PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the employment and support for special operations forces across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the joint force commander deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05
DATED 18 APRIL 2011

• Merges material from Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force*, which is consequently rescinded following approval of JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.

• Expands the discussion of special operations joint task force, to include the addition of a vignette and a definition.

• Clarifies and defines preparation of the environment, operational preparation of the environment, and advance force operations.

• Revises special operations activities.

• Defines and discusses counter threat finance.

• Modifies doctrine in regard to command and control of special operations forces.

• Expands discussion of intelligence support to special operations.

• Adds sections on civil affairs operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, military working dogs, and engineer support.

• Adds numerous vignettes throughout publication.


• Modifies, adds, and removes multiple terms and definitions from JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Overview of Special Operations
- Describes Special Operations Core Activities
- Describes Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
- Discusses the Support Considerations for Special Operations Forces

Overview of Special Operations

**Special Operations**

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide joint force commanders (JFCs) and chiefs of mission with discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives.

**Designated Special Operations Forces**

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command (CCMD). It is unique among the CCMDs in that it performs Service-like functions and has Military Department-like responsibilities and authorities. A theater special operations command (TSOC) is a subordinate unified command of USSOCOM. TSOCs perform broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to special operations forces (SOF) capabilities. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has assigned operational control (OPCON) of the TSOCs and attached SOF tactical units to their respective geographic combatant commander (GCC) via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. United States Army Special Operations Command is the designated Army component command for USSOCOM and provides manned, trained, and equipped Army special operations
forces. **Naval Special Warfare Command** is designated the Navy component command of USSOCOM and mans, trains, equips, and provides SEALs. **US Air Force Special Operations Command** is designated the Air Force component of USSOCOM and organizes, trains, equips, and provides trained Air Force special operations forces. **US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command** is designated the Marine Corps component of USSOCOM and trains, equips, and provides Marine Corps special operations forces.

### Special Operations Core Activities

#### Introduction

USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips SOF for special operations core activities, and other such activities as may be specified by the President and/or SecDef. Special operations missions may include more than one core activity. The special operations core activities are: direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations.

#### Direct Action

Direct action entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments.

#### Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance entails reconnaissance and surveillance actions normally conducted in a clandestine or covert manner to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (CF).

#### Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

SOF support USG efforts to curtail the development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery by state and non-state actors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Counterterrorism</strong></th>
<th>Counterterrorism is activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks in order to render them incapable of using unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unconventional Warfare</strong></td>
<td>UW consists of operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Internal Defense</strong></td>
<td>Foreign internal defense refers to US activities that support a host nation’s (HN's) internal defense and development strategy and program designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Force Assistance</strong></td>
<td>USG security sector reform (SSR) focuses on the way a HN provides safety, security, and justice with civilian government oversight. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) primary role in SSR is to support the reform, restructure, or reestablishment of the HN armed forces and the defense aspect of the security sector, which is accomplished through security force assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hostage Rescue and Recovery</strong></td>
<td>Hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents. Offensive operations in support of hostage rescue and recovery can include the recapture of US facilities, installations, and sensitive material overseas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterinsurgency</strong></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</strong></td>
<td>Foreign humanitarian assistance is a range of DOD humanitarian activities conducted outside the US and its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Information Operations</strong></td>
<td>Military information support operations (MISO) are planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.

**Civil Affairs operations**

Civil affairs operations are actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs that enhance the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.

### Command and Control of Special Operations Forces

**Assignment of Special Operations Forces**

SOF units based in the US are generally assigned to and under combatant command (COCOM) of Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), with OPCON exercised through the USSOCOM Service component commands. SecDef assigns the TSOCs to USSOCOM under CDRUSSOCOM’s COCOM, and assigns OPCON of the TSOCs to the GCCs. SecDef also authorizes CDRUSSOCOM/GCCs to establish support relationships when SOF commanders are required to simultaneously support multiple operations or commanders.

**Special Operations Forces Joint Task Force**

The special operations joint task force (SOJTF) is the principal joint SOF organization tasked to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, or a contingency. A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows USSOCOM to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate JFCs based on the strategic, operational, and tactical context. Depending on circumstances, the SOJTF may be directed to serve as the joint task force (JTF), or a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC).

**Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater**

The TSOC plans and conducts operations in support of the GCC. The GCC normally exercises OPCON of attached SOF through the commander, theater special operations command (CDRTSOC), who may exercise OPCON of subordinate forces directly from the TSOC location, or through a smaller special operations command-forward, located elsewhere in the theater of operations.
SOF commanders have elements to liaise with various organizations. The **special operations command and control element (SOCCE)** is the focal point for SOF-CF coordination, and the synchronization of special operations activities with other joint operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conducts operations in support of a CF. It performs command and control (C2) or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC, commander, SOJTF, or commander, joint special operations task force [CDRJSOTF]). A **special operations liaison element (SOLE)** is typically a joint team provided by the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF to the joint force air component commander (if designated) at the joint air operations center, or appropriate Service air component C2 center to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize special operations air, surface, and subsurface activities with joint air operations. The **special operations liaison officer (SOLO)** is a SOF officer with language, cultural, military, and civilian training in addition to SOF staff experience. SOLOs are assigned to a HN’s national SOF headquarters as part of a recurring and permanent US SOF presence in select HNs. The **SOF representative** is an experienced SOF officer proficient in the language most commonly used for partner nation government business. SOF representatives are assigned to the US embassies in selected partner nations as part of a recurring and persistent US SOF presence.

SOF and CF often share the same operational areas for extended periods when they are mutually reliant on each other’s capabilities. SOF-CF synchronization facilitates unity of effort; maximizes the capability of the joint force; and allows the JFC to optimize the principles of joint operations in planning and execution.

Support for SOF is tailored to the situation and mission with flexibility to withstand dynamic operational environments. Support arrangements often cross Service lines to utilize unique capabilities and sustain independent and low-visibility operations in austere and remote areas.
<table>
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<th><strong>Executive Summary</strong></th>
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**Intelligence Support**

The intelligence function and its importance to special operations requires an understanding of the special operations core activities and the need to enable SOF with fully fused all-source intelligence for those activities.

**Logistic Support**

The CDRTSOC, the JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF when a JTF is established, approves logistic requirements for SOF in theater for validation by the GCC. For limited contingency and crisis response operations that require rapid or time-sensitive responses, USSOCOM component commands normally maintain the capability to support SOF elements for an initial period of 15 days. Service and/or supporting organizations should be prepared to support special operations as soon as possible but not later than 15 days after SOF are employed.

**Service-Provided Capabilities**

When SOF organizations lack mission-essential capabilities, SOF will identify and request CF support through joint planning and force management processes.

**Communications Systems Support**

Deployed SOF require real-time, global communications to collect, transmit, process, display, store, and transport raw mission data as well as finished large, commercial broadcast-quality MISO products. Operational planning should allocate resources for direct, on-demand connectivity among the SOF operator, US and multinational partners in the field or operational area, and rear echelon.

**Fire Support**

Special operations may require long-range, surface-based, joint fire support in remote locations or for targets beyond the land, maritime, and amphibious force area of operations. SOF liaison elements coordinate fire support through both external and SOF channels. SOF liaison elements (e.g., SOCCE and SOLE) coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SOF fire support.

**Air Support**

In addition to their organic air capabilities for infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, precision fire, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support, SOF often requires conventional air support. Air support can include ISR, airlift, close air support, air refueling, electronic warfare (EW), and the use of SOF or CF joint terminal attack controllers, and the elements and capabilities of an Air Force air support operations center.
### Maritime Support
Maritime support includes fire support, military deception, deterrence, and seabasing. Seabasing provides SOF with access to the global, sustained, forward presence of the US Navy.

### Electronic Warfare
SOF forces are highly dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for almost every aspect of their operations (e.g., communications, intelligence, sensors). EW personnel and capabilities have proven a critical enabler for special operations by ensuring friendly access to the EMS while denying it to the adversary.

### Other Support Considerations
Other support considerations include: operational contract support, HN support, multinational support, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organization support, public affairs support, combat camera support, legal support, protection, space support, meteorological and oceanographic support, cyberspace operations support, civil-affairs support, countering weapons of mass destruction support, military working dogs/multipurpose canines, counter-improvised device support element, counter threat finance, and explosive ordinance disposal.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the employment and support for SOF across the range of military operations.
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

“I is not big armies that win battles; it is the good ones.”

Maurice de Saxe
Mes Reveries, iv, 1732

1. Introduction

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the Services, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for and conduct special operations. It describes special operations and provides general guidance for commanders to plan for, employ, and execute command and control (C2) and support of special operations forces (SOF) leveraging the global SOF network. The global SOF network is a synchronized network of people and technology (US, allies, and partner nations[PNs]) designed to support commanders through inter-operable capabilities that enable special operations. See Chapter III, “Command and Control of Special Operations Forces,” for more specific information on the global SOF network. Additional information regarding some specific special operations and the qualities and capabilities of SOF also are provided in the following publications: Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations; JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense; and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. Additionally, SOF maintains core competencies in counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations that are discussed in detail in JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

2. Special Operations

a. Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide JFCs and chiefs of mission (COMs) with discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives. These operations are designed in a culturally attuned manner to create both immediate and enduring effects to help prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war. They assess and shape foreign political and military environments unilaterally, or with host nations (HNs), multinational partners, and indigenous populations. Although special operations can be conducted independently, most are coordinated with conventional forces (CF), interagency partners, and multinational partners, and may include work with indigenous, insurgent, or irregular forces. Special operations may differ from conventional operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. SOF often conduct distributed operations with small operational and logistics footprints far from major bases. SOF employ sophisticated communications systems and a
broad array of infiltration, support, and exfiltration techniques to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas.

c. While special operations can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority are planned and conducted in support of theater campaigns. Special operations typically complement—not compete with nor substitute for—conventional operations.

d. Special operations are built on individuals and small units who apply special skills with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation. Special operations normally require precise tactical-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the cultures and languages of the operational areas. Rigorous training and mission rehearsals are integral to the success of most special operations. Special operations conducted by small SOF units, with unique capabilities and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time), provide the USG with a wide array of military options. These options may generate less liability or risk of escalation than are normally associated with employment of larger and more visible CF. Foreign partners will at times be more willing to work with SOF due to their small footprint in politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments. Critical to the evaluation and planning for future special operations is the review, and potential employment of, joint lessons learned and best practices from previous operations. Collection of joint lessons learned in accordance with (IAW) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) guidance promotes the availability of such information for SOF consideration and decision making.

e. Special operations can be a single engagement, such as direct action (DA) against a critical target; as a protracted operation or series of activities such as support to insurgent forces through unconventional warfare (UW); or support to a HN force through foreign internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA). Military information support operations (MISO) can be used during special operations to influence selected target audiences’ behavior and actions. Civil affairs operations (CAO) also provide essential support to a JFC or country team. Special operations, synchronized with MISO and CAO, can create effects disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

f. Sometimes SOF require CF support to optimize overall operational effectiveness. Depending on the mission, operational environment, and required SOF capabilities, support requirements may vary and could include aspects of any of the joint functions: C2, protection, fires, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and sustainment.

g. SOF training and development criteria emphasize civilian education, professional military education, foreign language training, and regional cultural education. Many SOF support personnel receive additional education through the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) or SOF component Service specific schools such as the US Air Force Special Operations School or the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. JSOU and the SOF component Service schools administer this special operations specific training, which fulfills unique SOF educational requirements that are not satisfied by Service education programs.
3. Designated Special Operations Forces

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command (CCMD). It is unique among the CCMDs in that it performs Service-like functions and has Military Department-like responsibilities and authorities. These unique functions, responsibilities, and authorities include USSOCOM performing the functions of programming, budgeting, acquisition, organizing, training, equipping, and providing combat-ready SOF for employment by the CCRs and developing strategy, doctrine, tactics, and procedures for SOF. SOF are trained to operate on their own under mission command, using modified/special equipment and irregular tactics, techniques, and procedures; and they train to accomplish their special operations core activities to achieve strategic and operational objectives. SOF core and augmenting forces are designated by Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. These Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces of the Services are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) for all SOF unless otherwise assigned by SecDef.

a. Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). A TSOC is a subordinate unified command of USSOCOM. TSOCs perform broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities. SecDef has assigned operational control (OPCON) of the TSOCs and attached SOF tactical units to their respective geographic combatant commander (GCC) via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. A GCC normally exercises OPCON of attached SOF through the commander, theater special operations command (CDRTSOC). TSOCs attached to their respective GCCs, are:

(1) Special Operations Command Europe.

(2) Special Operations Command Africa.

(3) Special Operations Command Central.

(4) Special Operations Command, Korea; OPCON to United States Pacific Command and further delegated passed to United States Force Korea.

(5) Special Operations Command Pacific.

(6) Special Operations Command South.

(7) Special Operations Command North.

b. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USASOC is the designated Army component command for USSOCOM and provides manned, trained, and equipped Army special operations forces (ARSOF). ARSOF consists of a variety of Army organizations, including the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Special Warfare Medical Group, US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), special forces (SF) groups, 75th Ranger Regiment, Army
Special Operations Aviation (SOA) Command, Military Information Support Operations Command, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), and the 528th Special Operations Sustainment Brigade (Airborne).

c. **Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM).** NAVSPECWARCOM is designated the Navy component command of USSOCOM and mans, trains, equips, and provides SEALs. Navy special operations forces (NAVSOF), including eight SEAL teams; one SEAL delivery vehicle team; three special boat teams; and supporting commands. Supporting forces also include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), cultural engagement; logistics support; and tactical mobility. Mobility forces include combatant craft, combat submersibles (small submarine-launched underwater craft), and tactical ground mobility vehicles. These forces combine into direct-action oriented, maritime focused, scaled and tailored force packages that integrate intelligence gathering and analysis, a versatile portfolio of insertion and extraction techniques, logistic support, flexible C2 options, and a high density of specialized capabilities. NAVSPECWARCOM teams and supporting commands are organized into six naval special warfare (NSW) groups; the Naval Special Warfare Center (training); and Naval Special Warfare Development Group (tactical development and evaluation).

d. **US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).** AFSOC is designated the Air Force component of USSOCOM and organizes, trains, equips, and provides trained Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF). AFSOF delivers specialized airpower using unique fixed-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft; special tactics teams (including combat controllers, pararescue, special operations weather teams, select tactical air-control party units and augmented with special operations surgical and evacuation teams); combat aviation advisors who assess, train, advise, and assist PN air forces; and specialized ISR personnel and capabilities that generate near-real-time, all-source intelligence products. AFSOC consists of the Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command Operations Center, Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center, 1st, 24th, 27th, 193rd (Air National Guard), and 919th (Air Force Reserve) Special Operations Wings, and the 352nd and 353rd Special Operations Groups.

e. **US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC).** MARSOC is designated the Marine Corps component of USSOCOM and trains, equips, and provides Marine Corps special operations forces (MARSOF). It provides Marine special operations teams that operate independently or as part of larger units. Marine special operations battalions can be task organized to conduct specific special operations missions in support of USSOCOM or a supported GCC. MARSOC consists of the Marine Special Operations Regiment (MSOR), 1st, 2nd, and 3rd (Marine special operations battalions), Marine Special Operations Support Group, and the Marine Special Operations School.

f. **Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).** JSOC is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM. JSOC is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics. JSOC has assigned and attached subordinate units and may deploy to support the GCC’s training, exercises, activities, and operations.
g. **Nationally Directed Missions.** The President and SecDef use designated SOF to conduct activities and operations across the world. Specific nationally directed special mission units (SMUs) are comprised of SOF and other forces, as required by specific mission requirements.

h. Certain CF receive enhanced training and equipment to support special operations and have developed habitual relationships with SOF units to conduct specific missions.

4. **Characteristics of Special Operations**

   a. Special operations are inherently joint because of the integration and interdependency that is established among ARSOF, NAVSOF, AFSOF, and MARSOF to accomplish their missions. SOF conduct joint and combined training both within the SOF community, with CF, and with interagency and multinational partners. When employed, SOF deploy with its C2 structure intact, which facilitates integration into the joint force, retains SOF cohesion, and provides a supported JFC with the control mechanism to address specific special operations concerns and coordinates its activities with other components and supporting commands.

   b. **SOF Partnerships.** SOF routinely operate with Department of State (DOS) and other USG departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other nations’ forces. Clandestine, covert, and low-visibility operations may require extensive interagency or interorganizational coordination.

   c. **SOF Personnel**

      (1) SOF undergo a rigorous selection process. After selection, they receive mission-specific training to achieve proficiency in special operations skills. SOF tend to be more experienced personnel, many of whom maintain competency in more than one military specialty.

      (2) Selected SOF maintain regional, cultural, and linguistic specialties. Extensive foreign language and cross-cultural training are routine parts of their development. Some personnel require highly technical and advanced training for anticipated missions.

   d. **SOF Capabilities.** Typically, SOF are organized into small, flexible, and agile self-contained teams that can operate without support in ambiguous, austere, and dynamic environments for short periods. SOF can:

      (1) Conduct operations with CF, multinational partners, and IGOs.

      (2) Work closely with foreign military and civilian authorities and populations, when directed.

      (3) Deploy rapidly and provide tailored responses.
(4) Gain access to hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive areas to prepare the operational environment for future operations and develop options for addressing potential national concerns.

(5) Conduct operations in austere environments with limited support and a low-profile.

(6) Communicate worldwide using organic equipment.

(7) Assess local situations and report rapidly.

(8) Execute special operations missions using nonstandard equipment.

e. Interdependence

(1) SOF are not a substitute for CF. SOF, however, can make CF more capable and efficient. Just as joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities, SOF and CF may rely on each other’s capabilities to maximize their respective capabilities. The degree of interdependence will vary based on specific roles, activities, and circumstances.

(2) SOF can operate independently or with CF. SOF add unique capabilities to achieve sometimes otherwise unattainable objectives. Integration enables the JFC to maximize CF and SOF core competencies. SOF special skills and low-visibility capabilities also provide an adaptable and scalable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise, and focused use of force.

f. SOF Limitations

(1) Special operations are generally limited in scope by the size of the SOF unit.

(2) Improper employment of SOF runs the risk of rapidly depleting capacity. SOF cannot be quickly reconstituted or rapidly expanded, because of the lengthy process required to recruit, train, and educate them.

### INTERDEPENDENCE

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (CF) worked together to capture or eliminate several key enemy leaders, including Saddam Hussein. SOF and US Army 4th Infantry Division (ID) steadily targeted and eliminated Saddam’s support by capturing and interrogating his political, military, and logistical supporters. The integration of tactical intelligence and operations between SOF and conventional forces enabled Saddam’s capture. The 4th ID and SOF experience in capturing Saddam is a model for integrating SOF and CF. SOF and CF benefited from the capabilities that the other force brought to the fight, validating the tenets of joint warfare.

Various Sources
(3) SOF are not a substitute for CF. In order to preserve SOF capabilities, SOF should not be employed to conduct operations where CF could be used to achieve the same objectives.

(4) Most special operations missions require CF logistics support. SOF are not structured with robust sustainment capabilities, therefore, SOF must frequently rely on external support for sustained operations. Limited SOF logistic capacity frequently requires support from CF supplemented by host-nation support (HNS) and/or operational contract support.

(5) COMs may restrict SOF access in noncombat areas.
g. **Special Operations Mission Considerations.** Before planning or conducting special operations, SOF and CF commanders and planners should consider:

1. Evaluation of each mission or activity for strategic or operational relevance. SOF should be used to create effects that require SOF’s unique skills and capabilities.

2. The mission should support theater campaign plans (TCPs), the JFC’s campaign, operation plan (OPLAN), or contingency response or the ambassador’s COM’s/country team’s mission performance plan. Unity of effort is essential for unified action.

3. SOF are not structured for attrition warfare.

4. The mission planning must include coordination for required resources to support SOF during the mission. SOF missions often require support from CF sources.

5. The mission objectives should justify the risks. SOF assets are limited. Commanders should evaluate risks to SOF before making employment decisions. In addition, commanders should consider US diplomatic and informational interests in risk calculation.

6. Use of cultural knowledge and language skills is normally required to accomplish the mission when contact or coordination with indigenous population or forces may be necessary.

5. **Special Operations Across the Range of Military Operations**

   a. SOF are a capabilities-based force. Each joint operation has a unique strategic context, so the nature of SOF activities will vary according to the distinct aspects of the mission and operational environment. TSOCs address GCC requirements through tailored subordinate plans and utilize the global SOF network to complement other means for maintaining global and theater situational awareness.

   b. **Range of Military Operations.** The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. Special operations can be conducted at all levels of warfare and throughout all phases of a campaign or operation and in any level of conflict.

   (1) **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations. SOF conduct engagement activities that support the GCCs, country teams, and other interagency partners. These activities shape the operational environment to keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and also serve to develop and build HN capabilities and capacities that can be leveraged in crises and war. In addition, SOF seek to enhance the USG’s and PNs’ situational awareness to anticipate, forewarn, prevent, or forestall crises.
Overview of Special Operations

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In December 1989, US Special Operations Command, South activated a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) to support US Southern Command's Joint Task Force South in Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. The objectives of Operation JUST CAUSE were to defeat the Panamanian Defense Forces, apprehend dictator Manuel Noriega, and facilitate restoration of democracy. The JSOTF included elements from US Army special forces, US Army 75th Ranger Regiment, and US Navy SEALs and special boat units, supported by US Army special operations aviation, psychological operations and civil affairs elements, and US Air Force special operations forces, combat controllers, and pararescuemen.

Various Sources

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. SOF provide GCCs with the capability to rapidly respond to crises of limited scale. SOF roles vary from assessment to conflict resolution. Responding to crises and addressing limited contingencies frequently involves both SOF and CF and requires detailed collaboration and coordination for joint force integration, planning, and execution.

(3) Major Operations and Campaigns. National interests are sometimes best protected through major operations or campaigns involving large-scale combat. The US seeks to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the US, its multinational partners, and the HN. For large-scale efforts, SOF conduct activities that support the JFC throughout the operation or campaign. Complex campaigns may require SOF, SMUs, and CF to conduct simultaneous activities. For such campaigns, USSOCOM may provide C2 headquarters (HQ) to provide C2 of SOF.

c. Special operations can be conducted at all levels of warfare and throughout all phases of a campaign or operation.

(1) For some national security objectives, special operations may be conducted under the direct supervision of the President or SecDef.

(2) Otherwise, the TSOC integrates special operations into military operations that support the TCP and other theater plans established by the GCC.

(3) Subordinate JFCs establish operational objectives for their respective operational areas. SOF enable JFCs to achieve operational objectives.

For a detailed discussion of the range of military operations, including the relationship to the instruments of national power, levels of warfare, and the categories of joint military activities, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
Task Force (TF) K-BAR—comprised of US Navy SEALs, Army special forces and psychological operations soldiers, Air Force special operations forces (SOF), and SOF from allied nations—accompanied US Marines into southern Afghanistan in November 2001. From a forward base near Kandahar, TF K-BAR elements conducted successful direct action raids and special reconnaissance missions against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces and leadership targets. In March 2002, TF DAGGER and TF K-BAR conducted operations to eliminate a pocket of al-Qaeda forces in eastern Afghanistan. Both task forces redeployed by April 2002 and were replaced by Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan.

Various Sources
CHAPTER II
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE ACTIVITIES

“We used the smallest force, in the quickest time, in the farthest place.”
T.E. Lawrence, on guerrilla tactics, in “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Army Quarterly 1920

1. Introduction

   a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, both address irregular warfare (IW) as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Non-state actors often seek to create instability and disrupt and negate state legitimacy and governance to gain and maintain control or influence over and the support of a relevant population. Non-state actors use political, psychological, and economic methods, reinforced with military-type activities that favor indirect approaches and asymmetric means. Countering these methods requires a different mindset and different capabilities than traditional warfare methods. SOF are selected, trained, and equipped to conduct all forms of IW. Special operations considers the totality of the cognitive, informational, physical, cultural, and social aspects of the operational environment to influence the local population’s behavior through unique capabilities to identify and influence relevant populations, enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. SOF capabilities complement CF capabilities.

   b. The strategic security environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. USSOCOM and the CCMDs posture their forces to deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats. Protracted, subversive, and clandestine threats from state and non-state actors who employ a variety of IW methods can originate from countries with which the US is not at war. SOF can operate in any environment to deter, deny, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations and other destabilizing forces which threaten US national interests.

   c. USSOCOM supports the national security strategy by maintaining unique skills, capabilities, and capacities for special operations SOF can deliver capabilities in combinations applicable to a broad range of strategic and operational challenges. USSOCOM trains SOF to conduct special operations during US unilateral and multinational operations and within IW mission areas, to include FID, UW, CT, COIN, and stability operations (see Figure II-1); USSOCOM is also the joint proponent for SFA. Although SOF units are few and small they conduct and counter IW worldwide. The global reach of SOF’s capabilities extends the military instrument of national power to areas where traditional warfare is neither well suited nor feasible. This chapter focuses on special operations core activities and unique characteristics.
2. Special Operations Core Activities

a. USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips SOF for special operations core activities (see Figure II-2), and other such activities as may be specified by the President and/or SecDef. These core activities reflect the collective capabilities of all joint SOF rather than those of any one Service or unit. While CF also conduct some of these activities (e.g., FID, SFA, foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA], and COIN), SOF conduct all of them using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and in unique conditions and to different standards, but in a manner that complements CF capabilities. SOF can tailor their capabilities in combinations that provide options for creating various effects to achieve a broad range of strategic and operational objectives. Additionally, due to inherent capabilities, SOF can also perform collateral activities such as counterdrug operations, support and advise multinational forces (MNFs), personnel recovery (PR), countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
b. Special operations missions may include more than one core activity. The execution of one core activity may have operational or strategic impact on other core activities being planned or executed. While executing a major operation or campaign, the following are some examples of the supporting aspects of some special operations activities that may be conducted:

1. **Special reconnaissance (SR)** and **DA** missions may directly support commander, joint special operations task force’s (CDRJSOTF’s) mission; and both may support a CF main effort;

2. **Hostage rescue and recovery** supports PR for the joint force;

3. FID and SFA may support training, advising, and equipping HN security forces as an element of a COIN operation;

4. MISO may be conducted to gain/erode support of a foreign population, or gain/erode the influence of a foreign government dependent upon whose side the USG is supporting;

5. CAO are conducted across the range of military operations to enhance the operational environment by identifying and mitigating the underlying causes of instability within civil society or applying functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government to foster stability;
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE ACTIVITIES IN ACTION

Since 1999, US special operations forces (SOF) have supported Plan Colombia, a partnership between the government of Colombia and the US Government to eliminate illegally armed groups, drug production, and trafficking. The plan’s three main objectives:

Restore state presence, authority, and institutions in strategically important areas;

Enable the armed forces, local forces, and national police to provide security for the populace; and

Reestablish the justice system and local governance, and broaden state services and sustainable development.

Along with their interagency partners, SOF advisors partnered with the Colombian military and police to build their capacity to achieve those objectives. US Army special forces trainers worked with Colombian special forces and the Colombian National Police to develop a rural police program in contested areas. US SOF advice and support facilitated fortified stations to allow rural police a permanent presence in areas lacking dedicated police forces.

US civil affairs and military information support personnel work closely with their Colombian counterparts, US Government departments and agencies, and other nongovernmental organizations to bring humanitarian assistance and economic development into the contested areas. Convincing the populace to recognize the Colombian government’s legitimacy, versus the insurgents’ or drug traffickers’, takes sustained effort. Civil affairs and psychological operations, although nascent in the Colombian military, can help convince Colombians that their government is legitimate.

US civil affairs teams have worked to improve the Colombian military’s capacity to conduct civil-military operations. To illustrate, US civil affairs personnel initially conducted medical civic-action programs in villages where aerial drug crop eradication occurred to inform the local populace of possible ill effects. Now, Colombian forces conduct these medical civic-action programs with US forces in support.

Various Sources

(6) CT and CWMD may be mutually supportive because of the potential nexus of certain terrorists and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and

(7) During a COIN operation, FID, DA, SR, CT, MISO, and CAO are likely to be conducted.

c. Preparation of the Environment (PE). SOF also take actions to prepare the operational environment for potential operations. PE is conducted during the shape phase of
Special Operations Core Activities

an operation as well as for developing and preparing for the entry of forces and supporting agencies to resolve conflicts using either lethal or nonlethal actions. PE supports special operations advance force operations (AFO) being conducted to refine the location of specific, identified targets and further develops the operational environment. Special operations AFO encompass many operational preparation of the environment (OPE) activities, but are intended to prepare for near-term DA. Special operations AFO may include, but are not limited to: close-target reconnaissance; tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL); reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of forces; infrastructure development; and terminal guidance. Unless specifically withheld, special operations AFO also include DA in situations when failure to act will mean loss of a fleeting opportunity for success.

d. **DA.** DA entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments. DA differs from other offensive actions in the level of diplomatic or political risk, the operational techniques employed, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. SOF may take DA through raids, ambushes, or other direct assault tactics; standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provision of terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; independent sabotage; and special antiship operations or maritime interception operations.

