What’s New for Nukes in the New NDAA?
At the time of publication, the NDAA had passed both chambers of Congress but had not yet been signed by the president. The Act, S. 1071, was signed into law on December 18.
Congress’ new annual defense spending package, passed on December 17, authorizes $8 billion more than the Trump administration requested, for a total of $901 billion. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) paints a picture of a Congress that is working to both protect and accelerate nuclear modernization programs while simultaneously lacking trust in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy to execute them. Below is an overview of provisions of note in the new NDAA related to nuclear weapons.
Sentinel / Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Every year since fiscal year (FY) 2017, Congress has inserted language into the NDAA prohibiting the Air Force from deploying fewer than 400 ICBMs (an arbitrary requirement put in place by pro-ICBM members of Congress fearful of any reductions in the force). The FY26 NDAA does not break this streak; in fact, it entrenches the requirement deeper into US policy. Rather than repeating the minimum ICBM requirement as a simple provision as previous NDAAs have done, Section 1632 of the new legislation inserts the requirement into Title 10 of the United States Code (the US Code is the official codification by subject matter of the general and permanent federal laws of the United States. Title 10 of the Code is the subset of laws related to the Armed Forces). This change means that Congress will no longer have to agree to and insert the requirement into the NDAA year after year. Instead, the requirement becomes the permanent standard and will require an affirmative change in a future NDAA to undo. Beyond requiring the Air Force to deploy at least 400 ICBMs, the new defense spending act additionally amends Title 10 of US Code to prohibit the Air Force from maintaining fewer than the current number of 450 ICBM launch facilities (essentially meaning that the Air Force cannot decommission any of the 50 extra launch facilities in the US inventory).
This change is indicative of a desire by Congress to bolster its protection of the ICBM program in response to increased scrutiny prompted by the ever-growing budgetary and programmatic failures of the Sentinel ICBM program. Interestingly, a provision in the Senate version of the defense authorization bill that would have established an initial operational capability (IOC) date for the Sentinel program of September 30, 2033, did not make it into the final text, suggesting a lack of confidence in the Air Force’s ability to achieve the milestone. With an original IOC of September 2030, the September 2033 date would have aligned with the Pentagon’s 2024 announcement that the Sentinel program was delayed by at least three years. The omission may thus indicate Congress’ anticipation of potential further delays to Sentinel’s schedule beyond the Air Force’s most recent estimate.
Nuclear Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)
In addition to protecting the most politically vulnerable nuclear weapons programs, the FY26 NDAA also aims to speed up US nuclear modernization and development, in some cases even beyond the requests of the administration. Despite the fact that the Pentagon’s FY26 budget request requested no discretionary funding for the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), the NDAA authorized $210 million for the program — on top of the $2 billion to the Department of Defense and $400 million to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) included in the July 2025 reconciliation package to “accelerate the development, procurement, and integration” of the SLCM-N missile and warhead, respectively.
Most notably, the new defense authorization act speeds up the SLCM-N’s deployment timeline by two years. Section 1633 of the act repeats the IOC date of September 30, 2034, established by the FY24 NDAA, but also requires DOD to deliver a certain number of SLCM-N — a number to be determined by the Nuclear Weapons Council — by September 30, 2032, to achieve “limited operational deployment” prior to IOC.
Future nuclear development
In addition to speeding up the deployment timeline for SLCM-N, the FY26 NDAA initiates and accelerates the development of new nuclear weapons by creating a new NNSA program in addition to the stockpile stewardship and stockpile responsiveness programs: the rapid capabilities program. The new program — established by section 3113 of the NDAA via insertion into Title 50 of the US Code (War and National Defense) — is tasked with developing new and/or modified nuclear weapons on an accelerated, five-year timeline (compared to the traditional 10-15 year timeline for new weapons programs) to meet military and deterrence requirements.
Numerous provisions in the new NDAA reflect a lack of trust by Congress in DOD and DOE’s ability to execute and deliver nuclear modernization programs. The creation of stricter and more detailed reporting requirements and action items for making progress on various nuclear weapons related programs constitute an increased effort by Congress to micromanage nuclear modernization programs.
One example of nuclear micromanagement in the act are Sections 150-151 regarding the B–21 bomber. Section 150 mandates the Air Force to submit to Congress:
- An annual report on the new B–21 nuclear bomber including:
- An estimate for the program’s average procurement unit cost, acquisition unit cost, and life-cycle costs,
- “A matrix that identifies, in six-month increments, plans for and progress in achieving key milestones and events, and specific performance metric goals and actuals for the development, production, and sustainment of the B–21 bomber aircraft program” (with detailed requirements for how the matrix should be subdivided and what information it must include),
- A cost matrix (also in six-month increments and including specified subdivisions),
- A semiannual update on the aforementioned matrices.
In addition, the provision requires the US Comptroller General to “review the sufficiency” of the Air Force’s report and submit an assessment to Congress. The following section of the NDAA additionally requires the Air Force to submit to Congress — within 180 days of the act’s enactment — “a comprehensive roadmap detailing the planned force structure, basing, modernization, and transition strategy for the bomber aircraft fleet of the Air Force through fiscal year 2040” (once again, including detailed requirements for what information the roadmap must include).
In a similar fashion, Sections 1641 and 1652 lay out strict reporting and planning requirements for sustaining the Minuteman III ICBM force and developing the Golden Dome ballistic missile defense program, respectively.
Such efforts by Congress to increase its management of US nuclear weapons programs could be in response to repeated and ongoing delays, cost overruns, and setbacks, or could simply reflect Congress’ desire to seize more control over the nuclear enterprise to get what it wants (or, likely, a bit of both). To be clear, Congressional scrutiny into nuclear programs is welcome amidst a trend of over-budget and behind-schedule procurement of unnecessary weapon systems by the Pentagon. Congress can and should play an important role in ensuring that the Departments of Defense and Energy are not handed blank checks for nuclear modernization.
That said, with this legislation, Congress authorized nearly $30 billion in spending for select nuclear weapons programs in FY26 alone. The tables below, developed by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, show a breakdown of Congress’ authorizations for these programs:
This article was researched and written with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.
Tracking the DF Express: A Practical Guide to Evaluating Chinese Media and Public Data for Studying Nuclear Forces
Observers of Chinese nuclear politics and force posture are old friends with information challenges. Open-source analysts of China’s nuclear force drew heavily on published Chinese-language writings, footage, and interviews by official Chinese media or private Chinese citizens, as well as commercial satellite imagery. These powerful open-source tools enable scholars to gain insight into some of the Chinese government’s most closely guarded secrets, such as the construction of 119 nuclear missile silos. Reports from well-regarded institutions, such as the PLA Rocket Force Order of Battle report by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, offer open-source research that provides concrete data on the Chinese nuclear force, using thoroughly analyzed imagery and Chinese-language materials. Other studies, such as several reports by the RAND Corporation and the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), extensively used Chinese military and technical writings to identify patterns in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s strategic thinking in its own words. Combined with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)’s annual report on nuclear forces, there is a growing and vibrant open-source intellectual community on the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF).
While researchers continue to dissect new information from China, obtaining reliable data has become increasingly difficult for two reasons. First, the Chinese government has curtailed foreign access to sources like academic databases that were previously fair game for scholarly use, complicating the already dense “information fog” over China’s political and military apparatus. Second, unverified, digitally altered, and AI-generated disinformation and misinformation are commonplace on popular social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter). Combined with the multitude of Chinese social media and video websites, weeding out the noise and distraction has become an increasingly challenging task for new researchers in this field.
This essay provides introductory guidance on the usefulness of Chinese social media and video platforms for observers and researchers of China’s nuclear force. This guide may assist researchers in identifying what to look for and on which platform, especially for those who are not advanced or native speakers of Mandarin. In the sections below, I compare a set of popular Chinese social media platforms and discuss the usefulness of each with respect to open-source study of the Chinese nuclear force. I also present a brief glossary of nicknames and vernacular terms related to nuclear matters in Mandarin, along with their translations. I conclude with a brief discussion of the use of AI-enabled translation tools for open-source research on the PLA.
Chinese media and OSINT: What’s good for what?
Sina Weibo (新浪微博)
Weibo is useful for providing timely, authoritative, and chronologically documented information on training exercises, operations, and policy changes that are of propaganda or morale-promoting value. The equivalent of X in China, Weibo is the biggest Chinese-language social media with over 500 million monthly active users as of 2024. It is likely the most influential social media platform in China, as indicated by the vast number of users and a highly agile and effective censorship system. Due to Weibo’s ability to rapidly disseminate information, all major state and military organs, including the PLA Daily, the Ministry of Defense, individual service branches, and all five PLA Theater Commands (战区), maintain official accounts on Weibo (Figure 1). These accounts are directly managed by dedicated propaganda or public affairs teams and authorized to post military content, which sometimes features approved footage and photos of training exercises. Details revealed in the footage or pictures may help researchers identify the unit leadership and the weapon systems used during the exercise. Additionally, Weibo is often the first platform to announce state media PLA news. The People’s Daily, CCTV, and the Xinhua Agency regularly post links to news articles and updates on Weibo to facilitate dissemination.
For researchers, Weibo contains a reasonably reliable search system. Researchers may use the Weibo search bar to look for mentions of “strategic deterrence,” “nuclear force,” or names of nuclear missiles and use the filter function to screen for content released by official accounts. For well-publicized events like a missile exercise, the topic may be included in the trending (热搜) section for real-time updates. However, a significant limitation of Weibo is that scholars must distinguish whether the content posted by the official accounts directly reflects the Party’s policy or simply shows a lower-level interpretation of the policy by individual units. These official accounts are likely managed by young, tech-savvy officers or civilian employees trained in public affairs.
