DC’s first-ever Climate Week brought with it many chances to discuss the hottest-button topics in climate innovation and policy. FAS took the opportunity to do just that, by hosting a panel to explore the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI), energy, and climate issues with leading experts. Dr. Oliver Stephenson, FAS’ Associate Director of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Policy, sat down with Dr. Tanya Das, Dr. Costa Samaras, and Charles Hua to discuss what’s at stake at this critical crossroads moment. 

Missed the panel? Don’t fret. Read on to learn the need-to-knows. Here’s how these experts think we can maximize the “good” and minimize the “bad” of AI and data centers, leverage research and development (R&D) to make AI tools more successful and efficient, and how to better align incentives for AI growth with the public good.

First, Some Level Setting 

The panelists took their time to make sure the audience understood two key facts regarding this space. First, not all data centers are utilized for AI. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) estimates that AI applications are only used in about 10-20% of data centers. The rest? Data storage, web hosting capabilities, other cloud computing, and more.

Second, load growth due to the energy demand of data centers is happening, but the exact degree still remains unknown. Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) models project that data centers in the US will consume anywhere between 6.7% and 12% of US electricity generation by 2028. For a country that consumes roughly 4 trillion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity each year, this estimation spans a couple hundred billion kWh/year from the low end to the high. Also, these projections are calculated based on different assumptions that factor in AI energy efficiency improvements, hardware availability, regulatory decisions, modeling advancements, and just how much demand there will be for AI. When each of these conditions are evolving daily, even the most credible projections come with a good amount of uncertainty.

There is also ambiguity in the numbers and in the projections at the local and state levels, as many data center companies shop around to multiple utilities to get the best deal. This can sometimes lead to projects getting counted twice in local projections. Researchers at LBNL have recently said they can confidently make data center energy projections out to 2028. Beyond that, they can’t make reasonable assumptions about data center load growth amid growing load from other sectors working to electrify—like decarbonizing buildings and electric vehicle (EV) adoption.

Maximizing the Good, Minimizing the Bad

As data center clusters continue to proliferate across the United States, their impacts—on energy systems and load growth, water resources, housing markets, and electricity rates—will be most acutely felt at the state and local levels. DC’s nearby neighbor Northern Virginia has become a “data center alley” with more than 200 data centers in Loudoun County alone, and another 117 in the planning stages. 

States ultimately hold the power to shape the future of the industry through utility regulation, zoning laws, tax incentives, and grid planning – with specific emphasis on state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs). PUCs have a large influence on where data centers can be connected to the grid and the accompanying rate structure for how each data center pays for its power—whether through tariffs, increasing consumer rates, or other cost agreements. It is imperative that vulnerable ratepayers are not left to shoulder the costs and risks associated with the rapid expansion of data centers, including higher electricity bills, increased grid strain, and environmental degradation.

Panelists emphasized that despite the potential negative impacts of AI and data centers expansion, leaders have a real opportunity to leverage AI to maximize positive outcomes—like improving grid efficiency, accelerating clean energy deployment, and optimizing public services—while minimizing harms like overconsumption of energy and water, or reinforcing environmental injustice. Doing so, however, will require new economic and political incentives that align private investment with public benefit.

Research & Development at the Department of Energy

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is uniquely positioned to help solve the challenges AI and data centers pose, as the agency sits at the critical intersection of AI development, high-performance computing, and energy systems. DOE’s national laboratories have been central to advancing AI capabilities: Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was indeed the first to integrate graphics processing units (GPUs) into supercomputers, pioneering a new era of AI training and modeling capacity. DOE also runs two of the world’s most powerful supercomputers – Aurora at Argonne National Lab and Frontier at ORNL – cementing the U.S.’ leadership in high-performance computing.  

Beyond computing, DOE plays a key role in modernizing grid infrastructure, advancing clean energy technologies, and setting efficiency standards for energy-intensive operations like data centers. The agency has also launched programs like the Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence for Science, Security and Technology (FASST), overseen by the Office of Critical and Emerging Tech (CET), to coordinate AI-related activities across its programs.

As the intersection of AI and energy deepens—with AI driving data center expansion and offering tools to manage its impact—DOE must remain at the center of this conversation, and it must continue to deliver. The stakes are high: how we manage this convergence will influence not only the pace of technological innovation but also the equity and sustainability of our energy future.

Incentivizing Incentives: Aligning AI Growth with the Public Good 

The U.S. is poised to spend a massive amount of carbon to power the next wave of artificial intelligence. From training LLMs to supporting real-time AI applications, the energy intensity of this sector is undeniable—and growing. That means we’re not just investing financially in AI; we’re investing environmentally. To ensure that this investment delivers public value, we must align political and economic incentives with societal outcomes like grid stability, decarbonization, and real benefits for American communities.

One of the clearest opportunities lies in making data centers more responsive to the needs of the electric grid. While these facilities consume enormous amounts of power, they also hold untapped potential to act as flexible loads—adjusting their demand based on grid conditions to support reliability and integrate clean energy. The challenge? There’s currently little economic incentive for them to do so. One panelist noted skepticism that market structures alone will drive this shift without targeted policy support or regulatory nudges.

Instead, many data centers continue to benefit from “sweetheart deals”—generous tax abatements and economic development incentives offered by states and municipalities eager to attract investment. These agreements often lack transparency and rarely require companies to contribute to local energy resilience or emissions goals. For example, in several states, local governments have offered multi-decade property tax exemptions or reduced electricity rates without any accountability for climate impact or grid contributions.

New AI x Energy Policy Ideas Underway

If we’re going to spend gigatons of carbon in pursuit of AI-driven innovation, we must be strategic about where and how we direct incentives. That means:

• Conditioning public subsidies on data center flexibility and efficiency performance.
• Requiring visibility into private energy agreements and emissions footprints.
• Designing market signals—like time-of-use pricing or demand response incentives—that reward facilities for operating in sync with clean energy resources.

We don’t just need more incentives—we need better ones. And we need to ensure they serve public priorities, not just private profit. Through our AI x Energy Policy Sprint, FAS is working with leading experts to develop promising policy solutions for the Trump administration, Congress, and state and local governments. These policy memos will address how to: mitigate the energy and environmental impacts of AI systems and data centers, enhance the reliability and efficiency of energy systems using AI applications, and unlock transformative technological solutions with AI and energy R&D. 

Right now, we have a rare opportunity to shape U.S. policy at the critical intersection of AI and energy. Acting decisively today ensures we can harness AI to drive innovation, revolutionize energy solutions, and sustainably integrate transformative technologies into our infrastructure.

The semiconductor shortfall during the COVID-19 pandemic spotlighted the consequences of underinvesting in critical technology ecosystems. This wake-up call, following years of advocacy and growing consensus, spurred bipartisan action through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which made transformative investments in the semiconductor industry as well as future-focused programs like the Economic Development Administration’s Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs) – a program I helped launch as EDA’s chief of staff – and the National Science Foundation’s Regional Innovation Engines (NSF Engines). These latter two initiatives – Tech Hubs and NSF Engines – are catalyzing dynamic innovation ecosystems across the country, advancing technologies critical to our national security and economic competitiveness while spurring broad-based regional economic growth.

But as these innovation ecosystems grow, so too does their demand for talent. Across these ecosystems, there is a need to fill specialized positions essential to their success. At the same time, we’re witnessing an exodus of talent from the federal service – scientists, engineers, technologists, workforce experts, and skilled generalists – professionals whose expertise could be lost altogether if not effectively deployed. While these departures are deeply troubling for government operations and the services Americans rely on, we face three pressing imperatives: preserving specialized knowledge, responding to the human impact on individuals suddenly without work, and addressing critical talent needs among these tech regions. During my time as a Senior Fellow at FAS, I’m focused on building bridges that connect these experienced professionals with innovation ecosystems where they can continue to apply their hard-won expertise in service of important national priorities. 

Innovation ecosystems: What are they?

Both NSF Engines and Tech Hubs seek to advance critical and emerging technologies, but each focuses on different stages of technological advancement – NSF Engines on the research and development and early translation of technologies, while Tech Hubs comes in to support scaling and commercializing these technologies to achieve global competitiveness. 