1. Forces conducting DA usually withdraw from the planned objective area as quickly as possible to limit the operation’s scope and duration. DA can provide specific and often time-sensitive results at operational and strategic levels of warfare.

2. SOF may conduct DA independently or as part of a larger joint operation or campaign. Although normally considered close combat, DA also includes precision marksmanship and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. Standoff attacks are preferred when the target can be damaged or destroyed without close combat. SOF employs close combat tactics and techniques when the mission requires precise or discriminate use of force.

3. DA missions may also involve locating and capturing or seizing selected high-value targets or materiel in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. These missions usually result from situations involving diplomatic and/or political sensitivity or military criticality of the adversary personnel or materiel being taken from remote or hostile environments.

4. DA supports PR (including unconventional assisted recovery) by use of dedicated ground combat elements, unconventional techniques, precise intelligence on isolated personnel, and indigenous or surrogate assistance.

5. Maritime DA can include across-the-beach operations; near-simultaneous underway nighttime shipboarding; underwater attack against ships or other targets; harbor attack; and gas and oil platform assault.

e. **SR.** SR entails reconnaissance and surveillance actions normally conducted in a clandestine or covert manner to collect or verify information of strategic or operational
significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in CF. These actions provide an additive collection capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. SR may include collecting information on activities of an actual or potential enemy or securing data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SEALs have historically conducted hydrographic reconnaissance in support of amphibious operations. SR may also include assessment of chemical, biological, residual radiological, or environmental hazards in a denied area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance, and may be accomplished by air, land, or maritime assets.

(1) SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information. SR may also complement other collection methods constrained by weather, terrain-masking, or adversary defenses. SOF conduct SR to place “eyes on target.” SR typically provides essential information to develop a commander’s situational awareness necessary for command decisions, follow-on missions, or critical assessments.

(2) Using SR enables the JFC to enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff planning and execution of joint operations. SOF are not dedicated reconnaissance assets for CF. Rather, the JFC typically tasks SOF to provide SR, and may establish a joint special operations area (JSOA) for that mission. On a case-by-case basis, the JFC may task SOF to conduct SR for essential intelligence in a CF’s operational area when the CF lacks the reconnaissance capability.

(3) SR and other intelligence operations are inherent to operations, not just planning. SOF also employ organic ISR assets that should not be confused with SR. These assets require synchronization from planning through execution, and include the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information. Persistent surveillance combined with tailored processing, exploitation, and dissemination provides SOF with precise intelligence. SOF require precise, detailed intelligence which must often be produced and disseminated in austere environments with limited data transport architectures.

(4) SOF depend on manned and unmanned assets. Essential intelligence support to SR includes signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and TTL devices to provide extended surveillance and reconnaissance according to SOF essential elements of information and priority intelligence requirements. SR is used for target identification and confirmation, laser target acquisition and post-strike reconnaissance. SR also may use unmanned aircraft (UA) with imagery, SIGINT, and other intelligence collection capability to provide persistent, high-fidelity intelligence on an adversary that moves and operates among civilians.

f. CWMD. SOF support USG efforts to curtail the development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery by state and non-state actors. WMD are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. The strategic objectives of CWMD operations
Special operations forces’ successes in the war on terrorism have driven a transformation in the relationship between operations and intelligence. Today, intelligence is operations. Perhaps the most famous example was the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The airstrike that killed Zarqawi was only a fraction of the effort to find and accurately target him. The true operational art behind that strike was a multidisciplined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) endeavor that laid bare the Zarqawi network and resulted in a find-fix-finish operation. Although it took more than 600 hours of ISR to find and track Zarqawi, it took only about 10 minutes to fix and finish the operation. Glenn W. Goodman, “ISR Now Synonymous with Operations,” Journal of Electronic Defense 30, Number 7 (July 2007), 19.

Various Sources

are to reduce incentives to obtain and employ WMD; increase barriers to acquisition and use of WMD; manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, failed states, and/or havens; and deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats. USSOCOM supports GCCs through technical expertise, materiel, and special teams to complement other CCMD teams that locate, tag, and track WMD; DA in limited access areas; helping build partnership capacity to conduct CWMD activities; MISO to dissuade adversaries from reliance on WMD; and other specialized capabilities. SOF are attentive to any nexus of WMD and transnational violent extremist organizations.

For further information on CWMD, refer to JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

g. **CT.** Terrorism has evolved over several decades from a tactic of inducing fear in select populations to a transnational threat of strategic proportions perpetrated primarily by groups of violent extremists. The US, its strategic partner nations, other Western societies, and emerging democracies are frequent targets. Whether the extremists are local insurgents or members of an international network, they are terrorists if they are non-state actors who use violence or the threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Access to WMD significantly increases terrorists’ capacity to install fear.

(1) **CT** is activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks in order to render them incapable of using unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. In addition to being a SOF core activity, CT is part of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) broader construct of combating terrorism, which is actions, including antiterrorism and CT, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat continuum.

(2) Interorganizational coordination maximizes the effectiveness of US and PNs’ CT efforts by synchronizing diplomatic, informational, military, and economic initiatives. USSOCOM, as the global synchronizer for DOD CT planning uses formal and informal relationships, liaison technical infrastructure, and information sharing policy to coordinate all
the instruments of national power. USG interagency partners work with USSOCOM to achieve unified action with PNs, IGOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.

(3) GCCs may also employ SOF to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations, as well as to shape and stabilize their operational environment to erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their support and sanctuary. SOF activities used in concert with stability operations, counterintelligence (CI), civil-military operations (CMO), and communication synchronization, enable partners to combat terrorism, deter tacit and active support for terrorism, and erode support for terrorist ideologies.

For further information on CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

h. UW. UW consists of operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. The USG conducted UW during major combat operations (e.g., World War II and the Korean War) to create security issues behind enemy lines and erode enemy power and their will to fight, and in support of insurgencies attempting to overthrow adversarial regimes (e.g., Nicaraguan Contras and Afghan Mujahideen). UW was used in support of the Northern Alliance against Taliban-controlled Afghan government forces following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. UW operations can put pressure on a hostile government, occupying power, or nation-state.

(1) USG objectives in UW operations span from support to groups resisting government authority to the overthrow of the government. A government must exercise public policy and provide state-like functions for a population to be recognized by the international community. It does not need to be a national government for such recognition. DOD, DOS, and other interagency partners evaluate diplomatic, environmental, and economic costs and benefits prior to recommending UW operations. UW operations present significant risks, but they can also help resolve international crises without overt, large-scale CF.

(2) Resistance movements and insurgencies commonly organize around interrelated elements of an underground, an auxiliary, and a guerrilla force. These organizations adapt to their environment (urban, rural, or a combination) and the governing authority’s internal security capabilities based on their inherent capabilities. A resistance movement differs from an insurgency in that an insurgency uses armed forces to oppose the existing regime, while a resistance movement may not. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s employment of nonviolent civil disobedience to free India from British rule is an example of a resistance movement.

(3) UW activities are conducted in support of a resistance or insurgency in a denied area. The initial focus of UW activities in support of an opposition is typically conducted in areas or environments where the governing authority has the capacity to deny overt freedom of action to the opposition. UW operations rely on synchronization of SOF and CF and unified action with one or more interagency and multinational partners.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001

On the night of 19 October 2001, an MH-47 Chinook helicopter from the US Army 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) carried the 12 men of US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 595 (C Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group [Airborne]) to a rendezvous point in the Darya Suf river valley south of the city of Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan. ODA 595 was assigned to assist the Northern Alliance fighters led by General Rashid Dostum to defeat Taliban forces occupying the city. Dostum’s men possessed few heavy weapons and the ODA personnel were astonished to discover that many were mounted on horseback. Dostum provided several hardy, surefooted Afghan ponies to allow ODA personnel, most of whom had no experience with horses, to accompany his forces as they moved to attack Taliban forces.

Quickly earning Dostum’s trust through their willingness to share the dangers of combat with his men, ODA 595 directed precision airstrikes on Taliban forces and arranged airdrops of badly needed supplies and ammunition. Augmented by an Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) combat controller and a Special Forces command and control element, ODA 595 supported Dostum’s forces as they overran Taliban defenses at Boy Beche on 5 November. A wild cavalry charge broke through enemy lines just moments after the impact of a barrage of precision-guided bombs directed by ODA personnel. Mounted on horseback and wheeled vehicles, ODA 595 rode with the forces of Dostum and his Northern Alliance allies as they pursued the Taliban retreating toward Mazar-e Sharif. Coalition airstrikes guided by the ODA and the AFSOF special tactics teams smashed the Taliban’s attempt to hold at the Chesmah-e Shafa pass on 9 November. The next morning, Northern Alliance fighters liberated Mazar-e Sharif, culminating the first successful ground offensive of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

(4) UW operations are a national strategic option, which uses fewer resources than conventional operations, while still mitigating an adversary’s typical anti-access capabilities. UW operations’ objectives include supporting the insurgency/resistance movement so it can influence, coerce, disrupt, or foster a change in governing authority.

(5) The sensitive nature of UW operations, the methods by which they are conducted and supported, and the ramifications of failure require the JFC to conduct extensive planning and preparation to reduce risk and to promote an acceptable outcome for US strategic interests. UW planning and preparation efforts typically involve extensive coordination, deconfliction, and integration across the USG and its partners. Potential strategic risk and diplomatic and/or political sensitivity of UW operations require planners to approach UW as a whole-of-government effort. Planning should also include an assessment of the depth of support for opposition groups; opposition groups’ plans for forming a new government, including plans to re-integrate former regime elements; and the presence and influence of radical or extremist elements among opposition groups.
Many factors inform the decision to conduct a UW operation. A feasibility assessment of the operational environment will determine if the proper conditions exist for SOF employment. The feasibility assessment includes an analysis of potential second- and third-order effects of the UW operation on regional stability. Conditions favorable to UW operations include insurgency/resistance movement objectives compatibility with US strategic objectives, vulnerability of the governing authority’s legitimacy, assets, infrastructure, and their inability to control its population and territory; willingness of the opposition group to partner with the US or another identified sponsor; and an operational environment suitable for UW.

UW operations may require a protracted period to achieve national policy objectives. UW operations may require time to mature and reach maximum effectiveness, especially as insurgent or resistance underground networks mature. Additionally, UW activities are enabled by support relationships with interagency partners and CF. CF may, in some instances, provide sustainment, quick reaction forces, medical support, transportation, reconnaissance and surveillance, or fires during UW operations.

i. **FID.** FID refers to US activities that support a HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and program designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability. As shown in Figure II-3, FID involves the application of the instruments of national power. In addition to enabling HNs to maintain internal stability and counter subversion and violence, FID should address the causes of instability. FID programs are tailored to the individual HN, and focus on CT, COIN, counterdrug, or stability operations. The three categories of FID are indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and US combat operations. During combat operations, US forces either integrate with or operate in the place of HN forces.

### Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense

- Involves all instruments of national power.
- Can occur across the range of military operations.
- Is conducted by both conventional forces and special operations forces.
- Supports and influences a host nation’s internal defense and development program.
- Includes training, materiel, technical and organizational assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and tactical operations.
- Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs.

*Figure II-3. Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense*
(1) The supported GCC normally designates a subordinate JFC from either the CF or SOF to lead the military forces and coordinates with the appropriate chief of mission (COM) who normally leads the overall USG effort. SOF typically contribute to a FID under the tactical control (TACON) or OPCON of a CDRTSOC. The SOF senior commander may be required to coordinate directly with the country team and COM at appropriate US embassies. In smaller FID operations, SOF units may compose the majority, if not the entire, US force. The opposite may be true in large-scale FID operations, particularly when HNs limit total US troops. FID operations may be initiated by SOF and then handed over to CF.

(2) As a joint operation, FID also uses stability operations to promote security and reduce the influence of adverse economic, political, and informational drivers of violence and conflict, through a combination of peacetime developmental, security cooperation activities, and, when necessary, crisis response actions. The goal is to enable HN forces to maintain internal stability, counter subversion and violence, and address root causes of instability.

(3) SOF Service components can contribute to FID. Primarily, SOF assess, train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces in support of FID. FID may also take the form of mobile training teams to teach indigenous personnel how to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. When authorized, SOF may also support HN combat operations.

(4) FID operations are planned at the national and ministerial levels (dependent upon the HN’s governmental structure), in support of the HN IDAD strategy and program, and in coordination with the COM. FID planning is complex. To integrate FID with national strategy and regional plans, FID planners must understand US foreign policy; focus to maintain or increase HN sovereignty and legitimacy; and understand the strategic implications and sustainability of US assistance to a HN. FID normally requires a security assistance program(s) to fund materiel requirements for military activities. Military planning for unified action is essential to build unity of effort in the USG approach to FID.

For further information on FID, refer to JP3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

j. Security Force Assistance. USG security sector reform (SSR) focuses on the way a HN provides safety, security, and justice with civilian government oversight. DOD’s primary role in SSR is to support the reform, restructure, or reestablishment of the HN armed forces and the defense aspect of the security sector, which is accomplished through SFA. SFA are DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. While SFA is primarily to assist a HN to defend against internal and transnational terrorist threats to stability, it also prepares FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part of a MNF. FSF include, but are not limited to, military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; interior and intelligence services; forces
peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; and their responsible government ministries or departments. US SFA activities train, equip, advise, and assist FSF organized under the HN’s national ministry of defense, or the equivalent governmental structure. Other USG departments and agencies focus on FSF assigned to other ministries such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. US SFA can also be provided to regional military or paramilitary forces, or an IGO’s security organization.

(1) SOF/CF performing SFA conduct an initial assessment of the FSF they will assist and then establish a way to continue assessing them throughout their development. The HN determines the structure of its military forces, to include approving all organizational structures and relationships. HN organizational prerogatives include the size of forces, types of units, and internal design.

(2) SFA is a means to support HN security reform whether through security cooperation activities for basic stability operations or a complex, structured FID effort that includes the forces at the tactical level up through the operational HUMINT and strategic level HQ and departments/ministries. Although FID and SFA are both subsets of security cooperation, neither is considered a subset of the other, and because they have a functional relationship within security cooperation, and SFA is also used outside of HN internal defense.

*For further information on FID and SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.*

**k. Hostage Rescue and Recovery.** Hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents. Offensive operations in support of hostage rescue and recovery can include the recapture of US facilities, installations, and sensitive material overseas.

**l. COIN.** COIN is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.

(1) **SOF and COIN Approaches.** SOF are essential to successful COIN operations. Their capacity to conduct a wide array of missions with HN security forces or integrated with US CF make them particularly suitable for COIN operations. They are particularly adept at using an indirect approach to positively influence segments of the indigenous population. In a more balanced or direct approach to COIN, however, they should be used to complement rather than replace the role of CF.

(2) **SOFs’ Core Activities and COIN.** SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish core activities that may be involved in COIN. Any of these special operations core activities may be conducted as part of a COIN operation. SOF must adhere to the same tenets of COIN as CF. Even if focused on DA missions, SOF must be cognizant of the need to win and maintain popular support.

(3) **DA.** DA missions may be required in COIN to capture or kill key insurgent leaders or other vital insurgent targets. The specific types of DA are raids, ambushes, and
direct assaults; standoff attacks; terminal attack control and terminal guidance operations; PR operations; precision destruction operations; and anti-surface operations.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

During the Salvadoran civil war, support to foreign internal defense (FID) by US trainers began in the early 1980s with mobile training teams from 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Initially, the mobile training teams stood up an elite counterinsurgency reaction force designed to counter the early tactical successes of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). They trained five Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions in-country, as well as at Ft. Benning and Ft. Bragg, to help stand up El Salvador's initial counterinsurgency capability.

Under the Reagan Administration a more formalized training structure was created through the Security Assistance and Training Management Organization. This organization assigned Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force advisors under the Foreign Military Sales’ Operational Planning and Assistance Training Team and Extended Training Service Specialist programs to US Military Group El Salvador. Trainers served at each Brigade and most military detachment headquarters, as well as at the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) National Headquarters (Estado Mayor Conjunto). While Army special forces constituted the majority of trainers, there were also trainers for intelligence, ground, naval, and air operations, logistics, civil affairs, civil defense and psychological operations (PSYOP). However, US congressional concern over the historical potential for expansion of the US role in the counterinsurgency effort led to a 55-personnel cap on trainers in El Salvador.

Nonetheless, this small cadre helped not only in training the ESAF, but also played a significant role in the professionalization of the armed forces in the face of repeated accusations of human rights abuses throughout the 1980s. From training on basic soldier skills at the armed forces military training center near La Unión, to working with the Salvadoran leadership at military detachment, brigade, and national levels, US military personnel were instrumental in setting the example for professional military conduct and reinforcing the importance of respect for human rights. Their efforts helped the ESAF overcome a reputation of unprofessional and abusive conduct that was pervasive in the 1980s.

At the same time, a focused ESAF PSYOP effort and targeted application of civil-military operations changed the image of the military. Inclusive messages such as “soy tan Salvadoreño como tu [I'm as Salvadoran as you are]” and employing combat troops to support humanitarian and civic assistance activities helped improve public and international perception of the ESAF and turned sentiments against the abuses of the FMLN, ultimately bringing about a peace agreement, cease fire, and demobilization of forces in 1992.

Various Sources
(4) **SR.** SOF may conduct SR into insurgent strongholds or sanctuaries. Activities within SR include environmental reconnaissance, armed reconnaissance, target and threat assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

(5) **CT.** Terrorism should be anticipated as a part of any insurgency. However, rather than just local terrorists supporting the insurgents, the more ominous threats are transnational terrorists taking advantage of the conflict and chaos of the situation for their own purposes. SOF are particularly capable of supporting HN CT efforts whether as part of a COIN operation, or just against transnational and other terrorists.

*For more information on COIN, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.*

m. **FHA.** FHA is a range of DOD humanitarian activities conducted outside the US and its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. DOS and the United States Agency for International Development would typically support the affected HN, and often in conjunction with an IGO such as the United Nations (UN). US military forces are not the primary USG means to provide humanitarian assistance (HA); the assistance they provide usually supplements or complements the other lead USG departments and agencies, SOF, and particularly civil affairs (CA). They can deploy rapidly with excellent long-range communications equipment, and operate in the austere and often chaotic environments typically associated with disaster-related HA efforts. Perhaps the most important capabilities found within SOF for FHA are their geographic orientation, cultural knowledge, language capabilities, and the ability to work with multiethnic indigenous populations, and international relief organizations to provide initial and ongoing assessments. CA are particularly well suited for stabilization efforts in disaster areas. SOF can provide temporary support such as airspace control for landing zones, communications nodes, security, and advance force assessments to facilitate the deployment of CF and designated HA organizations until the HN or another organization can provide that support.

n. **MISO.** MISO are planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.

(1) SOF and CF should plan MISO to support all phases of operations and campaigns.

(2) MISO planners will identify target audiences and MISO objectives, themes, activities, and products that support the JFC’s plan. However, MISO is most successful when integrated and synchronized with complementary information-related capabilities (IRCs) and actions of the joint force and other interagency partners to create psychological effects. Messages and action must be congruent to influence target audiences to change their attitudes, perceptions, and behavior.

(3) In peacetime and during limited crises response operations, MISO are usually planned and coordinated through the TSOC. In permissive or uncertain environments not
AGAINST ABU MUSAB ZARQAWI

After the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein, Abu Musab Zarqawi filled the insurgent leadership vacuum in Iraq. He was viewed by many anti-American Arabs as a modern day Robin Hood. His group, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), received manpower, money, arms, and sanctuary from across the Arab world because Zarqawi stood up to the US military.

The Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), based in the Baghdad Green Zone, began a concerted effort to change the Arab world’s perception of Zarqawi. To build the case showing Zarqawi’s brutality and systematic violence, the JPOTF documented every attack attributed to AQI, and using a variety of products (newspapers, radio, television, face-to-face, handbills, loudspeakers, and the Internet), highlighted the ever increasing death toll of innocent Muslims. Zarqawi’s reputation changed from that of an Arab Robin Hood to a radical who relished the “Slaughter of Innocents.” This ultimately resulted in Osama bin Laden warning Zarqawi that he was losing the battle of the media because of his indiscriminate killing of innocent Muslims.

The JPOTF documented effects of the joint psychological operations (PSYOP) messages and actions against Zarqawi using a variety of impact indicators. A March 2004 Oxford poll reported that 98 percent of Iraqis recognized AQI’s attacks hurt the progress of the country. The JPOTF publicized a $10 million reward for information leading to Zarqawi’s capture, further increasing the pressure. The JPOTF used a series of opinion editorials and political cartoons in local and regional media to attack Zarqawi as a murderer of Muslims. Shortly thereafter, Zarqawi and AQI published a “manifesto” stating that they did not kill Muslims. PSYOP messaging helped put AQI on the media defensive for subsequent attacks within Iraq. Reports of other Iraqi insurgents attacking AQI forces provided evidence of a growing rift between non-Iraqi Zarqawi loyalists and Iraqis.

The role of PSYOP in marginalizing Abu Musab Zarqawi helped change the AQI narrative from directly attacking US and coalition forces to defending AQI activities despite mounting evidence of AQI civilian casualties. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, spokesman Combined Joint Task Force—Seven, said “The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date.” The psychological pressure on AQI and Zarqawi continued until 7 June 2006 when an airstrike killed him and several other AQI leaders.

Various Sources

involving combat operations, MISO are planned and integrated with other security cooperation activities and operations and with other USG efforts to further national strategy objectives through the GCC’s TCP and contingency plans. In major contingencies, the JFC may establish a separate joint military information support task force (JMISTF) to conduct MISO.
(4) Military information support (MIS) forces can also be used to provide civil authority information support (CAIS). CAIS include DOD information activities conducted under a designated lead federal agency or other US civil authority to support dissemination of public or other critical information during domestic emergencies.

(a) When authorized for domestic employment, CAIS informs by utilizing its message development, production, and dissemination capabilities to deliver administrative and public service information to affected populations in the operational area. Messages typically include information such as the location of relief sites, how to obtain essential services, disease prevention tips, current civil authority instructions, and similar messages. Organic dissemination equipment such as radio broadcast systems, print production assets, and loudspeaker systems can be used to augment inadequate civilian commercial public information capabilities and provide information to isolated populations in affected areas.

(b) All CAIS activities are coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal agency public affairs (PA) activities as required.

(5) **Relationship to Other Activities.** MISO play a key role in special operations, particularly in IW situations that focus on ideological and sociopolitical dimensions during FID, COIN, CT, stability operations, and UW. For example, MIS teams may deploy to support approved FID, CT, or COIN operations, demining, or FHA programs either under OPCON of a JFC or in support of a COM.

(6) USSOCOM retains the preponderance of active duty MIS forces under the USASOC. USSOCOM also gains RC MIS forces through AFSOC when Air National Guard assets are mobilized. USSOCOM is the DOD proponent for MISO to coordinate the collaborative development and integration of DOD MISO with US strategic objectives.

For further information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

   **CAO.** CAO are actions planned, executed, and assessed by CA that enhance the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. All CMO should be coordinated and support the commander’s objectives. All CA core tasks support the JFC’s CMO objectives.

(1) CAO support of special operations is usually conducted by small CA teams or elements, generally without the support of larger military formations, in isolated, austere, and in many cases diplomatically or politically sensitive environments. CA teams in such environments must be flexible and innovative. CAO require planning and support from the CA staff at the supported TSOC. Additionally, these operations require planning and coordination with multiple civilian and military partners to facilitate decentralized execution. CA normally require combat service support and may require combat support from CF Service components.
(2) CA teams identify critical civil vulnerabilities, conduct civil reconnaissance, engage HN and interagency partners, create tactical plans, based on country or theater specific expertise, and facilitate unity of effort to achieve objectives. CA forces can oversee projects, and eventually close activities and actions with assessments and targeting refinement. CA leaders should be prepared to serve as the senior SOF representative in countries with a limited SOF footprint.

(3) CA core tasks include:

(a) Populace and resources control.

(b) FHA.

(c) Nation assistance.

(d) Support to civil administrations.

(e) Civil information management.

(4) **CMO and CAO.** CMO should be considered in the planning and execution of military operations. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, COIN, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats. Commanders responsible for an operational area typically are also responsible for the civilian population. That responsibility may be reflected in the proportional balance of stability operations with offensive and defensive operations during a joint operation. CMO may be conducted before or during military operations and especially during stability operations. Commanders conduct CMO in permissive, uncertain, or hostile operational environments to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civilian authorities (governmental and nongovernmental) and the civilian population.

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**OPERATION TOMODACHI (MARCH-APRIL 2011)**

On 11 March 2011, the eastern coast of Honshu, Japan was struck by a tsunami caused by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, killing thousands and inundating homes, farms, and damaging a nuclear power plant. The US Air Force 353rd Special Operations Group quickly developed a plan with Japanese government officials to reopen the Sendai Airport to facilitate rescue and humanitarian assistance operations. Special operations forces (SOF) personnel surveyed the airfield on 16 March, and American and Japanese crews cleared the runway for use by 20 March. For the next three weeks, SOF combat controllers directed over 250 US and Australian military aircraft delivering two million pounds of humanitarian aid and fuel for rescue vehicles. Japanese personnel relieved the SOF teams and resumed control over airport operations on 1 April.

Various Sources
CMO facilitate military operations and minimize interference by or friction with civilian entities while supporting accomplishment of tasks to create the effects to achieve operational objectives. CA may help military forces perform activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local government. CMO may be conducted prior to, concurrently with, and following other military operations, especially during stability operations. In carrying out their CMO responsibilities, commanders use CAO. The relationship between CMO and CAO is best considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

(5) Civil-Military Engagement (CME). CME is a formal program initiated by USSOCOM to address specific shaping activities that support US global CT efforts against violent extremist organizations. CME activities are managed and coordinated at the theater level by the TSOC for the GCC. CME activities are coordinated with phase 0 (shape) of the GCC’s TCPs, and synchronized with the DOS country strategy for the affected HN in which those activities are conducted. CME activities are planned, prepared, executed, and assessed by CA elements of USASOC, known as civil-military support elements (CMSEs). CME objectives seek to counter indigenous support to violent extremist organizations and their networks through the deployment of modular and scalable task-organized CMSEs. CMSEs conduct local and regional engagements to counter violent extremist efforts to win public support and build sanctuaries by exploiting the local population. In coordination with the country team and HN, the CMSE is useful for a whole-of-government approach to support both the USG objectives to gain access, integrate actions horizontally and vertically, and to routinely engage with a HN government and the indigenous population in coordination with the COM and country team. Although CME is planned and conducted through CA elements, CME should not be confused with the CMO and CAO in support of a JFC during a joint operation.

(6) Relationship to Other Core Activities. In most protracted IW situations, especially those involving unified action and overt interorganizational coordination with the HN, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector, SOF should include CA; and CAO should be planned to complement the other core activities to achieve the JFC’s objectives.

For further information on CMO, CME, and CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

“The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly.”

Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke (“The Elder”), 1800-1891

1. Introduction

   a. Command. Command is the authority a commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment, and includes responsibility to accomplish assigned missions. Command relationships and command authorities are discussed in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs establish command relationships and further delegate selected authorities required by subordinate commanders to execute assigned activities and operations. CDRTSOC, CDRJSOTF, and the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), when designated, are all JFCs.

   b. Unity of Command. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the authority to direct and employ all forces in pursuit of a common purpose. No two commanders may exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time. While CDRUSSOCOM maintains COCOM of all SOF and TSOCs, GCCs normally are given OPCON of the TSOCs in their theaters. Unity of command within a chain of command for SOF is sometimes complex because of the diverse SOF component capabilities, missions, and the small-size of numerous operational elements across large operational areas. These elements can operate with numerous concurrent support relationships with a JFC’s Service components, and simultaneously work with HN forces and among indigenous populations. The guiding principle is to place all SOF in an operational area or tasked with a specific mission or operation under a single SOF commander with the authority to coordinate special operations among all supporting and supported units. Unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef, GCCs command special operations activities or missions in their area of responsibility (AOR). GCCs generally command SOF through the CDRTSOC.

   c. Unity of Effort and Unified Action. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, as a result of unified action, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. Unified action is the synchronized, coordinated, and integrated activities of government and nongovernment entities with those of the military to achieve common objectives. Through unified action, SOF are often employed as part of a whole-of-government effort—operating with other joint forces, various interagency partners—and multinational partners, IGOs, NGOs, and HN forces and organizations. This requires SOF commanders to ensure special operations are coordinated and synchronized with other efforts. Unity of effort enables unity of command.
d. **Global SOF Network.** All SOF, whether in home station or deployed in support of the GCCs, are part of the global SOF network. Networking allows SOF to exchange information and intelligence and collaborate globally, which is essential to counter transnational and transregional terrorists and other enemies and adversaries. The global SOF network includes nodes and other liaison elements to coordinate and synchronize special operations. The key organization in each GCC’s AOR is the TSOC.

e. **C2.** SOF commanders may utilize the principles of mission command to execute C2. Mission command emphasizes decentralized C2 to the tactical level. Mission command enables military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. Mission-type orders empower subordinate leaders to exercise judgment, disciplined initiative, and independence when they carry out their tasks. SOF generally operate in small units distributed across the operational area. This requires “bottom-up” tactical-level planning and decentralized execution, framed by higher HQ’s strategic and operational guidance, and a robust communications architecture.

f. **Command Relationships.** US command authorities and relationships include COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support. The specific command relationship will define the command authorities a commander has over assigned or attached forces, and the authorities that commander may further delegate. JFCs establish command relationships with responsibilities and authorities for mission execution.

g. **Special Operations Command Relationship Tenets.** Commanders exercising command over SOF should:

   (1) Provide a clear chain of command to create unity of command with the authority to accomplish assigned tasks.

   (2) Establish clear organizational relationships to achieve unity of effort. Clearly define authorities, roles, and relationships and ensure subordinate commanders, staff principals, and leaders of C2 nodes and liaisons understand their authority and their relationships with others.

   (3) Provide supported commands SOF staff with sufficient experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support operations.

   (4) Integrate SOF with CF, multinational, and HN forces early in the planning process.

   (5) Match SOF unit capabilities with mission requirements.

   (6) Understand SOF’s synchronization of special operations within joint operations as part of unified action.

   (7) Ensure that requisite liaisons are in place and they know their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

   (8) Maintain SOF continuity within operational areas and commanders.
h. Special Operations Mission Planning Considerations. Special operations mission planning is generally governed by four considerations:

(1) SOF begin planning by developing targeting and mission options based on the JFC’s guidance and intent. Timely articulation of how SOF can help achieve the JFC’s objectives and intent leads to effective utilization of SOF and optimizes integration with the CF.

(2) Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute to the strategic and operational objectives within the lines of operation and lines of effort being executed by the JFC. Limited resources and extensive planning require a commander to selectively employ SOF for high-priority operations. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may dictate that the President and/or SecDef place specific operational limitations upon the supported and supporting forces.

(3) SOF missions are complete packages that include infiltration, resupply, potential emergency resupply, fire and maneuver support, and exfiltration must be thoroughly planned before committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy and friendly situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area are key planning factors. They will dictate the size, composition, and capabilities of the mission force, the nature of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used, and the methods of infiltration and exfiltration, period of force exposure, logistic requirements, and size and composition of the command and support structure.

   (a) Special operations targeting and mission planning will require coordination with all applicable joint forces through the appropriate supported JFC. During an ongoing crisis or during sustained combat, conventional targeting and strike response time for ordnance delivery is extremely quick and may affect SOF maneuver corridors, infiltration/exfiltration routes, hide sites, PR sites, or target areas. CF planner involvement during the early planning stages will facilitate coordination and synchronization of all assets, including the allocation of conventional resources to support and augment SOF activities. Special operations mission planning should support all applicable aspects of the JFC’s plans.

   (b) Reliable intelligence is required for the detailed targeting and mission planning by SOF. Intelligence is vital to successful mission execution and to the survival of deployed operational elements. Based on assigned strategic theater objectives and operational direction provided by the supported JFC, the CDRTSOC or CDRJSOTF provides mission guidance to the subordinate SOF commanders, providing them with the basis for the development of comprehensive concept of operations and mission plans that allow for the flexible yet focused execution required by SOF.

(4) Special operations can rarely be repeated after first attempt since special operations targets normally are perishable. Therefore, thorough mission planning and, whenever possible, mission rehearsals are typically essential to success. Commanders should anticipate such preparation time.
2. Assignment of Special Operations Forces

   a. As established in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 162, and discussed in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, all forces shall be assigned or attached to and under command of a CCDR, except as otherwise directed by SecDef. A force may be transferred from the CCDR to whom it is assigned and temporarily attached to another CCDR by authority of SecDef. SOF units based in the US are generally assigned to and under COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM, with OPCON exercised through the USSOCOM Service component commands.

   b. SecDef assigns the TSOCs to USSOCOM under CDRUSSOCOM’s COCOM, and assigns OPCON of the TSOCs to the GCCs. SecDef also authorizes CDRUSSOCOM/GCCs to establish support relationships when SOF commanders are required to simultaneously support multiple operations or commanders.

3. Special Operations Forces Joint Task Force

   For military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, forward-based and distributed C2 nodes under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC provide the necessary C2 for assigned and attached SOF. The special operations joint task force (SOJTF) is the principal joint SOF organization tasked to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, or a contingency.

   a. **SOJTF.** A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows USSOCOM to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate JFCs based on the strategic, operational, and tactical context. SOF capacity may be especially challenged during major combat operations or other large-scale campaigns. When theater SOF requirements exceed the TSOC’s capacity, GCCs may request an SOJTF from USSOCOM. In coordination with the GCC, theater component, and joint task force (JTF) commanders, the SOJTF commander is responsible for planning, integrating, and conducting of special operations in a designated operational area. When tasked, the SOJTF commander may plan, integrate, and conduct all military operations in the designated theater of operations.

   b. A SOJTF is composed of four elements: the HQ, SOF units, support forces, and Service-provided capabilities. The HQ element provides the C2 of all SOF in the SOJTF. It may augment existing capability, or provide the full theater capability, as required. The second element is the SOF units, which may include air, ground, maritime, and special designated SOF capabilities. The third element includes the SOF organic combat support and combat service support capabilities, which may include, but are not limited to, aviation support, fires support, intelligence, logistics, and communications. Since SOF are limited in size and capability, the fourth element consists of Service-provided capabilities augmented from CF. The SOJTF scalability also allows expanding into a MNF as required (see Figure III-1).
c. Depending on circumstances, the SOJTF may be directed to serve as the JTF, or a JFSOCC. The SOJTF provides a capability to C2 multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) and a joint special operations air component (JSOAC) or a JTF consisting of both CF and SOF.

4. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater

a. TSOC. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization to plan and control special operations and other SOF activities. The TSOC plans and conducts operations in support of the GCC. The GCC normally exercises OPCON of attached SOF through the CDRTSOC, who may exercise OPCON of subordinate forces directly from the TSOC location, or through a smaller special operations command-forward (SOC-FWD), located elsewhere in the theater of operations. A SOC-FWD is normally smaller than a TSOC, and a tailored, operational-level HQ that provides a forward-deployed, persistent presence, and C2 capability (see Figure III-2). If conditions warrant more robust SOF presence and engagement, a SOC-FWD can transition to a JSOTF. The SOC-FWD develops a close working relationship with the associated country team, HN forces, and any MNFs or IGOs within the HN, and helps the CDRTSOC in the role of JFC/CDRJSOTF, and as the senior theater special operations advisor to the GCC. For military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, forward-based and distributed nodes under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC provide C2 for SOF.
CDRTSOC. As the commander of a subunified command, CDRTSOC is a JFC with the authority to plan and conduct joint operations as directed by the GCC and to exercise OPCON of assigned and attached forces. The CDRTSOC may designate subordinate CDRJSOTFs and establish JTFs to plan and execute operations. The CDRTSOC may also function as a JFSOCC within a GCC-established joint force.
(2) **Theater Special Operations Advisor.** The CDRTSOC advises the GCC, Service component commanders, and others on the employment of SOF. CDRTSOC may develop specific recommendations for the use of SOF in theater. The GCC may designate CDRTSOC as a staff officer on the CCMD staff, in addition to duties as CDRTSOC, and designate the TSOC a special operations directorate of the CCMD in addition to being a subordinate unified command. While this places additional staff responsibilities on the TSOC, it facilitates special operations staff actions within the CCMD by providing the GCC and staff one source for special operations expertise and eliminates special operations division within a CCMD directorate.

b. **Joint Special Operations C2 Organizations.** There are several options for C2 of SOF below the TSOC level: the joint force special operations component, JSOTF, and the JSOAC. Multiple GCC operational requirements and missions may be served most efficiently by multiple SOF organizations. The GCC must establish appropriate command relationships between the SOF commanders (i.e., CDRTSOC, JFSOCC, and CDRJSOTF), and any designated commanders, JTF (CJTFs), and the theater Service and functional component commanders. SOF commanders and CJTFs must establish command relationships among their Service and functional components. Refer to Figure III-3 for the organizational and command structure from the CCMD down to the JSOTF.

(1) **JFSOCC.** The JFSOCC is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or JTF responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and assets, including planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC acts as the senior SOF representative in the operation or within the theater. The JFSOCC supports the JFC with unique and effective SOF capability while ensuring the SOF components are organized for optimum contribution to the JTF. The JFSOCC provides a CF/SOF synchronizing process with the JTF through the joint forces land component commander, if designated. SOF is inherently organized as a joint force, providing a timely capability to coordinate across multiple services with communications connectivity that provides accurate and timely information to the JFSOCC. The JFSOCC capability to assist with C2 functions is critical during the initial phases of crisis response.

(2) **JSOTF.** A JSOTF is generally composed of units of two or more SOF Service components formed to unilaterally carry out specific special operations or activities, or to support a JFC conducting joint operations. A JSOTF may have CF supporting it for specific missions. A JSOTF is normally established by a JFC (e.g., a GCC, a subordinate unified commander such as a CDRTSOC, or a CJTF). For example, a GCC could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a specific joint operations area (JOA) of the theater; then either the GCC or the CJTF could designate a CDRJSOTF and establish a JSOTF, subordinate to that CJTF, to plan and execute special operations. Likewise, a CDRTSOC could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or operational area assigned by the GCC. When a JSOTF is formed to directly support a GCC, the CDRTSOC normally acts as the CDRJSOTF. CDRJSOTF is a JFC and exercises the authority and responsibility assigned by the establishing JFC. A JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the TSOCC staff and augmented by Service components or an existing O-6-level HQ from an
existing SOF Service component with augmentation from other SOF or CF. As directed by the President or SecDef, a JSOTF may also be established and deployed from outside the theater into the AOR in coordination with that GCC.

(3) **JSOAC.** The JSOAC is the SOF functional air component. A CDRTSOC, JFSOCC, or CDRJSOTF may designate a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC) to plan and execute joint special operations air activities, and
coordinate conventional air support for SOF with the joint force air component commander (JFACC), if designated. The JSOACC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of SOF air assets or the best capacity to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned and supporting air assets, which can include Army SOA, AFSOF, and other air assets. SOF commanders may place selected SOA assets under CF control. A JSOACC may support multiple JSOTFs in one or more operational areas in a theater of operations. A JSOAC may be a standing organization, or formed in response to a crisis, or for a major operation or campaign. Normally, the only SOF functional component under a CDRTSOC, JFSOCC, or CDRJSOTF is a JSOAC. The other components are Service components. Figure III-4 depicts notional JSOAC and its assets.

c. **SOF Service Components and Organizations.** The CDRJSOTF may establish one or more subordinate special operations task forces (SOTFs) from SOF Service components under a JSOTF. A SOTF is a grouping of SOF assets formed to carry out a specific operation or a continuing mission. SOTFs are scalable organizations built around the nucleus of an Army special forces unit, Ranger unit, Marine Corps special operations unit, or NSW unit. The CDRJSOTF may assign each SOTF an operational area within the JSOA or a functional mission.

(1) **ARSOF.** ARSOF frequently form the core of a JSOTF with the commander and staff of an SF group/Ranger regiment. An Army component of a JSOTF may be designated as an SOTF and can consist of one or more of the following forces: SF, Rangers,
MISO, CA, and Army SOA forces supported by the ARSOF sustainment brigade. A SOTF is normally established with an SF battalion or Ranger regimental commander and staff and their respective units. The SOTF normally has MIS and CA forces attached even if there is a separate JMISTF or joint civilian-military operations task force.

(a) SF. SF units are task-organized as SF groups and battalions, both of which have organic HQ and support elements. When deployed, an SF group or battalion may be designated a SOTF.

(b) Rangers. A Ranger force can work unilaterally under a JSOTF. The Ranger regimental HQ may serve as a SOTF HQ when augmented with liaison officers (LNOs) and additional staff personnel from other conventional and SOF units. This augmentation may include MIS, CA, aviation, communication, and logistic units or other functions. Ranger-led SOTFs are normally the Army special operations component of a JSOTF. Rangers can also serve as the Army component of a JTF. If the Ranger regiment and other ARSOF or SOF HQ are under the same JSOTF commander, the JSOTF commander normally forms two or more SOTFs.

(c) SOA. SOA are organic ARSOF assets with OPCON normally exercised by the CDRJSOTF through either the Army Service component commander or JSOACC. When a JSOACC is established as a functional component commander by the CDRTSOC/JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, the Army SOA may be under OPCON of the JSOACC.

(2) NAVSOF. The NAVSOF task organization is based on operational requirements, and may include SEALs, submersible platforms, combatant craft, and supporting forces.

(a) Naval Special Warfare Task Force (NSWTF). For a major operation or campaign, the NAVSOF component of a JSOTF is normally referred to as a NSWTF. An NSWTF has one or more subordinate naval special warfare task groups (NSWTGs). NSW units may be designated a SOTF and assigned a specific area in the JSOA.

(b) NSWTG. The NAVSOF may be a NSWTG. A NSWTG has one or more subordinate naval special warfare task units (NSWTUs).

(c) Some NSW units may be tasked to support and be placed under the command of a US Navy CF commander rather than a joint SOF commander. When NAVSOF conduct operations with a US Navy strike group, a NSW LNO will be assigned to the strike group staff. Whenever possible, the NSWTG or NSWTU commander should be embarked in the same ship or submarine hosting the assault force. A NSWTG or NSWTU based on a submarine or ship may be TACON to the afloat unit commander.

(3) AFSOF. The Air Force special operations air component (AFSOAC) is normally composed of elements of a special operations wing, special operations group, or squadron, and Air Force special tactics personnel. A JSOACC, if designated by the JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF, is typically the commander, AFSOAC (COMAFSOAC). When
subordinate AFSOF units deploy to forward operations bases or advanced operations bases, the COMFSSOAC may establish one or more provisional units:

(a) **Air Force Special Operations Air Detachment (AFSOAD).** The AFSOAD is a squadron-sized HQ that could be a composite organization composed of different US Air Force assets. The AFSOAD normally is subordinate to an AFSOAC, JSOAC, JSOTF, or a JTF, depending upon the joint organizational structure. When the AFSOAD is assigned joint assets, the AFSOAD becomes a joint special operations air detachment.

(b) **Air Force Special Operations Air Element (AFSOAE).** The AFSOAE contains selected AFSOF units that are normally subordinate to an AFSOAC or AFSOAD.

(4) **MARSOF.** MARSOC is the Marine Corps Service component of USSOCOM. MARSOC deploys units in support of USSOCOM. The MARSOF of a JSOTF may be one of the following subordinate commands:

(a) **MSOR.** MARSOC has one MSOR. The regiment maintains three Marine special operations battalions and deploys task-organized scalable expeditionary MARSOF worldwide. MSOR organizes, trains, equips, and deploys SOF in support of USSOCOM or a GCC.

(b) **Marine Special Operations Battalions.** The three Marine special operations line battalions each has four companies. These companies can be task organized to conduct SR, DA, SFA, and FID missions in support of USSOCOM or a GCC. These companies may also provide tailored military combat skills training and advisor support for specified foreign forces.

(c) **Marine Special Operations Support Group.** This unit provides specified support to special operations missions as directed by the MARSOC.

d. **JSOA**

(1) The JFC may establish a JSOA, which is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned to the CDRJSOTF to conduct special operations activities. JSOAs normally help coordinate and deconflict SOF and CF missions, which can reduce the risks of friendly fire incidents. JSOAs are typically within the land and maritime component commanders’ areas of operation and may be limited by time or until special operations activities are completed. SOF often conduct operations prior to the arrival of CF. Coordination is vital in the transition from SOF AFO to follow-on operations by CF to maintain the timing and tempo of the operation. JSOAs are normally established within the operational areas of the CF for a specific time or until special operations activities are completed.

(2) The SOF commander may further assign subordinated commanders specific areas or sectors within the JSOA for mission execution. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in
size to accommodate a discrete mission (e.g., SR or DA) or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of special operations activities. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous use of CF and SOF in the same general operational area. When a JSOA is designated, the JFSOCC (or CDRJSOTF) is the supported commander within the designated JSOA.

5. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces across the Range of Military Operations

The tailored C2 support of GCC plans starts with a SOC-FWD capability resident within the TSOC, or provided through attached forces. The C2 process is scalable based on the size of the force and tailored to the situation (such as integrated with CF, multinational, or intergovernmental partners) (see Figure III-5). TSOCs may choose to establish intermediate and/or distributed command elements from the TSOC, normally as a SOC-FWD element. The TSOC has multiple options for tasking and deploying C2 elements in order to match SOF capabilities and meet GCC requirements. Examples of forward-deployed SOF elements include the SOC-FWD, SOTF, JSOTF, and SOJTF—each C2 element is designed to meet unique operational requirements. As an operation matures, the SOC-FWD can expand to multiple SOTFs, or a SOC-FWD can form the nucleus of a JSOTF or SOJTF. The various SOF C2 elements can provide timely information, halt or delay the development of hostilities, and provide time for the JFC to prepare and deploy a larger CF/SOF integrated response.

a. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

(1) SOF’s primary role in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence is in support of a broader whole-of-government approach, integrated with both USG and partner capabilities. SOF’s unique capabilities support the US military instrument of national power and support the USG departments and agencies, partner nations, or intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) to protect and advance national security interests, deter conflict, and shape regional security. SOF provides a critical capability for the GCC to support and influence these activities. SOF provides an efficient and effective DOD commitment that builds and develops regional security forces while maintaining a positive forward presence during persistent engagement and pre-crisis periods. The military and security cooperation engagements during these activities emphasize the regional stabilization goals outlined within the GCC’s TCP. During this stage, distributed SOF elements influence stability through building or sustaining partnerships, and developing capability and capacity in FSF.

For more information, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(2) Based on these small decentralized engagement activities, linked as part of broader campaigns and regional strategies, large C2 organizations are not required to coordinate in-country activities or multiple actions across the region. During these activities, SOF elements are under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC in support of the TCP or emerging regional security concerns. Within a supported country, the senior US representative is the
COM or US ambassador. The senior DOD representative within the country team is the senior defense official (SDO) or defense attaché (DATT) who is responsible for partner nation military engagements and DOD security actions. SOF elements are deployed within chosen countries and coordinate with US country teams through the DATT office or designated DOD office. Although SOF elements under the OPCON of the CDRTSOC, the supporting SOF element has coordination responsibilities with the country team. The scale
of the activity in a designated country or region may require a larger forward-deployed C2 element. The decision is based on GCC guidance, mission analysis, and TSOC requirements for effective C2 based on force structure. Larger engagements within a chosen country may require a SOTF-level C2 capability, where multiple SOF elements are conducting activities at multiple locations. When the CDRTSOC organizes a C2 capability at any level, the primary intent is a flattened command structure versus a hierarchical one to facilitate control and mission command execution (see Figure III-6 for notional organizational structure for security cooperation).

b. **Crisis Response and Limited Contingencies**

(1) The CDRTSOC plays a critical role during regional crisis response operations...
supporting the GCC, both as the special operations advisor and as the SOF component commander. The CDRTSOC has SOF elements in theater for supporting contingencies. If the SOF supporting element is deployed from the US, the CDRTSOC normally maintains the role as the supported SOF commander with OPCON over all SOF. Normally, the TSOC will initially deploy a small C2 element forward to allow time for larger C2 options dependent upon force apportionment. In larger contingencies, the CDRTSOC may deploy forward as the JFSOCC or designate a JFSOCC to a JTF, who is normally selected from the largest provider of forces.

(2) The CDRTSOC has multiple rapid C2 options including: establishing a SOC-FWD element, designating a SOTF from the deploying force, or (based on the scope of response) establishing a JSOTF, CJSOTF, or SOJTF. The general premise for this methodology is to make available the appropriate C2 functions to meet the demands from the supporting force. The goal is to establish the appropriate C2 architecture for the responding force (including coalition partners) to support intergovernmental priorities, and to synchronize operations and support (see Figure III-7). Dependent upon the operational situation, the COM may be the USG lead in an affected HN.

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**Notional Organizational Structure for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency**

![Diagram of organizational structure](attachment:organizational_structure.png)

*Figure III-7. Notional Organizational Structure for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency*
c. **Major Operations and Campaigns.** Major operations and campaigns are inherently joint that require robust C2 architectures. The buildup of forces can progress from a battalion size force during crisis response or limited contingency operations to a corps-level force during major operations or a campaign. Prior established SOF contingency C2 elements may facilitate the buildup of supporting joint forces. An evolution of force buildup will influence established SOF C2 structures resulting in a possible operational handover to, and potential integration with, an incoming JTF. As major operations and campaigns develop, modifying the SOF C2 organization(s) to better enable interdependence and synchronization with the larger US and MNFs is critical to success.

*For more information on the, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.*

(1) In major operations or campaigns, the GCC will normally establish a JTF commanded by a JFC. If designated by the GCC, the JFC can be a SOF commander. If the JFC is not a SOF commander, the GCC can task the CDRTSOC to provide a SOF commander (i.e., JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF) to exercise C2 over assigned and attached US and multinational SOF. The CDRTSOC has several scalable options to consider when supporting the JTF.

(a) The CDRTSOC will consider the SOF requirements and capacity to determine the appropriate SOF C2 architecture.

(b) The CDRTSOC will consider the amount of MNFs supporting the JTF and whether apportionments of the MNFs are SOF, special police units, or partnered conventional units supported by or advised by US SOF. C2 functions provided by SOF include scalable levels of C2, coordination elements, and liaison elements.

(c) The CDRTSOC will determine C2 requirements, either a tailored or functional design construct through modular systems.

(d) Scalable means the C2 is designed by size (i.e., company, battalion, brigade equivalent levels) determined from analysis of the SOF functional requirements, size of the SOF elements, complexity of the special operations, volume of multinational special operations forces, and responsibilities of the force.

(2) If the SOF elements do not require a separate C2 structure, then liaison elements are established to ensure that SOF ground and air operations are effectively coordinated, synchronized, and deconflicted with the JTF. Normally, SOF liaison cells are functionally designed, and the size depends on the scope of operations. Two examples of SOF liaison elements are a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) and a special operations liaison element (SOLE). A SOCCE supports the JTF to synchronize operations between SOF and CF. A SOLE is designated by the SOF commander to the JFACC or conventional air commander to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SOF and conventional air operations. The benefits of liaisons to the joint force are communications, operations, and intelligence connectivity between SOF and CF.
(3) The establishment of a SOJTF (as in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) can improve CF/SOF integration and interdependence. The SOJTF acts as a single HQ to plan and coordinate all special operations in theater; and employ and sustain US and multinational SOF. The SOJTF increases synergies in intelligence, communications, and information sharing, improves manpower efficiency, improves critical enablers to the force, and enhances coordination between all special operations in theater.

(4) SOF has inherent capability for contingency or crisis response operations. Initially, the TSOC may provide organic C2 for the special operation or activity required in theater. When the GCC designates a JTF to assume mission requirements, the TSOC may send SOF liaison element representation to the JTF to coordinate special operations in the region or maintain C2 of special operations from the TSOC. These decisions are determined as the CDRTSOC evaluates the CF/SOF interdependence and integration requirements with the incoming JTF (see Figure III-8).

d. SOF under control of a non-US command. When directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS, GCCs may place SOF units under the TACON of a non-US MNF commander. In such instances, OPCON of US SOF units will be retained by an appropriate CCDR, and the CCDR will normally delegate and exercise OPCON through a US SOF commander within the multinational command structure.
6. Special Operations Coordination, Liaison, and Distributed Command Elements

SOF commanders have elements to liaise with various organizations. These elements improve communication, facilitate concurrent planning, and synchronize and coordinate SF and CF operations. These elements may support specific military commanders and/or PNs/HN. HQ USSOCOM, the TSOCs, USSOCOM components, USSOCOM elements in the National Capital Region (NCR), and interagency and multinational SOF partners design, plan, and oversee execution of special operations in support of national strategic objectives.

a. Support to Military Commanders

   (1) SOCCE. The SOCCE is the focal point for SOF-CF coordination, and the synchronization of special operations activities with other joint operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conducts operations in support of a CF. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC, SOJTF, or CDRJSOTF). Its level of authority and responsibility is defined in the order establishing the SOCCE and may vary. It collocates with the command center/post of the supported force to coordinate planning, synchronize, and deconflict special operations with the operations of the supported force, and it facilitates communications interoperability. For example, a SOCCE may locate with the JFC in the joint operations center (JOC) and another with the joint force land component commander. The SOCCE can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component HQ. The JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF, or JSOTF component commanders may attach liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE. The SOCCE remains under the OPCON of the establishing SOF commander. The SOCCE performs the following functions:

   (a) Facilitates or exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or placed in direct support of, the supported CF commander, as directed.

   (b) Advises the supported commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities, and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.

   (c) Advises the supporting SOF commander(s) of the supported commander’s current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.

   (d) Provides secure communications links.

   (e) Coordinates and deconflicts special operations activities with CF operations.

   (f) Assists the supported CF commander and staff in planning and executing linkup with SOF.
In Afghanistan, United States Special Operations Command stood up a special operations joint task force (SOJTF) to enable unity of command by combining several special operation forces (SOF) organizations. The SOJTF coordinated multiple complex activities which employed many SOF, while simultaneously synchronizing special operations with conventional force headquarters, other United States Government departments and agencies, and coalition partners.
(2) **Special Operations Liaison Element.** A SOLE is typically a joint team provided by the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF to the JFACC (if designated) at the joint air operations center (JAOC), or appropriate Service air component C2 center to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize special operations air, surface, and subsurface activities with joint air operations. The SOLE director works directly for the JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF as a liaison and has no command authority. The SOLE director typically places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison members of the SOLE in the JAOC. The SOLE coordinates special operations in the air tasking order and the air space control order. The SOLE provides liaison between the JAOC and the senior SOF HQ to help build fire support coordination measures which minimize the risk of friendly fire. A SOLE is tailored (see Figure III-9).

(3) **SOF LNOs.** SOF LNOs report to their SOF commander or SOF Service component commander. They are dispatched to JTF components to convey information which enables mission execution and reduces the risk of friendly fire, minimizes duplication of effort or disrupts ongoing operations, and prevents the loss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may help coordinate fire support, overflight clearances, aerial refueling, targeting, military deception (MILDEC), MISO, CAO, and other activities based on requirements. These liaison efforts help the JFC’s integrate CF and SOF to efficiently use limited resources and assets.

b. **Support to Country Teams and HNs**

(1) **Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO).** The SOLO is a SOF officer with language, cultural, military, and civilian training in addition to SOF staff experience. SOLOs are assigned to a HN’s national SOF HQ as part of a recurring and permanent US SOF presence in select HNs. Operating under COM authority, a SOLO is the CDRUSSOCOM’s direct representative and the primary SOF advisor to the SDO/DATT, country team, and to HN SOF leadership. SOLOs focus on developing and maintaining the HN SOF command and its institutional relationships with HN government ministries (e.g., the ministry of defense, ministry of finance, ministry of the interior), and their leadership. SOLOs monitor all SOF activities inside the HN and coordinate in-country, theater, and global SOF activities in support of COM/country team, CDRTSOC, GCC, and US/HN.
special operations command equities at the strategic level. SOLOs are under CDRUSSOCOM COCOM and under OPCON of the CDRTSOCs unless otherwise directed. SOLO are normally assigned to duty at the US embassy when the HN does not have a SOF HQ.
(2) **SOF Representative.** The SOF representative is an experienced SOF officer proficient in the language most commonly used for PN government business. SOF representatives are assigned to the US embassies in selected PNs as part of a recurring and persistent US SOF presence. Like SOLOs, a SOF representative operates under COM authority and serves as the primary SOF advisor to the SDO/DATT, country team, and to HN SOF leadership. Focused on the operational and tactical level, SOF representatives coordinate efforts of US SOF units to develop HN SOF unit tactical capabilities. SOF representatives coordinate local, theater, and global SOF activities in support of COM, CDRTSOC, GCC, and US/HN special operations command equities from the tactical through the operational level. SOF representatives maintain visibility on all US SOF activities inside the HN and coordinate those activities with the SDO/DATT. SOF representatives are under OPCON of CDRTSOC unless otherwise directed.

