In a report released this week by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), FAS analyst Matt Schroeder provides an unprecedented look at global efforts to counter the terrorist threat from Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). The report, which appears as an appendix in this year’s edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, goes beyond mainstream media coverage of counter-MANPADS efforts (i.e. the myopic focus on anti-missile systems) by providing detailed summaries of oft-ignored but critically important programs to secure MANPADS inventories, destroy surplus missiles, collect missiles from the black market, and strengthen export controls. Also assessed are the strengths and limitations of the various anti-missile systems that are currently being considered for installation on commercial airliners and at airports. The appendix concludes with a list of recommendations for expanding and strengthening international counter-MANPADS efforts.
The SIPRI Yearbook is published annually by Oxford University Press.
For more information:
“Appendix 14A: Global Efforts to Control MANPADS” in SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, June 2007). A summary of the appendix is available on SIPRI’s website.
The Small Arms Trade (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007). Chapters 5 through 8 provide a 30-year overview of manpads proliferation and control efforts.
ASMP Issue Brief #1: MANPADS Proliferation. The Issue Brief is one of the largest online repositories of information on manpads and features links to over 300 articles, reports, and policy documents on manpads, their proliferation, and control efforts.
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