The Intelligence Science Board (ISB), which was established in 2002 to provide independent scientific advice to the Director of National Intelligence, has been disbanded by the new DNI, James R. Clapper Jr., as part of a process of reorganizing and streamlining the ODNI organization.
“My understanding is that the Director will be disbanding all 20 of his advisory boards, which includes the ISB,” one participant in Intelligence Science Board studies told Secrecy News.
DNI Clapper “did a zero base review of all outside advisory boards as part of an efficiency review,” an ODNI official said. “The new strategy is to have one Senior Advisory Group and then convene Task Forces on specific issues as needed.” The Task Forces in turn “may have expiration dates.” The membership of the new umbrella Advisory Group is now in formation, the official said.
The overall contribution of the Intelligence Science Board is difficult for an outsider to assess, since little of its work has been made public. But the Board’s 2006 report on “Educing Information” (pdf), which authoritatively explained that there was no empirical justification for the use of coercive interrogation (or torture), remains a milestone in the field. It demonstrated independent judgment as well as immediate policy relevance.
An ODNI spokesman said the move to eliminate the Board should not be seen as a rejection of science advice, but as a step toward a smaller standing bureaucracy and increased efficiency.
“One of the things I’m doing is… essentially restructuring the Office of the Director of National Intelligence” said DNI Clapper at an October 6 speech (pdf) to the Bipartisan Policy Center.
While it seems that the current political climate may not incentivize the use of evidence-based data sources for decision making, those of us who are passionate about ensuring results for the American people will continue to firmly stand on the belief that learning agendas are a crucial component to successfully navigate a changing future.
In recent months, we’ve seen much of these decades’ worth of progress erased. Contracts for evaluations of government programs were canceled, FFRDCs have been forced to lay off staff, and federal advisory committees have been disbanded.
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits.
At a recent workshop, we explored the nature of trust in specific government functions, the risk and implications of breaking trust in those systems, and how we’d known we were getting close to specific trust breaking points.