The United States Air Force has forward deployed about one-third of its B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia, or about half the B-2s considered fully operational at any given time. A Planet Labs satellite image taken earlier today shows six of the characteristic bombers on the apron alongside six refueling tankers.

A Planet Lab satellite image from earlier today shows six B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The current deployment of at least six B-2s to Diego Garcia is unusually large and exceeds the number of climate tents at the base designed to protect the sensitive surface of the bombers. The current deployment began a week ago.

US bombers regularly deploy on so-called Bomber Task Force missions to bases overseas or long-range exercise flights. That has included occasional B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia before (one in 2024 (hot pit refuel) and three in 2020), but the visits are rare and B-2s are designed to carry out global strike missions without having to deploy to forward locations. A B-2 strike against the Houthis in November 2024, for example, was flown directly from Whiteman AFB.

B-52 bombers have also deployed to Diego Garcia, including in 2024.

During 2024, U.S. bombers (B-1, B-2, and B-52) were deployed about 60 percent of the year to a theater or providing continental U.S. (CONUS) -to-CONUS flights in support of theaters or in support of U.S. Strategic Command and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to the U.S. Air Force.

During the past week the number of bombers visible at the base has fluctuated from none to two or four, indicating that the remaining bombers are either inside the climate tents or airborne on a training or perhaps bombing mission against Houthis forces. The U.S. Air Force operates a fleet of 20 B-2s. Of these, one is a test aircraft, and normally only 10-12 are considered fully operational with the rest undergoing repairs and routine maintenance. During the Spirit Vigilance exercise in April 2024, for example, the 509^th and 131^st bomber wings at Whiteman AFB in Missouri conducted a “mass fly-off” of all the operational B-2 bombers.

The B-2s deployed at Diego Garcia constitute about half of the operational B-2s, seen here in a “mass fly-off” exercise at Whiteman AFB in 2024.

That means about half of the entire operational B-2 force is currently forward deployed at Diego Garcia. The large deployment to Diego Garcia is part of evolving B-2 operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean that also involve more deployments to Australia.

The B-2 bombers are dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons include precision guided bombs and cruise missiles as well as heavy earth penetrators. Nuclear weapons include the B61-12 guided bombs and the B61-11 nuclear earth-penetrator (the B61-7 has been replaced by the B61-12 and the B83-1 is no longer operational). There are no nuclear weapons on this Diego Garcia mission.

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Background: United States Nuclear Weapons, 2025

FAS is invested in seeing more students gain science and technology skills and enter STEM careers, both for students and for our country’s competitive advantage. In light of this, the FAS Talent Hub would like to highlight one former teacher working at the Department of Education, and the contributions he’s made.

Stephen Kostyo

Stephen Kostyo joined FAS as an Impact Fellow in January of 2023, and started his tour of service with the Department of Education later that year. Kostyo’s focus at the department has been developing and implementing efforts to prioritize a whole student approach through the Full-Service Community Schools (FSCS) and Promise Neighborhoods (PN) programs, ED’s primary place-based programs. Specifically, he has helped manage $241 million in annual appropriations across both programs supporting over 100 grantees.

While at the Department of Education, Kostyo helped create many resources for federal grant recipients like a fact sheet discussing FSCS collaboration opportunities with 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st CCLC), a data-driven reporting framework for FSCS grantees, guidance to support students in foster care, an evidence-based chronic absenteeism explainer, and hosted a 5-part “Blending and Braiding” webinar series on the use of federal, state, and local funds to implement whole child approaches to education. 

“Everyone I’ve met at the U.S. Department of Education is passionate, insightful, valuable, and hard-working. This has been the main take-away from my FAS Fellowship. Policies cannot be disconnected from the people who implement them. Leveraging the expertise of former educators, service coordinators, and community leaders empowers local schools to do what they know is best for all kids and families. We need these people in public service. 

I’ve been privileged to work alongside multiple teams at the Department to highlight schools that are making incredible impacts. Too often extraordinary leaders don’t have a megaphone or outlet to share the secrets to their success. So taking the time to lift up their work and its connections to Department-funded programs via webinars, resources, conferences, and site visits has been incredibly rewarding. It has allowed me to show off how community schools in California, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania are reducing chronic absenteeism, or how Promise Neighborhoods in Maryland, Indiana, and Texas are using their schools as hubs to co-locate essential student services like tutoring, nutrition, and health care. Ultimately, my colleagues and I have taken the tools of the Department to show that students across our country—in urban areas, rural areas, red states, and blue states—are thriving in public schools. By letting them and the people who support them share the challenges they have overcome, we’re helping replicate what works.”

A former middle and high school level math and science teacher, Kostyo views his time in service as a continuation of his work to improve public education. He’s written about the benefits of a community school approach and the need for better student data systems for FAS, how states can end corporal punishment in schools by implementing restorative discipline policies, and why extended-year timelines can improve high school graduation rates by reengaging students who experience unexpected challenges.  

Thank you, Stephen! Best wishes as you continue working on these vital efforts.

The Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) took place at the United Nations headquarters in New York City March 3-7. A large and diverse group of stakeholders convened, including 86 countries and over a thousand representatives from 163 civil society organizations. The week included rich discussions in plenary sessions and numerous side events hosted by state delegations and civil society groups. 

The treaty, which entered into force in 2021, is the first to place a full ban on the possession, use, or testing of nuclear weapons. With 73 states parties and 94 signatories, the treaty is now just one country shy of a global majority. A unique aspect of the treaty that sets it apart from other nuclear weapons agreements is its emphasis on humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and centering of affected community voices. The 3MSP, for example, was presided over by Kazakhstan, whose environment and citizens have been affected by Russian nuclear explosive tests.

The 3MSP took place at a time of increased geopolitical and historical significance. The final political declaration adopted at the conclusion of the week noted the increasing risk of nuclear war, with growing nuclear arsenals, modernization programs, and nuclear saber rattling around the world. This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the first testing and use of nuclear weapons – and relatedly, FAS’s founding. 

Welcomed Advancements of the Past Year

Over the past year, the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons has experienced numerous wins that were celebrated at the Meeting of State Parties. New ratifications of the treaty by Indonesia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Solomon Islands brought the number of states parties to just one shy of a global majority. During the intersessional period, working groups established in the Vienna Action Plan and further strengthened at 2MSP continued work on universalization, establishing an international trust fund for research and medical compensation for affected communities, and creating verification measures for states to disarm.

Possibly the most well-earned achievement of the year came from Nihon Hidankyo, a Japanese organization of survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (known as “Hibakusha”), which won the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for advocating against nuclear weapons use through personal testimony. Nihon Hidankyo has long supported the TPNW, and several members were in attendance at the 3MSP to share their stories at side events, stand in solidarity with other affected communities, and support the treaty’s implementation.

Other United Nations actions this year worked towards a world free from nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly Resolution for a new scientific study on the consequences of nuclear war passed with 136 votes in favor, 3 against and 29 abstentions. The resolution’s call for researching climatic, environmental, and health consequences aligns with the TPNW’s focus on humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. The overwhelming majority of global states voting in favor of the resolution also indicated a motivation by non-nuclear states for a world without nuclear weapons. The UN Summit of the Future also reaffirmed the call for disarmament in its Pact for the Future.

Concerning Developments

In recent years, geopolitical tensions and disruptive technologies have heightened the risk of nuclear war. In January, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock closer to midnight; at 89 seconds, the clock is the closest it has ever been to the metaphorical apocalypse. Every single nuclear-armed state is advancing their nuclear forces in number or in capabilities.

The Trump administration has proposed new costly military programs like the Iron Dome missile defense system. The program could spur additional Chinese and Russia nuclear buildup as they ensure deterrence capabilities that are designed to outsmart the missile defense system. In addition, the administration’s seeming abandonment of allies have led to a call by some European and Asian state leaders to increase defense spending and consider the development of their own nuclear weapons.