Sometimes, these individuals might improvise and go beyond what they were prescribed. Some more active accounts, such as the Eastern Theater Command official account, have interacted with random Weibo users in the past and have eagerly implied their belligerent stance toward Taiwan. This led many Chinese netizens to interpret the official account’s posts as a sign of imminent military action, which thankfully was not the intention. Additionally, state-run accounts have also taken down content (primarily propaganda material) for reasons other than revealing unapproved or sensitive information. Again, since the accounts are likely managed by younger personnel at the lower level, contents could be removed when it was later found to be too politically sensitive or too unpersuasive. In 2019, the People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) official account posted a propaganda article on Weibo aimed at inspiring nationalistic fervor. It quoted a passionate patriotic poem written by Wang Jingwei (汪精卫), whom the Chinese government considered a “traitor (汉奸)” for cooperating with the Imperial Japanese invaders, most likely because the editor had known about the poem but not its authorship. The comment section quickly pointed out this “political mistake (政治错误)”, leading to the content’s prompt removal. As such, researchers should be aware that removed content does not necessarily suggest valuable information worth hiding.
It is also important to note that accessing Weibo sometimes involves more than typing in the URL. Aside from the content available on the front page (e.g., the trending section), the rich content of the platform is only accessible after logging in. One does not need a mainland Chinese phone number to create an account on Weibo. A virtual number from a trusted provider is also sufficient. Even without an account, researchers could still access the Weibo homepage of many accounts by searching the account’s name in a search engine (for instance, here is the direct link to the official PLA Eastern Theater Weibo page). However, Sina Weibo’s search bar will not be available for unregistered users.
CCTV.com (央视网)
CCTV.com is a webpage that gives scholars access to the state media’s TV programs without a registered account. In addition to live-streamed news stories, the webpage also serves as a large but incomplete archive of past TV programs. CCTV.com has high-definition PLA video footage and interviews, which may be particularly useful for open-source analysis. Some of the CASI reports made clever use of video footage released by Chinese state media to identify key information regarding training exercises and unit deployment, particularly the CCTV-7 channel dedicated to military content. Other open-source intelligence analysts were able to map out key personnel, location, and weapon system information from CCTV news broadcasts and military TV programs. The search bar supports keyword searches and includes government-sponsored TV programs from various channels. The search also returns results from CCTV webpages and the Xinhua Agency. This is the most useful for finding information related to specific missile systems. For instance, among the top results for “DF-26” include footage of a DF-26 missile from a documentary (Figure 2). The search result for “dual-capability” also returned a video by a Chinese military commentator who states that China’s hypersonic vehicle is dual-capable (Figure 3). For open-source analysis, having the ability to revisit footage that might contain useful information on the PLARF is a major advantage of this platform. At the same time, the search function is limited to the titles of the program, not necessarily the content. Furthermore, many of the videos available on CCTV.com are commentaries from Chinese military experts. While the commentary from the Chinese experts may be useful, the visual component may not always be the latest developments. Because of the length requirement of the TV program, the visual element may only have looped videos of known weapon testing or parade footage. Researchers may consider comparing the footage from different programs to remove the repeated material.
Bilibili (哔哩哔哩), Douyin (抖音), Kuaishou (快手)
Bilibili, Douyin, and Kuaishou are among the most used entertainment video-sharing and short-video platforms in China. Bilibili is a video service primarily for animation, comics, and games (ACG) content. It has a “bullet comment (弹幕)” function that allows users to inject text over the video content in real time. The platform attracts over 100 million daily users as of 2024. Douyin (the Chinese mainland version of TikTok) and Kuaishou are short-video platforms with a significantly larger user base than Bilibili, with Douyin content reaching over 1 billion active users monthly. Unsurprisingly, the PLA, the individual Theater Commands, and the Chinese government and Party organs maintain an active presence on these platforms for propaganda, news updates, and publicity programs, often repeating the same message sent across other outlets.
However, despite these platforms’ popularity, they are not great resources for open-source nuclear force research for two reasons. First, there is overwhelming noise from private click-farming content creators who would grossly overstate or fabricate China’s military capabilities to profit from nationalistic sentiments. A researcher may find many videos speculating about the capabilities of the H-20 bomber with no credible source to back up the claims. Private content creators typically have no privileged access to information. In the rare cases where some villagers filmed a rocket booster falling from the sky (some Chinese rocket boosters in the past landed in populated villages), the video is often quickly censored on these closely watched platforms. Second, official government accounts on these platforms almost always repeat information that has been released on Weibo and other traditional news platforms. Some Party organs, such as the Communist Youth League (共青团), which pushes propaganda to the younger generation, would convey the same approved message using CGI videos to boost nationalist sentiment, but the content itself is no more useful than reading the official news release. Overall, there is little added advantage of using the entertainment-based services for potentially useful open-source information.
Combining Sources
While Chinese video and social media platforms could assist OSINT research on China’s nuclear forces, researchers could also combine the visual element of weapon systems with textual data gathered from authoritative Chinese platforms like China Military Online (中国军网), PLA Procurement website (军队采购网), and Qi Cha Cha (企查查). The visual data can help identify many technical aspects of the PLA’s nuclear weapons, but the textual information can greatly inform the acquisition, production, and deployment of the weapon and support systems. Provinces with robust military and heavy industries, such as Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, and Shaanxi, sometimes release contracting and procurement information locally on provincial and municipal government websites. The information found on local government websites is admittedly sporadic, making broad, systematic collection difficult. Still, such information could serve as valuable first-hand sources for OSINT researchers. For more technical analysis of weapon systems, the China National Intellectual Property Administration (中国国家知识产权局) has a patent database that could be useful to track the development and ownership of certain enabling technologies for nuclear systems. This may be further enhanced by using the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (中国知网CNKI) to locate academic articles on the relevant technology, though access to CNKI articles usually requires an institutional subscription through a university library. Note that many of the Chinese government and military websites do not support a secure HTTPS connection. Some, like Qi Cha Cha, may require the user to access its content from a Chinese mainland IP address. Researchers should deploy cybersecurity tools to take full advantage of these resources.
Nicknames and Vernacular
In addition to the advantages and limitations of different social media platforms, researchers should be aware of the common nicknames and vernacular related to the Chinese nuclear force. Much like how the F-16 is commonly called “viper” instead of the official name “fighting falcon,” there are also nicknames for weapons and systems in the PLA. The table below summarizes several common terms and explains their meaning and primary usage.
A Note on Using AI Translation Services
There is little doubt that AI-enabled translation services like DeepL offer convenient and mostly accurate translations of Chinese texts. However, users should exercise caution when asking the AI to translate lengthy or complicated Chinese texts. Since the Chinese written language system is not space-delimited and often contains a mix of recently invented slang words, formal, and classical Chinese (文言文) phrases and quotes, the translation software sometimes cannot adjust properly to the context in which the classical phrases are used. This could easily lead to misinterpretation.For instance, translating and searching for the phrase “nuclear force (核力量)” may return results that contain the phrase “hardcore power (硬核力量)”, which is unrelated to nuclear weapons. In another example, a PLA Daily article uses the phrase “北约军费连增虚实几何” as the title, which mixes the classical grammar with modern Mandarin. DeepL would translate the word “几何” as “geometry” because it is the most used meaning in modern Mandarin, whereas the correct interpretation is “to what extent” or “by how much” in this context (Figure 4).
In a similar instance, DeepL entirely fails to translate the part that contains classical grammar and offers an incorrect translation (Figure 5). This is most likely because the software treats the original Chinese phrase as a statement, whereas the classical grammar indicates a question.
Therefore, it is prudent to cross-reference and look up phrases individually when using AI-enabled translation tools. Inserting complete paragraphs is likely less accurate than looking up difficult phrases or individual vocabulary.
Conclusion
This paper provides a preliminary guide on using Chinese social media and video platforms for nuclear-related open-source research by reviewing the usefulness and credibility of the content released by various official and privately owned platforms (Table 2). In sum, there is no singular most useful platform for information on the Chinese nuclear force, but some may help piece together interesting findings upon cautious review and cross-reference. While advanced Chinese language proficiency and cultural familiarity remain irreplaceable skills that can greatly enhance the accuracy and speed of open-source analysis, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for successful open-source analysis on China’s nuclear forces. Researchers can still make effective and efficient use of publicly available information by applying analytical due diligence and having context-specific awareness of Chinese sources.
This publication was made possible by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
A Guide to Satellite Imagery Analysis for the Nuclear Age – Assessing China’s CFR-600 Reactor Facility
Satellite imagery has long served as a tool for observing on-the-ground activity worldwide, and offers especially valuable insights into the operation, development, and physical features related to nuclear technology. This report serves as a “start-up guide” for emerging analysts interested in assessing satellite imagery in the context of the nuclear field, outlining the steps necessary for developing comprehensive and effective analytical products.
What goes on in the mind of an analyst during satellite imagery analysis? Four broad steps included in this report – establishing context, collecting imagery, analyzing imagery, and drawing conclusions – serve as a simple outline for analysts interested in assessing satellite imagery with a particular focus on the nuclear field. This report uses China’s CFR-600 reactor site as a case study, providing a roadmap to the analytical thought processes behind the analysis of satellite imagery.
This report was adapted into an ArcGIS StoryMap, an interactive multimedia narrative. Click here to view the StoryMap.
Inspections Without Inspectors: A Path Forward for Nuclear Arms Control Verification with “Cooperative Technical Means”
The 2010 New START Treaty, the last bilateral agreement limiting deployments of U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals, will expire in February 2026 with no option for renewal. This will usher in an era of unconstrained nuclear competition for the first time since 1972, allowing the United States and Russia to upload hundreds of additional warheads onto their deployed arsenals if they made a political decision to do so. The removal of both the verifiable limits on nuclear weapons, as well as the agreed and proven mechanisms of information sharing about each country’s nuclear arsenal, will increase mistrust, lead to nuclear military planning based on worst case scenarios, and potentially accelerate a global nuclear arms race amid a worsening geopolitical environment.
Traditional nuclear arms control, including New START, relies on the availability of on-site inspections to verify compliance. However, Russia has suspended its participation in New START and opposes intrusive inspections, while political conditions make negotiating an equally robust successor treaty improbable in the near term.
The proposal: verifiable nuclear arms control without on-site inspections
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” (CTM) for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits. This approach builds on Cold War precedents—particularly SALT II, which relied largely on national technical means (NTM)—while leveraging modern Earth-observation satellites whose capabilities have significantly advanced in recent years.
The proposed interim agreement would:
- Preserve New START’s central limits on launchers and warheads.
- Resume notifications and data exchanges.
