Countering China’s Monopolization of African Nations’ Digital Broadcasting Infrastructure
Summary
The majority of people living in the African continent access their news and information from broadcasted television and radio. As African countries follow the directive from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to migrate from analog to digital broadcasting, there is an urgent need to sequester the continent’s broadcast signal distributors (BSDs).1 BSDs provide the necessary architecture for moving broadcasted content (e.g., television and radio) into the digital sphere.
Most BSDs in Africa are owned and operated by Chinese companies. Of 23 digitally migrated countries, only four BSDs (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, and Zimbabwe) are officially known to be outside the influence of China-based companies. The implicit capture of the BSD marketplace by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) threatens African democracies and could undermine international partnerships among African nations and with the United States. Excessive Chinese control over African BSDs also raises security concerns and impedes establishment of a robust, competitive, and rules-based global market in communications infrastructure.
The United States should therefore consider the following actions to support African civil society, media regulators, and legislators in securing an information ecosystem that advances democratic values:
- Creating a Program on Traditional and Digital Media Literacy within the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs 2021 Africa Regional Democracy Fund.
- Supporting a Regional Digital Broadcasting Coordinator for each of the five African sub-regional groups, via the Digital Ecosystem Fund and the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.
- Enhancing U.S.-based competitiveness by expanding the Digital Attaché Program to promote alternative BSDs in Africa.
- Leveraging the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit proposed in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act to advance a regulatory and liability framework governing the relationships among BSDs, content producers, and constitutional protections.
It’s paramount to balance both innovation capabilities and risk as we work towards ensuring that the U.S. bioeconomy is a priority area for both the Nation and for National Security.
The Federation of American Scientists supports the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology’s Final Report and the Recommendations contained within it.
The U.S. should create a new non-governmental Innovation Accelerator modeled after the successful In-Q-Tel program to invest in small and mid-cap companies creating technologies that address critical needs of the United States.
To sustain America’s leadership in AI innovation, accelerate adoption across the economy, and guarantee that AI systems remain secure and trustworthy, we offer a set of policy recommendations.