“The President does not need the concurrence of either his military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the launch of nuclear weapons,” the Congressional Research Service reminded readers last month in an updated “defense primer” on “Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.”
The CRS defense primer series consists of two-page introductions to a variety of basic military and intelligence topics. The primers do not generally present information that is altogether new to specialists, but they are a convenient way to increase national security literacy among non-specialist members of Congress and the public.
Recently updated items in the series include the following.
Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: Procurement, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018
Defense Primer: Information Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 18, 2018
Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 18, 2018
Defense Primer: President’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, CRS In Focus, updated December 17, 2018
*
Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.
The Special Counsel Investigation After the Attorney General’s Resignation, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 2, 2019
Government Expenditures on Defense Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet, updated December 19, 2018
Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 2, 2019
DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission–An Overview, CRS In Focus, updated December 19, 2018
New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China, CRS In Focus, December 17, 2018
Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies, updated December 19, 2018
The United States faces urgent challenges related to aging infrastructure, vulnerable energy systems, and economic competitiveness. But the permitting workforce is unprepared to implement changes. Here’s how they can improve.
S.325 would establish a clear, sustained federal governance structure for extreme heat by bringing all responsible agencies together to coordinate planning, preparedness, and response, a key recommendation of FAS’ 2025 Heat Policy Agenda.
In an industry with such high fixed costs, the Chinese state’s subsidization gives such firms a great advantage and imperils U.S. competitiveness and national security. To curtail Chinese legacy chip dominance, the United States should weaponize its monopoly on electronic design automation software.
Improving American competitiveness, security, and prosperity depends on private and public stakeholders’ ability to responsibly site, build, and deploy proposed critical energy, infrastructure, and environmental restoration projects.