- Uphold the principle of non-interference with national technical means of verification.
- Incorporate a set of cooperative measures to expose systems for satellite verification, making possible remote monitoring and counting of nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons.
Such a regime could either be a formal, legally-binding treaty or an informal political arrangement. A non-binding arrangement may also encourage the participation of other nuclear states willing to freeze the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons, including China, the United Kingdom, France, India, and Pakistan.
How would it work?
Significant increases in both the quality and quantity of state-owned and commercial observation satellites now allow global monitoring of missile silo fields, weapons storage sites, air bases, and ports at high resolutions, in different bands, and at actionable frequencies of observation. These developments make it possible to:
- Count strategic launchers. Missile silos, mobile launchers garrisoned in bases, submarines in ports, and heavy bombers at air bases are all observable by electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensors. Large-scale silo construction is now nearly impossible to conceal.
- Assess deployment status. Cooperative measures—such as opening silo doors for satellite passes—could verify whether launchers contain missiles. AI-assisted SAR and EO imagery could detect, classify and count nuclear bombers. Unique markings or alphanumeric codes placed on mobile launchers and bombers could facilitate counting and identification from space.
- Estimate deployed warheads. New START counts every nuclear bomber as carrying a single warhead. A similar counting rule could be established for other delivery vehicles. Otherwise, exposing missiles’ re-entry vehicles (RV) during coordinated satellite overpasses could allow for the counting of warheads remotely. While this could not confirm if the displayed RVs are nuclear or decoys, it would set verifiable upper limits.
- Address non-strategic and non-deployed weapons. Novel SAR observation techniques can help detect undisclosed activity and traffic around storage facilities, ensuring weapons are not secretly moved in or out.
Why this matters
Arms control is a crucial tool for managing nuclear risks. The proposed remote-sensing verification regime could help maintain transparency, facilitate communication, and provide predictability between the United States and Russia beyond 2026, reducing the danger of nuclear arms racing without needing to tackle the politically sensitive issue of on-site inspections.
No past or present arms control regime is perfect and completely safe against cheating. An agreement fully relying on observation satellites would not fully eliminate uncertainty, but it would be relatively easier to negotiate than one with on-site inspections, and it would increasingly raise the costs of deception, providing visibility into major nuclear developments and leaving a pathway to more comprehensive arms control once it becomes politically viable in the future.
FAS Receives $500k Grant On Emerging Disruptive Technologies and Mobile Nuclear Launch Systems
The Carnegie Corporation of New York grant funds research in partnership with The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) on the destabilizing impacts of emerging and disruptive technologies on mobile nuclear launch platforms.
Washington, D.C. – November 6, 2025 – The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has received a $500,000 grant to analyze the capabilities of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) to track and trail mobile nuclear launch platforms—particularly land-based mobile missile forces and sea-based systems. The grant comes from the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY) to investigate, alongside The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the associated impact on nuclear stability.
The grant funds a two-year project to support FAS’ and BASIC’s joint effort to research current EDT capabilities and potential future applications in order to supply experts and policymakers with data to recommend short- and medium-term risk reduction measures. Additionally, the grant enables FAS and BASIC to bring together an interdisciplinary community of scientific, technical, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) experts.
“We are excited to partner with BASIC on this project and grateful to CCNY for the opportunity,” said Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, Senior Research Associate on the Nuclear Information Project at FAS and co-lead of the project. “As OSINT analysts, it’s important that we are aware of what new tools and capabilities are out there for tracking nuclear forces. It is essential, however, that we are responsible practitioners with a thorough understanding of the implications for nuclear stability if such technologies threaten the traditional survivability of mobile systems.”
The project scope will include desk-based research, workshops with leading experts and practitioners, briefings with stakeholders, and publications. The conclusion of the grant will result in educational events about the findings across nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, with the objective to reduce nuclear risk.
“BASIC is delighted to be partnering with FAS to investigate the impacts of the cutting-edge emerging and disruptive technologies on the stealth of land- and sea-based mobile nuclear delivery platforms,” writes BASIC Executive Director Sebastian Brixey-Williams. “If such platforms can be detected – whether allied or adversary owned – nuclear stability may be significantly compromised. It is therefore essential that nuclear planners are equipped with robust and clear-eyed assessments of potential risks and recommendations on mitigation measures.”
The impact of “near-term” EDTs (defined as those that are currently in development or expected to develop over the next 5-10 years) is a topic BASIC has reported extensively.
“This work lies at the critical intersection between technology and policy. By strengthening a community of experts who understand these technologies and their associated risks, we can more effectively inform and engage the public and policymakers on nuclear dangers and strategic stability challenges,” said Eliana Johns, Senior Research Associate with the Nuclear Information Project at FAS and co-lead of the project.
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ABOUT FAS
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) works to advance progress on a broad suite of contemporary issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver transformative impact, and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table. Established eighty years ago by scientists in response to the atomic bomb, FAS continues to bring scientific rigor and analysis to address national challenges. More information about FAS work at fas.org.
Incomplete Upgrades at RAF Lakenheath Raise Questions About Suspected US Nuclear Deployment
Satellite imagery of RAF Lakenheath reveals new construction of a security perimeter around ten protective aircraft shelters in the designated nuclear area, the latest measure in a series of upgrades as the base prepares for the ability to store U.S. nuclear weapons. However, U.S. budget documents indicate that forthcoming upgrades to security and command and control are required before the base can accommodate a nuclear mission. These projects introduce more questions than answers about RAF Lakenheath’s nuclear status and what its role will be in the NATO nuclear strike mission.
In addition to these upgrades, the United Kingdom recently announced plans to expand its nuclear posture by adding a nuclear role for the Royal Air Force through the purchase of 12 F-35As from the United States to join NATO’s nuclear sharing mission; a further reduction in the “independence” of the UK deterrent.
Combined, these changes mark a departure from decades of nuclear policy and underscore a broader shift in NATO nuclear posture in response to tensions with Russia.
Are There New U.S. Nukes in the UK?
In July 2025, a set of two USAF C-17 flights directly from Kirtland AFB to RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk, England, triggered widespread rumors that nuclear weapons had been shipped to the base. While the indicators are strong, other Air Force budget documents raise questions about whether the necessary nuclear upgrades at the base have been completed to allow deployment yet.
Aside from Türkiye, each NATO country that hosts U.S. nuclear weapons has purchased the F-35A Lightning II to replace its legacy aircraft in the nuclear delivery role. In 2022, RAF Lakenheath became the first European base to receive the F-35A, and its 48th Fighter Wing remains the only USAF wing to operate both the F-15E and the F-35A nuclear-capable fighter aircraft. Years of accumulating evidence now point to the preparation of U.S.-operated RAF Lakenheath to receive U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs, marking the first time in nearly 20 years that the USAF nuclear mission has returned to the United Kingdom.
Then, on July 17, 2025, analysts tracked the flight of a C-17 nuclear transport plane associated with the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force from Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico to RAF Lakenheath. The direct flight from the USAF nuclear weapons depot at Albuquerque did not overfly other countries on its way to Lakenheath, a strong indicator that the aircraft could have been carrying nuclear materials. A second similar flight took place a few days later on July 23. During these dates, several signs, such as increased security measures at RAF Lakenheath, suggest that these flights could have been the first transfer of nuclear weapons to the base. Despite these strong indicators, several factors regarding additional command and security features raise doubts that a weapons shipment has already occurred.
First and foremost, if nuclear weapons were to be deployed, we would expect to see a completed security perimeter around the designated nuclear area at RAF Lakenheath similar to what other nuclear bases across Europe have received (see figure 1). The FY25 USAF Military Construction Budget included a project for establishing a “Surety mission Protective Aircraft Shelter Barrier System,” which will consist of fencing, security gates, access and perimeter control roads, entry control points, and cybersecurity. The Air Force document states that the project is “required to provide a permanent perimeter security system around 22 Protective Aircraft Shelters that will be used to support the Surety mission.” Without these additional features, according to the US Air Force, “Royal Air Force Lakenheath lacks the physical security measures needed to protect Surety assets within the Protective Aircraft Shelters from unauthorized access, theft, damage, sabotage, or unauthorized use.”
Notably, satellite imagery from Planet Laboratories does reveal the initial construction of a secure fencing perimeter in the designated nuclear area that began as early as February 2025. However, the construction is taking place around ten, not 22, of the protective aircraft shelters, as the FY26 budget had indicated. Meanwhile, there is no mention of this fencing project in the FY23 or FY24 budgets, and the FY25 budget states that construction for this project is set to start in May 2026, with completion anticipated for October 2029. There is also no mention of a fencing or “security barrier” project in the FY26 budget estimate. Additionally, the FY25 budget indicates that $185 million was requested and authorized for this project, but only $5 million was appropriated, meaning the project wasn’t cancelled, but Congress only released that number out of the total authorized funds. It is possible that the funding for this project could have been redesignated to come from a different budget, but it is nevertheless an odd discrepancy.
Two other major infrastructure projects outlined in the U.S. Air Force FY26 military construction budget have yet to be completed. The first project is for a “Command Post” at RAF Lakenheath, which will involve replacing and improving security at facilities to meet intelligence security standards, hardening facilities to protect against “collateral effects,” and expanding capacity to accommodate an increase in staff to support the “surety mission” as well as the “Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications, and Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal equipment.” The budget states that “if this project is not provided, Royal Air Force Lakenheath will not be able to accommodate the Surety Beddown mission” (see figure 2). It continues, saying that without this facility, staff “will not be able to implement the minimum command and control requirements at Royal Air Force Lakenheath. This limitation will impede mission capability, readiness, and contingency support to ongoing and future operations within the European area of responsibility.” Construction for the command post is not scheduled to begin until August 2027 and is not expected to be completed until July 2031.
