DNI Intelligence Community Directives Disclosed
The policy infrastructure of U.S. intelligence community is defined by directives issued by the Director of National Intelligence on everything from security policy to roles and missions to relations with Congress.
The new system of policy statements, known as Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs), is the successor to the former Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). The new ICDs are gradually supplementing, modifying or replacing the existing DCIDs.
The DNI has also issued a series of Intelligence Community Policy Memorandums (ICPMs), which are initial statements of policy that have not yet been formalized as an ICD.
Several ICDs and ICPMs have recently been released by the Office of the DNI in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists.
They cover such topics as open source intelligence, personnel security, the role of the IC analytic ombudsman, the roles of the various Deputy Directors of National Intelligence, and the use of portable electronic devices in secure facilities.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.