Lists of radio frequencies assigned to the U.S. Air Force’s Civil Air Patrol (CAP) will henceforth be withheld from public disclosure, according to a January 2006 memorandum (pdf) from the CAP National Commander.
“It has come to our attention that the radio frequency assignments provided us by the USAF are considered sensitive information and require protection from unauthorized release,” wrote Maj. General Antonio J. Pineda.
“Such [information] must be removed from public access, such as on the Web, and may not be released to outside agencies without coordination,” he wrote.
“As we prepare for an increased role in Homeland Security, it is very likely we will encounter additional information requiring our protection.”
“A rigid stance on information security shows that we continue to be a professional partner in the defense of our nation,” he wrote.
“A rigid stance on information security,” of course, is the source and the driver of a whole set of other problems. But that is beyond the scope of this memo.
See “Protection of Radio Frequency Information,” US Air Force Civil Air Patrol, January 20, 2006.
Also in the sensitive but unclassified (SBU) category is the Department of Energy’s venerable “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information” (UCNI) marking.
Unlike most other SBU designations, UCNI has been defined with some specificity. Official guidelines (pdf) spell out exactly what is and what is not within its proper boundaries.
UCNI is also authorized by statute, not invented out of whole cloth, and it carries enormous financial penalties for those who disclose it without authorization. For these reasons, it will be a particular challenge to integrate UCNI policy into a uniform, government-wide policy on sensitive but unclassified information.
For official guidance on UCNI, see “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, General Guideline GG-5,” Department of Energy, February 2004.
On Tuesday, December 23rd, the Department of Defense released its annual congressionally-mandated report on China’s military developments, also known as the “China Military Power Report,” or “CMPR.” The report is typically a valuable injection of information into the open source landscape, and represents a useful barometer for how the Pentagon assesses both the intentions and […]
Successful NC3 modernization must do more than update hardware and software: it must integrate emerging technologies in ways that enhance resilience, ensure meaningful human control, and preserve strategic stability.
The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) paints a picture of a Congress that is working to both protect and accelerate nuclear modernization programs while simultaneously lacking trust in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy to execute them.
For Impact Fellow John Whitmer, working in public service was natural. “I’ve always been around people who make a living by caring.”