The second project outlined in the FY26 Air Force budget is a “Defender Operations Compound” at RAF Lakenheath, which includes a range of security-related infrastructure, personnel, and operational support, as the existing capacity is deemed “undersized for the current mission.” The purpose of this project is “to provide enhanced security capabilities supporting the potential stationing of specialized weapons at Royal Air Force Lakenheath. Specialized weapons surety includes materiel, personnel, and procedures contributing to the safeguarding and reliability of specialized weapons, and to the assurance that there will be no specialized weapon accidents, incidents, unauthorized weapon detonation, or degradation in performance at the target.” This section of the budget repeated a statement about the importance of this project for Lakenheath to be able to “accommodate the potential Surety mission beddown.” Construction is not scheduled to begin until March 2028 and is not expected to be completed until June 2031. Both of these programs—the Command Post and the Defender Operations Compound—were listed as “future projects” in the FY24 and FY25 budgets.
The ongoing construction of a security perimeter and the pending construction of command and control infrastructure outlined in the budget raise the question of whether the USAF would have deployed gravity bombs to Lakenheath already. Additionally, these uncertainties prompt further questions about whether Lakenheath’s role has shifted from a contingency site to a more permanent or semi-permanent deployment location.
If There Aren’t New U.S. Nukes Now, There Will Be At Some Point
Meanwhile, on June 24, 2025, the United Kingdom announced the purchase of 12 new nuclear-capable F-35As from the United States and its intention to join NATO’s nuclear sharing mission. These aircraft will be based at RAF Marham, an air base near Lakenheath with a similar Cold War nuclear legacy, and the base will also eventually be equipped to host U.S. nuclear gravity bombs in the 2030s.
The United Kingdom retired and destroyed all its nonstrategic gravity bombs in 1998 and has since relied solely on four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines for its nuclear deterrent. The submarines carry ballistic missiles leased from the United States, and although the warhead has been developed and manufactured by the United Kingdom, the design is similar to the U.S. Navy’s W76 warhead, and the United States also supplies the reentry body. This decision to join the NATO nuclear-sharing mission with dual-capable aircraft equipped with U.S. nuclear bombs increases the United Kingdom’s reliance on the United States and marks a significant departure from decades of UK nuclear strategy and posture, apparently in reaction to the growing concern about Russia.
This plan was first hinted at in the UK’s latest Strategic Defence Review—published on June 2, 2025—which recommended that the Ministry of Defence “commence discussions with the United States and NATO on the potential benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission.” Less than a month later, the UK government formally announced its decision to buy the 12 F-35As from the United States. A parliamentary inquiry to the Minister of Armed Forces by the Defence Committee questioned whether the decision is coherent with the UK’s current nuclear doctrine and raised concerns about retaining British nuclear sovereignty, considering that the 12 F-35As will not be able to use their nuclear weapons unless authorized to do so by the president of the United States. The inquiry Chair also commented on how this change is the “most significant defence expansion since the Cold War” and noted that the UK’s Defence Nuclear Enterprise remains outside of meaningful parliamentary inquiry, despite accounting for around 20% of the total defence budget.
Similar to the upgrades taking place at Lakenheath, the future deployment of U.S. gravity bombs to RAF Marham will require significant upgrades to command and control and infrastructure at the base. From specialized tarmacs for the new F-35As, to updating the protective aircraft shelters and specialized WS3 storage vaults for nuclear gravity bombs (which were deactivated in the late-1990s), to improving security perimeters and installations at the base, RAF Marham has a long way to go before the nuclear mission becomes operational in the early 2030s.
The Bigger Picture in Europe
The nuclear upgrades at RAF Lakenheath and RAF Marham contradict statements made by NATO officials just a few years ago. In 2021, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated, “We have no plans of stationing any nuclear weapons in any other countries than we already have these nuclear weapons as part of our deterrence.” Two years later, in 2023, then-head of NATO nuclear policy Jessica Cox echoed Stoltenberg’s assurance, saying, “There is no need to change where they are placed.”
The news of a potential deployment of nuclear weapons to RAF Lakenheath and the UK’s purchase of F-35As for the NATO nuclear mission are the latest in a series of developments showing increased nuclear posturing in Europe over the past decade. The deepening crisis with Russia has led to an increase in rhetoric, posture, and operational exercises involving nuclear weapons from the United States and NATO countries. Expansive upgrades to bases storing U.S. nuclear weapons across Europe, enhanced visibility of NATO’s annual tactical nuclear exercise, increased strategic bomber operations, and strategic missile submarines making port visits or surfacing for photo opportunities are just some of the more tangible signals that are raising the profile of nuclear weapons. France, too, has bolstered its nuclear rhetoric, increased spending on its nuclear program, and announced plans to establish another nuclear air base at Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur in eastern France.
All together, the NATO nuclear upgrades combined with Russia’s own upgrades and nuclear sharing with Belarus, illustrate a deepening reliance on nuclear weapons for security in Europe. The United Kingdom’s entry into the NATO nuclear mission and the likely deployment of U.S. B61 bombs to not one but two bases in the United Kingdom mark the first time since the end of the Cold War that the number of nuclear bases in Europe and the amount of nuclear weapons on European territory could be growing rather than decreasing.
This article was researched and written with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Jubitz Family Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.
Avoiding Nuclear Danger in Northeast Asia
For the last two years, experts from the Federation of American Scientists and Nagasaki University have engaged with American, Japanese and South Korean experts as well as partners with valuable insights on nuclear policies in China and Russia to assess the risks of nuclear use and escalation in Northeast Asia. The results of this work are sobering, but not surprising. The growing reliance on nuclear weapons and growing geo-political tensions in the region are a recipe for nuclear disaster. Only purposeful and coordinated actions among countries that seek to avoid war and the use of nuclear weapons can reverse these trends and address these dangers. If current trends and dynamics continue, the risk of nuclear use will continue to increase.
Our consultations included commissioned working papers from U.S., Japanese and South Korean authors, as well as experts on China and Russia to assess the role nuclear weapons play in the security policies of those countries, and how each country views the prospect of war and nuclear risk. Two workshops, one in Seoul and one in Tokyo, were convened by our organizations over the last year and a half. These events included discussions both before and after the U.S. election, and before and after the declaration of martial law in South Korea. The papers and discussions led to a recently published special feature on “The Future of Nuclear Stability in East Asia” of Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament ( J-PAND) .
As the lead researchers for this project, we have developed the following assessments and believe pursuing a set of concrete and deliberate recommendations are essential if Governments seek to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict through accident or miscalculation. The authors do not assume that such steps will change the broader geo-strategic realities in the region. However, these steps, if integrated into government action, offer the prospect of constructive collaboration among states where such efforts are scarce. Furthermore, it remains possible that, once engaged on an issue of mutual self-preservation, the momentum can be created for other cooperative efforts.
Reducing Nuclear Risks and Salience
Unless the policies and activities of all nuclear-armed states and their allies change in East Asia, the probability of a nuclear crisis will continue to grow. This reality should be alarming to all states in the region, as all will suffer should the region (or the world) witness the use of nuclear weapons in combat or even during peacetime as tools for coercion. What is needed is both a recognition of the dynamics driving the potential for crisis by national leaders, coupled with deliberate actions to reduce the risks of accident, escalation, and, where possible, reliance on nuclear weapons for anything other than core nuclear deterrence. Even then, the risks of accidents due to human behavior and complex systems should lead any responsible country to establish in advance a set of mechanisms for communicating to avoid misperception or mistakes when a crisis emerges, which inevitably will.
Of course, not all analysts see these dynamics the same way. The dominant view in the United States is that America’s nuclear capabilities are both essential and highly valuable in both deterring and assuring, and the more reliable and credible these capabilities are, the more stable will be U.S. alliances, and the region as a whole. However, if one considers multiple national perspectives as well as the risks of both accident and miscalculation, there are clear consequences for increasing nuclear salience and enhancing reliance on nuclear weapons that should lead to a deeper examination of alternatives and steps to mitigate those risks. At a minimum, recognizing that the risk of nuclear acquisition, signaling, and use in the region are increasing must lead to closer examination of ways to reduce the risks of accidental or unintended conflict, and to find ways to separate broader U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons from the possible decision by more states in the region to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
Of course, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there will be an inherent risk that they will be used, and indeed multiple nations continue to rely on nuclear deterrence as a basis for their security. However, there should be no tolerance for accepting unnecessary nuclear risks associated with accidents and miscalculation. Moreover, while all states seek to project their ability to use and manage escalation to their own benefit, there needs to be greater work invested to understanding escalation dynamics among all states in the region and time spent avoiding the risk of uncontrolled or runaway escalation pressures.
In its simplest form, the world and the nations of the region need to recognize that they are part of a multipolar nuclear vortex of potential conflict among four states with nuclear weapons, and two others advanced conventionally-armed states who could trigger (intentionally or otherwise) a conflict with global dimensions. The risks of conflict in the region are as grave as they have ever been, and concerted, reasoned and multi-faceted efforts to manage the nuclear risks inherent in the region are required.
Just as states in the region have different perspectives about what enhances or reduces stability, states also have different interests when it comes to measures perceived to enhance stability and predictability. Eager to maintain the regional security status quo, the United States has sought for many years to promote a set of dialogues and norms to reduce the risks of conflict and accident. However, not content with the status quo, in which the United States maintains broad sway and can project military power in the region, China has resisted crisis management or risk reduction efforts. U.S. officials have proposed repeatedly to establish a set of guard rails on escalation, to which Chinese officials have remarks that such protections may only encourage the U.S. to continue reckless behavior.
Nevertheless, all states regardless of history and intent need to be attentive to the region’s growing nuclear dangers. Russia, China, and the United States have adopted a common position that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. North Korea, which is not recognized formally as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, has not issued any similar statements. However, the consequences of any nuclear use in the region would be extreme and must be avoided at all costs.
Steps that could be pursued to that end are discussed below. These include working to reinforce the norm of non-nuclear use, as well as development of tangible mechanisms that can be used in a crisis to communicate and potentially avoid unwanted or accidental escalation.
Political and Diplomatic Steps
Nuclear Leadership
Leaders in the participant countries, and mainly in those with nuclear weapons, need to invest the time and effort to better understand the magnitude of the nuclear risks they manifest, and to communicate with each other at the direct, personal level that they understand those realities. In all of the affected countries, the military services and organizations that support nuclear missions tend to take on a momentum of their own in service of providing their leadership with options for military victory and possible nuclear use. That is their job, yet their actions also can place pressures on leaders whose interests are necessarily broader. Demonstrating at a high political level that those authorized to use and provide options for the use of nuclear weapons understand the risks and consequences involved is an essential step in reducing nuclear dangers. The temptation to bluff, project indifference, or adopt “mad man” postures must be conclusively rejected by all states in the region.
