The Department of Defense has finally released the 2024 version of the China Military Power Report. We will provide additional analysis of the Chinese arsenal in early 2025 but offer these observations for now:

The report estimates that China, as of mid-2024, had more than 600 nuclear warheads in its stockpile, an increase of roughly 100 warheads compared with the estimate for 2023 and about 400 warheads since 2019. As we have stated for several years, this increase is unprecedented for China and contradicts China’s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. DOD assesses that the Chinese nuclear buildup “almost certainly is due to the PRC’s broader and longer-term perceptions of progressively increased U.S.-PRC strategic competition.”

The breakdown of the DOD estimate comes with considerable uncertainty. It appears to assume that sufficient warheads have been produced to arm many – perhaps up to one third – of the silos in the three new ICBM silo fields in northern China. Different assumptions about how those silos will be armed greatly influence warhead projections:

Different assumptions about how China will arm it’s missile silos can significantly influence warhead number projections.

Matching the warhead estimate with the known force structure also depends on how many of the new liquid-fuel silos under construction in the mountains of central/southeastern China are operational, and how many of missiles carry multiple warheads. Other variables are how many warheads are assigned to the DF-26 IRBM launchers (probably not all of them), how many of the six SSBNs have been upgraded to the JL-3 SLBM and whether it is assigned multiple warheads, and how many DF-41 ICBM launchers are operational and how many warheads each missile is assigned.

As in previously years, the DOD report misleadingly describes the Chinese warheads as “operational.” This gives the false impression that they’re all deployed like Russia and U.S. nuclear warheads on their operational forces and has already created confusion in the public debate by causing some to compare all Chinese warheads with the portion of US warheads that are deployed. What DOD calls China’s “operational” warheads is equivalent to DOD’s entire nuclear warhead stockpile, whether deployed, operational, or reserve.

Except for perhaps a small number, the vast majority of Chinese warheads are thought to be in storage and not deployed on the launchers. This situation may be changing with a higher readiness level and emerging launch-on-warning capability.

The report repeats earlier projections that China might have over 1,000 warheads by 2030 but does not mention previous projections of 1,500 warheads by 2035. But this expansion requires additional plutonium production. The report confirms that China “has not produced large quantities of plutonium for its weapons program since the early 1990s” and anticipates that it “probably will need to begin producing new plutonium this decade to meet the needs of its expanding nuclear stockpile.”

ICBMs

The report lists 550 ICBM (Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile) launchers with 400 ICBMs, an increase of 50 launcher and 50 missiles compared with last year’s report. That is more ICBM launchers than the United States has, although far from all the Chinese silos are armed.

It is unclear what operational status a missile must have to be included in the count or whether 400 is simply the total number of missile available for the launchers. If it means operational (which I don’t think is the case), then 400 ICBMs would imply a significant number of the new silos loaded.

The report includes a map that appears to match previous FAS analysis of the three silo fields:

The DOD map of the three northern silo fields appears to match earlier FAS analysis.

The report states that the three ICBM fields were probably completed in 2022 and that PLARF has loaded “at least some” ICBMs into the silos. The report says China “probably continues to arm” the silo fields.

For now, the new silo fields appear intended for the solid-fuel DF-31A. The DOD report identifies a new version of the DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 3), which is probably the version intended for the silos.

The ICBM estimate appears to come with several caveats. One is that the number of ICBM launchers is not the same as the number of operational ICBMs. A silo launcher appears to be counted when construction is completed, whether it is operational with missile or not. To get to 550 launchers, it is necessary to count everything, including all the 320 silos in the three new northern silo fields as well as all the silos under construction in the southeastern mountains.

The report says the silo construction in the central/southeastern part of China will probably result in about 50 silos there, matching estimates made by FAS and others. The report confirms that those new silos are intended for DF-5 liquid-fuel missiles and appears to suggest that at least two brigades with the new silos are intended for the new multi-megaton DF-5C that it says China is now fielding.

The 2024 China Military Power Report confirms reports by FAS, Ben Reuter, and Decker Eveleth about the modernization of the DF-5 silos in central/southeastern China.

The report does not say how many of the new DF-5 silos – if any – have been loaded with missiles.

The new DF-41 ICBM is not said to be deployed in silos but so far only as a road-mobile system in a few brigades. But the DOD report says China might pursue silo and rail deployments for the missile in the future.

The new DF-27 is described as dual-capable and while capable of shorter ICBM ranges mainly be intended for conventional IRBM missions.

IRBMs and MRBMs

The report lists 250 IRBM (Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile) launchers with 500 missiles, the same as in 2023. This force apparently consists entirely of the DF-26, of which the report identifies three versions. Previously an anti-ship version was identified in addition to the basic version, so it is unclear if the first two versions are used to differentiate between the conventional and nuclear versions. Regardless, the DF-26 is replacing the DF-21 MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic Missile) and the report says there are no longer any brigades with “dual nuclear-conventional capable DF-21Cs” (which is odd because the C was the conventional and the A was the nuclear).

The DF-17 MRBM maneuverable glide vehicle is described as conventional.

SSBNs

The report says that China continues to operate six Jin-class Type 094 SSBNs (nuclear powered ballistic missiles submarines) equipped with either the JL-2 or the 10,000-km range JL-3 SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile). Despite the longer range of the JL-3 SLBM, it is not capable of targeting the Continental United States from the South China Sea. A submarine would have to deploy up into the shallow Bohai Sea to be able to target part of CONUS.

The DOD report says the six SSBNs “are conducting at sea deterrent patrols.” In the U.S. Navy, that means the missiles are armed with nuclear warheads, but the DOD report does not explicitly say this is the case for China.

The report says the SSBNs are “representing the PRC’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent,” and says China “has the capacity to maintain a constant at sea deterrent presence.” More Jin-class SSBNs apparently are under construction.

The next-generation Type 096 apparently is not yet under construction. It is said it will get a new longer-range missile, although it is unclear if that is older language that used to refer to the JL-3. The report says the Type 096 SSBN “probably is intended to field MIRVed SLBMs,” indicating that the SLBMs on the current Jin-class are not.

Bombers

The report repeats previous statements that China is fielding a nuclear version of the H-6 medium-range bomber. The nuclear version H-6N is capable of carrying a large air-launched ballistic missile that “may be” nuclear capable. Although China is often said to have a Triad, the air-leg is nascent and still only includes one brigade that is developing tactics and procedures for the PLAAF nuclear mission. 

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As mentioned above, we will provide additional analysis of the DOD report and Chinese nuclear forces early in the new year. More information: The Nuclear Information Project

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The Federation of American Scientists’ work on nuclear transparency would not be possible without generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Longview Philanthropy, the Jubitz Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.

While attempts at dialogue and military-to-military communication with China regarding its growing nuclear arsenal have increased, the United States has so far been unable to establish permanent lines of communication on nuclear weapons issues, let alone reach a substantive bilateral arms control agreement with China. Given the simmering tensions between the United States and China, lack of communication can be dangerous. Miscommunication or miscalculation between the two nuclear powers – especially during a crisis – could lead to escalation and increased risk of nuclear weapons use. 

In an effort to prevent this, the next U.S. presidential administration should pursue a Missile Pre-Launch Notification Agreement with China. The agreement should include a commitment by each party to notify the other ahead of all strategic ballistic missile launches. Similar agreements currently exist between the United States and Russia and between China and Russia. One between the United States and China would be a significant confidence-building measure for reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use and establishing a foundation for future arms control negotiations.

Challenge and Opportunity

Between states with fragile relations, missile launches may be seen as provocative. In the absence of proper communication, a surprise missile test launch in the heat of a tense crisis could trigger overreaction and escalate tensions. Early warning systems are made to detect incoming missiles, but experts estimate that the US early-warning system would have just two minutes to determine if the attack is real or serious enough to advise the president on a possible nuclear counterattack. For example, when the Soviet Union test-launched four submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 1980, the US early warning system projected that one of the missiles appeared to be headed toward the United States, resulting in an emergency threat assessment conference of US officials. 

Establishing regular communications is increasingly important as China grows its nuclear arsenal of quick-launching ballistic missiles, with the Pentagon estimating that China’s arsenal may reach 1,000 warheads by 2030. This is creating increasing concern about China’s intentions for how it might use nuclear weapons. In reaction, some US officials are signaling that it may be necessary for the United States to field new nuclear weapons systems or increase the number of deployed warheads. Defense hawks even advocate curtailing diplomatic communication with China, arguing that talks would allow China leverage and insight into US nuclear thinking.

With tensions and aggressive rhetoric on the rise, the next administration needs to prioritize and reaffirm the necessity of regular communication with China on military and nuclear weapons issues to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and conflict and mitigate the chance of accidental escalation and miscalculation.

The opportunity for negotiating an agreement with China exists despite heightened tensions. Although still inadequate, military-to-military communications between China and the United States have improved since a breakdown in 2022 following Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, to which China responded with military exercises, missile tests, and sanctions on the island.