Together, they’re advancing our capabilities in 10 key technology areas: 

1. Advanced manufacturing and robotics 
2. Advanced materials 
3. Artificial intelligence 
4. Biotechnology 
5. Communications technology and immersive technology 
6. Cybersecurity and data storage 
7. Disaster risk and resilience 
8. Energy technology 
9. Quantum 
10. Semiconductors and advanced computing. 

This geographically distributed innovation model is taking root across America, with 31 designated Tech Hubs and 10 NSF Engines receiving between approximately $15 million to $50 million each – not to mention the dozens of other innovation ecosystems that received development grants to continue to build their ecosystem strategies – spanning the majority of states across the country.

NSF Engines

Map of NSF Engines & EDA BBBRC via NSF on Tableau

Note: NSF’s interactive map also includes the Build Back Better Regional Challenge, a program of the Economic Development Administration, that includes many innovation ecosystems that span the country as well. In this version, only Tech Hubs and NSF Engines are demarcated on the map.

The strength of these innovation ecosystems lies in their coalition approach, which brings together industry, start-ups, research universities, community colleges, economic and workforce development organizations, community-based nonprofits, and entrepreneurial ecosystem builders. As these ecosystems scale, this broad spectrum of stakeholders need talent to fill a variety of roles: lab scientists, engineers, technicians, partnership managers, business support and entrepreneurship program staff, workforce development program managers, and other specialized industry and ecosystem builder roles. Where will some of this talent come from? I believe part of the answer lies in the talented professionals departing federal service.

The federal service: Who are they?

Since January 2025, tens of thousands of federal workers have left the federal government, in addition to thousands of contractors who have supported government services. They come from agencies where they worked in areas helpful to innovation ecosystems, like the National Institutes of Health (helpful for biotech-focused ecosystems) to the Department of Labor (helpful for workforce development strategizing). These individuals have managed multimillion-dollar grant programs, provided expert technical analyses and developed best practices across every area you can think of, and navigated complex stakeholder networks. Many already live in or near regions with emerging innovation ecosystems, given the distributed nature of federal agencies, and others are willing to relocate for the right mission-driven opportunity, potentially even back to places they call home. Their early involvement in these innovation ecosystems would help build the momentum needed for technological breakthroughs and sustained growth, in turn leading to more job creation for others at the local and regional level. 

The initiative

With FAS’s support, I am launching an initiative to connect scientists, engineers, technologists, economic and workforce development practitioners, program manager extraordinaires, and other professionals who recently departed federal service with emerging innovation ecosystems across the country that need their expertise. 

We’re talking directly with Tech Hubs and NSF Engines communities to identify immediate and near-term talent needs within their leadership teams, across federally funded Tech Hub and NSF Engine component projects, and among consortium stakeholders. Simultaneously, we are engaging displaced federal workers and contractors through job fairs and direct outreach to understand their skillsets, career interests, and location preferences. To help both innovation ecosystems and these workers, we aim to showcase opportunities across innovation ecosystems, facilitate direct matchmaking to expedite hiring, and create additional resources tailored to the needs of these professionals and innovation ecosystems. 

This is an opportunity for innovation ecosystems to take advantage of the availability of mission-driven professionals who have transferable skills to meet the needs of these regions. At the same time, this allows former federal professionals to continue meaningful, public-purpose work that contributes to America’s technological leadership in a new capacity. 

It is to our national peril if we do not set up these innovation ecosystems to succeed. And it is also to our peril if we do not leverage the thousands of years of collective experience these former feds have to offer. This FAS initiative wants to see regions, people, and the country succeed, and is doing so by addressing critical talent gaps in these strategically imperative innovation ecosystems, offering pathways for continued public-purpose impact, and ensuring the nation as a whole does not lose valuable expertise. 

What you can do

We are excited to share more information soon on these available opportunities and how federal workers can plug in. In the meantime, if you are an innovation ecosystem – even outside of Tech Hubs and NSF Engines – please do reach out to learn more or share open roles. If you are a federal worker, fill out this interest form, and we’ll add you to the list to receive more information as it becomes available. And if you have any thoughts to offer on this initiative, we are all ears. 

As the design of Tech Hubs and NSF Engines shows us, it takes a coalition of committed organizations and individuals to achieve big, but necessary, goals.

Maryam Janani-Flores (mjananiflores@fas.org) is a Senior Fellow at FAS and former chief of staff at the U.S. Economic Development Administration.

In 2014, my colleagues  at the Monterey Institute for International Studies and I authored a study called The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad. This report laid out comprehensively, for the first time, that the recently launched US nuclear modernization program–including building new nuclear-armed submarines, bombers, and long-range missiles as well as new nuclear weapons–would likely cost over $1 trillion during its 30-year time scale. Until then, no one had even an estimate for how much these programs would cost over their lifetimes. At the time, my co-authors and I were criticized by advocates for the nuclear modernization program as alarmist and accused of actively seeking to inflate estimates to undermine political support for these programs. Overall, proponents argued that these programs were necessary and that the cost was a mere fraction of the Pentagon’s overall budget, historically low when compared to the nuclear modernization of the 1970s and 1980s. What was originally described merely as a bow wave of costs has become a tsunami.

On April 25, the Congressional Budget Office released its latest estimate that costs of maintaining the current nuclear arsenal and modernizing the entire program would cost nearly $1 trillion over the next 10 years alone.  As was once said, there are lies, damn lies, and statistics. This is not an argument about statistics but about absolute numbers. By any measure, $1 trillion is an enormous amount of money to spend in 10 years, and any other U.S. Government or private effort on this scale would receive intense scrutiny and attention–in fact, the Sentinel ICBM modernization most recently triggered a critical breach of the Nunn McCurdy act in 2024. Moreover, if the nuclear budget is going to average 10% from the estimated $1 trillion annual defense budget for the next decade, the nuclear program is now eating the defense budget alive.

For those who may doubt whether oversight is necessary, one only needs to look at one of the more visible elements of the nuclear modernization program–the effort to replace the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile program. When we did our original estimate in 2014, there was no estimate for the cost of replacing the MMIII. We noted that past efforts to build comparable long-range missile systems were complex, expensive, and prone to large cost overruns. The example we cited was the “Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, which involved the purchase of 150 space launch vehicles based on existing technologies. Originally slated to cost $30 billion, program costs now exceed $70 billion.”

The sole recommendation of this 2014 report was that the USG and Department of Defense in particular needs to create a stand alone nuclear budget to understand the complex nature of these programs and their costs, and keep them on budget and under control. While we did not push the recommendation in the report, we strongly suggested overall that the program was unlikely to meet schedule and cost milestones because it was going to put the constrained U.S. defense industrial capacity under stress and it would be better to stagger these complex multi-decade and multi-billion dollar programs.Ten years later, this recommendation is still needed.

To push these programs through and dismiss alternatives, the military and defense contractors and defense hawks in Congress argued the sky was falling, that Russia and China were modernizing, that nuclear war would be more expensive, so there was no margin for error or delay to consider alternatives. Ironically, the mismanagement of the modernization program now threatens to produce the very delay they were warning against.

In all of these areas, our report was not only rebuffed by advocates for the nuclear modernization program, but our recommendations were ignored. And over time, the consequences of plowing ahead with these programs despite predicted problems have come to pass. The MMIII replacement program, now dubbed Sentinel, was originally estimated to cost $62 billion. That program is now slated to cost $126 billion in the next 10 years alone, and over $140 billion in total. Those costs can also be expected to keep rising due to ongoing delays in the program. This program bypassed the normal programmatic reviews and procurement milestones, and was rushed to a single source contract during President Trump’s first term, with predictably bad results. It now seems likely that the Air Force will have to extend the life of the MMIII missile through 2050–something supporters of the new ICBM have argued would be impossible in both 2021 and 2023.

There is still no comprehensive budget from DOD laying out their costs or predicting the full cost of implementing the current U.S. nuclear weapons modernization program. This is akin to agreeing to buying a house without knowing the sales price, the mortgage rate, or the monthly payment. Yes, you need to live somewhere, but in an era where critical U.S. programs for defense, science, climate, health and international programs and even nuclear weapons security and safety are being cut, it is nonsensical that these programs continue without adequate oversight and knowledge of their true costs.

