Global Risk

Status of World Nuclear Forces

03.29.24 | 4 min read | Text by Hans Kristensen & Matt Korda & Eliana Johns & Mackenzie Knight & Kate Kohn

Who owns the world’s nuclear weapons?

Despite progress in reducing nuclear weapon arsenals since the Cold War, the world’s combined inventory of nuclear warheads remains at a very high level: nine countries possessed roughly 12,121 warheads as of early-2024.

Combined, the United States and Russia now possess approximately 88 percent of the world’s total inventory of nuclear weapons, and 84 percent of the stockpiled warheads available for use by the military. Currently, no other nuclear-armed state sees a need for more than a few hundred nuclear weapons for national security, although many of these states are increasing their nuclear stockpiles.

Globally, the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is slowing compared with the past 30 years. Moreover, these reductions are happening only because the United States and Russia are still dismantling previously retired warheads.

In contrast to the overall inventory of nuclear weapons, the number of warheads in global military stockpiles – which comprises warheads assigned to operational forces – is increasing once again. The United States is still reducing its nuclear stockpile slowly. France and Israel have relatively stable inventories. But China, India, North Korea, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, as well as possibly Russia, are all thought to be increasing their stockpiles (see map below, click here for higher resolution image):

Of the world’s approximate 12,121 nuclear warheads, roughly 9,585 are in the military stockpiles for use by missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines.  The remaining warheads have been retired but are still relatively intact and are awaiting dismantlement). Of the 9,585 warheads in the military stockpiles, some 3,904 are deployed with operational forces (on missiles or bomber bases). Of those, approximately 2,100 US, Russian, British and French warheads are on high alert, ready for use on short notice (see table):

Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2024
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, Federation of American Scientists, 2024

The exact number of nuclear weapons in each country’s possession is a closely held national secret, so the estimates presented here come with significant uncertainty. Most nuclear-armed states provide essentially no information about the sizes of their nuclear stockpiles. Yet the degree of secrecy varies considerably from country to country. Between 2010 and 2018, the United States disclosed its total stockpile size, but in 2019 the Trump administration stopped that practice. In 2020, the Biden administration restored nuclear transparency – a brief victory for nuclear accountability in a democratic country – but then declined to declassify any US stockpile data for 2021, 2022, or 2023. Similarly, in 2021 the United Kingdom announced that it would no longer disclose public figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. Additionally, as of 2024 both the United States and Russia have elected to no longer exchange publicly-available data about their deployed strategic warheads and launchers as mandated by the New START Treaty.

Despite these limitations, however, publicly available information, careful analysis of historical records, and occasional leaks make it possible to make best estimates about the size and composition of the national nuclear weapon stockpiles. For a breakdown of the nuclear warhead categories of the different nuclear-armed states, and for links to more details overviews of each country’s arsenals, see this table:

Status of World Nuclear Forces, 2024
CountryDeployed StrategicDeployed NonstrategicReserve/NondeployedMilitary Stockpile(a)Total Inventory(b)
United States1,670(g)100(h)1,9383,708(i)5,044(j)
United Kingdom120n.a.105225225(m)
North Korea0n.a.505050(q)
Status of World Nuclear Forces, 2024

How to read this table: “Deployed strategic warheads” are those deployed on intercontinental missiles and at heavy bomber bases. “Deployed nonstrategic warheads” are those deployed on bases with operational short-range delivery systems. “Reserve/Nondeployed” warheads are those not deployed on launchers but in storage (weapons at bomber bases are considered deployed). The “military stockpile” includes active and inactive warheads that are in the custody of the military and earmarked for use by commissioned deliver vehicles. The “total inventory” includes warheads in the military stockpile as well as retired, but still intact, warheads in the queue for dismantlement. For additional guidance, see endnotes below (note: as estimates are updated, they may vary from the printed materials below).

