Negotiating with North Korea: History and Options
The alternative to military conflict with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program is to advance some kind of negotiated settlement. But what would that be? And how could it be achieved?
A new report from the Congressional Research Service summarizes the limited successes of past nuclear negotiations between the US and North Korea, including lessons learned. Looking forward, it discusses the features of possible negotiations that would need to be determined, such as the specific goals to be achieved, preconditions for negotiations (if any), the format (bilateral or multilateral), and potential linkage to other policy issues.
See Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea: In Brief, December 4, 2017.
See also Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea, CRS In Focus, September 4, 2017.
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