Whether the U.S. can afford these programs is a reasonable question. Knowing how much these new systems will cost, it is appropriate to ask: if the Pentagon can not produce even a budget on costs, how can they be expected to oversee and deliver what their advocates claim are critical national security programs? The inadequate oversight, cost management and even basic program accountability will result, as we predicted in 2014, “disarmament by default”,  an unsustainable and dangerous way to manage U.S. national security.

For more than twenty years, the Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences (IES) has served as a guiding light for U.S. education research. Its work has pushed the field forward, supporting high-quality, rigorous research in a field known for its reliance on word-of-mouth over science. The studies it funded have answered critical questions about “what works” in key areas like improving reading achievement and increasing associate’s degree attainment. It has served as a centralized, objective repository of data and research to inform educator practice, school district procurement, and state legislation. Even with these achievements, IES has room to grow to ensure that cutting edge research makes it into the hands of those who need it, when they need it.

As part of IES’s ongoing leadership, it has been moving to adopt an approach called “living evidence.” Use of this emerging approach would keep decision-makers up-to-date about the solutions that have been rigorously tested and hold potential to address core challenges facing American schools: How do we respond to astonishingly low scores on NAEP tests? Are there evidence-based approaches we can employ in schools that will help end the national “epidemic” of social isolation? How do we ensure that both our college graduates and those who do not wish to attend college can obtain high-paying jobs?

Harnessing Innovation

This week, FAS and its partners at the Future Evidence Foundation (FEF) released a new report: Harnessing Innovation: Options for Implementing Living Evidence at the Institute of Education Sciences (which you can download using the button on the left-hand side of this page). It describes in great depth how IES could build on existing processes to produce living reviews as part of their What Works Clearinghouse. 

Over time, many have come to believe that the agency moves too slowly to be responsive to practitioner needs, that its approach to sharing research findings does not make clear enough for users whether an intervention is backed by strong evidence, and that it needs to better support innovation. Living evidence is not the silver bullet that can address all of these issues in full. And yet, its proposed adoption could be the foundation for a sea change, allowing IES to more responsively share when new best practices and innovative approaches are identified in the academic literature through the What Works Clearinghouse. However, recent seismic shifts have severely damaged IES’s capability to move forward with using this innovative model: the Trump Administration’s cancellation of nearly all active contracts, including those that made the What Works Clearinghouse’s work possible, and a reduction-in-force (RIF) that led to the firing of nearly all of IES’s staff. 

Report Insights and Key Takeaways

The report was produced as the product of a year-long partnership, where FAS and FEF were granted the opportunity to engage deeply with leadership and staff from IES. Our team learned about their day-to-day processes and potential roadblocks on the path to change. The final ‘options memo’ was carefully constructed to give the IES team a set of realistic approaches they could take to addressing some of their greatest challenges: discerning the topics where knowing ‘what works’ could be most beneficial to the more than 100 million people that the U.S. education system touches, finding the highest-quality academic research from the thousands of studies produced each year on education, and doing this work within a limited set of resources (IES funding made up less than 1% of the Department of Education’s overall spending in 2024). These recommendations were informed by conversations with many of those that knew IES’s work best, from its contractors to the readers of the What Works Clearinghouse’s reports. They offer feasible ways for IES to craft more efficient processes for developing their resources.

From this process, our team had two key takeaways: 

1. While the What Works Clearinghouse faces challenges in achieving its goal to make rigorous research accessible to policymakers and practitioners, the staff and contractors that led its work were steadfast in their dedication to improving its resources. 
2. Living evidence is not just the way of the future in academic circles beyond the U.S., but is a model that is feasible to implement in large federal agencies.

However, canceling contracts and firing experienced, dedicated staff has kneecapped IES’s ability to make the changes necessary to begin creating and deploying living reviews. An opportunity may now be missed to better align IES’s work not just to what their constituents need, but also to how a global community is moving forward in thinking about how to better connect evidence to policy and practice. While the administration has signaled its intent to rebuild IES in the future, it will take time to enact a new vision, and to fix what will inevitably break in the absence of staff to support key resources including the Regional Education Laboratories, the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC), and the What Works Clearinghouse. In that time, peer government R&D agencies such as UK Research and Innovation and major philanthropic organizations such as the Wellcome Trust will step up to lead the way on developing infrastructure that supports the use of emerging technology to build living reviews, moving the rest of the world forward while U.S. government agencies remain in the past.

Living Evidence Global Community of Practice

Living evidence still has a path forward in the U.S, and opportunities to continue to grow along with the growing global movement. Innovation outside of government for living evidence holds promise for U.S. education stakeholders, led by work through the HEDCO Institute at the University of Oregon and the clearinghouse Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development. The recommendations in the report will offer value for such organizations as they work to shift toward living systematic reviews, setting the tone for best practice in evidence synthesis while IES is in transition. FAS and FEF will continue to help support this work through our convening of a Living Evidence Community of Practice.

Further, it is our hope that the learnings shared in the report will be considered in re-imagining future iterations of IES. In its short 23 years of existence, IES has raised the rigor of evidence that influences education and made strides in both generating and summarizing evidence that has the potential to inform practice. Even if the administration moves forward in its stated aim of “returning education back to the states”, state and local leaders will still need IES’s resources to understand how best to disburse their budgets. Employing a living approach to evidence synthesis, disseminated at a national level, is a streamlined way to enable evidence-based decision-making nationwide. If the administration genuinely prioritizes government efficiency, the report’s recommendations warrant serious consideration.

In 2023, the U.S. bioeconomy generated 643,992 domestic jobs and contributed $210.4 billion to the U.S. GDP, establishing it as a significant economic force. This impact is largely due to its broad and diverse scope. While the U.S. bioeconomy does not have a consensus definition, nearly all versions of the definition include biotechnology as a central driver. Consequently, a wide range of industries are encompassed within the bioeconomy (Table 1). Previous administrations, including the previous Trump Administration, have championed and advanced biotechnology and biomanufacturing. The Biden Administration released the Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy (Bioeconomy EO) focused on expanding domestic biomanufacturing capacity, streamlining regulations for biotech products, and expanding market opportunities. With a new chapter ahead of us, the United States is presented with incredible challenges and opportunities in the face of China’s dominance in this space.

However, the broad scope of the U.S. bioeconomy also presents significant challenges. While there is general consensus on the types of industries relevant to the bioeconomy, there is no definitive agreement on which should be included or excluded, resulting in certain sectors within an industry being classified as part of the bioeconomy even if the industry as a whole is not. This lack of clarity creates confusion which could result in missed opportunities for ongoing development and support programs that these industries could benefit from. Furthermore, this ambiguity fosters the creation of artificial silos, hindering cross-sector communication and potentially causing a loss of valuable collaborative capabilities. This lack of clarity additionally complicates the measurement of the bioeconomy’s economic contributions, leaving valuable opportunities for growth and development underexplored due to an inability to identify sectors that require further investment.

The Bioeconomy EO made significant strides in understanding the U.S. bioeconomy, but substantial growth remains. A key lesson learned is the need for a common, consensus-based definition and lexicon to improve communication across sectors, as agencies like the DOD, USDA, and DOE often struggle to talk across sectors without a shared language. NIST’s Bioeconomy Lexicon, last updated in February 2025, remains incomplete, with important terms like continuous fermentation still undefined. Additionally, there is a growing need for standards and metrics, and continued investment in NIST’s initiatives, which are essential to build a unified strategy that maximizes the bioeconomy’s full potential.

Despite these difficulties, the U.S. bioeconomy continues to demonstrate resilience and growth, particularly as we enter the next technological revolution driven by advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and sustainable development. This underscores the critical need for investment across all levels of the U.S. bioeconomy. By making strategic investments in the bioeconomy now, the U.S. can position itself to capitalize on future innovations and advancements, unlocking the projected growth potential, which is expected to reach $400 billion by 2030. Investment in the U.S. bioeconomy not only promotes economic growth but also yields broader benefits, like fostering job creation, driving development of new technologies that enhance the quality of life, providing resilience to long-term prosperity, and staking out significant competitive advantage at the global scale. Overall, the U.S. bioeconomy represents a powerful force with immense potential, one that must be recognized and leveraged further.

