years were “delisted” by the EU on Implementation Day.

The following EU sanctions remained in place after the JCPOA began implementation:

• An embargo on sales to Iran of arms, missile technology, other proliferation-sensitive items, and gear for internal repression.
• A ban on Iranian persons and entities designated for human rights abuses or supporting terrorism from visiting EU countries, and a freeze on their EU-based assets (see Appendix A below).

Even though the EU countries did not reimpose sanctions on Iran after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, many European firms have ceased Iran-related transactions or exited the Iran market.61

• Cars and Buses. Renault and Citroen of France suspended their post-JCPOA $1 billion investments in a joint venture with two Iranian firms to boost car production capacity in Iran to 350,000 cars per year. In August 2018, Daimler (manufacturer of Mercedes Benz autos) announced suspension of business in Iran. Scania of Sweden ended an effort to establish a factory in Iran to supply the country with 1,350 buses, and Volvo halted truck assembly in Iran in 2018.

• Other Industry. German industrial giant Siemens said in late 2018 that it would pursue no new Iranian business. Italy’s Danieli industrial conglomerates and Gruppo Ventura have exited the Iranian market.

• Banking. Among the major banks that have publicly announced exiting the Iran market are: DZ Bank and Allianz of Germany; Oberbank of Austria; and Banque Wormser Freres of France. In July 2018, at U.S. request, Germany’s central bank blocked Iran’s withdrawal of $400 million in cash from the Europäische-Iranische Handlesbank (EIH), which is partly owned by Iran.62

• Energy. No EU state has bought Iranian oil since U.S. energy sanctions went back into effect in November 2018. Total SA of France has exited a nearly $5 billion energy investment in South Pars gas field.

• Shipping. Hapag-Lloyd of Germany and Denmark’s AP Moller-Maersk have ceased shipping services to Iran.

• Telecommunications. Germany telecommunications firm Deutsche Telekom announced in September 2018 that it would end its business in Iran.

---

62 Germany’s Central Bank Imposes Rule to Stop Cash Delivery to Tehran. Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2018.
• **Rhum Gas Field.** One project, the Rhum gas field in the North Sea that is partly owned by Iranian Oil Company (a subsidiary of NIOC), has been able to continue operating. In part because the field supplies about 5% of Britain’s demand for natural gas, in October 2018, the Trump Administration renewed the license of BP and Serica Energy to continue providing services to the field.63

**European Special Purpose Vehicle/INSTEX**

The EU countries continue to try to preserve the JCPOA in the face of the Trump Administration’s maximum pressure policy on Iran and Iran’s violations of the JCPOA’s terms. On August 6, 2018, a 1996 EU “blocking statute” that seeks to protect EU firms from reimposed U.S. sanctions took effect.

In September 2018, Germany, France, and Britain, joined by Russia and China, as well as Iran, endorsed the creation of a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV) that would facilitate trade with Iran by avoiding dollar-denominated transactions or other exposure to the U.S. market. In a January 31, 2019, joint statement, France, Britain, and Germany announced the registration of the SPV, named the “Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges” (INSTEX). Its stated focus has been on transactions in goods not subject to sanctions, including medicines, medical devices, and food, but it might eventually expand to oil and other products.64 In April 2019, Iran set up the required counterparty—the “Special Trade and Finance Instrument” (STFI). Six additional countries in Europe joined the INSTEX system in December 2019 and the mechanism subsequently sought to speed up processing of medical transactions to help Iran deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. On March 31, 2020, INSTEX completed its first transaction—for about $540,000 worth of medical equipment.65

At the August 2019 G-7 summit in Biarritz, France, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed to provide a $15 billion credit line for Iran to purchase goods through INSTEX, with the credit line to be secured by future Iranian oil deliveries. U.S. officials later signaled opposition to the credit line proposal and it has not advanced.66

While attempting to preserve civilian economic engagement with Iran, the European countries have sought to support U.S. efforts to counter Iran’s terrorism and proliferation activities. In January 2019, the EU added Iran’s intelligence service (MOIS) and two intelligence operatives to its terrorism-related sanctions list in response to allegations of Iranian terrorism plotting in Europe. Germany followed that move by denying landing rights to Iran’s Mahan Air, which the United States has designated as a terrorism-supporting entity. Italy in November 2019 banned flights of Mahan Air.

**SWIFT Electronic Payments System**

The management of the Brussels-based Swift electronic payments system has sought to balance financial risks with the policies of the EU governments. In March 2012, SWIFT acceded to an EU request to expel 14 EU-sanctioned Iranian banks.67 Some Iranian banks were still able to conduct electronic transactions with the European Central Bank via the “Target II” system. Even though

---

the EU has not reimposed sanctions on Iran in concert with the Trump Administration, SWIFT’s board is independent and, in order to avoid risk of U.S. penalties, in late 2018, the system again disconnected the Iranian banks that were “relisted” for U.S. sanctions.

**China and Russia**

Russia and China, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and parties to the JCPOA, historically have imposed only those sanctions required by Security Council resolutions. Increasingly aligned on regional issues, Iran and Russia have agreed to expand energy and more general trade, but there is little evident implementation of any agreements. In December 2018, Iran signed a free trade deal with the Russia-led “Eurasian Economic Union,” suggesting Russian intent to potentially circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran.

China is a major factor in the effectiveness of any sanctions regime on Iran because China remains Iran’s largest oil customer. During 2012-2016, China was instrumental in reducing Iran’s total oil exports because it cut its buys from Iran to about 435,000 barrels per day from its 2011 average of 600,000 barrels per day. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, China has reduced its oil imports from Iran (see Table 1), but China has continued to import at least some Iranian oil despite the ending of the SRE as of May 2, 2019. Iran’s automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China. In November 2018, China’s Kunlun Bank—a CNPC affiliate that was sanctioned under CISADA in 2012—reportedly stopped accepting Euro and then China currency-denominated payments from Iran.\(^68\) A state-owned China firm (CNPC) withdrew from a major phase of Iran’s South Pars gas field, perhaps to avoid U.S. sanctions.

In mid-2019, the Administration has begun to more frequently sanction Chinese economic entities for transactions with Iran.\(^69\) On July 23, 2019, the Administration sanctioned (under IFCA) a small Chinese firm, Zhuhai Zhenrong Company Ltd., for buying oil from Iran.\(^70\) Prior to the expiration of the SREs, China had stockpiled 20 million barrels of Iranian oil at its Dalian port,\(^71\) and importation of that oil apparently is not counted until it clears customs checkpoints.

Yet, China continues to invest in Iran. China’s President Xi Jinping visited Iran and other Middle East countries in the immediate aftermath of the JCPOA, and stated that Iran is a vital link in an effort to extend its economic influence westward through its “One Belt, One Road” initiative. In concert, Chinese firms and entrepreneurs have been modernizing Iran’s rail and other infrastructure.\(^72\) Since 2019, Iran and China have discussed a 25-year deal for China investments in Iran to total $280 billion to be invested in Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors, and $120 billion in upgrading Iran’s transport and manufacturing infrastructure.\(^73\) China and Iran were reported in July 2020 to be negotiating finalizing the agreement, which might include arms sales

---


\(^69\) In April 2018, the Commerce Department (Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS, which administers Export Administration Regulations) issued a denial of export privileges action against China-based ZTE Corporation and its affiliates. The action was taken on the grounds that ZTE did not uphold the terms of a March 2017 settlement agreement with BIS.


\(^71\) “Boxed In: $1 billion of Iranian Crude Sits at China’s Dalian Port.” *Reuters*, May 1, 2019.


to Iran and other strategic ties, and including China’s purchases of Iranian oil at discounted prices.\textsuperscript{74}

**Japan/Korean Peninsula/Other East Asian Countries**

During 2010-2016, Japan and South Korea enforced sanctions on Iran similar to those imposed by the United States and the EU. Both countries cut imports of Iranian oil sharply and banks in the two countries restricted Iran’s foreign exchange assets held in their banks. From 2016-2018, when U.S. sanctions were suspended, both countries increased importation of Iranian oil, and eased restrictions on Iran’s accounts.

Both countries—and their companies—have historically been unwilling to undertake transactions with Iran that could violate U.S. sanctions. They reduced their Iranian oil purchases and received SRE sanctions exceptions on November 5, 2018. In early 2019, Japan imported some Iranian oil, and South Korea purchased about 200,000 barrels per day of Iranian condensates, but both countries stopped energy transactions with Iran upon expiration of their SREs in May 2019. South Korea sought, but was denied, Administration concurrence to continue to import Iranian condensates (a very light oil) on which South Korea’s petrochemical sector depends. Among banks, South Korea’s Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea, and Nomura Holdings of Japan, are reportedly restricting Iran’s use of its Central Bank accounts held in both countries.\textsuperscript{75}

**Other East Asian Countries**

North Korea, like Iran, has been subject to significant international sanctions. North Korea has never pledged to abide by international sanctions against Iran, and it reportedly cooperates with Iran on a wide range of strategic ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missiles. A portion of the oil that China buys from Iran (and from other suppliers) might be transshipped to North Korea, but it is not known if North Korea buys any Iranian oil directly.\textsuperscript{76}

Taiwan and Singapore have generally been small buyers of Iranian oil. Taiwan resumed imports of Iranian oil after sanctions were eased in 2016 and received an SRE in November 5, 2018, but has bought no Iranian oil since late 2018. Singapore has been a small buyer of Iranian oil and has not bought any Iranian oil since U.S. sanctions went back into effect in 2018.

**India and Pakistan**

Iran’s economy is highly integrated into those of its immediate neighbors in South Asia. India cites U.N. Security Council resolutions as its guideline for policy toward Iran. During 2011-2016, when U.N. sanctions were in force on Iran, India’s central bank ceased using a Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran, and the two countries agreed to settle half of India’s oil buys from Iran in India’s currency, the rupee. India reduced its imports of Iranian oil substantially after 2011, but, after sanctions were eased in 2016, India’s oil imports from Iran increased to as much as 800,000 bpd in July 2018—well above 2011 levels. Indian firms resumed work that had been ended or slowed during 2012-2016. India also paid Iran the $6.5 billion it owed for oil purchased during 2012-2016.\textsuperscript{77} In June 2018, after the Trump


\textsuperscript{75} Author conversations with South Korean officials, January – December 2019.


\textsuperscript{77} “India Seeks to Pay $6.5 Billion to Iran for Oil Imports.” \textit{Economic Times of India}. May 16, 2016.
Administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, India received an SRE until May 2019, and India has not imported Iranian oil since that time.

In 2015, India and Iran agreed that India would help develop Iran’s Chahbahar port and an associated railway that would enable India to trade with Afghanistan unimpeded by Pakistan. In May 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Iran and signed an agreement to invest $500 million to develop the port and related infrastructure. The Trump Administration has given India the “Afghanistan reconstruction” exception under Section 1244(f) of IFCA. However, in July 2020, Iran cited India’s non-performance of contracts to exclude the country from further work on the railway at the port.\(^78\)

Iran’s economic relations with Pakistan are less extensive than are its economic ties to India. One test of Pakistan’s compliance with sanctions was a pipeline project that would carry Iranian gas to Pakistan—a $7 billion project that U.S. officials on several occasions stated would be subject to ISA sanctions. Iran reportedly completed the pipeline on its side of the border but, during President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Pakistan in March 2016, Pakistan did not commit to complete the line. In 2009, India dissociated itself from the project.

**Turkey**

Turkey is a large neighbor whose relations with Iran have been uneven. Prior to the Trump Administration’s ending of all SREs in 2019, Turkey bought about 40% of its oil from Iran. Turkey reduced purchases of Iranian oil during 2012-2016, but its buys returned to 2011 levels after sanctions on Iran were eased in 2016. Turkey’s SRE to buy Iranian oil expired in May 2019 and Turkey has not been a buyer of Iranian oil since, according to Bloomberg oil transactions data.

Turkey also buys natural gas from Iran via a pipeline built in 1997, which at first was used for a swap arrangement under which gas from Turkmenistan was exported to Turkey. Direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey through the line began in 2001,\(^79\) but no ISA sanctions were imposed on the grounds that the gas supplies were crucial to Turkey’s energy security.

Pre-JCPOA, in response to press reports that Turkey’s Halkbank was settling Turkey’s payments to Iran for energy with gold, U.S. officials testified on May 15, 2013, that the gold going from Turkey to Iran consists mainly of Iranian private citizens’ purchases of Turkish gold. U.S. prosecutions have occurred since, against Halkbank and various individuals, for alleged violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran.\(^80\)

The rich energy reserves of the Caspian Sea have created challenges for U.S. efforts to deny Iran financial resources. The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations cited potential ISA sanctions to deter oil pipeline routes involving Iran—thereby successfully promoting an the alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005.

**Iraq and Persian Gulf States**

The Arab monarchy states of the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—are oil exporters and close allies of the United States. Still, they maintain relatively normal trade with Iran. One Gulf state in particular, UAE, has sometimes

---

\(^78\) “Iran drops India from Chabahar rail project, cites funding delay.” *The Hindu*, July 14, 2020


attracted U.S. scrutiny because of the large presence of Iranian firms there. Several UAE-based firms have been sanctioned by the United States, as noted in the tables at the end of the report. Iran and several of the Gulf states, including Kuwait and Bahrain, have had discussions on various energy and related projects. However, their projects have not materialized because of broad Iran-Gulf disputes. Qatar and Iran share the large gas field in the Gulf waters between them, and their economic relations have become closer in light of the isolation of Qatar by three of its GCC neighbors, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain. Iran and Oman have active economic relations, including a joint venture to expand Oman’s Al Duqm port, which is envisioned as a major hub for regional trade. Omani banks, some of which operate in Iran, were used to implement some of the financial arrangements of the JPoA and JCPOA.

Iraq has sought to remain engaged economically with Iran while avoiding running afoul of U.S. sanctions on Iran. In 2013, Iraq signed an agreement with Iran to buy natural gas through a joint pipeline that would supply several Iraqi power plants. The Trump Administration has accommodated Iraq’s need for Iranian electricity supplies by giving Iraq waiver permission—under Section 1247 of IFCA—to pay Iran for electricity and the Iranian natural gas that runs Iraq’s power plants. That section provides for waivers of up to 180 days, but the Administration has limited the waiver to shorter increments, and requires that the funds due to Iran are held in escrow at Iraq’s Trade Bank.

Syria and Lebanon

Iran has extensive economic relations with both Syria and Lebanon, countries where Iran asserts that core interests are at stake. Iran has sought to use banks in Lebanon to provide financial assistance to Hezbollah as well as to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Asad. To try to curb this activity, the Trump Administration has sanctioned some Lebanese banks for facilitating Iranian aid to Hezbollah, although in the process perhaps weakening the Lebanese banking system and aggravating Lebanon’s economic downturn. In July 2020, U.S. officials threatened to impose sanctions on Lebanon if the government moves forward with a Hezbollah suggestion that the country ease its financial difficulties by buying oil from Iran.

In January 2017, Iran and Syria signed a series of economic agreements giving Iranian firms increased access to Syria’s mining, agriculture, and telecommunications sectors, as well as management of a Syrian port. In July 2019, Gibraltar diverted an Iranian tanker delivering oil to

---

81 Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.” A total of $5.7 billion in Iranian funds had built up in Oman’s Bank Muscat by the time of implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016. In its efforts to easily access these funds, Iran obtained from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department a February 2016 special license to convert the funds (held as Omani rials) to dollars as a means of easily converting the funds into Euros. Iran ultimately used a different mechanism to access the funds as hard currency, but the special license issuance resulted in a May 2018 review by the majority of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation to assess whether that license was consistent with U.S. regulations “Obama Misled Congress, Tried and Failed to Give Iran Secret Access to US Banks Before the Deal.” Business Insider, June 6, 2018; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. “Review of U.S. Treasury Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System.” Majority Report. May 2018.


