It is important to understand that there is no rigorous, consensual definition of what constitutes classified information. Instead, in a practical sense, classified information is whatever the executive branch says it is.
(A minority of classified information, such as nuclear weapons design information, is specified and protected by statute. The remainder, the large majority, is classified by executive order.)
In 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency declassified the total intelligence budget for that year ($26.6 billion). But intelligence budget figures from three, four and five decades earlier remain classified. Why? Because the CIA says so!
One might argue that it should be the other way around — budget figures from the remote past should be declassified while more recent figures should perhaps be classified. But such logic is foreign to CIA classification policy, and to the classification system as a whole.
By far the most sensitive government document Secrecy News has obtained in recent years is a January 2006 military manual that explains in nearly 200 pages of detail exactly how to use a particular type of weapon that is known to pose a significant terrorist threat.
If there is anything that should be classified in the interests of national security, this manual would seem to be it. Yet it is unclassified. Distribution is “unlimited.”
The conclusion that emerges from the chaos of government information policy is that the classification system is essentially an administrative tool used by the executive branch for its own internal purposes. It is a poor index of what is sensitive and what is not.
By preparing credible, bipartisan options now, before the bill becomes law, we can give the Administration a plan that is ready to implement rather than another study that gathers dust.
Even as companies and countries race to adopt AI, the U.S. lacks the capacity to fully characterize the behavior and risks of AI systems and ensure leadership across the AI stack. This gap has direct consequences for Commerce’s core missions.
The last remaining agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons has now expired. For the first time since 1972, there is no treaty-bound cap on strategic nuclear weapons.
As states take up AI regulation, they must prioritize transparency and build technical capacity to ensure effective governance and build public trust.