Investment in the Bioeconomy Drives Regional Development 

Given the vastness of the U.S. bioeconomy, a top-down approach alone will not be enough to drive the rapid growth needed for global competitiveness. A bottom-up approach, led by regional efforts, is essential for fostering growth and innovation across the country. Combining both approaches can boost the national GDP, stimulate regional economies, and create jobs. Regional programs like the EDA Tech Hubs, NSF Biofoundries, and U.S. Manufacturing Institutes like BioMADE and NIIMBL are already supporting localized bioeconomies, or micro-bioeconomies, tailored to specific resources and technologies.

While federal initiatives are important, it is equally important to assess their effectiveness. Understanding the return on investment from these programs is essential, not just for local micro-bioeconomies, but for their broader impact on the U.S. economy. For example, BioMADE has seen significant budget increases, including a $450 million boost in 2023, but its 2024 allocation of $75 million across 65 projects raises questions about fund distribution. As BioMADE supports more projects, further evaluation is needed to determine how effectively it is utilizing resources to advance U.S. biotechnology and biomanufacturing.

Ultimately, it will be essential for stakeholders in the U.S. bioeconomy to closely examine regional programs and assess their effectiveness. A comparative analysis of funding across different programs, agencies, and performance metrics will be necessary to ensure these investments are delivering tangible benefits and are aligned with broader bioeconomy goals. One key lesson from the Bioeconomy EO is that the U.S. must acknowledge that we can do more and that we have not yet done enough. The U.S. bioeconomy is still in its early stages, with significant room for growth and improvement. If the federal government and regional entities do not continue investing in this crucial sector, the nation will face serious economic, social, and global challenges in the future. Failing to act will only stifle progress and allow global competitors to surpass the U.S. in production, manufacturing, skill development, and resource acquisition. To ensure the U.S. bioeconomy thrives, sustained investment, decisive action, and a unified national and regional strategy are essential. 

What Areas of the U.S. Bioeconomy Still Need Development?

The bioeconomy EO focused on many different components of the bioeconomy to grow and foster, but despite the EO’s best efforts, not all areas have developed to the same degree. Several areas still require further development, investment, and strategy to safeguard and grow portions of the U.S. bioeconomy.

One important area is Supply Chain Resiliency. In March 2024, the USDA published a report aimed at creating a more resilient biomass supply chain, in accordance with the deliverable in section 5C of the bioeconomy EO. Biomass is an important component of the U.S. bioeconomy but the bioeconomy supply chain encompasses much more. Resiliency should extend to ensuring that all material and intellectual inputs and outputs in the U.S. bioeconomy are safeguarded against disruptions, such as those experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic, and built to last. The pandemic exemplified our reliance on products made outside of the U.S. to keep our biomanufacturing ecosystem functioning, such as the need for single-use plastics or specific biological inputs for vaccine production. In light of this, achieving true resilience requires building a flexible, global supply chain to ensure access to diverse biological resources and the ability to rapidly adapt to global market demands, rather than relying solely on a U.S.-centric model. Establishing stockpile agreements and treaties will be key to ensuring the bioeconomy’s supply chain can withstand unforeseen challenges.

Another important aspect is Bio-Based Product Procurement. The bioeconomy EO included several deliverables focused on bio-based procurement, such as identifying procurement challenges, producing annual fiscal reports, and creating new procurement programs within different agencies. However, despite the emphasis on these issues, little has been published beyond a USDA report that offers generic recommendations to address challenges. These recommendations, such as measuring the bioeconomy and coordinating carbon intensity labels, fail to address the real difficulties that have hindered bio-based procurement at the federal level.

Additionally, Workforce Development & Bioliteracy is crucial for the success of the U.S. bioeconomy. To fully capitalize on the potential of the bioeconomy, a skilled workforce is required. While the OSTP has released an action plan to boost the bioeconomy workforce, further investment and coordination are necessary to meet the bioeconomy’s needs. The U.S. manufacturing sector has been the backbone of the economy since the industrial revolution, and transitioning to biomanufacturing offers the opportunity to create new jobs and bring substantial economic growth to regions across the country. However, this shift requires significant workforce development reforms, including reassessing immigration policies to ensure that the best global talent is attracted to the U.S., further strengthening the economy.

Strategic Next Steps for the U.S. Bioeconomy and the New Administration

To strategically foster the growth of the U.S. bioeconomy and remain globally competitive, the new administration must not only prioritize the development of currently underdeveloped areas within the bioeconomy but also establish the foundational infrastructure necessary for long-term success. A crucial first step would be establishing a clear and adaptable definition of the U.S. bioeconomy. This would help not only in measuring its progress but also in defining which sectors and sub-sectors fall under its umbrella. 

Additionally, the administration should focus on regional development through the creation of micro-bioeconomies, which would diversify and strengthen the national bioeconomy. Implementing a bottom-up approach allows regions to tailor their strategies to local strengths, like existing industries, academic institutions, or workforce capacities, while aligning with broader federal priorities. This could involve reskilling and redeploying existing manufacturing capacity into biomanufacturing, leveraging local resources, talent, and infrastructure. These efforts would not only support economic growth and job creation at the regional level, but also enhance national resilience by decentralizing production and fostering innovation across the nation.

To support this regional strategy, the federal government must provide a comprehensive national framework based on clear goals and achievable metrics. For instance, a target such as increasing the production of bio-based products by 50% by 2050 for domestic consumption could help coordinate efforts across various agencies and set a clear path for growth. Furthermore, the federal government should focus on providing the necessary infrastructure for biotechnology and biomanufacturing development, not only physical infrastructure, such as processing facilities and biomanufacturing plants, but also intangible infrastructure like workforce development, talent enhancement, financial mechanisms, and intellectual property creation. The Trump administration could also lead in advancing bio-based material production and green chemical production through novel biotechnologies. These efforts would not only benefit American consumers by providing sustainable alternatives to essential products but would also strengthen national security and defense positions.
The Trump administration presents significant opportunities to advance the bioeconomy, but it must also carefully navigate the wide-ranging activities the sector encompasses. Policy changes, particularly cuts to funding for scientific research and development, could have unintended consequences that hinder progress. While some repealed executive orders may not have directly affected the sector, reductions in funding for science and education are likely to create ripple effects, such as a shortage of trained workers or disruptions in the supply chain, which could trigger cascading negative impacts. Therefore, thoughtful and strategic decision-making is crucial to ensuring the bioeconomy reaches its full potential.

While the U.S. has made significant advancements and remained a global leader in biotechnology over the past decade, the next four years will be critical in determining whether it can sustain that leadership. According to the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, China has prioritized biotechnology and, by extension, the bioeconomy for the past 20 years and is rapidly advancing toward dominance in the field unless the U.S. takes decisive action. Meanwhile, the Netherlands recently announced an investment of approximately €1.3 billion to expand its biotechnology sector, with the goal of becoming a global leader by 2040. This growing international investment signals rising global competition, and the U.S. must strengthen its bioeconomy to stay ahead. The Trump administration  does not need to start from scratch; it can build on the accomplishments of its first term and the progress made since.

The Clean Air Act. The Clean Water Act. The National Environmental Policy Act. These and most of our nation’s other foundational environmental laws were passed decades ago – and they have started to show their age. The Clean Air Act, for instance, was written to cut air pollution, not to drive the whole-of-economy response that the climate crisis now warrants. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 was designed to make cars more efficient in a pre-electric vehicle era, and now puts the Department of Transportation in the awkward position of setting fuel economy standards in an era when more and more cars don’t burn gas.

Trying to manage today’s problems with yesterday’s laws results in government by kludge. Legacy regulatory architecture has foundered under a patchwork of legislative amendments and administrative procedures designed to bridge the gap between past needs and present realities. Meanwhile, Congressional dysfunction has made purpose-built updates exceptionally difficult to land. The Inflation Reduction Act, for example, was mostly designed to move money rather than rethink foundational statutes or regulatory processes – because those rethinks couldn’t make it past the filibuster.

As the efficacy of environmental laws has waned, so has their durability. What was once a broadly shared goal – protecting Americans from environmental harm – is now a political football, with rules that whipsaw back and forth depending on who’s in charge. 

