The Logan Act, which became law in 1799, generally prohibits U.S. citizens from engaging in freelance diplomacy with foreign governments.

The Act is the subject of a new report from the Congressional Research Service.

“Although it appears that there has never been a prosecution under the Logan Act, there have been several judicial references to it, indicating that the Act has not been forgotten and that it is at least a potential point of challenge … against anyone who without authority allegedly interferes in the foreign relations of the United States.”

See “Conducting Foreign Relations Without Authority: The Logan Act,” February 1, 2006.

At a time when the legality of U.S. intelligence activities such as the NSA surveillance program is a live issue, President Bush announced that he would name three individuals to the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is supposed to notify the President of any unlawful activities performed by U.S. intelligence agencies.

The three appointees are Adm. David E. Jeremiah, attorney Arthur B. Culvahouse and former Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans. All three are members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

As prescribed in Executive Order 12863, the Intelligence Oversight Board “shall prepare for the President reports of intelligence activities that the IOB believes may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.”

The IOB, like the PFIAB, is a White House advisory body that works exclusively for the President, and only rarely releases any information to the public.

The terms “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion” have almost become household words by now due to continuing public controversy over the legality of the NSA surveillance program.

The legal definitions of these terms were examined in a new memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Senate Intelligence Committee. A copy was obtained by Secrecy News.

See “Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and Reasonableness Standards in the Context of the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,” January 30, 2006.

Two leading Democratic members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees wrote to the Director of the
Congressional Research Service yesterday to reject charges of CRS “bias” that were leveled by Rep. Pete Hoekstra, Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, last week.

“We write to correct the record,” wrote Senator Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Jane Harman on February 7.

“We have found these CRS documents very helpful in conducting our oversight responsibilities, and disagree that they are ‘speculating with respect to highly sensitive national security matters’ as Chairman Hoekstra asserts.”

“Indeed, the legal analyses provided by CRS have been especially informative given the Executive Branch’s unwillingness to provide information to the Congress or to the American public as is appropriate,” they wrote.

The National Reconnaissance Office has published a new Journal in unclassified format.

“National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice” is intended “for the education and information of the NRO community” and to promote “the study, dialogue, and understanding of the discipline, practice, and history of national reconnaissance.”

The centerpiece of the first issue is a critical article originally published in 2002 by Robert J. Kohler, a former CIA and NRO official on “The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office.” It is followed by a rejoinder from NRO deputy director Dennis Fitzgerald, a newly updated reply from Mr. Kohler, and a further response from Mr. Fitzgerald.

In what may be a reflection of NRO ambivalence about publishing an unclassified journal, the new publication is not available on the agency web site. Nor would the NRO Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance agree to provide the journal in softcopy.

But a scanned copy of the full text of the journal is now available on the Federation of American Scientists web site (thanks to J).

See “National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice,” first unclassified issue, 2005.

For several decades the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) Command has been the Navy’s cryptologic organization, with responsibility for signals intelligence and communications security and with NAVSECGRU Activities scattered around much of the world.

But now the NAVSECGRU Command has been disestablished and all NAVSECGRU Activities and Detachments have been renamed as Navy Information Operations Commands (NIOCs) and Detachments (NIODs).

See OPNAV Note 5450, Disestablishing the Naval Security Group Command, December 29, 2005.

The Naval Security Group Command, headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, was designated by that name in 1968, according to Jeffrey Richelson’s The U.S. Intelligence Community (4th edition, p. 84).

Air Force personnel are warned in a recent instruction not to track low observable (LO) or “sight sensitive” aircraft during test flights at Edwards Air Force Base.

“Low observable” is another term for stealth, and “sight sensitive” refers to objects that yield sensitive information simply by visual inspection.

“It is strictly forbidden to train tracking sensors (e.g. radar, infrared, electro-optical, personal cameras, sound recording devices, etc.) on any LO or sight-sensitive assets,” the Air Force instruction states.

“The single exception to this rule is to promote safety of flight.” Even then, “Recording of data will immediately terminate upon the termination of the flight safety incident.”

See “Security Procedures for Inadvertent Tracking and Sensor Acquisition of Low Observable and Sight Sensitive Programs,” Edwards Air Force Base Instruction 31-17, 14 November 2005 (thanks to RT).

After nearly a decade of pressure from openness advocates inside and outside of government, the Department of Energy has finally released its landmark history of the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The study “was commissioned [in 1996] to facilitate discussions of HEU storage, safety, and security with stakeholders, to encourage other nations to declassify and release similar data, and to support the national policy on transparency of nuclear materials.”

The newly released report “contains details of the U.S. HEU inventory as of September 30, 1996, and provides a historical material balance that summarizes over 50 years of U.S. activities that produced, acquired, and utilized HEU.”

