DoD Adds “Credibility Assessment” to Polygraph Program
The Department of Defense has revised and supplemented its polygraph program to include non-polygraph techniques for detecting deception.
A new Pentagon directive (pdf) introduces the term “Credibility Assessment (CA),” which refers to “The multi-disciplinary field of existing as well as potential techniques and procedures to assess truthfulness that relies on physiological reactions and behavioral measures to test the agreement between an individual’s memories and statements.”
The new directive also transfers the polygraph program from the Defense Security Service to the secretive DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). The program will be overseen by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Eleven military and defense intelligence organizations listed in the directive are authorized to conduct polygraph and credibility assessment examinations.
The reliability of polygraph testing for employee screening is widely disputed on scientific grounds. But many government security officials nevertheless insist on its value and utility, and the practice persists.
See “Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program,” Department of Defense Directive 5210.48, January 25, 2007.
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