Mumbai Attacks, Official Secrets, and Soviet Centrifuges
The Congressional Research Service has issued — but has not publicly released — a new report on “Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests” (pdf), December 19, 2008.
The history of official secrets legislation in the United Kingdom is set forth in a new memorandum (pdf) from the UK House of Commons Library, which also provides background on notable cases involving unauthorized disclosures of classified government information (flagged by Docuticker.com). See “Official Secrecy,” December 30, 2008.
The challenges and benefits of improving intelligence sensor data integration are discussed in a new joint report from the Defense Science Board and the Intelligence Science Board. See “Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence” (pdf), November 2008.
A 1957 account (pdf) of centrifuge research in the Soviet Union by Austrian physicist Gernot Zippe, translated (and partially redacted) by the Central Intelligence Agency, is now available online. See “The Problem of Uranium Isotope Separation by Means of Ultracentrifuge in the USSR,” 8 October 1957.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.