Expand Footnotes

a Warheads in the “military stockpile” are defined as warheads in the custody of the military and earmarked for use by military forces.
 b The “total inventory” counts warheads in the military stockpile as well as retired, but still intact, warheads awaiting dismantlement.
 c This number is higher than the aggregate data under the New START Treaty because this table also counts bomber weapons at bomber bases as deployed. Detailed overview of Russian forces as of 2024 is here. Numbers have been updated for later changes.
 d All are declared to be in central storage, although some storage sites may be close to bases with operational forces. Many retired non-strategic warheads are thought to be awaiting dismantlement.
 e Includes an estimated 1,112 strategic warheads and all 1,558 non-strategic warheads.
 f In addition to the 4,380 warheads in the military stockpile, an estimated 1,200 retired warheads are thought to be awaiting dismantlement. Public details are scarce, but we estimate that Russia is dismantling 200-300 retired warheads per year. The future of the Russian stockpile size is debated: US Strategic Command and part of the Intelligence Community claim “Russia’s overall nuclear stockpile is likely to grow significantly over the next decade – growth driven primarily by a projected increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Others privately disagree. A major uncertainty is how many tactical weapons will be replaced by new nuclear versions versus conventional weapons. See 2024 overview of Russian forces here.
 g This number is higher than the aggregate data released under the New START data because this table also counts bomber weapons on bomber bases as deployed. Detailed overview of 2024 U.S. forces is here.
 h Approximately 100 B61 bombs are deployed in Europe at six bases in five countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey).
 i The U.S. government declared in March 2018 that its stockpile included 3,822 warheads as of September 2017. After that, the Trump administration decided no longer to declassify the numbers. In 2021, the Biden administration declassified the number of warheads in the stockpile and the number of dismantled warheads, noting that the stockpile consisted of 3,750 warheads as of September 2020. Since then, additional warheads have been retired for an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,700 warheads.
 j In addition to the roughly 3,700 warheads in the military stockpile and the approximate 1,500 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement, roughly 20,000 plutonium cores (pits) and some 4,000 Canned Assemblies (secondaries) from dismantled warheads are in storage at the Pantex Plant in Texas and Y-12 plant in Tennessee. For a detailed 2023 overview of U.S. forces, see here.
 k Weapons for France’s single aircraft carrier are not deployed on the ship under normal circumstances but could be on short notice. Warhead loadings on some submarines missiles have been reduced to increase targeting flexibility. For a detailed overview of French nuclear forces, see here).
 l The Chinese stockpile is increasing, and in 2022 the US Department of Defense claimed that by 2030 China’s nuclear stockpile “will have about 1,000 operational nuclear warheads.” Part of that increase is already well underway and our estimate includes some of it; however, these claims depend on many uncertain factors, including how many missile silos will be built, how many warheads each missile will carry, and assumptions about the future production of fissile materials by China. A small number of the warheads are now thought to be deployed, while the rest are kept in storage under central control. China considers all of its nuclear weapons to be strategic, but the US military calls its medium-and intermediate-range missile non-strategic. Our detailed 2024 overview of Chinese nuclear forces is here.
 m The number of British warheads on each submarine was lowered from 48 to 40. This lowered the number of “operationally available” warheads from 160 to 120. The plan was to reduce the stockpile to “not more than 180” by the mid-2020s, but the Johnson government announced in 2021 that it would increase the stockpile to “no more than 260 warheads.” Detailed overview of UK nuclear forces here.
 n Although Israel has produced enough plutonium for 100-200 warheads, the number of delivery platforms and estimates made by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that the stockpile might include approximately 90 warheads. Detailed 2021 overview here.
 o Estimating the number of Pakistani warheads comes with great uncertainty because neither Pakistan nor western governments provide public information. None of Pakistan’s warheads are thought to be mated with missiles but kept in central storage, most in the southern parts of the country. More warheads are in production. Detailed 2023 overview here.
 p Estimating the number of Indian warheads comes with great uncertainty because neither Indian nor western governments provide public information. Despite efforts to increase readiness, we estimate Indian nuclear warheads are not mated with missiles but in central storage. Bomber weapons could probably be employed on relatively short notice. More warheads are in production. Detailed 2022 overview here.
 q After six nuclear tests, including two of 10-20 kilotons and one of more than 150 kilotons, we estimate that North Korea might have produced sufficient fissile material for up to 90 warheads. The number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower. We estimate that North Korea might have approximately 50 assembled warheads, although this number is certainly increasing. Detailed 2022 overview here.
 r Numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational status of the four lesser nuclear weapons states and the uncertainty about the size of the total inventories of three of the five initial nuclear powers.

In historical context, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined significantly since the Cold War: down from a peak of approximately 70,300 in 1986 to an estimated 12,100 in early-2024. Government officials often characterize that accomplishment as a result of current or recent arms control agreements, but in reality the overwhelming portion of the reduction happened in the 1990s. Some also compare today’s numbers with those of the 1950s, but that is like comparing apples and oranges; today’s forces are vastly more capable.

The pace of reduction has slowed significantly compared with the 1990s and appears to continue only because of dismantlement of retired weapons; the trend is that the military stockpiles (useable nuclear weapons) are increasing again.

Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Stockpiles
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Robert S. Norris, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, Federation of American Scientists, 2024

Instead of planning for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-armed states appear to plan to retain large arsenals for the indefinite future. As such, they are in conflict with the objective and spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

All continue to modernize their remaining nuclear forces at a significant pace, several are adding new types and/or increasing the role they serve in national strategy and public statements, and all appear committed to retaining nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.

For an overview of global modernization programs, see our contributions to the SIPRI Yearbook and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor. Individual country profiles are available from the FAS Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

The information available for each country varies greatly, ranging from the most transparent nuclear weapons state (United States) to the most opaque (Israel). Accordingly, while the stockpile estimate for the United States is based on “real” numbers, the estimates for several of the other nuclear-armed states are highly uncertain.

These nuclear weapons estimates are produced by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight of the Federation of American Scientists. Their work is based on the pioneering accomplishments of analysts Thomas Cochran, Robert Norris, and William Arkin, without whom this public service would not be possible.

This work is made possible through grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Future of Life Institute, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Longview Philanthropy, the New-Land Foundation, the Prospect Hill Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and individual donors. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.