(3) **Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE).** A SOFLE is a task-organized rotational SOF element deployed within a specific nation or embedded within CF to conduct liaison activities. The SOFLE can coordinate, assess, and recommend training, equipping, and engaging opportunities with HN forces or provide connectivity and synchronization of expeditionary forces. TSOCs may establish a SOFLE on a temporary basis in a country that does not have a SOLO or SOF representative assigned. SOFLEs are experienced SOF operators (senior enlisted and/or officer) who are attached to the US embassy, partnered nation force, or CF and coordinate with HN forces. SOFLEs are placed in those areas that directly support security cooperation goals and objectives. A SOFLE may function as a team or an individual and may engage in SOF activities.

(4) **Partnership Development Team (PDT).** A scalable and tailored USSOCOM staff element composed of subject matter experts that work with the TSOC to conduct site assist visits at HN SOF commands to help them develop/refine their organizational capabilities, capacity, and human resources initiatives. PDTs are initiated at the request of a HN SOF command through the COM and may be facilitated through the SOLO, SOF representative, or SOFLE.

c. **USSOCOM Elements in the NCR.** The USSOCOM elements in the NCR are an extension of HQ USSOCOM and serve as the focal point for coordinating and collaborating special operations issues with interagency partners, PNs, and other multinational or private sector entities represented in the NCR. USSOCOM elements in the NCR facilitate interagency coordination between SOF and other interagency partners, and are a major element in the global SOF network that enables interagency coordination overseas. Special operations support teams (SOSTs) are cornerstones of the USSOCOM NCR elements.

(1) The Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP) is the methodology for providing on-site facilitation of DOD planning with other USG departments and agencies for global operations against terrorist networks. The IAPP supports intergovernmental agency information sharing, improves security situational awareness, and builds a teamwork approach to unified security activities.
(2) SOSTs are USSOCOM representatives embedded with the NCR HQ of interagency partners to foster interagency coordination and collaboration. SOST chiefs are liaisons from CDRUSSOCOM to the other USG department or agency partner.

(3) USSOCOM elements in the NCR facilitate aligning the activities of SOF with USG functional lines of effort. USSOCOM elements in the NCR are a major element in part of the global SOF network that strengthens the relationships of SOF with USG departments and agencies and other organizations.

d. **Global Mission Support Center (GMSC).** The GMSC is USSOCOM’s primary point of contact to support worldwide SOF missions. The GMSC has three primary functions:

   (1) **Global Awareness:** Track global SOF inventory and demand; integrate information on operations, plans, and threats; conduct critical event notifications; improve SOF situational awareness.

   (2) **Responsive Support:** Expediently coordinate responses to requests for information (RFIs), requests for forces, and requests for support; provide GCCs and USG partners entry point into HQ USSOCOM staff functions and battle rhythm; manage sourcing/execution feasibility and risk analysis for force allocation; enable USSOCOM and SOF support for GCCs/CDRTSOCs and their component commanders.

   (3) **Coordination:** Communicate CDRUSSOCOM’s intent and direction, when appropriate, to SOF in all theaters; coordinate key battle rhythm events to promote purpose and unity of effort across the global SOF network; when necessary, integrate crisis response actions into routine operations; provide a point of contact to coordinate and collaborate with other CCMDs.

7. **Interdependence of Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces**

   a. SOF and CF often share the same operational areas for extended periods when they are mutually reliant on each other’s capabilities. Early and detailed coordination between SOF and CF enables unity of effort. SOF-CF synchronization facilitates unity of effort; maximizes the capability of the joint force; and allows the JFC to optimize the principles of joint operations in planning and execution.

   b. Certain special operations missions require supporting CF to receive enhanced training and/or equipment. SOF-CF interdependence is best achieved when requirements are determined early and units have the opportunity to develop relationships and procedures in advance of executing missions.

   (1) **SOA.** The CDRJSOTF, JSOACC, and COMAFSOAC coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict special operations with conventional air operations through the SOLE in the JAOC, and through liaisons to other organizations.
(2) **Land Based Special Operations.** The CDRJSOTF synchronizes special operations on land through LNOs and SOCCEs at joint and land force HQ (Army corps, Marine expeditionary force, division, or landing force).

(3) **Maritime Special Operations.** The CDRJSOTF synchronizes maritime special operations through the use of LNOs at the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) staff (if designated) or appropriate Navy force HQ. If a JSOTF afloat is established, it would serve as the forward liaison command to synchronize maritime special operations and coordinate support for maritime special operations with the JFMCC and Navy HQ.

*For further information on CF-SOF integration and interoperability, refer to Army Tactical Publication 6-03.05/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-36.1/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-05.19/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, v.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Synchronization.*

### 8. Interorganizational Coordination

a. For unified action where the JFC may not control all elements, he seeks cooperation and builds consensus to achieve unity of effort through interagency coordination for a whole-of-government approach, and interorganizational coordination for a comprehensive approach. Interorganizational coordination is integral to special operations from a local through a global context. US SOF commanders should routinely foster personal relationships with other leaders, and establish professional relationships with foreign military staffs during military engagement and security cooperation activities. Those relationships

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**TASK FORCE 58—OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

Initially established for the purpose of conducting amphibious raids in southern Afghanistan in 2001, Task Force (TF)-58, ultimately conducted an amphibious assault with conventional forces 350 miles inland to seize a desert airstrip, named Forward Operating Base Rhino. With joint force commander coordination and synchronization between special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces, SOF supported the amphibious operation. Special operations TF South, also known as TF K-Bar already operating in the area, provided a SEAL detachment for the special reconnaissance of Rhino, which freed up additional landing force helicopters for the assault. TF K-Bar also conducted beach hydrographic observations to support surface landings in Pakistan. This operation illustrates how close coordination between SOF and conventional forces can be used to complement each other and support mission accomplishment.

*Source: US Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2002: From the Sea, History Division, United States Marine Corps, Washington*
over time can build mutual trust and confidence that enable more effective interorganizational coordination when there is a need for unified action. Through their robust liaison structure, SOF establish the same type of relationships with certain interagency partners and also enables more effective interagency coordination.

b. Consultation, persuasion, compromise, and consensus are methods to promote unified action. Commanders and staffs who build personal relationships to inspire trust and confidence are more likely to succeed. Creating harmony and synergy with interagency and multinational partners is complex because relationships are not clearly defined. The GCC or CJTF may task a CDRJSOTF to coordinate with interorganizational partners.

c. USSOCOM has established the International SOF Coordination Center to manage multinational and interagency information sharing and collaboration within the global SOF network. The International Special Operations Forces Coordination Center contains partner nation LNOs to the USSOCOM HQ.

For further information on interagency considerations and interorganizational coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

9. Multinational Forces and Operations

SOF operate with MNFs on a routine and recurring basis. US SOF assesses, trains, advises, assists, equips (when applicable), and operates with numerous HN forces in joint combine exchange training and other security cooperation activities, and SOF participate in exercises or operations with them collectively as MNFs.

a. GCCs, in coordination with DOS and other interagency partners, typically assign SOF to train and operate with MNFs. SOF tasked to train or operate with MNF partners will often need to coordinate with PNs national and theater level leaders.

b. US SOF under a foreign commander remain under the OPCON of a US commander, unless otherwise directed by the President.

c. SOF may liaise with and advise units of a MNF, and provide those units primary communications with their operational HQ. Under these conditions, SOF require significant additional communications equipment.

d. MNF operations often require US logistics support.

e. MNF operations typically require interpreters to facilitate communication and coordination.

f. Foreign disclosure and information sharing guidelines must be followed to coordinate and release intelligence, information, technology, and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures to PNs.

For further information on multinational coordination and operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.
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CHAPTER IV
SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

“Guerrilla war is a kind of war waged by the few but dependent on the support of the many.”

Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Foreword to Mao Tse-Tung, Guerrilla Warfare (1961)

1. Introduction

Support for SOF is tailored to the situation and mission with flexibility to withstand dynamic operational environments. Support arrangements often cross Service lines to utilize unique capabilities and sustain independent and low-visibility operations in austere and remote areas. SOF must be able to exploit information derived from the full range of intelligence (i.e., multinational, national, theater, and tactical), and often directly from ISR systems.

2. Intelligence Support

a. Overview. The intelligence function and its importance to special operations requires an understanding of the special operations core activities and the need to enable SOF with fully fused all-source intelligence for those activities. SOF often deploy with a small force, including limited intelligence personnel and equipment. Direct augmentation from external intelligence organizations and reachback will often be necessary to rapidly respond to emerging requirements. Key considerations for intelligence support include an understanding of the operational environment, a population centric focus, constant collaboration among the operations, plans, and intelligence staffs, long-term engagement with PNs, and when necessary, linking intelligence agencies to certain SOF organizations for special requirements. SOF intelligence staffs collaborate with the CCMDs, USSOCOM, interagency partners, and the intelligence community (IC) to build a fused intelligence picture. For many IW situations that require distributed operations throughout a large operational area, there should be an operations-intelligence fusion capability at the applicable tactical level to ensure that actionable intelligence, which may be perishable, is available.

b. Requirements. Intelligence support begins with articulation of mission requirements. This includes identification of intelligence and manpower assets, information and intelligence requirements, and intelligence production to support targeting and the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for the commander’s decision cycle.

c. Intelligence Support to SOF Activities. Most special operations missions require a combination of all-source analysis, collection management, SR, identity intelligence (I2), reachback support, force protection, PE, and information sharing and foreign disclosure.

(1) All-Source Analysis. All-source intelligence is used to characterize the operational environment, identify adversary strategies and courses of action, and understand physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior. Analysts identify the adversary’s network and support find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate.
(F3EAD) analysis. F3EAD includes identifying the adversary’s essential functions and resources local customs and lifestyle, and positive identification of key adversaries. All-source analysis also examines civil information, such as cultural characteristics, grievances and issues, the condition of facilities and institutions, and opportunities to influence relevant populations, especially for MISO, UW, FID, stability operations, COIN, and CA missions.

(2) **Collection Operations Management.** When intelligence gaps have been determined, collection plans are developed and collection requirements are submitted. Collection operations management directs, schedules, and controls collection platforms, sensors and intelligence capabilities. It also includes the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information from collection operations. Intelligence assets are assigned based on their capability to support the operational commander’s intelligence requirements.

(3) **SR.** The operations-intelligence interface in SR is addressed in Chapter II, “Special Operations Core Activities.” Intelligence support to SR involves all-source analysis. Most important, support for SR involves detailed intelligence of the infiltration and exfiltration routes, and hide sites for manned SR and line of sight analysis and counter-air threats for UA. Three types of SOF support to SR are SIGINT, HUMINT, and emplacement of TTL devices and unattended ground sensors. Intelligence support to laser designation includes identifying hide sites and understanding the likely attack headings so continuous laser designation is possible. SR collection can be fused with theater or national efforts to provide a more comprehensive picture of a target area.

(4) **I2.** I2 is the collection, analysis, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes. The identification process utilizes biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI), forensics-enabled intelligence (FEI), information obtained through document and media exploitation (DOMEX), and combat information and intelligence to identify a person or members of a group. I2 fuses identity attributes (biological, biographical, behavioral, and reputational information related to individuals) and other information and intelligence associated with those attributes collected across all intelligence disciplines. I2 utilizes enabling intelligence activities, like BEI, FEI, and DOMEX, to discern potential threat actors by connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials, analyzing patterns of life, and characterizing their level of potential threats to US interests. USSOCOM exploits biometric, forensic, document and media data collections and integrates the data with all-source intelligence to locate and track unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances. Intelligence collections are processed through the appropriate DOD and interagency databases, exploited to produce intelligence, and then disseminated to deployed SOF and throughout the interagency. I2 products enable real-time decisions in special operations worldwide.

(5) **Weapons Technical Instruction (WTI).** WTI may provide a better understanding of certain aspects of the global environment and enables rapid targeting of individuals or threat networks, material sourcing, force protection, prosecution support, and signature characterization. It accomplishes this by leveraging technical and forensic capabilities and processes that collect, exploit, analyze, and disseminate information derived from improvised weapons in an asymmetric threat environment. Exploiting these improvised weapons and related components provides information that identifies
associations between people, places, and things; synchronizing this information and products with that of the intelligence disciplines ensures that the specific threat and operational environment are more fully understood. The effectiveness of WTI is amplified through robust information sharing throughout DOD, interagency and PNs.


(6) Reachback

(a) Small footprint operations limit the amount and types of forward-located intelligence support provided. As such, SOF typically require a value-added reachback effort. Discrete reachback capabilities allow forward-located SOF teams to leverage theater, national and Service assets outside the operational area for classified and open source studies, data, and actionable intelligence. Sufficient communications bandwidth and connectivity are essential to reachback support.

(b) Interagency partners are capable of providing reachback support. For example; the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analytic Center provides reachback support of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to augment exploitation capabilities while allowing SOF to maintain a small footprint. Exploitation reachback can also be coordinated through multinational partners who possess similar capabilities.

(7) Force Protection. Small footprint operations are often conducted in hostile or uncertain environments. CI and military source operations (MSO) can help mitigate risks for small SOF teams conducting these operations.

(a) CI. CI activities are conducted to detect, identify, assess, exploit, and counter or neutralize the threat posed by foreign intelligence entities, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism. CI identifies vulnerabilities and assesses hostile forces capabilities to target military operations. CI activities may also provide formal liaison with HN, intelligence, law enforcement, and security activities to assist operations and provide force protection support to joint forces.

(b) MSO. MSO are the collection, from, by, and/or via humans, of foreign and military and military-related intelligence. HUMINT sources serve as “eyes and ears” to track adversary activity. Sources include walk-ins, developed sources, unwitting persons, and protected sources. HUMINT collection personnel may develop information through the elicitation of sources. Establishing a reliable source network is an effective collection method.

(8) PE. PE is an umbrella term for activities conducted by selectivity trained SOF to prepare the operational environment for potential special operations. PE consists of OPE and special operations AFO. PE is supported by intelligence operations. Intelligence typically builds on the information provided by OPE and special operations AFO. The information provided by these operations can enhance joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment to support subsequent military operations.
(a) **OPE.** OPE is broadly understood as the conduct of activities in likely or potential operational areas to prepare and shape the operational environment. CCDRs conduct OPE to develop knowledge of the operational environment, establish human and physical infrastructure, and for general target development. OPE activities include, but are not limited to, passive observation; area and network familiarization; site surveys; mapping the information environment; the operational use of individuals; developing nonconventional assisted recovery capabilities; use of couriers; developing safe houses and assembly areas; positioning transportation and telecommunication assets; and cache emplacement and recovery.

(b) **Special Operations AFO.** Special operations AFO refine the location of specific, identified targets and further develop the operational environment for near-term DA. Special operations AFO encompass many OPE activities, including but not limited to close-target reconnaissance; TTL; RSOI; infrastructure development; and terminal guidance. Special operations AFO also include DA in situations when failure to act will mean loss of fleeting opportunity for success, unless otherwise directed.

(c) **Intelligence Operations.** Intelligence operations are carried out by designated and trained personnel to support requirements and activities within the intelligence process. Intelligence operations include, but are not limited to, HUMINT activities, including MSO CI activities; SIGINT; and ISR. Intelligence operations complement OPE and special operations AFO in the preparation of the environment.

(9) **Intelligence and Information Sharing and Foreign Disclosure**

(a) **Intelligence Sharing.** Intelligence sharing with PNs enables joint and multinational operations and helps maintain good relationships. Information about sources and methods to obtain sensitive intelligence should not be shared with allies and resistance forces unless authorized by the appropriate agency.

(b) **Foreign Disclosure.** National disclosure policy is designed to enable USG leaders to release classified information to foreign governments and international organizations when needed. Commanders should contact the supporting intelligence or foreign disclosure office prior to releasing classified intelligence or sensitive information to PNs. The foreign disclosure office then contacts the appropriate organization or agencies to get approval to release all or a portion of the material requested.

(c) **Intelligence Connectivity.** The worldwide IC network has a special operations component. That component includes personnel, databases, systems, and processes that support operations from the tactical to the national level. This connectivity encompasses a distributed DOD architecture of regional and functional joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs), geographic and functional CCMDs, combat support agencies, other interagency components, and HNs. The communications systems infrastructure enables forward presence and global reach to collect, report, analyze, produce, and disseminate intelligence to all levels and end users.

(d) **Threat Finance Intelligence Support.** Threat finance intelligence activities, including those undertaken with the USG departments and agencies and/or
multinational partners, involve collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, interpretation, production, and dissemination of intelligence products in support of DOD counter threat finance (CTF) activities and capabilities.

For further information on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

3. Operational Contract Support

Operational contract support is as integral to special operations as it is to conventional operations. The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning limitations and high operating tempo, means that SOF may be augmented with contracted support, including contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are specifically authorized through their contract to accompany the force. To do this, contract support integration and contractor management must be integrated into military planning and operations. Early integration of contract support is necessary for resolution of any unique security clearance or operations security (OPSEC) concerns.

For more information regarding operational contract support, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

4. Logistic Support

GCCs and their Service component commanders, in coordination with the CDRTSOC, develop and provide support to assigned and attached SOF. The CDRTSOC, the JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF when a JTF is established, approves logistic requirements for SOF in theater for validation by the GCC. SOF logistic requirements should be identified during the planning process. For limited contingency and crisis response operations that require rapid or time-sensitive responses, USSOCOM component commands normally maintain the capability to support SOF elements for an initial period of 15 days. Service and/or supporting organizations should be prepared to support special operations as soon as possible but not later than 15 days after SOF are employed. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more of the following:

a. Service Support. Logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service, except where otherwise agreed or directed. Services support SOF units whether the SOF unit is assigned to the Service component, the TSOC, JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. SOF Service-common logistic support includes equipment, material, and supplies. These include standard military items, base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a Service to support and sustain its own forces, including those forces assigned to the CCMDs. Items and services defined as Service-common by one Service are not necessarily Service-common for all other Services.

b. Joint In-Theater Support. The majority of SOF missions require theater joint logistic planning and execution. When a theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the GCC will determine if another Service component
can do so through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements may also be used when more effective than normal Service support.

c. **Nonstandard Support.** When time, geographic, or resource constraints make it impractical for the theater support infrastructure to support SOF, the GCC may ask CDRUSSOCOM to deploy organic USSOCOM combat service support assets. Nonstandard support may include nonstandard logistics support, which adapts processes such as acquisition, storage, funding, and transportation to best support the mission. This may include using both conventional providers within DOD and other sources outside DOD.

d. **Special Operations-Peculiar Support.** Special operations-peculiar logistic support includes equipment, materials, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Service. This includes modifications approved by CDRUSSOCOM for application to standard items and services used by the Services; and items and services approved by CDRUSSOCOM as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission.

For more information on special operations-peculiar support, see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands.

e. **Health Services.** SOF often operate in countries with little or no healthcare support structure and in remote areas exposed to health threats. Risk and mitigation measures for substandard sanitation, water contamination, environmental exposures and endemic disease should be identified in health risk assessments during planning. Proactive force health protection is often essential to minimize health risks and preserve SOF assets for the mission.

   (1) **Austere SOF Support Structure.** SOF health support has a limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills, to include emergency treatment, preventive medicine, and limited veterinary and dental care. SOF medical personnel can plan and conduct specialized medical support and patient movement. Not all SOF missions require SOF-trained medical assets. SOF medical assets are limited and may require support from CF. SOF units have varying degrees of first responder (Role 1) capabilities and limited forward resuscitative (Role 2) capabilities. SOF does not have organic theater hospitalization (Role 3) or definitive care (Role 4) capabilities readily available and must rely on either available theater health services assets or local HN capabilities when access to theater hospitalization (Role 3) care is an urgent necessity.

   (2) **Conventional Support Structure.** SOF depend on CF’s medical support structure to augment SOF limited organic capability and medical assets. SOF medical units initially deploy with sufficient assets to support immediate operational planning requirements. SOF and theater medical planners need to establish a SOF medical logistics resupply process within the theater medical logistics system. The TSOC component
commander coordinates conventional health services to augment SOF organic medical capability. Certain special operations require security measures to protect the identity of select SOF personnel.

(3) **UW Medical Support.** Medical elements supporting the resistance forces engaged in UW must be mobile, responsive, and effective in preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. It is unlikely the resistance movement will have a safe rear area where it can take casualties for treatment. Medical personnel may operate casualty collection points and provide further evacuation of casualties.

*For further information on health services, refer to JP 4-02, Health Services.*

f. **Operational Contract Support.** The frequent introduction of higher technologies, coupled with smaller force structure and manning limitations, and high operating tempo increases the likelihood that forward-deployed SOF will be augmented with contracted support, including contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees authorized to accompany the force. Contractor management are often integrated into military planning and operations. Early integration of contract support can help resolve unique security clearance or OPSEC concerns. For more information regarding operational contract support, see JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support.*

*For further information on SOF logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.*

5. **Host-Nation Support**

HNS is that civil and military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. For special operations, HNS may be restricted by OPSEC considerations, mission requirements and duration, and the operational environment.

a. HNS can reduce the military logistic footprint and allow earlier deployment combat capabilities. Long-term HNS logistic support can free service logistic capabilities for other contingencies.

b. Some considerations for HNS:

1. Authority to negotiate must be obtained through the supported JFC (to include the supported GCC) and through the appropriate COM channels.

2. Whenever possible, HNS agreements should allow SOF commanders to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

3. Interpreter support for negotiations should be obtained through local nationals.

4. A legal advisor, preferably experienced in HNS, should help negotiate and review HNS agreements.

5. The lead USG department or agency negotiates and contracts HNS.
(6) Centralized planning and coordinate HNS functions (i.e., identification of requirements and procurement) should be coordinated for efficiency.

(7) HN logistic support must include movement, distribution, and security of HNS items appropriate to the operational environment.

(8) HN logistics support may be limited.

For additional information regarding HNS, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. Refer to DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, for policy for the acquisition from and transfer to authorized foreign governments of logistics support, supplies, and services.

6. Multinational Support

Multinational support to SOF can complement HNS.

a. Multinational support may range from general Service-like assistance to highly structured and integrated support from multinational CF and multinational SOF. Common examples include information and intelligence sharing; providing liaison teams and support to planning; materiel assistance; basing, access, and overflight permission; and linguistic and cultural advice and awareness. Multinational SOF and CF can enable troop rotations, support strategic movements, provide medical evacuations, conduct FID, and participate in multinational support teams.

b. Multinational support to SOF can be enabled through multinational coordination cells; senior national representatives and DATTs; specialized predeployment and interoperability training; agreements (e.g., communications security and cross-servicing agreements); and combined training and exercises. Joint combined exchange training programs can increase interoperability between US and HN forces and improve operational capabilities.

7. Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations Support

IGOs can be found operating in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. Collectively, they possess unique expertise in a wide-range of specialty areas (e.g., human rights, education, health care, humanitarian aid, economic development). Individually, some may be highly specialized. Many cope with logistical challenges similar to the military. Some possess independent logistical, communications, and security infrastructure to enable their activities. In some geographic areas, IGOs and NGOs may have operated for months or years before SOF arrive and an IGO or NGO may possess a detailed understanding of the operational environment different than that of the military.

a. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), NATO, and the World Bank, are all IGOs. The UN has subcomponents such as UNOCHA and the Office of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNOCHA mandate includes coordination of humanitarian response, policy development, and humanitarian advocacy. UNHCR protects and supports refugees at the request of a government or the UN, and assists in voluntary repatriation, local
integration or resettlement to a third country. IGOs can be highly flexible in humanitarian crises and have access to a multitude of resources.

b. SOF commanders may use CA to leverage the resources and expertise of IGOs, NGOs, HN organizations, and USG departments and agencies to support the SOF commander’s CMO efforts.

c. NGOs often attempt to maintain neutrality by distancing themselves from military activities. Neutrality can enhance NGOs’ freedom of movement in areas denied to the indigenous government or military by insurgents. NGOs avoid closely associating with the military to avoid the appearance of favoritism in the minds of different factions. Despite these concerns, some NGOs choose to cooperate with the military on a case-by-case basis by providing or accepting support to achieve mutually beneficial objectives.

8. Service-Provided Capabilities

When SOF organizations lack mission-essential capabilities, SOF will identify and request CF support through joint planning and force management processes. CF can be asked to provide conventional airlift support, ground security and air defense assets, especially at remote sites; horizontal and vertical engineer assets; medical and veterinary assets for medical or agricultural projects; combat service support assets; criminal investigation and legal services; Service-common equipment and associated maintenance assets; expertise in conventional force specialties for training missions (e.g., indirect fire assets above 81 millimeter; cultural engagement teams; civil government functions, civil infrastructure development, economic development). SOF pre-deployment planning for Service-provided capabilities will ensure training to reduce SOF and CF redundancies or gaps.

9. Communications Systems Support

a. Deployed SOF require real-time, global communications to collect, transmit, process, display, store, and transport raw mission data as well as finished large, commercial broadcast-quality MISO products. Operational planning should allocate resources for direct, on-demand connectivity among the SOF operator, US and multinational partners in the field or operational area, and rear echelon. SOF communications systems support are designated to:

(1) Use systems which leverage national systems and services to the maximum extent possible.

(2) Provide access to mission data to the lowest tactical level.

(3) Support C2 while simultaneously providing situational awareness to the lowest tactical SOF operator.

b. The DOD communications systems architecture allows operators at all levels access to a worldwide communications backbone and seamless information transfer through a robust, global infrastructure known as part of the Department of Defense information networks (DODIN). The DODIN is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, and security.

c. All acquired and fielded information technology solutions (i.e., networks, radios, applications) are tailored to provide interoperable capabilities and value so their use does not compromise the SOF operational unit. The information technology solutions must have the flexibility to integrate not only with state-of-the-art technology and current organic systems, but also with older communications infrastructure and equipment often found in less developed nations.

*For further information on communications support of SOF, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

10. Public Affairs Support

a. **Diplomatic and Political Sensitivity of Special Operations.** During the joint operation planning process PA guidance should be developed and approved to address diplomatic and PN political sensitivity.

b. **PA Planning and the Special Operations Mission.** PA will accurately reflect the objective of SOF missions to US audiences. PA will also be aligned with MISO and CMO, and with strategic, operational, and tactical OPSEC requirements. The GCC should develop proposed PA guidance that is coordinated and synchronized with supporting commands and other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.

*For further information on PA support, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.*

11. Combat Camera Support

a. **Combat camera** provides still and video documentary products that support MISO and other special operations missions. Many combat camera teams supporting SOF are uniquely equipped with night-vision and digital-image transmission capabilities. Combat camera imagery is used to portray the true nature of US operations to multinational partners and civilian populations, as well as adversaries, and to counter adversary disinformation. The SOF link to combat camera support is normally through the supported GCC’s visual information planner.

b. **Visual Information.** The coordination of visual information is an important function that leverages cross-element support. Visual information is derived from a variety of sources such as UA collected imagery, PA imagery, intelligence related imagery, satellite imagery, individual SOF operator collected imagery, gun camera imagery, as well as combat camera products. The visual information function supports planning and implementation of special operations IAW the commander’s guidance. The JFC should coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions to support objectives and provide integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level.
12. Legal Support

Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many special operations activities. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. The US cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power without this legitimacy. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates foster legitimacy and credibility through decisions and actions that comply with applicable US, international, and, in some cases, HN laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their forces operate IAW the law of war and the established rules of engagement (ROE). Each SOF commander has a servicing staff judge advocate (SJA) to advise on these and other legal issues during all stages of the planning and execution of special operations missions and are encouraged to seek legal review. Nonetheless, the concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict adherence to law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization, as applicable.

For further information on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

13. Protection

a. Protection conserves SOF operational capability through active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, bases, infrastructure, and lines of communications from attack, and passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Protection also involves applying technology and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire and emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. The protection function can also extend beyond force protection to encompass protection of US civilians; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. For force protection responsibility, typically each GCC has TACON of US forces in their AOR.

b. Protection considerations include basic force security; active and passive air and missile defense; OPSEC; defensive cyberspace operations cybersecurity; electronic protection; PR; CBRN operations; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations; antiterrorism support; combat identification; survivability; safety; and force health protection. SOF commanders must ensure special procedures for air and missile defense are established when garrisoned outside of the JFC’s operational area.