Allied/Conventional Leadership
Japan and South Korea, as the non-nuclear states in the region – as well as Taiwan – should continue to take and expand efforts to encourage constructive engagement and risk reduction measures so that leaders of China, the United States, Russia and North Korea recognize the new nuclear age the world has entered. The lessons that led the leaders of the Soviet Union and United States to end the last global nuclear arms race appear to have been forgotten or lost, a form of collective amnesia about the virtues of cooperative approaches to tempering risks. America’s non-nuclear allies can stimulate broader engagement including through academic, Track II, civil society, economic and other forms of indirect, non-governmental engagement. These channels may not produce immediate results, but should be pursued as they are low risk approaches that can be valuable in expanding consultations, increasing the flow of information, and identifying opportunities for governmental engagement. Through intermediaries, regional groupings, and other bi- and multilateral settings, the non-nuclear weapon states endangered by the nuclear dynamics in East Asia need to increase their efforts to build and support risk reduction dialogues, or avenues for those discussions among the nuclear states.
Intra-alliance Discussions
In today’s environment, it is both important and appropriate for U.S. allies to be vocal in encouraging the United States to remain an active security provider and a conduit for constructive dialogues in the region. However, U.S. allies should also speak out and engage their counterparts in Washington when and if they believe it will be harder for them to continue strong security cooperation with the United States if Washington is not actively seeking to reduce the risks of escalation to the nuclear level in a conflict with other regional powers. There is no region where U.S. allies can expect to reap security benefits of a nuclear alliance with Washington without risk. Yet it remains impossible to predict how increased nuclear risks might influence political dynamics in U.S. allies such as South Korea and Japan. This dynamic should be an open part of expanding extended deterrence and security discussions among the U.S. and its security partners.
Within the U.S. extended deterrent relationships with South Korea and Japan, as well as its partnership with Taiwan, there also needs to be a more fulsome and mature discussion about the balance between deterrence and defense, and risks of nuclear escalation. The U.S. relationships with Japan and South Korea especially over the last decades has matured to the point that Tokyo and Seoul take an active role in understanding, assessing, characterizing, and planning detailed responses to specific threat scenarios. This coordination benefits all of the states, but should also include active discussions about conventional-nuclear weapon dynamics, including the risks of accidents and escalation within and beyond the nuclear level, and develop more robust tools for preventing and controlling such escalation, and avoiding miscommunication and accidents. It is unknown, and perhaps unknowable in advance of a conflict, whether the United States will act on its defense commitments in a conflict. However, with increased doubts about U.S. commitments comes the risk both that U.S. allies will seek to expand their own capabilities, drawing a reaction from China and North Korea (while allies’ actions are already reactions to their actions), and furthering the action-reaction cycle that defines arms race instability. Of course, there is also the omnipresent concern that China or North Korea will miscalculate, may assume they can act with impunity, and then find the U.S. ready, willing and able to meet its defense commitments. In short, the region is going to be more unstable and U.S. allies have a direct interest in ensuring not only that they are prepared to face a possible attack, but that they and the United States invest the time and effort now to avoid a conflict should one start by accident or through miscalculation, or escalate beyond the conventional level.
One of the most positive developments for security and deterrence in East Asia over the last few years has been the improved coordination and tempering of political animus between Japan and South Korea, owing in part to the active encouragement of the United States. It is no overstatement that the United States cannot hope to create a stable deterrent relationship with China if it is unable to work with two like-minded partners in Japan and South Korea, not least if those two countries cannot work together toward a common goal of stability and conflict avoidance. To be sure, Seoul and Tokyo have different threat concerns and priorities. But the ability to deter conflict, project strength and coordination, and act quickly and decisively to terminate a conflict and avoid escalation comes through enhanced and durable political and military coordination and collaboration among the United States and its allies in the region. A thickening of US-ROK-Japan as a trilateral security partnership is among the best options those states have to preserve peace and stability in East Asia.
Technical Tools
It remains an open question whether geopolitical tension in the region have led to arms racing or whether arms racing has led to geopolitical tensions. The growth of conflict and tension in the region is a long history and regardless of whether one believes weapons drive conflict or conflict drives weapons, the dynamics in the region are clear for all to see. It is possible that no amount of dialogue, engagement, and risk reduction efforts will disrupt these dynamics. The history of humanity is, in many ways, the history of warfare. However, that history is also loaded with episodes of unwanted and unnecessary conflicts that were detrimental to all involved. As technology improves, countries and other groups will have tools to reduce the risks of accidents and miscommunication, as well as unintended escalation. To be effective, these tools need to be in place before any conflict begins. Examples include:
Crisis communication tools
The public often considers telephone hotlines as the standard tool for communicating with leaders in a crisis. However, it is not widely known that the United States and Soviet Union, and later Russia, put in place a basic but more capable computer-based system that did not rely on voice communications between leaders to pass messages, but established an open computer display in each capital to ensure that no matter the contingency, messages could be sent and read without any action by the receiving side. In fact, the nuclear risk reduction centers remain in place and in use between Washington and Moscow to this day. The ability to send a message without having to wait for the other side to “pick up the phone” has proved to have important political and technical advantages over more simple telecommunications.
No similar system (except for some bilateral mechanisms that require the other side to respond) exists anywhere in East Asia between the United States or any of the countries in the region. The establishment of risk reduction communication centers in all of the capitals, or simply establishing them between bilateral pairs, is one way to create mechanisms before a crisis strikes to help resolve misunderstandings or miscommunications. While it is entirely possible that a message sent will not be reciprocated or well received, there is little to any cost to establishing such a system. Indeed, even the absence of a response can be important information that aids decision making.
The United States and Russia could offer to expand their current system to include other countries, share and demonstrate the technology that they use for consideration by China, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea, or pairs of states could establish similar networks on their own. One way to facilitate this process might also be for a civil society group, such as National Academies of Science or other equivalent academic centers to establish test networks that could be used and demonstrated over a period of months for national military and leaderships in the individual countries to observe the system in use before they commit to them as a political decision.
Incident Agreements
The United States and the Soviet Union worked over the course of the Cold War to establish norms of behavior and then create operational tools for their militaries to communicate at the operational level to manage accidents. These were largely successful both in providing tools to manage crises and signaling that both sides had an interest in avoiding unintended or unwanted conflicts. Despite efforts to create similar systems and tools in East Asia, agreements or tools that have been put in place (such as 1998 US-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement as well as 2018 Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japan-China Defense Authorities and 2023 Hotline between Japanese and Chinese Defense Authorities) to manage potential incidents among the relevant armed forces (naval and air forces being the main focus with China, and ground forces being a major concern on the Korean Peninsula) are far from enough. They should first make these existing mechanisms effective and useful and then expand them to establish norms of behavior and create operational communication tools.
Not all states in the region support the establishment of such mechanisms, but they are a potentially useful tool that willing states should look to establish and promote. Demonstrating responsible behavior and signaling a concern about the direction of regional security are both valuable opportunities for leaders, and despite some concerns would have no tangible effect on the ability to both deter and prepare for a potential clash of forces. There have been multiple studies done on best practices for such systems including how to establish pre-existing norms of behavior, conduits for communication, and how states should behave if an accident or unplanned clash among forces takes place. These efforts should continue and be enhanced. Where possible U.S., ROK and Japanese approach for intra-alliance/partner behavior and products should be published and promoted as standards that could form the basis for broadening of such efforts to include China and North Korea, as well as Russia.
Build and Use Open-Source Networks
The space revolution has provided governments and independent analysts with a stunning set of tools that previously were inaccessible to all but intelligence agencies in a handful of developed countries. Now, the availability of commercial observation satellites and low-cost drones create potential tools for states in the region to monitor each other’s military behaviors, anticipate potential moves that undermine the security of another, and have detailed information that can be used as part of risk reduction or crisis management processes. Obviously, not all countries in East Asia are pleased with the newfound transparency that can be imposed from outside of their own borders, but this technology will only continue to expand and provide potential tools for others in the region. This will at once reduce the likelihood of military surprises, yet at the same time, the growth of information manipulation technologies, including artificial intelligence, will mean that not everything a country can see is necessarily the truth. This balance between information and mis- or disinformation is a particular challenge in the 21st-century that should concern all states in the region, even though that might seek to use mis- and disinformation to their own advantage.
One concept that should be further developed and promoted is the creation of open-source information fusion cells, involving relevant experts from all of the countries involved in East Asian security dynamics. Having a single location with participants from the various countries who can assess, analyze, and even discuss data being provided by open-source capabilities could be a powerful tool in developing a common framework for discussing a crisis, should one take place. It is unlikely given the current political dynamics that all of the countries in the region will soon agree to establish such a center, thus an interim step might be to establish a trial open-source operation through academic or non-governmental civil society organization that could be accessed by countries in the region by invitation.
Build on what is working
One of the simplest tools for avoiding miscalculation utilized by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia has been advance notification of ballistic missile test launches. More recently, the United States and China have engaged in apparently reciprocal advance notifications of recent ICBMs tests. This basic step can avoid the risk that a simple test launch might occur at a time of tension and catch any state off guard. Efforts should be made by the United States and China to encourage other states in the region, including North Korea, to follow this standard model to encourage responsible behavior, if not moderation.
Other Steps by the United States, and Allies and Partners
These above steps, whether used in bilateral or multilateral settings, could improve the ability of states to avoid a crisis or manage one should it take place. However, there are other steps
that can be pursued by the United States and its friends and allies in the region that can also improve the outlook for avoiding unwanted or unnecessary nuclear risks.
Broaden routine deterrence and assurance dialogues among the United States and its allies and partners in both bilateral and multilateral formats. Existing dialogues and committees have been useful political tools for improving transparency within bilateral alliances, improving trilateral engagement, and finding ways to enhance military reassurance and deterrence. However, these discussions often overlook other important areas of interdependence among the United States, Japan, and South Korea—and how their cooperation in these areas contributes to the security and prosperity of all three countries. In addition to continuing and deepening these discussions, to include regular engagement on what specific threats they seek to deter and how to do so without taking unnecessary nuclear risks, the countries should also look to engage on economic, technical, cultural, and human exchange dynamics to deepen the anchors for these alliances and partnerships that form the basis for their security in the region.
