In 2023, the U.S. bioeconomy generated 643,992 domestic jobs and contributed $210.4 billion to the U.S. GDP, establishing it as a significant economic force. This impact is largely due to its broad and diverse scope. While the U.S. bioeconomy does not have a consensus definition, nearly all versions of the definition include biotechnology as a central driver. Consequently, a wide range of industries are encompassed within the bioeconomy (Table 1). Previous administrations, including the previous Trump Administration, have championed and advanced biotechnology and biomanufacturing. The Biden Administration released the Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy (Bioeconomy EO) focused on expanding domestic biomanufacturing capacity, streamlining regulations for biotech products, and expanding market opportunities. With a new chapter ahead of us, the United States is presented with incredible challenges and opportunities in the face of China’s dominance in this space.

However, the broad scope of the U.S. bioeconomy also presents significant challenges. While there is general consensus on the types of industries relevant to the bioeconomy, there is no definitive agreement on which should be included or excluded, resulting in certain sectors within an industry being classified as part of the bioeconomy even if the industry as a whole is not. This lack of clarity creates confusion which could result in missed opportunities for ongoing development and support programs that these industries could benefit from. Furthermore, this ambiguity fosters the creation of artificial silos, hindering cross-sector communication and potentially causing a loss of valuable collaborative capabilities. This lack of clarity additionally complicates the measurement of the bioeconomy’s economic contributions, leaving valuable opportunities for growth and development underexplored due to an inability to identify sectors that require further investment.

The Bioeconomy EO made significant strides in understanding the U.S. bioeconomy, but substantial growth remains. A key lesson learned is the need for a common, consensus-based definition and lexicon to improve communication across sectors, as agencies like the DOD, USDA, and DOE often struggle to talk across sectors without a shared language. NIST’s Bioeconomy Lexicon, last updated in February 2025, remains incomplete, with important terms like continuous fermentation still undefined. Additionally, there is a growing need for standards and metrics, and continued investment in NIST’s initiatives, which are essential to build a unified strategy that maximizes the bioeconomy’s full potential.

Despite these difficulties, the U.S. bioeconomy continues to demonstrate resilience and growth, particularly as we enter the next technological revolution driven by advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, and sustainable development. This underscores the critical need for investment across all levels of the U.S. bioeconomy. By making strategic investments in the bioeconomy now, the U.S. can position itself to capitalize on future innovations and advancements, unlocking the projected growth potential, which is expected to reach $400 billion by 2030. Investment in the U.S. bioeconomy not only promotes economic growth but also yields broader benefits, like fostering job creation, driving development of new technologies that enhance the quality of life, providing resilience to long-term prosperity, and staking out significant competitive advantage at the global scale. Overall, the U.S. bioeconomy represents a powerful force with immense potential, one that must be recognized and leveraged further.

Investment in the Bioeconomy Drives Regional Development 

Given the vastness of the U.S. bioeconomy, a top-down approach alone will not be enough to drive the rapid growth needed for global competitiveness. A bottom-up approach, led by regional efforts, is essential for fostering growth and innovation across the country. Combining both approaches can boost the national GDP, stimulate regional economies, and create jobs. Regional programs like the EDA Tech Hubs, NSF Biofoundries, and U.S. Manufacturing Institutes like BioMADE and NIIMBL are already supporting localized bioeconomies, or micro-bioeconomies, tailored to specific resources and technologies.

While federal initiatives are important, it is equally important to assess their effectiveness. Understanding the return on investment from these programs is essential, not just for local micro-bioeconomies, but for their broader impact on the U.S. economy. For example, BioMADE has seen significant budget increases, including a $450 million boost in 2023, but its 2024 allocation of $75 million across 65 projects raises questions about fund distribution. As BioMADE supports more projects, further evaluation is needed to determine how effectively it is utilizing resources to advance U.S. biotechnology and biomanufacturing.

Ultimately, it will be essential for stakeholders in the U.S. bioeconomy to closely examine regional programs and assess their effectiveness. A comparative analysis of funding across different programs, agencies, and performance metrics will be necessary to ensure these investments are delivering tangible benefits and are aligned with broader bioeconomy goals. One key lesson from the Bioeconomy EO is that the U.S. must acknowledge that we can do more and that we have not yet done enough. The U.S. bioeconomy is still in its early stages, with significant room for growth and improvement. If the federal government and regional entities do not continue investing in this crucial sector, the nation will face serious economic, social, and global challenges in the future. Failing to act will only stifle progress and allow global competitors to surpass the U.S. in production, manufacturing, skill development, and resource acquisition. To ensure the U.S. bioeconomy thrives, sustained investment, decisive action, and a unified national and regional strategy are essential. 

What Areas of the U.S. Bioeconomy Still Need Development?

The bioeconomy EO focused on many different components of the bioeconomy to grow and foster, but despite the EO’s best efforts, not all areas have developed to the same degree. Several areas still require further development, investment, and strategy to safeguard and grow portions of the U.S. bioeconomy.

One important area is Supply Chain Resiliency. In March 2024, the USDA published a report aimed at creating a more resilient biomass supply chain, in accordance with the deliverable in section 5C of the bioeconomy EO. Biomass is an important component of the U.S. bioeconomy but the bioeconomy supply chain encompasses much more. Resiliency should extend to ensuring that all material and intellectual inputs and outputs in the U.S. bioeconomy are safeguarded against disruptions, such as those experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic, and built to last. The pandemic exemplified our reliance on products made outside of the U.S. to keep our biomanufacturing ecosystem functioning, such as the need for single-use plastics or specific biological inputs for vaccine production. In light of this, achieving true resilience requires building a flexible, global supply chain to ensure access to diverse biological resources and the ability to rapidly adapt to global market demands, rather than relying solely on a U.S.-centric model. Establishing stockpile agreements and treaties will be key to ensuring the bioeconomy’s supply chain can withstand unforeseen challenges.

Another important aspect is Bio-Based Product Procurement. The bioeconomy EO included several deliverables focused on bio-based procurement, such as identifying procurement challenges, producing annual fiscal reports, and creating new procurement programs within different agencies. However, despite the emphasis on these issues, little has been published beyond a USDA report that offers generic recommendations to address challenges. These recommendations, such as measuring the bioeconomy and coordinating carbon intensity labels, fail to address the real difficulties that have hindered bio-based procurement at the federal level.

Additionally, Workforce Development & Bioliteracy is crucial for the success of the U.S. bioeconomy. To fully capitalize on the potential of the bioeconomy, a skilled workforce is required. While the OSTP has released an action plan to boost the bioeconomy workforce, further investment and coordination are necessary to meet the bioeconomy’s needs. The U.S. manufacturing sector has been the backbone of the economy since the industrial revolution, and transitioning to biomanufacturing offers the opportunity to create new jobs and bring substantial economic growth to regions across the country. However, this shift requires significant workforce development reforms, including reassessing immigration policies to ensure that the best global talent is attracted to the U.S., further strengthening the economy.

Strategic Next Steps for the U.S. Bioeconomy and the New Administration

To strategically foster the growth of the U.S. bioeconomy and remain globally competitive, the new administration must not only prioritize the development of currently underdeveloped areas within the bioeconomy but also establish the foundational infrastructure necessary for long-term success. A crucial first step would be establishing a clear and adaptable definition of the U.S. bioeconomy. This would help not only in measuring its progress but also in defining which sectors and sub-sectors fall under its umbrella. 

Additionally, the administration should focus on regional development through the creation of micro-bioeconomies, which would diversify and strengthen the national bioeconomy. Implementing a bottom-up approach allows regions to tailor their strategies to local strengths, like existing industries, academic institutions, or workforce capacities, while aligning with broader federal priorities. This could involve reskilling and redeploying existing manufacturing capacity into biomanufacturing, leveraging local resources, talent, and infrastructure. These efforts would not only support economic growth and job creation at the regional level, but also enhance national resilience by decentralizing production and fostering innovation across the nation.