For more detailed information regarding protection, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. For more detailed information regarding cyberspace operations, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

14. Fire Support

Special operations may require long-range, surface-based, joint fire support in remote locations or for targets beyond the land, maritime, and amphibious force area of operations. SOF liaison elements coordinate fire support through both external and SOF channels. SOF liaison elements (e.g., SOCCE and SOLE) coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SOF fire
support. Interoperable communications and detailed planning facilitates rapid, responsive, and accurate fire support to SOF operating in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory.

*For further information on fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.*

15. **Air Support**

In addition to their organic air capabilities for infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, precision fire, and ISR support, SOF often requires conventional air support. Air support is typically provided by the JFACC. The JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF normally provides a SOLE to the JFACC. In addition to helping to deconflict and coordinate special operations with the JFACC, the SOLE helps coordinate special operations requests for air support. Air support can include ISR, airlift, close air support, air refueling, electronic warfare (EW), and the use of SOF or CF joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), and the elements and capabilities of an Air Force air support operations center (ASOC). JTACs can work directly for SOF units. ASOCs can help the SOF commander integrate and synchronize use of air power to support special operations. CF elements providing air support to SOF units may require additional training and equipment. In addition, US Air Force special tactics teams with robust communications capabilities are typically attached to ARSOF and NAVSOF units for coordinating all forms of air support from the tactical level in the operational areas.

*For further information on close air support, refer to JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support. For more information on air mobility operations, see JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. For more information on air C2, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.*

16. **Maritime Support**

a. Maritime support is provided by the JFMCC, the Navy component commander, and/or the Marine Corps component commander. Maritime support includes fire support, MILDEC, deterrence, and seabasing.

b. Seabasing support can be provided by conventional naval forces (carrier strike group, amphibious ready group, surface strike group, missile defense surface action group, or submarines) as well as Military Sealift Command ships and commercial vessels.

c. Seabasing of SOF provides the JFC with multiple options. Given the freedom of navigation laws for surface ships and the stealth of submarines, seabased SOF are able to operate throughout the oceans and along the littorals of the world with few restrictions—lower profile and less intrusive presence, no reliance on HNS, no diplomatic clearance, minimal political risk, and often without detection—to enable persistent, unobtrusive, mobile, SOF presence in locations where conflict is most likely and most consequential. Seabasing provides SOF with access to the global, sustained, forward presence of the US Navy.

d. Seabasing allows the force to position and maneuver, approach inside the horizon or retreat over it, to reposition along a coastline, to move beyond the reach of sensors, or to move to a different area as situations change. The inherent mobility increases options compared to land-based assaults from a known point, improves operational security, and
mitigates an adversary’s ability to evade US operations. Another key value that Navy or other seabase platforms brings is persistent presence. Seabasing can offer this presence in remote littoral areas where land bases are not available for reasons of diplomacy, geography, or lack of supporting infrastructure. Even when land basing may be an option, sea-based platforms reduce the land based footprint, may decrease strategic airlift requirements, and improve force security.

e. Seabasing support typically requires advanced planning and coordination due to operational, technical, and safety issues. Pre-embarkation coordination should include LNOs, planning and mission preparation space requirements (to include security requirements), communications requirements, antenna placement, ordnance requirements, armory and magazine stowage, boat support (well deck procedures, launch and recovery, deck space, maintenance space), fuel (gasoline, diesel, aircraft), supporting forces desired, medical support (e.g., level II resuscitation capability), berthing, detainee operations, electromagnetic environmental effects safety, kennel space, nonstandard waivers, and other requirements. There are a variety of logistical, administrative, and C2 challenges when operating from a seabase, including adequate connectivity (unclassified and classified), other network connections and permissions, antenna connections, frequency management, and extra bandwidth.

f. Seabases can support patrol craft, auxiliary boats, helicopters, and SOF, providing a base of operations for everything from counter-piracy/smuggling, maritime security, CT operations, and major combat operations. Seabases can range from relatively small platforms with limited ability to support a NSWTU to larger platforms that can support a JSOTF HQ with robust combatant craft and helicopter support capabilities. Capabilities provided by the seabase, which may consist of more than one vessel, are scaled to mission-specific requirements based on mission type and duration, threat, operational security considerations, and environmental conditions. During amphibious operations, the commander, amphibious task force, and the commander, landing force, may also provide amphibious support for the MARSOF and other SOF units.

g. When a surface ship or ships are assigned as the supporting force to SOF, it is referred to as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB).

For more information on helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft employment from Navy ships, see JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations. For more information on amphibious operations, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. For more information on seabasing, see Navy Warfare Publication 3-62M, Seabasing.

17. Space Support

Space support to SOF is provided through national and DOD space capabilities in coordination with the JFC’s space coordinating authority, to include validation by the supported CCDR. DOD space support is provided to CCDRs and subordinate JFCs through the Joint Functional Component Command for Space under Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

For further information on space support, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.
18. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support

a. **Use of Environmental Data.** Environmental information should be integrated in the SOF commander’s decision-making process from initial planning through execution (e.g., joint operation planning process and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment). Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data can provide information such as studies of general climatology, operational climatology, hydrographs, and specific weather forecasts such as mission execution forecast for the operational area focused on operationally significant METOC thresholds. This information can be used by the commander to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain specific special operations. A METOC briefing is normally part of a commander’s daily update briefing.

b. **Exploitation of METOC Conditions.** Potentially, an execution decision may be based on exploiting certain weather and METOC conditions to provide the best advantages in conducting operations while avoiding environmental conditions that will adversely impact operations. SOF units train to exploit every advantage, and operate at the limits of their capabilities, frequently requiring extraordinarily precise, fine-scale METOC products.

c. **Environmental Effects on Space Operations.** With increased military reliance on space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects on space operations. METOC support personnel can provide information that will allow the SOF commander to anticipate the loss of one or more critical space-based systems, such as precision navigation, timing, and communications systems.

For further information on METOC support, refer to JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

19. Cyberspace Operations Support

Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace operations in support of special operations can sometimes be conducted remotely, thus reducing the SOF footprint and contributing to freedom of action within a given operational area. The Services maintain administrative control of their cyberspace forces, some of which provide direct, general, or mutual support to SOF missions. SOF requires cyberspace support in the areas of planning, coordination, synchronization, monitoring, and potentially access. Cyberspace operations support is typically provided through respective CCMD’s joint cyberspace center, which is supported by US Cyber Command. JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF normally requests cyberspace support when joint operation planning is initiated. Elements provided to SOF units may require additional training or equipment to effectively and safely facilitate cyberspace support during special operations. SOF communications systems must leverage national cyberspace capabilities, systems and services to the maximum extent possible. SOF cyberspace capabilities and systems must support C2 while simultaneously providing full cyberspace situational awareness to the lowest tactical SOF element.

For further information on cyberspace operations, refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
20. Electronic Warfare

EW should be integrated in the SOF commander’s decision-making process from initial planning to execution. SOF forces are highly dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for almost every aspect of their operations (e.g., communications, intelligence, sensors). This dependence is further complicated by significant congestion from friendly and neutral electromagnetic systems and the EW capabilities of our adversaries. EW personnel and capabilities have proven a critical enabler for special operations by ensuring friendly access to the EMS while denying it to the adversary. EW can be employed to create decisive, standalone effects, or used in support of military operations by generating various levels of control, detection, denial, deception, disruption, degradation, exploitation, protection, and destruction.

For further information on EW support, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

21. Civil Affairs Operations

CA assess the civil environment; identify and engage with key authorities and other influential civilians; build civil relationships; identify factors fostering instability; and conduct CAO to achieve JFC objectives or build partnership capacity in support of strategic goals. When the scope of the JFC’s objectives exceeds the capacity of SOF CA, the SOF commander may request CF to augment SOF CA capability.

a. While the majority of the Army’s CA organizations are US Army Reserve, the entire force consists of commands, brigades, battalions, and companies capable of supporting SOF and CF at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

b. US Marine Corps CA operate primarily in the near-shore, littoral environment, and specialize in populace and resource control for certain security cooperation activities, FHA, support to civil administration, nation assistance, and civil information management.

For more information on CA structure with the Services, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

22. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Support

CWMD USG activities are conducted to ensure the US, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD. WMD are CBRN weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapons when such means are separable from the weapons. The threat posed by the proliferation of WMD technology to additional state actors and the possibility of terrorist access to a nuclear device are recognized through a range of capabilities and activities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, should preventive measures fail. The primary role of SOF for CWMD is preventing WMD development, proliferation, and use. USSOCOM supports GCCs by delivering the following capabilities: technical expertise, materiel, and special teams to complement the supported GCCs whose teams locate, tag, and track WMD; capabilities to conduct DA in limited access areas; support for building partners’ capacity for conducting CWMD activities; use of MISO
to dissuade adversary pursuit of and reliance on WMD; and other specialized capabilities as required to counter WMD. CDRUSSOCOM is the global synchronizer for CT planning to include operations against terrorist use of WMD and supports Commander, USSTRATCOM as the global synchronizer for DOD CWMD planning.

For more detailed information on the SOF role in CWMD including capabilities and limitations, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Field Manual 3-05.105/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-11.30/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.35/USSOCOM Publication 3-11, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

23. Military Working Dogs/Multipurpose Canines

SOF use Service multipurpose canines to support joint activities during military operations. Multipurpose canines are military working dogs that are capable of locating explosives or humans to provide early warning of potential hazards; facilitate capture of armed enemies, and saves lives. Multipurpose canines can detect a wide range of munitions and homemade explosives used to construct IEDs. Tactical use of multipurpose canines can deprive the enemy of explosive caches and components, and disrupt the enemy’s ability to attack mounted and dismounted patrols. Integration of SOF and conventional canine teams in pre-mission training improves the capabilities of the handler/canine team. Lessons learned show that canines can reduce casualties, increase freedom of movement, and instill unit confidence to counter IED threats.

24. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Support Element

The JFC may provide SOF a counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) support element. A C-IED support element is a tailored combination of specialized enablers. These enablers include, but are not limited to, biometrics, forensics, EOD, WTI, site exploitation, sociocultural analysis, network analysis (friendly, neutral, and threat networks), cellular exploitation, DOMEX, and law enforcement professionals. These enablers are internally task organized across multiple staff sections to assist in the organization, coordination, integration, and assessments of C-IED enablers. The C-IED support element may also have representative that participates in targeting and assessment boards, cells, and working groups.

For additional guidance on C-IED, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.

25. Counter Threat Finance

CTF activities are designed to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and/or use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary’s ability to negatively affect US interests. CTF support can assist SOF in the execution of SOF core activities in many operations, to include CWMD, CT, UW, FID, SFA, MISO, and CAO.
26. Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EOD forces have become a critical enabler to special operation over the past decade. Within the current and anticipated future global security environment, the proliferation of commercially available technology has elevated the IED to the weapon system of choice for IW adversaries to offset overwhelming US military superiority. Each Marine special operations battalion has been assigned organic EOD operators within their command. EOD personnel possess the capability to detect, locate, access, diagnose, render safe, and/or neutralize, recover, exploit, and dispose of unexploded explosive ordnance, IEDs, and WMD.

*For more detailed information on the Services’ EOD capabilities see Army Tactical Techniques, and Procedures 4-32.16/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-17.2C/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-02.5/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.32, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment.*
APPENDIX A
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

   a. A JSOTF is organized in a manner similar to a conventional JTF and is normally established by a JFC to plan and conduct special operations. The JSOTF is a JTF composed of SOF from more than one Service and may have CF assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. A JSOTF may be established subordinate to another JTF, a geographic CCMD, or subunified command (e.g., TSOC). For example, a GCC may designate a JTF to prosecute operations in a specific operational area and attach SOF (established as a JSOTF) to that JTF to plan and execute special operations. Likewise, a CDRTSOC may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the GCC’s AOR. Large-scale operations may necessitate the establishment of multiple JSOTFs; each JSOTF may focus on a particular set of activities or tasks, or operate in a separate operational area and all be assigned to their respective JSOAs. Additionally, the JSOTF could operate as a JSOTF-afloat embarked on an AFSB. This may be required when force protection and security are of concern, when an HN may not allow a land-based JSOTF on its territory, and/or in instances when the JSOTF is primarily conducting operations in a maritime operational area.

   b. The initial establishment of a JSOTF staff presents significant organizational, planning, and training considerations. These considerations normally involve the ability to rapidly fuse a core SOF-staff with a diverse group of key CF augmentees, who may have varying degrees of understanding and experience in special operations, into a functioning staff for the JSOTF. Therefore, key SOF personnel assigned to a JSOTF staff, as well as those key personnel who coordinate with a JSOTF HQ, should understand JSOTF staff operating procedures, and special operations techniques and procedures in general, to enable timely establishment of the JSOTF, and initiation of planning and execution of special operations.

2. Authority to Establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force

   A JSOTF may be established on the recommendation of the CDRTSOC. The JFC is normally the establishing authority. Refer to Chapter III, “Command and Control of Special Operations Forces,” paragraph 2, “Assignment of Special Operations Forces,” for SOF units deploying from the US.
3. Establishing a Joint Special Operations Task Force

When the nucleus of a TSOC staff is used to establish a JSOTF, the CDRTSOC still maintains responsibility for continued theater strategic-level activities in support of the GCC. The JSOTF establishment may impact on the TSOC’s other missions by the loss of key TSOC staff personnel to the JSOTF. Therefore, a TSOC may require significant augmentation to its staff in order to stand up and operate a JSOTF along with its normal theater missions.

a. **Crisis Development.** If a crisis situation develops in a GCC’s AOR that could involve the use of military forces, crisis action planning (CAP) procedures will be used as the framework for the timely development and exchange of information among all participants. As the crisis develops, the GCC’s TSOC may initiate CAP for that contingency. As the mission evolves, the CDRTSOC may be tasked to establish a JSOTF, using members of the TSOC staff as the nucleus or core of the JSOTF staff.

b. **Decision Process.** CAP provides a basis for higher authority decisions that must be acted upon by the CDRJSOTF. JTF and JSOTF establishment normally occurs between the stages of crisis assessment and course of action (COA) selection of CAP. Once a CDRJSOTF is designated, the CDRJSOTF and JSOTF staff will participate in CAP procedures concurrently with the complex task of establishing the JSOTF.

c. **LNOs.** During CAP, the CDRJSOTF may request LNOs from allocated SOF components to assist in mission analysis and COA development. Component LNOs ensure that all capabilities and limitations are considered and that their component commanders remain fully informed of activities, plans, and intentions. The CDRJSOTF may also collocate LNOs with the GCC commander and with the subordinate JFC, if designated, to advise their staffs on special operations capabilities, and to keep the CDRJSOTF informed as to COAs being considered and potential operational requirements. These LNOs can significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance SOF mission planning and targeting processes.

d. **Nucleus of the JSOTF Staff.** The CDRTSOC normally has a plan with a joint manning document to create a JSOTF staff. A preferred method is to develop a JSOTF staff around a core drawn from the TSOC or another existing SOF component (HQ element of an SF group). Augmentees may then be added to the core staff from other SOF Service components. Additional augmentation is typically drawn from CF Service components. The primary sources of these augmentees will be a USSOCOM augmentation package drawn from the USSOCOM staff and USSOCOM Service component staffs and their subordinate commands; an augmentation package drawn from the staffs of the CCMD and Service components; individual mobilization augmentees assigned to the TSOC; and special operations detachments from the National Guard.

e. **CDRJSOTF Responsibilities.** CDRJSOTF makes recommendations to the establishing JFC on SOF employment and execution of assigned missions. CDRJSOTF develops a detailed plan for integrated employment of forces based on an assessment of
the operational situation, and the JFC’s intent, guidance, and objectives. Other specific responsibilities include:

(1) **Organizing the Force.** CDRJSOTF organizes forces over which he has OPCON. CDRJSOTF also organizes the JSOTF HQ to assist in the control of SOF, provide support to subordinate SOF units, and coordinate with other JTFs and components as required.

(2) **Considering Operational Areas and Control Measures.** The CDRJSOTF may use a variety of C2 and coordination procedures to simultaneous employ SOF in the same operational area with CF. SOF-CF integration requires a well-structured C2 architecture and coordination process between the CDRJSOTF, JFC, and among all their components. Within the operational area, SOF must be aware of designations of various types of operational areas (e.g., JOA, land and maritime areas of operation), airspace coordinating measures, fire support coordination measures, air tasking orders, airspace control orders, and other fires and targeting coordination and safeguards that support synchronization or deconfliction to prevent interference or friendly fire.

(3) **Establishing Command Relationships.** When establishing the JSOTF, the JFC delegates appropriate command authorities, normally OPCON of SOF to the CDRJSOTF. The CDRJSOTF exercises OPCON through subordinate SOF Service/functional component commanders or subordinate CDRJSOTFs. The command relationships between a CDRJSOTF and subordinate forces are discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Command and Control of Special Operations Forces.”

(4) **Providing Special Operations Operational Direction and Guidance.** For planning and execution, the CDRJSOTF provides the commander’s intent, guidance, and objectives to JSOTF component commanders. For employment, the CDRJSOTF provides timely and concise missions or tasks to each component and subordinate commander. Tasks must be realistic and allow the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible. SOF units are typically tasked through the SOF mission planning and targeting processes.

(5) **Maintain Integrity and Quality of SOF Mission Planning and Targeting Processes.** SOF employment is guided by the special operations mission planning principles. The establishing JFC and supporting components should understand SOF mission planning and targeting processes. The integrity and quality of the SOF mission planning and targeting processes rely on well-informed decisions by JFCs/CDRJSOTFs.

### 4. Organizing a Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters

The notional organization of a JSOTF HQ is normally established in a concept/operation plan that includes a joint manning document specifically designed to support the anticipated missions. A CDRJSOTF may organize the JSOTF HQ as necessary to carry out all assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities. There are several options that may be used to establish and organize a JSOTF HQ: use a TSOC HQ; augment a core SOF component HQ; or organize an HQ in an ad hoc manner from various SOF and CF components and units. Whichever the option, a joint RSOI process will be necessary and this process must support
the JSOTF mission and provide the best opportunity for success. When fully organized, the JSOTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service SOF having significant forces assigned to the command. CDRJSOTF will make the final decision on the composition of the HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and a battle rhythm, as required. Figure A-1 depicts a notional JSOTF HQ organization.

a. **Staff Assignment Considerations**

   (1) The JSOTF staff must be qualified to perform joint responsibilities.

   (2) Proportionate SOF representation on the staff as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of members is typically based on planned size and composition of the tasked SOF units under the CDRJSOTF.

   (3) Fill key positions based on the mission and type of special operation anticipated. JSOTF manning documents also assign conventional personnel to non-SOF technical, administrative, and logistics positions.

b. **Augmentation.** When mission requirements exceed the JSOTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), the CDRJSOTF should request assistance through the JSOTF establishing authority. USSOCOM supports JSOTF manning shortfalls by requesting augmentation from the Services and internal tasking from its assigned AC and RC forces. Staff officers who augment the JSOTF nucleus from CCMDs or the Services should be trained and qualified to fill JSOTF augmentation billets. CF support personnel can augment the JSOTF in billets such as personnel, logistics, engineer, and other specialties. In addition, SOF components should forward augmentation requirements to the CDRJSOTF for consideration and validation by the supported JFC. As examples, does a SOTF organization require augmentation to support Army special operations? Is the NSWTG self-sufficient or does it require assistance? Will a Marine Corps special operations company afloat, require a JSOTF (afloat) or augmentation to perform its mission? Does the AFSOAD/JSOAC require specific augmentee expertise to perform its mission? Are Service space support teams needed to support operations? Will an operational staff be required to operate in a forward area embarked as a JSOTF afloat? Early planning for total augmentation requirements provides a basis for budgeting resources and training.

c. **Deployable Augmentation Cells.** An establishing authority may have a deployable cell of experts prepared to augment a JSOTF to provide assistance in the early stages of JSOTF staff formation, organization, and initial planning. These deployable cells, typically sourced at the CCMD level, can be tailored to provide assistance to a JSOTF for a limited duration. For example, a joint personnel reception cell may facilitate the joint reception, processing, training, and integration or onward movement of L and JSOTF staff augmentees; or a planning cell may facilitate initial planning requirements until the JSOTF plans directorate/section is fully formed.

d. **Reception and Orientation.** A staff and facilities orientation program should be established to ensure that all individuals assigned to the JSOTF become thoroughly familiar
with staff operating procedures. This can be accomplished through a joint personnel reception center, a short training program, or even use of a buddy system whereby an experienced JSOTF staff member mentors a newly assigned individual. Staff directorates normally provide specific orientation and training for personnel working in their sections.

e. **Reachback.** JSOTFs should establish reachback arrangements to organizations outside the operational area for additional assistance in functional areas such as planning, intelligence, and logistics.
5. Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Functions and Responsibilities

CDRJSOTFs are provided staffs to assist them in the decision-making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support and its authority is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining situational awareness.

a. Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-1)

(1) Functions

(a) The JSOTF J-1 provides oversight of joint personnel readiness, joint personnel services coordination, and joint manpower management for the JSOTF. If the mission is limited, the HQ staff will likely be small, and will have few if any, special staff officers. In this event, the J-1 may be responsible for oversight or coordination of additional staff functions such as: legal; financial management; safety; casualty reporting; postal operations; and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR). If the JSOTF chaplain does not accompany the HQ for a specific mission, the J-1 may have additional responsibility for coordinating religious support.

(b) The J-1 must be knowledgeable of various Service, theater, and USSOCOM personnel policies. However, assigned and attached SOF elements will receive their manpower and personnel support through normal Service channels.

(c) Most of the JSOTF J-1 tasks are of a general nature and differ little from those performed by any JTF J-1. These include the development and coordination of personnel policies and plans; providing appropriate input to the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) and plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) for the personnel section of JSOTF OPLANs; the maintenance of current personnel estimates, personnel readiness, and casualty reporting; oversight and planning of the JSOTF personnel replacement program; and the projection of future JSOTF personnel requirements, to include RC augmentation. The JSOTF J-1 also manages the command’s evaluation reporting, joint awards and decorations, and leave programs. Service awards for which the CDRJSOTF may not have authority are forwarded to respective Service commands in theater for management. Additionally, the J-1 will provide assistance to the joint mortuary affairs office as part of the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) on an as-required basis. The JSOTF J-1 assists the mortuary affairs effort by managing the entry points for the casualty reporting and casualty notification systems for the Services.

(d) Some J-1 tasks are performed differently during special operations than during conventional operations. What differentiates special operations-specific J-1 tasks from general personnel and manpower tasks is that they must properly address the special operations-specific dimensions of manpower and personnel matters. Additionally, because special operations missions are often conducted in remote regions outside of
established support areas, routine personnel-related duties may require effort beyond that required of a conventional staff.

(e) Special operations situations affect several of the general joint manpower and personnel J-1 functions and will differ with the special operations core task being performed. For example, during FID operations, the JSOTF J-1 may have duties in addition to those associated with the JSOTF HQ itself. In these situations, the J-1 may be advising, assisting, and training an indigenous HN military organization. During UW missions, the J-1 may be deeply involved in monitoring personnel strength, health, and readiness of a US supported insurgent force. Thus, the J-1 can easily be involved in activities beyond the duties generally associated with a personnel and administrative staff officer. A notional JSOTF J-1 organization is depicted in Figure A-2.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Administer personnel programs; coordinate and monitor entitlements and benefits, MWR, postal services, and personnel support for contingency operations; and prepare evaluation reports and awards and decorations recommendations.

(b) Participate in JSOTF planning, mission analysis, and COA development.

(c) Prepare the personnel estimates and annex E (Personnel) to the OPLAN.

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Figure A-2. Notional Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff Organization within a Joint Special Operations Task Force
(d) Prepare and maintain the joint manning document and request augmentation as required.

(e) Establish and effectively operate the joint visitors bureau (JVB) and joint personnel reception center, as directed. The JSOTF may operate a protocol section vice a JVB based on size and capability.

(f) Advise the CDRJSOTF on matters concerning JSOTF component personnel replacement plans and status.

(g) Monitor unit strengths, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports, casualty reports, and reports of critical personnel shortages.

(h) Maintain records to support recommendations for joint unit and individual DOD awards and decorations. Provide appropriate endorsements IAW CDRJSOTF guidance.

(i) When a safety officer is not assigned to the JSOTF staff, implement and monitor the JSOTF safety program and recommend remedial actions.

(j) Ensure that personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate OPSEC vulnerabilities.

(k) When a provost marshal is not assigned to the JSOTF staff, and in consultation with the SJA, administer policies and procedures for detainees, civilian internees, other detained personnel, and formerly captured or missing US personnel.

(l) In consultation with the J-3, administer policies and procedures for indigenous and dislocated civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.

(m) Assist in the planning and administration of a NEO.

(n) Establish liaison at key theater nodes to facilitate personnel functions.

(o) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on personnel, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

b. Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2)

(1) Functions

(a) The primary function of the J-2 is to provide intelligence and CI support to the JSOTF HQ and to direct the intelligence activities of the JSOTF. An additional function of the J-2 is to support the CDRJSOTF and staff by providing timely warning intelligence and ensuring the availability of intelligence on the JSOA and the JOA. Members of the directorate actively participate in joint staff planning and coordinating,
directing, integrating, and controlling of intelligence efforts. The JSOTF J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose adversary capabilities and intentions. A notional JSOTF J-2 organization is depicted in Figure A-3.

(b) The JSOTF J-2 should be responsive to intelligence taskings and requests from higher HQ, lateral HQ, and subordinate SOF components. Additionally, the J-2 is the access point for joint force acquisition of JSOTF-produced intelligence and CI products. The J-2 supervises the production and maintenance of target intelligence packages (TIPs) and

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**Figure A-3. Notional Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff Organization within a Joint Special Operations Task Force**
ensures that intelligence is integrated from all sources. Special Operations intelligence may differ from that used by CF in that it is often more detailed and more perishable, particularly in missions to combat terrorism and for the insertion or extraction of SOF. This is especially true when target-area social, political, and economic information, as well as adversary infrastructure data, are germane to SOF’s expected missions. The JSOTF J-2 may request additional national intelligence support.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Tailor intelligence production, architecture, systems, and support to the specific, unique mission requirements.

(b) As required, establish a joint intelligence support element (JISE) and a tactical sensitive compartmented information facility.

(c) Develop, refine, and update the JSOTF intelligence estimate, based on the CJTF estimates, to provide a common understanding and view of the operational environment.

(d) Write and provide annex B (Intelligence), and annex M (Geospatial Information and Services) of the JSOTF operation order (OPORD) to the JSOTF J-3.

(e) Identify communication link requirements for feeding space-based ISR into key operations and intelligence centers supporting special operations.

(f) Request support from the theater J-2 for TIPs for preplanned targets, and for assistance and input in the development of TIPs for emerging missions. This support is normally provided by the supported GCC’s intelligence assets.

(g) Act as the central point of contact for intelligence RFIs within the JSOTF HQ and components. Answer RFIs and validate and forward other RFIs as appropriate, using the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers. Prioritize and track RFIs, and review RFI responses for content and completeness of answers.

(h) Provide intelligence support to targeting within the JISE/JOC, and to the joint planning group (JPG).

(i) Assist the JSOTF J-3 in developing and refining the CDRJSOTF’s critical information requirements by consolidating PIR nominations into the staff recommendation for the commander.

(j) Provide support to the JSOTF J-3 in the planning and execution of information operations (IO) and IRCs and related activities such as OPSEC and MILDEC.

(k) Plan, direct, coordinate, and synchronize CI and HUMINT as appropriate.
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(l) Provide intelligence summaries IAW JFC guidance to the next higher HQ, laterally, to components, and other coordinating agencies and pass time-sensitive information collected by SOF assets to the JISE in a timely manner.

(m) Assign and task intelligence resources within the JSOTF to answer commander’s PIRs and refine targeting data provided in theater TIPs.

(n) Provide threat assessments to the HQ commandant in support of antiterrorism and force protection. Update as required.

(o) Establish fusion centers with the HN and appropriate multinational partners as required.

(p) Establish open-source intelligence (OSINT) reachback capability for unclassified OSINT support.

(q) Establish I2 reachback for operational I2 support.

