The activities of Pakistan’s notorious Abdul Qadeer Khan in proliferating nuclear weapons technology are examined in detail in a recent Master’s Thesis, along with an analysis of their enabling conditions and some of their larger implications.
“The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of control over nuclear technology ever,” wrote author Christopher O. Clary.
“For the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weapon–the supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designs–were outside of state oversight and control.”
“This thesis demonstrates that Khan’s nuclear enterprise evolved out of a portion of the Pakistani procurement network of the 1970s and 1980s. It presents new information on how the Pakistani state organized, managed, and oversaw its nuclear weapons laboratories.”
See “The A.Q. Khan Network: Causes and Implications” by Christopher O. Clary, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2005.
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