The second Trump Administration launched the biggest environmental deregulatory campaign in history against this backdrop. But that campaign, coupled with massive reductions in the federal civil service and a suite of landmark court decisions (including Loper Bright) about how federal agencies regulate, risks pushing U.S. regulatory architecture past the point of sensible and much-needed reform and into a state of complete disrepair.

Dismantling old systems has proven surprisingly easy. Building what comes next will be harder. And the work must begin now. 

It is time to articulate a long-term vision for a government that can actually deliver in an ever-more complex society. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is meeting this moment by launching an ambitious new project to reimagine the U.S. environmental regulatory state, drawing ideas from across ideological lines.

The Beginning of a New Era

Fear of the risks of systemic change often prevent people from entertaining change in earnest. Think of the years of U.S. squabbles over how or whether to reform permitting and environmental review, while other countries simply raced ahead to build clean energy projects and establish dominance in the new world economy. Systemic stagnation, however, comes with its own consequences. 

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) are a case in point when it comes to climate and the environment. Together, these two pieces of legislation represented the largest global investment in the promise of a healthier, more sustainable, and, yes, cheaper future. Unfortunately, as proponents of the “abundance” paradigm and others have observed, rollout was hampered by inefficient processes and outdated laws. Implementing the IRA and the IIJA via old systems, in short, was like trying to funnel an ocean through a garden hose – and as a result, most Americans experienced only a trickle of real-world impact.

Similar barriers are constraining state progress. For example, the way we govern and pay for electricity has not kept pace with a rapidly changing energy landscape – meaning that the United States risks ceding leadership on energy technologies critical to national security, economic competitiveness, and combating climate change.

But we are perhaps now entering a new era. The United States appears to be on the edge of real political realignments, with transpartisan stakes around the core role of government in economic development that do not match up neatly to current coalitions. This realignment presents a crucial opportunity to catalyze a new era of climate, environmental, and democratic progress.

FAS will leverage this opportunity by providing a forum for debate and engagement on different facets of climate and environmental governance, a platform to amplify insights, and the capacity to drive forward solutions. Examples of topics ripe for exploration include:

• Balancing agility and accountability. As observed, regulatory approaches of the past have struggled to address the interconnected, quickly evolving nature of climate and environmental challenges. At the same time, mechanisms for ensuring accountability have been disrupted by an evolving legal landscape and increasingly muscular executive. There is a need to imagine and test new systems designed to move quickly but responsibly on climate and environmental issues. 
• Complementing traditional regulation through novel strategies. There is growing interest in using novel financial, contractual, and other strategies as a complement to regulation for driving climate and environmental progress. There is considerable room to go deeper in this space, identifying both the power of these strategies and their limits. 
• Rethinking stakeholder engagement. The effectiveness of regulation depends on its ability to serve diverse stakeholder needs while advancing environmental goals. Public comment and other pipelines for engaging stakeholders and integrating external perspectives and expertise into regulations have been disrupted by technologies such as AI, while the relationship between regulated entities and their regulators has become increasingly adversarial. There is a need to examine synergies and tradeoffs between centering stakeholders and centering outcomes in regulatory processes, as well as examine how stakeholder engagement could be improved to better ensure regulations that are informed, feasible, durable, and distributively fair. 

In working through topics like these, FAS seeks to lay out a positive vision of regulatory reconstruction that is substantively superior to either haphazard destruction or incremental change. Our vision is nothing less than to usher in a new paradigm of climate and environmental governance: one that secures a livable world while reinforcing democratic stability, through systems that truly deliver for America. 

We will center our focus on the federal government given its important role in climate and environmental issues. However, states and localities do a lot of the work of a federated government day-to-day. We recognize that federal cures are unlikely to fully alleviate the symptoms that Americans are experiencing every day, from decaying infrastructure to housing shortages. We are committed to ensuring that solutions are appropriately matched to the root cause of state capacity problems and that federal climate and environmental regulatory regimes are designed to support successful cooperation with local governments and implementation partners. 

FAS is no stranger to ambitious endeavors like these. Since our founding in 1945, we have been committed to tackling the major science policy issues that reverberate through American life. This new FAS workstream will be embedded across our Climate and Environment, Clean Energy, and Government Capacity portfolios. We have already begun engaging and activating the diverse community of scholars, experts, and leaders laying the intellectual groundwork to develop compelling answers to urgent questions surrounding the climate regulatory state, against the backdrop of a broader state capacity movement. True to our nonpartisan commitment, we will build this work on a foundation of cross-ideological curiosity and play on the tension points in existing coalitions that strike us all as most productive.

We invite you to join us in conversation and collaboration. If you want to get involved, contact Zoë Brouns (zbrouns@fas.org).

Decision to Sunset IRS’ Direct File Previews Worse Taxpayer Experience in 2026

Yesterday, tens of thousands of taxpayers filed their returns using IRS Direct File, the agency’s new free, public, online tax filing service now in its second filing season. They joined hundreds of thousands who have used the service, and who have been nearly-unanimously thrilled to fulfill their tax obligations easily and directly. It seems we have finally done the impossible: make Tax Day anything but the most dreaded day of the year. At least we did.

Today, the Associated Press reported that the Treasury Department will discontinue the program. “Cutting costs and saving money for families were just empty campaign promises,” says Adam Ruben, a vice president at the Economic Security Project of the administration’s decision to end the program.

I was an original architect of Direct File from 2021 until just a few months ago, and got to see its impact on government and on taxpayers directly. Make no mistake: Direct File is a shining example of government capacity and government efficiency. By providing a critical government service for free, and helping taxpayers file more timely and more accurate returns, it is projected to eventually generate $11 billion in net savings for taxpayers every year. 

The dismantling of the program is not, at all, a step toward government efficiency. This is a move that will degrade our government services, incurring massive costs for people trying to file their taxes, further damaging the capacity of the nation’s revenue-collection agency, and making our institutions less robust and less capable.

It’s no secret: Americans do not love tax season.

The Direct File story started for me, personally, when I moved back to the U.S. after living in London for 9 years. I had already spent years working in digital services: I had built the first in-house digital team at the brand-new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2010, and then worked on multiple projects in London, culminating in helping the London Borough of Camden digitally transform its entire operations practically overnight during the pandemic. I moved back to the States and joined the US Digital Service to help rebuild after Covid, bringing the lessons I had learned from the UK. My first project at USDS was leading our efforts on Child Tax Credit expansion — ensuring that families across the country could access the enormous new child benefit that was created in the March 2021 American Rescue Plan.

But there was a problem: families naturally had to file a tax return to claim their tax credit. And I was pretty surprised to learn that our government still did not, in 2021, offer a free, online way to file your taxes directly with the government. Around the world, tax collection is seen as an inherent government function and, as such, tax filing is a service that the government offers free of charge. I thought we should too, especially if we were going to make such critical social supports contingent on it during a crisis. 

Instead, in the U.S., we relied on a confusing — and sometimes costly — mishmash of private offerings and support from non-profits designed to ensure most people could maybe, sort of, file a return for free if they needed to. It made the barrier to entry high, both in terms of trying to navigate how to simply file a return, nevermind to do so without cost. Tax filing, I thought, is a core function of government, and making it free and easy to use would cut through this waste and deliver for the American people.

I wasn’t the only one who thought this way. By 2021, a free public filing service was already the “white whale” of civic tech; everyone knew this was the critical government function to bring into a modern digital product, and yet it was too big, too daunting, too much of a change. Honestly, never in a million years did I think we would pull it off, either. The IRS, for all its genuine accomplishments in the face of constantly shrinking budgets and aging technology, had no real experience launching an enormous, high-stakes tech product designed to simplify the mind-numbing complexities of an American tax return. This was government capacity we would have to create.

But, we did. Since Direct File launched as a pilot in March 2023, hundreds of thousands of people have now filed their returns with it, to stunning results. In its pilot year, 86% of users said that Direct File increased their trust in the IRS. In its second year, it is winning awards and killing it with users, with a Net Promoter Score in the +80s, up from +74 last year (Apple’s, which is considered astronomically high, is +72). Direct File is a wildly successful government startup. Not only that, but the IRS now has its own in-house capacity to continue building awesome digital experiences — capacity that could have gone toward cost savings and experience improvements in all matter of IRS operations. This is all capacity, needless to say, that has gone away, all in the name of “efficiency.”