To support this regional strategy, the federal government must provide a comprehensive national framework based on clear goals and achievable metrics. For instance, a target such as increasing the production of bio-based products by 50% by 2050 for domestic consumption could help coordinate efforts across various agencies and set a clear path for growth. Furthermore, the federal government should focus on providing the necessary infrastructure for biotechnology and biomanufacturing development, not only physical infrastructure, such as processing facilities and biomanufacturing plants, but also intangible infrastructure like workforce development, talent enhancement, financial mechanisms, and intellectual property creation. The Trump administration could also lead in advancing bio-based material production and green chemical production through novel biotechnologies. These efforts would not only benefit American consumers by providing sustainable alternatives to essential products but would also strengthen national security and defense positions.
The Trump administration presents significant opportunities to advance the bioeconomy, but it must also carefully navigate the wide-ranging activities the sector encompasses. Policy changes, particularly cuts to funding for scientific research and development, could have unintended consequences that hinder progress. While some repealed executive orders may not have directly affected the sector, reductions in funding for science and education are likely to create ripple effects, such as a shortage of trained workers or disruptions in the supply chain, which could trigger cascading negative impacts. Therefore, thoughtful and strategic decision-making is crucial to ensuring the bioeconomy reaches its full potential.

While the U.S. has made significant advancements and remained a global leader in biotechnology over the past decade, the next four years will be critical in determining whether it can sustain that leadership. According to the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, China has prioritized biotechnology and, by extension, the bioeconomy for the past 20 years and is rapidly advancing toward dominance in the field unless the U.S. takes decisive action. Meanwhile, the Netherlands recently announced an investment of approximately €1.3 billion to expand its biotechnology sector, with the goal of becoming a global leader by 2040. This growing international investment signals rising global competition, and the U.S. must strengthen its bioeconomy to stay ahead. The Trump administration  does not need to start from scratch; it can build on the accomplishments of its first term and the progress made since.

The Clean Air Act. The Clean Water Act. The National Environmental Policy Act. These and most of our nation’s other foundational environmental laws were passed decades ago – and they have started to show their age. The Clean Air Act, for instance, was written to cut air pollution, not to drive the whole-of-economy response that the climate crisis now warrants. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 was designed to make cars more efficient in a pre-electric vehicle era, and now puts the Department of Transportation in the awkward position of setting fuel economy standards in an era when more and more cars don’t burn gas.

Trying to manage today’s problems with yesterday’s laws results in government by kludge. Legacy regulatory architecture has foundered under a patchwork of legislative amendments and administrative procedures designed to bridge the gap between past needs and present realities. Meanwhile, Congressional dysfunction has made purpose-built updates exceptionally difficult to land. The Inflation Reduction Act, for example, was mostly designed to move money rather than rethink foundational statutes or regulatory processes – because those rethinks couldn’t make it past the filibuster.

As the efficacy of environmental laws has waned, so has their durability. What was once a broadly shared goal – protecting Americans from environmental harm – is now a political football, with rules that whipsaw back and forth depending on who’s in charge. 

The second Trump Administration launched the biggest environmental deregulatory campaign in history against this backdrop. But that campaign, coupled with massive reductions in the federal civil service and a suite of landmark court decisions (including Loper Bright) about how federal agencies regulate, risks pushing U.S. regulatory architecture past the point of sensible and much-needed reform and into a state of complete disrepair.

Dismantling old systems has proven surprisingly easy. Building what comes next will be harder. And the work must begin now. 

It is time to articulate a long-term vision for a government that can actually deliver in an ever-more complex society. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is meeting this moment by launching an ambitious new project to reimagine the U.S. environmental regulatory state, drawing ideas from across ideological lines.

The Beginning of a New Era

Fear of the risks of systemic change often prevent people from entertaining change in earnest. Think of the years of U.S. squabbles over how or whether to reform permitting and environmental review, while other countries simply raced ahead to build clean energy projects and establish dominance in the new world economy. Systemic stagnation, however, comes with its own consequences. 

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) are a case in point when it comes to climate and the environment. Together, these two pieces of legislation represented the largest global investment in the promise of a healthier, more sustainable, and, yes, cheaper future. Unfortunately, as proponents of the “abundance” paradigm and others have observed, rollout was hampered by inefficient processes and outdated laws. Implementing the IRA and the IIJA via old systems, in short, was like trying to funnel an ocean through a garden hose – and as a result, most Americans experienced only a trickle of real-world impact.

Similar barriers are constraining state progress. For example, the way we govern and pay for electricity has not kept pace with a rapidly changing energy landscape – meaning that the United States risks ceding leadership on energy technologies critical to national security, economic competitiveness, and combating climate change.

But we are perhaps now entering a new era. The United States appears to be on the edge of real political realignments, with transpartisan stakes around the core role of government in economic development that do not match up neatly to current coalitions. This realignment presents a crucial opportunity to catalyze a new era of climate, environmental, and democratic progress.

FAS will leverage this opportunity by providing a forum for debate and engagement on different facets of climate and environmental governance, a platform to amplify insights, and the capacity to drive forward solutions. Examples of topics ripe for exploration include:

• Balancing agility and accountability. As observed, regulatory approaches of the past have struggled to address the interconnected, quickly evolving nature of climate and environmental challenges. At the same time, mechanisms for ensuring accountability have been disrupted by an evolving legal landscape and increasingly muscular executive. There is a need to imagine and test new systems designed to move quickly but responsibly on climate and environmental issues. 
• Complementing traditional regulation through novel strategies. There is growing interest in using novel financial, contractual, and other strategies as a complement to regulation for driving climate and environmental progress. There is considerable room to go deeper in this space, identifying both the power of these strategies and their limits. 
• Rethinking stakeholder engagement. The effectiveness of regulation depends on its ability to serve diverse stakeholder needs while advancing environmental goals. Public comment and other pipelines for engaging stakeholders and integrating external perspectives and expertise into regulations have been disrupted by technologies such as AI, while the relationship between regulated entities and their regulators has become increasingly adversarial. There is a need to examine synergies and tradeoffs between centering stakeholders and centering outcomes in regulatory processes, as well as examine how stakeholder engagement could be improved to better ensure regulations that are informed, feasible, durable, and distributively fair. 

In working through topics like these, FAS seeks to lay out a positive vision of regulatory reconstruction that is substantively superior to either haphazard destruction or incremental change. Our vision is nothing less than to usher in a new paradigm of climate and environmental governance: one that secures a livable world while reinforcing democratic stability, through systems that truly deliver for America. 

We will center our focus on the federal government given its important role in climate and environmental issues. However, states and localities do a lot of the work of a federated government day-to-day. We recognize that federal cures are unlikely to fully alleviate the symptoms that Americans are experiencing every day, from decaying infrastructure to housing shortages. We are committed to ensuring that solutions are appropriately matched to the root cause of state capacity problems and that federal climate and environmental regulatory regimes are designed to support successful cooperation with local governments and implementation partners. 

FAS is no stranger to ambitious endeavors like these. Since our founding in 1945, we have been committed to tackling the major science policy issues that reverberate through American life. This new FAS workstream will be embedded across our Climate and Environment, Clean Energy, and Government Capacity portfolios. We have already begun engaging and activating the diverse community of scholars, experts, and leaders laying the intellectual groundwork to develop compelling answers to urgent questions surrounding the climate regulatory state, against the backdrop of a broader state capacity movement. True to our nonpartisan commitment, we will build this work on a foundation of cross-ideological curiosity and play on the tension points in existing coalitions that strike us all as most productive.

We invite you to join us in conversation and collaboration. If you want to get involved, contact Zoë Brouns (zbrouns@fas.org).

Decision to Sunset IRS’ Direct File Previews Worse Taxpayer Experience in 2026

Yesterday, tens of thousands of taxpayers filed their returns using IRS Direct File, the agency’s new free, public, online tax filing service now in its second filing season. They joined hundreds of thousands who have used the service, and who have been nearly-unanimously thrilled to fulfill their tax obligations easily and directly. It seems we have finally done the impossible: make Tax Day anything but the most dreaded day of the year. At least we did.