In general, the global appetite for arms control and nonproliferation has decreased. There have been no clear moves to revitalize the New START treaty since Russia suspended its participation in 2023. U.S. efforts to engage in risk reduction talks with China have also not been successful as China is not convinced nuclear arms control is in their security interests. There does not appear to be any efforts between the United States and Russia to negotiate a follow-on treaty to New START, which expires in February 2026 and is the last remaining treaty constraining the deployed arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers. The past two Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conferences have failed to reach final consensus documents. Combined with the reduction in diplomatic efforts between nuclear states, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence create instability and an increased risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding that could lead to nuclear use.

States demonstrated their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in their military strategy through spending, rhetoric, and exercises in 2024. For example, ICAN’s Global Nuclear Weapons Spending report published in 2024 found that in 2023 the nine nuclear weapons states spent 91.4 billion on nuclear weapons, an increase of 13.4 % from the previous year, and projected that 2024 spending would surpass $100 billion.

3MSP Discussions and Decisions

The international trust fund for affected communities was a topic of much discussion at the Meeting. Communities in the Pacific island nations, Kazakhstan and the continental United States face many illnesses and health complications from radioactive fallout from explosive nuclear testing. From 1949 to 1989, the Soviet Union conducted about 456 nuclear tests near the Kazakh city of Semey, resulting in birth defects, a multitude of cancers, and immune disorders in generations of nearby residents. The United States, United Kingdom, and France conducted 318 tests across the Pacific, causing environmental damage, forcibly displacing communities, and health consequences. The United States conducted an additional 928 tests on the continental United states, irradiating residents across the West. The purpose of the international trust fund will be to fund community health studies related to nuclear weapons impacts that will inform humanitarian assistance subsequently provided by the fund. The working group in charge of planning and preparing the fund will also provide a report no later than four months before the first review conference of the TPNW on the technical provisions for the fund. 

The 3MSP decided that the first review conference for the Treaty will be held in New York City November 30–December 4, 2026 with South Africa presiding. Before then, states expect productive work again in the intersessional period. This will include work on the universalization of the treaty, led by Austria, New Zealand, and Uruguay; victim assistance and environmental remediation again led by Kazakhstan and Kiribati; and the creation of an international authority for verification led by Malaysia and the Philippines.

Representatives and allies of communities affected by uranium mining and milling expressed concerns that the TPNW preamble text which protects “the research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” is in contention with providing full nuclear justice and prevents trust fund compensation to all affected communities.

A working paper submitted by 44 civil society organizations expressed that nuclear technologies from “cradle to grave” impact public health and the environment. Noting that uranium mining and milling overwhelmingly occurs on indigenous lands, the groups advocated for the acknowledgement that all nuclear technologies, due to the requisite uranium resources, have the potential to cause contamination to environments and negative health consequences.

Both Marshall Islands official state and civil society representatives also called for structural changes within the treaty. The Marshall Islands, where the United States conducted over 33 nuclear explosive tests, are severely contaminated by radioactive fallout, resulting in high rates of health issues like cancers, birth defects, and immune disorders among the population and forced displacement of residents as the fallout relegated certain areas uninhabitable. The Marshall Islands support the efforts of the TPNW, but have not ratified the treaty. 

The delegation from the Marshall Islands argued that the language in Article 6 of the treaty does not adequately place burden on the United States for environmental remediation for nuclear testing. In his statement, the Marshallese Ambassador said the TPNW “wrongfully absolves responsibility for the consequences of nuclear weapons testing from those states which conducted the nuclear testing. And instead leaves us responsible to pay for billions of dollars of adjudicated impacts which we did not choose.” While states that support the treaty do stand in solidarity with each other, they do not have monolithic views about the correct implementation or structure.

Many of the working papers written by affected communities also call for the international trust fund to be open to non-state parties, which would increase engagement with the treaty and open opportunities for further compensation to impacted communities.

Numerous side events featured a coalition of affected communities in an impressive show of solidarity. For example, the Bikini Day Side Event: “Damage of Nuclear Weapons and Urgent Need for Relief – Nuclear Sufferers Speak,” featured Japanese and Korean Survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Pacific island communities affected by nuclear testing, Marshall Islanders, and Gilbertese representatives. While originally the term “hibakusha” translated in Japanese to bomb-affected people and referred specifically to survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this term has been widely shared with and adopted by other impacted communities. Regardless of whether it was Japanese bomb survivors or downwinders from tests before and after, both communities share the pain of a bomb dropping on their land. The solidarity and respect to all affected populations and generations demonstrates the dedication to a united front for a world without nuclear weapons. 

As 2025 is the 80th year since the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many of the original atomic bomb survivors have since passed. While many within the Hibakusha community worried that future generations would be too preoccupied with other issues like the economy and climate change to continue advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, there remains a strong and vibrant youth movement against the bomb that carries forward on the testimony of survivors. During the Youth for TPNW side event, youth delegates heard from a Hibakusha who was just 2 years old when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on her hometown of Nagasaki. She said, “today’s listeners are tomorrow’s storytellers.” 

Recent CNN reporting on the Trump administration’s firing of personnel handling Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sparks concern over the future of the FOIA system. This move by the administration puts a system that is already strained by lack of staff and funding at even further risk, and raises the question of whether other FOIA officers across the federal service are safe or if more will be fired in the coming days. 

Signed into law in 1967, the Freedom of Information Act is one of the crowning achievements of government transparency in the United States. It gives the public the right to request federal government records, representing decades of advocacy centered around the idea that a government should be transparent and accountable to its people. Under FOIA, any record from any federal agency is subject to being disclosed with the exceptions for national security, foreign policy, private, and legal proceedings. This provides journalists, researchers, civic society, and the wider public with valuable insights into how their government is executing its obligations. Since its creation, FOIA requests have been used to reveal information that exposes wasteful government spending, threats to public health and safety, excessive secrecy, and more. Based on the First Amendment’s fundamental freedom of the press, FOIA acknowledges the right to access government places and papers. 

Among the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE) ongoing purge of thousands of federal employees, members of OPM’s “privacy team,” as well as staff responsible for FOIA requests at OPM, have been fired, according to familiar sources who spoke with CNN. 

At FAS, our teams have used FOIA and declassification reviews for decades as a means of increasing transparency and holding the government accountable. This work has led to the declassification of the size and history of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the discovery of inadequate security at nuclear weapons storage sites. 

Steven Aftergood, former director of the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, is a long-term FOIA practitioner. In 1997, Aftergood was a plaintiff in a FOIA lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), resulting in the declassification of the CIA budget for the first time in 50 years. 

The current legislative design of FOIA “fails to balance supply and demand,” Aftergood said in a conversation with FAS staff about the recent firings at OPM, and how firing FOIA officers will further strain an already overburdened and under-resourced process. ”Requesters can easily generate high volumes of requests that overwhelm an agency’s ability to respond. Nor does Congress reliably provide the resources that are needed to meet the demand. Breakdowns and mutual frustration are the predictable result.”

FOIA requires that agencies reply with a determination to valid requests within 20 business days, but many agencies can’t keep up with requests. While FOIA applies to all agencies, each agency implements it differently. For example, according to the Government Accountability Office, total government backlogs of FOIA requests surpassed 200,000 in 2022.

“Some agencies respond to FOIA requests diligently and promptly. That has been my experience with the US Patent and Trademark Office, for example,” said Aftergood. “Some agencies barely comply with the law at all, allowing requests to linger for years or even a decade and more. The US Air Force is notorious in this respect.” 

In an era of such massive sweeps upending federal programs, increased transparency is even more important to provide the public with the knowledge necessary to respond and hold the government accountable. Now is the time to bolster and improve the FOIA process, not to fire those who are working–with already limited resources–to hold it together. In order to ensure the transparency of government actions required for a democratic society, Congress should reform FOIA, directing further funding to equip trained personnel with the resources they need. To assist in evaluating agency needs, the Project on Government Oversight suggests agencies include a line-item FOIA budget during the appropriation request process. 