On November 6, 2023, Chinese Director-General of the Department of Arms Control Sun Xiaobo and US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability Mallory Stewart discussed nonproliferation and nuclear transparency during the first US-China arms control talk in five years. Days later, Presidents Biden and Xi decided to resume military-to-military conversations and encouraged a follow-up arms control talk. A high-level China-US defense policy talk at the Pentagon in early January 2024 followed this summit. Most recently, Presidents Biden and Xi agreed in Lima, Peru that humans, not artificial intelligence, should have control over the decision to launch nuclear weapons. These meetings show promising signs of improved dialogue, but the United States’ continual emphasis on China as a competitor and China’s recent cancelation of arms control talks with the United States over Taiwan continue to undermine progress.

Policy Models

A Missile Pre-Launch Notification Agreement between China and the United States should include a commitment to provide at least 24 hours of advanced notice of all strategic ballistic missile tests including the planned launch and impact locations. The agreement would build on historical models of risk reduction measures between other states. For example, at the 1988 Moscow Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Ballistic Missiles to notify each other of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact no less than 24 hours in advance of any intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. These notifications were communicated through established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), signed in 1991, followed up on the notification agreement by including an agreement to provide more information, such as telemetry broadcast frequencies, in addition to the planned launch date and the launch and reentry area. 

The two countries expanded on this agreement through the Memorandum of Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches (also known as JDEC MOA) and the Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches (PLNS MOU). The purpose of these agreements, signed in 2000, was to prevent a nuclear attack based on a false early warning system notification, and the agreements were carried forward into the New START treaty that entered into force in 2011.

While Russia has suspended its participation in the New START treaty and increased its threatening rhetoric around the potential use of nuclear weapons in its war in Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia would continue to provide notification of ballistic missile launches to the United States. This demonstrates the value of communication amid tensions and conventional conflict to prevent misunderstanding. 

In 2009, Russia and China signed a pre-launch notification agreement, marking China’s first bilateral arms control agreement. This agreement was extended in 2020 for another 10 years and covers launches of ballistic missiles with ranges over 2,000 km that are in the direction of the other country. The United States and China have no such arrangement. However, China did notify the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the Japanese Coast Guard 24 hours before an ICBM launch into the Pacific Ocean on September 25, 2024. This launch appeared to be the first test into the Pacific China has conducted in over thirty years, and the gesture of notifying the United States beforehand was, according to a Pentagon spokesperson, “a step in the right direction to reducing the risks of misperception and miscalculation.” With this notification, the groundwork and precedent for dialogue on a missile pre-launch notification agreement has been laid.

Plan of Action

Create and present a draft agreement

The next administration should direct the State Department Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability to draft a proposal for a missile pre-launch notification agreement requiring mutual pre-launch notifications for missile launches with ranges of 2,000 km or more, as well as the sharing of launch and impact locations.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability should present the draft proposal to China’s Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry.

Invite President Xi Jinping to participate in talks

The administration should propose a neutral site in the Asian-Pacific region, possibly in Hanoi, Vietnam, for a meeting between the US president and President Xi Jinping to emphasize the shared goal of trade security and discuss a missile test launch agreement. The meeting should include other high-level military commanders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, as well as their relevant Chinese counterparts. 

Continue notifying China of all US missile test launches

The next administration should continue the precedent set by China in September 2024 to voluntarily provide advance notification of all ballistic missile test launches even in the absence of a negotiated agreement, like was done in the November 2024 Minuteman launch, and even if done unilaterally going forward. Such action would improve the prospect for reaching a negotiated agreement by demonstrating good faith and commitment to conflict mitigation.  

Raise the topic of missile launch notifications in P5 meetings

China has since assumed the rotating position of Chair of the P5, which could be a useful forum for considering new proposals for risk reduction measures among all nuclear states. After direct engagement with China on an agreement, China may have an interest in working with the United States to lead a multilateral agreement, as China would have more control over the language, international recognition for nuclear risk reduction, and improved security amid global nuclear modernization.

The next administration should direct The Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation under the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation to raise the topic of missile launch notifications and a potential launch notification agreement during the P5 process meeting ahead of the 2025 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory conference.

In order to work constructively with China on reducing the risk of nuclear use, a pre-launch notification agreement should, for now, be decoupled from any other arms control measures that would propose limiting China’s nuclear weapons stockpile or any launch capabilities. While comprehensive arms control may be an ultimate goal, linking the two at the outset would complicate talks significantly and likely prevent an agreement from coming to fruition; the United States should start with small steps to foster trust between the two nations and deepen regular military-to-military communication. 

Pursuing and negotiating a Missile Pre-Launch Notification Agreement with China will emphasize common objectives and help prevent escalation by miscommunication.

This action-ready policy memo is part of Day One 2025 — our effort to bring forward bold policy ideas, grounded in science and evidence, that can tackle the country’s biggest challenges and bring us closer to the prosperous, equitable and safe future that we all hope for whoever takes office in 2025 and beyond.

Every year since Fiscal Year 2017, Congress has passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that prohibits reducing the quantity of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) below 400. This amendment inhibits progress on adapting the U.S. ICBM force to meet the demands of the new geostrategic environment and restricts military planners to a force structure based on status quo rather than strategic requirements. Congress should ensure that no amendments dictating the size of the ICBM force are included in future NDAAs; this will allow the size of the ICBM force to be determined by strategic military requirements, rather than arbitrary quotas set by Congress. 

Challenge and Opportunity

Congressional offices that represent the districts where ICBMs are located work together on a bipartisan basis to advocate for the indefinite sustainment of their ICBM bases. This group of lawmakers, known as the “Senate ICBM Coalition,” consists of senators from the three ICBM host states – Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota – plus Utah, where ICBM sustainment and replacement activities are headquartered at Hill Air Force Base. Occasionally, senators from Louisiana – the home state of Air Force Global Strike Command – have also participated in the Coalition’s activities.

Over the past two decades, the members of the coalition have played an outsized role in dictating U.S. nuclear force posture for primarily parochial reasons – occasionally even overriding the guidelines set by U.S. military leaders – in order to prevent any significant ICBM force reductions from taking place. 

In 2006, for example, this congressional coalition successfully reduced the mandated life expectancy for the Minuteman III ICBM from 2040 to 2030, thus accelerating the deployment of a costly new ICBM by effectively shortening the ICBM’s modernization timeline by a decade. As U.S. Air Force historian David N. Spires describes in On Alert: An Operational History of the United States Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-2011, “Although Air Force leaders had asserted that incremental upgrades, as prescribed in the analysis of land-based strategic deterrent alternatives, could extend the Minuteman’s life span to 2040, the congressionally mandated target year of 2030 became the new standard.”

In another notable example, during the Fiscal Year 2014 NDAA negotiations, senators from the ICBM coalition inserted amendments into the bill that explicitly blocked the Obama administration from conducting the environmental assessment that would be legally necessary in order to reduce the number of ICBM silos. In a subsequent statement, coalition members specifically boasted about how they had overruled the Pentagon on the ICBM issue: “the Defense Department tried to find a way around the Hoeven-Tester language, but pressure from the coalition forced the department to back off.” 

By inserting these types of amendments into successive NDAAs, the ICBM coalition has been highly successful in preventing the Department of Defense from fully determining its own nuclear force posture. 

The force posture of the United States’ ICBMs, however, is not – and has never been – sacred or immutable. The current force level of 400 deployed ICBMs is not a magic number; the number of deployed U.S. ICBMs has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and it could be reduced even further for a variety of reasons, including those related to national security, financial obligations, the United States’ modernization capacity, or a good faith effort to reduce deployed U.S. nuclear forces.

When the Bush administration deactivated the “Odd Squad” at Malmstrom Air Force Base in the mid-2000s, for example – bringing the ICBM force down from 500 to 450 – the main driver was economics, not security: the 564th Missile Squadron used completely different and more expensive communications and launch control systems from the rest of the Minuteman III force. (See: David N. Spires, On Alert: An Operational History of the United States Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-2011, 88 2nd ed., pp. 185.)

By legislating an arbitrary quota for the number of ICBMs that the United States must deploy at all times, Congress is leaving successive presidential administrations and Departments of Defense hamstrung with regards to shaping future force posture. 

Plan of Action

In order to ensure that the Department of Defense is no longer held to arbitrary force posture requirements that have little basis in military strategy, Congress should ensure that no amendments dictating the size of the ICBM force are included in future NDAAs. If such amendments are included, however, they should be based on strategic needs established by presidential and Defense Department guidance documents. 

Conclusion

The stakes of inaction on this front are significant, particularly from a cost perspective, as the maintenance of this arbitrary 400-ICBM quota has served to heavily bias procurement outcomes towards significantly more expensive options. For example, in part due to this arbitrary 400-ICBM quota, the Pentagon’s procurement process for the next-generation ICBM yielded a preference for producing a brand-new missile – the Sentinel – rather than life-extending the current Minuteman III, deploying a smaller number, and cannibalizing the retired missiles for parts that would facilitate the life-extension process. 

While this adapted life-extension could have likely been accomplished at a fraction of the cost of building a completely new missile, the Sentinel acquisition program, in contrast, is now approximately 81 percent over-budget and more than two years behind schedule relative to Pentagon estimates from 2020. This constituted an overrun in “critical” breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act. 

To that end, it is imperative that Congress take action to ensure that ICBM force posture is shaped by security requirements, rather than parochial and arbitrary metrics that limit the financial and military flexibility of both the Pentagon and the President. 