The impact for taxpayers from Direct File alone are, and would have been, enormous. In the U.S., the IRS estimates that it takes the average person over 9 hours and costs $160 to file your taxes each year. We even heard anecdotally from Direct File users who had paid thousands of dollars to do what Direct File does for free. There also remain millions of households who, every year, don’t file their returns at all, leaving sizable refunds on the table, because they can’t navigate the confusing tax filing “offers” advertising tax filing services. These households would have stood to finally access billions of dollars they leave unclaimed every year.

Not only are taxpayers saving these hundreds of dollars, they also feel newly empowered to interact with their government and take control of their tax situations. For decades, Americans have been told that they are not smart enough to do your own taxes; only highly-paid specialists that you have to pay for, can do it for you. Direct File stripped away the noise and showed taxpayers that filing can be simple and easy. The valuable trust this creates in government and public institutions is impossible to quantify.

Finally, there is the issue of data privacy and security. Taxpayers filing via private services must expose their most sensitive personal and financial information to third parties that monetize their data, sometimes illegally and without taxpayers’ consent. Without a public filing option, taxpayers are more or less required to sacrifice their privacy and the security of their data just to fulfill their filing obligations. Direct File gives taxpayers the option to protect their data and provide it straight to the tax agency, without a middleman.

All this — the in-house capacity to modernize the IRS, billions of dollars in cost savings, an empowered public — is what is cancelled today. But they have it exactly backwards. It’s a functional, high-quality government that’s efficient. The chaos they are sowing is anything but.

On Tuesday, 4/8/25, the bipartisan National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB) released their findings on how the U.S. can support and bolster the emerging bioeconomy sector. This sector, which includes biotechnology and biomanufacturing, is increasingly important to scientists working across disciplines – and will continue to shape the economic fortunes of regions across the country. 

FAS looks forward to dissecting, advancing, and advocating for the Commission’s report. FAS has been active and influential in this sector and has worked with various stakeholders and experts to advance evidence-based policy recommendations to boost the U.S. bioeconomy (more below). While the report provides an essential starting point to grow and secure our biotechnology and biomanufacturing enterprise, it will be important to advocate for the recommendations found within it, but also to add and refine recommendations to meet the ever evolving U.S. bioeconomy. 

FAS is especially enthusiastic about the recommendations that emphasize prioritizing and advancing biotechnology at the national level, ensuring the U.S. maintains its innovation edge. We also strongly support the recommendations aimed at scaling biotechnologies and biomanufacturing by fostering private sector growth and leveraging various financial mechanisms. These recommendations are crucial in addressing some of the most urgent challenges facing the U.S. bioeconomy and will serve as a vital step toward establishing a dynamic and adaptable national strategy for the sector. See our policy statement for more details.

Cautious and Enthusiastic Interest

While FAS is optimistic of the impact that this report can have, it is also important for FAS to be cautious around national security issues due to our 80 year old legacy. FAS began in response to how new technologies (nuclear) could be used for war (nuclear weapons). Today we remain watchful of technologies with the potential of misuse. FAS team members involved with national security take an understandably cautionary approach. The confluence of technology and access mean that there is risk associated with bio-products, too. “This opportunity must also be balanced with a clear-eyed understanding that increasing economic competition, heating geopolitics, and advancing life sciences capabilities may change how countries and other actors view the utility of globally repugnant capabilities such as biological weapons.” said Yong-Bee Lim, Associate Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists.

The report details the importance of safeguarding the biotechnology and biomanufacturing enterprise to remain competitive at the global scale, especially with China (recall the recent semiconductor shortages). However, “it’ll be important to balance both innovation capabilities and risk as we work towards ensuring that the U.S. bioeconomy is a priority area for both the Nation and for National Security.” said Nazish Jeffery, Bioeconomy Policy Manager at the Federation of American Scientists.

Bioeconomy Presents Significant Opportunities

Still, FAS continues advocating and promoting this area with great enthusiasm. The nascent bioeconomy is more than just leading edge biology meets computational gains. There are a myriad of scientific, economic, and social benefits to be had by leveraging this new industry.

No one at FAS knows this better than Nazish Jeffery, who spearheaded efforts to understand this moment. For more than two years she has worked with biologists, technologists, policymakers and biotechnology companies to investigate how the U.S. can maintain competitiveness while distributing economic rewards equitably domestically.

FAS sponsored policy sprints, which are open calls for participants in academia and industry to submit and develop actionable policy memos that address a particular issue or sector. The goal is to infuse diverse perspectives and expertise into policy that improves lives for all Americans. Since the start of the Commission’s investigations, FAS has sponsored policy sprints on topics such as the intersection of biology and artificial intelligence, as well as a sprint soliciting ideas to grow the bioeconomy sector itself. 

This emerging technology sector brought in $210 billion into the U.S. economy in 2023, and is projected to grow to $400 billion by 2030. The economic potential of the bioeconomy is significant; policymakers should promote and work in partnership with industry to continue development in distributed regions across the U.S. to invigorate innovation and enable job creation. This opportunity must also be balanced with a clear-eyed understanding that increasing economic competition, heating geopolitics, and advancing life sciences capabilities may change how countries and other actors view the utility of globally repugnant capabilities such as biological weapons.

FAS interviewed, worked with, or sought input from numerous academics, technologists, bio-industry leaders, elected representatives, and organizations, to understand the full spectrum of the value chain and push forward the best ideas.

FAS invites you to take a look at what possibilities lay ahead, presented below.

Bioeconomy Policy Sprint

The FAS Bioeconomy Sprint produced actionable policy memos to strengthen the bioeconomy in concert with outside expertise, including:

• A Matter of Trust: Helping the Bioeconomy Reach Its Full Potential with Translational Governance by Christopher Gilliespie
• BioNETWORK: The Internet of Distributed Biomanufacturing by Justin C. Sanchez
• Coordinating the U.S. Government Approach to the Bioeconomy by Sarah R. Carter
• Strengthening the U.S. Biomanufacturing Sector Through Standardization by Chris Stowers
• Accelerating Biomanufacturing and Producing Cost-Effective Amino Acids through a Grand Challenge by Allison Berke
• Project BOoST: A Biomanufacturing Test Facility Network for Bioprocess Optimization, Scaling, and Training by Ed Chung & Charles Fracchia
• Advancing the U.S. Bioindustrial Production Sector by Michael Fisher
• Accelerating Bioindustry Through Research, Innovation, and Translation by Jon Roberts

Bioeconomy x AI Policy Sprint

Artificial intelligence continues to develop exponentially; these recommendations can scale alongside AI and deliver substantial benefits:

• Develop a Screening Framework Guidance for AI-Enabled Automated Labs by Tessa Alexanian
• An Evidence-Based Approach to Identifying and Mitigating Biological Risks From AI-Enabled Biological Tools by Richard Moulange & Sophie Rose
• A Path to Self-governance of AI-Enabled Biology by Oliver Crook
• A Global Compute Cloud to Advance Safe Science and Innovation by Samuel Curtis
• Establish Collaboration Between Developers of Gene Synthesis Screening Tools and AI Tools Trained on Biological Data by Shrestha Rath
• Responsible and Secure AI in Production Agriculture by Jennifer Clarke

Additional Bioeconomy Research

Given the ongoing cost curve declines of compute, increased access to data, and growing interest in this emerging sector, FAS continues to investigate a range of related topics. Some recent work includes:

• Understanding the U.S. Bioeconomy: Agency Perspectives
• The U.S. Bioeconomy Needs Biomass, But What Is It and How Do We Use It?
• The Importance of Standards for the U.S. Bioeconomy & National Security: A Conversation with Congressman Jake Auchincloss
• Bold Goals Require Bold Funding Levels. The FY25 Requests for the U.S. Bioeconomy Fall Short
• Regulations, funding, and knowledge gaps: Challenges and opportunities in bringing agricultural biotechnology to market
• The U.S. Bioeconomy is Not Yet Sustainable. Here’s What Needs to Change.
• Implementing the Bioeconomy Executive Order: Lessons Learned and Future Considerations
• Wins, Gaps, & Looking Forward in the U.S. Bioeconomy
• “The US needs to lean into an old strength”: Maintaining Progress and Growing US Biomanufacturing

FAS will continue to work in this important area. Ongoing work related to the U.S. bioeconomy will be regularly updated here: https://fas.org/initiative/bioeconomy/

The United States Air Force has forward deployed about one-third of its B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia, or about half the B-2s considered fully operational at any given time. A Planet Labs satellite image taken earlier today shows six of the characteristic bombers on the apron alongside six refueling tankers.

