The U.S. Government was acquiescent in Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons technology over a period of decades, according to a new book on the subject.
The activities of individual members of Pakistan’s nuclear procurement network in the United States are examined in detail by investigative reporters David Armstrong and Joseph Trento in “America and the Islamic Bomb,” Steerforth Press, 2007.
Richard M. Barlow, a former CIA and Defense official who attempted to “blow the whistle” on Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear technology in the 1980s, was effectively punished for his efforts.
“For his candor, and despite the backing of some top intelligence officials, Barlow was stripped of his Top Secret/Codeword clearances and hounded out of the Pentagon,” wrote Jeff Stein in “The Nuclear Bombshell That Never Went Off,” CQ Homeland Security, October 19.
No one will be surprised if we end up with a continuing resolution to push our shutdown deadline out past the midterms, so the real question is what else will they get done this summer?
Rebuilding public participation starts with something simple — treating the public not as a problem to manage, but as a source of ingenuity government cannot function without.
If the government wants a system of learning and adaptation that improves results in real time, it has to treat translation, utilization, and adaptation as core functions of governance rather than as afterthoughts.
Coordination among federal science agencies is essential to ensure government-wide alignment on R&D investment priorities. However, the federal R&D enterprise suffers from egregious siloization.