This action-ready policy memo is part of Day One 2025 — our effort to bring forward bold policy ideas, grounded in science and evidence, that can tackle the country’s biggest challenges and bring us closer to the prosperous, equitable and safe future that we all hope for whoever takes office in 2025 and beyond.

In early November 2024, the United States released a report describing the fourth revision to its nuclear employment strategy since the end of the Cold War and the third since 2013. The public report summarizes a classified employment guidance reportedly issued by President Joseph Biden in April and was submitted to Congress as required by law (and is sometimes known as the section 491 report after the relevant section of the U.S. Code).

The Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning Guidance of the United States “directly informs DoD’s development of nuclear employment options for consideration by the President in extreme circumstances and establishes requirements that shape U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and posture.”

The report is notable as the first known effort by a U.S. president to provide guidance on the nuclear employment strategy amid growing concern about China’s dramatic buildup of nuclear forces. The report does not reflect the recommendation of the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and several other expert groups to expand the size or capability of the nation’s nuclear forces. However, because of an ambiguity in the text about what is required to “deter” multiple adversaries simultaneously, the report is likely to support the narrative that the Biden administration accepts the need for an eventual buildup. Biden’s guidance appears to leave major questions in nuclear strategy to the incoming Trump administration. 

Timing and tone

Like its predecessor, the Biden administration released its nuclear employment guidance report following the election of a new president. The timing of these releases decreases the time that administration officials can work with planners and acquisition managers on implementation and therefore reduces their ability to affect plans. The timing of the release also decreases the presidents’ ability to inform and assure allies, given outstanding questions about whether, when, and how the incoming president will modify nuclear strategy.

The 2024 report marks a distinct shift in tone from the unclassified 2020 report, which summarized the classified employment guidance issued in April 2019. The unclassified summary was a broad defense of US nuclear strategy and devoted considerable time to arguing against proposed shifts that had been debated in Congress, in public, and on the campaign trail (including a sizable section arguing against a “sole purpose” declaration that the incoming president had endorsed while a candidate). In this sense, the 2024 report is less a political and persuasive document than a simple summary of the president’s guidance. Where the 2020 report sought to constrain the incoming president, the authors of the 2024 guidance appear to have taken pains to leave options open. 

Ambiguity on the “two peer problem”

Contrary to public reports, the new guidance does not “reorient America’s deterrent strategy to focus on China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal.” Although the importance of China is increasing, Russia is still the focus due to its much larger nuclear arsenal.

The report also does not directly articulate or address the so-called “two peer problem”—the concern that US nuclear forces are insufficient to simultaneously deter both Russia and China. The document does note that “growing collaboration and collusion between Russia, the PRC, the DPRK, and Iran” raises the “possibility of coordinated or opportunistic aggression.” But it does not state that Russia and China are peer threats, apparently reflecting the description in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review that China is “a growing factor in evaluating our nuclear deterrent.” 

The new guidance document refers to “multiple nuclear competitors,” but does not explicitly use the “two peer” description frequently used in the public debate by defense officials and others. While the guidance report does not repeat quantitative estimates for China’s buildup that appear in Department of Defense reports, it does state that China has attained a “nascent nuclear triad.” That description credits China with sophisticated air and sea legs, both of which lag significantly behind the capability of US forces, especially the bomber leg. In practice, China is unlikely to become a  peer of Russia and the United States in total stockpiled warheads, ballistic missile submarines, or in long-range bombers in the foreseeable future. 

The 2024 nuclear weapons employment guidance is the fourth revision since the end of the Cold War and the third since 2013.

The guidance report simply states that “it may be necessary to adapt current U.S. force capability, posture, composition, or size,” and directs the Pentagon “to continuously evaluate whether adjustments should be made.” This language effectively leaves it to the incoming Trump administration to decide whether to expand the U.S. arsenal in response to China’s buildup. Though some Biden administration officials have hinted that they expect to need more capacity, the employment guidance report does not establish a presumption one way or the other.

The closest that President Biden’s guidance comes to an answer to the “two peer problem” is to direct that “the United States be able to deter Russia, the PRC, and the DPRK simultaneously in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.” Yet the document does not require U.S. forces to maintain the capability to perform other or all objectives against multiple adversaries simultaneously. It does not, for example, require the U.S. forces to limit damage against multiple peer adversaries simultaneously or to restore deterrence in the event that it fails—both objectives that are likely to carry higher quantitative or qualitative requirements than deterrence. Including either requirement would effectively endorse the recommendation of the Strategic Posture Commission that China’s buildup demands that the United States follow suit. 

The language of the employment strategy report does not clearly indicate whether U.S. forces are required to perform these more demanding objectives. The president could have stated, for example, that U.S. forces are not required to maintain the capability to limit damage against multiple adversaries simultaneously. Without this statement, many will continue to assume that this requirement does exist because counterforce deterrence requires damage limitation.

The 2024 employment strategy does not add any requirement to increase the size of U.S. strategic forces, but it does help to lay the groundwork for future increases. It is a far cry from the 2013 employment strategy’s conclusion that the United States could “ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.” 

Guidance on other issues

On conventional forces, the 2024 employment guidance requires “the integration of non-nuclear capabilities into U.S. nuclear planning.” This language reflects similar passages in each US nuclear policy document since the end of the cold war. The 2013 version referred to planning “to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make these objectives and effects achievable.” The 2020 version noted that the Pentagon “is pursuing the integration of conventional and nuclear planning when appropriate.” 

Like its predecessor, the 2024 guidance does not adopt the Obama administration’s aspiration to increase reliance on conventional forces for kinetic strike. Even more than the 2020 document, the 2024 language portrays conventional forces as supportive of the “nuclear deterrence mission.” The language could pertain to, for example, interoperability of nuclear and conventional forces for signaling or strike missions, which is fully consistent with the Trump administration’s concept of “conventional-nuclear integration.” However, the 2024 document is more direct in requiring changes to nuclear plans and characterizes the classified guidance as placing a “greater emphasis” on non-nuclear capabilities. For the guidance to have the intended effect on plans, U.S. officials would have to participate in revisions to operational plans in the coming years, a process that is no longer possible for Biden appointees. 

The integration of non-nuclear planning is facilitated by adaptive nuclear planning, according to the guidance document. Unlike deliberate plans, which are flexible employment plans tailored to deter and, if necessary, achieve objectives against specific nuclear-armed adversaries, adaptive plans “would be implemented as needed in a crisis or conflict to tailor deterrence operations and employment options in accordance with the emerging circumstances of a contingency.” The guidance stresses the increasing “importance of managing escalation in U.S. planning for responding to limited strategic attack…including reducing the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear attack…” Adaptive nuclear planning is not new but the guidance document explains it is linked to non-nuclear options as well.

On the law of armed conflict, the 2024 guidance reiterates previous statements that “all nuclear plans must be consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict,” though it does not clarify what this requires or how compliance is assessed. The 2024 document does not repeat its predecessors’ statements on civilian targeting. It does not repeat the 2013 language that the United States “will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects,” nor the lower bar in the 2022 document removes the clause on “civilian objects.” The elision does not signal an intention to target civilian populations or objects and is probably the result of an attempt to reduce the length of the report. However, the oversight may make it difficult to assess whether the Trump administration is reinterpreting its law of armed conflict obligations.

On arms control, the document promises that the United States “will abide by the central limits of the New START Treaty for the duration of the Treaty as long as it assesses that Russia continues to do so,” but offers no assurances beyond February, 2026, either reciprocal or unilateral. The guidance states that “future bilateral agreements or arrangements with Russia… will need to account for U.S. deterrence requirements and other strategic threats globally.” U.S. arms control agreements with Russia have always done that so the explicit condition in the new guidance appears intended to constrain bilateral arms control. However, the passage lends more ammunition to opponents of arms control.

On sole authority, the document goes out of its way to affirm that the president has taken no steps to adjust the requirements or procedure for nuclear launch authorization. Especially in the final months of the first Trump administration, several current and former U.S. officials expressed concern about the existing system of sole authority. When Donald Trump again takes custody of the nuclear codes in January, he will find no new guardrails on his ability to order use of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

As the 2024 nuclear employment guidance report states, it offers “more continuity than change with the approach of previous administrations.” The Biden administration could have chosen to try to influence ongoing debates on strategy and force structure, but instead prefers to leave these questions to the incoming Trump administration.

President’s Biden’s employment strategy does break with previous administration’s in one important respect. As written, it does little to advance President Obama’s objective to decrease the nation’s reliance on its nuclear arsenal. It is possible that certain components of the document—on the requirement to “deter” multiple adversaries simultaneously and on integration of nonnuclear capabilities—are intended to advance this goal but the current text will likely do more to increase reliance on nuclear forces.

And with the declaration in June that “we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required” if the trajectory of adversary arsenals doesn’t change, the Biden administration has essentially set the stage for the Trump administration to increase the deployed arsenal.

If the president’s intention was to reduce reliance on nuclear forces and reduce upward pressure for new nuclear forces, senior administrations should clarify the language before leaving office.

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The Federation of American Scientists’ work on nuclear transparency would not be possible without generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Longview Philanthropy, the Jubitz Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.