(r) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on intelligence, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

c. Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3)

(1) Functions

(a) The JSOTF J-3 assists the CDRJSOTF to plan, coordinate, synchronize, direct, control, monitor, and assess operations. The CDRJSOTF normally will delegate tasking authority over subordinate units to the J-3 for mission-type orders. While a JSOTF normally includes a J-5, in unusual situations where there is not a J-5, the J-3 assumes responsibility for current and future planning functions. A notional JSOTF J-3 organization is depicted in Figure A-4.

(b) The J-3 future operations division receives approved OPLANs in a handover from the J-5 future plans division, and then converts the approved OPLANs into OPORDs for tasking and execution. As part of this process, the J-3 future operations division, supported by the J-2, directs the JSOTF targeting process and identifies targets and target systems for incorporation into OPORDs and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). It also integrates IRCs into future operations. The J-3 future operations division leads the JSOTF HQ CAP and assists the J-5 in deliberate planning.

(c) The J-3 current operations division establishes the JOC and monitors the readiness of assigned and attached forces. It receives approved OPORDs and FRAGORDs in a handover from the J-3 future operations division, and then directs, monitors, coordinates, synchronizes, and assesses their execution.
(d) A special actions cell located within the J-3 may be established to handle sensitive staff actions and operations that exceed the capabilities of normal staff channels due to their handling and classification levels. In combined operations the special actions cell will often handle issues (not releasable to foreign nationals) that cannot be handled in normal staff channels because of the integration of MNF staff within the JSOTF. Special actions are frequently interagency in nature, involve sensitive capabilities, and almost always not releasable to multinational partners or allies. Often special actions remain compartmented throughout planning but in many cases are downgraded and handled as normal functions once operations commence.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Understand the intent from the President, SecDef, and/or the CCDR.

(b) Plan, direct, monitor, coordinate, synchronize, and assess current and future operations.

(c) Maintain a current operations estimate.

(d) Maintain the JSOTF standard operating procedure (SOP).

(e) Prepare OPLANs, OPORDs, reports, and records.

(f) In coordination with the J-2, J-5, and the SJA, anticipate, review, and recommend changes to ROE. Participate in ROE development. Assist the CDRJSOTF in proper dissemination of ROE.
(g) Review and recommend approval or disapproval of subordinate unit proposed COAs and OPORDs.

(h) Recommend special operations, priorities for operational support, task organization, and organizational boundaries and other control measures.

(i) Coordinate staging areas, airspace, and JSOTF operations with those of other friendly forces.

(j) Plan and coordinate METOC operations for the JSOTF (including oversight of SOF component METOC requirements) and prepare annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Services) for all OPLANs or OPORDs.

(k) In coordination with J-2, establish and enforce security measures, to include focal point and special access programs.

(l) Coordinate with JSOTF HQ liaison elements.

(m) Plan and coordinate cover and MILDEC activities.

(n) Review evasion and recovery plans.

(o) Plan and coordinate comprehensive SOF support to JFC’s PR strategy, and be prepared to establish and operate a PR coordination cell and an unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell.

(p) Minimize the potential for friendly fire incidents. Methods to do so may include ensuring reasonable safeguards used in planning processes and effective C2 systems used during execution phases.

(q) Coordinate requirements for integrated space capabilities in the operational area with the JFC-designated space coordinating authority.

(r) Direct after-action reviews and lessons learned reporting requirements IAW Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.25, Joint Lessons Earned Program.

(s) As required, conduct PR missions for SOF or other components as mission and capabilities allow coordinate for nonconventional assisted recovery sources and support.

(t) Manage the special access program and focal point system.

(u) Provide operational oversight of RSOI of SOF.

(v) Represent SOF activities to JTF organizations such as the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and IO cell.

(w) Develop annexes A, C, G, H, J, N, R, S, T, U, and X, to include CDRJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.
(x) Coordinate and synchronize CA and CMO.

(y) Plan, synchronize, and deconflict joint fires and joint air support within the JSOTF. If required, form a joint fires element and a joint air coordination element.

(z) Synchronize CTF activities. If required establish a dedicated CTF capability that integrates intelligence and operations, analyzes financial intelligence, and coordinates the execution of DOD CTF activities.

(aa) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

d. **Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4)**

(1) **Functions**

(a) The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, transportation, field services, general engineering, OPCON support, and other logistic activities as directed. If there is no command surgeon attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 is also responsible for health services; if a command surgeon is attached, health services planning are stand-alone functions of the surgeon. If there is no budget officer attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 may perform this function. A notional JSOTF J-4 organization is depicted in Figure A-5.

(b) While SOF logistic support is primarily a Service responsibility, the J-4 must monitor the JSOTF’s logistic readiness to ensure successful accomplishment of the
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CDRJSOTF’s assigned tasks. The routine sustainment of forces is monitored by the J-4 who is responsible for recommending logistic priorities to the CDRJSOTF, monitoring Service support to SOF, arranging inter-Service support agreements when advantageous and coordinating special operations peculiar logistic support with USSOCOM.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Provide logistic oversight of SOF (US and multinational) in the operational area.

(b) Plan, coordinate, and manage external logistic support for the CDRJSOTF and staff. The HQ commandant normally provides internal support to the JSOTF.

(c) Comply with logistic procedures established by the JFC.

(d) Coordinate support requirements for attached/assigned SOF components, first from supporting organizations of the parent Service, then with other SOF components. If unsuccessful, then coordinate with the JTF J-4 logistics readiness center to satisfy the requirement.

(e) Coordinate all SOF Service component requests for special operation-peculiar supplies and equipment items through the TSOC to the USSOCOM SOF support activity.

(f) Maintain a current logistic estimate to delineate the specific requirements that apply to logistic estimates or provide references that will clarify what is involved.

(g) Monitor and report JSOTF equipment readiness status.

(h) Recommend controlled supply rates of critical resources.

(i) Ensure the accountability of supplies and equipment.

(j) Plan, coordinate, and monitor administrative movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(k) Coordinate with communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) to ensure that communications and automated systems will support the JTF logistic operations. The JSOTF J-4 should identify those systems to which his access is required to support logistic operations and to quantify logistic communication requirements.

(l) Recommend stock levels for SOF support.

(m) Provide logistic status to higher HQ.

(n) Support operational resupply of SOF.

(o) In conjunction with the J-5 and the J-3, plan and coordinate the strategic movement of SOF via the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) list.
(p) In coordination with the supported GCC’s designated component, provide and/or ensure that adequate logistic support is provided to SOF during joint RSOI IAW the supported CCDR’s reception plan.

(q) Develop annex D (Logistics) to CDRJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans. If the JSOTF does not have a command surgeon or budget officer assigned, the J-4 may also be responsible for development of those particular annexes.

(r) Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those detainees that are under the control of the JSOTF.

(s) Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those indigenous and dislocated civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.

(t) Ensure that access to USSOCOM through the TSOC is established for reachback support for special operations-peculiar requirements.

(u) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on logistics, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

e. Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5)

(1) Functions

(a) The JSOTF J-5 conducts planning for the JSOTF, develops and recommends C2 arrangements, coordinates ROE with the J-3 and in consultation with the SJA, may represent the command at the JFC’s JTCB, and may chair the JSOTF targeting panel if designated. The J-5 participates in the JFC’s planning process. The J-5 also may be tasked to develop plans unique to special operations in support of the JFC. The J-5 also projects future SOF requirements for material, organization, and doctrine based on an analysis of current operations. In coordination with the JSOTF J-3 and J-4, the J-5 develops the JSOTF input to the theater TPFDD and submits it to the TSOC J-5 for approval and further action. A notional JSOTF J-5 organization is depicted in Figure A-6.

(b) While the JSOTF HQ is involved in deliberate planning and CAP, detailed tactical mission planning is accomplished by the SOF element tasked by their JSOTF component commander. The JSOTF J-5 normally is occupied with the command’s deliberate or future planning cell. The J-5 also plays an important supporting role to the J-3 in CAP. The J-5 is the primary JSOTF HQ planning representative at the CCMD or JTF HQ for deliberate planning and will normally write and coordinate the special operations portion of the higher HQ plans. A JSOTF rarely conducts unilateral special operations planning; however, for protracted UW or FID operations, a JSOTF subordinate plan may be appropriate.
During the execution phase of an operation, the J-5 is the JSOTF’s future planner. The J-5 is responsible for developing the JSOTF input to the JFC future plans division, participating in the JFC JPG, and translating JFC future plans. The JSOTF J-5 may place a liaison element within the JFC future plans division to facilitate these actions. In these roles, the J-5 develops special operations tasks to support each phase of the operation, develops future plans, and passes these plans to the J-3 for coordination and tasking to the subordinate components. The J-5 analyzes the operation and develops special operations tasks for operations planned 72 hours in advance and beyond.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Prepare and coordinate required OPLANs or OPORDs in support of the CDRJSOTF.

(b) Participate in preparation and coordination of JFC OPLANs, campaign plans, and OPORDs; develop JSOTF input to these plans; and advise the CDRJSOTF on issues associated with these plans during their development.

(c) Develop COAs within the framework of the JSOTF assigned objective or mission, forces available, and commander’s intent. This includes: anticipating tactical and operational opportunities and risks and recommending supporting ROE; wargaming; synchronizing combat power in support of each COA; consideration of command relationships; and identifying decision criteria to support analysis of the developed COA.

(d) Promulgate the commander’s decision in planning directives, OPLANs, or OPORDs.
(e) Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase of the operation.

(f) Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational HQ as required.

(g) Determine forces required and available and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.

(h) Ensure that the SOF requirements are entered in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

(i) Provide planning recommendations for HNS.

(j) Provide assistance to the J-3 in the preparation of orders.

(k) Coordinate and review the TPFDD input through the Global Command and Control System.

(l) Coordinate with the J-3 to ensure that political-military activities such as NEO and CMO are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassy and HN governments from a strategy and policy perspective.

(m) Participate in ROE development.

(n) Form and operate the JPG as directed.

(o) Provide input to appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations) of JTF OPLAN.

(p) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

f. Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-6)

(1) Functions

(a) The J-6 has the functional responsibility for communications and computer/information systems in support of the CDRJSOTF. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command’s operational and strategic requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications systems to exercise command in the execution of the JSOTF mission. A notional JSOTF J-6 organization is depicted in Figure A-7.

(b) The directorate provides communications and computer systems within the JSOTF HQ and coordinates support by second-party providers such as the Joint Communication Support Element and US Army 112th Signal Battalion by providing circuits over satellite, radio, and other communications links.
(2) Responsibilities

(a) Process JSOTF HQ communications and computer systems requirements and employ required capabilities, ensuring access at the lowest possible tactical level.

(b) Participate in JSOTF component planning and coordinate with supported JTF and higher HQ for required equipment and expertise.

(c) Establish communications and cybersecurity reporting requirements with the supported CCMD’s joint cyberspace center and with other joint force components.

(d) Manage and maintain the JSOTF HQ communications and computer systems to include operating a joint network operations control center that provides frequency management and video teleconferencing; operating a message center; coordinating cybersecurity DODIN operations and defensive cyberspace operations for JSOTF networks and information systems with the respective CCMD joint cyberspace center; and providing system administration for the SOF networks.

(e) Manage contract support for JSOTF communications and computer systems infrastructure.

(f) Prepare communications estimate, communications plans, and communications annexes to OPLANs and OPORDs.
(g) Monitor and report readiness status of communications systems.

(h) Establish and maintain JSOTF ability to protect data and information, to include identifying SOF cyberspace capabilities that could be targeted by the adversary; defensive methods to protect cyberspace capabilities given the cyberspace threat intelligence; and proven processes to execute special operations in the event that the adversary degrades SOF cyberspace capabilities that negatively impacts special operations.

(i) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on communications system support, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

g. SJA

(1) Functions

(a) The SJA is the CDRJSOTF’s legal adviser, ensuring that the JSOTF complies with international law, US law, and DOD policy. The SJA coordinates with the JTF SJA and JSOTF component commands and performs other legal functions as required.

(b) Legal professionals provide decision makers with the information and analysis needed to evaluate options, assess risks, and make informed decisions within the bounds of international and domestic law. The SJA applies a comprehensive understanding of the law, multilateral and bilateral agreements, and international legal customs and practices to help commanders evaluate the alternatives necessary to plan, train, mobilize, deploy, employ forces, and then transition to peace. From the earliest stages of planning, execution, and redeployment, legal professionals identify and assist in the resolution of legal constraints and by providing responsive readiness programs to the military member.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) In consultation with the CDRJSOTF, J-5, and J-3, assist in ROE development, both initial and supplemental, and provide expertise on all ROE. Once approved, the SJA should assist the J-3 in the training of all personnel on the ROE.

(b) Participate as a member of appropriate planning cells and provide expertise on legal issues that apply to emerging missions.

(c) Participate in ROE and targeting cells to ensure compliance with the law of war, ROE, and other legal requirements.

(d) Advise CDRJSOTF on the impact of international law and agreements affecting the mission.

(e) Provide legal advice to CDRJSOTF and the JSOTF targeting panel as part of the target validation phase of the targeting cycle.
(f) Review the OPLAN/OPORD for any legal considerations that may affect implementation of the plan or order, such as the law of war, status of forces, ROE, international agreements, and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(g) Advise the CDRJSOTF on all disciplinary and military justice issues, with particular attention to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and courts-martial convening authority.

(h) Oversee the reporting and investigation of incidents including law of war violations, claims, loss of equipment or funds, and personal injury or death.

(i) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-2 to ensure compliance with intelligence oversight requirements.

(j) Review, as required, future expenditures to ensure compliance with fiscal law and regulations.

(k) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on the SJA, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

h. Public Affairs Officer (PAO)

(1) Functions

(a) The PAO advises the commander on the impact that JSOTF operations are likely to have on public attitude, PA policies of higher HQ, and the command’s need for media products. Additionally, a PAO will usually serve as the JSOTF public spokesperson and will prepare public affairs guidance (PAG) and the PA portion of OPLANs and OPORDs.

(b) In those missions involving extensive interaction with an indigenous population, the PAO may also serve as the link between the command and the senior DOS representative and/or other designated authority responsible for releasing information to the HN media.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Based on guidance from the JFC develop PAG and a PA plan prior to deployment and execute and update as required. The PAG and the PA plan should support the JFC’s mission and objectives.

(b) Ensure PA and visual information assets are deployed with the JSOTF command group.

(c) Develop annex F (Public Affairs) to the CDRJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.
(d) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-3, JSOTF or JTF IO cell or designated IO staff section to plan, coordinate, and deconflict the PA and MISO activities.

(e) Establish and participate in the media operations center as appropriate. If a JSOTF does not establish a media operations center, participate in the JFC media operations center as directed by the CDRJSOTF.

(f) Depending on the scope and duration of an operation, coordinate with the news media representatives, as appropriate.

(g) Coordinate the use of combat camera assets with the JFC.

(h) Participate in JSOTF or JTF IO cell planning and coordination.

(i) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

i. Surgeon

(1) Functions. The surgeon establishes, monitors, and evaluates JSOTF health services for the JSOTF and SOF components.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Advise the CDRJSOTF on medical support.

(b) Coordinate theater patient movement policy as appropriate.

(c) Provide medical technical supervision and coordination of treatment facility activities.

(d) Coordinate medical support, including medical logistics, with the appropriate staff to prevent duplication of effort.

(e) Manage the command preventive medicine program.

(f) Complete all required medical reports and messages.

(g) Publish annex Q (Medical Services) to the CDRJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, and supporting plans, as appropriate.

(h) Identify medical PIRs and RFIs to the J-2.

(i) Assess allied, PN, HN, and NGO medical asset availability.

(j) As required, coordinate with the theater patient movement requirements center and the area joint blood program office and disseminate medical regulating and blood management procedures.
(k) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on health services, refer to JP 4-02, Health Services.

j. Chaplain

(1) Functions. The chaplain is the CDRJSOTF’s primary advisor for religious affairs. The chaplain develops and coordinates plans, policies, and procedures for religious support for the CDRJSOTF and supervises the provision of religious support throughout the JSOTF operational area.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Advise the CDRJSOTF on religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion in order to provide for the religious needs of all assigned personnel and other authorized civilians.

(b) Advise the CDRJSOTF and staff on indigenous religious customs, traditions, organizations, communities, symbols, facilities, and sensitivities within the operational area and their impact upon the mission.

(c) Advise the command and leaders on ethical decision-making and moral leadership concerning issues related to policies, programs, initiatives, plans, and exercises.

(d) Monitor religious support programs and exercises staff technical supervision over the provision of religious support for forces under the CDRJSOTF’s command.

(e) Provide direct personal religious support to the JSOTF HQ.

(f) Identify Service component religious support team requirements and coordinates for program funding, logistic support, personnel replacement, and augmentation requirements for subordinate religious support teams.

(g) In coordination with the command CMO staff, perform liaison with local national civilian religious leaders, NGOs, and IGOs as required.

(h) Coordinate with combatant command, joint force, MNF, and Service component command chaplains as necessary to ensure that subordinate religious support teams are resourced to provide religious support for members of their units and others as required.

(i) Develop and maintain staff estimates and joint religious support plans. Prepare appendix 6 (Religious Support) to annex E (Personnel) of all OPLANs or OPORDs.

(j) Other responsibilities as directed.
For further information on chaplain functions, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

k. **Budget Officer**

(1) **Functions.** The budget officer is the CDRJSOTF’s financial manager and advisor. In lieu of a budget officer, the J-4 may perform this function. Financial management functions include obtaining various obligation authorities, funds control, cost capturing, and cost reporting.

(2) **Responsibilities**

(a) Serve as principal financial management advisor to the CDRJSOTF and as focal point for JSOTF financial management matters.

(b) Establish JSOTF financial management responsibilities.

(c) Ensure that established fiscal responsibility is maintained.

(d) Provide estimates of resource requirements, budgetary guidance, and fund control to the JSOTF subordinate commands and the JFC as required. Provide actual and estimated cost and resource requirements to the JFC. Furnish the financial status of the operation.

(e) Establish fiscal controls to ensure the efficient use of resources. This may include publishing procedures as necessary to address items such as automated data processing equipment and copier procurement, local purchase thresholds, and the establishment of blanket purchase agreements.

(f) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-1 on special pay and allowances for JSOTF personnel.

(g) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-4 on logistic requirements and support to ensure that they complement the financial management responsibilities.

(h) Coordinate with the SJA and/or legal advisor on fiscal and contract issues.

(i) Coordinate with JSOTF HQ commandant on funding for internal JSOTF sustainment support funding.

(j) Coordinate with JSOTF or JFC contracting office/officer for the legal review of contracts.

(k) Obtain necessary advice from JSOTF SJA to ensure that expenditures comply with fiscal law and regulation.

(l) Develop appendix 3 (Finance and Disbursing) to annex E (Personnel) to CDRJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or supporting plans.
(m) Responsible for all aspects of cash management in the JSOTF to include training of paying agents and field ordering officers, coordinating for funds issuance, clearing and review of accounts and processing of reporting requirements.

(n) Careful coordination with executive agent, HQ, theater command elements, the TSOC, MNFs, and CJSOTF is required to deconflict authorities and establish formal processes ensure proper support and sharing of costs if appropriate.

*For further information on budget functions, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.*

1. **HQ Commandant**

   (1) **Functions.** The HQ commandant reports directly to the CDRJSOTF or deputy CDRJSOTF and is responsible for all aspects of the HQ support activities. The HQ commandant assumes initial responsibility for all equipment and facilities assigned to the JSOTF HQ and assigns subsequent responsibilities to personnel and agencies in direct control of those designated areas. The HQ commandant and HQ support activity are capable of providing essential day-to-day administrative and logistic support and sustainment to the JSOTF HQ in a field environment. The myriad of functions and responsibilities of the HQ commandant and the support activity staff require early coordination with the J-1 and J-3 in the planning process. There are numerous possibilities concerning the organization of the HQ commandant element. Each mission will dictate the requirements, capabilities, and structure of the organization. A notional HQ commandant element is depicted in Figure A-8.

   (2) **Responsibilities.** The task support activity areas that follow are common to most operations for a JSOTF HQ. Certain procedures may vary. Preliminary requirements can be identified through the conduct of a site survey.

   (a) Base operations support to include: unit level logistic support, billeting, transportation, messing, unit level health support, sanitation, environmental protection,
engineering and construction requirements, and supply functions necessary to maintain the operation of the JSOTF HQ element.

(b) Assist the J-1, as required, with postal administration. This may require a terminal capability, distribution, collection, postal finance services, security, and customs and agriculture support.

(c) Determine specific personnel and equipment needs, as well as sources to support camp functions. Conduct a mission analysis early in the planning process.

(d) Assist the J-1 in operating the joint personnel reception center. This includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.

(e) Assist the J-1, as required, with the operation of the MWR program. This includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.

(f) Provide for camp physical security operations. Coordinate with the J-2 to obtain security, base defense, and force protection information and intelligence and the J-3 to address force protection requirements. Ensure that a threat assessment is completed and measures identified to combat each threat. Also consider: rear area security, physical security of classified material, visitor control, refugee assistance, traffic control and flow within the HQ area, internment facilities, and other security considerations as warranted. The HQ commandant may be assigned the mission for base defense of the JSOTF HQ. In this case, the HQ commandant would assume the role of the base defense commander and be responsible for perimeter security, guard mount, physical security of the compound, and battle action drills.

(g) Coordinate movement, deployment, and redeployment of base camp operations.

(h) Ensure that coordination has been accomplished for JSOTF advanced echelon elements.

(i) Develop appendix 5 (Military Postal Service) to annex E (Personnel) to CDRJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or supporting plans.

(j) Provide administrative and personnel support to the JSOTF HQ element.

_for further information on personnel, refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support._

6. **Boards, Centers, and Cells**

The CDRJSOTF may elect to form any number and type of organizational structures within the JSOTF HQ to support the mission. The first step in that decision-making process is to determine what organizational structures (boards, centers, and cells) have been formed by the JFC and/or what organizational structures have been delegated to the CDRJSOTF as the principal commander to operate. Then the CDRJSOTF formulates which JSOTF HQ organizations (and LNOs or staff officers) are best suited to support both the JFC concept of
operations and the JSOTF mission. Typically, the CDRJSOTF forms subordinate organizations, each under the supervision of a specific staff director, to support the mission (see Figure A-9).

Figure A-9. Joint Special Operations Task Force Boards and Cells
7. Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists

Detailed checklists that may be of assistance to the JSOTF principal staff (J-1-J-6, HQ commandant, and SJA) are provided in Appendix B, “Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists.”


A TSOC or Service SOF unit that may be tasked to establish a JSOTF HQ may consider the need for preparing a SOP for use when organizing a JSOTF. It may be used for both exercises and actual contingencies, as appropriate.
APPENDIX B
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF
CHECKLISTS

The following checklists are provided to assist the JSOTF staff in the preparation, planning, and execution of their functional responsibilities. They are not intended to be all-inclusive and should be modified to suit the accomplishment of the stated JSOTF mission.

   
a. General

   (1) Does a joint system exist for the J-1 that allows summation of separate Service personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualties accounting; and personnel requisitions?

   (2) Do current plans include a current summary of unit personnel needs?

   (3) Are critical unit positions identified?

   (4) Do the following issues pertain to JSOTF personnel?

      (a) Have JSOTF augmentation shortfalls and requirements been identified and submitted to the CCDR?

      (b) Are minimum grade, security clearances, and requirements by sex specified?

      (c) Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?

      (d) Have instructions been issued for passports, visas, immunizations, uniform requirements, and travel restrictions?

   (5) Have administrative procedures been established by Service component commanders, before deployment, for the following JSOTF personnel actions?

      (a) Giving members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney and to seek other Service-provided legal assistance (as available)?

      (b) Giving members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit?

   (6) Does the J-1 have the required capabilities to correct any deficiencies for personnel once they have deployed to the field?

      (a) Making provisions to pay members while deployed?

      (b) Providing passports and visas as required?
(7) Have other personnel actions been accomplished, such as medical screening, identification cards or tags, and Service record updates (including a record of emergency data)?

(8) Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?
   
   (a) Special leave?
   
   (b) Hostile fire or imminent danger pay?
   
   (c) Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion?
   
   (d) Free postage?
   
   (e) Sole surviving son?
   
   (f) Absentee voting?

(9) Have MWR activities for JSOTF personnel been coordinated?

(10) Is military postal support adequately and equitably addressed in JSOTF and Service component commands’ plans?

(11) Have supporting US disbursing officers been requested to provide US and indigenous currencies for official purposes and for use by JSOTF members?

(12) Are planning factors for computing personnel attrition developed IAW existing Service procedures?

(13) Has liaison been established with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the handling of detainees, civilian internees, and other detained persons?

(14) Have procedures been developed between the J-1 and J-2 for the in-theater processing of returned formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel?

(15) Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning through medical channels?

(16) Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?

(17) Consistent with operational requirements, is the maximum practical use being made of local civilian labor?

(18) Have appropriate liaison positions been established with local civil authorities?

b. Plans and Policies
(1) Have all policies regarding use of indigenous labor by the JSOTF been coordinated with component CA officers? (The JSOTF J-1 and J-3 should coordinate CA issues.)

(2) Have J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatants and civilians?

(3) Have internal SOPs been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?


a. General

(1) With inputs from the JSOTF J-3, have the JSOTF J-2’s missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the CDRJSOTF?

(2) Has a complete intelligence assessment of the situation been developed?

(3) Have the current warning intelligence indicators in the JSOA been identified?

(4) Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?

(5) Are situation assessments periodically updated?

(6) Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the CDRJSOTF and up the chain of command?

(7) Are the CDRJSOTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional and/or theater assessments?

(8) Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?

(9) Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of the JSOTF’s, JTF’s and CCMD’s organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?

(10) Has additional national intelligence support been requested, as appropriate?

(11) Have the JSOTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, and/or reservists, been identified?

(12) Have the deployable elements to support the JSOTF’s efforts in collection management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical in-depth analysis been identified?

(13) Have the JSOTF intelligence managers been kept abreast of intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?
(14) Have the requirements for a JISE to support the JSOTF been determined? (Establishment of a JISE will be situation dependent.)

(15) Has the JSOTF J-2, in coordination with the JSOTF J-6, developed a JSOTF intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability and adequate and appropriate security laterally, vertically, and with MNFs? (JSOTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and LAN to carry information and intelligence.)

(16) Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for PIRs and RFIs been determined?

(17) Has federation of intelligence responsibilities been considered, defined, and clearly delineated among the JSOTF, supported JTF, CCMD, and national level agencies?

(18) Have any JSOTF subordinate units been receiving intelligence support directly from the supported CCDR or national levels?

(19) Has the JSOTF coordinated, through the JTF, with the supported GCC’s JIOC to determine whether PIRs have already been established for the current situation? (PIRs should be built around CDRJSOTF’s requirements.)

(20) In concert with the JSOTF J-3, JTF J-3, and the supported CCDR’s JIOC, have PIRs been tailored for the current situation?

(21) Have PIRs been kept current, and are they updated periodically?

(22) Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?

(23) Have the JSOTF J-2’s automated data processing equipment requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported JTF’s, CCMD’s, and subordinate’s systems (to include compatibility for multinational JSOTF operations when required)?

(24) In concert with the supported commander’s J-2 and the JSOTF J-3, have all the JSOTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?

(25) Have JSOTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities been identified?

(26) Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded through the JTF and supported CCDR’s JIOC for subsequent tasking at the appropriate echelon?

(27) Have requirements for all GI&S support been identified?

(28) Have JSOTF GI&S shortfalls been identified?
(29) Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed, through channels, the Joint Staff J-2?

(30) Has the annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the CDRJSOTF’s OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan?

(31) Can the JSOTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

(32) Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

(33) Have procedures been established and coordinated with the supported GCC’s JIOC to support the production of TIPs?

(34) Have SOF IO requirements and sources been identified?

(35) Have I2 operations been incorporated into mission planning IAW USSOCOM Directive 525-40, *Identity Intelligence Operations*?

(36) Have biometric, forensic, WTI, cellular exploitation, sociocultural analysis, network analysis, site exploitation, and DOMEX collection requirements, to include deployable exploitation analysis centers (EACs) and existing HN databases locations been incorporated into the overall collection plan?

(37) Have personnel designated to fill deployed J-2 exploitation positions been identified and properly trained?

(38) Have I2 operations transmission and forensics transport methods and procedures been developed?

(39) Have biometrically enabled watch list requirements and encounter ROE/procedures been developed and disseminated?

(40) Have procedures been implemented for issuing security badges and access control to the JSOTF HQ?

b. CI, HUMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, SIGINT, *measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)*, and TECHINT

(1) Have the JSOTF’s requirements for CI, HUMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and TECHINT collection been identified?

