Those who are involved (or merely interested) in the field of geospatial intelligence will want to know about a new Army doctrinal publication on the subject.

“Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.”

The new publication provides a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of the field. See Geospatial Engineering, ATP 3-34.80, June 2014 (very large pdf).

The Secretary of the Army last week issued a directive specifying that retaliating against someone for reporting a crime is itself a crime.

“No Soldier may retaliate against a victim, an alleged victim or another member of the Armed Forces based on that individual’s report of a criminal offense,” the new Directive states. See Prohibition of Retaliation Against Soldiers for Reporting a Criminal Offense, Army Directive 2014-20, June 19, 2014.

Prohibited forms of retaliation include adverse personnel actions and ostracism, as well as “acts of cruelty, oppression or maltreatment.”

The directive implements a requirement that was enacted by Congress in the 2014 defense authorization act (section 1709) as part of a legislative response to instances of sexual assault in the military.

Far from being a subject of merely antiquarian interest, military history is an essential tool for training of soldiers and for institutional accountability, according to newly updated Army doctrine.

But only if it is done right.

In Military History Operations (ATP 1-20, June 2014), the Army discusses what military history is for, its development over time, and the proper way to produce it. Some excerpts:

“The history of Army operations and activities is not documented or written for public affairs purposes. It is not shaped to reflect particular viewpoints, programmatic goals, or institutional agendas. In the past, military organizations and commands exaggerated achievements of individuals, units, or systems while downplaying setbacks. Army field historians guard against these instances and ensure that historical documents, reports, and official histories reflect a full accounting of operations or institutional developments as they occur. Anything less is a disservice to the Soldiers and Army civilians whose actions are documented, those who must learn from them, and to the integrity of the Army as a whole.”

“History cannot be fabricated. Any fabrication corrupts tradition, professional education, and tradition. The integrity and standing of Army history, gained over nearly a century of recognized excellence, can be permanently damaged. The Army is best served by the careful and unbiased recording and analysis of the past. To prevent any potential damages from occurring, the collection, research, and writing of Army history is based on impartiality, objectivity, and accuracy.”

“Historical writing is clear, concise, organized, and to the point. Some historians fail to communicate well. They confuse rather than clarify, are wordy rather than concise, and hide main ideas rather than getting to the point. Good writers communicate in plain English and choose words with care to convey meaning. They avoid trite or vague phrases; stale figures of speech; jargon; acronyms; and pompous, high-sounding, and self-conscious literary language. Historical narratives are in active voice, use strong nouns and verbs, and include short vignettes to illustrate points or enliven the narrative. However, they should not embellish or glorify events or offer judgments of individuals or actions. The narrative recounts events as each one occurred.”

The new doctrine instructs Army historians to maintain awareness of captured enemy documents, and encourages them to seek out non-traditional and unofficial historical resources (like the private video and photographic images that were recently the subject of a classification complaint):

“Both official and unofficial photographs and video imagery enhances historical document collections and [are] included in historical document collections. Combat camera teams and public affairs photographers take official photographs and video imagery and provide copies to command and unit historians or military history detachments (MHD). Additionally, many Soldiers carry digital cameras, video recorders, or mobile phones with cameras and video capabilities. The field historian searches for unofficial photographs and videos of potential historical value. This search includes accessing social media sites, personal blogs, and photo-sharing sites.”

“Military history does not produce solutions for problems and does not guarantee success on the battlefield. An approach with these goals leads to frustration and biased or inaccurate history. Rather, military history affords an understanding of the dynamics to shape the present and [provides] soldiers the perspective of viewing current and future problems with ideas of how similar challenges were confronted in the past.”

“If history rarely provides concrete answers, it offers insight and understanding. It promotes how to think and not what to think,” the Army publication said.

The Department of Defense prepares and trains for military operations in environments in which communications and surveillance are denied or obstructed, a new report to Congress says.

Combatant commanders “spend many man-hours… developing frameworks and procedures for using alternative methods, diversifying communications paths and media, and pursuing the ability to use distributed operations in a denied environment.”

The issue was summarily addressed in a mandatory report to Congress on “Joint Strategy for Readiness and Training in a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Denied Environment.” The brief, unclassified report was transmitted to Congress in February 2014 and released under the Freedom of Information Act this week.

