Other Coverage
New artificial intelligence programs like ChatGPT raise troubling questions about nuclear security. And chatbots can be fooled.
The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Department of Defense maintaining an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads.
In recent years, nuclear-armed states have increasingly––and unnecessarily––withheld critical details about their nuclear arsenals from their publics, allies, and adversaries. This needs to change.
The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. The authors cautiously estimate that North Korea may have produced enough fissile material to build between 45 and 55 nuclear weapons; however, it may have only assembled 20 to 30.
How can governments improve their public messaging about nuclear risks?
Canadian involvement in US missile defence would not prevent Russia or China from modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Instead, it could kick the arms race up another notch.
In this Special Report for the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, the Nautilus Institute, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Matt Korda presents a comprehensive account of the DPRK’s nuclear warheads, delivery systems, fuel types, and launch systems, followed by an analysis of the DPRK’s and the United States’ nuclear doctrine and potential nuclear use.
This issue of the Nuclear Notebook examines Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda estimate includes a stockpile of roughly 90 warheads.
The Bulletin virtual program “China’s new nuclear silo fields: Negotiating card or arms race catalyst” features Duyeon Kim, Matt Korda, and Tong Zhao in conversation with Susan D’Agostino.
This article is part of a series on the impact of U.S. and Russian military complexes on the bilateral relationship.
This joint event by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament at Uppsala University (AMC) considers the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament.
China is building a second field of missile silos in its western deserts, according to a new study, which researchers say signals a potential expansion of its nuclear arsenal and calls into question Beijing's commitment to its "minimum deterrence" strategy.
Researchers at the Federation of American Scientists estimate that China has approximately 250 underground missile silos under construction after they used satellite imagery to identify a new field being built in western China.
China is expanding its capacity to store and launch nuclear missiles, US scientists say.
Discovery from commercial satellite imagery follows another U.S. think-tank analysis appearing to identify a separate missile-silo project.
Is China scrapping its “minimum deterrent” strategy and joining an arms race? Or is it looking to create a negotiating card, in case it is drawn into arms control negotiations?
Episode of the New York Times' "The Daily" podcast featuring FAS' discovery of China's new nuclear silo field.
This policy memo presents four alternative policy options that the Biden administration could pursue in lieu of the current GBSD program of record.
This survey was conducted with the purpose of exploring Americans’ opinions about US nuclear posture in general, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in particular.
Not only are fears of a “transparent ocean” dramatically overhyped, but even if they were true, it would not affect the United States’ ability to maintain a credible second-strike capability––even without ICBMs.
Interview with Sebastian Zuba (Bullet Points Podcast) about Gen Z and Millennial perspectives on nuclear weapons issues.
Quoted in Sean Howard's piece for the Cape Breton Spectator (7 October 2020).
Quoted in Steve Liewer's piece for the Omaha World Herald (27 September 2020).
Trump is markedly more of an enabler than an enemy of the military-industrial complex, and yet, he is correct to note that national security decisions are often influenced by corporate interests.
According to a new report, 61 percent of Americans––including both Democratic and Republican majorities––are in favor of phasing out the United States’ aging fleet of 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
When it comes to funding nuclear weapons, it seems that there’s barely any daylight this year between Democrats and Republicans.
When we eventually re-emerge from lockdown we could be stepping out into an entirely new reality: a world without any tangible constraints on nuclear arsenals, and very few on conventional military arsenals.
Given the immediate and long-term concerns surrounding the program, Congress should not allow GBSD to be fast-tracked.
The U.S. nuclear enterprise is ill-equipped to deal with the inevitable onslaught of climate catastrophes that will devastate nuclear bases and their employees in the coming months and years.
As long as we fail to recognize the linkages between the challenges and injustices we face at home and those we face abroad, the solutions we put forth will fall short.
Are the stars finally aligning for Washington and Moscow to extend the New START treaty?
For the first time ever, the Nuclear Notebook examines the status of US missile defense, a key driver of the global nuclear arms race.
Three minutes’ discussion among two candidates is a pitiful amount of time to devote to a truly existential threat.
Trump's top two national security officials are manufacturing a crisis in order to catapult the United States into an explosive conflict with Iran.
The national security field has an "Expertise" problem.
If we want to keep the nuclear field sustainable, our focus shouldn’t just be on the weapons themselves, but on the community as a whole.
India is estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities. India’s nuclear strategy, which has traditionally focused on Pakistan, now appears to place increased emphasis on China.
Russia’s violation aside, Trump’s response—to pull out of the treaty—makes the United States needlessly complicit in its demise and frees Russia from both the responsibility and pressure to return to compliance.
Rather than strengthening deterrence, ambiguity surrounding U.S. and Russian nuclear thresholds is causing both sides to make dangerous assumptions about one another’s intentions.