The United States Air Force is replacing its current arsenal of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with an entirely new type of ICBM, known as Sentinel (previously known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent or GBSD). Sentinel’s price tag continues to grow beyond initial expectations, with the program on track to become one of the country’s most expensive nuclear modernization projects ever. 

As it stands, the Sentinel program is risky, draws funding away from more urgent priorities, and will exacerbate the Pentagon’s budget crisis. A better approach would be to life-extend a portion of the current ICBM force (the Minuteman III) in the near term in order to spread the costs of nuclear modernization out over the longer term. This approach will ensure that the United States can field a capable ICBM force on a continuous basis without compromising other critical security priorities. 

Challenge and Opportunity

The Sentinel ICBM program involves (1) a like-for-like replacement of the 400 Minuteman III ICBMs currently deployed across Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming, (2) the creation of a full set of test-launch missiles, and (3) upgrades to launch facilities, launch control centers, and other supporting infrastructure. Sentinel would keep ICBMs in the United States’ nuclear arsenal until at least 2075.

Unfortunately, the Sentinel program is riddled with challenges and flawed assumptions that have significantly increased both its cost and risk, and that will continue to do so over the coming years, as described below.

Sentinel’s price tag continues to grow beyond initial expectations

The Sentinel program’s ever-increasing price tag indicates that the program is not nearly as cost-effective as initially projected. In 2015, the Air Force issued a preliminary estimate that Sentinel (then “GBSD”) would cost $62.3 billion to acquire. One year later, the Pentagon’s Cost Analysis & Program Evaluation (CAPE) office projected that Sentinel could more realistically cost $85 billion, a 37% increase from the Air Force’s estimate. In August 2020, CAPE’s projected Sentinel acquisition cost jumped again to $95.8 billion, with total life-cycle costs reaching as high as $263.9 billion¹. In October 2020, the Pentagon reported that CAPE’s latest life-cycle estimate was $1.9 billion greater than its 2016 estimate, but did not explain why the estimate had grown. In January 2024, the Air Force notified Congress that the Sentinel program would cost 37 percent more than projected and take at least two years longer than estimated–an overrun in “critical” breach of Congress’ Nunn-McCurdy Act. The overrun put Sentinel’s anticipated cost at approximately $130 billion. In July 2024, upon certifying the Sentinel program to continue after its Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Pentagon announced a new CAPE estimate of $140.9 billion, constituting an 81% increase compared to the 2020 estimate.

As Sentinel matures over the coming years and schedule delays compound these cost issues, it will likely incur further cost increases. Sentinel is on track to become one of the country’s most expensive nuclear-related line items over the next decade.

Sentinel draws funding away from more urgent priorities

By its own admission, the Pentagon cannot afford all the weapons it wants to buy. In July 2020, the then-Air Force Chief of Staff, General Dave Goldfein, remarked that the Sentinel program represents “the first time that the nation has tried to simultaneously modernize the nuclear enterprise while it’s trying to modernize an aging conventional enterprise,” and added that “[t]he current budget does not allow you to do both.”

Funding tradeoffs at the Pentagon have already become apparent. In early 2020, for example, a decision to dramatically increase the budget of the National Nuclear Security Administration directly led to a Virginia-class submarine being cut from the Navy’s budget plan. Compounding the problem is the fact that the Pentagon is currently facing a “bow wave” of major expenditures. The bills for several big-ticket procurement projects—including Sentinel, the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, the F-35 fighter, the B-21 bomber, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, and the KC-46A tanker—will all come due over the next decade. With growing recognition that the Pentagon simply cannot afford to foot so many major bills simultaneously, these large procurement projects have been characterized as “fiscal time bombs”^,

The Sentinel program is already impacting funding of other defense programs with its latest batch of cost overruns. The Pentagon admitted in a July 2024 press release that they certified the Sentinel program to continue despite its critical cost and schedule overruns, partly because Sentinel “is a higher priority than programs whose funding must be reduced to accommodate the growth in cost of the program.” In reality, however, the Air Force does not yet know which programs will face funding reductions to offset Sentinel’s increase. General James Slife, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, stated in July 2024 that because Sentinel’s cost growth will be realized several years from now, “it is a decision for down the road to decide what trade-offs we’re going to need to make in order to be able to continue to pursue the Sentinel program.” 

With these funding issues in mind, it is imperative to think carefully about whether spending $141 billion to acquire the Sentinel right now makes sense. It may well be a better use of funds to focus on pressing security objectives––such as hardening U.S. command-and-control systems against cyber threats.

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Life-extending part or all of the Minuteman III ICBM force—instead of moving to acquire Sentinel as quickly as possible—would constitute a cheaper and less risky option for the United States to field a viable ICBM force at New START levels for at least the next two decades. The Pentagon’s primary justification for pursuing the Sentinel program was the assumption that building an entirely new missile force from scratch would be cheaper than life-extending the Minuteman III force. This assumption stands in stark contrast to an Air Force-sponsored analysis that “[a]ny new ICBM alternative will very likely cost almost two times—and perhaps even three times—more than incremental modernization of the current Minuteman III system.”  

The Pentagon’s assumption also does not match historical precedent. In 2012, after the completion of a comprehensive round of Minuteman III life-extension programs, the Air Force admitted that it cost only $7 billion to turn the Minuteman III ICBMs into “basically new missiles except for the shell.” There is little public evidence to suggest that a similar round of life-extension programs would cost significantly more. Even if the programs were more expensive, the added expense is unlikely to come anywhere close to Sentinel’s projected $141 billion acquisition fee; tripling the previous $7 billion price tag for Minuteman III upgrades would still amount to less than one-sixth of the acquisition price of Sentinel.

If a life-extension option were pursued in lieu of Sentinel, it is likely that the Minuteman III’s critical subsystems would eventually need to be replaced. Replacement appears to be technologically feasible. Lieutenant General Richard Clark, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, testified to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2019 that it would be possible to extend the lives of the Minuteman III’s propulsion and guidance systems one more time, despite his stated preference for proceeding with the GBSD. Furthermore, a 2014 RAND report commissioned by Air Force Global Strike Command found “no evidence that would necessarily preclude the possibility of long-term sustainment.” In fact, the report noted, “we found many who believed the default approach for the future is incremental modernization, that is, updating the sustainability and capability of the Minuteman III system as needed and in perpetuity.” 

Plan of Action

The next administration should revise its nuclear employment guidance to accept a slightly higher threshold for risk with regard to its ICBM force. This action is critical for enabling a life-extended Minuteman III force because the Pentagon’s interest in pursuing Sentinel is largely driven by its own interpretation of presidential nuclear-employment guidance. If the Air Force believes that the Minuteman III might dip below a preset reliability threshold, then the service will push for Sentinel in order to meet the current nuclear-employment guidance.

Revising the guidance to accept a slightly higher threshold for risk would reduce the need to pursue Sentinel immediately. This revision would first be publicly reflected in the next administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, and would then be translated into policy by the Pentagon. 

It is important to emphasize that (1) presidential revisions to the nuclear-employment guidance are not unusual, and (2) revising the nuclear-employment guidance would have little bearing on strategic stability. In a nuclear first strike, an adversary would still be forced to target every silo. This means that a life-extended Minuteman III force would theoretically produce the same deterrence effect as a brand-new Sentinel force. 

To provide additional support for the guidance revision, the next administration could launch a National Security Council-led review of the role of ICBMs in U.S. nuclear strategy. In particular, this review would assess the feasibility and cost of a Minuteman III life-extension program. The review would also consider whether such a program could be further enabled by reducing the number of deployed ICBMs or the number of annual flight tests, or by pursuing new forms of nondestructive booster reliability testing (see FAQ for more details). 

Conclusion

Life-extending the nation’s existing arsenal of Minuteman III missiles instead of immediately pursuing the Sentinel program is the best way to ensure that the United States can continue to field a capable ICBM force without sacrificing funding other critical national-security priorities. 

This course of action could buy the United States as much as twenty years of additional time to decide whether to pursue or cancel a follow-on Sentinel program, thus allowing the United States to further spread out costs and reconsider the future role of ICBMs in U.S. nuclear posture. 

This action-ready policy memo is part of Day One 2025 — our effort to bring forward bold policy ideas, grounded in science and evidence, that can tackle the country’s biggest challenges and bring us closer to the prosperous, equitable and safe future that we all hope for whoever takes office in 2025 and beyond.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are there any concerns with accepting a higher threshold for risk with the ICBM force?

While accepting a higher threshold for risk with the ICBM force may sound politically difficult, in reality it has little bearing on strategic stability. The Air Force projects that a 30-year-old missile core has an estimated failure probability of 1.3%, which increases exponentially each year. As long as the expected failure rate did not climb too high, though, an adversary conducting a nuclear first strike would still have to target every silo because there would be no way of knowing which missiles were functional and which were duds. This means that a life-extended Minuteman III force would theoretically produce the same deterrence effect as a brand-new Sentinel force. Additionally, it is extremely unlikely that the United States would ever elect to launch only a small number of ICBMs in a crisis. As a result, even a 10% failure rate across all 400 launched ICBMs would still enable approximately 360 fully functional missiles to reach their targets.

