U.S. Assistance to Iraq, Post-War Germany, Japan Compared (CRS)
The total amount of U.S. aid to Iraq since 2003 is already comparable to post-World War II U.S. assistance to Germany and nearly double that provided to Japan, according to a new Congressional Research Service analysis (pdf).
“U.S. assistance to Germany totaled some $4.3 billion ($29.6 billion in 2005 dollars) for the years of direct military government (May 1945-May 1949) and the overlapping Marshall Plan years (1948/1949-1952).”
“Total U.S. assistance to Japan for the years of the occupation, from 1946-1952 was roughly $2.2 billion ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars), of which almost $1.7 billion was grants and $504 million was loans.”
By comparison, “U.S. assistance to Iraq appropriated from FY2003 to FY2006 totaled some $28.9 billion.”
The CRS report is careful to note the various distinctions between the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the occupations of Germany and Japan.
For one thing, “Unlike the cases of Germany and Japan, there was no massive humanitarian crisis requiring aid in Iraq.”
On the other hand, “Iraq also faces an insurgency that deliberately sabotages the economy and reconstruction efforts, whereas there were no resistance movements in either Germany or Japan.”
CRS does not permit direct public access to its products. A copy of the new report was obtained by Secrecy News.
See “U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared,” March 23, 2006.
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