The system of national borders that is intended to exclude unauthorized persons can be conceptualized as a “fortress” with rigid barriers forming a secure perimeter, or as a “complex organism” with flexible layered defenses and interactions with the external environment. The application of these models to the United States, along with an evaluation of their possible effectiveness, is presented in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See “People Crossing Borders: An Analysis of U.S. Border Protection Policies,” May 13, 2010.
Other new CRS products that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (both pdf).
“Potential Stafford Act Declarations for the Gulf Coast Oil Spill: Issues for Congress,” May 13, 2010.
“FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Court Cases,” May 12, 2010.
While it seems that the current political climate may not incentivize the use of evidence-based data sources for decision making, those of us who are passionate about ensuring results for the American people will continue to firmly stand on the belief that learning agendas are a crucial component to successfully navigate a changing future.
In recent months, we’ve seen much of these decades’ worth of progress erased. Contracts for evaluations of government programs were canceled, FFRDCs have been forced to lay off staff, and federal advisory committees have been disbanded.
This report outlines a framework relying on “Cooperative Technical Means” for effective arms control verification based on remote sensing, avoiding on-site inspections but maintaining a level of transparency that allows for immediate detection of changes in nuclear posture or a significant build-up above agreed limits.
At a recent workshop, we explored the nature of trust in specific government functions, the risk and implications of breaking trust in those systems, and how we’d known we were getting close to specific trust breaking points.