For 58 years, FOIA has put power and knowledge directly in the hands of the people. Any erosion of transparency mechanisms such as FOIA–whether by direct abolishment or de-prioritization that leads to eventual decay–sets a concerning precedent. The Trump administration should reverse the firing of FOIA officers at OPM and allocate increased funding for FOIA personnel across the federal service.

The federal government’s approach to deploying AI systems is a defining force in shaping industry standards, academic research, and public perception of these technologies. Public sentiment toward AI remains mixed, with many Americans expressing a lack of trust in AI systems. To fully harness the benefits of AI, the public must have confidence that these systems are deployed responsibly and enhance their lives and livelihoods.

The first Trump Administration’s AI policies clearly recognized the opportunity to promote AI adoption through transparency and public trust. President Trump’s Executive Order 13859 explicitly stated that agencies must design, develop, acquire, and use “AI in a manner that fosters public trust and confidence while protecting privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and American values.” This commitment laid the foundation for increasing government accountability in AI use.

A major step in this direction was the AI Use Case Inventory, established under President Trump’s Executive Order 13960 and later codified in the 2023 Advancing American AI Act. The agency inventories have since become a crucial tool in fostering public trust and innovation in government AI use. Recent OMB guidance (M-24-10) has expanded its scope, standardizing AI definitions, and collecting information on potential adverse impacts. The detailed inventory enhances accountability by ensuring transparency in AI deployments, tracks AI successes and risks to improve government services, and supports AI vendors by providing visibility into public-sector AI needs, thereby driving industry innovation.

The end of 2024 marked a major leap in government transparency regarding AI use. Agency reporting on AI systems saw dramatic improvements, with federal AI inventories capturing more than 1,700 AI use cases —a 200% increase in reported use cases from the previous year. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) alone reported 158 active AI use cases. Of these, 29 were identified as high-risk, with detailed documentation on how 24 of those use cases are mitigating potential risks. This level of disclosure is essential for maintaining public trust and ensuring responsible AI deployment.

OMB is set to release revisions to its AI guidance (M-24-10) in mid-March, presenting an opportunity to ensure that transparency remains a top priority.

To support continued transparency and accountability in government AI use, the Federation of American Scientists has written a letter urging OMB to maintain its detailed guidance on AI inventories. We believe that sustained transparency is crucial to ensuring responsible AI governance, fostering public trust, and enabling industry innovation.

Between 2006 and 2015, the United Kingdom repeatedly and publicly announced its intentions to decrease the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile, most recently committing to at most 180 weapons by the mid-2020s. As the years went by, non-government policy experts and nuke watchers assumed that the UK Government was making good on its word and that the UK nuclear arsenal would continue to gradually reduce. In reality, the United Kingdom is thought to have maintained a nuclear stockpile of approximately 225 weapons, and, in a surprise move in 2021, the United Kingdom declared that it would extend the ceiling of its “overall nuclear weapon stockpile” to no more than 260 weapons. This constituted an abrupt about-face from its previous commitments and trajectory. 

However, the infrastructure underpinning the sustainability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons and their modernization has experienced significant budgetary and scheduling challenges. Furthermore, the UK has dramatically reduced the public transparency of its nuclear forces, making it increasingly difficult to understand and debate the true scope of these challenges.

The UK’s Nuclear Warhead Modernization

Announced in 2005, the Atomic Weapons Establishment’s (AWE) Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP) was an initiative to deliver infrastructure and technology to sustain the United Kingdom’s current stockpile and underpin its warhead replacement program. Each of these main infrastructure and technology projects is named after a constellation: Project Orion for a high-power research laser that began operations in 2013, Project Leo for a small parts manufacturing facility, Project Pegasus for the manufacturing of uranium components effort, and so on. Several of these projects under the NWCSP related to techniques used for nuclear weapons development in place of explosive testing. Part of the NWCSP mission also involved refurbishing the United Kingdom’s current warheads for integration with the U.S.-supplied, upgraded Mk4A aeroshell, which was completed in 2023. The NWCSP was scheduled to run from April 2008 until April 2025 and was removed from the MOD Government Major Projects Portfolio data starting in 2022, indicating it could have been downsized from a large-scale development initiative.

In February 2020, the UK defence secretary announced a new warhead program—the A21/Mk7/ Astraea. This new warhead is currently in the concept stage but is planned to eventually replace the Mk4A/Holbrook beginning in the late 2030s. As was the case with the previous version, the A21/Mk7 Astraea design and production will have a “very close connection” to the future US W93/Mk7.

In 2023, the MOD confirmed that £127 million had been spent on the A21 Astraea warhead replacement program as of March 2022. The total cost of the replacement program has not been released, given it is still in the early stages. However, even if cumulative costs are released, individual costs associated with the warhead modernization program will be challenging to identify due to changes in UK budgetary reporting practices. In 2023, nuclear-related programs and expenditures—including the AWE and the NWCSP—were compiled into one heading under Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), which appears as a single line item in the departmental estimates. This makes it impossible to see the direct in-service costs associated with the individual programs. DNE funding was also “ringfenced” within the MOD budget to protect it against spending cuts. 

The UK’s declaration that its stockpile ceiling will be raised to 260 raises several questions. In the early- to mid-2000s, the United Kingdom possessed a stockpile of roughly 280 warheads, but in 2010 announced it would reduce this level to “no more than 225 warheads.” To be able to increase this level to up to 260 warheads, as announced by the UK government in 2021, it seems some of the retired warheads—or components from them—must have been retained in some form. The United Kingdom appears to use the term “stockpile” to describe operational, deployed, and retired weapons. The timeline for potentially increasing the stockpile to up to 260 is not known, but if it is a relatively short timeline, it would seem to require reconstituting some retired warheads. If it is a longer timeline, it could potentially involve increasing the number of A21 Astraea warheads in the future. Of the “no more than 225” warhead stockpile level, the United Kingdom has previously explained that 120 warheads would be operationally available, of which 40 would be deployed on the single ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) on patrol at all times. The reason for increasing the stockpile to up to 260 warheads appears to be derived from an interest in increasing the number of “operationally available” warheads to be able to deploy a full warhead load on the SSBN fleet—something the recent warhead level did not allow.

Critical Infrastructure 

Any warhead design, manufacturing, and testing occurs at the AWE site at Aldermaston while the warheads are assembled, maintained, and decommissioned at AWE Burghfield. These two sites are critical to maintaining the United Kingdom’s existing stockpile and will play a significant role in the new warhead replacement program. 

Upgrades at AWE Burghfield

Project MENSA—one of the infrastructure programs under the NWCSP—aims to consolidate existing nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly operations into a single building located in the center of the AWE Burghfield complex called the Main Processing Facility (MPF). MENSA will replace the existing Gravel Gertie bunkers used for warhead assembly and disassembly on the eastern part of the campus, which are designed to collapse inward in the event of an explosion. Other new infrastructure for this project includes a support building and 16 lightning protector towers to accompany the MPF, as well as an associated plant building, gatehouses, vehicle inspection bays, substation buildings, security fences, access roads, and Sustainable Drainage System (SuDS) infrastructure.

Project MENSA’s completion has been delayed by more than seven years, and its expected cost is £1.36 billion over its original total budget of £0.8 billion. Construction progress at the site can be observed through satellite imagery and should be nearing completion of construction according to the MoD’s 2024 Major Project Portfolio data. 