Expand trilateral communication and coordination mechanisms among the United States, Japan and ROK. Japanese and ROK officials in particular need to put forward a very clear demand signal to the United States that they value the trilateral process consolidated during the Biden administration and would welcome efforts to expand the scope of their engagement. These dialogues should seek to adopt a heavier emphasis on crisis, coordination and scenario planning, to include both escalation and de-escalation scenarios, as well as to conduct exercises around unexpected or surprise events.
Consider tighter regional missile defense architectures. Missile defense is becoming an increasingly important element of deterrence by denial in the region. It is increasingly clear that effective missile defenses can play a significant role in deterring adversaries and reassuring allies. In this regard, developing tighter regional missile defense architectures should be considered. If coordinating and implementing regional missile defense architectures among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan proves successful, it could have an important politically stabilizing effect by linking them together and reinforcing their relationships in the face of potential political challenges. However, several important issues must be kept in mind when considering regional cooperation on missile defenses, for example, concerns that such cooperation could further stimulate investment in ballistic missile capabilities by North Korea, China, and Russia (although they are already expanding their capabilities regardless), as well as rising costs of missile defense systems. Advancing cooperation between Japan and South Korea still remains politically fragile, posing a challenge to regional cooperation. Furthermore, if Taiwan is to be included in such a regional architecture, China will certainly react harshly both politically and militarily. While the delicate and complex nature of regional relations must be carefully weighed, developing tighter regional missile defense architectures is worth considering.
Promote broader dialogue on the utility and risks of reliance on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons are clearly an important component of strategic deterrence, but they are not a panacea and because of their immense destructive power they should always and only be an option of last resort. This tone needs to be routinely re-injected into alliance discussion to avoid over-reliance on nuclear options and to ensure that nuclear reliance does not become an adversary to prudent and more stabilizing conventional investments for both deterrence and combat. Additional discussions should be pursued to determine when and how it would be possible to reduce or even eliminate the role for nuclear weapons in some contingencies in favor of conventional options that may increase the efficacy of conventional deterrence and escalation management.
Engage adversaries, in close consultation with allies, even if the prospects for progress are limited. Its willingness to break with conventional wisdom and engage adversaries is one area where the current American administration may have a distinct advantage over its predecessors. President Trump has demonstrated that he does not feel constrained in talking with U.S. adversaries, and is willing and even eager to engage with the leadership of foreign countries with historically adversarial or difficult relations with the United States. This high-level engagement provides an opportunity to breakthrough bureaucratic hurdles and achieve terrific strides, if effectively planned and managed. President Trump could choose to reengage North Korea, has even after launching military strikes against Iran offered to pursue diplomacy with Tehran, and is reportedly eager to negotiate and engage directly with China’s president. If any of these dialogues are pursued, then important crisis management and avoidance tools should be brought into these high-level dialogues by the United States. In particular, as it was pointed out in the article of the J-PAND’s special issue on “Nuclear Weapons and China’s National Security: Consistency, Evolvement and Risk Management”, there may be great value in establishing procedures for risk reduction that focus on the timeliness of the tools as well as standardization and maintenance activities to ensure that these tools are operable when needed. At the same time while more complicated, it may be possible for the leaders of these countries or their designated technical teams to work on identifying potential flashpoints and reach task agreements on how the two sides can identify and possibly avoid what are seen as provocative actions. It remains to be seen whether or not China or North Korea are interested in pursuing such high-level high stakes diplomacy, and if they do whether they will be open to areas that have traditionally been excluded from past dialogues. However, if in this new environment, China and North Korea are able to recognize the risks of nuclear escalation and agree that all states in the region would be better off reducing the risk of accidental or unintended nuclear use, then there are tools that all three countries, in close consultations with Japan and South Korea, could pursue to achieve those ends.
Conclusion
None of the steps including above alone or collectively will eliminate the risks of conflict among the multiple nuclear and nuclear dependent states in Northeast Asia. The economic, political and security stakes and dynamics indicate that the region will remain one influenced by tension and increasing military risk until there are fundamental changes in the region, including the nature of leadership in multiple countries, or until there is a collective understanding about the benefits to be gained through political and security engagement and broader integration. While those changes seem unlikely, history is filled with examples where previously insurmountable changes were achieved through unexpected developments.
That being said Northeast Asia looks to occupy in the 21st century the same space Europe occupied the 20th century as a potential flashpoint for military and political tensions among great powers and their partner states. The fact that multiple countries possess nuclear weapons and are dependent on them ultimately for their security, makes the risks of accident, miscalculation, or escalation much more dangerous than the Cold War period. It will take consistent leadership and action to navigate the complex dangers in the region and to avoid what many analysts considered to be an increasingly possible outcome, a nuclear conflict in East Asia.
Understanding the Two Nuclear Peer Debate
Since 2020, China has dramatically expanded its nuclear arsenal. That year, the Pentagon estimated China’s stockpile of warheads in the low 200s and projected that it would “at least double in size.”1 Two years later, the report warned that China would “likely field a stockpile of about 1500 warheads by its 2035 timeline.”2 Both inside and outside government, the finding has transformed discourse on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Adm. Charles Richard, while Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, warned that changes in China’s nuclear forces would fundamentally alter how the United States practices strategic deterrence. In 2021, Richard told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “for the first time in history, the nation is facing two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.”3 In his view, China is pursuing “explosive growth and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces” that will provide “the capability to execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy.”4 In Richard’s view, the United States is facing a “crisis” of deterrence that will require major shifts in U.S. nuclear strategy.5 “We’re rewriting deterrence theory,” he told an audience.6 For Richard, the danger is not just that the United States would face two separate major power, nuclear-armed adversaries but two nuclear peers that can coordinate their actions or act to exploit opportunities created by the other.
How the United States responds to China’s nuclear buildup will shape the global nuclear balance for the rest of the century. For many observers, the “two nuclear peer problem” presents an existential choice because existing U.S. nuclear force structure and strategy cannot maintain deterrence against two nuclear peers simultaneously. There are only three options: expand the capability of U.S. nuclear force structure; shift nuclear strategy to engage nonmilitary targets;7 or do nothing, which increases the risk of regional aggression and nuclear use.
Despite this growing wave of concern and commentary, there has been no systematic studies that define the nature of the “two nuclear peer problem” and the options available to the United States and its allies for responding to China’s nuclear buildup. An informed decision about how to respond to China’s buildup will depend on answering two additional questions.
First, what exactly is the threat posed by China’s expanding nuclear forces? What is a “two nuclear peer problem” and will the United States face one in the next decade? Specifically, will China’s nuclear buildup render U.S. nuclear forces incapable of attaining critical objectives for deterring nuclear attacks.
Second, what are the best options for responding to China’s expanding nuclear forces? What are the available options to modify U.S. nuclear force structure given existing constraints and will these options effectively correct vulnerabilities created by a “two nuclear peer problem?” Would these options create new risks to the interests of the United States and its allies?
In the following chapters, we each consider a central aspect of the “two nuclear peer problem” and the options available to meet it. Though we have tried to coordinate our chapters so they do not overlap, and build on assumptions and data regarding U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces, each chapter is the work of a single author. We do not present a consensus perspective or set of recommendations and do not necessarily endorse the arguments made in neighboring chapters.
In chapter 2, Adam Mount surveys expert analysis and the statements of government officials to develop a more rigorous definition of the “two nuclear peer problem” than currently exists in the literature. Characterizing and categorizing the risks posed by a tripolar system leads to an unappreciated possibility: there is no “two nuclear peer problem” in the way that the problem is commonly presented. As it stands today, the prominent and influential discourse on the “two nuclear peer problem” does not clearly or accurately characterize the risks posed by China’s expanding nuclear forces, nor the range of options available to U.S. officials to respond. The need to deter two nuclear adversaries does not necessarily create a qualitatively new problem for U.S. strategic deterrence posture.
Subsequent chapters evaluate important pieces of the “two nuclear peer problem” in detail. In chapter 3, Hans Kristensen presents new estimates of U.S. and Chinese force structure to 2035. He provides correctives against excessive estimates of China’s current and future capability and argues it should not properly be considered a nuclear peer of the United States.
The final chapters consider two plausible ways that a tripolar system could present a qualitatively new threat to U.S. deterrence credibility. In chapter 4, Pranay Vaddi considers how China’s buildup will affect U.S. nuclear strategy. He surveys how U.S. planning has historically approached China and evaluates multiple courses of action for how the United States might adapt. In chapter 5, John Warden examines the prospects for Sino-Russian cooperation in peacetime, in crisis, in conventional conflict, and in a nuclear conflict. He argues that it is not only the material facts of China’s buildup that will drive U.S. planning, but the expectations and risk acceptance of U.S. officials with respect to Sino-Russian coordination and U.S. extended deterrence commitments.
The authors are grateful to Carnegie Corporation of New York for their generous funding of the project, as well as innumerable colleagues, academics, and government officials for informative discussions. The authors each write in an independent capacity. Their chapters do not reflect the positions of any organization or government.
All the King’s Weapons: Nuclear Launch Authority in the United States
The president of the United States is the only person in the country who can order the use of nuclear weapons, a power commonly known as “sole authority.” This power is granted to the president largely through policy tradition, but the president’s Constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief is often cited as the legal basis. Sole authority was first codified in 1948 when the National Security Council (NSC) adopted the conclusions of NSC-30, which read: “The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.” The policy has since been reaffirmed in numerous official documents, including, most recently, the Department of Defense’s 2024 Report to Congress on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, which states, “the Guidance reaffirms that the President remains the sole authority to direct U.S. nuclear employment.”