Today, the Associated Press reported that the Treasury Department will discontinue the program. “Cutting costs and saving money for families were just empty campaign promises,” says Adam Ruben, a vice president at the Economic Security Project of the administration’s decision to end the program.

I was an original architect of Direct File from 2021 until just a few months ago, and got to see its impact on government and on taxpayers directly. Make no mistake: Direct File is a shining example of government capacity and government efficiency. By providing a critical government service for free, and helping taxpayers file more timely and more accurate returns, it is projected to eventually generate $11 billion in net savings for taxpayers every year. 

The dismantling of the program is not, at all, a step toward government efficiency. This is a move that will degrade our government services, incurring massive costs for people trying to file their taxes, further damaging the capacity of the nation’s revenue-collection agency, and making our institutions less robust and less capable.

It’s no secret: Americans do not love tax season.

The Direct File story started for me, personally, when I moved back to the U.S. after living in London for 9 years. I had already spent years working in digital services: I had built the first in-house digital team at the brand-new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2010, and then worked on multiple projects in London, culminating in helping the London Borough of Camden digitally transform its entire operations practically overnight during the pandemic. I moved back to the States and joined the US Digital Service to help rebuild after Covid, bringing the lessons I had learned from the UK. My first project at USDS was leading our efforts on Child Tax Credit expansion — ensuring that families across the country could access the enormous new child benefit that was created in the March 2021 American Rescue Plan.

But there was a problem: families naturally had to file a tax return to claim their tax credit. And I was pretty surprised to learn that our government still did not, in 2021, offer a free, online way to file your taxes directly with the government. Around the world, tax collection is seen as an inherent government function and, as such, tax filing is a service that the government offers free of charge. I thought we should too, especially if we were going to make such critical social supports contingent on it during a crisis. 

Instead, in the U.S., we relied on a confusing — and sometimes costly — mishmash of private offerings and support from non-profits designed to ensure most people could maybe, sort of, file a return for free if they needed to. It made the barrier to entry high, both in terms of trying to navigate how to simply file a return, nevermind to do so without cost. Tax filing, I thought, is a core function of government, and making it free and easy to use would cut through this waste and deliver for the American people.

I wasn’t the only one who thought this way. By 2021, a free public filing service was already the “white whale” of civic tech; everyone knew this was the critical government function to bring into a modern digital product, and yet it was too big, too daunting, too much of a change. Honestly, never in a million years did I think we would pull it off, either. The IRS, for all its genuine accomplishments in the face of constantly shrinking budgets and aging technology, had no real experience launching an enormous, high-stakes tech product designed to simplify the mind-numbing complexities of an American tax return. This was government capacity we would have to create.

But, we did. Since Direct File launched as a pilot in March 2023, hundreds of thousands of people have now filed their returns with it, to stunning results. In its pilot year, 86% of users said that Direct File increased their trust in the IRS. In its second year, it is winning awards and killing it with users, with a Net Promoter Score in the +80s, up from +74 last year (Apple’s, which is considered astronomically high, is +72). Direct File is a wildly successful government startup. Not only that, but the IRS now has its own in-house capacity to continue building awesome digital experiences — capacity that could have gone toward cost savings and experience improvements in all matter of IRS operations. This is all capacity, needless to say, that has gone away, all in the name of “efficiency.”

The impact for taxpayers from Direct File alone are, and would have been, enormous. In the U.S., the IRS estimates that it takes the average person over 9 hours and costs $160 to file your taxes each year. We even heard anecdotally from Direct File users who had paid thousands of dollars to do what Direct File does for free. There also remain millions of households who, every year, don’t file their returns at all, leaving sizable refunds on the table, because they can’t navigate the confusing tax filing “offers” advertising tax filing services. These households would have stood to finally access billions of dollars they leave unclaimed every year.

Not only are taxpayers saving these hundreds of dollars, they also feel newly empowered to interact with their government and take control of their tax situations. For decades, Americans have been told that they are not smart enough to do your own taxes; only highly-paid specialists that you have to pay for, can do it for you. Direct File stripped away the noise and showed taxpayers that filing can be simple and easy. The valuable trust this creates in government and public institutions is impossible to quantify.

Finally, there is the issue of data privacy and security. Taxpayers filing via private services must expose their most sensitive personal and financial information to third parties that monetize their data, sometimes illegally and without taxpayers’ consent. Without a public filing option, taxpayers are more or less required to sacrifice their privacy and the security of their data just to fulfill their filing obligations. Direct File gives taxpayers the option to protect their data and provide it straight to the tax agency, without a middleman.

All this — the in-house capacity to modernize the IRS, billions of dollars in cost savings, an empowered public — is what is cancelled today. But they have it exactly backwards. It’s a functional, high-quality government that’s efficient. The chaos they are sowing is anything but.

On Tuesday, 4/8/25, the bipartisan National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB) released their findings on how the U.S. can support and bolster the emerging bioeconomy sector. This sector, which includes biotechnology and biomanufacturing, is increasingly important to scientists working across disciplines – and will continue to shape the economic fortunes of regions across the country. 

FAS looks forward to dissecting, advancing, and advocating for the Commission’s report. FAS has been active and influential in this sector and has worked with various stakeholders and experts to advance evidence-based policy recommendations to boost the U.S. bioeconomy (more below). While the report provides an essential starting point to grow and secure our biotechnology and biomanufacturing enterprise, it will be important to advocate for the recommendations found within it, but also to add and refine recommendations to meet the ever evolving U.S. bioeconomy. 

FAS is especially enthusiastic about the recommendations that emphasize prioritizing and advancing biotechnology at the national level, ensuring the U.S. maintains its innovation edge. We also strongly support the recommendations aimed at scaling biotechnologies and biomanufacturing by fostering private sector growth and leveraging various financial mechanisms. These recommendations are crucial in addressing some of the most urgent challenges facing the U.S. bioeconomy and will serve as a vital step toward establishing a dynamic and adaptable national strategy for the sector. See our policy statement for more details.

Cautious and Enthusiastic Interest

While FAS is optimistic of the impact that this report can have, it is also important for FAS to be cautious around national security issues due to our 80 year old legacy. FAS began in response to how new technologies (nuclear) could be used for war (nuclear weapons). Today we remain watchful of technologies with the potential of misuse. FAS team members involved with national security take an understandably cautionary approach. The confluence of technology and access mean that there is risk associated with bio-products, too. “This opportunity must also be balanced with a clear-eyed understanding that increasing economic competition, heating geopolitics, and advancing life sciences capabilities may change how countries and other actors view the utility of globally repugnant capabilities such as biological weapons.” said Yong-Bee Lim, Associate Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists.

The report details the importance of safeguarding the biotechnology and biomanufacturing enterprise to remain competitive at the global scale, especially with China (recall the recent semiconductor shortages). However, “it’ll be important to balance both innovation capabilities and risk as we work towards ensuring that the U.S. bioeconomy is a priority area for both the Nation and for National Security.” said Nazish Jeffery, Bioeconomy Policy Manager at the Federation of American Scientists.

Bioeconomy Presents Significant Opportunities

Still, FAS continues advocating and promoting this area with great enthusiasm. The nascent bioeconomy is more than just leading edge biology meets computational gains. There are a myriad of scientific, economic, and social benefits to be had by leveraging this new industry.

No one at FAS knows this better than Nazish Jeffery, who spearheaded efforts to understand this moment. For more than two years she has worked with biologists, technologists, policymakers and biotechnology companies to investigate how the U.S. can maintain competitiveness while distributing economic rewards equitably domestically.

FAS sponsored policy sprints, which are open calls for participants in academia and industry to submit and develop actionable policy memos that address a particular issue or sector. The goal is to infuse diverse perspectives and expertise into policy that improves lives for all Americans. Since the start of the Commission’s investigations, FAS has sponsored policy sprints on topics such as the intersection of biology and artificial intelligence, as well as a sprint soliciting ideas to grow the bioeconomy sector itself. 