A Planet Lab satellite image from earlier today shows six B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The current deployment of at least six B-2s to Diego Garcia is unusually large and exceeds the number of climate tents at the base designed to protect the sensitive surface of the bombers. The current deployment began a week ago.

US bombers regularly deploy on so-called Bomber Task Force missions to bases overseas or long-range exercise flights. That has included occasional B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia before (one in 2024 (hot pit refuel) and three in 2020), but the visits are rare and B-2s are designed to carry out global strike missions without having to deploy to forward locations. A B-2 strike against the Houthis in November 2024, for example, was flown directly from Whiteman AFB.

B-52 bombers have also deployed to Diego Garcia, including in 2024.

During 2024, U.S. bombers (B-1, B-2, and B-52) were deployed about 60 percent of the year to a theater or providing continental U.S. (CONUS) -to-CONUS flights in support of theaters or in support of U.S. Strategic Command and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to the U.S. Air Force.

During the past week the number of bombers visible at the base has fluctuated from none to two or four, indicating that the remaining bombers are either inside the climate tents or airborne on a training or perhaps bombing mission against Houthis forces. The U.S. Air Force operates a fleet of 20 B-2s. Of these, one is a test aircraft, and normally only 10-12 are considered fully operational with the rest undergoing repairs and routine maintenance. During the Spirit Vigilance exercise in April 2024, for example, the 509^th and 131^st bomber wings at Whiteman AFB in Missouri conducted a “mass fly-off” of all the operational B-2 bombers.

The B-2s deployed at Diego Garcia constitute about half of the operational B-2s, seen here in a “mass fly-off” exercise at Whiteman AFB in 2024.

That means about half of the entire operational B-2 force is currently forward deployed at Diego Garcia. The large deployment to Diego Garcia is part of evolving B-2 operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean that also involve more deployments to Australia.

The B-2 bombers are dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons include precision guided bombs and cruise missiles as well as heavy earth penetrators. Nuclear weapons include the B61-12 guided bombs and the B61-11 nuclear earth-penetrator (the B61-7 has been replaced by the B61-12 and the B83-1 is no longer operational). There are no nuclear weapons on this Diego Garcia mission.

Background: United States Nuclear Weapons, 2025

FAS is invested in seeing more students gain science and technology skills and enter STEM careers, both for students and for our country’s competitive advantage. In light of this, the FAS Talent Hub would like to highlight one former teacher working at the Department of Education, and the contributions he’s made.

Stephen Kostyo

Stephen Kostyo joined FAS as an Impact Fellow in January of 2023, and started his tour of service with the Department of Education later that year. Kostyo’s focus at the department has been developing and implementing efforts to prioritize a whole student approach through the Full-Service Community Schools (FSCS) and Promise Neighborhoods (PN) programs, ED’s primary place-based programs. Specifically, he has helped manage $241 million in annual appropriations across both programs supporting over 100 grantees.

While at the Department of Education, Kostyo helped create many resources for federal grant recipients like a fact sheet discussing FSCS collaboration opportunities with 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st CCLC), a data-driven reporting framework for FSCS grantees, guidance to support students in foster care, an evidence-based chronic absenteeism explainer, and hosted a 5-part “Blending and Braiding” webinar series on the use of federal, state, and local funds to implement whole child approaches to education. 

“Everyone I’ve met at the U.S. Department of Education is passionate, insightful, valuable, and hard-working. This has been the main take-away from my FAS Fellowship. Policies cannot be disconnected from the people who implement them. Leveraging the expertise of former educators, service coordinators, and community leaders empowers local schools to do what they know is best for all kids and families. We need these people in public service. 

I’ve been privileged to work alongside multiple teams at the Department to highlight schools that are making incredible impacts. Too often extraordinary leaders don’t have a megaphone or outlet to share the secrets to their success. So taking the time to lift up their work and its connections to Department-funded programs via webinars, resources, conferences, and site visits has been incredibly rewarding. It has allowed me to show off how community schools in California, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania are reducing chronic absenteeism, or how Promise Neighborhoods in Maryland, Indiana, and Texas are using their schools as hubs to co-locate essential student services like tutoring, nutrition, and health care. Ultimately, my colleagues and I have taken the tools of the Department to show that students across our country—in urban areas, rural areas, red states, and blue states—are thriving in public schools. By letting them and the people who support them share the challenges they have overcome, we’re helping replicate what works.”

A former middle and high school level math and science teacher, Kostyo views his time in service as a continuation of his work to improve public education. He’s written about the benefits of a community school approach and the need for better student data systems for FAS, how states can end corporal punishment in schools by implementing restorative discipline policies, and why extended-year timelines can improve high school graduation rates by reengaging students who experience unexpected challenges.  

Thank you, Stephen! Best wishes as you continue working on these vital efforts.

The Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) took place at the United Nations headquarters in New York City March 3-7. A large and diverse group of stakeholders convened, including 86 countries and over a thousand representatives from 163 civil society organizations. The week included rich discussions in plenary sessions and numerous side events hosted by state delegations and civil society groups. 

The treaty, which entered into force in 2021, is the first to place a full ban on the possession, use, or testing of nuclear weapons. With 73 states parties and 94 signatories, the treaty is now just one country shy of a global majority. A unique aspect of the treaty that sets it apart from other nuclear weapons agreements is its emphasis on humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and centering of affected community voices. The 3MSP, for example, was presided over by Kazakhstan, whose environment and citizens have been affected by Russian nuclear explosive tests.

The 3MSP took place at a time of increased geopolitical and historical significance. The final political declaration adopted at the conclusion of the week noted the increasing risk of nuclear war, with growing nuclear arsenals, modernization programs, and nuclear saber rattling around the world. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the first testing and use of nuclear weapons – and relatedly, FAS’s founding. 

Welcomed Advancements of the Past Year

Over the past year, the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons has experienced numerous wins that were celebrated at the Meeting of State Parties. New ratifications of the treaty by Indonesia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Solomon Islands brought the number of states parties to just one shy of a global majority. During the intersessional period, working groups established in the Vienna Action Plan and further strengthened at 2MSP continued work on universalization, establishing an international trust fund for research and medical compensation for affected communities, and creating verification measures for states to disarm.

Possibly the most well-earned achievement of the year came from Nihon Hidankyo, a Japanese organization of survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (known as “Hibakusha”), which won the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for advocating against nuclear weapons use through personal testimony. Nihon Hidankyo has long supported the TPNW, and several members were in attendance at the 3MSP to share their stories at side events, stand in solidarity with other affected communities, and support the treaty’s implementation.

Other United Nations actions this year worked towards a world free from nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly Resolution for a new scientific study on the consequences of nuclear war passed with 136 votes in favor, 3 against and 29 abstentions. The resolution’s call for researching climatic, environmental, and health consequences aligns with the TPNW’s focus on humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. The overwhelming majority of global states voting in favor of the resolution also indicated a motivation by non-nuclear states for a world without nuclear weapons. The UN Summit of the Future also reaffirmed the call for disarmament in its Pact for the Future.

Concerning Developments

In recent years, geopolitical tensions and disruptive technologies have heightened the risk of nuclear war. In January, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock closer to midnight; at 89 seconds, the clock is the closest it has ever been to the metaphorical apocalypse. Every single nuclear-armed state is advancing their nuclear forces in number or in capabilities.

The Trump administration has proposed new costly military programs like the Iron Dome missile defense system. The program could spur additional Chinese and Russia nuclear buildup as they ensure deterrence capabilities that are designed to outsmart the missile defense system. In addition, the administration’s seeming abandonment of allies have led to a call by some European and Asian state leaders to increase defense spending and consider the development of their own nuclear weapons.