Despite its foundational place in U.S. nuclear policy, sole authority has for years come under heavy scrutiny by experts, journalists, and American citizens. Experts publish pieces warning of the dangers of such a system, people take to social media to remind their networks that “this is the guy with the nuclear codes” whenever the president acts in a concerning manner, and lawmakers even introduce legislation to try to constrain the president’s authority. Recent polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Carnegie Corporation of New York found that 61% of Americans are either somewhat or very uncomfortable with the president having sole authority over nuclear launch decisions.
Sole authority appears like a dangerous toy in the hands of unstable, unreliable, or erratic presidents. President Bill Clinton reportedly lost his nuclear authorization codes for months during his presidency. Jimmy Carter rumoredly sent his codes to the dry cleaners in the pocket of his suit jacket. Following the assassination attempt against Ronald Reagan in 1981, Reagan was separated from his military aide, and all of his clothes, including the pants in which the card carrying his nuclear codes sat, were stripped in the hospital and thrown away. His codes were later recovered by the FBI from a hospital trash can. Further, the mental and intellectual reliability of presidents has been questioned, with Reagan’s formal Alzheimer’s diagnosis coming just five years after he left office, John F. Kennedy’s known use of strong pain medications, Richard Nixon’s heavy drinking and erratic behavior leading up to his resignation, and Donald Trump’s history of making flippant remarks and threats of nuclear use, to name a few.
Other concerns with presidential sole authority include the immense time and psychological pressure placed on presidents in crisis scenarios that hinders rational thinking, the challenge to democratic values posed by a system that places ultimate power in one individual’s hands, the ethical and legal burden placed on lower level military officials, and more. But before we can attempt to solve the broad “problem” of sole authority, a more thorough understanding of it is needed.
This report investigates how we arrived at this system of launch authority in the United States today. It traces the origins of sole authority to the earliest days of the nuclear age and follows the history of trial and error — with new procedures and systems added or abandoned as vulnerabilities were detected and new technology emerged — culminating in an assumption that we have arrived today at the optimal system for nuclear launch authority. This report interrogates that assumption first by providing an in-depth understanding of how the policy of sole authority works today and how the nuclear enterprise in the United States is set up to enable it, then by evaluating the risks and vulnerabilities that remain. Finally, the report analyzes the merits and drawbacks of policy proposals that have been put forward by experts and lawmakers to answer a crucial question: is sole authority solvable, or is it truly the best system possible for nuclear launch authority? If the latter, should we accept that reality?
Nuclear Weapons At China’s 2025 Victory Day Parade
On September 3, 2025, China showcased its military power in a parade commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the end of World War II. The parade featured a large number of new military weapons and equipment, including new and modified nuclear systems that had not been previously publicly displayed. This parade was also the first time China had showcased land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear weapons in the same parade, marking an important milestone in the country’s longtime effort to establish a nuclear triad.
As in some previous parades, the official announcer for the 2025 parade clearly distinguished between the nuclear and conventional weapon systems displayed during the parade. Hypersonic missiles such as the DF-17 and the DF-26D were grouped in conventional formations, whereas the five weapon systems that followed were explicitly referred to as being part of the nuclear formation. This language may be innocuous, but largely fits with Western descriptions of the weapons.
Although only one of the nuclear weapons presented at the parade was entirely new (the DF-61 ICBM), that and the many other systems displayed in this and previous parades – combined with the construction of three large missile silo fields and so far more than a tripling of the nuclear warhead stockpile – vividly illustrate the significant modernization and buildup of nuclear forces that China has undertaken over the past couple of decades. This buildup appears to contradict China’s obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and risks stimulating nuclear buildups in the United States and India – developments that would not be in China’s interest. Instead of building up the nuclear arsenal, the Chinese leadership instead should freeze it and work with the other nuclear-armed states to responsibly limit the numbers and roles of nuclear weapons.
In the sections below we describe the nuclear weapons displayed at the parade and their role in the Chinese nuclear posture.
Ground-based nuclear missiles
Based on new information from the parade footage, it seems China now has nine different versions of land-based ICBMs: DF-5A, DF-5B, DF-5C, DF-27 (not yet displayed in public), DF-31A, DF-31AG, DF-31BJ, DF-41, and DF-61. Interestingly, rather than necessarily representing incremental upgrades, many of the missiles are quite distinct from one another: five are road-mobile, and four are silo-based; three are liquid-fueled, four are solid-fueled, and two are unconfirmed; at least one carries MIRVs, at least one carries an HGV, at least one carries a multi-megaton warhead, and one may even carry a conventional warhead.
The DF-61
The DF-61 is a new missile that was grouped alongside the DF-31BJ, JL-3, and JL-1 nuclear systems during the parade, suggesting it is also nuclear. The display of the DF-61 ICBM launcher was a surprise because the Chinese Rocket Force (PLARF) is still fielding the DF-41, and the two systems are strikingly similar. In fact, the DF-61 launcher displayed at this year’s parade appears to be nearly identical to the DF-41 launcher displayed in the 2019 parade. Other than the paint job, they look the same (see image below; image sizes and angles vary slightly). This raises the question of whether the DF-61 missile is a modified version of the DF-41 missile. Another possibility is that the DF-61 is the conventional ICBM rumored to be under development by China, but that doesn’t fit with the DF-61 being displayed as part of the nuclear group. (Instead, the conventional ICBM could be the DF-27, which was not displayed at the parade.)
The DF-61 ICBM launcher displayed at the 2025 Victory Day Parade looks almost identical to the DF-41 ICBM launcher displayed in 2019.
The DF-31BJ
The vehicle identified in the parade as DF-31BJ looks different than a road-mobile launcher with its stub end of the missile canister and the personnel compartment only including the left side for the driver (see image below). It is possible that this vehicle is a missile loader and the DF-31BJ is the designation of the ICBM assigned to the three large silo fields in northern China. The “J” likely denotes the silo basing, as the Chinese character “井” or “jing” means “well” and is used by the PLA to describe silos.
The DF-31BJ is possibly a missile transport loader for the ICBMs being loaded into China’s three large silo fields.
The DOD reported last year that China probably began loading a DF-31-class solid-fuel ICBM across its three new ICBM silo fields. To do that, a missile transport and loading truck would be needed, which might be the DF-31BJ displayed at the parade. The status of the silo loading is unknown in public, but we estimated early this year that perhaps 30 silos had been loaded. While silo loading at the three silo fields has not been publicly shown, a possible load training operation at the Jilantai training complex in 2021 shows a 20-meter truck that might have been an early version of the DF-31BJ (see image below).
A possible DF-31BJ missile transporter is seen in 2021 practicing loading an ICBM into a silo at the Jilantai training complex in northern China.
The DF-5C
The long-rumored DF-5C was displayed with all three sections: the first stage on a long trailer at the rear, the upper stage on a shorter trailer, and a warhead reentry vehicle shape in the front. This is similar to the first display of the original DF-5 at the parade back in 1984 (see image below).
The DF-5C ICBM lineup in the 2025 parade is similar to the initial DF-5 display in the 1984 parade four decades ago.
The DF-5C is, according to the DOD, intended to carry a multi-megaton warhead. As such, it is probably a replacement for the DF-5A first deployed in the 1980s, which is already equipped with a multi-megaton warhead. Another version, known as the DF-5B, is capable of delivering up to five smaller MIRVs.
Similar to the DF-5 in the 1984 parade, the four DF-5Cs were displayed with four cone-shaped reentry vehicle shapes intended to illustrate the aeroshell designed to protect the multi-megaton warhead during reentry of the atmosphere (see below).
The 2025 parade displayed the reentry vehicle shape for the DF-5C multi-megaton warhead.
Sea-based nuclear missile
The Chinese Navy displayed the JL-3 (Julang-3) sea-launched ballistic missile, which is currently being back-fitted onto modified Jin-class (Type 094A) ballistic missile submarines at their homeport on Hainan Island in the South China Sea.
The JL-3 displayed at this year’s parade (above) looks very similar to the JL-2 displayed in the 2019 parade (below), with no visible external changes to the payload section or fuel stages.
The JL-3 has a longer range than its predecessor, JL-2, probably around 10,000 kilometers, according to the DOD. Although the DOD claims this is “giving the PRC the ability to target [the continental United States] from littoral waters,” that is not the case if the missile is launched from the South China Sea. Launching from the shallow Bohai Sea or the Yellow Sea would probably be less secure.
Air-delivered nuclear missile
For the first time, China displayed a nuclear weapons system for delivery by aircraft. This is the JL-1, or JingLei-1, translating to “sudden thunder” (not to be confused with the JL-3 or Julang-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which translates to “massive wave”). The official parade commentator described it as an “air-based long-range missile.”
The JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile for the H-6N bomber was displayed in the 2025 parade for the first time.
This is likely the air-launched ballistic missile (designated CH-AS-X-13 by the DOD) that the Chinese air force has been working on for several years to integrate on the H-6N intermediate-range bomber. The first bomber base to be equipped for the nuclear mission is thought to be Neixiang air base in Henan province.
The JL-1 ALBM seen loaded on the H-6N bomber. Image: @lqy99021608
The H-6N does not have an intercontinental range like Russian and U.S. bombers. To increase its range, the H-6N has been equipped with a refueling boom that enables the bomber to refuel during flight. Several H-6Ns were seen during the parade flying in formation with Y-20U tankers (the quality of images from the parade was hampered by air pollution, so an archive photo is used below), which is a converted Y-20 military transport aircraft that can refuel both bombers and fighter jets. The first known public imagery of an H-6N by a Y-20U tanker is from January 2025.
The nuclear-capable H-6N was displayed with a Y-20U tanker (archive photo).
Other Missile Launchers
The weapons described above were grouped in the nuclear part of the parade. Noticeable weapons in the conventional weapons lineup included the DF-26D (a new conventional variant of the DF-26 that also includes a nuclear version), the DF-17 medium-range hypersonic glide vehicle, and the CJ-1000 (sometimes also described as DF-1000) long-range cruise missile.
Additional Information:
• Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025
• Status of world nuclear forces
• The FAS Nuclear Information Project
This article was researched and written with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Jubitz Family Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.
