When the government revoked the security clearance of J. Robert Oppenheimer on purported national security grounds in April 1954, it sent shock waves through the scientific community and elsewhere.
If Oppenheimer, the man who had done more than any other individual to advance the development of the atomic bomb, was a security risk to the nation, then who might not be?
In the aftermath of the Oppenheimer proceeding, the Federation of American Scientists issued two short statements (pdf) on how to improve personnel security policy so as “to safeguard the rights of present and prospective government employees and to promote the true security of the nation.”
The FAS statements, presented to Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss in July 1954, still have some pertinence today.
Secrecy News’ friend Priscilla McMillan’s superb account of the security proceeding against Oppenheimer has just been published in paperback.
See “The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer” by Priscilla J. McMillan, Penguin Books, 2006.
Successful NC3 modernization must do more than update hardware and software: it must integrate emerging technologies in ways that enhance resilience, ensure meaningful human control, and preserve strategic stability.
The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) paints a picture of a Congress that is working to both protect and accelerate nuclear modernization programs while simultaneously lacking trust in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy to execute them.
For Impact Fellow John Whitmer, working in public service was natural. “I’ve always been around people who make a living by caring.”
While advanced Chinese language proficiency and cultural familiarity remain irreplaceable skills, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for successful open-source analysis on China’s nuclear forces.