This emerging technology sector brought in $210 billion into the U.S. economy in 2023, and is projected to grow to $400 billion by 2030. The economic potential of the bioeconomy is significant; policymakers should promote and work in partnership with industry to continue development in distributed regions across the U.S. to invigorate innovation and enable job creation. This opportunity must also be balanced with a clear-eyed understanding that increasing economic competition, heating geopolitics, and advancing life sciences capabilities may change how countries and other actors view the utility of globally repugnant capabilities such as biological weapons.

FAS interviewed, worked with, or sought input from numerous academics, technologists, bio-industry leaders, elected representatives, and organizations, to understand the full spectrum of the value chain and push forward the best ideas.

FAS invites you to take a look at what possibilities lay ahead, presented below.

Bioeconomy Policy Sprint

The FAS Bioeconomy Sprint produced actionable policy memos to strengthen the bioeconomy in concert with outside expertise, including:

• A Matter of Trust: Helping the Bioeconomy Reach Its Full Potential with Translational Governance by Christopher Gilliespie
• BioNETWORK: The Internet of Distributed Biomanufacturing by Justin C. Sanchez
• Coordinating the U.S. Government Approach to the Bioeconomy by Sarah R. Carter
• Strengthening the U.S. Biomanufacturing Sector Through Standardization by Chris Stowers
• Accelerating Biomanufacturing and Producing Cost-Effective Amino Acids through a Grand Challenge by Allison Berke
• Project BOoST: A Biomanufacturing Test Facility Network for Bioprocess Optimization, Scaling, and Training by Ed Chung & Charles Fracchia
• Advancing the U.S. Bioindustrial Production Sector by Michael Fisher
• Accelerating Bioindustry Through Research, Innovation, and Translation by Jon Roberts

Bioeconomy x AI Policy Sprint

Artificial intelligence continues to develop exponentially; these recommendations can scale alongside AI and deliver substantial benefits:

• Develop a Screening Framework Guidance for AI-Enabled Automated Labs by Tessa Alexanian
• An Evidence-Based Approach to Identifying and Mitigating Biological Risks From AI-Enabled Biological Tools by Richard Moulange & Sophie Rose
• A Path to Self-governance of AI-Enabled Biology by Oliver Crook
• A Global Compute Cloud to Advance Safe Science and Innovation by Samuel Curtis
• Establish Collaboration Between Developers of Gene Synthesis Screening Tools and AI Tools Trained on Biological Data by Shrestha Rath
• Responsible and Secure AI in Production Agriculture by Jennifer Clarke

Additional Bioeconomy Research

Given the ongoing cost curve declines of compute, increased access to data, and growing interest in this emerging sector, FAS continues to investigate a range of related topics. Some recent work includes:

• Understanding the U.S. Bioeconomy: Agency Perspectives
• The U.S. Bioeconomy Needs Biomass, But What Is It and How Do We Use It?
• The Importance of Standards for the U.S. Bioeconomy & National Security: A Conversation with Congressman Jake Auchincloss
• Bold Goals Require Bold Funding Levels. The FY25 Requests for the U.S. Bioeconomy Fall Short
• Regulations, funding, and knowledge gaps: Challenges and opportunities in bringing agricultural biotechnology to market
• The U.S. Bioeconomy is Not Yet Sustainable. Here’s What Needs to Change.
• Implementing the Bioeconomy Executive Order: Lessons Learned and Future Considerations
• Wins, Gaps, & Looking Forward in the U.S. Bioeconomy
• “The US needs to lean into an old strength”: Maintaining Progress and Growing US Biomanufacturing

FAS will continue to work in this important area. Ongoing work related to the U.S. bioeconomy will be regularly updated here: https://fas.org/initiative/bioeconomy/

The United States Air Force has forward deployed about one-third of its B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia, or about half the B-2s considered fully operational at any given time. A Planet Labs satellite image taken earlier today shows six of the characteristic bombers on the apron alongside six refueling tankers.

A Planet Lab satellite image from earlier today shows six B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The current deployment of at least six B-2s to Diego Garcia is unusually large and exceeds the number of climate tents at the base designed to protect the sensitive surface of the bombers. The current deployment began a week ago.

US bombers regularly deploy on so-called Bomber Task Force missions to bases overseas or long-range exercise flights. That has included occasional B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia before (one in 2024 (hot pit refuel) and three in 2020), but the visits are rare and B-2s are designed to carry out global strike missions without having to deploy to forward locations. A B-2 strike against the Houthis in November 2024, for example, was flown directly from Whiteman AFB.

B-52 bombers have also deployed to Diego Garcia, including in 2024.

During 2024, U.S. bombers (B-1, B-2, and B-52) were deployed about 60 percent of the year to a theater or providing continental U.S. (CONUS) -to-CONUS flights in support of theaters or in support of U.S. Strategic Command and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to the U.S. Air Force.

During the past week the number of bombers visible at the base has fluctuated from none to two or four, indicating that the remaining bombers are either inside the climate tents or airborne on a training or perhaps bombing mission against Houthis forces. The U.S. Air Force operates a fleet of 20 B-2s. Of these, one is a test aircraft, and normally only 10-12 are considered fully operational with the rest undergoing repairs and routine maintenance. During the Spirit Vigilance exercise in April 2024, for example, the 509^th and 131^st bomber wings at Whiteman AFB in Missouri conducted a “mass fly-off” of all the operational B-2 bombers.

The B-2s deployed at Diego Garcia constitute about half of the operational B-2s, seen here in a “mass fly-off” exercise at Whiteman AFB in 2024.

That means about half of the entire operational B-2 force is currently forward deployed at Diego Garcia. The large deployment to Diego Garcia is part of evolving B-2 operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean that also involve more deployments to Australia.

The B-2 bombers are dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons include precision guided bombs and cruise missiles as well as heavy earth penetrators. Nuclear weapons include the B61-12 guided bombs and the B61-11 nuclear earth-penetrator (the B61-7 has been replaced by the B61-12 and the B83-1 is no longer operational). There are no nuclear weapons on this Diego Garcia mission.

---

Background: United States Nuclear Weapons, 2025

FAS is invested in seeing more students gain science and technology skills and enter STEM careers, both for students and for our country’s competitive advantage. In light of this, the FAS Talent Hub would like to highlight one former teacher working at the Department of Education, and the contributions he’s made.

Stephen Kostyo

Stephen Kostyo joined FAS as an Impact Fellow in January of 2023, and started his tour of service with the Department of Education later that year. Kostyo’s focus at the department has been developing and implementing efforts to prioritize a whole student approach through the Full-Service Community Schools (FSCS) and Promise Neighborhoods (PN) programs, ED’s primary place-based programs. Specifically, he has helped manage $241 million in annual appropriations across both programs supporting over 100 grantees.

While at the Department of Education, Kostyo helped create many resources for federal grant recipients like a fact sheet discussing FSCS collaboration opportunities with 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st CCLC), a data-driven reporting framework for FSCS grantees, guidance to support students in foster care, an evidence-based chronic absenteeism explainer, and hosted a 5-part “Blending and Braiding” webinar series on the use of federal, state, and local funds to implement whole child approaches to education. 

“Everyone I’ve met at the U.S. Department of Education is passionate, insightful, valuable, and hard-working. This has been the main take-away from my FAS Fellowship. Policies cannot be disconnected from the people who implement them. Leveraging the expertise of former educators, service coordinators, and community leaders empowers local schools to do what they know is best for all kids and families. We need these people in public service. 

I’ve been privileged to work alongside multiple teams at the Department to highlight schools that are making incredible impacts. Too often extraordinary leaders don’t have a megaphone or outlet to share the secrets to their success. So taking the time to lift up their work and its connections to Department-funded programs via webinars, resources, conferences, and site visits has been incredibly rewarding. It has allowed me to show off how community schools in California, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania are reducing chronic absenteeism, or how Promise Neighborhoods in Maryland, Indiana, and Texas are using their schools as hubs to co-locate essential student services like tutoring, nutrition, and health care. Ultimately, my colleagues and I have taken the tools of the Department to show that students across our country—in urban areas, rural areas, red states, and blue states—are thriving in public schools. By letting them and the people who support them share the challenges they have overcome, we’re helping replicate what works.”