Upgrades at AWE Aldermaston

AWE Aldermaston, where warhead design, development, manufacturing, assembly, and testing occur, is also undergoing significant upgrades and revitalization. In 2024, AWE announced two new infrastructure programs—the Future Infrastructure Programme (FIP) for general infrastructure and the Future Materials Campus (FMC) for nuclear material manufacturing and storage—to consolidate existing programs and invest in new ones to increase capacity for maintaining, manufacturing, and storing nuclear weapons. The procurement process for these multi-year, multi-billion pound projects began on April 22 and December 12, 2024, respectively. The FMC, in particular, will be a collection of facilities, including nuclear science and technology centers and laboratories, to be built at AWE Aldermaston. This program will replace two major projects that initially fell under the NWCSP—Project Pegasus and Project Aurora. 

Project Pegasus was described as a new enriched uranium storage and manufacturing facility at AWE Aldermaston that would replace the existing enriched uranium handling facility located at the A45 building. Work began in 2003, and the original projected service date was 2016. The approved cost was originally £634 million before it skyrocketed to £1.7 billion. After a six-year delay and a three-year pause, construction of the new storage facility began, and the manufacturing facility was scheduled to be finished by 2030. The severe delays were mainly due to challenges with the supply chain environment and an “overly complex technical solution” that resulted in additional construction and safety costs and a “reassessment” of the project design and requirements. 

The UK government was also in the early design phase of Project Aurora, an infrastructure project for a new plutonium manufacturing facility that would replace the current A90 building at AWE Aldermaston. This program was experiencing delays due to resourcing problems, supply chain shortages, and high-skilled workforce challenges. Project Aurora was removed from the NWCSP and added as an independent program to the MOD’s Major Projects Portfolio in 2022. Projects Aurora and Pegasus were both removed from the 2024 version of the MOD’s Major Projects Portfolio database, likely due to their absorption into the new FMC program.

The other central element of NWCSP is the delivery of a new hydrodynamics facility. In 2010, the United Kingdom and France signed the Teutates Treaty, which allowed for cooperation on warhead physics research between the two nations. From this agreement, the EPURE radiographic facility was built at Valduc in France, and a joint UK-France Technology Development Centre was established at Aldermaston. These facilities will support hydrodynamic research that will allow the study of the effects of aging and manufacturing processes on nuclear warheads without nuclear explosive testing. Because of the Teutates program, the UK’s original plans for a ‘Project Hydrus’ hydrodynamics facility were canceled. 

Outstanding Challenges 

The facilities described above are deemed crucial to the United Kingdom’s effort to modernize and refurbish its nuclear deterrent. However, the significant delays and cost overruns have elicited criticism from the public and concern from government authorities over the years. In August 2024, the House of Commons reported a spending deficit on nuclear programs across the Defence Equipment Plan. Over the next ten years (2023 to 2033), costs are forecasted at £117.8 billion, of which only £109.8 billion had been budgeted for when the report was released. 

Alongside these warhead development and infrastructure programs, the United Kingdom is also replacing its four SSBNs with the new Dreadnaught class, the first of which is expected to enter service in the early 2030s. This modernization has also been plagued by cost increases and threatens to be delayed, given maintenance issues with the existing fleet.

Moreover, the recent decrease in UK government transparency regarding the status of its nuclear arsenal and modernization program reflects a worrisome global trend. The United Kingdom has not publicly declared the approximate size of its stockpile since 2010, following the Obama Administration’s decision to release its stockpile number. In 2021, the MOD referred to the 2010 announcement again but did not explicitly say what the stockpile number was. Moreover, it said it would “no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers.”

Additionally, the MOD said in 2023 that it was withholding information on planned in-service dates for many of the above-referenced projects for “reasons of national security” and did not release this information in its 2022, 2023, and 2024 Major Projects Portfolio data. Finally, the MOD has published an annual update to Parliament since 2011 on the progress of nuclear weapons upgrades, but there has been no report published for 2023 or 2024.

While some of this backsliding is likely rooted in concerns about public perception of persistent programmatic delays, the overall picture raises concerns about a pattern of declining transparency and reduced public ability to monitor and hold the UK government accountable for its nuclear weapons program. 

President Trump is moving quickly to push U.S. allies to invest even more in their own defense. NATO allies have already committed to spend 3% of their GDP on defense, yet the U.S. is now calling for them to spend at least 5%. It is likely that U.S. allies in East Asia will soon face similar calls to do more. Greater investments in conventional capabilities make a lot of sense. However, there are some U.S. policy experts, officials and academics calling for more U.S. allies to go nuclear to reduce U.S. defense requirements. These calls are dangerously misguided and ignore the threat any proliferation – including by U.S. allies – poses to American security interests. They must be rejected wholesale by the Trump Administration.  

One of the most enduring successes of U.S. national security policy has been its effort to limit the number of states with nuclear weapons. Predictions that dozens of countries might possess nuclear weapons did not materialize because of concerted U.S. actions. The risks include the reality that U.S. allies can and often do experience internal instability or even regime collapse, that any state with nuclear weapons creates a risk that those materials or knowhow can be stolen or diverted, that any state with nuclear weapon in a crisis might actually use those weapons, and lastly the reality that states with their nuclear weapons are less susceptible open to U.S. influence. There may be reasons why a state may want to go nuclear from their own perspective but there are few if any lasting benefits to American security that comes from proliferation to friends and allies.

Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons, but perhaps 40 additional states are technically advanced enough to build nuclear weapons if they chose to do so. Many of these states are U.S. allies or partners, including in Europe as well as Japan, South Korea, and even the island of Taiwan. That these states never went nuclear (although some tried) is due to a combination of factors, including the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to their security, the pressure America brought to bear when these states indicated a potential interest in building independent nuclear arsenals, and the recognition that if the world was serious about getting rid of all nuclear weapons then their spread was a step in the wrong direction.

The re-election of Donald Trump has understandably spooked many U.S. allies, renewing doubts that America will come to their aid. The growth of China’s military and economic power relative to the United States is adding to these concerns. More allies are asking now, just as they did during the Cold War if America would really risk Boston to protect Berlin, or Seattle to protect Seoul. As this question festers and as America’s relative power over China and other states ebbs, the lure to encourage U.S. friends to develop nuclear weapons of their own to deter or defeat an attack will grow. After all, the theory goes, why should the United States worry if its friends go nuclear?

In the real world, however, the spread of nuclear weapons anywhere complicates and undermines U.S. security. One reason is states are not always stable. In the 1970s, the U.S. supported its Treaty partner Iran acquiring nuclear reactors and advanced technology but in 1979, that regime was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution. Pakistan went nuclear when the U.S. needed its help fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and has faced wave after wave of instability and crisis. And South Korea is a more recent challenge. For the last few decades, South Korea was considered a stable and vibrant democracy – even hosting a Summit for Democracy last year. Under President Yoon, South Korea has voiced increasing interest in an independent nuclear arsenal. And just last year, a former Trump official, Elbridge Colby, expected to serve in a senior policy role at the Pentagon publicly encouraged South Korea to build their own nuclear weapons to deter North Korea and enable the U.S. to focus more on China. The situation in South Korea, with an impeached President and no clear sense of who controls the country’s military, would be a lot more dangerous if Seoul had nuclear weapons. 

This is not just an issue for newer nuclear weapons states. Prior to the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, a coup created confusion for days over exactly who had the ability to control Soviet nuclear weapons.  Following the USSR’s demise, nuclear weapons and materials remained at risk of theft and diversion for years and required massive U.S. efforts and investments to prevent their loss. And even the United States is not immune from these risks. The 2021 insurrection raised nuclear risk to the point that the Speaker of the House had to publicly ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs about the risk that President Trump might use nuclear weapons in a gambit to remain in power, and Chairman Milley took extraordinary steps to insert himself into the nuclear chain of command to preempt that risk. Any nuclear arsenal anywhere is a potential danger if political circumstances change.

And states with nuclear weapons create a nuclear risk if nuclear technology, materials and knowhow are stolen or diverted. Five of today’s nuclear weapon states – America, Russia, China, France, and Pakistan – have either knowingly or unwittingly helped other states go nuclear.  Even if theft or transfer were not an issue, when new states have gone nuclear in the past, others have followed. America’s nuclear success led the Soviet Union to build them as well. This in turn led the UK and France to follow suit. These four nuclear weapon programs fueled China’s desire to join the club. Beijing having the bomb drove India to do the same, which then led Pakistan to follow suit.  