83 “Pompeo: We are trying to prevent Iran from selling crude oil to Hezbollah.” Arab News, July 9, 2020.

84 Iran Signs Phone, Gas Deals with Syria. Agence France Presse, January 17, 2017.
Syria, a transaction that violated EU sanctions on Syria. The ship delivered the oil to Syria after its release by Gibraltar in August 2019.

Venezuela

During 2020, Iran has expanded its economic relations with the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela which, like Iran, is heavily targeted by U.S. sanctions. In May 2020, five Iranian tankers shipped gasoline to Venezuela, reportedly in exchange for gold (which is a form of hard currency). U.S. officials threatened sanctions on those as well as four other tankers bound for Venezuela and successfully deterred the latter four from completing their deliveries. The United States subsequently took legal action to impound those four shipments. Iran-Venezuela relations had fluctuated prior to the 2020 Iranian shipments, and earlier agreements between the two received little, if any, implementation.

International Financial Institutions/World Bank/IMF and WTO

The United States representatives to international financial institutions are required to vote against international lending to Iran, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block international lending. Asserting that it needs additional funds to cope with the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic, Iran applied for a $5 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in March 2020. Administration officials have opposed the loan on the grounds that Iran has sufficient funds to manage its response to the pandemic, and no loan decision has been announced by the IMF as of July 2020.

Iran has received no international financial loans since 2005. In 1993, the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. During FY1994-FY1996, foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank because of its loans to Iran, contributing to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. In May 2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land management projects, plus $400 million for earthquake relief.

WTO Accession

Iran has sought to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Iran began accession talks in 2006 after the George W. Bush Administration dropped its objection to Iran’s application as part of an effort to persuade Iran to reach a nuclear agreement. The accession process generally takes many years, and generally requires consensus of existing WTO members. The Trump Administration opposes Iran’s admission, and Iran’s efforts to join the WTO have not advanced.

Effectiveness of Sanctions

Trump Administration officials assert that U.S. sanctions on Iran are “working.” The following sections assess the effectiveness of Iran sanctions according to a number of criteria.

87 “U.S. envoy says Iran sanctions working, warns against nuclear breaches.” Reuters, June 27, 2019.
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Strategic Capabilities

The international sanctions regime of 2011-2015 is widely credited with increasing Iran’s willingness to accept the JCPOA. The Trump Administration asserts that its campaign of “maximum pressure” on Iran, implemented mainly through sanctions, is intended to cause Iran to negotiate a revised JCPOA that would limit not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its missile program and its regional malign activities. Iran has refused such negotiations with the United States, insisting that the United States provide JCPOA sanctions relief as a precondition to talks.88

Sanctions during 2011-2015 did not prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. And, even though U.S. and EU sanctions remained on Iran’s missile programs after the JCPOA was implemented, Iran has been able to expand the scale and sophistication of its missile capabilities, as demonstrated by Iran’s September 14, 2019, strike on critical Saudi energy infrastructure and Iran’s retaliatory attack for the killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Still, Iran’s nuclear and missile programs might have advanced faster were sanctions not imposed.

Sanctions—as well as Resolution 2231—have prevented Iran from buying significant amounts of major combat systems since the early 1990s. The U.N. ban on Iran’s importation and exportation of weaponry expires on October 18, 2020. U.S. intelligence directors testified in 2019 that Iran continues to develop its own increasingly advanced naval mines, submarines, and attack craft.89

Effects on Iran’s Regional Influence

The imposition, lifting, or reimposition of strict sanctions have arguably had minimal effect on Iran’s regional behavior. Iran intervened extensively in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen during the 2011-2015 period when sanctions had a significant adverse effect on Iran’s economy. Iran has remained engaged in these regional conflicts after sanctions were eased in 2016, and since U.S. sanctions were reimposed in late 2018. Iran’s regional activities are assessed in: CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman

Administration officials have cited Hezbollah’s financial difficulties as evidence that its “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran is harming Iran’s abilities to project power in the region.90 The claim references reports since early 2019 that the party has had to appeal for donations, cut expenses, request donations, and delay or reduce payments to its fighters.91 In 2020, the Administration has also attributed the apparent drawdown of pro-Iranian fighters in Syria to the effect of U.S. sanctions. An alternative explanation is that Iran is adjusting its expenditures to the reduced activity on the Syria battlefield, where Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias have been fighting on behalf of the Asad regime.

The Administration also has sought to highlight the effect of its policy on Iran’s defense budget. President Trump stated that Iran’s defense budget had increased 40% during the 2016-2018 time frame of JCPOA implementation.92 On October 16, 2019, the State Department Special

88 “Iran says pandemic will not force talks with the US.” Al Monitor, April 20, 2020.
92 Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran, August 6, 2018.
Representative on Iran, Ambassador Brian Hook, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that

However, from 2017 to 2018, when our pressure went into effect we saw a reduction in [Iran’s] military spending of nearly 10 percent. Iran’s 2019 budget, which was released in March, called for even steeper cuts, including a 28 percent cut to their defense budget and a 17 percent cut for IRGC funding.93

Oversight. A provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17) requires that a semiannual report on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA include information on any Iranian use of funds to support acts of terrorism. However, because the United States has ceased implementing the JCPOA, the semi-annual reports apparently are not prepared any more.

Domestic Political Effects

Although no U.S. Administration has publicly asserted that the goal of U.S. sanctions on Iran is to bring about the change of Iran’s regime, a key question is whether U.S. sanctions might produce political change in Iran. In late 2017-early 2018 and in November 2019, unrest broke out over economic conditions and government repression. Still, U.S. sanctions were suspended at the time of the unrest in late 2017 and there were few secondary sanctions during the large Green Movement uprising of 2009-2010, suggesting that the connection between sanctions and Iran unrest might be tenuous. Still, some Iranian protesters complain that the country’s money is being spent on regional interventions rather than on the domestic economy.

Nor have U.S. sanctions necessarily always achieved favorable gradual political change. The Trump Administration’s maximum pressure campaign has arguably undermined President Hassan Rouhani—and bolstered Iranian hardliners—by illustrating that negotiations with the United States do not produce better relations with the United States. Hardliners overwhelmingly won Iran’s February 2020 parliamentary elections.94

Economic Effects

U.S. sanctions during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a substantial toll on Iran’s economy.

- **GDP and Employment Trends.** During 2011-2015, Iran’s economy contracted approximately 20% over the period, and the unemployment rate rose to about 20%, but the JCPOA-related sanctions easing enabled Iran to achieve 7% annual growth during 2016-2018.95 The IMF reported that Iran’s economy declined by about 8% during March 2019-March 2020, and a further contraction is expected during 2020-2021.96 The estimates account for the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and of U.S. sanctions.

- **Oil Exports.** During the 2011-2015 sanctions period, Iran’s crude oil sales fell from 2.5 mbd in 2011 to about 1.1 mbd by 2014. The JCPOA sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to 2011 levels, but the reimposition of U.S. sanctions—including termination of the SREs—has driven Iran’s oil exports below 300,000 barrels per day in mid-2020.

93 Testimony of Special Representative Brian Hook. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 16, 2019.
95 “Foreign Investors Flock to Iran as U.S. Firms Watch on the Sidelines.” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2017.
• **Banking.** Global banks mostly left the Iranian market during 2011-2015 and hesitated to reenter the Iran market after the 2016 easing of sanctions because of (1) reported concerns that the United States might still sanction their Iran transactions; (2) a lack of transparency in Iran’s financial sector; (3) lingering concerns over past financial penalties for processing Iran-related transactions in the United States; and (4) the inability to use dollars in Iran-related transactions. Those banks that reentered the Iran market in 2016 exited again or limited their transactions with Iran after the U.S. reimposed sanctions in 2018.

• **Accessibility of Hard Currency Assets Held Abroad.** During 2011-2016, sanctions prevented Iran from accessing the hard currency in its accounts abroad which, in January 2016, stood at about $115 billion. Iran was able to access the funds during 2016-2018, but Iran’s foreign reserves again became restricted by reimposed U.S. sanctions in late 2018. The current total value of Iran’s hard currency assets abroad has been estimated by U.S. officials as about $85 billion, but only about 10% of that is accessible due to the U.S.-imposed restrictions.

• **Currency Decline.** For most of the period of JCPOA implementation (2016-2018), the market value of the rial was about 35,000 to the dollar. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 caused the rial’s value to plummet to 150,000 to the dollar by the November 5, 2018, and it reached its lowest levels ever (200,000 to the dollar) in late June 2020.

• **Inflation.** The drop in value of the currency caused inflation to accelerate during 2011-2013 to a rate of about 60%—a higher figure than that acknowledged by Iran’s Central Bank. As sanctions were eased, inflation slowed to the single digits by June 2016, meeting the Central Bank’s stated goal. The U.S. exit from the JCPOA caused inflation to increase to nearly 40%, by the end of 2018, but the level stabilized in 2019, according to Iran’s Central Bank governor.

• **Industrial/Auto Production and Sales.** Iran’s light-medium manufacturing sector was expanding prior to 2011, but its dependence on imported parts left the sector vulnerable to sanctions and vehicle production fell by about 60% from 2011 to 2013. The auto sector, and manufacturing overall, rebounded after sanctions were lifted in 2016, but declined again following the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.

• **U.S.-Iran Trade.** U.S.-Iran trade remains minimal. In 2015, the last full year before JCPOA implementation, the United States sold $281 million in goods to Iran and imported $10 million worth of Iranian products. The slight relaxation of the U.S. import ban stemming from the JCPOA likely accounted for the significant increase in imports in 2016 to $86 million. U.S. exports to Iran spiked to $440 million for 2018, primarily from a major increase in U.S. sales of soybeans to Iran that year (about $318 million of that commodity). For 2019, the

---

97 CRS conversation with Department of the Treasury officials, July 2015. Of this amount, about $60 billion was due to creditors such as China or to repay nonperforming loans to Iranian energy companies working in the Caspian and Persian Gulf.


100 Ibid.

101 Figures in this paragraph is from the U.S Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics database.
first full year in which all U.S. sanctions were back into effect, U.S. exports to Iran fell to $73 million and imports from Iran were only about $1.4 million.

Iran’s Economic Coping Strategies

Iran has sought to try to mitigate the economic effect of sanctions.

- **Export Diversification.** Over the past 10 years, Iran has promoted sales of petrochemicals and nonoil products, and they constitute a growing percentage of Iran’s revenue.\(^\text{102}\) As discussed above, Iran’s March 2020-2021 budget assumes that Iran will earn minimal oil revenues during the budget year.

- **Reallocation of Investment Funds and Import Substitution.** Sanctions compelled some Iranian manufacturers to increase domestic production of some goods as substitutes for imports. Supreme Leader Khamene’i publicly supports building a “resistance economy” that is less dependent on imports and foreign investment.

- **IRGC in the Economy/Privatization.** Since 2010, portions of Iran’s state-owned enterprises have been transferred to the control of quasi-governmental entities, including cleric-run foundations (bonyads), holding companies, or investment groups. The IRGC’s corporate affiliates are assessed by some experts as controlling at least 20% of Iran’s economy.\(^\text{103}\) Rouhani has sought to push the IRGC out of Iran’s economy through divestment, but with limited success.

- **Subsidy Reductions.** Then-President Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) reduced generous subsidies while temporarily compensating families with small cash payments. Gasoline prices were raised to levels similar to those in other regional countries. Rouhani has continued that policy, and he has improved collections of taxes.\(^\text{104}\)

\(^{102}\) Testimony of Patrick Clawson before the Senate Banking Committee. January 21, 2015.

\(^{103}\) “How Trump’s terrorist designation of Iran’s revolutionary guard impacts its economy.” CNBC, April 12, 2019.

\(^{104}\) Patrick Clawson testimony, January 21, 2015, op. cit.
**Figure 1. Economic Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iran’s GDP growth rate (%)</th>
<th>2005-2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2016 JCPOA implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-2020 IMF estimates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2006 International sanctions imposed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2016 International sanctions lifted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018 U.S. sanctions reinstated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iran’s total oil production (millions of barrels per day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IMF 2019, U.S. Energy Information Administration, OPEC.

**Effect on Energy Sector Development**

Since 2011, there has been little development activity at Iran’s various oil and gas development sites, and many foreign investors resold their equity stakes to Iranian companies that are less technically capable than international firms. The lifting of sanctions in 2016 prompted Iran to try to lure foreign investors back into the sector with more generous investment terms under a concept called the “Iran Petroleum Contract” that gives investing companies the rights to a set percentage of Iran’s oil reserves for 20-25 years.\(^{105}\) Iran signed a number of new agreements with international energy firms after 2016 but, as noted above, major energy firms divested again in response to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA. **Appendix B** at the end of this report discusses various Iranian oil and gas fields and the fate of post-1999 investments in them.

Iran’s development of its gas export sector has been slow. Iran still uses its gas mostly to reinject into aging oil fields. However, Iran is exporting natural gas primarily to Turkey and Armenia. Sanctions have rendered Iran unable to develop a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export business.

---

\(^{105}\) Thomas Erdbrink.”New Iran Battle Brews over Foreign Oil Titans.” *New York Times*, February 1, 2016.
With respect to gasoline, several suppliers stopped selling gasoline to Iran after CISADA (see above) was enacted. In response, Iran expanded several of its refineries and, in 2017, Iranian officials said Iran had become self-sufficient in gasoline.

**Human Rights-Related Effects**

It is difficult to draw any direct relationship between sanctions and Iran’s human rights practices. Human rights reports by the State Department assess that there has been only modest improvement in Iran’s practices in recent years, but the altered policies are not attributed by these reports to any changes in sanctions.\(^{106}\)

Since 2012, foreign firms have generally refrained from selling the Iranian government equipment to monitor or censor social media use. However, the regime retains the ability to monitor and censor social media use, and it is also developing a progressively more advanced cyber capability using indigenously-upgraded technology.

**Humanitarian Effects**

The COVID-19 pandemic has put a spotlight on the extent to which sanctions might be affecting Iran’s response to the disease—despite the fact that humanitarian items are exempt from U.S. sanctions. For further analysis, see CRS Insight IN11279, *COVID-19 and U.S. Iran Policy*, by Kenneth Katzman.

During 2012-2016, and since 2018, sanctions reportedly have limited Iran’s ability to import expensive Western-made medicines, such as chemotherapy drugs and medicines for multiple sclerosis.\(^{107}\) Other reports in 2019 indicated that global food traders halted supplying Iran because of the absence of trade financing,\(^{108}\) or, alternately, their shipments have been held at Iranian docks until payments clear. Some of the scarcity of medicines is caused by banks’ refusal to finance such sales, even though doing so is not subject to sanctions. The State Department has issued statements that the Iranian government exaggerates reports of the effects of U.S. sanctions on its medical imports,\(^{109}\) whereas other accounts say that Iranians, particularly those with connections to the government, take advantage of shortages by cornering the market for key medicines.

**U.S. COVID Response**

The Trump Administration has undertaken several steps to assist Iran’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and, in the process, perhaps parry calls to broadly ease sanctions on Iran.