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What is the most significant technical obstacle to conducting a Minuteman III life-extension?

Testing is critical to ensure that the Minuteman III missiles continue to function as designed if they are life-extended. However, there is a limited quantity of Minuteman III boosters that can be used as test assets. This problem was identified early in the Sentinel acquisition process by both internal and external analysts, who noted that increasing the average ICBM test rate from three to four and a half test firings per year – as was done in 2017 – would inevitably exhaust the surplus boosters and lead to a depletion of the currently-deployed ICBM force around 2040., There are several ways to overcome this obstacle without building a brand-new missile force. 

One option would be to lower the average test rate from four and a half tests per year back down to three. If the Air Force was prepared to accept a slight additional risk of booster failure––given the fact that, as discussed above, doing so would have no discernible effect on strategic stability––then the number of tests per year could realistically be decreased. To that end, a 2017 Center for Strategic and International Studies report estimated that if the United States chose to re-core its ICBMs and move the firing rate back to three tests per year, then it would be possible to maintain the Minuteman III force at New START levels (400 deployed ICBMs) until 2050.

Another option would be to reduce the number of deployed ICBMs. Again, doing so would not meaningfully affect deterrence but would make a significant quantity of additional missiles available for testing purposes. For example, if the Pentagon reduced its deployed ICBM force from 400 to 300 missiles, it could maintain the current testing rate of four and a half tests per year without the missile inventory dropping below 300 until approximately 2060. A portion of the missiles used for testing could also be converted into commercial or governmental space launch vehicles, thus eliminating the requirement to eventually “re-core” them to ICBM standards.

A third option would be for the Air Force to explore nondestructive methods for testing the reliability of their solid rocket motors. George Perkovich and Pranay Vaddi suggest in their 2021 “Model Nuclear Posture Review” that this could be achieved through technological advances in ultrasound and computed tomography. The Air Force could also consider adapting the Navy’s nondestructive-testing techniques – which involve sending a probe into the bore to measure the elasticity of the propellant – to evaluate the reliability of the Minuteman III force. As Steve Fetter and Kingston Reif noted in 2019, these types of nondestructive testing methodologies “would permit the lifetime of each motor to be estimated on an individual basis. Rather than retire all motors at an age when a small percentage are believed to be no longer reliable, only those particular motors with measurements indicating unacceptable aging could be retired.” Nondestructive testing may be the most effective option, because if successful it would eliminate the attrition problem altogether.

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Is the Minuteman III ICBM simply “too old?”

Despite the Pentagon’s repeated claims that the Minuteman III ICBM will become “unviable” after 2030, the Minuteman III’s critical subsystems remain highly reliable with age. There is little evidence to suggest that this will change within the next decade. The Minuteman III’s guidance and propulsion modules were modernized during the 2000s and continue to perform successfully during tests.

A March 2020 Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center briefing to industry partners also acknowledged that the useful life of the Minuteman III force could be extended with “better NS-50 [guidance module] failure data,” because “current age-out on guidance is an engineering ‘best guess’ with no current data.” This suggests that the Air Force’s prediction about the post-2030 “unviability” of these subsystems is based on little actual evidence.

Importantly, the 2030 benchmark for the Minuteman III’s “unviability” appears to have been selected by Congress, not by the Air Force. A consequential amendment inserted into the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of the Air Force to “modernize Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles in the United States inventory as required to maintain a sufficient supply of launch test assets and spares to sustain the deployed force of such missiles through 2030.” This amendment ultimately had a significant impact on the timeline of Sentinel because, as Air Force historian David N. Spires describes, “Although Air Force leaders had asserted that incremental upgrades, as prescribed in the analysis of land-based strategic deterrent alternatives, could extend the Minuteman’s life span to 2040, the congressionally mandated target year of 2030 became the new standard.”

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How is the Navy’s strategy of dealing with its aging nuclear systems different than the Air Force’s strategy?

It is telling that the Navy is not currently contemplating the purchase of a brand-new missile to replace its current arsenal of Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and instead plans to conduct a second life-extension to keep them in service until 2084. This life-extension is enabled in large part by the Navy’s unique nondestructive method of testing its boosters, described above. In January 2021, Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe Jr., the Navy’s Director for Strategic Systems Programs, remarked that “solid rocket motors, the age of those we can extend quite a while, we understand that very well.”

To demonstrate this fact, in 2015 the Navy conducted a successful Trident SLBM flight test using the oldest 1st-stage solid rocket motor flown to date (over 26 years old), as well as 2nd- and 3rd-stage motors that were 22 years old. Rather than replace these missiles as they exceed the planned design life of 25 years, the Navy stated in 2015 that they “are carefully monitoring the effects of age on our strategic weapons system and continue to perform life extension and maintenance efforts to ensure reliability.”

Rather than conduct similar life-extension operations, the Air Force has elected to completely replace its Minuteman III force with the brand-new, highly expensive Sentinel.

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Why does the Air Force claim that pursuing Sentinel is cheaper than life-extending Minuteman III?

A 2016 report to Congress reveals that the Air Force baked multiple flawed assumptions into its cost-assessment process, the most influential of which was the presumption that the United States would continue deploying 400 ICBMs until 2075. However, as researchers from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explained in a January 2021 report, “Basing analysis on a straight-line requirement projected all the way to 2075 practically predetermines the outcome.” Rather than prematurely selecting these benchmarks, the Pentagon’s analysis could have considered which options were most cost-effective under a variety of circumstances.

In reality, ICBM force posture is neither sacred nor immutable, and there is little security rationale behind the Pentagon’s selections of the number 400 and the year 2075. The year 2075 a relatively arbitrary timeframe that is not codified in either the Nuclear Posture Review or in other key strategic documents. Moreover, a 2013 inter-agency review—featuring the participation of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and then-Vice President Joe Biden’s office—ultimately found that U.S. deterrence requirements could be met by reducing U.S. nuclear forces by up to one-third.

Yet despite their lack of strategic rationale, these pre-selected force requirements and exaggerated timelines heavily bias the Pentagon’s cost-assessment process in favor of Sentinel. In particular, if the Pentagon had selected a different ICBM retention timeline – 2050, for example, or even 2100 – then a revised cost assessment would have suggested that life-extending the Minuteman III force would be significantly more cost-effective than building an entirely new Sentinel missile force from scratch.

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Washington, D.C. – November 12, 2024 – The United Kingdom is modernizing its stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as detailed today in the Federation of American Scientists latest edition of its Nuclear Notebook, “United Kingdom Nuclear Forces, 2024”. The researchers estimate that the United Kingdom has maintained its stockpile of 225 nuclear warheads and predict an eventual increase based on shifting posture to counter Russia, modernization, and alliance efforts. The Notebook is published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and available here.

“Budget overruns remain a constraint for the UK nuclear modernization program, significant parts of which are done in close collaboration with the United States, and efforts are underway to expand the nuclear warhead stockpile,” observes Hans Kristensen, Director of the FAS Nuclear Information Project and one of the Nuclear Notebook authors.

Modernization and nuclear infrastructure construction

The United Kingdom is replacing its sole nuclear platform––the aging Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)––with the new Dreadnought-class that is currently under construction. 

Additionally, the FAS report includes satellite imagery of ongoing construction at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) facilities at Aldermaston and Burghfield, including a new warhead assembly facility, enriched uranium storage facility, and plutonium manufacturing facility. 

Challenges for the future

Budget overruns and delays in construction continue to be one of the biggest issues for the United Kingdom’s nuclear program. Projected costs for the UK Navy have gone up by 41 percent due to the Dreadnought SSBN program. Delays in this program could threaten the Navy’s ability to maintain their Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD), as it would put additional stress on the Vanguard fleet that has already been pushed past its service life. Nuclear infrastructure projects, including the MENSA warhead facility, are also behind schedule and over-budget. 

Collaboration with the United States

Upgrades at RAF Lakenheath discovered by the Notebook authors signal the return of the United States Air Force nuclear mission to the United Kingdom, although it is unlikely that US nuclear weapons will be permanently stored on UK soil in peacetime. The arrival of the F-35A Lightning II, capable of carrying B61-12 gravity bombs, US budgetary indicators for special storage upgrades, and the construction of a new “surety” dormitory for US Airmen at RAF Lakenheath all indicate preparations for the potential return of US nuclear weapons which have been absent in the United Kingdom since 2008. 

The Notebook also outlines cooperation between the UK and US Navy on missile tests. This year, UK ballistic missile submarines conducted test fires off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, and US laboratories evaluated and provided measurements for the test effort.

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ABOUT THE NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK 

The FAS Nuclear Notebook, co-authored by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, is an effort by the Nuclear Information Project team published bi-monthly in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The joint publication began in 1987. FAS, formed in 1945 by the scientists who developed the nuclear weapon, has worked since to increase nuclear transparency, reduce nuclear risks, and advocate for responsible reductions of nuclear arsenals and the role of nuclear weapons in national security.

This latest issue follows the release of the 2024 India Nuclear Notebook. The next issue will focus on the United States. More research is located at FAS’s Nuclear Information Project.

The Federation of American Scientists’ work on nuclear transparency would not be possible without generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Longview Philanthropy, the Jubitz Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.