A former middle and high school level math and science teacher, Kostyo views his time in service as a continuation of his work to improve public education. He’s written about the benefits of a community school approach and the need for better student data systems for FAS, how states can end corporal punishment in schools by implementing restorative discipline policies, and why extended-year timelines can improve high school graduation rates by reengaging students who experience unexpected challenges.  

Thank you, Stephen! Best wishes as you continue working on these vital efforts.

The Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) took place at the United Nations headquarters in New York City March 3-7. A large and diverse group of stakeholders convened, including 86 countries and over a thousand representatives from 163 civil society organizations. The week included rich discussions in plenary sessions and numerous side events hosted by state delegations and civil society groups. 

The treaty, which entered into force in 2021, is the first to place a full ban on the possession, use, or testing of nuclear weapons. With 73 states parties and 94 signatories, the treaty is now just one country shy of a global majority. A unique aspect of the treaty that sets it apart from other nuclear weapons agreements is its emphasis on humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and centering of affected community voices. The 3MSP, for example, was presided over by Kazakhstan, whose environment and citizens have been affected by Russian nuclear explosive tests.

The 3MSP took place at a time of increased geopolitical and historical significance. The final political declaration adopted at the conclusion of the week noted the increasing risk of nuclear war, with growing nuclear arsenals, modernization programs, and nuclear saber rattling around the world. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the first testing and use of nuclear weapons – and relatedly, FAS’s founding. 

Welcomed Advancements of the Past Year

Over the past year, the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons has experienced numerous wins that were celebrated at the Meeting of State Parties. New ratifications of the treaty by Indonesia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Solomon Islands brought the number of states parties to just one shy of a global majority. During the intersessional period, working groups established in the Vienna Action Plan and further strengthened at 2MSP continued work on universalization, establishing an international trust fund for research and medical compensation for affected communities, and creating verification measures for states to disarm.

Possibly the most well-earned achievement of the year came from Nihon Hidankyo, a Japanese organization of survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (known as “Hibakusha”), which won the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for advocating against nuclear weapons use through personal testimony. Nihon Hidankyo has long supported the TPNW, and several members were in attendance at the 3MSP to share their stories at side events, stand in solidarity with other affected communities, and support the treaty’s implementation.

Other United Nations actions this year worked towards a world free from nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly Resolution for a new scientific study on the consequences of nuclear war passed with 136 votes in favor, 3 against and 29 abstentions. The resolution’s call for researching climatic, environmental, and health consequences aligns with the TPNW’s focus on humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. The overwhelming majority of global states voting in favor of the resolution also indicated a motivation by non-nuclear states for a world without nuclear weapons. The UN Summit of the Future also reaffirmed the call for disarmament in its Pact for the Future.

Concerning Developments

In recent years, geopolitical tensions and disruptive technologies have heightened the risk of nuclear war. In January, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock closer to midnight; at 89 seconds, the clock is the closest it has ever been to the metaphorical apocalypse. Every single nuclear-armed state is advancing their nuclear forces in number or in capabilities.

The Trump administration has proposed new costly military programs like the Iron Dome missile defense system. The program could spur additional Chinese and Russia nuclear buildup as they ensure deterrence capabilities that are designed to outsmart the missile defense system. In addition, the administration’s seeming abandonment of allies have led to a call by some European and Asian state leaders to increase defense spending and consider the development of their own nuclear weapons.

In general, the global appetite for arms control and nonproliferation has decreased. There have been no clear moves to revitalize the New START treaty since Russia suspended its participation in 2023. U.S. efforts to engage in risk reduction talks with China have also not been successful as China is not convinced nuclear arms control is in their security interests. There does not appear to be any efforts between the United States and Russia to negotiate a follow-on treaty to New START, which expires in February 2026 and is the last remaining treaty constraining the deployed arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers. The past two Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conferences have failed to reach final consensus documents. Combined with the reduction in diplomatic efforts between nuclear states, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence create instability and an increased risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding that could lead to nuclear use.

States demonstrated their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in their military strategy through spending, rhetoric, and exercises in 2024. For example, ICAN’s Global Nuclear Weapons Spending report published in 2024 found that in 2023 the nine nuclear weapons states spent 91.4 billion on nuclear weapons, an increase of 13.4 % from the previous year, and projected that 2024 spending would surpass $100 billion.

3MSP Discussions and Decisions

The international trust fund for affected communities was a topic of much discussion at the Meeting. Communities in the Pacific island nations, Kazakhstan and the continental United States face many illnesses and health complications from radioactive fallout from explosive nuclear testing. From 1949 to 1989, the Soviet Union conducted about 456 nuclear tests near the Kazakh city of Semey, resulting in birth defects, a multitude of cancers, and immune disorders in generations of nearby residents. The United States, United Kingdom, and France conducted 318 tests across the Pacific, causing environmental damage, forcibly displacing communities, and health consequences. The United States conducted an additional 928 tests on the continental United states, irradiating residents across the West. The purpose of the international trust fund will be to fund community health studies related to nuclear weapons impacts that will inform humanitarian assistance subsequently provided by the fund. The working group in charge of planning and preparing the fund will also provide a report no later than four months before the first review conference of the TPNW on the technical provisions for the fund. 

The 3MSP decided that the first review conference for the Treaty will be held in New York City November 30–December 4, 2026 with South Africa presiding. Before then, states expect productive work again in the intersessional period. This will include work on the universalization of the treaty, led by Austria, New Zealand, and Uruguay; victim assistance and environmental remediation again led by Kazakhstan and Kiribati; and the creation of an international authority for verification led by Malaysia and the Philippines.

Representatives and allies of communities affected by uranium mining and milling expressed concerns that the TPNW preamble text which protects “the research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” is in contention with providing full nuclear justice and prevents trust fund compensation to all affected communities.

A working paper submitted by 44 civil society organizations expressed that nuclear technologies from “cradle to grave” impact public health and the environment. Noting that uranium mining and milling overwhelmingly occurs on indigenous lands, the groups advocated for the acknowledgement that all nuclear technologies, due to the requisite uranium resources, have the potential to cause contamination to environments and negative health consequences.

Both Marshall Islands official state and civil society representatives also called for structural changes within the treaty. The Marshall Islands, where the United States conducted over 33 nuclear explosive tests, are severely contaminated by radioactive fallout, resulting in high rates of health issues like cancers, birth defects, and immune disorders among the population and forced displacement of residents as the fallout relegated certain areas uninhabitable. The Marshall Islands support the efforts of the TPNW, but have not ratified the treaty. 

The delegation from the Marshall Islands argued that the language in Article 6 of the treaty does not adequately place burden on the United States for environmental remediation for nuclear testing. In his statement, the Marshallese Ambassador said the TPNW “wrongfully absolves responsibility for the consequences of nuclear weapons testing from those states which conducted the nuclear testing. And instead leaves us responsible to pay for billions of dollars of adjudicated impacts which we did not choose.” While states that support the treaty do stand in solidarity with each other, they do not have monolithic views about the correct implementation or structure.

Many of the working papers written by affected communities also call for the international trust fund to be open to non-state parties, which would increase engagement with the treaty and open opportunities for further compensation to impacted communities.

Numerous side events featured a coalition of affected communities in an impressive show of solidarity. For example, the Bikini Day Side Event: “Damage of Nuclear Weapons and Urgent Need for Relief – Nuclear Sufferers Speak,” featured Japanese and Korean Survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Pacific island communities affected by nuclear testing, Marshall Islanders, and Gilbertese representatives. While originally the term “hibakusha” translated in Japanese to bomb-affected people and referred specifically to survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this term has been widely shared with and adopted by other impacted communities. Regardless of whether it was Japanese bomb survivors or downwinders from tests before and after, both communities share the pain of a bomb dropping on their land. The solidarity and respect to all affected populations and generations demonstrates the dedication to a united front for a world without nuclear weapons. 