- In January 2020, even before the COVID-19 pandemic had been acknowledged in Iran, the United States processed the first transactions under a “Swiss humanitarian channel” under which U.S. medical equipment can be sold to buyers in Iran that are determined to be using the items purely for the purposes intended. The channel was announced in October 2019, in partnership with Switzerland.
- In February 2020, the Treasury Department clarified that Iran’s Central Bank accounts abroad could be used for humanitarian purchases without risk of U.S. sanctions.

---

\(^{106}\) Department of State. 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights, Released in 2020.


\(^{109}\) State Department. Iran’s Sanctions Relief Scam., April 6, 2020.
sanction, and that donations could go to Iranians from U.S. donors. The steps stopped short of steps taken in previous natural disasters in which the Administration provided a 90 day general license for sales to Iran.

- In March 2020, the United States formally offered Iran assistance to help it cope with the pandemic. Iran refused the aid.
- On the other hand, as noted, the United States is trying to persuade other members of the IMF executive board to jointly, with the United States, deny Iran the requested $5 billion loan for its COVID-19 response. Some Members of Congress have called on the Administration to support the loan. The IMF has not announced a decision on the loan as of July 2020.

Air Safety

In the aviation sector, some Iranian pilots complain publicly that U.S. sanctions caused Iran’s passenger airline fleet to deteriorate to the point of jeopardizing safety. Iran’s aviation safety record is widely assessed as relatively poor, but it is not clear if any issues were due to difficulty in acquiring U.S. spare parts.

- In February 2016, Iran Air—which was delisted from U.S. sanctions as of Implementation Day—announced it would purchase 118 Airbus commercial aircraft at an estimated value of $27 billion. Airbus received an OFAC license and three of the aircraft were delivered before the Treasury Department revoked its export licenses for the planes in 2018.
- In December 2016, Boeing and Iran Air finalized an agreement for the purchase of 80 passenger aircraft and the leasing of 29 others. Boeing received a specific license for the transaction, which had an estimated value of $17 billion. None of the aircraft was delivered by the time the export licenses were revoked in 2018.
- In April 2017, Iran’s Aseman Airlines signed a tentative agreement to buy at least 30 Boeing MAX passenger aircraft. No U.S. license for this sale was announced prior to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA. The airline is owned by Iran’s civil service pension fund but managed as a private company.
- In June 2017, Airbus agreed to tentative sales of 45 A320 aircraft to Iran’s Airtour Airline, and of 28 A320 and A330 aircraft to Iran’s Zagros Airlines. No U.S. license for the sale was announced prior to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
- ATR, owned by Airbus and Italy’s Leonardo, sold 20 aircraft to Iran Air. It delivered eight aircraft by the time of the U.S. JCPOA exit and was given licenses to deliver another five by the November 2018 effective date of the export license revocation.

Post-JCPOA Sanctions Legislation

JCPOA oversight and implications, and broader issues of Iran’s behavior have been the subject of legislation.

110 Senator Robert Menendez: Menendez & Engel Propose Policies for Addressing COVID-19 in Iran. Press release, April 3, 2020; Feinstein urges Trump to reverse plan to block Iran request for $5B in IMF aid, claims it is in ‘our national interest’ Fox News, April 11, 2020.
114th Congress

The JCPOA stated that as long as Iran complies with the JCPOA, the sanctions that were suspended or lifted shall not be reimposed on other bases. The Obama Administration asserted that some new sanctions that seek to limit Iran’s military power, its human rights abuses, or its support for militant groups would not violate the JCPOA.

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17)

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA, P.L. 114-17) provided for a congressional review period after which Congress could pass legislation to disapprove of the JCPOA. No such legislation of disapproval was enacted. There are several certification and reporting requirements under INARA, although most of them no longer apply as a result of the Trump Administration withdrawal:

- **Material Breach Report.** INARA required the Administration to report a potentially significant Iranian breach of the agreement within 10 days of acquiring credible information of such. Within another 30 days, the President must determine whether this is a material breach and whether Iran has cured it.

- **Certification Report.** INARA required the President to certify, every 90 days, that Iran is “transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing” the agreement, and that Iran has not taken any action to advance a nuclear weapons program. On October 13, 2017, the Administration declined to make that certification, on the grounds that continued sanctions relief is not appropriate and proportionate to Iran’s measures to terminate its illicit nuclear program.

- If a breach is reported, or if the President does not certify compliance, Congress may initiate within 60 days “expedited consideration” of legislation that would reimpose any Iran sanctions that the President had suspended.

- **Semiannual Report.** INARA required an Administration report every 180 days on Iran’s nuclear program, including not only Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments but also whether Iranian banks are involved in terrorism financing; Iran’s ballistic missile advances; and whether Iran continued to support terrorism.

Visa Restriction

The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 114-113) contained a provision amending the Visa Waiver Program to require a visa to visit the United States for any person who has visited Iraq, Syria, or any terrorism list country (Iran and Sudan are the two aside from Syria still listed) in the previous five years. The Obama Administration issued a letter to Iran stating it would implement the provision in such a way as not to not impinge on sanctions relief, and allowances for Iranian students studying in the United States were made in the implementing regulations. Another provision of that law required an Administration report to Congress on how Iran has used the benefits of sanctions relief.

Iran Sanctions Act Extension

The 114th Congress acted to extend ISA before its scheduled expiration on December 31, 2016. The Iran Sanctions Extension Act (H.R. 6297), which extended ISA until December 31, 2026, without any other changes, passed the House on November 15 by a vote of 419-1 and then passed
the Senate by 99-0. President Obama allowed the bill to become law without signing it (P.L. 114-277), even though the Administration said the extension was not necessary.

**Reporting Requirement on Iran Missile Launches**

The conference report on the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-328, Section 1226) required quarterly reports to Congress on Iran’s missile launches the imposition of U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran’s ballistic missile launches, until December 31, 2019. The conference report on the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91) extended the requirement until December 31, 2022. The report is to include efforts to sanction entities that assist those missile launches.

**114th Congress Legislation not Enacted**

- The Iran Policy Oversight Act (S. 2119) and the Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act (H.R. 3662) would have added certification requirements for the Administration to remove designations of Iranian entities sanctioned. The House passed the latter bill but then vacated its vote.

- The IRGC Terrorist Designation Act (H.R. 3646/S. 2094) required a report on whether the IRGC meets the criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The Obama Administration argued that the law that set up the FTO designations (Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1189]) applies such designations only to non-state groups.

- The IRGC Sanctions Act (H.R. 4257) would have required congressional action to approve an Administration request to remove a country from the terrorism list and would have required certification that any entity to be “delisted” from sanctions is not a member, agent, affiliate, or owned by the IRGC.

- The Prohibiting Assistance to Nuclear Iran Act (H.R. 3273) would have prohibited the use of U.S. funds to assist Iran’s nuclear program.

- The Justice for Victims of Iranian Terrorism Act (H.R. 3457/S. 2086) prohibited the President from waiving U.S. sanctions until Iran completed paying judgments issued for victims of Iranian terrorism. The House passed it on October 1, 2015, by a vote of 251-173 despite Obama Administration opposition.\(^{111}\)

- H.R. 3728 would have amended ITRSHRA to make mandatory sanctions against electronic payments systems such as SWIFT if they were used by Iran.

- The Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act of 2016 (S. 2725) would have required that Iran’s automotive, chemical, computer science, construction, electronic, energy metallurgy, mining, petrochemical, research, and telecommunications industries be subject to U.S. sanctions, if those sectors were determined to provide support for Iran’s ballistic missile program. A similar bill, H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act, passed the House on July 14, 2016, by a vote of 246-179.

- H.R. 4992, which passed the House on July 14, 2016, by a vote of 246-181, and the related Countering Iranian Threats Act of 2016 (S. 3267), would have required foreign banks and dollar clearinghouses to receive a U.S. license for any dollar transactions involving Iran.

---

\(^{111}\) For more information on the issue of judgments for victims of Iranian terrorism, see CRS Report RL31258, *Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism*, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
Several bills and amendments in the 114th Congress sought to block or impede the sale of the Boeing aircraft to Iran by preventing the licensing, financing, or Ex-Im Bank loan guarantees for the sale. These included H.R. 5715, H.R. 5711, and sections of the FY2017 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act (H.R. 5485). H.R. 5711 passed by the House on November 17, 2016, by a vote of 243-174. The Obama Administration opposed the bills.

The Trump Administration and Iran Sanctions Legislation

Even before the Trump Administration withdrew the United States out of the JCPOA, Congress acted on or considered additional Iran sanctions legislation. The following Iran sanctions legislation was enacted or considered in the 115th Congress.

The Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44)

S. 722, which initially contained only Iran-related sanctions, was reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after incorporating sanctions on Russia, and it passed the Senate on June 15, 2017, by a vote of 98-2. Subsequently, H.R. 3364, containing not only S.722 provisions but also sanctions on North Korea, passed both chambers (P.L. 115-44, August 2, 2017). The main provisions of CAATSA are discussed in the sections above, and Section 108 of the law requires an Administration review of all designated entities to assess whether such entities are contributing to Iran’s ballistic missile program or to Iranian support for international terrorism.

Legislation in the 115th Congress Not Enacted

- H.R. 1638. On November 14, 2017, the House Financial Services Committee ordered reported H.R. 1638, the Iranian Leadership Asset Transparency Act, requiring the Treasury Secretary to report to Congress on the assets and equity interests held by named Iranian persons, including the Supreme Leader. That day, the Committee also reported out H.R. 4324, Strengthening Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance Act. The bill would have required Administration reports on whether financing of Iranian commercial passenger aircraft purchases posed money-laundering or risks or benefited Iranian proliferation or terrorism.

- H.R. 5132. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Economic Exclusion Act mandated Administration reports on whether specified categories of entities are owned or controlled by the IRGC, or conduct significant transactions with it. The bill defined an entity as owned or controlled by the IRGC even if the IRGC’s ownership interest is less than 50%, and would have required a report on whether the Iran Airports Company violates E.O. 13224 by facilitating flight operations by Mahan Air, which is a designated as a terrorism supporting SDN.

- H.R. 4591, S. 3431, and H.R. 4238. Several bills would have codified Executive Order 13438 by requiring the blocking of U.S.-based property and preventing U.S. visas for persons determined to be threatening the stability of Iraq, mentioning specifically the Iraqi militia groups Asaib Ahl Al Haq and Harakat Hizballah Al Nujaba. H.R. 4591 passed the House on November 27, 2018.
116th Congress

Legislation introduced subsequent to the May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA appeared to try to support implementation of the Administration’s maximum pressure campaign. The following pertain to sanctions and not the broader issue of U.S.-Iran military confrontation or other Iran issues and represents a sampling of introduced legislation.

- Several bills similar or virtually identical to those introduced previously have been introduced, imposing sanctions on Iranian proxies in Iraq and elsewhere. These bills include H.R. 361, the Iranian Proxies Terrorist Sanctions Act of 2019, and H.R. 571, the Preventing Destabilization of Iraq Act of 2019.
- The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Exclusion Act (S. 925), similar to H.R. 5132 in the 115th Congress, has been introduced in the Senate.
- The Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act (H.R. 2118). The bill includes provisions similar to H.R. 1698 in the 115th Congress.
- The Block Iranian Access to U.S. Banks Act of 2020 (H.R. 6243) would prohibit any U.S. license to provide financial services to the government of Iran.

Other Possible U.S. and International Sanctions

There are a number of other possible sanctions that might receive consideration—either in a global or multilateral framework. These possibilities are analyzed in CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.

---

112 See CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
### Appendix A. U.S., U.N., EU and Allied Country Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Sanctions</th>
<th>U.N. Sanctions</th>
<th>EU and Other Allied Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Observation:</strong> Most sweeping sanctions on Iran of virtually any country in the world</td>
<td>As of 2010, U.N. sanctions were intended to give countries justification to cooperate with U.S. secondary sanctions. Post-JCPOA: Resolution 2231 is the only operative Resolution on Iran.</td>
<td>EU closely aligned its sanctions tightening with that of the United States. Most EU sanctions lifted in accordance with the JCPOA, although some sanctions on arms, dual-use items, and human rights remain. Japan and South Korea sanctions also became extensive but were almost entirely lifted in concert with the JCPOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on U.S. Trade with, Investment in, and Financing for Iran:</strong> Executive Order 12959 and CISAD ban U.S. firms from exporting to Iran, importing from Iran, or investing in Iran.</td>
<td>U.N. sanctions did not ban civilian trade with Iran or general civilian sector investment in Iran.</td>
<td>No comprehensive EU ban on trade in civilian goods with Iran was imposed at any time. Japan and South Korea did not ban normal civilian trade with Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions on Foreign Firms that Do Business with Iran’s Energy Sector:</strong> Several laws and orders mandate sanctions on virtually any type of transaction with/in Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent. However, Resolution 1929 “not[es] the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.” This is interpreted as providing U.N. support for countries to impose economic sanctions on Iran.</td>
<td>The EU banned almost all dealings with Iran’s energy sector after 2011. These sanctions now lifted, but no oil imports from Iran since 2018. Japanese and South Korean measures banned new energy projects in Iran. These sanctions now lifted, but no Iranian oil being imported by either.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Foreign Assistance:</strong> U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—other than purely humanitarian aid—is banned under §620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Iran is also routinely denied direct U.S. foreign aid under the annual foreign operations appropriations acts.</td>
<td>No U.N. equivalent</td>
<td>EU measures of July 2010, banned grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran, and financing of enterprises involved in Iran’s energy sector. These sanctions now lifted. Japan and South Korea did not ban aid or lending to Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:</strong> Iran is ineligible for U.S. arms exports under several laws, as discussed in the report.</td>
<td>As per Resolution 1929 (paragraph 8), as superseded by Resolution 2231, Security Council approval is required to sell Iran major weapons systems.</td>
<td>EU sanctions include a comprehensive ban on sale to Iran of all types of military equipment. Arms embargo remains post-JCPOA. No similar Japan and South Korean measures announced, but neither exports arms to Iran.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### U.S. Sanctions

**Restriction on Exports to Iran of “Dual Use Items”:**
Primarily under §6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72) and §38 of the Arms Export Control Act, there is a denial of license applications to sell Iran goods that could have military applications.

**Sanctions Against Lending to Iran:**
Under §1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118), U.S. representatives to international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are required to vote against loans to Iran by those institutions.

**Sanctions Against the Sale of Weapons of Mass Destruction-Related Technology to Iran:**
Several laws and regulations provide for sanctions against entities, Iranian or otherwise, that are determined to be involved in or supplying Iran’s WMD programs (asset freezing, ban on transaction with the entity).

**Ban on Transactions with Terrorism Supporting Entities:**
FTO and E.O 13224 designations ban transactions with entities determined by the Administration to be supporting terrorism. Numerous entities, including some of Iranian origin, have been designated.

**Human Rights Sanctions:**
CISADA and other laws provide for a prohibition on travel to the U.S., blocking of U.S.-based property, and ban on transactions with Iranians determined to be involved in serious human rights abuses, or who sell Iran equipment to commit such abuses.

### U.N. Sanctions

U.N. resolutions on Iran banned the export of many dual-use items to Iran. Resolution 2231 set up a procurement network for the P5+1 to approve of all purchases for Iran’s ongoing nuclear program.

Resolution 1747 (paragraph 7) requested, but did not mandate, that countries and international financial institutions refrain from making grants or loans to Iran, except for development and humanitarian purposes.

No longer applicable

Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph 12) imposed a worldwide freeze on the assets and property of Iranian WMD-related entities named in an Annex to the resolution. Each subsequent resolution expanded the list of Iranian entities subject to these sanctions.