Somewhat relatedly, a declassified 1971 memorandum from the National Reconnaissance Office addressed the subject of “avoidance of coorbital intercept,” or anti-anti-satellite operations.

The subject was highly sensitive at the time. “Any action on our part which demonstrates the possibility that we possess the ability to evade a coorbital intercept… is potentially compromising of the great efficacy of U.S. satellite collection capability in this area.”

Unrelatedly, but notably, the Federal Judicial Center has published a compilation of “protective orders” that were issued by courts in national security criminal cases, including espionage trials and leak cases, over the past 15 years.  See National Security Prosecutions: Protective Orders, April 2014.

 

“Without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act than to act.”

That note of prudence and restraint recurs throughout the newly revised U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 on “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies” that was published this month.

The new manual replaces the celebrated 2006 edition of FM 3-24 (then simply entitled “Counterinsurgency”) associated with Gen. David Petraeus, who coordinated its development.  That earlier manual may have been the most popular and widely read U.S. military doctrinal publication ever released.

The new edition builds upon rather than rescinds its predecessor. Some of the changes are subtle, extending even to the definition of “insurgency.”

The 2006 edition defined insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” In the new edition, insurgency now means “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” The reference to a government has been removed in the new definition, and insurgency is conceived as a tactic rather than a movement.

To a lay reader, the new Field Manual presents a becoming modesty about the utility of violent action, along with a sensitivity to the specifics of every conflict, and an alertness to ethical norms and legal requirements. A few excerpts:

“The conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who reside in that nation. Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems. As such, one of the Army and Marine Corps’ primary roles in counterinsurgency is to enable the host nation.”

“The general rule for the use of force for the counterinsurgents is ‘do not create more enemies than you eliminate with your action’.”

“Effective counterinsurgency commanders tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they do not promise more than can be provided.”

“Although most well-led and well-trained U.S. military personnel perform their duties honorably and lawfully, some will commit various crimes, including violations of the law of war…. All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual must be reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action.”

Remarkably, the Army invited external input in 2011 from the public (or at least from “practitioners, scholars, and agency partners”) in the development of the revised Field Manual.

The new manual, like the previous one, has drawn criticism in some quarters for emphasizing the role of soft power at the expense of lethality and traditional warfighting.

“The 2014 FM hurtles down the wrong track,” wrote former Reagan defense official Bing West. “It offers no advice about resolve, cohesion, morale, ferocity, trust and victory…. If we cannot put our enemies six feet in the ground and infuse that same fierce, implacable, winning spirit into the host nation forces, friendly persuasion and development aid will be seen by our enemies as weakness and fecklessness,” he wrote in Small Wars Journal on May 14.

But perhaps the severest criticism of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine derives from actual record of counterinsurgency programs. The continuing violence and instability in Iraq and Afghanistan would seem to indicate that existing counterinsurgency doctrine is either misconceived or that, for whatever reason, it cannot be effectively implemented.

“Emerging Intelligence Technologies” is the theme of the latest issue of the U.S. Army’s Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB), January-March 2014.

“Rapid technology developments in response to urgent wartime requirements have brought the intelligence community (IC) some tremendous new capabilities. Advancement in the areas of biometrics, battlefield forensics, miniaturization, SIGINT terminal guidance, DCGS-A, and distributed processing have been vital to the success of Military Intelligence (MI) and the Army,” wrote Maj. Gen. Robert P. Ashley.

“This issue of MIPB looks at several of these capabilities and their integration into our formations.”

The new Bulletin was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

Last June, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a classified “execute order” to authorize and initiate a military operation.

The nature, scope and duration of the military operation could not immediately be determined — even the title of the order is classified — but it evidently pertains to the conduct of military cyberspace activities.

The existence of the previously undisclosed execute order was revealed last week in a new Air Force Instruction.

“Classified processes governing C2 [command and control] of AF [Air Force] offensive and defensive cyberspace operations conducted by AF Cyber Mission Forces are addressed in a classified CJCS [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] Execute Order (title classified) issued on 21 Jun 13,” said Air Force Instruction 10-1701, entitled “Command and Control (C2) for Cyberspace Operations,” dated 5 March 2014.

An execute order goes beyond planning or preparation for conflict, and represents the commencement of a military operation.

The formal definition of an execute order (or EXORD) is “an order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations,” according to the official Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02).