(2) Has the requirement for establishment of a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC) (or joint documentation exploitation center (JDEC) at the JTF or JSOTF level) and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?
(3) Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC if determined to be necessary?

(4) If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?

(5) Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been identified?

(6) Has emergency dissemination authority for GEOINT products been obtained?

(7) Has tailored GEOINT been requested (once target has been identified)? Has GEOINT been forwarded to requesting command?

(8) Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? (If not, work with cryptologic support group and command NSA Central Security Service representative and/or GCC to obtain if applicable.)

(9) Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?

c. **J-2X**

(1) Have JSOTF CI, HUMINT, and CT intelligence requirements been identified?

(2) Have CI and HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?

(3) Has the J-2, if required, been appointed the CI coordinating authority?

(4) Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a force protection measure?

(5) Has CI been included in collection management planning?

(6) Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

d. **Joint Force Exploitation Staff Element**

(1) Has the collection plan for materials to be exploited been created?

(2) Have the collection and exploitation requirements for deployed laboratories and material evacuation been identified?

(3) Have the authorities been granted to collect and process captured material?

(4) Are all available exploitation capabilities, to include partner and HNs, coordinated and synchronized to the fullest extent possible?

(5) Has reachback support been determined and the logistics infrastructure identified in order to transport material?
(6) What is the region’s improvised weapons threat (i.e., modified munitions and weapons, improvised explosive devices, and improvised CBRN weapons)?

(7) What is the region’s history of manufacturing and usage of conventional and improvised weapon component and precursors?

e. **Multinational Interaction**

   (1) Has liaison been established between joint and MNF intelligence structures?

   (2) Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with MNFs?

   (3) Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?

   (4) Have interoperability and security of communications system support systems been ensured?

   (5) Has release and/or disclosure of imagery information to MNFs been considered?


   a. **Current and Future Operations**

   Note: A number of the checklist items refer to the planning process and may fall under the responsibility of the J-5 depending on how the JSOTF is organized and who is directed to accomplish the planning.

   (1) Have current plans been evaluated?

   (2) Have special operations options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the superior commander?

   (3) Have special operations strategic and operational military objectives been developed and forwarded to the superior commander?

   (4) Have component and supporting commanders been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs?

   (5) Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing ROE, requesting modification if necessary.)

   (6) Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized?
(7) Has the commander’s estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the superior commander?

(8) Has the status of noncombatants in the JOA or JSOA been evaluated to determine the requirement for a NEO plan?

(9) Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?

(10) Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

(11) What is the deployment status of reserve units?

(12) Have replacement units and personnel been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the superior commander for resolution?

(13) Has the superior commander’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?

(14) Has guidance been developed for components?

(15) Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been developed?

(16) Have pre-hostility special operations (SR, UW, MISO, CAO, CT) been considered during COA development?

(17) Have IRCs, requirements, and coordination been considered in SOF missions and activities?

(18) Has the CJTF or senior JFC been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?

(19) Has the JSOTF legal officer been consulted concerning applicable international agreements, any special requirements of the law of war that affect the particular operation, or the ROE authorized for the mission?

(20) Have joint fire support capabilities, requirements, and coordination, to include fire support coordination measures, been considered in SOF missions and activities?

(21) Have SOF aviation and/or support aviation requirements been properly considered and planned for?

(22) Have ISR requirements been coordinated with the J-2?

(23) Has a GCCS teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?

(24) What is the impact of identified shortfalls on the COA?
(25) Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require elevation to the senior commander?

(26) How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and allied publics?

(27) Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?

(28) Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commander’s guidance?

(29) Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan?

(30) Is the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan complete and in the proper format?

(31) Has the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate plan been submitted to the superior commander for approval?

(32) Has an EXORD been received?

(33) Has the OPORD, or subordinate plan been adjusted for the senior commander’s EXORD before issuing the commander’s EXORD?

(34) Are plan objectives being met?

(35) Is a reassessment of objectives required?

(36) Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?

(37) Have CTF capabilities, requirements, and coordination been considered in SOF missions and activities

(38) Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

(39) Does the situation call for termination of operations?

(40) Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

(41) Can the JSOTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

(42) Have USG departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CA operations?

(43) Has the senior commander’s CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities and are the priorities supporting on-going operations?
(44) Has MISO support been coordinated?

(45) Have combat identification measures been established?

(46) Have requirements for integrated space force enhancement been coordinated through channels with USSTRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC)?

(47) Have the effects of WMD, and the toxic industrial materials which can produce similar effects, been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations units been notified?

(48) Have the warning and reporting systems for WMD been tested?

(49) Have PR plans been coordinated?

(50) Have control measures and procedures been coordinated and deconflicted?

(51) Have all C-IED enablers, inherent within the C-IED support element, been organized and integrated throughout the staff?

b. **Monitoring and Tracking the Flow of SOF**

(1) In the absence of a JPG, the JSOTF J-3 may establish an operations planning and execution cell, composed of J-3, J-4, and J-5 planners (at a minimum), to complete the TPFDD planning tasks, monitor the flow of SOF, and track forces to their destination. The following questions may be of use to this team.

(a) Have plan identification numbers been established for each COA?

(b) Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?

(c) Has plan information been entered?

(d) Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified?

(e) Have NEO, medical evacuation, and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?

(f) Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?

(g) Has the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?

(h) Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?

(i) Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?

(j) Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the senior commander?
(k) Have deployment requirements been verified?
(l) Has transportation lift allocation been verified?
(m) Has each daily deployment increment been validated?

(2) Have intratheater movement plans been developed?
   
   (a) Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?
   (b) Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is under way?
   (c) Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD requirements?
   
   (d) Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?
   (e) Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?
   (f) Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the JTF, supported CCMD, and USTRANSCOM?
   
   (g) Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the database? (Continue to update deployment information on the deployment database.)
   (h) Is unit status being reported after arrival?

(3) Has a rotation schedule for SOF assets, personnel, and equipment been established?

   c. **Staffing, Centers, and Cells**

   (1) Has a JOC been established and properly staffed?
   
   (a) Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during the CAP process?
   (b) If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?

   (2) If directed by the CDRJSOTF (based on J-3 recommendation), are the following true?
   
   (a) Has a PR coordination cell been established?
   (b) Has a JSOTF targeting panel been established?
   (c) Has a ROE planning cell been formed?
Appendix B

(d) Has a weather cell been formed?

(e) Has an IO cell been formed?

(f) Has a civil-military operations center (CMOC) been established?

(g) Has the CTF cell been formed?

(h) Has the CDRJSOTF provided initial guidance concerning the functions and responsibilities of the above organizations?

(i) Have these organizations been properly staffed?

(j) Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?

3. If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and coordinate execution of joint special operations air operations?

4. If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JSOA?

5. If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air offense/defense operations within the JSOA?

6. Has the base defense commander integrated the base defense plan into the tactical operations of the JSOTF?

d. **CMO (Executed by the J-9 Staff if Established)**

1. Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization, use, and integration of attached CA forces?

2. Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the relationship between the JSOTF and the civil component in the JSOA?

3. Has the CDRJSOTF been advised of the impact that JSOTF operations and the civilian population will have on one another?

4. Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the JSOA?

5. In coordination with the SJA, has the CDRJSOTF been advised of his legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of JSOTF operations on civilian populations.

6. Have civil-military plans, programs, and policies been coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with strategic objectives?
(7) Have systems been emplaced prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated funds dedicated to CMO?

(8) Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to subordinate units been identified?

(9) Has coordination been established with CMO funds controlling authority/financial managers to meet the CDRJSOTF objectives?

(10) Have the requirements for CMO/CAO area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?

(11) Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) as no-fire or restricted fire areas?

(12) Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the CDRJSOTF CMO plan?

(13) Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified and integrated with the CMO plan?


a. General

(1) Is there a concise statement of the purpose for which the logistic support plan is prepared?

(2) Does this paragraph provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and CONOPS that the logistic planning supports?

(3) Are the objectives specified?

(4) Have SOF submitted requirements that identify logistics support requirements?

b. Assumptions. Does this paragraph list the assumptions upon which the CONOPS and logistic support are based?

c. Responsibilities (Are the responsibilities established for the following organizations?):

(1) Joint Staff?

(2) USSOCOM?

(3) USTRANSCOM?

(4) Services?
(5) Combatant commands and their component commands?

(6) TSOCs?

(7) Defense Security Cooperation Agency?

(8) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)?

(9) DOS and US embassies?

(10) Security assistance organizations?

(11) Liaison offices?

(12) Defense Logistics Agency?

(13) Army and Air Force Exchange Service?

(14) Units or elements providing logistic support to SOF components?

d. **Concept of Logistic Support**

(1) Does this paragraph describe how supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, contracting, engineer, and logistic field service support will be provided?

(2) Does this paragraph specify which logistic elements will provide the support? Are the forces provided adequate?

(3) Does the planned support complement the tactical plan? Is it adequate and feasible?

(4) Have the terrain and enemy intelligence been analyzed to determine the impact on logistic support?

(5) Has the deployment flow been properly analyzed to determine the time phasing for introduction of logistic elements to support the combat forces?

(6) Have HNS availability and subsequent risks been considered?

(7) Has the support of special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services been adequately addressed?

(8) Have validation procedures for special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services been clearly established?

(9) Is there an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with HNs in the JOA or with other coalition nations in the operation?
(10) Are provisions made for adequate logistic support of detainees, civilian internees, and other detained persons?

(11) Are provisions made for adequate logistic support for those indigenous and displace civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

e. Supply

(1) General

(a) Are the supply system and procedural guidance provided?

(b) Is the flow of requisitions described?

(c) Is the flow of materiel described?

(d) Is a project code required and identified?

(e) Is a force activity designator upgrade required?

(f) Are in-country DOD activity address codes required?

(g) Are LOC procedures described?

(h) Is the number of days of supplies required to accompany troops identified?

(i) Are provisions made for contracting and local purchase support?

(j) Are the stockage objectives by class of supply specified?

(k) Will automated or non-automated procedures be used?

(l) Will automated systems of supported units and task-organized CSS units interface?

(m) Have the inter-Service support requirements been identified and common-, cross-, and joint-serving arrangements coordinated for support of SOF?

(n) What support will be provided by HN or foreign nation support?

(o) What in-theater support is required?

(p) Are retrograde procedures for excess and unserviceable items spelled out?

(q) What are the provisions for emergency resupply?

(r) Is the space coordinating authority available to coordinate access to space capabilities (reconnaissance and surveillance, environmental monitoring, imagery,
communications, positioning, and navigation) that can help resolve logistic issues through in-transit visibility?

(s) Have initial preplanned supply support and emergency support packages been considered?

(t) Is the communications capability provided and compatible with the automated systems being deployed?

(u) Are changes to the DOD activity address file required, such as “ship-to” address?

(v) Are some supply support activities to be designated as air LOCs?

(w) Are procedures described for cancellation or diversion of materiel in-process or in-transit at the termination of the operation or exercise?

(x) Are provisions made for logistic support of displaced civilians, detainees, and indigenous personnel?

(y) Is there covered storage in the operational area to protect supplies from the elements? If not, are shipments packed for outdoor storage?

(z) Are materials handling equipment (MHE) requirements provided?

(aa) Is sufficient rigging material available for conventional and special operations airdrop operations?

(bb) Is the Defense Automatic Addressing System aware of the communications routing identifier and DOD activity address codes to be used for processing direct requisitions and direct supply status?

(cc) Have distribution procedures for maps been addressed?

(2) Class I (Subsistence)

(a) Are mess facilities identified and adequate?

(b) Are the ration cycles described by phase? Is a ration cycle proposed?

(c) Are fresh eggs, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats, juices, milk, and canned soft-drink supplements to ration meals considered?

(d) Do local fresh fruits and vegetables meet US standards?

(e) Have unitized operational rations been considered for ease of handling and accountability?

(f) Are cash meal payment procedures established?
(g) What method of distribution will be used (unit distribution or supply point distribution)?

(h) Are bakery supplements to ration meals considered?

(i) Are veterinary personnel adequate for the subsistence support requirements?

(j) Are hospital rations required?

(k) Are chill, freeze, and refrigeration requirements for unit dining facilities and Class I supply point addressed?

(l) Are water support requirements satisfied, to include possible decontamination requirements?

(m) Are the water sources fresh, brackish, or salty?

(n) Is the water source local systems, surface, or wells?

(o) What type of water purification unit is required?

(p) Are chillers required?

(q) What is the water planning factor in gallons per person per day?

(r) What are the treatment, storage, distribution, and cooling requirements? Are they satisfied by deploying unit capability?

(s) What are the well drilling requirements? Are there any existing wells? What is the quality of water from existing wells?

(t) Are potable ice considerations covered? What is the requirement planning factor?

(u) Have the medical planners provided for certification of ice as potable?

(3) Class II (General Support Items)

(a) Are requirements for individual clothing and mission-essential consumables addressed?

(b) Have provisions been made for the replacement of damaged personal clothing and CBRN individual protective equipment or personal protection equipment?

(c) Which self-service supply center listing will be used as the basis for the Class II stockage?
(d) How will the logistic support element replenish organizational clothing and individual equipment and self-service supply center items?

(e) Do any of the following items require special consideration?

1. Special operations-peculiar materials.
2. Tentage and tentage repair kits.
3. Administrative and office supplies.
4. Folding cots.
5. Insect bars with mosquito netting.
6. Banding material and tools.
7. Water purification chemicals and test kits.
8. Insect repellent and sun screen.
9. Field laundry and bath supplies and hospital laundry supplies.
10. Dining facility supplies, including paper and plastic products.
11. Trash disposal supplies.
12. Vector control equipment and supplies.
13. Latrine chemicals and supplies.
15. Cold weather clothing and equipment.
16. Air conditioners or fans.
17. Maps, distribution, and storage.

(4) Class III (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants [POL])

(a) Is proper storage and dispensing equipment available for Class III items (POL, industrial gasses, etc.)?

(b) Are Service requirements by location for each type of product established?

(c) Is the use of contractor-provided bulk fuels considered?

(d) Are ordering and accountable officer requirements addressed?
(e) Are existing pipeline distribution systems available? What are the pipeline and storage capabilities?

(f) Are remote refueling sites or forward arming and refueling points required? What capabilities are required?

(g) Are inter-Service support billing and reimbursement procedures specified?

(h) Are POL-quality surveillance procedures specified? Are the required test kits on hand?

(i) Is there a petroleum laboratory available?

(j) Are additives required for commercial fuels? Who will provide them?

(k) Are any unique package product requirements addressed?

(l) Are industrial gasses addressed?

(5) Class IV (Construction/Barrier Material)

(a) Are requirements for construction and protection addressed?

(b) Are construction materials locally available?

(c) Are basic loads to be deployed?

(d) Will pre-positioned materiel be available?

(6) Class V (Ammunition)

(a) Are unit basic loads to be deployed?

(b) Is the logistic support structure prescribed?

(c) Are EOD support requirements and procedures addressed?

(d) Are special operations-peculiar ammunition requirements addressed?

(e) Have Service-common ammunition requirements been coordinated through applicable Service channels?

(f) Have all special operations aircraft requirements been considered (ammunition, security, ramp-space, maintenance, other)?

(g) Have the storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety requirements been reviewed and addressed in the planning?

(h) Are requirements identified by category of munitions?
(i) Are sustaining rates of munitions addressed?

(j) Are special permits needed? Who issues them?

(7) Class VI (Personal Demand Items)
   (a) Are the deploying personnel provided guidance on personal demand items?
   (b) Are sundry packs available?
   (c) Is indirect or direct exchange support considered?
   (d) If exchange support is required:
       1. Has HQ Army and Air Force Exchange Service (Plans) been notified?
       2. Have the exchange staffing, stock assortment, security, facility, transportation, and communications requirements been identified and coordinated?
       3. Is financial management support for the exchange identified?
       4. Has the policy on rationing and check cashing been determined?

(8) Class VII (Major End-Items)
   (a) Are special operations-peculiar equipment requirements identified and validation procedures established?
   (b) Does the plan specify the equipment fill level for deploying units?
   (c) Are equipment redistribution (cross-leveling) requirements specified?
   (d) Are replacement actions for salvage equipment specified?
   (e) Are operational readiness float requirements addressed?

(9) Class VIII (Medical Material/Medical Repair)
   (a) Are medical supply procedures prescribed?
   (b) Does this portion of the logistic support plan complement the medical support plan?
   (c) Are special medical equipment and supply requirements identified based on medical mission and the operational area?
   (d) Are memoranda of understanding established with medical logistic providers to ensure that these medical supplies are stored, maintained, and ready to meet all operational contingencies?
(e) Are special storage requirements satisfied?

(f) Is the disposal of salvage medical supplies addressed?

(g) Are medical oxygen and other medical gas requirements (such as anesthesia) identified and resupply procedures established?

(h) Is local purchase an option? Are procedures and guidelines established?

(10) Class IX (Repair Parts)

(a) Are special operations-peculiar repair requirements specified?

(b) Are common repair parts requirements, including repairables, specified?

(c) Are cannibalization procedures addressed?

(d) Are requirements for nonexpendable components addressed?

(e) Is stockage of major assemblies addressed?

(f) Have special storage requirements been addressed for dry batteries, classified repair parts, high dollar, and pilferables, etc.?

(g) Is disposal of hazardous materials, such as lithium batteries and radioactive residue, specified? Are HN requirements taken into account regarding disposal?

(11) Class X (Other)

(a) If Class X materials are required, does the plan describe the source?

(b) What is the source of funding for Class X supplies?

f. Maintenance

(1) Does the plan describe how unit, intermediate (direct support and general support), and special operations-peculiar equipment maintenance will be performed?

(2) Is missile maintenance support required and available?

(3) Does the plan address calibration requirements?

(4) Is maintenance exchange addressed?

(5) Have extreme weather aspects been considered (e.g., heat, cold, humidity, and dust)?

(6) Are site security and storage requirements identified?
(7) Are special power requirements for maintenance facilities identified (e.g., voltage, phase, frequency, stability, and anticipated load in kilowatts)?

(8) Are building suitability screening factors identified by type of maintenance facility (e.g., minimum height and width for doors, floor load bearing requirements, and environmental control necessities)?

(9) Are operational readiness floats addressed?

(10) How will repairs under warranty be performed in the operational area?

(11) Will depot level maintenance be conducted in the operational area?

(12) Is the evacuation of unserviceable repairables addressed?

(13) Have procedures for replacing maintenance tools and equipment been specified?

(14) Is maintenance to be accomplished by contractors? Is the US Government able to meet contract requirements (contractor personnel life support, government furnished equipment [GFE], workspace, security, etc.)?

g. **Deployment and Distribution**

(1) General

(a) Is there a requirement for expedited cargo distribution to the operational area?

(b) Are the transportation support systems for supply distribution and air LOC validation procedures outlined?

(c) Have MHE requirements been addressed?

(d) What is the availability of USTRANSCOM, DIA, or NGA data analysis regarding the operational area’s transportation infrastructure, to include ports, airfields, roads, railroads, and inland waterways?

(e) Is there a rail system available? What are schedules and capability?

(f) Is the highway net described? What are the capabilities and limitations?

(g) What is the weather impact on ports, airfields, and highway nets?

(h) Are in-country highway, rail, air, and inland waterway mode requirements addressed?

(i) Are the transportation movement priority and transportation account codes provided? Are transportation funding procedures established?
(j) Has a dedicated in-country, intratheater, or intertheater movement system for personnel and high-priority cargo been established?

(k) Has coordination been made with USTRANSCOM for personnel and equipment movements?

(l) Has the use of foreign flag carriers been addressed?

(m) What agency will accept and coordinate administrative transportation requirements for SOF?

(n) What HNS support is available?

(o) Have medical evacuation requirements been included in the planning?

2. Airfields

(a) What airfields are available to support military operations?

(b) Has a coordinating HQ been designated for all airlift support?

(c) Has support been planned for USAF mobile aeromedical staging facilities?

(d) What are the personnel and cargo reception capabilities of the aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation?

(e) What are the maximum cargo capabilities of the airfield?

(f) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the roads that access the airfield?

(g) What contract civilian or HN personnel and equipment assets are available to assist at the aerial ports of debarkation and embarkation?

(h) Has an arrival/departure airfield control group organization been designated?

(i) Have aerial port squadron and/or contingency response group requirements been identified?

(j) What airfield facilities are available for military use during arrival/departure airfield control group operations?

(k) What is the best source for additional information on the airfields?

(l) Have channel airlift requirements been specified?

(m) Have airbase defense requirements been properly addressed?
(n) Are procedures in place to determine if a USG position exists on whether landing and parking fees will be paid during the current operation and to pay fees, if required?

(o) What types of aircraft are the airfield’s improved areas (landing strip[s], taxiways, parking ramps, etc.) rated for? Does the ADVON have the capability to determine this information?

(3) Supply Routes

(a) What are the road movement and convoy restrictions?

(b) What routes are available to support military operations?

(c) What are the terrain characteristics and capabilities of the routes available to support military operations?

(d) What are the dimensions and classifications of roads, tunnels, and bridges along the routes?

(e) What capabilities exist to repair damaged segments of routes?

(f) What segments of the routes are heavily used by the civilian populace?

(g) What are the most likely routes fleeing refugees would use?

(h) Are traffic control measures in-place?

(i) What is the best source for additional information on the routes?

h. Field Services

(1) Are laundry, bath, clothing renovation, and latrine requirements addressed? Local sources?

(2) Are graves registration and mortuary capabilities adequate to support the anticipated requirements?

(3) Are procedures for salvage collection, evacuation, and disposal covered?

(4) Are base or post exchange services required and provided?

(5) Is fire protection provided for aviation, ammunition, and bases?

(6) Are procedures for waste disposal addressed?

(7) Are field bakery services required and provided?
(8) Are procedures specified and do units have the equipment necessary for cleaning of equipment for redeployment to meet customs and agriculture requirements to enter the US or other nations?

i. **Miscellaneous**

(1) Have billeting and support requirements at ISBs and FSBs been addressed?

(2) Are HN military personnel with experience in US military schools identified?

(3) Have arrangements been made with US and HN customs and immigration for the movement of US personnel and equipment? Will contractors (transportation and on-ground support) need USG support for resupplying US forces or bringing their people/equipment into the HN?

(4) Are procedures for logistic reporting established?

(5) Is delousing support required?

(6) Are isolation or rehearsal facilities required?

(7) What are the funding aspects of logistic support?

(8) Are procedures in place for transference of equipment to allies or partners during multinational operations?

(9) Have all requirements been costed?

(10) Has an account processing code been established?

(11) Have special operations-peculiar equipment resourcing procedures been identified?

(12) What is the electrical power cycles of the country? Are transformers required?

(13) Are printing and duplicating requirements identified?

(14) Are the communications to support logistic operations provided for in the communications planning? Telephone? Facsimile (secure and nonsecure)? Secure copiers and storage and handling facilities? Computer connectivity for operation planning, situational awareness, and Standard Army Management Information System and other logistic systems? Secure and nonsecure VTC and other collaboration tools, if required? Are these systems protected using cybersecurity and defense in depth?

(15) Have requirements for aerial delivery, personal parachutes, and air items been identified?

(16) Is a source of cryogenic gases (oxygen, nitrogen, etc.) required?
(17) Have diving-support requirements been addressed?

(18) Have administrative-use vehicle requirements been identified?

(19) Are audio-visual requirements identified?

(20) Have communication frequencies been cleared with the HN government?

(21) Are there adequate provisions in the plan for contracting support?

(22) Have an adequate number of contracting officers with the proper warrant been provided?

(23) Is adequate financial management support available?

(24) Is adequate legal support available?

(25) Is adequate linguist support available?

(26) Are there provisions in the plan for maneuver or war damage claims resulting from logistic operations?

(27) Are automated logistic systems procedures properly addressed?

(28) Have backup master files been established and prepared for shipment separate from the primary master files?

(29) Are maintainers, operators, and managers assigned and well trained?

(30) Have site selection and preparation for automated equipment considered accessibility, geographic, terrain, and security requirements?

(31) Is there a continuity of OPLANs?

(32) Are sufficient copies of user manuals on hand and current?

(33) Are sufficient repair parts available for the computer hardware, including generators and other subsystems?

(34) Have provisions been made for backup support for repair parts, hardware maintenance, and the receipt of software change packages?

(35) Have details been worked out for transmission of documents to higher and lower echelons?

(36) Will customer units require training? Are customer user manuals available for automated system support?
(37) Have OPSEC requirements been integrated into logistic planning? Has the logistic signature been minimized?

(38) Have security police requirements for special operations bases, facilities, training areas, rehearsal sites, and storage sites been identified and resourced?


a. General

(1) What is the current political-military situation?

(2) Has a national strategic political-military plan been received from the supported JFC?

(3) Have current plans been evaluated?

(4) Have special operations strategic and operational military objectives been developed and forwarded to the supported commander?

(5) Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

(6) Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JSOTF establishing authority for resolution?

(7) Has the JSOTF supported commander’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?

(8) Has guidance been developed for components?

(9) Have OPORD or OPLAN shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?

(10) Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPORD or OPLAN?

(11) Is the OPORD or OPLAN complete and in the proper format?

(12) Does the database accurately reflect all force and sustainment requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission?

(13) Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?

(14) Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

(15) Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during prehostilities?

(16) Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

b. CAP
Note: The following checklist is arranged by the joint operation planning activities and functions that the CDRJSOTF and planning staff should consider during a crisis situation. All items in the checklist may not apply directly to the CDRJSOTF, but are provided to illustrate the overarching CAP process.

(1) **Situational Awareness**

(a) **Situation Development**

1. What are the national and military strategies and US national security policy for the region or country?

2. What is the nature of the conflict or crisis that might require military resources to resolve it?

3. What are or might be the potential missions or tasks from the President or Secretary of Defense?

4. Will action be unilateral or multinational?

5. What is the current situation (who, what, when, where, and why)?

6. How will the enemy or adversary conceptualize the situation? What are the goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss?

7. What steps can be taken to collect additional information?

8. What is the status of communications with key US and foreign government agencies and personnel? Has a list of key phone numbers been established?

9. Has the supported commander developed an intelligence collection plan?

10. Has the supported commander deployed sufficient organic reconnaissance resources? Should national assets be tasked or repositioned?

11. Has the supported commander established a JNCC?

12. Are any US or MNFs conducting operations within the JSOTF JSOA? What type? Duration? Who commands those forces?

13. What is the status of communications to and/or from and within the JSOA?

14. Has the supported commander established an IO cell?

(b) **Crisis Assessment**
1. Is NEO needed?
   a. Are there any US or other DOD civilian noncombatants in the JSOA? How many? Where are they located? Are they in any danger?
   b. Is there a NEO plan for this JOA? Has the DOS authorized a NEO? Has the DOS asked for DOD assistance?
   c. Are MIS forces needed to support the NEO?

2. Have agencies or commands (e.g., USSTRATCOM, NGA, or environmental support facilities) that provide specialized or long-lead support been notified of the ongoing analysis and the potential for future support?

3. What dedicated communications should be established with these agencies or commands for use by operations, intelligence, and logistic personnel?

4. What requests, if any, have been made by the foreign government(s)? What is the DOS position?

5. What security cooperation may be provided to the foreign government(s) concerned?

6. What FHA may be provided to the foreign government(s)?

7. What sources have been identified to fund assistance efforts?

8. Does the US have any treaty or legal obligations?

9. Are there status-of-forces agreements with the foreign government(s)?

10. Is a military coordinating committee required?

11. What CA assets should be used to support a NEO?

12. Is a CMOC established at the JTF to coordinate and facilitate US and MNF operations with other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and foreign nation agencies and authorities?

13. What coordination and assistance will be required for other USG department and agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and foreign national agencies and authorities?

14. Is there a current plan for the area or situation?

15. What type and level of special operations are most advantageous for the current situation?

16. What are the key friendly, enemy, and neutral target groups and their special operations vulnerabilities?
17. Has a teleconference been established to support the operation?

18. What is the plan identification number applicable to the operation?

19. Is a database maintained by the supported commander that is current or applicable to the situation?

20. Are there adequate provisions to maintain secrecy, achieve surprise, and preserve the security of SOF against attack?

21. What OPSEC and MILDEC measures are required? Is a cover story required or available? Are diversionary actions needed to support the preparation, deployment, and employment of forces?

22. What national-level actions are necessary to protect secrecy and execute MILDEC?

23. What are foreign governments’ (including hostile) attitudes toward US intentions and military capabilities? How could these be shaped to US advantage?