### EU and Other Allied Countries

EU banned the sales of dual use items to Iran, including ballistic missile technology, in line with U.N. resolutions. These restrictions remain post-JCPOA.

Japan and S. Korea have announced full adherence to strict export control regimes.

The July 2010 measures prohibited EU members from providing grants, aid, and concessional loans to Iran, including through international financial institutions. Sanctions lifted post-JCPOA.

Japan and South Korea banned medium- and long-term trade financing and financing guarantees. Short-term credit was still allowed. These lifted post-JCPOA.

The EU measures imposed July 27, 2010, commit the EU to freezing the assets of WMD-related entities named in the U.N. resolutions, as well as numerous other named Iranian entities. Most of these restrictions remain.

Japan and South Korea froze assets of U.N.-sanctioned entities. Most of these restrictions have been lifted.

The EU retains a ban on providing equipment that can be used for internal repression, and has sanctioned nearly 100 Iranians for human rights abuses.

Japan and South Korea have announced bans on named Iranians involved in WMD programs.
### U.S. Sanctions

**Restrictions on Iranian Shipping:**
Under Executive Order 13382, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has named Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and several affiliated entities as entities whose U.S.-based property is to be frozen.

**Banking Sanctions:**
During 2006-2011, several Iranian banks have been named as proliferation or terrorism supporting entities under Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, and CISADA prohibits banking relationships with U.S. banks for any foreign bank that conducts transactions with Iran's Revolutionary Guard or with sanctioned Iranian entities. FY2012 Defense Authorization (P.L. 112-81) prevents U.S. accounts with foreign banks that process transactions with Iran's Central Bank (with specified exemptions).

**Ballistic Missiles:** U.S. proliferations laws provide for sanctions against foreign entities that help Iran with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

### U.N. Sanctions

Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any ships in national or international waters—if there is an indication that the shipments include goods whose export to Iran is banned. These resolutions no longer apply.

However, two Iranian banks were named as sanctioned entities under the U.N. Security Council resolutions. U.N. restrictions on Iranian banking now lifted.

Resolution 1929 (paragraph 9) prohibited Iran from undertaking “any activity” related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Resolution 2231 calls on Iran not to develop or launch ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. Expires October 18, 2023.

### EU and Other Allied Countries

The July 2010 EU measures banned Iran Air Cargo from access to EU airports and froze the EU-based assets of IRISL and its affiliates. Insurance and reinsurance for Iranian firms are banned. These sanctions now lifted.

Japan and South Korean measures took similar action against IRISL and Iran Air. Sanctions now lifted.


Brussels-based SWIFT expelled sanctioned Iranian banks from the electronic payment transfer system. This restriction was lifted but then reimposed when the U.S. left the JCPOA.

Japan and South Korea took similar measures South Korea imposed the 40,000 Euro threshold requiring authorization. Japan and S. Korea froze the assets of 15 Iranian banks; South Korea targeted Bank Mellat for freeze. These sanctions now lifted.

EU measures of July 2010 required adherence to this provision of Resolution 1929. EU has retained ban on providing ballistic missile technology to Iran in post-JCPOA period.
Appendix B. Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1999</td>
<td>Doroud (oil)</td>
<td>Total and ENI received “special rule” ISA exemption</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>205,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total and ENI received “special rule” ISA exemption</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>205,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 1999</td>
<td>Balal (oil)</td>
<td>Total/ Bow Valley (Canada)/ENI</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>40,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec./May 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand PTTEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1999</td>
<td>Soroush and Nowruz (oil)</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands)/ENI</td>
<td>$800 million</td>
<td>190,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2000</td>
<td>Anaran bloc (oil)</td>
<td>Lukoil (Russia) and Statoil (Norway)</td>
<td>$105 million</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2000</td>
<td>South Pars Phases 4 and 5 (gas)</td>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>$1.9 billion</td>
<td>2 billion cu. ft./day (cfd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2001</td>
<td>Caspian Sea oil exploration—construction of submersible drilling rig for Iranian partner</td>
<td>GVA Consultants (Sweden)</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2001</td>
<td>Darkhovin (oil)</td>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>100,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil)</td>
<td>Sheer Energy (Canada)/CNPC (China)/ Naftgaran Engineering (Iran)</td>
<td>$80 million</td>
<td>25,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2002</td>
<td>South Pars Phases 9 and 10 (gas)</td>
<td>GS Engineering and Construction Corp. (South Korea)</td>
<td>$1.6 billion</td>
<td>2 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2002</td>
<td>South Pars Phases 6, 7, and 8</td>
<td>Statoil (Norway)</td>
<td>$750 million</td>
<td>3 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2004</td>
<td>Azadegan (oil)—South and North</td>
<td>CNPC—N. Azadegan</td>
<td>$200 million (Inpex stake): China $2.5 billion</td>
<td>260,000 bpd, 80,000 is from N. Azadegan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell/Petronas (Malaysia)—MoU to develop S. Azadegan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2004</td>
<td>Tuskan Block</td>
<td>Petrobras (Brazil)</td>
<td>$178 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2004</td>
<td>Yadavaran (oil)</td>
<td>Sinopec (China), deal finalized Dec. 9, 2007</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
<td>300,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congressional Research Service
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Saveh bloc (oil)</td>
<td>PTT (Thailand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2006</td>
<td>Garmasar bloc (oil)</td>
<td>Sinopec (China)</td>
<td>$20 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2006</td>
<td>Arak Refinery expansion</td>
<td>Sinopec (China); JGC (Japan). Work continued by Hyundai Heavy Industries (S. Korea)</td>
<td>$959 million</td>
<td>Expansion to produce 250,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2006</td>
<td>Khorramabad block (oil)</td>
<td>Norsk Hydro and Statoil (Norway)</td>
<td>$49 million</td>
<td>no estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2006</td>
<td>North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas)</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Co.</td>
<td>$16 billion</td>
<td>3.6 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2007</td>
<td>LNG Tanks at Tombak Port</td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)</td>
<td>$320 million</td>
<td>200,000 ton capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2007</td>
<td>South Pars Phases 13 and 14</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol (Spain)</td>
<td>$4.3 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2007</td>
<td>Esfahan refinery upgrade</td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2007</td>
<td>S. Pars Phases 22, 23, and 24</td>
<td>Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO)</td>
<td>$12. billion</td>
<td>2 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2007</td>
<td>Golshan and Ferdowsi onshore and offshore gas and oil fields and LNG plant</td>
<td>Petrofield Subsidiary of SKS Ventures (Malaysia)</td>
<td>$15 billion</td>
<td>3.4 billion cfd gas/250,000 bpd of oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Jofeir Field (oil)</td>
<td>Belarusneft (Belarus)</td>
<td>$500 million</td>
<td>40,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)</td>
<td>Edison (Italy)</td>
<td>$44 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2008</td>
<td>Lavan field (offshore natural gas)</td>
<td>PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas Company, Poland), divested to Iranian firms in 2011</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2008</td>
<td>Danan Field (on-shore oil)</td>
<td>Petro Vietnam Exploration and Production Co. (Vietnam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Field/Project</th>
<th>Company(ies)/Status (If Known)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Output/Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2008</td>
<td>Iran’s Kish Gas Field</td>
<td>Oman (cofinancing of project)</td>
<td>$7 billion</td>
<td>1 billion cfd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2008</td>
<td>Moghan 2 (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil province)</td>
<td>INA (Croatia), but firm withdrew in 2014</td>
<td>$40-$140 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new construction)</td>
<td>Uhde (Germany)</td>
<td>$40-$140 million</td>
<td>300,000 metric tons/yr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2008</td>
<td>Resalat Oilfield</td>
<td>Amona (Malaysia), joined in June 2009 by CNOOC and another China firm, COSL.</td>
<td>$1.5 billion</td>
<td>47,000 bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2009</td>
<td>Bushehr Polymer Plants</td>
<td>Sasol (South Africa), but firm withdrew in 2014</td>
<td>$8 billion</td>
<td>Capacity is 1 million tons per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2009</td>
<td>Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—Incl. LNG terminal construction and Farsi Block gas field/Farzad-B bloc.</td>
<td>Indian firms: Oil and Natural Gas Corp. of India (ONGC); Oil India Ltd., India Oil Corp. Ltd./minor stakes by Sonanagol (Angola) and PDVSA (Venezuela).</td>
<td>$8 billion</td>
<td>20 million tonnes of LNG annually by 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2009</td>
<td>Abadan refinery</td>
<td>Sinopec</td>
<td>Up to $6 billion if new refinery is built</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2009</td>
<td>South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas Sweetening Plant</td>
<td>G and S Engineering and Construction (South Korea)</td>
<td>$1.4 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2009</td>
<td>South Pars Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3</td>
<td>Daelim (S. Korea)—Part 2; Tecnimont (Italy)—Part 3</td>
<td>$4 billion ($2 bn each part)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2010/July 2017</td>
<td>South Pars Phase 11</td>
<td>CNPC (China), with Iran Petropars</td>
<td>$4.7 billion</td>
<td>1.8 billion cu ft/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Azar Gas Field</td>
<td>Gazprom (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2011</td>
<td>Zagheh Oil Field</td>
<td>Tatneft (Russia)</td>
<td>$1 billion</td>
<td>55,000 barrels per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Aban Oil Field</td>
<td>Zarubezhneft (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Paydar Garb Oil Field</td>
<td>Zarubezhneft (Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Field/Project</td>
<td>Company(ies)/Stat us (If Known)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Output/ Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Schlumberger (France)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Parsi and Rag E-Sefid</td>
<td>Schlumberger signed a MoU to assess the fields.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Sumar Oil Field</td>
<td>PGNiG signed MoU to assess the field for six months.</td>
<td>PGNiG (Poland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Karanj</td>
<td>International Pergas Consortium signed a MoU to assess this field.</td>
<td>Pergas (consortium of firms from Norway, Britain, and Iran)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Changuleh Oil Field</td>
<td>Companies signed MoU’s to assess field.</td>
<td>Gazprom (Russia), PTTEP (Thailand), and DNO (Norway)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Kish Gas Field</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell signed MoU to assess the field</td>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Chesmekosh Gas Field</td>
<td>Gazprom signed MoU to assess the field</td>
<td>Gazprom (Russia) and Petronas (Malaysia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Shadegan Oil Field</td>
<td>Khuzestan province, producing about 65,000 bpd.</td>
<td>Tatneft (Russia)</td>
<td>500,000 bpd max.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Various oil and gas journals, as well as CRS conversations with some U.S. and company officials. Some information comes from various GAO reports, the latest of which was January 13, 2015 (GAO-15-258R).

**Notes:** CRS has no mandate, authority, or means to determine violations of the Iran Sanctions Act, and no way to confirm the status of any of the reported investments. The investments are private agreements between Iran and the firms involved, which are not required to reveal the terms of their arrangements. Responsibility for a project to develop Iran’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.
Appendix C. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N. Resolutions and EU Decisions

**U.N. Security Council Resolutions**

Entities in italics were “delisted” on Implementation Day. Entities in standard font to remain listed until Transition Day (October 2023), unless removed earlier by Security Council. Persons listed are identified by the positions they held when designated; some have since changed.

**Entities Sanctioned by Resolution 1737 (resolution no longer active)**

- Farayand Technique (centrifuge program)
- Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
- 7th of Tir (DOI subordinate)
- Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)—missile program
- Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG)—missile program
- Fajr Industrial Group—missile program
- Gen. Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Mouri (Malak Ashtar University of Defense Technology rector)
- Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO official)
- Reza Gholi Esmaili (AIO official)
- Ahmad Vahid Dastjerd (Head of AIO)
- Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi (Commander in Chief, IRGC)
- Gen. Hosein Salimi (Commander, IRGC Air Force)
- Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEIO)
- Mesbah Energy Company (Arak supplier)
- Mohammad Qanadi, AEIO Vice President
- Behman Asgarpour (Arak manager)
- Ehsan Monajemi (Natanz manager)
- Fereidoun Abbasi Davani (Qods Force commander)
- Mohsen Fakrizadeh (senior defense scientist)
- Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industrial Group)
- Ahmad Derakshandeh (head of Bank Sepah)
- Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi (IRGC ground forces commander)
- Naser Maleki (head of SHIG); Brig. Gen. Morteza Reza'i (Deputy commander-in-chief, IRGC)
- Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan (chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
- Karaj Nuclear Research Center
- Novin Energy Company; Cruise Missile Industry Group
- Kavoshyar Company (subsidiary of AEIO)
- Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International PLC (funds AIO and subordinate entities in missile activities)*
- Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center
- Seyed Jaber Safarli (Natanz manager)
- Amir Rahimi (head of Esfahan nuclear facilities); Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (head of SBIG)
- Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International were delisted on Implementation Day by a separate decision the Security Council. They were not named on the Resolution 2231 attachment of entities to be delisted on that day. No information has been publicized whether Ahmad Derakshandeh, the head of Bank Sepah, was also delisted.
Entities Added by Resolution 1803 (resolution no longer active)

Requires that countries report when the following persons enter or transit their territories:

- Amir Moayyed Alai (centrifuge program management)
- Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (Natanz complex technician)
- Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (senior AEIO official)
- Haleigh Bakhtiari
- Mortezah Behzad (centrifuge component production)
- Mohammad Eslami (Defense Industries Training and Research Institute)
- Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEIO, involved in Arak)
- M. Javad Karimi Sabet (head of Novin Energy)
- Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (manager at Esfahan uranium conversion facility)
- Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi (military official, for trying to circumvent U.N. sanctions)
- Houshang Nobari (Natanz)
- Abbas Rashidi (Natanz)
- Ghasem Soleymani (Saghand uranium mine)
- Morteza Behzad (centrifuge component production)
- Mohammad Eslami (Defense Industries Training and Research Institute)
- Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEIO, involved in Arak)
- M. Javad Karimi Sabet (head of Novin Energy)
- Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (manager at Esfahan uranium conversion facility)
- Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi (military official, for trying to circumvent U.N. sanctions)
- Houshang Nobari (Natanz)
- Abbas Rashidi (Natanz)
- Ghasem Soleymani (Saghand uranium mine)

Travel banned for five Iranians sanctioned under Resolutions 1737 and 1747.

Adds entities to the sanctions list:

- Electro Sanam Co.
- Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (centrifuge production)
- Barzaganin Tejeral Tavanmad Saccal
- Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEIO laboratory)
- Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
- Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. (Makes batteries for Iranian military and missile systems)
- Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front co.)
- Industrial Factories of Precision
- Joza Industrial Co.
- Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries
- Tamas Co. (uranium enrichment)

Entities Added by Resolution 1929 (resolution no longer active)

Makes mandatory a previously nonbinding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions. Adds one individual banned for travel—AEIO head Javad Rahiqi.

- Amin Industrial Complex; Armament Industries Group
- Defense Technology and Science Research Center (owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense)
- Doostan International Company
- Farasakht Industries
- First East Export Bank, PLC
- Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
- M. Babaie Industries
- Shahid Karrazi Industries
- Malek Ashtar University (subordinate of Defense Technology and Science Research Center, above)
- Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (sells Iranian made arms to customers worldwide)
- Mian Machinery Manufacturing
- Pejman Industrial Services Corp.;
- Sabalan Company; Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company
- Shahid Sattari Industries
- Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (acts on behalf of the DIO)
- Special Industries Group (DIO subordinate)
- Tiz Pars (cover name for SHIG)
- Yazd Metallurgy Industries
- Modern Industries Technique Company
- Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (research component of the AEIO)

The following IRGC-affiliated firms (several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction affiliate):

- Fater Institute
- Gararge Sazendegi Ghaem
- Gorb Karbala
- Gorb Nooh
- Hara Company
- Sepasad Engineering Company
- Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute
- Khadam ol-Anbiya
- Makin
- Omran Sahel
- Oriental Oil Kish
- Rah Sahel
- Rahab Engineering Institute
- Sahel Consultant Engineers
- Sepanir

The following entities determined to be owned or controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL): Irano Hind Shipping Company; IRISL Benelux; and South Shipping Line Iran.