ABOUT FAS

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) works to advance progress on a broad suite of contemporary issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver dramatic progress, and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table. Established in 1945 by scientists in response to the atomic bomb, FAS continues to work on behalf of a safer, more equitable, and more peaceful world.

The last resolution producing similar scientific research was published in 1989

Washington, D.C. – October 24, 2024 – The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) announces its support for the UN General Assembly Draft Resolution on Nuclear War Effects and Scientific Research, announced August 20th, and calls for others to do the same. FAS believes the resolution is a necessary advancement of scientific understanding of the devastating consequences of a nuclear war.

“Whether people support or oppose nuclear weapons, they deserve to know what the consequences of nuclear use are. An independent fact-based expert study is the best way to do that. All member States, including the United States, can and should support this UN resolution,” says Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project (NIP) at FAS. “FAS believes in the need for science to inform policy, which is why we call for support of this resolution.”

“The UN resolution is an important and timely measure for articulating the toll of nuclear weapons on humans and the environment,” says Eliana Johns, Senior Research Associate at FAS. “It also provides an opportunity to inject science into nuclear weapons policy deliberations so that policymakers, practitioners, and the public have access to updated and accurate data about nuclear weapons, their effects, and the destruction their use would entail.”

Scientific Report Last Updated in 1989

This resolution, introduced by Ireland and New Zealand, would create a scientific panel to conduct the first comprehensive study on the effects of nuclear war since 1989. With major advances in technology and scientific evidence bases, the independent panel of 21 scientific researchers will produce a more accurate and updated report reflecting current global trends.

It has been over 30 years since the last study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war was issued by the UN Secretary-General. Since then, globalization has greatly linked human populations; the global population has grown by 50%, and states’ nuclear arsenals have modernized and advanced. At a time when all nuclear weapons states are undergoing efforts to modernize their arsenals, a better technical understanding of how a nuclear war would impact humanity and the environment is vital to informing discussions on nuclear weapons policy and highlighting nuclear weapons effects on impacted communities.

FAS Nuclear Information Project

FAS is a non-partisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to deploying evidence-based policies to address global threats. From its founding by a group of atomic scientists and engineers involved in the Manhattan Project, FAS has worked for the public promotion of science, and the freedom and integrity of scientists and scientific research to benefit humanity. FAS is proud to support a scientific community that communicates the devastating effects of nuclear war on humans and the environment. In addition to ongoing research, published at the FAS website, the NIP team produces the semi-monthly Nuclear Notebook, published in academic journal Taylor and Francis as well as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ website.

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ABOUT FAS

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) works to advance progress on a broad suite of contemporary issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver dramatic progress and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table. Established in 1945 by scientists in response to the atomic bomb, FAS continues to work on behalf of a safer, more equitable, and more peaceful world. More information at fas.org, and more information about the Nuclear Information Project at https://fas.org/initiative/nuclear-information-project/.

The United States currently observes a voluntary moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons testing. At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is required by law to maintain the capability to conduct an underground nuclear explosive test at the Nevada National Security Site, if directed to do so by the U.S. president. 

Restarting U.S. nuclear weapons testing could have very negative security implications for the United States unless it was determined to be an absolute technical or security necessity. A restart of U.S. nuclear testing for any reason could open the door for China, Russia, Pakistan, and India to do the same, and make it even harder to condemn North Korea for its testing program. This would have significant security consequences for the United States and global environmental impacts.

The United States conducted over 1,000 nuclear weapons tests before the 1991 testing moratorium took effect. It was able to do so with the world’s most advanced diagnostic and data detection equipment, which enabled the US to conduct advanced computer simulations after the end of testing. Neither Russia or China conducted as many tests, and many fewer of those were able to collect advanced metrics, hampering these countries’ ability to match American simulation capabilities. Enabling Russia and China to resume testing could narrow the technical advantage the United States has held in testing data since the testing moratorium went into effect in 1992. 

Aside from the security loss, nuclear testing would also have long-lasting radiological effects at the test site itself, including radiation contamination in the soil and groundwater, and the chance of venting into the atmosphere. Despite these downsides, a future president has the legal authority—for political or other reasons—to order a resumption of nuclear testing. Ensuring any such decision is more democratic and subject to a broader system of political accountability could be achieved by creating a more integrated approval process, based on scientific or security needs. To this end, Congress should pass legislation requiring the NNSA administrator to certify that an explosive nuclear test is technically necessary to rectify an existing problem or doubt in U.S. nuclear surety before a test can be conducted.

Challenges and Opportunities

The United States is party to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits atmospheric tests, and the Threshold Ban Treaty of 1974, limiting underground tests of more than 150 kilotons of explosive yield. In 1992, the United States also established a legal moratorium on nuclear testing through the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment, passed during the George H.W. Bush Administration. After extending this moratorium in 1993, the United States, Russia, and China also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, which prohibits nuclear explosions. However, none of the Annex 2 (nuclear armed) states have ratified the CTBT, which prevents it from entering into force. 

Since halting nuclear explosive tests in 1992, the United States has benefited from a comparative advantage over other nuclear-armed states, given its advanced simulation and computing technologies, coupled with extensive data collected from conducting over 1,000 explosive nuclear tests over nearly five decades. The NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program uses computer simulations to combine new scientific research with data from past nuclear explosive tests to assess the reliability, safety, and security of the U.S. stockpile without returning to nuclear explosive testing. Congress has mandated that the NNSA must provide a yearly report to the Nuclear Weapons Council, which reports to the president on the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The NNSA also maintains the capability to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada Test Site as directed by President Clinton in Presidential Decision Directive 15 (PDD-15). National Security Memorandum 7 requires the NNSA to have the capability to conduct an underground explosive test with limited diagnostics within 36 months, but the NNSA has asserted in their Stockpile Stewardship and Management plan that domestic and international laws and regulations could slow down this timeline. A 2011 report to Congress from the Department of Energy stated that a small test for political reasons could take only 6–10 months.

For the past 27 years, the NNSA administrator and the three directors of the national laboratories have annually certified—following a lengthy assessment process—that “there is no technical reason to conduct nuclear explosive testing.” Now, some figures, including former President Trump’s National Security Advisor, have called for a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing for political reasons. Specifically, testing advocates suggest—despite a lack of technical justification—that a return to testing is necessary in order to maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and to intimidate China and other adversaries at the bargaining table. 

A 2003 study by Sandia National Laboratories found that conducting an underground nuclear test would cost between $76 million and $84 million in then-year dollars, approximately $132 million to $146 million today. In addition to financial cost, explosive nuclear testing could also be costly to both humans and the environment even if conducted underground. For example, at least 32 underground tests performed at the Nevada Test Site were found to have released considerable quantities of radionuclides into the atmosphere through venting. Underground testing can also lead to contamination of land and groundwater. One of the most significant impacts of nuclear testing in the United States is the disproportionately high rate of thyroid cancer in Nevada and surrounding states due to radioactive contamination of the environment.

In addition to health and environmental concerns, the resumption of nuclear tests in the United States would likely trigger nuclear testing by other states—all of which would have comparatively more to gain and learn from testing. When the CTBT was signed, the United States had already conducted far more nuclear tests than China or Russia with better technology to collect data, including fiber optic cables and supercomputers. A return to nuclear testing would also weaken international norms on nonproliferation and, rather than coerce adversaries into a preferred course of action, likely instigate more aggressive behavior and heightened tensions in response.

Plan of Action

In order to ensure that, if resumed, explosive nuclear testing is done for technical rather than political reasons, Congress should amend existing legislation to implement checks and balances on the president’s ability to order such a resumption. Per section 2530 of title 50 of the United States Code, “No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.” Congress should amend this legislation to stipulate that, prior to any nuclear test being conducted, the NNSA administrator must first certify that the objectives of the test cannot be achieved through simulation and are important enough to warrant an end to the moratorium. A new certification should be required for every individual test, and the amendment should require that the certification be provided in the form of a publicly available, unclassified report to Congress, in addition to a classified report. In the absence of such an amendment, the president should make a Presidential Decision Directive to call for a certification by the NNSA administrator and a public hearing under oath to certify the same results cannot be achieved through scientific simulation in order for a nuclear test to be conducted.

Conclusion

The United States should continue its voluntary moratorium on all types of explosive nuclear weapons tests and implement further checks on the president’s ability to call for a resumption of nuclear testing.

This action-ready policy memo is part of Day One 2025 — our effort to bring forward bold policy ideas, grounded in science and evidence, that can tackle the country’s biggest challenges and bring us closer to the prosperous, equitable and safe future that we all hope for whoever takes office in 2025 and beyond.

On September 25, 2024, the Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the South Pacific. The announcement stated that this was a “routine arrangement in [their] annual training plan.” However, the ICBM was launched from Hainan Island, an unusual location for this kind of missile. In addition, the reentry vehicle impacted in the South Pacific, an estimated 11,700 km away, marking the first time China had targeted the Pacific in a test since 1980 when it tested its first ICBM (the DF-5) at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.

This map, created by Dr. Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek on X), shows hazard areas from Navigational Warnings and a NOTAM with the reconstructed ballistic flight path. (source)

Given the unusual nature of this test launch and the lack of official information about the status of China’s nuclear forces, this event is an opportunity to further examine China’s nuclear posture and activities, including the type of missile, how it fits into China’s nuclear modernization, and where it was launched from.