24. What are the reactions of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly foreign governments?

25. What level of opposition can be expected from hostile governments?

26. What support can be expected from friendly and allied and coalition governments?

27. What access and overflight assurances do friendly forces have for deployment or employment operations?

28. What are the PA implications and responsibilities for the area?

29. Has a DOD media pool been activated?

30. What are the JFC themes and messages that apply to this crisis?

(2) Planning

(a) COA Development

1. What precisely must be accomplished in the crisis to strengthen or support the objectives established by the President and Secretary of Defense?

2. What are the general operations, intelligence, and logistic requirements to support the actions so as to bring about the objectives?
3. Do the military objectives identified take into account exploitable enemy vulnerabilities that are critical to the CDRJSOTF’s responsibilities and intent or are critical to the enemy’s intent?

4. From the CDRJSOTF’s perspective, are the special operations objectives attainable?

5. What is the commitment of the adversary to their most likely COA?

6. What are the current ROE in the area?
   a. Do they need to be changed because of the current situation?
   b. Who should recommend changes?

7. What SOF are readily available and when could they arrive on scene?

8. What reception and operations support facilities are needed and available?

9. What types and amounts of logistic support are available from friendly and allied nations?

10. Are joint or multinational interoperability considerations involved?

11. Is medical support adequate to support planned operations?

12. Has DIRLAUTH been established, as applicable, within the operational, intelligence, and logistic nets, with the committed forces, supported and supporting commands (as applicable), and national agencies?

13. What medical support is available in the objective area or provided for in the OPLAN or OPORD?

14. What additional SOF are required (e.g., USSOCOM, TSOC, or HN SOF)?

15. What is the unit readiness of the available or allocated forces?

16. What are the major constraints before forces can be committed?

17. What is the status of GI&S support within the area?

18. What are the environmental (meteorological, oceanographic) support capabilities and constraints within the area? Who is coordinating environmental support? How are civilian, HN, and regional meteorological assets being leveraged to support operations?
19. Will special CJCS-controlled communications assets, such as the JCSE, be required?

20. Will the use of IRCs enhance mission success for each COA being considered?

21. Have subordinate and supporting commands or agencies been tasked to enter database requirements for development of deployment estimates by USTRANSCOM?

22. Have plans for the use of space systems (e.g., for reconnaissance and surveillance, warning, positioning and navigation, communications, imagery, environmental monitoring) been integrated into JSOTF plans?

23. What is the status of both intertheater and intratheater mobility resources and supporting elements? Are facilities, airports, seaports, and LOCs capable of supporting the operation?

24. What are the logistic factors that affect actions under consideration?

25. Is aerial refueling required during deployment and/or employment?

26. Will ISBs be required?

27. What is the backup COA?

28. What all-source intelligence resources are available? Has the full range of intelligence capabilities been employed to ensure maximum intelligence support to planning efforts by the supported CCDR? Has CDRJSOTF declared emergency reconnaissance and implemented SIGINT operational tasking authority, if delegated? Will additional national intelligence support be requested?

29. Has coordination been conducted with USSTRATCOM to determine whether repositioning or launch of space systems is required for JSOTF operations?

30. Will EW units, such as radar jammers or communications jammers, be required?

31. Which airports and seaports are available to SOF?

   a. Are runway lengths and weight-bearing capacities adequate for the planned forces?

   b. Are pier capabilities and depth of water sufficient to accommodate sealift?

   c. Is the runway close enough to the JSOA (or objective) to provide adequate on station time for ISR assets?
32. Will use agreements need to be coordinated with other nations?

33. Have sufficient warranted contracting officers been assigned?

34. Has a sufficient amount of local currency been obtained to support the exercise or operation?
   a. Are other currencies required?
   b. Is the use of precious metals required?

35. Has local civilian labor support been acquired?

36. Have adequate funds been identified to support the COA?

37. Have procedures been established to ratify irregular purchases?

38. What procedures must be established to protect information exchange between the United States and foreign forces and governments?

39. Have standard JSOTF special technical operations (STO) billets been activated and indoctrination conducted on special access programs?

(b) **COA Selection**

1. What COA has been selected? Have the pros and cons of each alternative, with regard to enemy options, been fully and objectively assessed (wargamed)?

2. What decisions have yet to be made? What changes to ROE are required?

(c) **Detailed Plan Development**

1. Is the mission clear? Is CDRJSOTF’s intent clear?

2. Are the ROE adequate for the JSOTF mission?

3. Is the COA consistent with the law of war and other aspects of the legal guidelines affecting the operation?

4. Are command relationships clear, unambiguous, and understood by all parties?
   a. Between supporting and supported commanders?
   b. For C2 for SOF?

5. Before operations commence, has the JSOTF J-2 established a JISE?
6. Has a joint PR center been designated or established?

7. Has the CJTF elected to designate functional component commanders?

   a. Have the functional component commands’ staffs been organized so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force?

   b. Are commanders of the other JTF components aware of the functional component commanders’ assigned authority and responsibilities?

   c. Have LNOs from the other JTF and JSOTF components been assigned to functional component commanders to facilitate coordinated joint force operations?

8. Has an airspace control authority been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if a JFACC is designated.) Is required liaison provided?

9. Has an AADC been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided?

10. What is the status of communications?

    a. Have multiple means of communications been provided for?

    b. Is there frequency deconfliction?

    c. Are the joint communications-electronics operation instructions adequate?

    d. Is there a requirement for joint airborne communications assets?

    e. Have common communications security materials (authenticators, operations codes, and keylists) been identified for all circuits, networks, and users?

    f. Are there any other special communications systems support requirements, to include GCCS capability for JSOTF components?

11. What country clearances are required for overflight, landing, or staging? What are the existing (or needed) agreements for overflight; staging; transit and refueling for combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft; and basing rights?

12. What forces and CONOPS are available if the adversary escalates operations abruptly?

13. Has sufficient coordination with allies been conducted?

14. What constraints have been placed on USTRANSCOM’s components (e.g., allocation of lift assets)?
15. What is the status of space system support coordination?

   a. If a ballistic missile threat exists, has a special request for tactical warning support been made to USSTRATCOM’s JSPOC? Additionally, has USSTRATCOM been requested to provide support from the theater event system, to include equipment required to receive downlink data (e.g., constant source and joint tactical terminal)?

   b. Has DOD satellite communications (SATCOM) support been coordinated with the USSTRATCOM through the appropriate regional SATCOM support center (RSSC)?

   c. Has Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Mobile Facility support been coordinated with USSTRATCOM and the appropriate regional satellite communications support center, as required?

   d. Have Global Positioning System (GPS) forecast runs been requested from USSTRATCOM’s JSPOC to determine times and locations of degraded navigational signals?

16. Has an ROE planning cell been formed?

17. Has the enemy situation changed appreciably? If so, what are the effects on the selected COAs?

18. Have all necessary actions been taken to provide for self-defense of JSOTF forces?

19. Will the predicted environmental conditions adversely affect the operation? Who will provide environmental updates to decision makers?

20. Is logistic and administrative planning adequate?

21. Has the OPORD been published?

22. Do the component commanders’ plans adequately address the coordinated employment, direction, and control of their forces in conformity with the JSOTF CONOPS?

23. Is a hand-off to CF required?

(3) Execution

(a) Has intelligence identified enemy movements or changes in the disposition of rear echelon, strategic, or other critical units that may affect special operations?
(b) What is the status of the deployment as planned? Are any phasing or prioritization changes required based on changes in the situation, mission, or strategic or operational lift availability? Are additional SOF required?

(c) Are any other changes necessary to ensure that military action will accomplish the objectives intended?

(d) Are there sufficient civil-military planners to coordinate escalation in military assistance to civilian governments and infrastructure?


a. General

(1) Is the communications system planner brought into the planning process early?

(2) Is a joint communications system planning meeting scheduled? Is a communications system planner from each organization attending the communications system planning meeting?

(3) Are the C2 relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and communications system decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?

(4) Are the communications system planners familiar with the C2 relationships for the JSOTF operation and are these relationships adequately covered in communications system planning documents?

(5) Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?

(6) Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the OPLAN or implementing instructions?

(7) Are support systems adequate to enable the communications system to support each COA being addressed?

(8) Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?

(9) Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable COMSEC devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted UHF SATCOM narrowband secure voice terminals)?

(10) Have adequate IA protections been applied to communications system? Have vulnerabilities been identified and appropriate risk mitigation strategies been evaluated and applied to reduce these vulnerabilities to an acceptable level of risk?
(11) Is the use of the intertheater COMSEC package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying materiel? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has NATO COMSEC been considered for operations in NATO?

(12) Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?

(13) Is there adequate planning to ensure that JCEOI are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed?

(14) Are operations codes available at all commands?

(15) Is planning for SOF and CF interoperability adequate for this operation?

(16) Are procedures in place to adequately plan communications system for special operations under both special operations and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?

(17) Are theater and tactical communications system interfaces (Defense Information System Network entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to senior commanders and the Joint Staff?

(18) Does communications system planning for deployment include command relationships, special operations OPCON procedures, special operations communications for underway sea or airlift, and for Air Mobility Command communications system?

(19) Are deployable GCCS terminals needed and planned for?

(20) Does the JSOTF have qualified GCCS and special operations-unique communications operators?

(21) Is planning adequate to have communications move into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the operation?

(22) Have the functions of the JNCC, if established, been developed and published?

(23) Has the J-6 determined what communications assets are already in the JOA (military, commercial, and other civilian) and can they be used?

(24) Is planning adequate to have the buildup of communications into the objective area early enough to prevent overload of initially deployed communications systems?

(25) Are communications units, equipment, and personnel included in the TPFDD?

(26) Has the operational impact of communications equipment arrival times been brought to the attention of the CDRJSOTF?
(27) Is there enough detail in the TPFDD about communications assets to assist in communications planning?

(28) Are there any special communications needs for the use and transfer of imagery or geospatial information?

(29) Are emission control procedures, requirements for OPSEC, MILDEC, frequency deconfliction, and avoiding mutual interference addressed in planning?

(30) Are communications systems support relationships with Service, agency and non-DOD partners understood?

  (a) Are communications system needs of the mission partners adequately addressed in planning?

  (b) Do the mission partners have sufficient interoperable communications systems support equipment and COMSEC for this operation?

(31) Are communications planners included early in planning for communications support for intelligence systems?

  (a) Have the J-2, J-3, and J-6 prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?

  (b) Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?

  (c) Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the spectrum?

  (d) Are support systems adequate to enable the communications system to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the CDRJSOTF?

  (e) Is the CDRJSOTF aware of various GPS user equipment employed in theater to include commercial sets?

  (f) Has a GPS CONOPS been disseminated?

  (g) Has the JSOTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?

(32) Have procedures been established to ensure the collection of lessons learned and best practices?
(33) Have PR, medical personnel, and communications system personnel coordinated communications early?
   
   (a) Are PR and medical evacuation communications adequately covered in planning?
   
   (b) Are plans for PR and medical evacuation communications adequately promulgated to the JSOTF?

(34) Are dedicated and secure communications for PA and the news media adequately covered in planning?

(35) Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation?

(36) Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets?

(37) Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

b. **Communications and Computer Systems**

(1) Are the following systems available and operational, as required?

   (a) VTC.
   
   (b) JSOTF LAN.
   
   (c) GCCS.
   
   (d) JDISS.
   
   (e) TBMCS.
   
   (f) METOC.
   
   (g) Commercial new(s) stations.
   
   (h) Message center, tactical.
   
   (i) Message center, GateGuard/MDS (general service and special category).
   
   (j) Commercial telephone, STU-III/STE.
   
   (k) Secure facsimile.
   
   (l) Tactical telephone, digital secure voice terminal, or voice over secure internet protocol.
(m) UHF, JTF command network.
(n) UHF, JFACC network.
(o) UHF, combat search and rescue (CSAR) network.
(p) UHF, SCI.
(q) UHF, JSOTF network.
(r) HF, JTF network.
(s) HF, JFACC network.
(t) HF, CSAR network.
(u) HF, SCI.
(v) HF, JSOTF network.
(w) UHF, ARSOF network.
(x) UHF, NAVSOF network.
(y) UHF, JSOACC network.
(z) UHF, special tactics squadron (STS) network.
(aa) UHF, Ranger network.
(bb) HF, ARSOF network.
(cc) HF, NAVSOF network.
(dd) HF, JSOACC network.
(ee) HF, STS network.
(ff) HF, Ranger network.
(gg) Very high frequency (VHF)/frequency modulation (FM), ARSOF network.
(hh) VHF/FM, NAVSOF network.
(ii) VHF/FM, JSOACC network.
(jj) VHF/FM, STS network.
(kk) VHF/FM, Ranger network.
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(ll) UHF/air-to-ground, ARSOF network.

(mm) UHF/air-to-ground, NAVSOF network.

(nn) Global Broadcast System.

(oo) UHF/air-to-ground, JSOACC network.

(pp) UHF/air-to-ground, STS network.

(qq) UHF/air-to-ground, Ranger network.

(rr) Personal computer-to-personal computer transfer.

(ss) Airborne C2 package.

(tt) Tactical chat network.

7. Headquarters Commandant

Site Survey Checklist

a. J-1/HQ commandant, primary contact, and telephone number.

b. Mailing address.

c. Emergency leave procedures.
   (1) Red Cross telephone numbers.
   (2) Scheduled airline ticket office.
      (a) Telephone number.
      (b) Location (street address or road directions).
      (c) Special requirements on temporary duty orders, (i.e., variation authorized).
      (d) Nearest civilian airport (road location).
      (e) Vehicle transport availability.

d. Check cashing facilities.

e. Laundry facilities, telephone number.
   (1) Washers, dryers, and commercial power available.
   (2) Contract service.
(3) Conventional unit supported.

f. Currency conversion.
   (1) Required?
   (2) Cost?
   (3) Nearest bank, money exchange facility, or Class A agent required.

g. Religious service availability.
   (1) Denominations.
   (2) Time.
   (3) Location of facilities.
   (4) Requirements for chaplain assistance.

h. Availability of post exchange service (fixed location or mobile).

i. Availability of MWR items.
   (1) Audio/visual rentals.
   (2) Movie theater, library, book loan, and newspaper service.
   (3) Gym and/or pool.
   (4) Officer and NCO club membership requirements.
   (5) Athletic equipment issue.
   (6) Off site transportation.

j. Orders requirements.
   (1) Temporary duty orders.
   (2) Orders for attachments.
   (3) NATO travel orders.

k. Special Post Operation Report Requirements.

l. Plaques or certificates for HNs (special language requirements), engraving.

m. Barber shop availability.
n. PAO and JVB contact.
o. Medical evacuation procedures.
   (1) Air.
      (a) On-call reaction time to maneuver area.
      (b) Standby.
      (c) Contact procedures.
   (2) Ambulance availability.
   (3) Aid Station/Medical Clinic availability.
      (a) How many beds?
      (b) What type of equipment?
      (c) Capabilities?
   (4) Medical, dental, and pharmacy coverage; flight surgeon for airborne operations
   (5) Hospital facilities, contact, and telephone number.
      (a) Military—contact, location, and telephone number.
      (b) Civilian—contact, location, and telephone number.
      (c) Distance from maneuver area.
p. Requirements for manifest at arrival airfield.
q. J-1/HQ commandant office space requirements.
r. Equipment (computers, printers, desks, chairs, other).
s. Military police support availability, contact, and telephone number.
t. Civilian administrative support, contact, and telephone number.
u. Reproduction and copying capabilities.
v. Interpreter requirements and availability.
w. Uniform requirements (on and off site).
x. Passport required?
y. Safety and environmental concerns, contact, and telephone number.
   (1) In local area.
   (2) In maneuver area, are fires permitted, cutting of trees allowed, digging holes, trash, disposal, and other activities allowed?

z. Medical
   (1) Force health protection and health care capabilities in the operational area.
      (a) Water purification requirements and testing (nitrates, lead, iron, other).
      (b) Recent and ongoing epidemics in local and maneuver area.
   (2) Resupply procedures.
      (a) Nearest US facility.
      (b) Local purchase.
      (c) Method of payment—military interdepartmental purchase request, operational fund, and/or local contract.

aa. Other
   (1) LNO with HN civil authority.
   (2) Off limits areas.
   (3) Availability of very important person quarters, transportation, and meals.
   (4) Reception station procedures for augmentees messing supportability (hours, personnel, costs).

Specific responsibilities from the above checklist may be performed, as directed by the JFC, CDRJSOTF, J-1, or HQ commandant.

8. Staff Judge Advocate
   a. Provide predeployment and postdeployment legal assistance, as necessary.
   b. Interpret and provide advice on status-of-forces agreement, if one exists, and other relevant international agreements.
   c. Brief status-of-forces agreement to all personnel.
   d. Interpret ROE and assist J-3 in training personnel.
e. Assist in development of supplemental ROE, as necessary.

f. Support appropriate law of war training for all personnel.

g. Provide advice during target selection development, including the review of prohibited and limited target lists.

h. Ensure that proper command relationships are identified.

i. Ensure proper processing of all general orders, including orders establishing provisional rear detachments with UCMJ jurisdiction as appropriate.

j. Review and provide advice on plans and procedures.

k. Review and provide advice on procedures for handling detainees, refugees, and displaced persons.

l. Provide advice on procedures for addressing asylum and temporary refuge.

m. Provide commanders advice on maintaining good order and discipline, including prosecutions under the UCMJ, nonjudicial punishment, and other adverse administrative actions.

n. Claims.

(1) Prepare for potential claims events.

(2) Identify and investigate potentially compensable events.

(3) Coordinate with the proper claims adjudication authority to resolve claims.

o. Advise the staff on contract law issues, including fiscal law, military construction, and HA (Denton shipments, Title 10, USC, Section 402, “Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries”).

p. Advise the staff on HN labor law.

q. Advise the staff on environmental law, including hazardous waste disposal.

r. Brief all personnel on appropriate ethical standards.

s. Provide legal advice to other staff agencies, as appropriate.

t. Identify the presence, expertise, and responsibilities of NGOs to the commander as they pertain to the legal issues. Further advise on what obligations the commander has to assist or cooperate with requests from NGOs. The SJA should work closely with other staff elements, primarily the J-2 and J-9, in developing this advice. Commanders may also consider forming an interagency coordination group (see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for more information).
u. Report questionable activity to the general counsel and inspector general of the DOD intelligence component concerned.

v. Determine what other US legal services in the area are available.

w. Are there procedures and formats for reporting to the CDRJSOTF all alleged serious crimes and incidents of national or international interest involving JSOTF personnel (e.g., a serious vehicle mishap)?

x. Are there procedures and authority to convene courts-martial, to administer nonjudicial punishment, or to take other administrative actions for less serious crimes and incidents?

y. Have legal advisors been identified through coordination with Service component for all legal support required by CDRJSOTF?

9. Provost Marshal

a. Which component within the JSOTF will handle detainees, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

b. Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of detainees, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

c. Which component within the JSOTF will handle indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

d. Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-05 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General
   a. Title 10, USC, as amended.
   b. Unified Command Plan.

2. Department of Defense Publications
   a. DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.
   b. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare.
   c. DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.
   d. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.
   e. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3305.06, Special Operations Forces (SOF) Foreign Language Policy.
   f. DODI 6000.11, Patient Movement (PM).

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
   a. CJCSI 3110.01H, 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
   b. CJCSI 3110.05E, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
   c. CJCSI 3110.06D, Special Operations Supplemental to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2010.
   d. CJCSI 3110.10F, Communications Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
   e. CJCSI 3110.12D, Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 2006 (JSCP FY 2006) (U).
   f. CJCS 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
   g. CJCSI 3210.01B, Joint Information Operations Policy (U).
   h. CJCSI 3214.01D, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.
i. CJCSI 3270.01A, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.*

j. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*


l. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*
n. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence.*
q. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.*
r. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations.*
s. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations.*
w. JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations.*
x. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.*
y. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support.*
z. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment.*

aa. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations.*


ll. JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism.*

mm. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*


tt. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs.*

uu. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics.*

vv. JP 4-02, *Health Services.*


xx. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning.*

yy. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System.*

4. **United States Special Operations Command and Service Publications**


   f. USSOCOM Publication 1, *Special Operations.*
Appendix C


h. USSOCOM Document 525-7, Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE).

i. USSOCOM Directive 525-40, Identity Intelligence Operations.

j. MARSOC Publication 1, MARSOF.

k. MARSOC Publication 1-0, Organization, Roles, and Missions.

l. MARSOC Publication 3, Training and Educating MARSOF.

m. Army Tactical Publication 6-03.05/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-36.1/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-05.19/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, v-3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Synchronization.

5. Other Sources


APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 April 2011.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO:  JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JED//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

   c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
### GLOSSARY

#### PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFO</td>
<td>advance force operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSB</td>
<td>afloat forward staging base</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSOAC</td>
<td>Air Force special operations air component</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSOAD</td>
<td>Air Force special operations air detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSOAE</td>
<td>Air Force special operations air element</td>
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<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Air Force special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASOC</td>
<td>air support operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEI</td>
<td>biometrics-enabled intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAIS</td>
<td>civil authority information support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>civil affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRJSOTF</td>
<td>commander, joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRTSOC</td>
<td>commander, theater special operations command</td>
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<td>CDRUSSOCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>conventional forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
</tr>
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<td>CJTF</td>
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<td>CME</td>
<td>civil-military engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSE</td>
<td>civil-military support element</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command (command authority)</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>COMAFOAC</td>
<td>commander, Air Force special operations air component</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>counter threat finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWMD</td>
<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>direct action</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATT</td>
<td>defense attaché</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>DODIN</td>
<td>Department of Defense information networks</td>
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<td>DOMEX</td>
<td>document and media exploitation</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>electromagnetic spectrum</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>F3EAD</td>
<td>find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEI</td>
<td>forensic-enabled intelligence</td>
</tr>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FRAGORD</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>FSF</td>
<td>foreign security forces</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>GMSC</td>
<td>Global Mission Support Center (USSOCOM)</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>I2</td>
<td>identity intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAPP</td>
<td>Interagency Partnership Program</td>
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<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>intelligence community</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>information-related capability</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>J-6</td>
<td>communications system directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>joint air operations center</td>
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<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
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<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
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<td>JIOC</td>
<td>joint intelligence operations center</td>
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<td>joint military information support task force</td>
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<td>JP</td>
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<td>joint planning group</td>
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<td>joint special operations area</td>
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<td>JSOC</td>
<td>joint special operations command</td>
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<td>joint special operations task force</td>
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<td>JSOU</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations University</td>
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<td>JTAC</td>
<td>joint terminal attack controller</td>
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<td>joint targeting coordination board</td>
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<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>joint visitors bureau</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>MARSOC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>MARSOF</td>
<td>Marine Corps special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>METOC</td>
<td>meteorological and oceanographic</td>
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<td>MILDEC</td>
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<td>MSOR</td>
<td>Marine Special Operations Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVSOF</td>
<td>Navy special operations forces</td>
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<td>NAVSPECWARCOM</td>
<td>Naval Special Warfare Command</td>
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<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Capital Region (US)</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NSW</td>
<td>naval special warfare</td>
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<td>NSWTF</td>
<td>naval special warfare task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSWTG</td>
<td>naval special warfare task group</td>
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<td>NSWTU</td>
<td>naval special warfare task unit</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPE</td>
<td>operational preparation of the environment</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>open-source intelligence</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<td>PAG</td>
<td>public affairs guidance</td>
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<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>partnership development team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>preparation of the environment</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
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<td>PN</td>
<td>partner nation</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>senior defense official</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>special forces</td>
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<td>security force assistance</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<td>SMU</td>
<td>special mission unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOA</td>
<td>special operations aviation (Army)</td>
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<td>SOCCCE</td>
<td>special operations command and control element</td>
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<td>special operations support team</td>
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<td>special operations task force</td>
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<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>TIP</td>
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<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTL</td>
<td>tagging, tracking, and locating</td>
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<td>UA</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft</td>
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<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTI</td>
<td>weapons technical intelligence</td>
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</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

advanced force operations. Operations conducted to refine the location of specific, identified targets and further develop the operational environment for near-term missions. Also called AFO. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

advanced operations base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Air Force special operations air component. The Air Force component of a joint special operations force, normally composed of a special operations wing, special operations group, or squadron, and element of an Air Force special tactics personnel. Also called AFSOAC. (Approved for replacement of “Air Force special operations component” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

Air Force special operations air detachment. A squadron-size headquarters that could be a composite organization composed of different Air Force special operations assets, normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations air component, joint special operations air component, joint special operations task force, or a joint task force. Also called AFSOAD. (Approved for replacement of “Air Force special operations detachment” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

Army special operations component. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

bare base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

CARVER. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
compartmentation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. Also called CF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

counter threat finance. Activities conducted to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and use of assets to fund activities that support an adversary’s ability to negatively affect United States interests. Also called CTF. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

denied area. An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Also called DA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

dry deck shelter. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

earliest anticipated launch time. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

emergency resupply. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

feasibility assessment. A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for special operations forces employment. Also called FA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)

force multiplier. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

forward operations base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

general purchasing agents. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

guerrilla warfare. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

infiltration. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
initial assessment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

interdepartmental or agency support. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

joint after action report. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

joint combined exchange training. A program conducted overseas to fulfill United States forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between United States forces and host nation counterparts. Also called JCET. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

joint servicing. That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in support of two or more Services. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air activities. Also called JSOACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

low-visibility operations. Sensitive operations wherein the diplomatic-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities and with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (Approved for replacement of “low visibility operations” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

main operations base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Marine Corps special operations forces. Those Active Component Marine Corps forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called MARSOF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)

mobile training team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

naval special warfare. A naval warfare specialty that conducts special operations with an emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments using small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. Also called NSW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
**Glossary**

**naval special warfare forces.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**naval special warfare group.** A permanent Navy echelon III major command to which most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. Also called **NSWG.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**naval special warfare task element.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**naval special warfare task group.** A provisional naval special warfare organization that plans, conducts, and supports special operations in support of fleet commanders and joint force special operations component commanders. Also called **NSWTG.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)

**naval special warfare task unit.** A provisional subordinate unit of a naval special warfare task group. Also called **NSWTU.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)

**naval special warfare unit.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**Navy special operations component.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**Navy special operations forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component Navy forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called **NAVSOF.** (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**on-call resupply.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**operational preparation of the environment.** The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment. Also called **OPE.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)

**partisan warfare.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**preparation of the environment.** An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations. Also called **PE.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

**Rangers.** Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

**recovery zone.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
resistance movement. An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

SEAL delivery vehicle team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with SEAL delivery vehicles, dry deck shelters, and other submersible platforms. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

SEAL team. United States Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

seaward launch point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

seaward recovery point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Service-common. Equipment, material, supplies, and services including base operating support adopted by a Service to support its own forces and those assigned to the combatant commands; items and services defined as Service-common by one Service are not necessarily Service-common for all other Services. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special access program. A sensitive acquisition, intelligence, or operations and support program, that imposes need-to-know and access controls beyond those normally provided for access to confidential, secret, or top secret information. Also called SAP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special actions. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special air operation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special boat squadron. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special boat team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special forces. United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special forces group. The largest Army combat element for special operations consisting of command and control, special forces battalions, and a support battalion capable of long duration missions. Also called SFG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

special mission unit. A generic term to represent an organization composed of operations and support personnel that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities. Also called SMU. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
special operations. Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special operations combat control team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special operations command. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special operations command and control element. A special operations element that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces activities. Also called SOCCE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE JP 3-05)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special operations joint task force. A modular, tailorable, and scalable special operations task force designed to provide integrated, fully-capable, and enabled joint special operations forces to geographic combatant commanders and joint force commanders. Also called SOJTF. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special operations mission planning folder. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special operations naval mobile environment team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special operations task force. A scalable unit, normally of battalion size, in charge of the special operations element, organized around the nucleus of special operations forces and support elements. Also called SOTF. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
special operations weather team. A task organized team of Air Force personnel organized, trained, and equipped to collect critical environmental information from data sparse areas. Also called SOWT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

special operations wing. An Air Force special operations wing. Also called SOW. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-05 as the source JP.)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Also called SR. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

special tactics team. An Air Force task-organized element of special tactics that may include combat control, pararescue, tactical air control party, and special operations weather personnel. Also called STT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

target critical damage point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

target stress point. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected targets and specific missions as well as general and specific instructions for accomplishment of the mission. Also called TASKORD. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

theater special operations command. A subordinate unified command established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. Also called TSOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

unconventional warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**Joint Doctrine Publications Hierarchy**
- JP 1
  - JP 1-0: Personnel
  - JP 2-0: Intelligence
  - JP 3-0: Operations
  - JP 4-0: Logistics
  - JP 5-0: Plans
  - JP 6-0: Communications System

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