European Union Iran Designations

Terrorism-related

Hamid Abdollahi
Mansoori Arbabsiar—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambasador in Washington
Asadollah Asadi—for alleged terrorist plot in Europe
Hashemi Moghadam—for alleged terrorist plot in Europe
Abdul Reza Shahli—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambasador in Washington
Gholam Ali Shakuri—for alleged plot to assassinate Saudi Ambasador in Washington
Qasem Soleimani—IRGC-QF commander
Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Hamas
Hezbollah Military Wing
Palestinian Islamic Jihad

**Human-Rights Related**

87 persons, mostly IRGC, Basij, Law Enforcement Forces commanders, as well as security militia chiefs such as Hossein Allahkaram of Ansar-e-Hezbollah. List also includes judicial officials such as Seyeed Hassan Shariati (head of Mashhad judiciary); Ghorban Ali Dorri-Najafabadi (former prosecutor-general); officials of Tehran revolutionary court; Supreme Court officials; Evin prison officials; province-level prosecutors; and others.

The full list is at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02011D0235-20180413&qid=1555351537619&from=EN
Appendix D. Entities Sanctioned under U.S. Laws and Executive Orders

For every table below, names in *italics* are entities and individuals that were delisted to implement the JCPOA. Under the JCPOA, entities in **boldface** were to be delisted on Transition Day (October 2023), had the United States remained in the JCPOA. Because of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, all delisted entities were relisted on November 5, 2018.

Table D-1. Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382 (Proliferation)

(many designations coincide with EU and UN designations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran); Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran); Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). AEOI and 23 subsidiaries remained delisted for secondary sanctions under E.O. 13382 but still designated as Iran-owned or controlled entities.</td>
<td>June 2005,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novin Energy Company (Iran) and Mesbah Energy Company (Iran)</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanam Industrial Group (Iran) and Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)</td>
<td>July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Sepah (Iran)</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kalaye Electric Company</strong></td>
<td>February 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Industries Organization (Iran)</td>
<td>March 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pars Trash</strong> (Iran, nuclear program), <strong>Farayand Technique</strong> (Iran, nuclear program), Fajr Industries Group (Iran, missile program), Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (missile program).</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran); Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea).</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; Bank Melli (Iran’s largest bank, widely used by Guard); Bank Melli Iran Zao (Moscow); Melli Bank PC (U.K.); Bank Kargarshahr; Arian Bank (joint venture between Melli and Bank Saderat). Based in Afghanistan; Bank Mellat (provides bank ing services to Iran’s nuclear sector); Mellat Bank SB QSC (Armenia). Persia International Bank PLC (U.K.); Khatam ol Anbiya Gharargah Sazandegi Nooh (main IRGC construction and contracting arm); Oriental Oil Kish (Iranian oil firm); Ghorb Karbala; Ghorb Nooh (synonymous with Khatam ol Anbiya); Sepasad Engineering Company (IRGC construction affiliate); Omran Sahel (IRGC construction affiliate); Sahel Consultant Engineering (IRGC construction affiliate); Hara Company; Ghararghe Sazandegi Ghaem</td>
<td>October 21, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals: Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official; Ahmad Yahid Dastjerdi (AIO head); Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO); Morteza Reza’i (deputy IRGC commander); Mohammad Hejazi (Basi commander); Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff); Hosein Salimi (IRGC Air Force commander). Resolution 1737; Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future Bank</strong> (Bahrain-based but allegedly controlled by Bank Melli)</td>
<td>March 12, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief); Mohsen Fakrzadeh-Mahabadi (senior nuclear scientist); Dawood Agha-Jani (head of Natanz facility); Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industries/missile program; Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabchi (heads Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group); Naser Maliki (heads Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group); Tamos Company uranium enrichment); Shahid Sattari Industries; 7th of Tir (centrifuge technology); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (partner of 7th of Tir); Parchin Chemical Industries (chemicals for ballistic missile programs)</td>
<td>July 8, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaj Nuclear Research Center; Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC); Jabber Ibn Hayyan (reports to AEOI); Safety Equipment Procurement Company; Joza Industrial Company (front company for SHIG)</td>
<td>August 12, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Date Named</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8; Kazar; Irvinvestship;</strong> <strong>Shipping Computer Services; Iran o Mir Shipping; Iran o Hind; IRISL Marine Services; Iriatyl Shipping; South Shipping; IRISL Multimodal; Oasis; IRISL Europe; IRISL Benelux; IRISL China; Asia Marine Network;</strong> <strong>CISCO Shipping; and IRISL Malta</strong></td>
<td>September 10, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense: Armament Industries Group; Farasakht Industries; Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co.; Iran Communications Industries; Iran Electronics Industries; and Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI)</td>
<td>September 17, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assa Corporation</strong> (alleged front for Bank Melli in New York property management, see text)</td>
<td>Dec. 17, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11 Bank Melli affiliates:</strong> <strong>Bank Melli Iran Investment (BMIIC); Bank Melli Printing and Publishing; Mehr Investment Holding; Mehr Cymen Ltd.;</strong> <strong>Cement Investment and Development; Mazandaran Cement Co.; Shomal Cement; Mazandaran Textile; Melli Agrochemical; First Persian Equity Fund; BMIIC Intel General Trading</strong></td>
<td>March 3, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC General Rostam Qasemi (head of Khatem ol-Anbiya) and several linked entities: Fater Engineering Institute, Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute, Makin Institute, and Rahab Institute</td>
<td>February 10, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Ali Jafari, IRGC Commander-in-Chief; IRGC Air Force; IRGC Missile Command; Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering (for ties to Khatem ol-Anbiya); Mohammad Reza Naqdi (Head of the IRGC’s Basij militia); Ahmad Vahedi (Defense Minister); Javad Mehr Toos, Javad Karimi Sabet (atomic energy procurement brokers) Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (SAIG, affiliate of Aircraft Industries Org that manages missile programs); Post Bank of Iran.</td>
<td>June 16, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five IRISL affiliates: <strong>Hofiz Darya Shipping Co.; Soroudh Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Co.; Sofiran Payam Darya; and Hong Kong-based Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics.</strong> 27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated IRISL ships. Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or controlled by Iran under E.O. 13599.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) for financial services to Bank Sepah, Mellat, EDBI, and others.</strong></td>
<td>Sept. 7, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pearl Energy Company</strong> (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat, Pearl Energy Services, SA, Ali Afzali (high official of First East Export Bank), IRISL front companies: Ashtead Shipping, Byfleet Shipping, Cobham Shipping, Dorking Shipping, Effingham Shipping, Farnham Shipping, Gomshall Shipping, and Horsham Shipping (all located in the Isle of Man). - IRISL and affiliate officials: Mohammad Hosein Dajmar, Gholaamhossein Golpavar, Hassan Jali Zadeh, and Mohammad Haji Pajand.</td>
<td>November 30, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC; Ansar Bank (for providing financial services to the IRGC); Mehr Bank (same justification as above); Moollem Insurance Company (for providing marine insurance to IRISL, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines)</strong></td>
<td>December 21, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM)</strong></td>
<td>May 17, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tidewater Middle East Company; Iran Air; Mehr-e Eqtesad Iranian Investment Co.</strong></td>
<td>June 23, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For proscribed nuclear activities: By State—Nuclear Reactor Fuels Company; Noor Afsar Gostar Company; Fulmen Group; Yasa Part. By Treasury—Javad Rahiqi; Modern Industries Technique Company; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA); Neka Novin; Parto Sanat; Paya Partov; Simatic Development Co</strong></td>
<td>November 21, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran Maritime Industrial Company SADRA (owned by Khatem-ol-Anbiya, with offices in Venezuela); Deep Offshore Technology PJS; Malship Shipping Agency and Modality Ltd (Malta-based affiliates of IRISL); Seyed Alaeddin Sadat Rasool (IRISL legal adviser); Ali Ezati (IRISL)</strong></td>
<td>March 28, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic Components Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN); Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center (AICTC) and Hamid Reza Rabiee (AICTC); Digital Medical Lab (DML) and Value Laboratory; Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX); Daniel freshly (Austria) and International General Resourcing FZE (UAE, Iran missile assistance)</strong></td>
<td>July 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Date Named</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Iranian Oil Company; Tehran Goshtarest, company owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Imam Hossein University (IRGC); Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University (services to IRGC)</td>
<td>November 8, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Fereidoun Abbasi Davani; Seyed Jaber Saffarsi of Novin Energy (affiliate of AEOI); Morteza Ahmadi Behzad (services to AEOI); Pouya Control—provides goods and services for uranium enrichment; Iran Pouya (centrifuge materials); Aria Nikan Marine Industry (goods for nuclear program); Amir Hossein Rahimy (procurer for Iran nuclear program); Mohammad Reza Rezvanianzadeh (nuclear program); Faratech (heavy water reactor project); Neda Industrial Group (equipment for Natanz facility); Tarh O Palayesh—(heavy water reactor); Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran (nuclear program supplier).</td>
<td>December 13, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAD Import Export Company (for shipping arms and other goods to Syria’s armed forces); Marine Industries Organization (affiliate of Iran Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics); Mustafa Esbati (acting on behalf of Marine Industries); Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group (affiliate of Defense Industries Org); Doostan International Company (provided services to Iran Aerospace Industries Org, which oversees Iran missile industries).</td>
<td>December 21, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babak Morteza Zanjani—chairmen of Sorinet Group that finances Iran oil sales abroad; International Safe Oil—provides support to NIOC and NICO; Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers (Dubai) and First Islamic Investment Bank (Malaysia)—finance NIOC and NICO; Kont Kosmetik and Kont Investment Bank—controlled by Babak Zanjani; Naffiran Intertrade Company Ltd. (owned by NIOC).</td>
<td>April 11, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian-Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB), for activities on behalf of the Export Development Bank of Iran that was sanctioned on October 22, 2008 (see above). EDBI was sanctioned for providing financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense. Aluminat, for providing centrifuge components to Kalaye Electric Co.; Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish; Fishro Systems Research Company (nuclear research and development); Taghtiran Kashan Company; and Sambouk Shipping FZC (UAE)</td>
<td>May 9, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For supporting Iran Air, the IRGC, and NIOC: Aban Air; Ali Mahdavi (part owner of Aban Air); DFS Worldwide; Everex; Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi; Farhad Ali Parvaresht; Petro Green; Hossein Vaziri. For helping Iran’s nuclear program: Farhad Bujar; Zolal Iran Company; Andisheh Zolal Co. For helping MODAFL: Reza Mozaffarinia.</td>
<td>May 23, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukovnya AE (Ukraine) for leasing aircraft to Iran Air.</td>
<td>May 31, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several Iranian firms and persons: Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company; The Exploration and Nuclear Raw Materials Company; Maro Sanat Company; Navid Composite Material Company; Negin Parto Khavar; Neka Novin officials Iradj Mohammadi Kahvarin and Mahmoud Mohammadi Dayeni; Neka Novin aliases including Kia Niroo; Qods Aviation Industries (operated by IRGC, produces UAVs, paragliders, etc); Iran Aviation Industries Organization; Reza Amidi; Fan Pardzan; Ertebat Gostar Novin.</td>
<td>December 12, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Canko (Turkey) and Tiva Sanat Group, (IRGC-Navy boats); Advance Electrical and Industrial Technologies and Pere Punti (Spain), for nuclear procurement; Ulrich Wipperman and Deutsche Forfait (Germany), and Deutsche Forfait Americas (U.S.) for NIOC oil deals.</td>
<td>February 6, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By State: Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (nuclear research); Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (Arak reactor); Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars; and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company (carbon fiber for Iran’s nuclear program).</td>
<td>April 29, 2014 (by both State and Treasury)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Treasury: Mohammad Javad Imarad and Arman Imanirad (aluminum for Iran’s nuclear program); Neferititi Shipping (IRISL’s agent in Egypt); Sazeh Morakab (services to SHIG, and Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co., HESA); Ali Gholami and Marzieh Bozorg (Sazeh Morakab). SHIG aliases identified: Sahand Aluminum Parts Co and Ardalan Machineries Co.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>director of MODAFL; Seyed Mohammad Hashemi; Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi. Musavi has worked with North Korean officials on ballistic missiles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two Iranian entities</strong> subordinate to SHIG: Shahid Nuri Industries and Shahid Movahed Industries. Updating of prior IRGC Missile Command designation to include IRGC Al Ghadir Missile Command (specific IRGC element with operational control of Iran’s missile program).</td>
<td>March 24, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17 ballistic missile-related Entities.</strong> Abdollah Asgharzadeh Network (supporting SHIG); Abdollah Asgharzadeh; Tenny Darian; East Start Company; Ofog Sabze Company; Richard Yue (China); Cosailing Business Trading Company (China); Jack Qin (China); Ningbo New Century Import and Export Co. Ltd (China); and Carol Zhou (China). Gulf-Based Rostamian Network (supporting SHIG and AIO); MKS International; Kambiz Rostamian; Royal Pearl General Trading. Iran-Based Network Working with Navid Composite and Mabrooka Trading: Ervin Danesh Aryan Company; Mostafa Zahedi; Mohammad Magham. Ghodrat Zargair and Zist Tajhiz Pooyesh Company (supporting Mabrooka Trading); Ghodrat Zargari, and Zist Tajhiz Pooyesh Company.</td>
<td>February 3, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic missile-related entities.</strong> Rahim Ahmadi (linked to Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group); Morteza Farasatpour (Defense Industries Organization); Matin Sanat Nik Andishan (supporting SHIG); and Ruan Ruling and three associated Chinese companies (missile guidance); Shanghai Gang Quan Trade Company, Shanghai North Begins International, and Shanghai North Transway International Trading Company.</td>
<td>May 17, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12 IRGC/military and ballistic missile entities</strong> Treasury: Rayan Roshd Aftar Company (IRGC drone and censorship equipment); Mohsen Parsajam, Seyyed Reza Ghasemi, and Farshad Hekemzadeh; Qeshm Madkandslooo Cooperative Co., Ramor Group (Turkey) and Resit Tavan of Ramor Group (supplying IRGC-Navy); Emily Liu, Abascience Tech Co. Ltd, Raybeam Optronics Co. Ltd., Raytronic Corporation Ltd., and Sunway Tech Co. Ltd (all China), for supporting MODAFL. State: IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Org and IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Org—both for supporting Iran ballistic missile program.</td>
<td>July 18, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missile entities related to Iran Simorgh space launch:</strong> six subordinates to Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG): Shahid Karimi Industries; Shahid Rastegar Industries; Shahid Cheraghi Industries; Shahid Varamini Industries; Shahid Kalhor Industries; and Amir Al Mo’Menin Industries.</td>
<td>July 28, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suppliers to Iran’s Naval Defence Missile Industry Group (SAIG):</strong> Shahid Alamolhoda Industries; Rastafann Ertebat Engineering Company, Fanamoj. For supporting Iran’s military: Wuhan Sanjiang Import and Export Company</td>
<td>October 13, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five ballistic missile entities (owned or controlled by Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, SBIG) : Shahid Kharrazi Industries; Shahid Sanikhani Industries; Shahid Moghaddam Industries; Shahid Eslami Research Center; and Shahid Shustari Industries.</td>
<td>January 4, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Wave Telecommunications (Malaysia) and Morteza Razavi (for supporting Fanamoj, designated on October 13, 2017); Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA) and Iran Aircraft Industries (SAHA) (military aviation industry); Shi Yuhua (China) (navigation equipment); Pardazan System Namad Arman (PASNA)(for procuring lead zirconium tritanate (PZT) for Iranian military); and Bochuang Ceramic Inc. and Zhu Yuequn (China) for selling Iran PZT.</td>
<td>January 12, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyed Mohammad Ali Haddadnezhad Tehrani, for supporting the IRGC Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization to improve Houthis missile capabilities</td>
<td>May 22, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Tejarat (for providing servides to support Bank Sepah); Trade Capital Bank (Belarus); Morteza Ahmadi Behzad (for acting on behalf of Pishro Company.</td>
<td>Nov. 5, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**31 individuals/entities connected to Iran’s Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), Shahid Karimi Group (missiles and explosives); Mohammad Reza Mehdipur, Akbar Motallebizadeh, Jalal Emami Gharah Hajjlu, and Sa’id Borjil. Shahid Chamran Group (electron acceleration, pulse power, wave generation); Sayyed Ashgar Hashemitabar. Shahid Fakhar Moghaddam Group (explosion simulators, neutron monitoring systems); Ruhollah Ghaderi Barmi, and Mohammad Javad Safari. Ten entities that research lasers, plasma technology, satellites, biotechnology, and other technologies for SPND: Sheikh Baha’i Science and Technology Research</td>
<td>March 22, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table D-2. Iran-Related Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martyr’s Foundation (Bonyad Shahid), a major Iranian foundation (bonyad)—for providing financial support to Hezbollah and PIJ; Goodwill Charitable Organization, a Martyr’s Foundation office in Dearborn, Michigan; Al Qard Al Hassan—part of Hezbollah’s financial infrastructure (and associated with previously designated Hezbollah entities Husayn al-Shami, Bayt al-Mal, and Yousser Company for Finance and Investment); Qasem Aliq—Hezbollah official, director of Martyr’s Foundation Lebanon branch, and head of jihad al-Bina (Lebanese construction company run by Hezbollah); Ahmad al-Shami (liaison between Hezbollah and Martyr’s Foundation chapter in Michigan).</td>
<td>July 25, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC-Qods Force and Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ; and other Iranian supported terrorist groups)</td>
<td>October 21, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda operatives in Iran: Saad bin Laden; Mustafa Hamid; Muhammad Rab’a al-Bahtyti; Alis Saleh Husain.</td>
<td>January 16, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qods Force senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi, Hasan Mortezaei, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi; Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, and its director Hesam</td>
<td>August 3, 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Petrochemical Network:** Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), for supporting Khatem ol-Anbiya, and 39 PGPIC subsidiaries and agents: Arvand Petrochemical Co.; Bandar Imam Abniroo Petrochemical Co (PC); Bandar Imam Besparan PC; Bandar Imam Faravaresh PC; Bandar Imam Kharazmi PC; Bandar Imam Kimiya PC; Bandar Imam PC; Bu Al Sina PC; Fajr PC; Hengam PC; Hormoz Urea Fertilizer Co.; Iranian Investment Petrochemical Group Co.; Karoun PC; Khouzestan PC; Lordegan Urea Fertilizer Co.; Mobin PC; Modabberan Eqtesad Co.; Nouri PC; Pars PC; Pardazad Non Industrial Operation Co.; Persian Gulf Apadana PC; Persian Gulf Bid Boland Gas Refinery Co.; Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Co.; Persian Gulf Fajr Yadavaran Gas Refinery Co.; Petrochemical Industries Development Management Co.; Rahavarani Fonoon PC; Shaid Tondgoyan PC; Urmia PC; Hemmat PC; Petrochemical Non-Industrial Operations and Services Co.; Ilam PC; Gachsaran Polymer Industries; Dah Dasht Petrochemical Industries; Broojen PC; NPC International (UK); NPC Alliance Corp. (Philippines); Atlas Ocean and Petrochemical (UAE); and Naghmeh FZE (UAE).