As 2025 is the 80th year since the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many of the original atomic bomb survivors have since passed. While many within the Hibakusha community worried that future generations would be too preoccupied with other issues like the economy and climate change to continue advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, there remains a strong and vibrant youth movement against the bomb that carries forward on the testimony of survivors. During the Youth for TPNW side event, youth delegates heard from a Hibakusha who was just 2 years old when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on her hometown of Nagasaki. She said, “today’s listeners are tomorrow’s storytellers.” 

Recent CNN reporting on the Trump administration’s firing of personnel handling Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sparks concern over the future of the FOIA system. This move by the administration puts a system that is already strained by lack of staff and funding at even further risk, and raises the question of whether other FOIA officers across the federal service are safe or if more will be fired in the coming days. 

Signed into law in 1967, the Freedom of Information Act is one of the crowning achievements of government transparency in the United States. It gives the public the right to request federal government records, representing decades of advocacy centered around the idea that a government should be transparent and accountable to its people. Under FOIA, any record from any federal agency is subject to being disclosed with the exceptions for national security, foreign policy, private, and legal proceedings. This provides journalists, researchers, civic society, and the wider public with valuable insights into how their government is executing its obligations. Since its creation, FOIA requests have been used to reveal information that exposes wasteful government spending, threats to public health and safety, excessive secrecy, and more. Based on the First Amendment’s fundamental freedom of the press, FOIA acknowledges the right to access government places and papers. 

Among the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE) ongoing purge of thousands of federal employees, members of OPM’s “privacy team,” as well as staff responsible for FOIA requests at OPM, have been fired, according to familiar sources who spoke with CNN. 

At FAS, our teams have used FOIA and declassification reviews for decades as a means of increasing transparency and holding the government accountable. This work has led to the declassification of the size and history of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the discovery of inadequate security at nuclear weapons storage sites. 

Steven Aftergood, former director of the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, is a long-term FOIA practitioner. In 1997, Aftergood was a plaintiff in a FOIA lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), resulting in the declassification of the CIA budget for the first time in 50 years. 

The current legislative design of FOIA “fails to balance supply and demand,” Aftergood said in a conversation with FAS staff about the recent firings at OPM, and how firing FOIA officers will further strain an already overburdened and under-resourced process. ”Requesters can easily generate high volumes of requests that overwhelm an agency’s ability to respond. Nor does Congress reliably provide the resources that are needed to meet the demand. Breakdowns and mutual frustration are the predictable result.”

FOIA requires that agencies reply with a determination to valid requests within 20 business days, but many agencies can’t keep up with requests. While FOIA applies to all agencies, each agency implements it differently. For example, according to the Government Accountability Office, total government backlogs of FOIA requests surpassed 200,000 in 2022.

“Some agencies respond to FOIA requests diligently and promptly. That has been my experience with the US Patent and Trademark Office, for example,” said Aftergood. “Some agencies barely comply with the law at all, allowing requests to linger for years or even a decade and more. The US Air Force is notorious in this respect.” 

In an era of such massive sweeps upending federal programs, increased transparency is even more important to provide the public with the knowledge necessary to respond and hold the government accountable. Now is the time to bolster and improve the FOIA process, not to fire those who are working–with already limited resources–to hold it together. In order to ensure the transparency of government actions required for a democratic society, Congress should reform FOIA, directing further funding to equip trained personnel with the resources they need. To assist in evaluating agency needs, the Project on Government Oversight suggests agencies include a line-item FOIA budget during the appropriation request process. 

For 58 years, FOIA has put power and knowledge directly in the hands of the people. Any erosion of transparency mechanisms such as FOIA–whether by direct abolishment or de-prioritization that leads to eventual decay–sets a concerning precedent. The Trump administration should reverse the firing of FOIA officers at OPM and allocate increased funding for FOIA personnel across the federal service.

The federal government’s approach to deploying AI systems is a defining force in shaping industry standards, academic research, and public perception of these technologies. Public sentiment toward AI remains mixed, with many Americans expressing a lack of trust in AI systems. To fully harness the benefits of AI, the public must have confidence that these systems are deployed responsibly and enhance their lives and livelihoods.

The first Trump Administration’s AI policies clearly recognized the opportunity to promote AI adoption through transparency and public trust. President Trump’s Executive Order 13859 explicitly stated that agencies must design, develop, acquire, and use “AI in a manner that fosters public trust and confidence while protecting privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and American values.” This commitment laid the foundation for increasing government accountability in AI use.

A major step in this direction was the AI Use Case Inventory, established under President Trump’s Executive Order 13960 and later codified in the 2023 Advancing American AI Act. The agency inventories have since become a crucial tool in fostering public trust and innovation in government AI use. Recent OMB guidance (M-24-10) has expanded its scope, standardizing AI definitions, and collecting information on potential adverse impacts. The detailed inventory enhances accountability by ensuring transparency in AI deployments, tracks AI successes and risks to improve government services, and supports AI vendors by providing visibility into public-sector AI needs, thereby driving industry innovation.

The end of 2024 marked a major leap in government transparency regarding AI use. Agency reporting on AI systems saw dramatic improvements, with federal AI inventories capturing more than 1,700 AI use cases —a 200% increase in reported use cases from the previous year. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) alone reported 158 active AI use cases. Of these, 29 were identified as high-risk, with detailed documentation on how 24 of those use cases are mitigating potential risks. This level of disclosure is essential for maintaining public trust and ensuring responsible AI deployment.

OMB is set to release revisions to its AI guidance (M-24-10) in mid-March, presenting an opportunity to ensure that transparency remains a top priority.

To support continued transparency and accountability in government AI use, the Federation of American Scientists has written a letter urging OMB to maintain its detailed guidance on AI inventories. We believe that sustained transparency is crucial to ensuring responsible AI governance, fostering public trust, and enabling industry innovation.

Between 2006 and 2015, the United Kingdom repeatedly and publicly announced its intentions to decrease the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile, most recently committing to at most 180 weapons by the mid-2020s. As the years went by, non-government policy experts and nuke watchers assumed that the UK Government was making good on its word and that the UK nuclear arsenal would continue to gradually reduce. In reality, the United Kingdom is thought to have maintained a nuclear stockpile of approximately 225 weapons, and, in a surprise move in 2021, the United Kingdom declared that it would extend the ceiling of its “overall nuclear weapon stockpile” to no more than 260 weapons. This constituted an abrupt about-face from its previous commitments and trajectory. 

However, the infrastructure underpinning the sustainability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons and their modernization has experienced significant budgetary and scheduling challenges. Furthermore, the UK has dramatically reduced the public transparency of its nuclear forces, making it increasingly difficult to understand and debate the true scope of these challenges.

The UK’s Nuclear Warhead Modernization

Announced in 2005, the Atomic Weapons Establishment’s (AWE) Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP) was an initiative to deliver infrastructure and technology to sustain the United Kingdom’s current stockpile and underpin its warhead replacement program. Each of these main infrastructure and technology projects is named after a constellation: Project Orion for a high-power research laser that began operations in 2013, Project Leo for a small parts manufacturing facility, Project Pegasus for the manufacturing of uranium components effort, and so on. Several of these projects under the NWCSP related to techniques used for nuclear weapons development in place of explosive testing. Part of the NWCSP mission also involved refurbishing the United Kingdom’s current warheads for integration with the U.S.-supplied, upgraded Mk4A aeroshell, which was completed in 2023. The NWCSP was scheduled to run from April 2008 until April 2025 and was removed from the MOD Government Major Projects Portfolio data starting in 2022, indicating it could have been downsized from a large-scale development initiative.