And any nuclear state might decide one day to use those weapons. Every nuclear leader must get every nuclear decision right, every time or boom. The history of U.S. and Soviet nuclear deterrence is marked as much by nuclear misunderstandings and potential accidents as by stable deterrence. India and Pakistan have the same problem. It is reasonable to assume new nuclear states with nuclear weapons would encounter many of the same risks.

And finally, from a very direct Americentric point of view, each state that acquires their own nuclear weapons lessens the ability of the United States to influence, control or dictate security outcomes in that state and region. While not the message U.S. diplomats use openly when trying to work diplomatically to stop proliferation, the issue of influence is as relevant to U.S. allies as adversaries. To the extent that the U.S. security is enhanced by being able to heavily influence how states around the world act, then enabling the spread of nuclear weapons undermines that ability.

It is and will continue to be tempting for the next Administration to find rapid and easy solutions to long-standing security challenges. Empowering U.S. allies to do more so Washington can do and spend less, or focus more effectively on fewer challenges is an understandable policy outcome. But enabling, or looking the other way at the spread of nuclear weapons is not in America’s interests anymore today than it was in the 20th century.  

President Trump’s executive order “Unleashing American Energy” promises an American economic revival based on lower costs, bringing back our supply chains, building America into a manufacturing superpower again, and cutting reliance on countries. Within this order he tasks the Secretary of Energy to prioritize programs to onshore critical mineral processing and development. Luckily, a little-known office at the Department of Energy (DOE) – the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC) – is already at the heart of that agenda.

MESC and the Manufacturing Renaissance

Energy manufacturing in the U.S. is experiencing a historic momentum, thanks in large part to the Department of Energy. Manufacturing was the backbone of the 20th century U.S. economy, but recent decades have seen a dramatic offshoring of domestic supply chains, in particular to China, that has threatened U.S. economic and national security. With the global supply chain crises of the early 2020s, driven by COVID and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Congress finally took note. Through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), lawmakers gave the federal government first-of-a-kind tools to reassert U.S. leadership in global manufacturing. This included creating, in 2021, a program (MESC) at the DOE that focuses on critical energy supply chains, including critical minerals.

Created in 2022 after the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that infused DOE with new funds to reshore advanced energy manufacturing, the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC) has been hard at work executing on reshoring manufacturing. Since inception, MESC has achieved a remarkable impact on the energy supply chain and manufacturing industry in the US. It has resulted in over $39 billion of investments from both the public and private sector into the American energy sector in companies that have created over 47,000 private sector jobs. Many of these jobs and companies that have been funded are for critical minerals development and processing.

MESC will be central to the energy dominance mission at the core of President Trump’s playbook along with Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Why MESC is Crucial for Energy Dominance

MESC’s funding for energy infrastructure will be critical to American energy dominance and to address the energy crisis declaration that Trump signed on day one in office. Projects funded through this office include critical minerals and battery manufacturing necessary to compete with China, and grid modernization technology to ensure Americans have access to reliable and affordable power. For example, Ascend Elements was awarded two grants totaling $480M to build new critical minerals and battery recycling programs in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. This grant will yield an estimated $4.4 billion in economic activity and over 400 jobs for Hopkinsville. Sila Technologies was granted $100M for a silicon anode production facility in Moses Lake, Washington, which will be used in hundreds of thousands of automobiles, and strengthening the regional economy

The Trump administration can build on these successes and break new ground along the way:

1. Work with congress to permanently establish MESC with statutory authority and permanent appropriated funds.
2. Continue funding projects that will result in a resilient domestic energy supply, including projects to update our grid infrastructure and those that will create new jobs in energy technologies like critical minerals processing and battery manufacturing.
3. Use DOE’s Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to ensure prices for critical minerals and other energy manufacturing technologies that are primarily created or manufactured in China or other foreign entities of concern are profitable for companies, and affordable for customers.

Cost-conscious citizens should enthusiastically support these efforts because MESC has already proven its capability to punch above its weight. By making funding more permanent, Congress can 10x or more the speed and scale with which we assert energy dominance.

MESC is small but mighty. Its importance to continuing U.S. dominance in energy manufacturing cannot be overstated. Despite that, its funding in the budget is not permanent. The Trump administration has an opportunity to supercharge American energy dominance through MESC, but they must come together with Congressional leaders to permanently establish MESC and its mission. 2025 is an opportunity for new leaders to invest in creating American manufacturing jobs and spur innovation in the energy sector.

Earlier this week, the Senate confirmed Chris Wright as the Secretary of Energy, ushering in a new era of the Department of Energy (DOE). In his opening statement before Congress, Wright laid out his vision for the DOE under his leadership—to unleash American energy and restore “energy dominance”, lead the world in innovation by accelerating the work of the National Labs, and remove barriers to building energy projects domestically. Prior to Wright’s nomination, there have already been a range of proposals circulating for how, exactly, to do this.

Of these, a Trump FERC commissioner calls for the reorganization – a complete overhaul – of the DOE as-is. This proposed reorganization would eliminate DOE’s Office of Infrastructure, remove all applied energy programs, strip commercial technology and deployment funding, and rename the agency to be the Department of Energy Security and Advanced Science (DESAS). 

This proposal would eliminate crucial DOE offices that are accomplishing vital work across the country, and would give the DOE an unrecognizable facelift. Like other facelifts, the effort would be very costly – paid for by the American taxpayer, unnecessary, and a waste of public resources. Further, reorganizing DOE will waste the precious time and money of the Federal government, and mean that DOE’s incoming Secretary, Chris Wright, will be less effective in accomplishing the goals the President campaigned on – energy reliability, energy affordability, and winning the competition with China. The good news for the Trump Administration is that DOE’s existing organization structure is already well-suited and well-organized to pursue its “energy dominance” agenda. 

The Cost of Reorganizing

Since its inception in 1977, the Department of Energy has evolved several times in scope and focus to meet the changing needs of the nation. Each time, there was an intent and purpose behind the reorganization of the agency. For example, during the Clinton Administration, Congress restructured the nuclear weapons program into the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to bolster management and oversight. 

More recently, in 2022, another reorganization was driven by the need to administer major new Congressionally-authorized programs and taxpayer funds effectively. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), DOE combined existing programs, like the Loan Programs Office, with newly-authorized offices, like the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED). This structure allows DOE to hone a new Congressionally-mandated skill set – demonstration and deployment – while not diluting its traditional competency in managing fundamental research and development.

Even when they make sense, reorganizations have their risks, especially in a complex agency like the DOE. Large-scale changes to agencies inherently disrupt operations, threaten a loss of institutional knowledge, impair employee productivity, and create their own legal and bureaucratic complexities. These inherent risks are exacerbated even further with rushed or unwarranted reorganizations.

The financial costs of reorganizing a large Federal agency alone can be staggering. Lost productivity alone is estimated in the millions, as employees and leadership divert time and focus from mission-critical projects to logistical changes, including union negotiations. These efforts often drag on longer than anticipated, especially when determining how to split responsibilities and reassign personnel. Studies have shown that large-scale reorganizations within government agencies often fail to deliver promised efficiencies, instead introducing unforeseen costs and delays. 

These disruptions would be compounded by the impacts an unnecessary reorganization would have on billions of dollars in existing DOE projects already driving economic growth, particularly in rural and often Republican-led districts, which depend on the DOE’s stability to maintain these investments. Given the high stakes, policymakers have consistently recognized the importance of a stable DOE framework to achieve the nation’s energy goals. The bipartisan passage of the 2020 Energy Act in the Senate reflects a shared understanding that DOE needs a well-equipped demonstration and deployment team to advance energy security and achieve American energy dominance. 

