The role of scientific research in weapon development was explored through four case studies written in 1984 by arms control scholar Milton Leitenberg. The case studies examine the development of anti-satellite weapons; weather modification; Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs); and biological weapons research.
Military research does not cause arms races, Leitenberg argued, nor is it autonomous or self-sustaining. Rather, military R&D is driven by a deliberate political process. Weapons systems are “produced by an enormous enterprise consciously established by political decision to produce them.”
“Military R&D is guided and directed: questions are put; particular materials, effects, and performance capabilities are sought; and research funding is allocated accordingly.”
It follows that a reallocation of research funding is also a political possibility. “Particularly in the area of weapons development and procurement decisions, there seems to be extremely little, if any, ‘technological imperative’ [that would somehow compel certain technology choices],” Leitenberg wrote.
The studies were originally prepared in support of a United Nations report. That UN report was never released, the author explains, due to objections from a Soviet official who wanted references to the USSR excised. But the supporting studies have now been published on the Federation of American Scientists website. See “Studies on Military R&D and Weapons Development” by Milton Leitenberg, 1984.
A lack of sustained federal funding, deteriorating research infrastructure and networks, restrictive immigration policies, and waning international collaboration are driving this erosion into a full-scale “American Brain Drain.”
With 2000 nuclear weapons on alert, far more powerful than the first bomb tested in the Jornada Del Muerto during the Trinity Test 80 years ago, our world has been fundamentally altered.
As the United States continues nuclear modernization on all legs of its nuclear triad through the creation of new variants of warheads, missiles, and delivery platforms, examining the effects of nuclear weapons production on the public is ever more pressing.
“The first rule of government transformation is: there are a lot of rules. And there should be-ish. But we don’t need to wait for permission to rewrite them. Let’s go fix and build some things and show how it’s done.”