“Execution begins when the President decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis,” according to Joint Publication 5-0 on Joint Operation Planning. “Only the President or SecDef can authorize the CJCS to issue an execute order (EXORD).

“Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished.”

“The CJCS-published EXORD defines the unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence (D-day) and the specific time an operation begins (H-hour) and directs execution of the OPORD [operation order].”

“The CJCS’s EXORD is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA [course of action] approved by the President or SecDef and detailed in the supported commander’s OPORD,” explained JP 5-0.

In response to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice Adm. Michael S. Rogers, the nominee for Commander, US Cyber Command (and Director, NSA), said that “Geographic combatant commanders already have authority to direct and execute certain Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) within their own networks.”

Judging from the new Air Force Instruction, however, the June 2013 execute order extends to offensive cyberspace operations as well.

All or most execute orders naturally start out as classified documents. But sooner or later, they are declassified.

A March 2011 execute order for Libya Contingency Operations can be seen here.

A January 1991 execute order for Operation Desert Storm, incongruously signed “Warm Regards, Colin Powell,” is here.

A rare reference to another currently classified execute order appeared in a paper published in Joint Force Quarterly (issue 69, April 2013, p. 53): “In compliance with the guidelines outlined in the Global Response Force Execute Order, JCSE [Joint Communications Support Element] maintains an alert-postured force that can deploy and have its communications packages fully operational within hours of notification for an emerging requirement.” That execute order dates from September 2012, and is classified Secret.

The Senate Armed Services Committee asked Adm. Rogers whether there was a need for greater transparency concerning “the nature of cyber warfare, and the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities.”

Adm. Rogers replied: “I believe the recent disclosures of a large portion of our intelligence and military operational history may provide us with [an] opportunity to engage both the American public and our international partners in discussion of the balance of offense and defense, the nature of cyber warfare, norms of accepted and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace, and so forth.”

“As cyberspace matures as a warfighting domain, I believe our classification policies will also evolve to support growing domestic and international partnerships and relationships,” Adm. Rogers wrote.

For the first time the U.S. Army has produced official doctrine on military activities in cyberspace, including offensive, defensive and network operations.

A new Army field manual “provides overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA)…. It provides enough guidance for commanders and their staffs to develop innovative approaches to seize, retain, and exploit advantages throughout an operational environment.”

It is “the first doctrinal field manual of its kind.” See FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, February 2014.

The manual introduces the fundamentals of cyber operations, or “cyber electromagnetic activities” (CEMA), defining terms and identifying important operational factors and constraints.

“Today’s Army must operate in cyberspace and leverage an electromagnetic spectrum that is increasingly competitive, congested, and contested.”

However, “execution of CEMA can involve significant legal and policy considerations.” Also, “possibilities of unintended or cascading effects exist and may be difficult to predict.”

Several years ago, any official discussion of offensive cyber operations was considered classified information. That is no longer the case, and the new Army manual — which itself is unclassified — treats the subject as a normal part of military conflict.

“Army forces conduct OCO [offensive cyberspace operations] across the range of military operations by targeting enemy and hostile adversary activity and related capabilities in and through cyberspace,” the Field Manual says.

Cyberspace attacks in support of offensive operations “may be directed at information resident in, or in transit between, computers (including mobile phones and personal digital assistants) and computer networks used by an enemy or adversary.”

“Cyberspace attacks may employ capabilities such as tailored computer code in and through various network nodes such as servers, bridges, firewalls, sensors, protocols, operating systems, and hardware associated with computers or processors. Tailored computer code is only one example of a cyberspace capability… designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace.”

“Cyberspace attacks may employ manipulation which includes deception, decoying, conditioning, and spoofing to control or change information, information systems, and networks.”

The Army manual also presents doctrine on defensive cyberspace operations and on information network operations. “[Defensive] countermeasures in cyberspace should not destroy or significantly impede the operations or functionality of the network they are being employed against, nor should they intentionally cause injury or the loss of life.”

The manual devotes some attention to the legal framework governing cyber operations, which “depends on the nature of the activities conducted.”  Under all circumstances, the manual says, “Army forces conducting CO [cyberspace operations] will comply with the law of war.”

Ordinarily, the manual states, the U.S. Army should not be conducting offensive cyber operations against U.S. targets. “Unless approved by appropriate authorities, Army assets cannot be used to perform attack or exploit operations on U.S. entities.”