The Next Nuclear Age: What the Washington Post Series Reveals About Our Perilous Present, from Trinity to Tehran
In the eighty years since the first successful test of a nuclear weapon, generations of effort has been spent to limit the spread of these weapons and prevent their use. The Federation of American Scientists, since our founding in 1945, has played a central role in helping understand the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and diligently worked to ensure the policy debate is informed by scientific and technical data. As part of our continuing legacy, the Global Risk program at FAS partnered with the Washington Post to publish a five part opinion series entitled: The Next Nuclear Age.
With 2000 nuclear weapons on alert, far more powerful than the first bomb tested in the Jornada Del Muerto during the Trinity Test 80 years ago, our world has been fundamentally altered. This series resurfaces clear warnings that nuclear policy is not just a relic of days gone past. Past generations had this threat at the forefront of their minds as a clear and present danger to the future civilization. However distant 80 years may feel, the threat still reaches into contemporary times with most recently the nuclear program of Iran becoming the target of strikes by the U.S. Military.
The Iran strikes are the manifestation of a debate mostly relegated to non-proliferation policy circles. We can watch as the preemptive effort to halt progress of Iran’s nuclear weapons program plays out in press conferences and analysis rather than the hypothetical. The strikes on Iran offer a unique pivot to evaluate some of the underlying assumptions about deterrence and what role the U.S. is willing to play in international institutions with our allies. There has been much analysis of the Iran strikes framed using the traditional logic of being able to halt programmatic development through brute force, i.e. bomb enrichment sites. In my assessment, more progress has been made and could continue to be made by supporting the sanctions regime and using more social coercion by partnering with our allies and supporting international institutions. When we choose to use military force, we ultimately trade in our legitimacy in the rules based order, pushing our allies to look at building their own nukes for security.
The real world implications of nuclear policy and diplomacy can be seen in the unfolding story with Iran, which is not quite done yet. The Next Nuclear Age as a five part series surfaces and grapples with the realities of living in the nuclear age and dispels myths surrounding nuclear policy and non-proliferation. Each part paints a vivid picture that reviews the history of nuclear close calls and details how the long-standing norm against proliferation is eroding. The subsequent articles describe how a nuclear war could start, who controls the use of nuclear weapons in the United States, and how a nuclear attack could unfold in the United States.
In the post Cold War Era, nuclear weapons have largely faded from the heat of popular culture however their threat is still a sobering reality. The Next Nuclear Age series serves as a reminder that the durability of the nuclear threat is omnipresent in modern life. Thousands of weapons are aimed and on high alert, one person has sole authority to launch, and a growing number of nations are considering spending billions to secure nuclear options as tensions rise.
After decades of work trying to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, our days ahead look riskier than in years prior. The multipolar geopolitical landscape exponentially raises risks of accidents and increases excuses to jump into an arms race. Countries are falsely substituting military capability for political credibility therefore increasing risk. Our allies and institutions are being clobbered by disinformation and mistrust and we are left feeling the pinch, having to result in widely unpopular military interventions in potentially protracted conflicts.
This series showcases how the accidents, miscalculations, and escalatory spirals have more room to become trigger points. Compressed decision-making timeframes revealed in the final installment show how quickly rational deliberation can give way to existential pressure. What worries me is that we’ve given up tools in our tool box that monitor and reduce risk. We’ve traded out diplomatic solutions and investment for military build up and an expensive vanity project of Trump’s Golden Dome. Ultimately it is our responsibility as citizens to uphold policymakers to account on these weapons before the unthinkable becomes inevitable.
Part 1: Why we should worry about nuclear weapons again
The Cold War prospect of global annihilation has faded from consciousness, but the warheads remain.
By Jon B. Wolfsthal, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda
The threat of nuclear weapons since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been largely absent from the public’s consciousness. Stockpiles have been reduced from Cold War highs but the thousands of remaining weapons could still destroy humanity.
“It is as if the lessons of the Cold War — that there is never a finish line to the arms race and that more effective nuclear weapons do not lead to stability and security — have been forgotten by the current generation of defense planners.”
The new frame of great power competition among the US, Russia and China, plus new nuclear dangers make today’s nuclear age more complicated and dangerous than the nuclear standoff between the first two major powers of the late 20th century. Nuclear policy experts refer to the U.S.-Russia-China nuclear triangle as a ‘three body problem’. However the ‘three body problem’ definition neglects the reality that nine countries have nuclear weapons. Any of the nuclear armed states could set off a global nuclear war. The public needs to relearn the language of nuclear risk and a new generation of leaders will be required to manage these dangers.
Part 2: How nuclear war could start
To understand how it could all go wrong, look at how it almost did.
By Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Allie Maloney
Roughly 2000 nuclear weapons that are on alert at any time across the globe. These weapons are ready to launch from submarines, dropped from planes and rocketed to targets. Some are mobile, fixed or in transit; all of them are vulnerable to accidents or affected by human or technical error.
“The end of humanity could arrive in minutes — that is what makes nuclear war so different from other wars.”
If there is one thing that can be counted on, it’s that nuclear accidents are bound to happen. It’s a matter of when, not if. One of the most dangerous parts of having nuclear arsenals is that accidents involving nuclear weapons could cause an acute global crisis, involving a web of interlocking states, enemies, and adversaries. The delicate balance of crisis can be spurred towards destruction when non-nuclear conflicts spill over into an escalatory spiral towards nuclear use, spelling destruction for all involved.
Part 3: Only one American can start a nuclear war: The president
The American president has the sole authority to order a nuclear strike, even if every adviser in the room is against it.
The authority to launch nuclear weapons in the United States rests on the shoulders of only one person, the President. Codified in both law and tradition, the President has the sole authority to launch a nuclear strike that once authorized is unstoppable. The established process to order a nuclear strike, using the ‘black book’, is a well choreographed procedure designed to provide the most streamlined options to the President in a time of crisis.
“The start of nuclear war, the probable deaths of millions and the choice of which cities to decimate — the black book distills these realities into a sanitized list of options that a former military aide to President Bill Clinton likened to a “Denny’s breakfast menu.”
The Constitution grants to only Congress in Article One the right to declare war. That said, a President has unilateral legal authority to launch nuclear weapons, even if the United States or its allies have not been attacked, runs counter to the way the US system was designed to operate. Such a weighty and world altering decision ought to be made using a system of checks and balances, not by one individual.
Part 4: What’s making some countries daydream about nukes again?
With or without Iran, the number of nuclear states could double, raising the risk of catastrophe.
By Jon B. Wolfsthal, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda
The incentives for developing nuclear weapons have changed in a world that has been rising in conflict. Paired simultaneously with reduced confidence among its allies that the United States is a reliable partner, the second largest nuclear armed state, allies and enemies alike are pushed into a new paradigm. Nuclear weapons are hard and expensive to build however with the incentives of security shifting towards development, some countries are willing to front the cost.
“Deterrence and reassurance depend on both military capability and political credibility. The credibility of a promise to protect is the fragile part of the calculus.”
A mass proliferation of nuclear weapons would ultimately cause more opportunities for accidents or misuse. This alone is a major reason why limiting the development of nuclear weapons is such a pressing issue. More weapons of mass destruction is more opportunity for things to go wrong, leading to irreversible consequences.
Part 5: How a nuclear attack on the U.S. might unfold, step by step
The American reaction to an attack is classified, but details made public paint a harrowing picture.
By Mackenzie Knight-Boyle
The process of how the U.S. would react to nuclear attack is classified; however there is a predictable path that it may follow based on public data. This article follows how a response would proceed. The ramifications on U.S. soil and abroad would be devastating.
“The defense secretary interjects, urging the president to make a decision in the next two minutes or risk losing the ability to retaliate.”
In the situation room, or wherever the President is deciding to make a launch, the space and time pushes the decision towards launch. As U.S. assets are targeted, the potential for ability to respond is shortened. Making the decision window in an accident scenario potentially just as lethal as an intentional launch. Some countries in order to amend this pressure have instituted ‘No First Launch’ policies whereby a country needs to be verifiably attacked with nuclear weapons to respond in kind – such a policy could be used in the U.S. to preempt accidental launch.
Poison in our Communities: Impacts of the Nuclear Weapons Industry across America
In 1942, the United States formally began the Manhattan Project, which led to the production, testing, and use of nuclear weapons. In August 1945, the United States dropped two nuclear weapons on Japanese cities, killing around 200,000 people by the end of 1945 and leaving survivors with cancer, leukemia and other illnesses caused by radiation exposure. While this was their only use in wartime, states have detonated nuclear weapons many times since for testing purposes, producing radioactive fallout. Many U.S. nuclear weapons production activities, including the mining of uranium and testing of the weapons themselves, have occurred outside of the continental United States. Notably, explosive testing in the Pacific islands and ocean spread radioactive fallout to Marshallese, Japanese, and Gilbertese people, forcibly displacing entire communities and producing intergenerational illnesses.
Much of the scholarship surrounding the effects of nuclear weapons on environmental and human health is framed within a potential detonation scenario. For example, studies have shown that even a regional nuclear war would cause millions of immediate deaths and trigger a “nuclear winter,” a shift in the climate that would disrupt agricultural production, thus killing hundreds of millions more through starvation. Additionally, in 2024, the United Nations General Assembly voted to create an independent scientific panel to study the health, environmental and economic consequences of nuclear war. While such research is crucial for understanding the consequences of nuclear weapons use, nuclear weapons are built, maintained, and deployed everyday, impacting communities at every stage even before detonation. Studying only the predictive futures of the use of a nuclear weapon in war is insufficient in understanding nuclear weapons’ holistic humanitarian impact. According to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, “The heart of American deterrence is the people who protect us and our allies. Here at STRATCOM, you proudly stand up—day in and day out and around the clock—to defend us from catastrophe and to build a safer and more peaceful future. So let us always ensure that the most dangerous weapons ever produced by human science are managed with the greatest responsibility ever produced by human government.” Nuclear deterrence theory contends that a retaliatory nuclear strike is so threatening that an adversary will not attack in the first place. Thus, nuclear advocates often suggest that these weapons protect American citizens and the U.S. homeland. This report demonstrates, however, that the creation and sustainment of the nuclear deterrent harms members of the American public. As the United States continues nuclear modernization on all legs of its nuclear triad through the creation of new variants of warheads, missiles, and delivery platforms, examining the effects of nuclear weapons production on the public is ever more pressing.