What missile is it? 

When news of the launch broke, navigational warnings and trajectory calculations indicated the missile was launched from northeast Hainan Island, a Chinese province in the South China Sea. This is not where China normally test-launches its ICBMs, and there is no ICBM brigade permanently deployed on the island. The location and the range of the missile indicated that it was a road-mobile missile launcher, either a DF-41 or DF-31A/AG type. In the days after the launch, several images surfaced with clues about the type of missile and its potential launch location. 

An image of the missile lauch released by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on September 25, 2024.

The first image, released by news outlets on September 25, showed features that made it clear that this was, in fact, a DF-31AG missile. The DF-31AG is a modernized version of China’s first solid-fuel road-mobile ICBM, the DF-31, which debuted in 2006. Since 2007, China has been supplementing and now completely replaced the initial DF-31 versions with the longer-range DF-31A. The DF-31A launcher had limited maneuverability, so in 2017, China first displayed the enhanced DF-31AG launcher. The DF-31AG will likely completely replace the DF-31A in the next few years. 

The DF-31AG launcher is thought to carry the same missile as the DF-31A, but the 21-meter-long eight-axle HTF5980 transporter erector launcher has improved maneuverability and is thought to require less support. The single erector arm seen in the above image matches other images of the DF-31AG. The image seems to show that the launcher was partially covered by some sort of camouflage during the launch.

The DF-31AG uses a cold-launch method, meaning the missile is ejected from the canister using compressed gas or steam before the first-stage engine ignites. Unfortunately, this also means it is harder to geolocate the site of the launch because there are unlikely to be burn marks that would normally remain visible on the ground after hot-launching a missile.

How did the missile get there? 

The nearest deployment of DF-31AG missiles is with the 632 Brigade located in Shaoyang in mainland China, around 800 km away. There is no confirmation that the missile came from this particular brigade, but the distance gives some perspective as to the process and amount of time it takes to bring a DF-31AG to Hainan Island.

To transport the mobile ICBM to Hainan, it was likely placed onto a railcar and brought to a port such as Yuehai Railway Beigang Wharf before being loaded onto a ship and transferred to Haikou port or a similar location at Hainan Island. From there, the missile was likely driven, along with the accompanying support vehicles, to a sheltered and protected area near the final launch location.

It remains unknown whether the missile was launched directly from the launch position itself, remotely from a local command post, or remotely from a centralized authority.

Where was the missile launched from? 

To find the precise location where the DF-31AG was launched on the island, we had to rely on the few photos and videos available to us (mostly captured by locals). To do this, we collaborated with analyst Ise Midori (@isekaimint on X), who carried out a complex analysis of the various launch videos to pinpoint the approximate launch location.

In the above image of the launch, one of the first noticeable features is the devastated vegetation, which matches what we would expect to see after typhoon Yagi impacted northeast Hainan in early September. There is also a small body of water barely visible at the bottom right of the image, which provides a clue when searching for the launch location. 

After analyzing the available images, photos, and videos, Midori determined the general area where the launch likely occurred to be in Wenchang, Hainan. While we are unable to determine the exact location with high confidence due to a lack of clearly identifiable signatures, we expect it to be within the area of interest indicated below, potentially at the highway intersection. 

Meanwhile, the image below began circulating on social media shortly after the launch. The image reportedly captures the DF-31AG as it was driving to its launch position, although the cloud coverage does not match that from the photo of the launch and could have been taken hours beforehand.    

An image of the DF-31AG missile driving on Hainan Island that circulated on social media shortly after the launch.

After observing the road markings and vegetation in the image, satellite imagery from Planet Labs PBC revealed a unique road that matched these signatures. This road is also only 1.9 km away from the launch location area of interest, increasing confidence that the launch occurred at or near this area.

Notably, both the launch area of interest and the location of the DF-31AG on the road are within the boundaries of what seems to be a new military training zone constructed in recent years. This also helps increase confidence in the launch area of interest and highlights this area as important for future observation.

Why here, and why now?

While China has not test-launched an ICBM into the Pacific in over four decades (it normally test launches the missiles in a very high apogee within its borders), it is not unusual for China – or other countries for that matter – to test-launch their nuclear-capable systems. It is interesting, however, to consider why China may have chosen to launch from Hainan Island instead of somewhere that is operationally representative or perhaps easier to travel to on the mainland coast. Nevertheless, the location allows China to fly the missile at full range without dropping missile stages on the ground or overflying other countries. It is unknown whether China will test-launch more ICBMs from Hainan Island in the future.

These types of tests also take months of extensive planning and coordination. Thus, the launch was likely motivated by broader political factors, not in response to particular recent events. Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, points out that this test was crucial for the PLARF to reestablish its internal and external credibility following corruption scandals and unprecedented leadership shifts. Additionally, reports of issues with the quality of certain missiles likely prompted a desire to reestablish recognition of operational competence. 

Further, because the PLARF conducted the test launch as part of a “military drill” rather than a technological development program, it likely aims to convey military prowess and combat readiness. Conducting an ICBM test over the ocean also likely reflects China’s ambition to solidify its international status as a major nuclear power since the United States also regularly tests its ICBMs over the open ocean. 

Notably, the Pentagon confirmed they received advanced notice of China’s test launch, which potentially sets a precedent for pre-launch notification and could leave room for further communication on risk reduction measures. Moving forward, it will be interesting to see if China begins to routinely conduct these kinds of tests beyond its borders and if it continues to provide pre-launch notification to relevant states. The new DF-41 has yet to be test-flown at full range in a realistic trajectory.

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This research was carried out with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York,  the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, Longview Philanthropy, and individual donors.

NATO chose to use a Dutch F-35A as illustration in the press release for its tactical nuclear weapons exercise Steadfast Noon.

NATO today began its annual tactical nuclear weapons exercise in Europe. Known as Steadfast Noon, the two-week long exercise involves more than 60 aircraft from 13 countries and more than 2,000 personnel, according to a NATO press release. That is slightly bigger than last year’s exercise that involved “up to 60” aircraft.

The exercise is co-hosted by Belgium and the Netherlands at the Kleine Brogel and Volkel airbases, respectively. Flight operations are focused over the North Sea and surrounding countries including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. NATO says a total of eight bases are involved.

The NATO press release does not identify the countries or bases that are involved, but an article in Key.Aero previously reported that a NATO spokesperson had identified the following:

The thirteen countries match the number of participants identified in the NATO press release. Of these, Finland is obviously the most interesting – perhaps surprising – because the former neutral country has chosen to participate in a nuclear exercise only 18 months after it became a member of NATO.

Base Modernizations

The exercise coincides with major upgrades underway at most of the nuclear bases in Europe. This modernization involves security upgrades to the underground vaults that store the U.S. nuclear weapons, underground cables and nuclear command and control systems, and facilities needed for the new F-35A nuclear-capable fighter-bomber.

Several of the nuclear bases in Europe have recently seen construction of a special loading pad for use by the US C-17 aircraft that transport nuclear weapons and service equipment. This includes Kleine Brogel in Belgium, Ghedi in Italy, and Volkel in the Netherlands. The new pads at Ghedi and Volkel have walls to conceal the nuclear weapons transports. In this year’s Steadfast Noon exercise area, Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium has undergone extensive upgrades to weapons maintenance facilities, including the US Air Force 701^st Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS) – the unit responsible for the physical security and maintenance of the weapons, as well as for delivering custody of the weapons to the user country’s air forces if directed to do so. This includes a new drive-through facility for nuclear weapons maintenance trucks. In addition, a large tarmac for C-17A nuclear transport aircraft has been added next to the presumed nuclear weapons area, construction of a high-security facility possibly related to nuclear weapons maintenance has been nearly completed, a new control tower has been added, and underground cables and the Alarm Communication & Display (AC&D) system have been upgraded. Much of this was previously visible on satellite images on Google Earth and described by FAS last year, but since then the image has been removed and all images of the base on Google Earth have been blurred to obscure details. In the interest of nuclear transparency, the image is included here:

Clear images of Kleine Brogel Air Base are now gone from Google Earth. This one was available last year but has since been removed.

In the Netherlands, Volkel Air Base has gone the extra mile to hide operations by building a wall in front of a parking area where aircraft enthusiasts used to watch and film the aircraft. A spokesperson at the base confirmed the purpose of the new wall: “We believe it is important that personnel can work safely and undisturbed. The visibility-restricting measures make it difficult to photograph operational equipment and air base personnel.” For the first time, this Steadfast Noon exercise will include the Royal Netherlands Air Force’s newly nuclear-certified F-35A fighter-bombers.

Walls have been built at Volkel Air Base to hide weapons loading and prevent the public from observing operations and equipment.

The German base at Büchel is in the middle of a year-long upgrade that includes a service area for the F-35A at the northern end of the base, a refurbished runway, as well as what appears to be a security upgrade of the nuclear weapons area with a possible loading pad for the US C-17 transport aircraft that are used to transport nuclear weapons and limited life components.

Modernization of Büchel Air Base in Germany appears to include a new double-fenced security perimeter around the nuclear shelters.