“Commanders must ensure that the legal, constitutional, and privacy rights of U.S. citizens are protected throughout the planning and execution of [cyber operations].”

    *    *    *

“Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons” is one of the topics addressed in the latest issue of the Journal of National Security Law and Policy.

Brendan Koerner reported on “How America’s Soldiers Fight for the Spectrum on the Battlefield” in Wired Threat Level, February 18.

The diverse factors that shape the execution of disaster relief and other foreign humanitarian assistance missions by the US military are described in a newly updated Department of Defense publication on the subject.

See Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication 3-29, January 3, 2014.

“Although US military forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct military operations that defend and protect US national interests, their inherent unique capabilities may be used to conduct FHA [Foreign Humanitarian Assistance] activities,” the publication said.

FHA “consists of Department of Defense activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.”

The publication said that DoD FHA operations necessarily include “intelligence collection concerning political, military, paramilitary, ethnic, religious, economic, medical, environmental, geospatial, and criminal indicators…. Intelligence operations during FHA operations are generally conducted in the same manner as in any other military operation.”

At the same time, however, “Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of a common humanitarian purpose… The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding entity– whether it is an NGO [nongovernmental organization], IGO [intergovernmental organization], assisting country government or host government– can be the source of all of the required data and information.”

“Tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data, versus the civilian need for transparency… often complicate effective civil-military coordination,” the DoD publication noted.

In a slight but welcome incremental reform, reports to Congress from the Department of Defense are to be posted online, according to a provision in the pending FY 2014 defense authorization act.

Up to now, such reports were to be made available to the public “upon request” (10 USC 122a). But under section 181 of the FY 2014 defense authorization bill, as agreed to by House and Senate conferees, the reports would have to be posted on a “publicly accessible Internet website” whether they were requested or not (h/t: FCNL).

The online publication requirement would not apply to DoD reports that contained classified or proprietary information, or that are otherwise exempt from disclosure under FOIA.

In a January 21, 2009 memorandum to agency heads, the newly inaugurated President Obama directed that “agencies should take affirmative steps to make information public. They should not wait for specific requests from the public. All agencies should use modern technology to inform citizens about what is known and done by their Government. Disclosure should be timely.” But agencies implemented this directive unevenly and incompletely.

The latest edition of U.S. joint military doctrine on counterinsurgency states that while working to defeat and contain insurgency, efforts should also be made to “address its root causes.”

Newly added doctrinal language “articulates that US counterinsurgency efforts should provide incentives to the host-nation government to undertake reforms that address the root causes of the insurgency.”

The latest revision also emphasizes the importance of gaining and retaining “US public support” for counterinsurgency programs.

“US public opinion should be considered as part of the OE [operational environment], just as the indigenous population opinion is essential to the COIN [counterinsurgency] effort, because USG COIN efforts must prove worthwhile to the US public,” the newly added language states. See Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, November 22, 2013.

The previous edition from 2009 may be found here. (Joint Publication 3-24 on Counterinsurgency is not to be confused with the 2006 Army Field Manual 3-24 associated with David Petraeus that bears the same title.)

To its harshest critics, counterinsurgency doctrine, though “marketed as a sophisticated and humane alternative to conventional combat,” is a failure and a farce.

“What purports to be a thinking man’s approach to war actually gives policy makers license to stop thinking,” wrote Andrew J. Bacevich in a scorching piece in The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 9, 2013.  “COIN offers technique devoid of larger purpose” and “when put to the test, counterinsurgency doesn’t work all that well,” he wrote.

U.S. military doctrine extends to religious aspects of combat operations and the role of chaplains as spiritual advisers. A new update to that doctrine “clarifies the chaplain’s advisement role in the targeting process to ensure the focus is on the ethical, moral, and religious dimensions.”

As noncombatants and “ministers of religion,” chaplains have protected status under the laws of war.

Accordingly, “chaplains must not engage directly or indirectly in combatant duties; will not conduct activities that compromise their noncombatant status; must not function as intelligence collectors or propose combat target selection; and will not advise on including or excluding specific structures on the no-strike list or target list. Advisement will focus on the ethical, moral, and religious dimensions of the targeting process.”

See Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, Joint Publication 1-05, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2013.