“Air Force intelligence components do not engage in experimentation involving human subjects for intelligence purposes,” a new Air Force Instruction (pdf) states categorically.
Except for the exceptions.
“Any exception would require approval by the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Air Force and would be undertaken only with the informed consent of the subject and in accordance with procedures established by AF/SG to safeguard the welfare of subjects.”
The new Instruction presents a generally scrupulous account of the regulatory framework within which Air Force intelligence operates. It addresses domestic search and surveillance, imagery collection and dissemination, mail covers, and other intelligence activities.
See Air Force Instruction 14-104, “Oversight of Intelligence Activities,” 16 April 2007.
Some other noteworthy new Air Force Instructions include these (both pdf):
AFI 10-2604, “Disease Containment Planning Guidance,” 6 April 2007.
AFI 40-201, “Managing Radioactive Materials in the U.S. Air Force,” 13 April 2007.
January saw us watching whether the government would fund science. February has been about how that funding will be distributed, regulated, and contested.
This rule gives agencies significantly more authority over certain career policy roles. Whether that authority improves accountability or creates new risks depends almost entirely on how agencies interrupt and apply it.
Our environmental system was built for 1970s-era pollution control, but today it needs stable, integrated, multi-level governance that can make tradeoffs, share and use evidence, and deliver infrastructure while demonstrating that improved trust and participation are essential to future progress.
Durable and legitimate climate action requires a government capable of clearly weighting, explaining, and managing cost tradeoffs to the widest away of audiences, which in turn requires strong technocratic competency.