Finally, in this year’s Steadfast Noon operating area the most significant new development is the return of the nuclear mission to RAF Lakenheath, the home of the US Air Force 48^th Fighter Wing with F-15E and F-35A fighter-bombers. The base previously was a major nuclear base with 33 underground storage vaults and over 100 nuclear bombs; but in the mid-2000s the US Air Force withdrew all the weapons and the nuclear mission was mothballed.

That began to change in 2022 when RAF Lakenheath was quietly added to the list of bases undergoing nuclear upgrades. Although the Pentagon tried to removed evidence of the change, other documents made it clear that the nuclear mission was returning. Satellite images of construction at RAF Lakenheath indicate that approximately 22 of the 33 protective aircraft shelters with underground WS3 vaults are involved in the nuclear upgrade.

Return of the nuclear mission to RAF Lakenheath appears to include 22 of the original 33 protective aircraft shelters with underground weapons vault.

It is unclear if nuclear weapons will return to RAF Lakenheath or the upgrade is intended as a backup to increase flexibility and reduce vulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons posture in Europe. After the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the policies of the Erdogan government, there has been speculations that the remaining weapons at Incirlik Air Base could be withdrawn; To that end it is interesting that the number of vaults that appear to be readied at RAF Lakenheath is about the same as the numbers remaining active at Incirlik.

Weapons Modernization

In addition to base and aircraft modernizations, the US Air Force is in the process of the replacing the legacy B61-3 and B61-4 tactical nuclear bombs with the new B61-12 guided nuclear bomb. The priority has been to supply the B-2 bombers at Whiteman AFB with the new weapon, but preparations are now underway to ship the B61-12 to bases in Europe and return the B61-3/4 bombs to the United States for dismantlement. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reported recently that the B61-12 is technically certified for not only US Air Force fighter-bombers but also certified NATO aircraft (F-16, F-35A, and Tornado).

The B61-12 nuclear bomb is now technically certified on the B-2 bomber and all US and NATO dual-capable fighter aircraft.

It is unknown if the B61-12 has been shipped to Europe. NATO officials have only been willing to say preparations are underway. If so, it is unlikely to go to all bases at the same time or necessarily within a short period of time; Instead, the new weapon will probably replace the old weapons gradually depending on aircraft and base upgrade status.

Load training of B61-12 (bottom) and legacy B61-4 (top) in a weapons storage vault of the kind installed at bases in Europe. Each vault can store up to four bombs but normally only have one or two. Image credit: US Air Force via The War Zone.

Our current estimate is that there are roughly 100 B61 nuclear bombs deployed in Europe at six bases in five countries. They constitute a small part of the total US nuclear stockpile of roughly 3,700 nuclear weapons.

Broader Context

Steadfast Noon is an annual exercise and planning for this one began over a year ago, NATO says. Nonetheless, the two-week long tactical nuclear weapons exercise with over 60 aircraft from 13 countries is taking place during very tense relations with Russia who for nearly three years has waged a brutal full-scale war against Ukraine and issued numerous warnings to NATO about potential use of nuclear weapons.

Earlier this year, Russia held a series of diverse tactical nuclear weapons exercise and distributed pictures and videos to make sure it was noticed in the West. And most recently Russian president Vladimir Putin announced possible changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine that appeared intended to signal a lower threshold for potential use of nuclear weapons.

In response, some analysts and institutes in the West are advocating for more nuclear weapons and broadening of the nuclear weapons sharing mission to more countries for what they believe is necessary to “strengthen deterrence” against Russia.

The United States has already increased the role and profile of nuclear bombers in support of NATO and US ballistic missile submarines have resumed visits to European ports – one submarine recently surfaced off Norway in a clear nuclear signal. In announcing the start of exercise Steadfast Noon, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that “Steadfast Noon is an important test of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent and sends a clear message to any adversary that NATO will protect and defend all Allies.” (Emphasis added.)

Combined, these action and reaction steps clearly have raised the nuclear profile over the past several years and are likely to be followed by more. With hardened rhetoric and increased signaling, the salience of nuclear weapons is again growing. Whether this will change the other sides’ behavior for the better or increase nuclear competition and risks even more remains to be seen.

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This research was carried out with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, Longview Philanthropy, and individual donors.

The future of U.S. Nuclear Policy is on the table in the 2024 election because the president of the United States has sole authority over the decision to launch nuclear weapons as the Commander in Chief. Proponents of the Trump Administration have advocated for increasing the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stockpile and encouraging allies like South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. What would a Harris Presidency mean for Nuclear Policy?

Women protesters at Greenham Commons and women groups who advocated for the treaty on the prohibitions of nuclear weapons may lead people to believe that women are less in support of nuclear weapons. However, a 2017 Stanford survey found that “women are as hawkish as men and, in some scenarios, are even more willing to support the use of nuclear weapons” in order to protect American troops. This isn’t just endemic to public opinion, when it comes to leadership, research has shown that while increasing the ratio of women in the legislature decreased the defense budget, having a women executive resulted in defense budgets raising by 3 percent.  According to the study’s model, “using year 2000 spending and GDP data, the presence of a female executive would produce almost a $10.6 billion increase in U.S. defense spending.” This sentiment was reflected in Harris’s speech at the Democratic National Convention: “As commander in chief, I will ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world. And I will fulfill our sacred obligation to care for our troops and their families, and I will always honor and never disparage their service and their sacrifice.” In the speech, she also said how she would be tougher than former President Trump on dictators like Kim Jong Un.

Harris has seemed to recognize the existential threat of nuclear war, responding to a question from a student in 2019, and saying “This president [Donald Trump], because he likes to sound tough as opposed to what my mother says — ‘It’s not about how you sound, it’s about how you act.’ — pulls us out of that [Iran Nuclear Deal], exposing us to great harm.” However, the current Biden-Harris Administration has continued nuclear modernization under the Sentinel program, and passed the National Defense Authorization Act, ordering the US Air Force to reduce the time it takes to upload ICBMs.

With regard to policy perspectives, some could argue there are gendered differences. Radiation from nuclear weapons fallout results in higher cases of cancer in females than males. Additionally, women face the brunt of psychological trauma from nuclear weapons attack. Because of these factors, scholars have noted the importance of including gendered analysis factors to nuclear weapons attack. 

Increasing women in leadership roles is important for gender parity and bringing in new perspectives, but it does not guarantee peace. Kamala Harris’s lived experience as a woman and daughter of immigrant parents may lead her to pursue more empathetic humanitarian policies or diplomatic arms control solutions, but it does not guarantee it. 

For a longer analysis on this issue, you can read more here.

Grant Funds Research of AI’s Impact on Nuclear Weapons, Biosecurity, Military Autonomy, Cyber, and other global issues

Washington, D.C. – September 11, 2024 – The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has received a $1.5 million grant from the Future of Life Institute (FLI) to investigate the implications of artificial intelligence on global risk. The 18-month project supports FAS’s efforts to bring together the world’s leading security and technology experts to better understand and inform policy on the nexus between AI and several global issues, including nuclear deterrence and security, bioengineering, autonomy and lethality, and cyber security-related issues.

FAS’s CEO Daniel Correa noted that “understanding and responding to how new technology will change the world is why the Federation of American Scientists was founded. Against this backdrop, FAS has embarked on a critical journey to explore AI’s potential. Our goal is not just to understand these risks, but to ensure that as AI technology advances, humanity’s ability to understand and manage the potential of this technology advances as well.

“When the inventors of the atomic bomb looked at the world they helped create, they understood that without scientific expertise and brought her perspectives humanity would never live the potential benefits they had helped bring about. They founded FAS to ensure the voice of objective science was at the policy table, and we remain committed to that effort after almost 80 years.”

“We’re excited to partner with FLI on this essential work,” said Jon Wolfsthal, who directs FAS’ Global Risk Program.  “AI is changing the world. Understanding this technology and how humans interact with it will affect the pressing global issues that will determine the fate of all humanity. Our work will help policy makers better understand these complex relationships. No one fully understands what AI will do for us or to us, but having all perspectives in the room and working to protect against negative outcomes and maximizing positive ones is how good policy starts.”

“As the power of AI systems continues to grow unchecked, so too does the risk of devastating misuse and accidents,” writes FLI President Max Tegmark. “Understanding the evolution of different global threats in the context of AI’s dizzying development is instrumental to our continued security, and we are honored to support FAS in this vital work.”

The project will include a series of activities, including high-level focused workshops with world-leading experts and officials on different aspects of artificial intelligence and global risk, policy sprints and fellows, and directed research, and conclude with a global summit on global risk and AI in Washington in 2026.

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ABOUT FAS

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) works to advance progress on a broad suite of contemporary issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver dramatic progress, and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table. Established in 1945 by scientists in response to the atomic bomb, FAS continues to work on behalf of a safer, more equitable, and more peaceful world. More information at fas.org.

ABOUT FLI

Founded in 2014, the Future of Life Institute (FLI) is a leading nonprofit working to steer transformative technology towards benefiting humanity. FLI is best known for their 2023 open letter calling for a six-month pause on advanced AI development, endorsed by experts such as Yoshua Bengio and Stuart Russell, as well as their work on the Asilomar AI Principles and recent EU AI Act.