DOE’s Existing Structure is Already Optimized to Pursue the Energy Dominance Agenda

In President Trump’s second campaign for office, he ran on a platform of setting up the U.S. to compete with China, to improve energy affordability and reliability for Americans, and to address the strain of rising electricity demand on the grid by using artificial intelligence (AI). DOE’s existing organization structure is already optimized to pursue President Trump’s ‘energy dominance’ agenda, most of which being implemented in Republican-represented districts. 

Competition with China

As mentioned above, in response to the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), DOE created several new offices, including the Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains Office (MESC) and the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED). Both of these offices are positioning the U.S. to compete with China by focusing on strengthening domestic manufacturing, supply chains, and workforce development for critical energy technologies right here at home. 

MESC is spearheading efforts to establish a secure battery manufacturing supply chain within the U.S. In September 2024, the Office announced plans to deliver over $3 billion in investments to more than 25 battery projects across 14 states. The portfolio of selected projects, once fully contracted, are projected to support over 8,000 construction jobs and over 4,000 operating jobs domestically. These projects encompass essential critical mineral processing, battery production, and recycling efforts. By investing in domestic battery infrastructure, the program reduces reliance on foreign sources, particularly China, and enhances the U.S.’s ability to compete and lead on a global scale. 

In passing BIL, Congress understood that to compete with China, R&D alone is not sufficient. The United States needs to be building large-scale demonstrations of the newest energy technologies domestically. OCED is ensuring that these technologies, and their supply chains, reach commercial scale in the U.S. to directly benefit American industry and energy consumers. OCED catalyzes private capital by sharing the financial risk of early-stage technologies which speeds up domestic innovation and counters China’s heavy state-backed funding model. In 2024 alone, OCED awarded 91 projects, in 42 U.S. states, to over 160 prize winners. By supporting first-of-a-kind or next-generation projects, OCED de-risks emerging technologies for private sector adoption, enabling quicker commercialization and global competitiveness. With additional or existing funding, OCED could create next-generation geothermal and/or advanced nuclear programs that could help unlock the hundreds of gigawatts of potential domestic energy from each technology area. 

Energy Affordability and Reliability

Another BIL-authorized DOE office, the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), is playing a crucial role in improving energy affordability and reliability for Americans through targeted investments to modernize the nation’s power grid. GDO manages billions of dollars in funding under the BIL to improve grid resilience against wildfires, extreme weather, cyberattacks, and other disruptions. Programs like the Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships (GRIP) Program aim to enhance the reliability of the grid by supporting state-of-the-art grid infrastructure upgrades and developing new solutions to prevent outages and speed up restoration times in high-risk areas. The U.S. is in dire need of new transmission to keep costs low and maintain reliability for consumers. GDO is addressing the financial, regulatory, and technical barriers that are standing in the way of building vital transmission infrastructure.  

The Office of State and Community Energy Programs (SCEP), also part of the Office of Infrastructure, supports energy projects that help upgrade local government and residential infrastructure and lower household energy costs. Investments from BIL and IRA funding have already been distributed to states and communities, and SCEP is working to ensure that this taxpayer money is used as effectively as possible. For example, SCEP administers the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), which helps Americans in all 50 states improve energy efficiency by funding upgrades like insulation, window replacements, and modern heating systems. This program typically saves households $283 or more per year on energy costs.

Addressing Load Growth by Using AI

The DOE’s newest office, the Office of Critical and Emerging Tech (CET), leads the Department’s work on emerging areas important to national security like biotechnology, quantum, microelectronics, and artificial intelligence (AI). In April, CET partnered with several of DOE’s National Labs to produce an AI for Energy report. This report outlines DOE’s ongoing activities and the near-term potential to “safely and ethically implement AI to enable a secure, resilient power grid and drive energy innovation across the economy, while providing a skilled AI-ready energy workforce.” 

In addition to co-authoring this publication, CET partners with national labs to deploy AI-powered predictive analytics and simulation tools for addressing long-term load growth.

By deploying AI to enhance forecasting, manage grid performance, and integrate innovative energy technologies, CET ensures that the U.S. can handle our increasing energy demands while advancing grid reliability and resiliency.

The Path Forward 

DOE is already very well set up to pursue an energy dominance agenda for America. There’s simply no need to waste time conducting a large-scale agency reorganization. 

In a January 2024 Letter from the CEO, Chris Wright discusses his “straightforward business philosophy” for leading a high-functioning company. As a leader, he strives to “Hire great people and treat them like adults…” which makes Liberty Energy, his company, “successful in attracting and retaining exceptional people who together truly shine.” Secretary Wright knows how to run a successful business. He knows the “secret sauce” lies in employee satisfaction and retention. 

To apply this approach in his new role, Wright should resist tinkering with DOE’s structure, and instead, give employees a vision, and get off to the races of achieving the American energy dominance agenda without wasting time, the public’s money, and morale. Instead of redirecting resources to reorganizations, the DOE’s ample resources and existing program infrastructure should be harnessed to pursue initiatives that bolster the nation’s energy resilience and cut costs. Effective governance demands thoughtful consideration and long-term strategic alignment rather than hasty or superficial reorganizations.

Federal hiring ebbs and flows with changes in administrations, legislative mandates, attrition, hiring freezes, and talent surges. The lessons and practices in this blog post series explore the earlier stages of the hiring process. Though anchored in our permitting talent research, the lessons are universal in their application, regardless of the hiring environment. They can be used to accelerate and improve hiring for a single or multiple open positions, and they can be kept in reserve during hiring downturns.

Assessing, Selecting, and Onboarding the Successful Candidate

Previously we described the end-to-end hiring process, the importance of getting hiring right from the start, and how sharing resources speeds hiring. This post focuses on the last two phases of the process: Assessment and Offer. While these phases include eight steps, we’ve narrowed down our discussion to five key steps:

1. Close Job Opportunity Announcement and Evaluate Applicants
2. Review Certificate of Eligibles, Conduct Interviews, and Make Selection
3. Make Tentative Job Offer and Receive Acceptance
4. Initiate Investigation at the Appropriate Level (Security Check)
5. Make Official Offer and Enter on Duty (Onboard New Hire)

Our insights shared in this post are based on extensive interviews with hiring managers, program leaders, staffing specialists, workforce planners, and budget professionals as well as on-the-job experience. These recommendations for improvement focus on process and do not require policy or regulatory changes. They do require adoption of these practices more broadly throughout HR, program, and permitting managers, and staff. These recommendations are not unique to permitting; they apply broadly to federal government hiring. These insights should be considered both for streamlining efforts related to environmental permitting, as well as improving federal hiring.

Breaking Down the Steps

For each step, we provide a description, explain what can go wrong, share what can go right, and provide some examples from our research, where applicable.

Close Job Opportunity Announcement and Evaluate Applicants 

Once the announcement period has ended, job announcements close, and HR begins reviewing the applications in the competitive hiring process. HR reviews the applications, materials provided by the applicants, and the completed assessments, which vary depending on the assessment strategy. This selection process is governed by policies in competitive examination and will be determined by whether the agency is following category rating, rule of many, or other acceptable evaluation methods.

If the agency is using a different hiring authority or flexibility, this step will change. For example, if the agency has Direct Hire Authority (DHA), they may not need to provide a rigorous assessment and may be able to proceed to selection after a review of resumes. Most agencies will still engage in some assessment process for these types of positions. After the applicants are evaluated, HR issues a Certificate of Eligibles (or “cert list”) with the ranking of the applicants from which the hiring manager can select, including the implementation of Veterans preference. 

