New Details on the National Cyber Security Initiative
Almost everything about the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI), established by National Security Presidential Directive 54 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23, is classified.
But following a classified March 2008 hearing on the subject, Senators Joe Lieberman and Susan Collins of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee teased out a few unclassified details about the effort.
“The response (pdf) includes information on the National Cyber Security Center, how privacy will be protected under the CNCI, how success of the initiative will be measured, and how the Department views the private sector’s role in the initiative,” the Senators noted in a news release. “The Department chose to redact information relating to contracting at the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD). The senators have asked DHS explain their reasons for the redactions.”
See also “DHS stays mum on new ‘Cyber Security’ center” by Stephanie Condon, CNET News, July 31.
And see, relatedly, the record of a May 21, 2008 hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee on “Implications of Cyber Vulnerabilities on the Resilience and Security of the Electric Grid” (pdf).
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