Matt Korda

Matt Korda

Senior Research Associate and Project Manager, Nuclear Information Project
Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament Progressive Foreign Policy Global Nuclear Weapons Arsenals Missile Defence Nuclear-Climate Nexus

Matt Korda is a Senior Research Associate and Project Manager for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, where he co-authors the Nuclear Notebook––an authoritative open-source estimate of global nuclear forces and trends. Matt is also an Associate Researcher with the Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Previously, he worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO HQ in Brussels. Matt is also the co-director of Foreign Policy Generation––a group of young people working to develop a progressive foreign policy for the next generation.

He received his MA in International Peace & Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where he subsequently worked as a Research Assistant on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. He also completed an internship with the Verification, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in London, where he focused on nuclear security and safeguards.

Matt’s research interests and recent publications focus on nuclear deterrence and disarmament, progressive foreign policy, and the nexus between nuclear weapons, climate change, and injustice. Matt’s work has been widely published and quoted in The Washington Post, Forbes, CBC, Politico, The Nation, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Defense One, Inkstick, 38 North, Arms Control Wonk, and others.

Matt is the Ploughshares Fund 2020 Olum Fellow and an Associate Member of the Canadian Pugwash Group. He is also a 2018 alumnus of IGCC’s Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp, a 2019 alumnus of the Wilson Center’s Nuclear History Boot Camp, and a 2019 CSIS Nuclear Scholar.

Current Work: Comprehensive study on the United States’ intercontinental ballistic missile force (ICBM Information Project); tracking global nuclear forces (bi-monthly Nuclear Notebook); progressive foreign policy (Foreign Policy Generation).

Other Coverage

This policy memo presents four alternative policy options that the Biden administration could pursue in lieu of the current GBSD program of record.
This survey was conducted with the purpose of exploring Americans’ opinions about US nuclear posture in general, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in particular.
Not only are fears of a “transparent ocean” dramatically overhyped, but even if they were true, it would not affect the United States’ ability to maintain a credible second-strike capability––even without ICBMs.
Interview with Sebastian Zuba (Bullet Points Podcast) about Gen Z and Millennial perspectives on nuclear weapons issues.
Quoted in Sean Howard's piece for the Cape Breton Spectator (7 October 2020).
Quoted in Steve Liewer's piece for the Omaha World Herald (27 September 2020).
Trump is markedly more of an enabler than an enemy of the military-industrial complex, and yet, he is correct to note that national security decisions are often influenced by corporate interests.
According to a new report, 61 percent of Americans––including both Democratic and Republican majorities––are in favor of phasing out the United States’ aging fleet of 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
When it comes to funding nuclear weapons, it seems that there’s barely any daylight this year between Democrats and Republicans.
When we eventually re-emerge from lockdown we could be stepping out into an entirely new reality: a world without any tangible constraints on nuclear arsenals, and very few on conventional military arsenals.
Given the immediate and long-term concerns surrounding the program, Congress should not allow GBSD to be fast-tracked.
The U.S. nuclear enterprise is ill-equipped to deal with the inevitable onslaught of climate catastrophes that will devastate nuclear bases and their employees in the coming months and years.
As long as we fail to recognize the linkages between the challenges and injustices we face at home and those we face abroad, the solutions we put forth will fall short.
Are the stars finally aligning for Washington and Moscow to extend the New START treaty?
For the first time ever, the Nuclear Notebook examines the status of US missile defense, a key driver of the global nuclear arms race.
Three minutes’ discussion among two candidates is a pitiful amount of time to devote to a truly existential threat.
Trump's top two national security officials are manufacturing a crisis in order to catapult the United States into an explosive conflict with Iran.
The national security field has an "Expertise" problem.
If we want to keep the nuclear field sustainable, our focus shouldn’t just be on the weapons themselves, but on the community as a whole.
India is estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities. India’s nuclear strategy, which has traditionally focused on Pakistan, now appears to place increased emphasis on China.
Russia’s violation aside, Trump’s response—to pull out of the treaty—makes the United States needlessly complicit in its demise and frees Russia from both the responsibility and pressure to return to compliance.
Rather than strengthening deterrence, ambiguity surrounding U.S. and Russian nuclear thresholds is causing both sides to make dangerous assumptions about one another’s intentions.