In February 2020, the UK defence secretary announced a new warhead program—the A21/Mk7/ Astraea. This new warhead is currently in the concept stage but is planned to eventually replace the Mk4A/Holbrook beginning in the late 2030s. As was the case with the previous version, the A21/Mk7 Astraea design and production will have a “very close connection” to the future US W93/Mk7.

In 2023, the MOD confirmed that £127 million had been spent on the A21 Astraea warhead replacement program as of March 2022. The total cost of the replacement program has not been released, given it is still in the early stages. However, even if cumulative costs are released, individual costs associated with the warhead modernization program will be challenging to identify due to changes in UK budgetary reporting practices. In 2023, nuclear-related programs and expenditures—including the AWE and the NWCSP—were compiled into one heading under Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), which appears as a single line item in the departmental estimates. This makes it impossible to see the direct in-service costs associated with the individual programs. DNE funding was also “ringfenced” within the MOD budget to protect it against spending cuts. 

The UK’s declaration that its stockpile ceiling will be raised to 260 raises several questions. In the early- to mid-2000s, the United Kingdom possessed a stockpile of roughly 280 warheads, but in 2010 announced it would reduce this level to “no more than 225 warheads.” To be able to increase this level to up to 260 warheads, as announced by the UK government in 2021, it seems some of the retired warheads—or components from them—must have been retained in some form. The United Kingdom appears to use the term “stockpile” to describe operational, deployed, and retired weapons. The timeline for potentially increasing the stockpile to up to 260 is not known, but if it is a relatively short timeline, it would seem to require reconstituting some retired warheads. If it is a longer timeline, it could potentially involve increasing the number of A21 Astraea warheads in the future. Of the “no more than 225” warhead stockpile level, the United Kingdom has previously explained that 120 warheads would be operationally available, of which 40 would be deployed on the single ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) on patrol at all times. The reason for increasing the stockpile to up to 260 warheads appears to be derived from an interest in increasing the number of “operationally available” warheads to be able to deploy a full warhead load on the SSBN fleet—something the recent warhead level did not allow.

Critical Infrastructure 

Any warhead design, manufacturing, and testing occurs at the AWE site at Aldermaston while the warheads are assembled, maintained, and decommissioned at AWE Burghfield. These two sites are critical to maintaining the United Kingdom’s existing stockpile and will play a significant role in the new warhead replacement program. 

Upgrades at AWE Burghfield

Project MENSA—one of the infrastructure programs under the NWCSP—aims to consolidate existing nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly operations into a single building located in the center of the AWE Burghfield complex called the Main Processing Facility (MPF). MENSA will replace the existing Gravel Gertie bunkers used for warhead assembly and disassembly on the eastern part of the campus, which are designed to collapse inward in the event of an explosion. Other new infrastructure for this project includes a support building and 16 lightning protector towers to accompany the MPF, as well as an associated plant building, gatehouses, vehicle inspection bays, substation buildings, security fences, access roads, and Sustainable Drainage System (SuDS) infrastructure.

Project MENSA’s completion has been delayed by more than seven years, and its expected cost is £1.36 billion over its original total budget of £0.8 billion. Construction progress at the site can be observed through satellite imagery and should be nearing completion of construction according to the MoD’s 2024 Major Project Portfolio data. 

Upgrades at AWE Aldermaston

AWE Aldermaston, where warhead design, development, manufacturing, assembly, and testing occur, is also undergoing significant upgrades and revitalization. In 2024, AWE announced two new infrastructure programs—the Future Infrastructure Programme (FIP) for general infrastructure and the Future Materials Campus (FMC) for nuclear material manufacturing and storage—to consolidate existing programs and invest in new ones to increase capacity for maintaining, manufacturing, and storing nuclear weapons. The procurement process for these multi-year, multi-billion pound projects began on April 22 and December 12, 2024, respectively. The FMC, in particular, will be a collection of facilities, including nuclear science and technology centers and laboratories, to be built at AWE Aldermaston. This program will replace two major projects that initially fell under the NWCSP—Project Pegasus and Project Aurora. 

Project Pegasus was described as a new enriched uranium storage and manufacturing facility at AWE Aldermaston that would replace the existing enriched uranium handling facility located at the A45 building. Work began in 2003, and the original projected service date was 2016. The approved cost was originally £634 million before it skyrocketed to £1.7 billion. After a six-year delay and a three-year pause, construction of the new storage facility began, and the manufacturing facility was scheduled to be finished by 2030. The severe delays were mainly due to challenges with the supply chain environment and an “overly complex technical solution” that resulted in additional construction and safety costs and a “reassessment” of the project design and requirements. 

The UK government was also in the early design phase of Project Aurora, an infrastructure project for a new plutonium manufacturing facility that would replace the current A90 building at AWE Aldermaston. This program was experiencing delays due to resourcing problems, supply chain shortages, and high-skilled workforce challenges. Project Aurora was removed from the NWCSP and added as an independent program to the MOD’s Major Projects Portfolio in 2022. Projects Aurora and Pegasus were both removed from the 2024 version of the MOD’s Major Projects Portfolio database, likely due to their absorption into the new FMC program.

The other central element of NWCSP is the delivery of a new hydrodynamics facility. In 2010, the United Kingdom and France signed the Teutates Treaty, which allowed for cooperation on warhead physics research between the two nations. From this agreement, the EPURE radiographic facility was built at Valduc in France, and a joint UK-France Technology Development Centre was established at Aldermaston. These facilities will support hydrodynamic research that will allow the study of the effects of aging and manufacturing processes on nuclear warheads without nuclear explosive testing. Because of the Teutates program, the UK’s original plans for a ‘Project Hydrus’ hydrodynamics facility were canceled. 

Outstanding Challenges 

The facilities described above are deemed crucial to the United Kingdom’s effort to modernize and refurbish its nuclear deterrent. However, the significant delays and cost overruns have elicited criticism from the public and concern from government authorities over the years. In August 2024, the House of Commons reported a spending deficit on nuclear programs across the Defence Equipment Plan. Over the next ten years (2023 to 2033), costs are forecasted at £117.8 billion, of which only £109.8 billion had been budgeted for when the report was released. 

Alongside these warhead development and infrastructure programs, the United Kingdom is also replacing its four SSBNs with the new Dreadnaught class, the first of which is expected to enter service in the early 2030s. This modernization has also been plagued by cost increases and threatens to be delayed, given maintenance issues with the existing fleet.

Moreover, the recent decrease in UK government transparency regarding the status of its nuclear arsenal and modernization program reflects a worrisome global trend. The United Kingdom has not publicly declared the approximate size of its stockpile since 2010, following the Obama Administration’s decision to release its stockpile number. In 2021, the MOD referred to the 2010 announcement again but did not explicitly say what the stockpile number was. Moreover, it said it would “no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers.”

Additionally, the MOD said in 2023 that it was withholding information on planned in-service dates for many of the above-referenced projects for “reasons of national security” and did not release this information in its 2022, 2023, and 2024 Major Projects Portfolio data. Finally, the MOD has published an annual update to Parliament since 2011 on the progress of nuclear weapons upgrades, but there has been no report published for 2023 or 2024.

While some of this backsliding is likely rooted in concerns about public perception of persistent programmatic delays, the overall picture raises concerns about a pattern of declining transparency and reduced public ability to monitor and hold the UK government accountable for its nuclear weapons program. 

President Trump is moving quickly to push U.S. allies to invest even more in their own defense. NATO allies have already committed to spend 3% of their GDP on defense, yet the U.S. is now calling for them to spend at least 5%. It is likely that U.S. allies in East Asia will soon face similar calls to do more. Greater investments in conventional capabilities make a lot of sense. However, there are some U.S. policy experts, officials and academics calling for more U.S. allies to go nuclear to reduce U.S. defense requirements. These calls are dangerously misguided and ignore the threat any proliferation – including by U.S. allies – poses to American security interests. They must be rejected wholesale by the Trump Administration.  

