DoD Ops in a C4ISR-Denied Environment, and More
The Department of Defense prepares and trains for military operations in environments in which communications and surveillance are denied or obstructed, a new report to Congress says.
Combatant commanders “spend many man-hours… developing frameworks and procedures for using alternative methods, diversifying communications paths and media, and pursuing the ability to use distributed operations in a denied environment.”
The issue was summarily addressed in a mandatory report to Congress on “Joint Strategy for Readiness and Training in a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Denied Environment.” The brief, unclassified report was transmitted to Congress in February 2014 and released under the Freedom of Information Act this week.
Somewhat relatedly, a declassified 1971 memorandum from the National Reconnaissance Office addressed the subject of “avoidance of coorbital intercept,” or anti-anti-satellite operations.
The subject was highly sensitive at the time. “Any action on our part which demonstrates the possibility that we possess the ability to evade a coorbital intercept… is potentially compromising of the great efficacy of U.S. satellite collection capability in this area.”
Unrelatedly, but notably, the Federal Judicial Center has published a compilation of “protective orders” that were issued by courts in national security criminal cases, including espionage trials and leak cases, over the past 15 years. See National Security Prosecutions: Protective Orders, April 2014.
With summer 2025 in the rearview mirror, we’re taking a look back to see how federal actions impacted heat preparedness and response on the ground, what’s still changing, and what the road ahead looks like for heat resilience.
Satellite imagery of RAF Lakenheath reveals new construction of a security perimeter around ten protective aircraft shelters in the designated nuclear area, the latest measure in a series of upgrades as the base prepares for the ability to store U.S. nuclear weapons.
It will take consistent leadership and action to navigate the complex dangers in the region and to avoid what many analysts considered to be an increasingly possible outcome, a nuclear conflict in East Asia.
Getting into a shutdown is the easy part, getting out is much harder. Both sides will be looking to pin responsibility on each other, and the court of public opinion will have a major role to play as to who has the most leverage for getting us out.