**Iranian Space Entities:** Astronautics Research Institute, Iran Space Agency, Iran Space Research Center.

**Nuclear managers:** Majid Agha’i, managing director of AEOI and Amjad Sazgar — for engaging in activities involving uranium enrichment in Iran

**Iran Shipping Companies:** Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and E-Sail Shipping Company (Shanghai). For transporting items related to Iran’s ballistic missile program. Designations took effect after a 180 day delay to allow Iran to find alternative sources to ship food and medicine.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khoshnevis, for supporting Lebanese Hezbollah; Imam Khomeini Relief Committee Lebanon branch, and its director Ali Zurai; Razi Musavi, a Syrian based Iranian official supporting Hezbollah.</td>
<td>December 21, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liner Transport Kish (for providing shipping services to transport weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah)</td>
<td>October 11, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander); Hamid Abdollahi (Qods force); Abdul Reza Shahlai (Qods Force); Ali Gholam Shakur (Qods Force); Mansour Arbabsiar (alleged plotter)</td>
<td>October 12, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahan Air (for transportation services to Qods Force)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)</td>
<td>February 16, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five entities/persons for weapons shipments to Syria and an October 2011 shipment to Gambia, intercepted in Nigeria: Yas Air; Behine Air (Iranian trading company); Ali Abbas Usman Jega (Nigeria); Qods Force officers: Esmail Ghani, Sayyid Ali Tabatabaei, and Hosein Aghajani.</td>
<td>March 27, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Minai, senior Qods Force member involved in Iraq; Karim Muhsin al-Ghanimi, leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) militia in Iraq; Sayyid Salah Hantush al-Maksusi, senior KH member; and Riyad Jasim al-Hamidawi, Iran based KH member.</td>
<td>November 8, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine-Mediterranean Airlines (Um Air, Ukraine) for helping Mahan Air and Iran Air conduct illicit activities; Rodrigue Elias Merhej (owner of Um Air); Kyrgyz Trans Avia (KTA, Kyrgyzstan) for leasing aircraft to Mahan Air; Lida Kim, director of KTA; Siranco (UAE), front for Mahan Air; Hamid Arabnejad, managing director of Mahan Air.</td>
<td>May 31, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several persons/entities in UAE aiding Mahan Air (see above): Blue Sky Aviation FZE; Avia Trust FZE; Hamidreza Malekouti Pour; Pejman Mahmood Kosrayanifard; and Gholamreza Mahmoudi.</td>
<td>February 6, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several IRGC-QF Qods Force offices in Afghanistan: Sayyed Kamal Musavi; Alireza Hemmati; Akbar Seyed Alhosseini; and Mahmoud Afkhami Rashidi.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-based Al Qaeda facilitator (supporting movement of Al Qaeda affiliated fighters to Syria): Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (aka Jafar al-Uzbeki or Jafar Muidinov).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meraj Air (for delivering weapons to Syria); Caspian Air (transporting personnel and weapons to Syria); Sayyed Jabar Hosseini (manager of Liner Transport Kish which IRGC uses); Pioneer Logistics (Turkey, helps Mahan Air); Asian Aviation Logistics (Thailand, helps Mahan Air). Pouya Air.</td>
<td>August 29, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Naser Airlines (Iraq) for transferring nine aircraft to Mahan Air, which is a 13224 designee: Issam Shamout, a Syrian businessman, and his company Sky Blue Bird Aviation, for the same transaction.</td>
<td>May 21, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight IRGC-QF and Hezbollah-related entities. Lebanon-Based IRGC-QF Network: Hasan Dehghan Ebrahimi (IRGC-QF operative in Beirut supporting Hezbollah); Muhammad Abd-al-Amir Farhat; Yahyra al-hajj; Maher Trading and Construction Company (laundering funds and smuggling goods to Hezbollah); Reem Pharmaceutical; Mirage for Engineering and Trading; Mirage for Waste Management and Environmental Services. Ali Sharifi (procuring spare parts for the IRGC-QF).</td>
<td>February 3, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six entities involved in IRGC-QF counterfeiting: Reza Heidari; Pardazesh Tasvir Rayan Co. (Rayan Printing); ForEnt Technik and Printing Trade Center GmbH (Germany); Mahmoud Seif; Tejarat Almas Mobin Holding (parent of Rayan Printing).</td>
<td>November 20, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine individuals and entities, disrupted by U.S.-UAE joint action, attempting to acquire dollars in UAE to provide to the IRGC-QF. Individuals: Mas’ud Nikbakht, Sali’d Najafpur, and Mohammad Khoda’i (financial activities for IRGC-QF); Mohammadreza Valadzaghard, Meghdad Amini, and Foad Salehi (illicit financial assistance to the IRGC-QF). Entities: Jahan Aras Kish (transferring funds for the IRGC-QF, Rashed Exchange (converting currency for the IRGC-QF), and Khedmati and Company Joint Partnership, for being owned by Khedmati and Khoda’i.</td>
<td>May 10, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons and entities providing IRGC-QF funds to Hezbollah: Central Bank Governor Valiollah Seif; Aras Habib and his Iraq-based Al Bilad Islamic Bank; and Muhammad Qasir</td>
<td>May 15, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Date Named</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four persons for helping the Houthi missile program through the IRGC</td>
<td>May 22, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace Forces Al Ghadir Missile Command: Mahmud Bagheri Kazemabadi; Mohammad Agha Ja’fari; Javad Bordbar Shir Amin; and Mehdi Azarisheh (IRGC-QF affiliate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-one entities linked to the Basij (including Basij firms that fund child soldiers in Syria):</td>
<td>October 16, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonyad Taavon Basij (economic conglomerate); Mehr Eqtisad Bank; Bank Mellat; Mehr Eqtisad Iranian Investment Company; Tadbirgaran Atieyh Investment Company; Negin Sahel Royal Company; Mehr Eqtisad Financial Group; Technotar Engineering Company; Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company; Taktar Investment Company; Iran’s Zinc Mines Development Company; Calcimin (owned by Iran Zinc Mines; Bandar Abbas Zinc Production Company; Qeshm Zinc Smelting and Reduction Company; Zanjan Acid Production Company; Persian Catalyst Chemical Company; Esfehan’s Mobarakeh Steel Company (largest in Middle East); Andisheh Mehrvaran Investment Company; Parsian Bank; Sina Bank; and Bahman Group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC-QF personnel supporting the Taliban: Mohammad Ebrahim Owhadi and Esma’l Razavi</td>
<td>October 23, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks and other Entities. Many of these were also redesignated under EO13382. Bank Mellat; Arian Bank; Bank Kargoshaei; Melli Bank PLC; Tose-E Development Company; Behshahr Industrial Development Corp.; Cement Industry and Development Company; Melli International Building and Industry Company; BMILC International General Trading LLC; Shomal Cement Company; Persian Gulf Sazb Karafarim; Mir Business Bank; Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI); EDBI Stock Exchange; EDBI Exchange Brokerage; Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, C.A.; Iran-Venezuela Bi-National Bank; Day Bank; Atieh Sazan Day; Baui Investment Company; Tejartost Garost Fardad; Day Exchange Company; Day Leasing Co.; Day Brokerage Co.; Tose-e Didar Iran Holding Co.; Royay-e Roz Kish Investment Co; Day E-Commerce; Tose-e Donya Shahr Kohan Co.; Damavand Power Generation Co.; Omid Bonyan Day Insurance Services; Omran Va Maskan Abad Day Co.; Day Iranian Financial and Accounting Services Co.; Persian International Bank PLC; First East Export Bank PLC; Mellat Bank Close Joint-Stock Co.; Bank Tejarat; and Trade Capital Bank (Belarus).</td>
<td>November 5, 2018 (in concert with reimposition of JCPOA-related sanctions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Hezbollah and IRGC-QF-related individuals who operate in Iraq: Shibli Mushin ‘Ubayd Al-Zaydi; Yusuf Hashim; Adnan Hussein Kawtharani; Muhammad ‘Abd-Al-Hadi Farhat</td>
<td>November 13, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals involved in a network through which Iran provides oil to Syria and funds Hezbollah and Hamas: Mohamed Amer Alchwiki (also designated under E.O. 13582 for providing financial support to Syria); Global Vision Group (also designated under E.O. 13582); Rasul Sajjad and Hossein Yaghoobi (for assisting the IRGC-QF); and Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal (for assisting Hezbollah).</td>
<td>November 20, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also designated under E.O. 13582 as part of the network: Promsyrioiimport; Andrey Dogaev; Mir Business Bank; and Tadbir Kish Medical and Pharmaceutical Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-recruited Afghan and Pakistani-staffed militia entities fighting in Syria: Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade. Qeshm Fars Air and Flight Travel LLC—Mahan Air affiliates—for weapons deliveries into Syria.</td>
<td>January 24, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-related entities: Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN), Iraqi Shia militia; and HAN leader Akram Abbas al-Kabi (previously sanctioned in 2008 when he headed a Mahdi Army “special group” militia)</td>
<td>March 5, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 individuals and entities that illicitly moved funds via the IRGC-controlled Ansar Bank and Ansar Exchange: MODAFL; Ansar Bank, its managing director Ayatollah Ebrahimi, and affiliates Iranian Atlas Company, Ansar Bank Brokerage Company, and Ansar Information Technology; Ansar Exchange, its managing director Alireza Atabaki, and UAE-based facilitators Reza Sakani, Mohammad Vakili and the Vakili-owned Atlas Exchange; Zagros Pardis Kish for helping MODAFL acquire vehicles in UAE; and its manager Iman Sedaghat; Sakan General Trading (UAE), its owner; Reza Sakani and Iran-based affiliate Sakan Exchange; Hital Exchange and its owner Seyyed Mohammad Reza Ale Ali; Golden Commodities General Trading (UAE), its owner Asadollah Seifi; Seifi-owned UAE firm The Best Leader General Trading; Sulayman Sakani and his firm Atlas Doviz Ticaret A.S. (Turkey) for assisting Atlas Exchange; Ali Shams Mulavi—Turkey-based facilitator for Ansar Exchange and UAE-based Naria General Trading; Lebra Moon General Trading (UAE).</td>
<td>March 26, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-based entities facilitating IRGC-QF access to Iraq’s financial system: South Wealth Resources Company (aka Manabea Tharwat al-Janoob General Trading Co.); Makki Kazim ‘Abd Al Hamid Al Asadi; and Muhammed Husayn Salih al-Hasani</td>
<td>June 12, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran Sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eight IRGC Commanders: IRGC Navy Commander Ali Reza Tangsiri; IRGC Aerospace Command Amiri Hajizadeh; IRGC Ground Forces Commander Mohammad Pakpour; and five IRGC Navy district commanders: Abbas Gholamshahi (district 1); Ramezan Zirahi (district 2); Yadollah Badin (district 3); Mansur Ravankar (district 4); and Ali Ozma’ (district 5)</td>
<td>June 24, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah Parliamentarians: Two Hezbollah parliamentarians for using their parliamentary positions to advance Hezbollah objectives and “bolstering Iran’s malign activities”: Amin Sherri and Muhammad Hasan Ra’d (who is also a member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council). Also designated: head of Hezbollah security and liaison to Lebanon’s security services Wafiq Safa.</td>
<td>July 9, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Institutions used by Hezbollah (all in Lebanon): Jammal Trust Bank SAL; Trust Insurance SAL; Trust Insurance Services SAL; Trust Life Insurance Company SAL</td>
<td>August 29, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Facilitators Moving Funds from IRGC-QF to Hamas: Muhammad Sarur; Kamal Abdelrahman Aref Awad; Fawaz Mahmud Ali Nasser; Muhammad Al-Ayy. Designations made in partnership with the Sultanate of Oman</td>
<td>August 29, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Tanker Seized and Released by Gibraltar: Adrian Darya I and Akhilesh Kumar (ship and captain, for carrying oil to Syria)</td>
<td>August 30, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Oil Shipping Network: 16 entities and 10 persons, including: Rostam Qasemi (former Oil Minister, now head of Iranian-Syrian Economic Relations Development Committee); Mehdi Group and subsidiaries (India)—Bushra Ship Management Private Limited, Khadija Ship Management Private Limited, Vaniya Ship Management. Kish P and I Club shipping insurer (Iran). Hokoul SAL Offshore, Talaqi Group, Nagham Al Hayat, Tawafuk, ALUMIX (Lebanon) for supplying Syrian state owned Sytrol oil company under IRGC-QF auspices.</td>
<td>September 4, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons and Entities Facilitating Funding from IRGC-QF: Muhammad Sa’id Izadi (head of Palestinian Office of the IRGC-QF contingent in Lebanon); Zaher Jabarin (Turkey-based Hamas liaison with the IRGC-QF); Redin Exchange (Turkey-based financial channel for IRGC-QF funding of Hamas and Hezbollah); Marwan Mahdi Salah Al Rawi (CEO of Redin Exchange); Ismael Tash (deputy CEO of Redin and facilitator of money transfers from Iran to Hamas); SMART (Ithalat Ihracat Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, import-export company associated with Redin)</td>
<td>September 10, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank. Central Bank of Iran, National Development Fund of Iran, and Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. For funneling funds to the IRGC, MODAFL, and Lebanese Hezbollah. National Development Fund, a sovereign wealth fund, is primarily involved in rural electrification and development.</td>
<td>September 20, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC-QF Shipping Network to Yemen: Abdolhossein Khedri; Khedri Jahan Darya Co; Maritime Silk Road LLC. Mahan Air Sales Agents: Gatewick LLC (Dubai); Jahan Destination Travel and Tourism LLC (Dubai); and Gomei Ai Services Co. (Hong Kong)</td>
<td>December 11, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah Individuals and Entities: Three individuals and 12 entities linked to the Martyr’s Foundation, which is part of Hezbollah’s support network. Entities sanctioned included Atlas Holdings and its affiliates involved in medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, paints, and tourism</td>
<td>February 26, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran and Iraq-based front companies controlled or supporting the IRGC-QF: Individuals and entities including: Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines in Iraq; Kosar Company; Alireza Fadakar (IRGC-QF commander in Najaf); Al Khameil Maritime Services (partly owned by QF); Mada’in Novin Traders; Sayyed Yaser Musavir (QF official helping Iraqi Shia militias); Shaykh Adnan al-Hamidawi (special operations commander for Kata’ib Hezbollah militia);</td>
<td>March 26, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D.3. Determinations and Sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total SA (France); Gazprom (Russia); and Petronas (Malaysia)—$2 billion project to develop South Pars gas field. ISA violation determined but sanctions waived in line with U.S.-EU agreement for EU to cooperate on antiterrorism and antiproliferation issues and not file a complaint at the WTO. Violation determined but sanctions waived.</td>
<td>May 18, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Date Named</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO), Iran and Switzerland. Sanctioned for activities to develop Iran’s energy sector.</td>
<td>Sept. 30, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (France); Statoil (Norway); ENI (Italy); and Royal Dutch Shell.</td>
<td>Sept. 30, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exempted under ISA “special rule” for pledging to wind down work on Iran energy fields.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpex (Japan)</td>
<td>Nov. 17, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exempted under the Special rule for divesting its remaining 10% stake in Azadegan oil field.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusneft (Belarus, subsidiary of Belneftekhim) Sanctioned for $500 million contract with NICO (see above) to develop Jofeir oil field. Other subsidiaries of Belneftekhim were sanctioned in 2007 under E.O. 13405 (Belarus sanctions).</td>
<td>March 29, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrochemical Commercial Company International (PCCI) of Bailiwick of Jersey and Iran; Royal Oyster Group (UAE); Tanker Pacific (Singapore); Allval Maritime (Liberia); Societie Anonyme Monégasque Et Aérienne (SAMAMA, Monaco); Speedy Ship (UAE/Iran); Associated Shipbroking (Monaco); and Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA, Venezuela). Sanctioned under CISADA amendment to ISA imposing sanctions for selling gasoline to Iran or helping Iran import gasoline. Allval Maritime and SAMAMA determinations were issued on September 13, 2011, to “clarify” the May 24 determinations that had named Ofer Brothers Group. The two, as well as Tanker Pacific, are affiliated with a Europe-based trust linked to deceased Ofer brother Sami Ofer, and not Ofer Brothers Group based in Israel. U.S.-based subsidiaries of PDVSA, such as Citgo, were not sanctioned.</td>
<td>May 24, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. (China); Kuo Oil Pte Ltd. (Singapore); FAL Oil Co. (UAE)</td>
<td>January 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctioned for brokering sales or making sales to Iran of gasoline.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sytrol (Syria), for sales of gasoline to Iran.</td>
<td>August 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Dimitris Cambis; Inspire Shipping; Kish Protection and Indemnity (Iran); and Bimeh Markasi-Central Insurance of Iran (CII, Iran). Sanctioned under ISA provision on owning vessels that transport Iranian oil or providing insurance for the shipments.</td>
<td>March 14, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Pacific; SAMAMA; and Allval Maritime Sanctions lifted. <strong>Special rule applied after “reliable assurances” they will not engage in similar activity in the future.</strong></td>
<td>April 12, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferland Co. Ltd. (Cyprus and Ukraine) Sanctioned for cooperating with National Iranian Tanker Co. to illicitly sell Iranian crude oil.</td>
<td>May 31, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dettin SPA (Italy) For providing goods and services to Iran’s petrochemical industry.</td>
<td>August 29, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-4. Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Nonproliferation Act or Executive Order 12938 for Iran-Specific Violations

