NRC Rescinds Secrecy Surrounding HEU Fuel Exports
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission says that it will no longer conceal the amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel proposed for export to foreign research reactors. The announcement marks a step back from the heightened secrecy adopted by the NRC and other government agencies post-September 11.
The revised policy had been sought by the Nuclear Control Institute, a non-proliferation advocacy organization, and the move was disclosed in an August 31 letter (pdf) to the Institute.
“After considering your recommendations and various other factors, NRC will discontinue automatically withholding material quantity information from the public versions of export license applications,” wrote NRC Chairman Dale E. Klein to NCI analyst Alan J. Kuperman.
Henceforward, “Federal Register notices for proposed HEU exports will also include quantities requested,” Chairman Klein wrote.
The Nuclear Control Institute had argued that such disclosure serves the public interest because it enables public vetting of applications for HEU exports and thereby helps to ensure that traffic in weapons-grade uranium is minimized.
NCI analyst Kuperman commended the NRC for “rethinking and reversing a secrecy policy that was a counter-productive over-reaction to the attacks of September 11.”
He said the new openness policy will “assist the Commission to fulfill its statutory responsibility to minimize commerce in bomb-grade uranium.”
“The NRC will continue to withhold information on projected or actual shipment schedules, delivery dates, … or any other related logistical information… as this information could be useful to a potential adversary,” Chairman Klein wrote.
The program invites teams of researchers and local government collaborators to propose innovative projects addressing real-world transportation, safety, equity, and resilience challenges using mobility data.
The Pentagon’s new report provides additional context and useful perspectives on events in China that took place over the past year.
Successful NC3 modernization must do more than update hardware and software: it must integrate emerging technologies in ways that enhance resilience, ensure meaningful human control, and preserve strategic stability.
The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) paints a picture of a Congress that is working to both protect and accelerate nuclear modernization programs while simultaneously lacking trust in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy to execute them.