In general, the global appetite for arms control and nonproliferation has decreased. There have been no clear moves to revitalize the New START treaty since Russia suspended its participation in 2023. U.S. efforts to engage in risk reduction talks with China have also not been successful as China is not convinced nuclear arms control is in their security interests. There does not appear to be any efforts between the United States and Russia to negotiate a follow-on treaty to New START, which expires in February 2026 and is the last remaining treaty constraining the deployed arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers. The past two Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conferences have failed to reach final consensus documents. Combined with the reduction in diplomatic efforts between nuclear states, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence create instability and an increased risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding that could lead to nuclear use.

States demonstrated their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in their military strategy through spending, rhetoric, and exercises in 2024. For example, ICAN’s Global Nuclear Weapons Spending report published in 2024 found that in 2023 the nine nuclear weapons states spent 91.4 billion on nuclear weapons, an increase of 13.4 % from the previous year, and projected that 2024 spending would surpass $100 billion.

3MSP Discussions and Decisions

The international trust fund for affected communities was a topic of much discussion at the Meeting. Communities in the Pacific island nations, Kazakhstan and the continental United States face many illnesses and health complications from radioactive fallout from explosive nuclear testing. From 1949 to 1989, the Soviet Union conducted about 456 nuclear tests near the Kazakh city of Semey, resulting in birth defects, a multitude of cancers, and immune disorders in generations of nearby residents. The United States, United Kingdom, and France conducted 318 tests across the Pacific, causing environmental damage, forcibly displacing communities, and health consequences. The United States conducted an additional 928 tests on the continental United states, irradiating residents across the West. The purpose of the international trust fund will be to fund community health studies related to nuclear weapons impacts that will inform humanitarian assistance subsequently provided by the fund. The working group in charge of planning and preparing the fund will also provide a report no later than four months before the first review conference of the TPNW on the technical provisions for the fund. 

The 3MSP decided that the first review conference for the Treaty will be held in New York City November 30–December 4, 2026 with South Africa presiding. Before then, states expect productive work again in the intersessional period. This will include work on the universalization of the treaty, led by Austria, New Zealand, and Uruguay; victim assistance and environmental remediation again led by Kazakhstan and Kiribati; and the creation of an international authority for verification led by Malaysia and the Philippines.

Representatives and allies of communities affected by uranium mining and milling expressed concerns that the TPNW preamble text which protects “the research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” is in contention with providing full nuclear justice and prevents trust fund compensation to all affected communities.

A working paper submitted by 44 civil society organizations expressed that nuclear technologies from “cradle to grave” impact public health and the environment. Noting that uranium mining and milling overwhelmingly occurs on indigenous lands, the groups advocated for the acknowledgement that all nuclear technologies, due to the requisite uranium resources, have the potential to cause contamination to environments and negative health consequences.

Both Marshall Islands official state and civil society representatives also called for structural changes within the treaty. The Marshall Islands, where the United States conducted over 33 nuclear explosive tests, are severely contaminated by radioactive fallout, resulting in high rates of health issues like cancers, birth defects, and immune disorders among the population and forced displacement of residents as the fallout relegated certain areas uninhabitable. The Marshall Islands support the efforts of the TPNW, but have not ratified the treaty. 

The delegation from the Marshall Islands argued that the language in Article 6 of the treaty does not adequately place burden on the United States for environmental remediation for nuclear testing. In his statement, the Marshallese Ambassador said the TPNW “wrongfully absolves responsibility for the consequences of nuclear weapons testing from those states which conducted the nuclear testing. And instead leaves us responsible to pay for billions of dollars of adjudicated impacts which we did not choose.” While states that support the treaty do stand in solidarity with each other, they do not have monolithic views about the correct implementation or structure.

Many of the working papers written by affected communities also call for the international trust fund to be open to non-state parties, which would increase engagement with the treaty and open opportunities for further compensation to impacted communities.

Numerous side events featured a coalition of affected communities in an impressive show of solidarity. For example, the Bikini Day Side Event: “Damage of Nuclear Weapons and Urgent Need for Relief – Nuclear Sufferers Speak,” featured Japanese and Korean Survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Pacific island communities affected by nuclear testing, Marshall Islanders, and Gilbertese representatives. While originally the term “hibakusha” translated in Japanese to bomb-affected people and referred specifically to survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this term has been widely shared with and adopted by other impacted communities. Regardless of whether it was Japanese bomb survivors or downwinders from tests before and after, both communities share the pain of a bomb dropping on their land. The solidarity and respect to all affected populations and generations demonstrates the dedication to a united front for a world without nuclear weapons. 

As 2025 is the 80th year since the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many of the original atomic bomb survivors have since passed. While many within the Hibakusha community worried that future generations would be too preoccupied with other issues like the economy and climate change to continue advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, there remains a strong and vibrant youth movement against the bomb that carries forward on the testimony of survivors. During the Youth for TPNW side event, youth delegates heard from a Hibakusha who was just 2 years old when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on her hometown of Nagasaki. She said, “today’s listeners are tomorrow’s storytellers.” 

Recent CNN reporting on the Trump administration’s firing of personnel handling Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sparks concern over the future of the FOIA system. This move by the administration puts a system that is already strained by lack of staff and funding at even further risk, and raises the question of whether other FOIA officers across the federal service are safe or if more will be fired in the coming days. 

Signed into law in 1967, the Freedom of Information Act is one of the crowning achievements of government transparency in the United States. It gives the public the right to request federal government records, representing decades of advocacy centered around the idea that a government should be transparent and accountable to its people. Under FOIA, any record from any federal agency is subject to being disclosed with the exceptions for national security, foreign policy, private, and legal proceedings. This provides journalists, researchers, civic society, and the wider public with valuable insights into how their government is executing its obligations. Since its creation, FOIA requests have been used to reveal information that exposes wasteful government spending, threats to public health and safety, excessive secrecy, and more. Based on the First Amendment’s fundamental freedom of the press, FOIA acknowledges the right to access government places and papers. 

Among the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE) ongoing purge of thousands of federal employees, members of OPM’s “privacy team,” as well as staff responsible for FOIA requests at OPM, have been fired, according to familiar sources who spoke with CNN. 

At FAS, our teams have used FOIA and declassification reviews for decades as a means of increasing transparency and holding the government accountable. This work has led to the declassification of the size and history of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the discovery of inadequate security at nuclear weapons storage sites. 

Steven Aftergood, former director of the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, is a long-term FOIA practitioner. In 1997, Aftergood was a plaintiff in a FOIA lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), resulting in the declassification of the CIA budget for the first time in 50 years. 

The current legislative design of FOIA “fails to balance supply and demand,” Aftergood said in a conversation with FAS staff about the recent firings at OPM, and how firing FOIA officers will further strain an already overburdened and under-resourced process. ”Requesters can easily generate high volumes of requests that overwhelm an agency’s ability to respond. Nor does Congress reliably provide the resources that are needed to meet the demand. Breakdowns and mutual frustration are the predictable result.”

FOIA requires that agencies reply with a determination to valid requests within 20 business days, but many agencies can’t keep up with requests. While FOIA applies to all agencies, each agency implements it differently. For example, according to the Government Accountability Office, total government backlogs of FOIA requests surpassed 200,000 in 2022.

“Some agencies respond to FOIA requests diligently and promptly. That has been my experience with the US Patent and Trademark Office, for example,” said Aftergood. “Some agencies barely comply with the law at all, allowing requests to linger for years or even a decade and more. The US Air Force is notorious in this respect.” 

In an era of such massive sweeps upending federal programs, increased transparency is even more important to provide the public with the knowledge necessary to respond and hold the government accountable. Now is the time to bolster and improve the FOIA process, not to fire those who are working–with already limited resources–to hold it together. In order to ensure the transparency of government actions required for a democratic society, Congress should reform FOIA, directing further funding to equip trained personnel with the resources they need. To assist in evaluating agency needs, the Project on Government Oversight suggests agencies include a line-item FOIA budget during the appropriation request process. 

For 58 years, FOIA has put power and knowledge directly in the hands of the people. Any erosion of transparency mechanisms such as FOIA–whether by direct abolishment or de-prioritization that leads to eventual decay–sets a concerning precedent. The Trump administration should reverse the firing of FOIA officers at OPM and allocate increased funding for FOIA personnel across the federal service.