These designations expired after two years, unless redesignated. The designations included in this table are those that were applied specifically for proliferation activity involving Iran.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic State Technical University and Glavkosmos, both of Russia. (both designations revoked in 2010)</td>
<td>July 30, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute (removed May 21, 2010)</td>
<td>January 8, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea)</td>
<td>January 2, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea) and Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import-Export (China)</td>
<td>June 14, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three entities from China for proliferation to Iran</td>
<td>January 16, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entity</td>
<td>Date Named</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armen Sargsian and Lizen Open Joint Stock Co. (Armenia); Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov (Moldova); and eight China entities for proliferation involving Iran</td>
<td>May 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)</td>
<td>July 4, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artillery shells to Iran. (Also designated under Executive Order 12938)</td>
<td>September 17, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 entities from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE, and Taiwan.</td>
<td>January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad), Russia, Spain, and Ukraine.</td>
<td>September 23, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities, mostly from China, for supplying of Iran’s missile program. Designations included North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong and China’s Norinco and Great Wall Industry Corp, sanctioned previously. Others sanctioned included North Korea’s Paeskan Associated Corporation, and Taiwan’s Ecoma Enterprise Co.</td>
<td>December 2004 and January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine entities, including from China (Norinco, Hondu Aviation, Dalian Sunny Industries, Zibo Chemet Equipment); India (Sabero Organic Chemicals and Sandhya Organic Chemicals); and Austria (Steyr Mannlicher GmbH). Sanctions against Dr. Surendar of India (see September 29, 2004) were ended because of information exonerating him.</td>
<td>December 23, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms (Rosobornexport and aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi); two North Korean entities (Korean Mining and Industrial Development, and Korea Pugang Trading); and one Cuban entity (Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology).</td>
<td>July 28, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Hamadi (Iraq); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); Al Zargaa Optical and Electronics (Sudan); Alexey Safonov (Russia); Arif Durrani (Pakistan); China National Aero Technology Import-Export (China); China National Electronic Import Export (China); Defense Industries Org, (Iran); Giad Industrial Complex (Sudan); Iran Electronics Industry (Iran); Kal al-Zuhiry (Iraq); Kolomna Design Bureau of Machine Building (Russia); NAB Export Co. (Iran); Rosoboronexport (Russia); Sanam Industrial Group (Iran); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Tula Design Bureau of Instrument Building (Russia); Yarmouk Industrial Complex (Sudan) Zibo Chemet Equipment Co. (China)</td>
<td>December 28, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. For assisting Iran: Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade Company (China); Iran’s Defense Industries Organization; Sokkia Company (Singapore); Challenger Corporation (Malaysia); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); and Arif Durrani (Pakistan national).</td>
<td>April 17, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China); IRGC; Korea Mining Development Corp. (North Korea); Korea Taesong Trading Co. (NK); Yolin/Yullin Tech, Inc. (South Korea); Rosoboronexport (Russia sate arms export agency); Sudan Master Technology; Sudan Technical Center Co; Army Supply Bureau (Syria); R and M International FZCO (UAE); Venezuelan Military Industries Co. (CAVIM). (Rosoboronexport removed May 21, 2010.)</td>
<td>October 23, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BelTechExport (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl Lee; Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG); Shanghai Technical By-Products International (China); Zibo Chemet Equipment (China)</td>
<td>July 14, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 entities: Belarus: Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association; Beltech Export; China: Karl Lee; Dalian Sunny Industries; Dalian Zhongbang Chemical Industries Co.; Xian Junyun Electronic; Iran: Milad Jafari; DIO; IRISL; IRGC Qods Force; SAD Import-Export; SBIG; North Korea: Tungang Trading; Syria: Industrial Establishment of Defense; Scientific Studies and Research Center; Venezuela: CAVIM. Belvestpromservice (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl Lee (China); SAD Import-Export (Iran); Zibo Chemet Equipment Co. (Iran); F</td>
<td>May 23, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belvestpromservice (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl Lee (China); SAD Import-Export (Iran); Zibo Chemet Equipment Co. (Iran); F</td>
<td>December 20, 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table D-5. Entities Designated under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992
(all designations have expired or were lifted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad al-Khatib (Jordan); Protech Consultants Private (India)</td>
<td>December 13, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Corp. (China); China Machinery and Equipment Import-Export Co. (China); China National Machinery and Equipment Import-Export Co. (China); China Shipbuilding Trading Co. (China); CMEC Machinery (China); Hans Raj Shiv (India); Jiangsu Youngli Chemicals and Technology Import-Export Co. (China); Q.C. Chen (China); Wha Cheong Tai Co. Ltd. (China).</td>
<td>July 9, 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-6. Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438 (July 17, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Forouzandeh, Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, accused of fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and of organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shiite militia fighters; Abu Mustafa al-Shelbani. Iran based leader of network that funnels Iranian arms to Shiite militias in Iraq; Isma'il al-Lami (Abu Dura). Shiite militia leader, breakaway from Sadr Mahdi Army; Al Zawra Television Station and its owner, Mishan al-Jabouri.</td>
<td>January 8, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdal Reza Shahlah, a deputy commander of the Qods Force; Akram Abbas Al Kabi, leader of Mahdi Army “Special Groups”; Harith Al Dari, Sunnis Islamist leader (Secretary General of the Muslim Scholars’ Association; Ahmad Hassan Kaka Al Ubaydi, ex-Baathist leader of</td>
<td>September 16, 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Iran Sanctions

**Entity** | **Date Named**
--- | ---
Sunni insurgents; Al Ray Satellite TV Channel, and Suraqiya for Media and Broadcasting, owned by Mish'an Al Jabburi (see above), and Raw'a Al Usta (wife of Al Jabburi). | July 2, 2009
Khata'ib Hezbollah (Mahdi splinter group); Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. (Muhandis was killed in the U.S. strike of January 3, 2020, that killed IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani.) | **Table D-7. Iranians Designated Under Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers (September 29, 2010)**

These persons are named in a semiannual report to Congress, required under CISADA. Virtually all of the persons on this list, and those listed under Executive order 13628 (below) are designated as human rights abusers by the European Union, whose list contains 87 individuals, including several province-level prosecutors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eight persons: IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari; Minister of Interior at time of June 2009 elections Sadeq Mahsouli; Minister of Intelligence at time of elections Qolam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei; Tehran Prosecutor General at time of elections Saeed Mortazavi; Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi; former Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar; Deputy National Police Chief Ahmad Reza Radan; Basij (security militia) Commander at time of elections Hossein Taeb</td>
<td>September 29, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two persons: Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Dowlatabadi (appointed August 2009), for indicting large numbers of protesters; Basij forces commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi (headed Basij intelligence during 2009 protests)</td>
<td>February 23, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Basij Resistance Force; Law Enforcement Forces (LEF); LEF Commander Ismail Ahmad Moghadam</td>
<td>June 9, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two persons: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hassan Firouzabadi; Deputy IRGC Commander Abdollah Araghi</td>
<td>December 13, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One entity: Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)</td>
<td>February 16, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One person: Ashgar Mir-Hejazi for human rights abuses on/after June 12, 2009, and for providing material support to the IRGC and MOIS.</td>
<td>May 30, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One entity: Abyssec, for training the IRGC in cyber tradecraft and supporting its development of offensive information operations capabilities.</td>
<td>December 30, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One entity and One person: Tehran Prisons Organization. For severe beating of prisoners at Evin Prison in April 2014; Sohrab Soleimani (brother of IRGC-QF commander) as head of Tehran Prisons Organization at the time of the attack above. Heads State Prisons Organization.</td>
<td>April 13, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons and entities designated following repression of December 2017-January 2018 protests: Judiciary head Sadeq Amoli Larijani (highest-ranking Iranian official sanctioned by the United States); Rajaei Shahr Prison; and Gholmreza Ziaei</td>
<td>January 12, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar-e Hezbollah internal security militia designations: Ansar-e Hezbollah; Ansar leaders Abdolhamid Mohtasham; Hossein Allahkaram; and Hamid Ostad. Evin Prison.</td>
<td>May 30, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghavamin Bank (for assisting Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces, LEF)</td>
<td>November 5, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade</td>
<td>January 24, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli (Interior Minister); LEF officials Hossain Ashtari Fard, Ayoub Soleimani, Mohsen Fathi Zadeh, Yahya Mahmooodzadeh, Hamidreza Ashraaq, and Mohammad Ali Noorinajad; Hassan Shavarpour Najafabadi (IRGC Vali Asr base commander); LEF Cooperative Foundation and its manager Habil Darvis.</td>
<td>May 20, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table D-8. Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13572 for Repression of the Syrian People (April 29, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force (IRGC-QF)</td>
<td>April 29, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force Commander); Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Qods Force operations and training)</td>
<td>May 18, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)</td>
<td>February 16, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-9. Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13606 (GHRAVITY, April 23, 2012))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); IRGC (Guard Cyber Defense Command); Law Enforcement Forces; Datak Telecom</td>
<td>April 23, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization</td>
<td>January 12, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanista Programming Group. For operating technology that monitors or tracks computers</td>
<td>May 30, 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-10. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13608 Targeting Sanctions Evaders (May 1, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ferland Company Ltd. for helping NITC deceptively sell Iranian crude oil</td>
<td>May 31, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three persons based in the Republic of Georgia: Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and Houshang Farsoudeh</td>
<td>February 6, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight firms owned or controlled by the three: Caucasus Energy (Georgia); Orchidea Gulf Trading (UAE and/or Turkey); Georgian Business Development (Georgia and/or UAE); Great Business Deals (Georgia and/or UAE); KSN Foundation (Lichtenstein); New York General Trading (UAE); New York Money Exchange (UAE and/or Georgia); and European Oil Traders (Switzerland).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evren Kayakiran (Turkey) for directing employees to provide U.S. products and services to Iran</td>
<td>February 7, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-11. Entities Named as Iranian Government Entities Under Executive Order 13599 (February 5, 2012)

_Hundreds of entities—many of which are names and numbers of individual ships and aircraft—were designated under this order to implement the JCPOA, and removed from the list of SDNs, in order that secondary sanctions not apply. Those entities are in italics. Others were designated as owned or controlled by the government of Iran before the JCPOA. As of November 5, 2018, all the entities designated under E.O. 13599 are subject to secondary sanctions._

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two insurance companies: Bimeh Iran Insurance Company (U.K.) Ltd. and Iran Insurance Company</td>
<td>June 16, 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Bank of Iran (aka Bank Markazi) 

Shipping Companies: Arash Shipping Enterprises Ltd.; Arta Shipping Enterprises Ltd.; Asan Shipping Enterprise Ltd.; Caspian Maritime Ltd.; Danesh Shipping Co. Ltd.; Davor Shipping Co. Ltd.; Dena Tankers FZE; Good Luck Shipping LLC; Hadi Shipping Company Ltd.; Haraz Shipping Company Ltd.; Hatif Shipping Company Ltd.; Hiroand Shipping Company Ltd.; Hoda Shipping Company Ltd.; Homa Shipping Company Ltd.; Honor Shipping Company Ltd.; Mehran Shipping Company Ltd.; Mersad Shipping Company Ltd.; Minab Shipping Company Ltd.; Pars Petrochemical Shipping Company; Proton Petrochemicals Shipping Ltd; Saman Shipping Company Ltd.; Savr Shipping Company Ltd.; Sepid Shipping Company Ltd.; Sima Shipping Company Ltd.; Sina Shipping Company; TC Shipping Company Ltd.

