The intense and occasionally hyperbolic controversy that erupted in the late 1990s over alleged theft of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets by the People’s Republic of China is revisited in a newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service.
See “China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets,” updated February 1, 2006.
Coincidentally, a Chinese newspaper yesterday accused the United States of relentlessly seeking to acquire Chinese nuclear secrets.
“In fact, as early as 1955, from the moment China decided to develop atomic bombs, US intelligence has been doing everything it could, with whatever means necessary, to gather relevant secret information,” the newspaper article said, presumably correctly.
See “The United States Has Been Probing for China’s Nuclear Intelligence by Various Methods and Whatever Means Necessary” by Yu Sung, Zhongguo Tongxun She, February 28, 2006.
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