Treasury Classification Guide, and Other Resources
The Department of the Treasury has recently produced a consolidated classification guide, detailing exactly what kinds of Treasury information may be classified at what level and for how long. It is in such agency classification guides, not in high-level government-wide policy statements, that the nuts and bolts of government secrecy policy are to be found, and perhaps to be changed. See “Security Classification Guide” (pdf), Department of the Treasury, December 2010.
The Congressional Research Service yesterday offered its assessment of the Stuxnet worm, which was evidently designed to damage industrial control systems such as those used in Iran’s nuclear program. See “The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability” (pdf), December 9, 2010.
Intelligence historian Jeffrey Richelson has written what must be the definitive account of the rise and fall of the National Applications Office, the aborted Department of Homeland Security entity that was supposed to harness intelligence capabilities for domestic security and law enforcement applications. The article, which is not freely available online, is entitled “The Office That Never Was: The Failed Creation of the National Applications Office.” It appears in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 65-118 (2011).
The latest issue of the Journal of National Security Law & Policy (vol. 4, no. 2) is now available online. Entitled “Liberty, terrorism and the laws of war,” it includes several noteworthy and informative papers on intelligence and security policy.
With summer 2025 in the rearview mirror, we’re taking a look back to see how federal actions impacted heat preparedness and response on the ground, what’s still changing, and what the road ahead looks like for heat resilience.
Satellite imagery of RAF Lakenheath reveals new construction of a security perimeter around ten protective aircraft shelters in the designated nuclear area, the latest measure in a series of upgrades as the base prepares for the ability to store U.S. nuclear weapons.
It will take consistent leadership and action to navigate the complex dangers in the region and to avoid what many analysts considered to be an increasingly possible outcome, a nuclear conflict in East Asia.
Getting into a shutdown is the easy part, getting out is much harder. Both sides will be looking to pin responsibility on each other, and the court of public opinion will have a major role to play as to who has the most leverage for getting us out.