Energy Firms: Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (Switzerland); Hong Kong Intertrade Company (Hong Kong); Noor Energy (Malaysia); Petro Energy Intertrade (Dubai, UAE) (all four named as front companies for NIIOC, Naftiran Intertrade Company, Ltd (NICO), or NICO Sarl)

58 vessels of National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC)

Banks: Ansar Bank; Future Bank B.S.C; Post Bank of Iran; Dey Bank; Eghtesad Novin Bank; Hekmat Iranian Bank; Iran Zamin Bank; Islamic Regional Cooperation Bank; Joint Iran-Venezuela Bank; Karafarin Bank; Mehr Iran Credit Union Bank; Parsian Bank; Pasargad Bank; Saman Bank; Sarmayeh Bank; Tat Bank; Tosee Taavon Bank; Tourism Bank; Bank-e Shahr; Credit Institution for Development

Entities and persons helping Iran evade oil shipping sanctions: Dimitris Cambis; Impire Shipping Co.; Libra Shipping SA; Monsoon Shipping Ltd.; Koning Marine Ltd.; Blue Tanker Shipping SA; Jupiter Seaways Shipping; Hercules International Ship; Hermis Shipping SA; Garbin Navigation Ltd.; Grace Bay Shipping Inc; Sima General Trading Co. FZE; Polinex General Trading LLC; Asia Energy General Trading; Synergy General Trading FZE.

Sambouk Shipping FZC, which is tied to Dr. Dimitris Cambis and his network of front companies.

Eight petrochemicals companies: Bandar Imam; Bou Ali Sina; Mobin; Nouri; Pars; Shahid Tondgooyan; Shazand; and Tebriz.

Six individuals including Seyed Nasser Mohammad Seyyedi, director of Sima General Trading who is also associated with NIIOC and NICO. The other 5 persons sanctioned manage firms associated with NIIOC and NICO.

Four businesses used by Seyyedi to assist NIIOC and NICO front companies: AA Energy FZCO; Petro Royal FZE; and KASB International LLC (all in UAE); and Swiss Management Services Sarl.

Execution of Imam’s Order (EIKO) and entities under its umbrella, designated for hiding assets on behalf of the government of Iran’s leadership: Tosee e Eghtesad Ayandehsazan Company (TEACO); Tadbir Economic Development Company (Tadbir Group); Tadbir Investment Company; Modaber; Tadbir Construction Development Company; Tadbir Energy Development Group; Amin Investment Bank; Pardis Investment Company; Mellat Insurance Company; Rey Investment Company; Reyco GmbH; MCS International GmbH (Mannesman Cylinder Systems); MCS Engineering (Efficient Provider Services GmbH); Golden Resources Trading Company LLC. (GRTC); Cylinder System Ltd. (Cylinder System DDO); One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd.; One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd.; Iran and Shargh Company; Iran and Shargh Leasing Company; Tadbir Brokerage Company; Rafsanjan Cement Company; Rishmak Productive and Exports Company; Omid Rey Civil and Construction Company; Behsaz Kashane Tehran Construction Company; Royal
### Table D-12. Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13622 for Oil and Petrochemical Purchases from Iran (July 30, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jam Petrochemical Company (for purchasing petrochemical products from Iran); Niksima Food and Beverage JLT (for receiving payments on behalf of Jam Petrochemical).</td>
<td>May 31, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Bank (for delivering from Moscow to Tehran of $13 million in U.S. bank notes paid to representatives of the Iranian government).</td>
<td>August 29, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five individuals and one company for helping Iran acquire U.S. banknotes: Hossein Zeidi, Seyed Kamal Yasini, Azizullah Qulandary, Asadollah Seifi, Teymour Ameri, and Belfast General Trading.</td>
<td>December 30, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anahita Nasirbeik—Asia Bank official (see above).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-13. Entities Sanctioned under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA, P.L. 112-239)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goldentex FZE (UAE)</td>
<td>August 29, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuhai Zhenrong (China) for purchasing oil from Iran</td>
<td>July 22, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Industrial and Engineering Supply Ltd. (China and Hong Kong) For transferring graphite to IRISL</td>
<td>June 25, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-14. Entities Designated as Human Rights Abusers under Executive Order 13628 (October 9, 2012, pursuant to ITRSHRA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali Fazli, deputy commander of the Basij; Reza Taghipour, Minister of Communications and Information Technology; LEF Commander Moghaddam (see above); Center to Investigate Organized Crime (established by the IRGC to protect the government from cyberattacks; Press Supervisory Board, established in 1986 to issue licenses to publications and oversee news agencies; Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Rasool Jalili, active in assisting the government's internet censorship activities; Anm Afzar Goster-e-Sharif, (censorship equipment); PekyAsa, another company owned by Jalili, to develop telecom software.</td>
<td>November 8, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-15. Entities Designated under E.O. 13645 on Auto production, Rial Trading, Precious Stones, and Support to NITC (June 3, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Five entities/persons supporting NITC:</td>
<td>December 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Oil Asia (Singapore); Sina Tankers (Singapore); Siqiriya Maritime (Philippines); Ferland Company Limited (previously designated under other E.O.); Vitaly Sokolenko (general manager of Ferland).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three entities/persons for deceptive Iran oil dealings:</td>
<td>April 29, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed Al Aqili (co-owner of Al Aqili Group LLC); Al Aqili Group LLC; Anwar Kamal Nizami (Dubai-based Pakistani facilitator, manages bank relations for affiliates of Al Aqili and Al Aqili Group. Also works for Sima General Trading, sanctioned under E.O. 13599).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faylaca Petroleum (for obscuring the origin of Iranian sales of gas condensates); Lissome Marine Services LLC and six of its vessels (for supporting NITC with ship-to-ship transfers); Abdelhak Kaddouri (manages Iranian front companies on behalf of NICO); Mussafer Polat (for obscuring origin of Iran’s gas condensate sales); Seyedeh Hanje Seyed Nasser Seyyedi (managing director of Faylaca).</td>
<td>August 29, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D-16. Entities Designated under Executive Order 13581 on Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Four individuals/entities: Ajily Software Procurement Group, Andisheh Vesal Middle East Company, Mohammed Saeed Ajily, and Mohammed Reza Rezkhah. For stealing engineering software programs from U.S. and other Western firms and selling them to Iranian military and government entities.</td>
<td>July 18, 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-17. Entities Designated under Executive Order 13694 on Malicious Cyber Activities (April 1, 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eight individuals/entities: ITSec Team, for 2011-12 distributed denial of services attacks on U.S. banks, acting on behalf of the IRGC; and Ahmad Fathi, Amin Shokohi, and Hamid Firoozi (for working for or with ITSec). Four persons working for or with Mersad Co, an IRGC-affiliate firm indicted in 2016 for computer disruption/botnet/malware activities in 2012-13 targeting 24 U.S. financial sector companies: Sadegh Ahmazadegand; Sina Keissar; Omid Ghaffarinia; and Nader Saedi.</td>
<td>September 14, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Khorashadizadeh and Mohammad Ghorbaniyan. For helping exchange bitcoin digital currency into Iranian rials on behalf of Iranian cyber actors involved with a “SamSam” ransomware scheme.</td>
<td>November 28, 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D-18. Entities Designated under E.O. 13846 Reimposing Sanctions (August 6, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayandeh Bank (for materially assisting IRIB).</td>
<td>November 5, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subsidiaries of China’s COSCO Shipping Corp. Ltd and persons for involvement in oil shipments from Iran:</strong> China Concord Petroleum Ltd.; COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Ltd.; COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman and Ship Management Co. Ltd.; Kunlun Holding Co Ltd.; Kunlun Shipping Co. Ltd; Pegasus 88 Ltd.; Yi Li; Yu Hua Mao; Luqian Shen; Bin Xu; Yazhou Xu.</td>
<td>September 25, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Section 7 of the E.O. (Human Rights related provision sanctioning persons who limit freedom of expression in Iran): Abolghassem Salavati, Mohammad Moghisseh (judges presiding over branches of the regime’s Revolutionary Court)</td>
<td>December 19, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Several petrochemical companies for brokering sales of Iranian oil and other petroleum products to China and UAE:</strong> Sanctioned by Treasury: Trilliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd (Hong Kong); Sage Energy HK Limited (Hong Kong); Peakview Industry Co. Ltd (Shanghai); and Beneathco DMCC (Dubai). Sanctioned by State Dept.: Shandong Qiwangda Petrochemical Co. Ltd (China); Jiaxing Industry Hong Kong Ltd.; Ali Bayandarian; and Zhiqing Wang</td>
<td>January 23, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entities involved in petrochemical transactions with Iran</strong> SPI International Proprietary Ltd. and Main Street 1095 (South Africa). McFly Plastic HK Ltd.; Saturn Oasis Co.; and Sea Charming Shipping Co. Ltd (Hong Kong). Dalian Golden Sun Import and Export Co. and Tianjin International Co. Ltd (Dalian, China). Aoxing Ship Management Ltd. (Shanghai). Armed Forces Social Security Investment Company (Iran). Mohammad Hassan Touli (managing director of Armed Forces Social Security Investment Company); Hossein Tavakkoli; and Rea Ebadzadeh Semnani.</td>
<td>March 18, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE Companies facilitating Iran petrochemical and oil sales</strong> Petro Grand FZE; Alphabet International DMCC; Swissol Trade DMCC; Alam Althrwa General Trading LLC; and Alwaneo LLC Co.</td>
<td>March 19, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For facilitating Iran petrochemical transactions</strong> Trilliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd (Hong Kong); Sage Energy HK Limited (Hong Kong); Peakview Industry Co. Limited (Shanghai); and Beneathco DMCC (UAE)</td>
<td>January 23, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table D-19. Executive Order 13871 on Metals and Minerals (May 8, 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pamchel Trading Beijing Ltd; Power Anchor Ltd (Seychelles); Hongyuan Marine Co.; Mobarakeh Steel Company (Iran, previously designated under E.O 13224); Saba Steel; Hormozgan Steel Co.; Esfahan Steel Co.; Oxin Steel Co.; Khorasan Steel Co.; South Kaveh Steel Co.; Iran Alloy Steel Co.; Golgohar Mining and Industrial Co.; Chadormalu Mining and Industrial Co.; Arfa Iron and Steel Co.; Khuzestan Steel Co.; Iranian Ghadir Iron and Steel Co.; Reputable Trading Source LLC (Oman); Iran Aluminum Co.; Al Mahdi Aluminum Co.; National Iranian Copper Industries; and Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co.</td>
<td>January 10, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliates of Iran’s Mobarakeh Steel Company:</strong> Iran – Metil Steel; South Aluminum Company; Sirjan Jahan Steel Complex; and Iran Central Iron Ore Company. Others: Tara Steel GmbH (Germany); UAE - Pacific Steel FZE; Better Future General Trading Co LLC; and Tuka Metal Trading DMCC.</td>
<td>June 25, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-20. Entities Designated as Gross Human Rights Violators under Section 7031(c) of Foreign Aid Appropriations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two Iranian prisons: Great Tehran Penitentiary; Qarchak Prison</td>
<td>December 5, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Shahvarpour - IRGC commander of Vali Asr unit</td>
<td>January 18, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli (Interior Minister), and Ali Fallahian (Intelligence head during 1989-1997)</td>
<td>May 20, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table D-21. Entities Designated under E.O. 13876 on the Supreme Leader and his Office (June 24, 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif</td>
<td>July 31, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten High-Ranking Officials/Personalities and One Major Entity: Ebrahim Raisi (head of the judiciary); Mojtaba Khamene’i (second son of the Supreme Leader, and liaison with the IRGC-QF and Basij); Mohammad Mohammad Golpayegani (chief of staff to the Supreme Leader); Vahid Haghanian (top aide to the Supreme Leader); Ali Akbar Velayati (former Foreign Minister and top foreign policy adviser to the Supreme Leader); Gholam-Ali Hadad-Adel (former Majles Speaker, adviser to the Supreme Leader); Mohammad Bagheri (head of the Armed Forces General Staff); Iran Armed Forces General Staff; Hossein Dehghan (military aide to the Supreme Leader, former Defense Minister, and former commander of the IRGC-QF contingent in Lebanon); Gholam Ali Rashid (head of Khatem ol-Anbiya Central Headquarters, a major military headquarters).</td>
<td>November 4, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Shamkhani—Secretary General of Iran Supreme National Security Council; Gholamreza Soleimani—commander of the Basij; Mohsen Reza’i—Expediency Council member and IRGC commander-in-chief 1981-1997; Mohammad Reza Naqdi—former Basij commander; Mohammad Reza Ashtiani—deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces; IRGC Brig. Gen. Ali Abdollahi—coordination deputy for the Armed Forces General Staff; Ali Asghar Hejazi—chief of Supreme Leader security; Mohsen Qomi—advisor to the Supreme Leader on international communications</td>
<td>January 10, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Members of Council of Guardians and Elections Supervision Committee (for manipulating Iran’s parliamentary elections): Ahmad Jannati (head of the Council of Guardians); Mohammad Yazdi; Siamak Rahpeyk; Abbas Ali Kadkhodaie (Council speaker); and Mohammad Hasan Sadeghi Moghadam

Table D-22. Executive Order 13818 Implementing the Global Magnitsky Act (December 20, 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date Named</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran-backed Iraqi militia figures: Qais al-Khazali (head of Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq militia); Laith al-Khazali; Husayn Falih al-Lami</td>
<td>December 6, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.