The elite JASON defense science advisory panel, most of whose deliberations and conclusions are classified, surfaced publicly for a moment with two new releases.
One new JASON report addresses the feasibility of reducing Defense Department dependence on fossil fuels.
“In light of an increasing U.S. dependence on foreign oil, as well as rising fuel costs for the U.S. and the DoD, and implications with regard to national security and national defense, JASON was charged in 2006 by the DDR&E [Director, Defense Research and Engineering] with assessing pathways to reduce DoD’s dependence on fossil fuels.”
A copy of the report was obtained by Secrecy News.
See “Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence,” JASON report JSR-06-135, September 2006 (105 pages, 4.5 MB PDF).
The second release is an unclassified summary of a JASON review of plutonium aging in nuclear weapons, which found that most plutonium weapon “pits” have “credible lifetimes of at least 100 years.” This important conclusion diminishes the case for any new nuclear weapon development.
See the unclassified executive summary (pdf) of the JASON report on “Pit Lifetime” (flagged by ArmsControlWonk.com).
While it seems that the current political climate may not incentivize the use of evidence-based data sources for decision making, those of us who are passionate about ensuring results for the American people will continue to firmly stand on the belief that learning agendas are a crucial component to successfully navigate a changing future.
In recent months, we’ve seen much of these decades’ worth of progress erased. Contracts for evaluations of government programs were canceled, FFRDCs have been forced to lay off staff, and federal advisory committees have been disbanded.
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits.
At a recent workshop, we explored the nature of trust in specific government functions, the risk and implications of breaking trust in those systems, and how we’d known we were getting close to specific trust breaking points.