What Can Go Wrong

• Most applicant assessments rely on the resume review and candidate self-assessment. Applicants who understand the process rate themselves as highly qualified on all aspects of the job, resulting in a certificate list with unqualified applicants at the top. Agencies are now required by law to use skills-based assessments in the Chance to Compete Act and previous Executive Order guidance to prevent this, but the adoption process will be slow.
• HR staffing resources are frequently strained to immediately review applications and resumes causing delays. This causes applicant and hiring manager dissatisfaction and possibly a loss of attractive, qualified applicants. Within permitting, hiring managers have been struggling to find talent with the required expertise, especially specialized or niche expertise, and this loss is a critical setback.
• Frequently HR specialists do not consult with the program managers to gain a deep understanding of what they’re looking for in a resume or application and rely solely on their interpretation of the qualifications listed in the position description. This can result in poor quality applicants referred to the hiring manager. 

What Can Go Right

• If the recruiters and hiring manager have engaged in effective recruiting, applicant quality is likely to be quite high. This eases the HR’s job of finding strong applicants.
• With a strong applicant pool, HR specialist can limit the number of applicants they consider and/or limit how long the job announcement is open. This will expedite the process, as the assessment will be faster. Rigorous assessments reduce the likelihood of unqualified applicants making it to the certificate list. A hiring manager who insists on a skills-based assessment will likely move forward with a successful hire. Using subject-matter experts in a Subject Matter Expert Qualifications Assessment (SME-QA) or similar assessment process can result in a strong list of applicants, and it has the added benefit of building familiarity by engaging the employee’s future peers in the process.

Review Certificate of Eligibles, Conduct Interviews, and Make Selection 

HR sends a Certificate of Eligibles (certificate list) to the hiring manager that ranks the applicants who passed the assessment(s). Under competitive hiring rules (as opposed to some of the other hiring authorities), hiring managers are obligated to select from the top of the Certificate of Eligibles list, or those considered to be most qualified. 

The Veterans preference rules also require that qualified Veterans move to the top of the list and must be considered first. Outside of competitive hiring and under other hiring authorities, the hiring manager may have more flexibility in the selection of candidates. For example, direct hire authority allows the hiring manager to make a selection decision based on their own review of resumes and applications. 

If determined as part of the assessment process beforehand, the hiring manager may choose to conduct final interviews with the top candidates. In this case, the manager then informs HR of their selection decision. 

What Can Go Wrong

• If the hiring manager cannot find an applicant they deem qualified on the certificate list, they inform HR, restart the hiring action, and/or re-post the position, further delaying the process. This happens frequently when the assessment tools default to a self-evaluation, or self-assessment. One Hiring Manager we met needed to request a second certificate list, and this extended the hiring process to nine months.
• Lack of resources in HR or the hiring manager’s program often results in evaluation and selection delays. Top applicants in high demand may take other jobs if the process takes longer than anticipated. This was a concern voiced by hiring managers during our interviews.
• In rare circumstances, agency funding could be uncertain and the budget function could rescind the approval to hire at this stage, frustrating hiring managers, applicants, and HR specialists.

What Can Go Right

• Strong recruiting early and throughout the process results in a strong certificate list with excellent candidates. One permitting agency, following best practice, kept a pipeline of potential candidates, including prior applicants to boost the quality of the applicant pool.
• An effective assessment process weeds out unqualified or unsuitable candidates and culls the list of applicants to only those who can do the job.
• A deep partnership between the HR staffing specialist and the hiring manager in which they discuss the skills and “fit” of the top candidates increases the hiring manager’s confidence in the selection.

Make Tentative Job Offer and Receive Acceptance

HR reaches out to the applicant to make a tentative job offer (i.e., tentative based on the applicant’s suitability determination, outlined below) and asks for a decision from the applicant within an acceptable time frame, which is normally a couple of days to a week. The HR staffing specialist will keep in close contact with the hiring manager and HR officials regarding the status of the candidate accepting the position.

What Can Go Wrong

• The applicant rejects the offer due to a misunderstanding of the job. This could be the location, remote work, or telework availability. In our interviews, we learned that some applicants declined offers because they believed the position was full time or a temporary position that could convert to a full time role, but that was not the case.
• The applicant rejects the offer due to a competing offer at a higher salary or as a result of other financial factors (e.g., relocation expenses). Some participants shared that financial factors had been the reason for some of their declinations.
• The applicant rejects the offer because of how they have been treated throughout the process or delays, which have led them to remain in their current role or accept another position.

What Can Go Right

• The HR specialist and others involved in the hiring process maintain regular communications with the candidate regarding their offer, listens to any concerns they may have about accepting their offer, and works with the hiring manager to correct any misperceptions about the job requirements.
• The HR specialist and the hiring manager understand the financial incentives they can use to negotiate salary, relocation expenses, signing bonuses, and other benefits to negotiate with the candidate. These options are usually agency-, function-, or job-specific.

Initiate Investigation at the Appropriate Level (Security Check)

Different federal occupations require different levels of suitability determinations or security clearances – from simple background checks to make sure the information an applicant provided on their application is accurate to a Top Secret clearance that enables the employee to access sensitive information. Each type of suitability determination has a different time frame needed for a security officer to evaluate the candidate. (Some positions require the security officer to not only interview the candidate, but also interview their friends, relatives, and neighbors.) This takes time during a part of the hiring process when both the candidate with the tentative offer and the hiring manager are anxious to move forward.

Once the candidate selection is made, the HR specialist works with the agency suitability professionals to initiate the background check and clearance process. Agency suitability experts work with the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA) to conduct the determination of the applicant. 

What Can Go Wrong

• Applicants who have never applied for a federal job may be unfamiliar with their responsibilities during the suitability determination. If they do not fill out the forms properly, this causes delays, especially when the applicant is slow to respond.
• If the candidate does not know how long the suitability determination will take or what is involved in the process, the lack of transparency may create uncertainty and/or frustration among the applicant. Furthermore, if the candidate is not kept informed on where they are in the process or what to expect next, they may get discouraged and decline the tentative offer.
• Delays in scheduling fingerprinting appointments or access to fingerprinting facilities can also lengthen the time for the suitability determination.

What Can Go Right

• The hiring manager, HR specialist, and suitability experts work together to ensure the candidate knows where they are in the process and what is expected of them through frequent check-ins and progress tracking.
• Offering applicants a range of options for fingerprinting, including the opportunity to go to a third party vendor for prints. This can enable fast digital uploads within 24 hours (applicant may have to pay for third-party services).
• Hiring managers and HR specialists leverage the DCSA resources and tools, including the PDT Tool to determine the level of background check needed for their role.
• The Suitability manager uses a case management system to track and maintain all suitability requests. This will help ensure nothing is lost, and system notifications can help keep the process on track by requesting applicants, hiring managers, and HR specialists complete their tasks in a timely manner. One interview participant highlighted this as critical to the timeliness of the suitability process.

Make Official Offer and Enter on Duty (Onboard New Hire)

The last step in the hiring process is administering the final offer of employment, identifying and Entry on Duty date, and onboarding the new employee. HR staff usually shepherd the new employee through this step. The hiring manager, administrator, or a peer mentor frequently assists the new employee in making sure the employee understands what they need to do to begin contributing to the agency.

What Can Go Wrong

• The candidate declines the final offer of employment due to delays or dissatisfaction with their experience during the hiring process.
• Frequently, onboarding consists of filling out online forms, paperwork to register the new employee in the various agency systems, and required compliance training. Minimal attention is spent on their work and how it connects to the agency mission.
• All too often, the new employee does not receive their computer equipment, phone, or other resources necessary for them to do their jobs in a timely manner. These delays degrade the initial employee experience.

What Can Go Right

• HR and hiring manager program staff stay in constant connection with the candidate as they accept the job and start the onboarding process, ensuring that the early employee experience is positive. This includes not only the administrative activities but also introductions to the agency and the work they will be doing.
• Program managers and administrative staff can work with IT functions and other departments to make sure the new employee has the equipment and resources needed to start their job successfully.
• The hiring manager establishes their relationship with the new employee during onboarding, creating a positive atmosphere for the employee by clearly articulating expectations.