One of the most enduring successes of U.S. national security policy has been its effort to limit the number of states with nuclear weapons. Predictions that dozens of countries might possess nuclear weapons did not materialize because of concerted U.S. actions. The risks include the reality that U.S. allies can and often do experience internal instability or even regime collapse, that any state with nuclear weapons creates a risk that those materials or knowhow can be stolen or diverted, that any state with nuclear weapon in a crisis might actually use those weapons, and lastly the reality that states with their nuclear weapons are less susceptible open to U.S. influence. There may be reasons why a state may want to go nuclear from their own perspective but there are few if any lasting benefits to American security that comes from proliferation to friends and allies.

Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons, but perhaps 40 additional states are technically advanced enough to build nuclear weapons if they chose to do so. Many of these states are U.S. allies or partners, including in Europe as well as Japan, South Korea, and even the island of Taiwan. That these states never went nuclear (although some tried) is due to a combination of factors, including the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to their security, the pressure America brought to bear when these states indicated a potential interest in building independent nuclear arsenals, and the recognition that if the world was serious about getting rid of all nuclear weapons then their spread was a step in the wrong direction.

The re-election of Donald Trump has understandably spooked many U.S. allies, renewing doubts that America will come to their aid. The growth of China’s military and economic power relative to the United States is adding to these concerns. More allies are asking now, just as they did during the Cold War if America would really risk Boston to protect Berlin, or Seattle to protect Seoul. As this question festers and as America’s relative power over China and other states ebbs, the lure to encourage U.S. friends to develop nuclear weapons of their own to deter or defeat an attack will grow. After all, the theory goes, why should the United States worry if its friends go nuclear?

In the real world, however, the spread of nuclear weapons anywhere complicates and undermines U.S. security. One reason is states are not always stable. In the 1970s, the U.S. supported its Treaty partner Iran acquiring nuclear reactors and advanced technology but in 1979, that regime was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution. Pakistan went nuclear when the U.S. needed its help fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and has faced wave after wave of instability and crisis. And South Korea is a more recent challenge. For the last few decades, South Korea was considered a stable and vibrant democracy – even hosting a Summit for Democracy last year. Under President Yoon, South Korea has voiced increasing interest in an independent nuclear arsenal. And just last year, a former Trump official, Elbridge Colby, expected to serve in a senior policy role at the Pentagon publicly encouraged South Korea to build their own nuclear weapons to deter North Korea and enable the U.S. to focus more on China. The situation in South Korea, with an impeached President and no clear sense of who controls the country’s military, would be a lot more dangerous if Seoul had nuclear weapons. 

This is not just an issue for newer nuclear weapons states. Prior to the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, a coup created confusion for days over exactly who had the ability to control Soviet nuclear weapons.  Following the USSR’s demise, nuclear weapons and materials remained at risk of theft and diversion for years and required massive U.S. efforts and investments to prevent their loss. And even the United States is not immune from these risks. The 2021 insurrection raised nuclear risk to the point that the Speaker of the House had to publicly ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs about the risk that President Trump might use nuclear weapons in a gambit to remain in power, and Chairman Milley took extraordinary steps to insert himself into the nuclear chain of command to preempt that risk. Any nuclear arsenal anywhere is a potential danger if political circumstances change.

And states with nuclear weapons create a nuclear risk if nuclear technology, materials and knowhow are stolen or diverted. Five of today’s nuclear weapon states – America, Russia, China, France, and Pakistan – have either knowingly or unwittingly helped other states go nuclear.  Even if theft or transfer were not an issue, when new states have gone nuclear in the past, others have followed. America’s nuclear success led the Soviet Union to build them as well. This in turn led the UK and France to follow suit. These four nuclear weapon programs fueled China’s desire to join the club. Beijing having the bomb drove India to do the same, which then led Pakistan to follow suit.  

And any nuclear state might decide one day to use those weapons. Every nuclear leader must get every nuclear decision right, every time or boom. The history of U.S. and Soviet nuclear deterrence is marked as much by nuclear misunderstandings and potential accidents as by stable deterrence. India and Pakistan have the same problem. It is reasonable to assume new nuclear states with nuclear weapons would encounter many of the same risks.

And finally, from a very direct Americentric point of view, each state that acquires their own nuclear weapons lessens the ability of the United States to influence, control or dictate security outcomes in that state and region. While not the message U.S. diplomats use openly when trying to work diplomatically to stop proliferation, the issue of influence is as relevant to U.S. allies as adversaries. To the extent that the U.S. security is enhanced by being able to heavily influence how states around the world act, then enabling the spread of nuclear weapons undermines that ability.

It is and will continue to be tempting for the next Administration to find rapid and easy solutions to long-standing security challenges. Empowering U.S. allies to do more so Washington can do and spend less, or focus more effectively on fewer challenges is an understandable policy outcome. But enabling, or looking the other way at the spread of nuclear weapons is not in America’s interests anymore today than it was in the 20th century.  

President Trump’s executive order “Unleashing American Energy” promises an American economic revival based on lower costs, bringing back our supply chains, building America into a manufacturing superpower again, and cutting reliance on countries. Within this order he tasks the Secretary of Energy to prioritize programs to onshore critical mineral processing and development. Luckily, a little-known office at the Department of Energy (DOE) – the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC) – is already at the heart of that agenda.

MESC and the Manufacturing Renaissance

Energy manufacturing in the U.S. is experiencing a historic momentum, thanks in large part to the Department of Energy. Manufacturing was the backbone of the 20th century U.S. economy, but recent decades have seen a dramatic offshoring of domestic supply chains, in particular to China, that has threatened U.S. economic and national security. With the global supply chain crises of the early 2020s, driven by COVID and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Congress finally took note. Through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), lawmakers gave the federal government first-of-a-kind tools to reassert U.S. leadership in global manufacturing. This included creating, in 2021, a program (MESC) at the DOE that focuses on critical energy supply chains, including critical minerals.

Created in 2022 after the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that infused DOE with new funds to reshore advanced energy manufacturing, the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC) has been hard at work executing on reshoring manufacturing. Since inception, MESC has achieved a remarkable impact on the energy supply chain and manufacturing industry in the US. It has resulted in over $39 billion of investments from both the public and private sector into the American energy sector in companies that have created over 47,000 private sector jobs. Many of these jobs and companies that have been funded are for critical minerals development and processing.

MESC will be central to the energy dominance mission at the core of President Trump’s playbook along with Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Why MESC is Crucial for Energy Dominance

MESC’s funding for energy infrastructure will be critical to American energy dominance and to address the energy crisis declaration that Trump signed on day one in office. Projects funded through this office include critical minerals and battery manufacturing necessary to compete with China, and grid modernization technology to ensure Americans have access to reliable and affordable power. For example, Ascend Elements was awarded two grants totaling $480M to build new critical minerals and battery recycling programs in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. This grant will yield an estimated $4.4 billion in economic activity and over 400 jobs for Hopkinsville. Sila Technologies was granted $100M for a silicon anode production facility in Moses Lake, Washington, which will be used in hundreds of thousands of automobiles, and strengthening the regional economy

The Trump administration can build on these successes and break new ground along the way:

1. Work with congress to permanently establish MESC with statutory authority and permanent appropriated funds.
2. Continue funding projects that will result in a resilient domestic energy supply, including projects to update our grid infrastructure and those that will create new jobs in energy technologies like critical minerals processing and battery manufacturing.
3. Use DOE’s Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to ensure prices for critical minerals and other energy manufacturing technologies that are primarily created or manufactured in China or other foreign entities of concern are profitable for companies, and affordable for customers.

Cost-conscious citizens should enthusiastically support these efforts because MESC has already proven its capability to punch above its weight. By making funding more permanent, Congress can 10x or more the speed and scale with which we assert energy dominance.

MESC is small but mighty. Its importance to continuing U.S. dominance in energy manufacturing cannot be overstated. Despite that, its funding in the budget is not permanent. The Trump administration has an opportunity to supercharge American energy dominance through MESC, but they must come together with Congressional leaders to permanently establish MESC and its mission. 2025 is an opportunity for new leaders to invest in creating American manufacturing jobs and spur innovation in the energy sector.