Conclusion

Hiring success depends heavily on the broader hiring ecosystem. There are many stakeholders (e.g., leadership, budget, program, HR, suitability, applicant) who play a crucial role; collaboration and communication is important for both a timely and successful hire. Adoption of best practices across the ecosystem will help to improve hiring outcomes, reduce process delays, and enhance the overall hiring experience for all parties involved. The best practices outlined in our blog post series provide a guide to better navigate the hiring process. 

The overall intent of hiring is to improve the performance of the federal program or function. New employees expand the organization’s workforce capacity and bring capabilities needed to achieve the mission. A skilled, prepared, and engaged federal employee can have an outsized impact on a program’s success.

Today, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists announced that the Doomsday Clock is 89 seconds to midnight. 

Created in 1974, the Clock is a symbolic representation of how close humanity is to global catastrophe—or midnight—due to man-made technologies. The Clock is set by the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, a group of experts on nuclear risk, biological threats, disruptive technologies, and climate change. Each time the Doomsday Clock is set, it is a visual reminder of the work to be done.

While the Clock has remained at 90 seconds for the past three years, today, the Bulletin announced that the Clock has moved 1 second to midnight, symbolizing a time of “unprecedented danger.” This is the closest the Doomsday Clock has ever been to midnight, even through events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the creation of the hydrogen bomb, 9/11, and North Korea’s first test of a nuclear weapon. The Science and Security Board explained that this change was due mainly to a rise in nuclear stockpiles, warming global temperatures, and advances in disruptive technologies. A “countdown to zero” metaphor, the Clock is used as a plea from scientists and experts for policy changes that would reduce the risk of nuclear war and mitigate the effects of climate change. 

Daniel Holz, the Chair of the Science and Security Board, stated that “the countries that possess nuclear weapons are increasing the size of all of their arsenals, investing hundreds of billions of dollars in weapons that can destroy civilization many times over.”

The Federation of American Scientists was founded over 75 years ago after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a commitment to the use of science and technology for the betterment of humanity. To this day, the staff continues to work towards the reduction of nuclear risks and to support evidence-based policy decisions.

In 2024, the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists reported on several of the risks that contributed to the clock’s hand moving forward. 

All nuclear weapons states are undergoing nuclear weapons modernization programs. While not all states are necessarily increasing the number of warheads in their stockpiles, a combination of nuclear signaling, the degradation of arms control, and massive spending indicate that we are entering an age of arms racing. All of these indicators demonstrate that states are further prioritizing nuclear weapons in their national security strategies, potentially at the expense of   more proximate security priorities. 

As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear war remains possible. The Nuclear Information Project provides transparency of global nuclear arsenals through open source analysis. It is through this data that policy makers can call for informed policy change. Pursuing policy options that lower the risks of nuclear war and global catastrophe should be of the utmost importance. In 2024, The Global Risk team at Federation of American Scientists proposed several options as part of FAS’s Day One Project.

Pursuing a Missile Pre-launch Notification with China as a Risk Reduction Measure

With tensions and aggressive rhetoric on the rise, the next administration needs to prioritize and reaffirm the necessity of regular communication with China on military and nuclear weapons issues to reduce the risk of misunderstandings. Details regarding a proposed agreement between China and the United States can be found in this policy memo. 

Removing Arbitrary Deployment Quotas for Nuclear Force Posture

Congress should ensure that no amendments dictating the size of the intercontinental ballistic missile force are included in future National Defense Authorization Acts. For more on reducing costs in the ICBM force and adjusting to current strategic objectives, read this policy memo.

Introducing Certification of Technical Necessity for Resumption of Nuclear Explosive Testing

The United States should continue its voluntary moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons tests and implement further checks on the president’s ability to call for a resumption of nuclear testing. On preventing environmental contamination, unnecessary spending, public health crises, and security threats due to resuming nuclear testing, read more here. 

Saving Billions on the US Nuclear Deterrent

Life-extending the existing Minuteman III missiles is the best way to field an ICBM force without sacrificing funding for other priorities. Read more in this policy memo.

In the machinery of national security decision-making, innovation is the first casualty of consensus. At the heart of this process lies the National Security Council’s multi-layered committee structure to develop policy recommendations for the President. While this process ensures broad interagency coordination, it also means that agencies can effectively veto options that challenge their interests. The result is that the President often only sees consensus recommendations that preserve institutional status quo, rather than the full range of viable policy options that might better serve national interests. The new National Security Advisor, Congressman Mike Waltz, should reshape the NSC process to provide better foreign policy advice for the President.

The Current Process: Design vs. Reality

The NSC’s decision-making process follows a carefully structured path. At the working level, Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) bring together Assistant Secretary-level officials and subject matter experts to develop initial policy options. These recommendations then move to the Deputies Committee, composed of deputy heads of relevant agencies, for refinement and further analysis. The Principals Committee, consisting of Cabinet-level officials, then reviews and shapes final recommendations before they reach the President through the National Security Advisor.

In theory, this layered approach should ensure thorough vetting while preserving diverse viewpoints. In practice, however, the system often produces the opposite effect. Each level of review tends to narrow options rather than expand them, as agencies work to protect their institutional interests and avoid conflict with other departments.

The Consensus Trap

The emphasis on interagency consensus, while well-intentioned, has become a structural impediment to bold or innovative policy options. Former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster warned about this in his book Battlegrounds stating, “Presenting a single option designed to either tell the President what he or she wants to hear, or to present the consensus position of the cabinet is doing him or her a disservice.” He argued that it is “important to provide the President with multiple options.”

When every agency effectively holds veto power over proposals, the path of least resistance becomes maintaining existing approaches with minor modifications. This dynamic is particularly problematic in rapidly evolving security situations where status quo responses may be inadequate.

Consider, for example, how options that might gore the ox of the Defense Department’s budget are quietly culled, or how proposals that ruffle the diplomatic feathers of the State Department rarely survive the process. While both of the Department’s perspectives may have merit, the current system often leads to their mutual neutralization, rather than producing either a creative outcome or an advancement of an option with dissents.

The Cost of Lost Alternatives

The consequences of this consensus-driven approach are significant. The President is often presented with artificially limited choices, typically framed as minor variations on existing policy rather than genuinely distinct alternatives. This narrowing of options can be particularly problematic in crisis situations where innovative approaches might be most needed. 

More concerning is what the President doesn’t see: options that challenge conventional wisdom, propose significant departures from existing policy, or require substantial institutional compromise or change. These alternatives, while potentially valuable, often don’t survive the gauntlet of interagency review.

Potential Reforms

During the Obama NSC we identified several reforms that could help address these structural limitations. Some of these ideas included:

1. Mandate a presentation of competing options: Require that multiple, genuinely distinct policy alternatives reach the President’s desk, even if they don’t have unanimous agency support.
2. Create independent analysis channels: Borrow the Intelligence Community’s Red Cell process and establish mechanisms for policy options to reach senior decision-makers without requiring consensus at every level.
3. Strengthen the NSC staff’s role: Empower NSC staff to develop independent options that might challenge agency preferences.
4. Reform the Deputies Committee process: Modify procedures to focus on developing multiple viable options rather than driving toward consensus.

The NSC’s current decision-making process, while sophisticated in design, often fails to provide the President with the full range of policy options needed for effective decision-making. The system’s emphasis on consensus, while valuable for implementation, has become an impediment to innovative policy development.

Reform is possible without dismantling the valuable coordination functions of the current system. By modifying procedures to ensure that diverse options reach senior decision-makers, the NSC can better fulfill its core mission: providing the President with the best possible range of choices for addressing national security challenges.

The goal isn’t to eliminate interagency coordination but to prevent it from unduly constraining presidential options. In an increasingly complex security environment, the President needs access to the fullest possible range of policy alternatives, not just those that survive the consensus-building process.

Jim Thompson is the Director of Government Capacity at the Federation of American Scientists. He served as a Director on both President Obama’s and President Biden’s National Security Councils.