“This report combines previously released data along with newly declassified information that has allowed DOE to issue, for the first time, a comprehensive report on HEU.”

“From 1945 through 1996, a total of 1,045.4 metric tons of uranium containing 859.2 metric tons of uranium-235 was produced in the United States at three facilities utilizing two different production technologies.”

“As of September 30, 1996, the total U.S. inventory of HEU was 740.7 MTU containing 620.3 MTU-235.”

Rich in detail, the 173 page report has been only minimally redacted (sanitized).

The report was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists.

See “Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance,” U.S. Department of Energy, January 2001.

Last week, Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.) lashed out at the Congressional Research Service for asserting that the Bush Administration may have had a legal responsibility to notify more than just eight members of Congress regarding the NSA surveillance activity.

Rep. Hoekstra, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, did not merely suggest that the CRS might be wrong; he claimed that the agency was actually biased against Bush Administration policy (“Mau-Mauing the Congressional Research Service”).

In fact, however, it is increasingly clear that Rep. Hoekstra is the one who misunderstood and misrepresented the requirements of the law.

Sen. Mike DeWine (R-OH) put the matter plainly at a February 6 Senate hearing on the NSA surveillance program, explaining that the statute which permits limited notification to eight members of Congress is relevant only to covert actions, and not to the NSA program.

“When you look at that section [50 USC 413(b)], the only thing this references as far as what this Group of Eight does is receive reports in regard to covert action. So that’s really all it is. It does not cover a situation like we’re talking about here at all,” Sen. DeWine said.

“We all have a great deal of respect for these eight people… They’re leaders of the Congress. But there’s no statutory authority for this group, other than the section that has to do with covert operation, and this [the NSA activity] is not a covert operation as defined in this specific section.”

“I don’t mean to be impolite… I guess I’m just kind of a strict constructionist, kind of a conservative guy, and that’s how I read the statute,” Sen. DeWine said.

See, relatedly, “Hoekstra blasts CRS for ‘bias'” by Jackie Kucinich, The Hill, February 7.

The Department of Defense is moving ahead smartly in response to President Bush’s executive order (EO) 13392 directing agencies to improve the processing of Freedom of Information Act requests.

Many outside observers were puzzled by the issuance of the December 14, 2005 order, since the current Administration has been no friend of FOIA or of public access to government information generally.

But even a perfunctory gesture from the President of the United States can have policy consequences, and agencies are now sorting through those consequences.

“Recent heightened interest in the FOIA from the public, the media, watchdog organizations, and the Congress has resulted in the need for the Federal Agencies to re-examine their FOIA programs,” wrote Michael B. Donley, DoD Director of Administration and Management.

“Historically, DoD Component FOIA programs have been under-emphasized, resulting in inadequate staffing and funding,” he wrote.

“To comply with the provisions of the EO, DoD Components must ensure that proper procedures are established and adequate resources are applied to their FOIA programs.”

The Project on Government Oversight obtained the DoD memorandum and provided a copy to Secrecy News.

See “Executive Order 13392 on the Freedom of Information Act — DoD Implementation,” memorandum for senior Department officials, February 1, 2006.

Meanwhile, however, the Pentagon public affairs office has been playing secrecy games with reporters, withholding budget documents from the press until the last possible moment.

See “DOD denies reporters budget prep time” by Pamela Hess, United Press International, February 6, 2006.

U.S. Air Force doctrine on special operations is presented in a new Air Force publication.

“This publication provides the overarching doctrinal guidance for the conduct of Air Force special operations across the full range of military operations. It describes the characteristics, capabilities, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) core tasks, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) core missions, typical organization, and command and control of AF Special Operations Forces.”

“The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive…. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it.”

See “Special Operations,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, 16 December 2005.

In a rare relaxation of mounting restrictions on disclosure of government information, the Labor Department has agreed to reverse its policy of withholding notes taken by mine safety inspectors from prompt release under the Freedom of Information Act.

In a January 11 letter written in the wake of the Sago mine disaster, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) had urged the Secretary of Labor to permit disclosure of these notes (Secrecy News, 01/17/06).

“This unwarranted secrecy may protect the mining industry from embarrassing disclosures, but it undermines accountability and mine safety,” Rep. Waxman wrote.

On January 20, three House Republicans, including Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), the new House Majority Leader, wrote to Labor Secretary Elaine Chao to make the same request.

“We share the concern expressed by some that … this blanket policy has had the effect of denying important information about mine safety to the public.”

In a January 30 reply to Majority Leader Boehner, a Labor Department official wrote that the disclosure policy would be revised to permit release of mine inspector notes “effective immediately.”

Rep. Boehner applauded the move. “Our request to Secretary Chao was made for one simple reason: to get more information, more quickly into the hands of Congress, the families impacted by the tragedies, and all those with a stake in mining and these investigations,” he said.

In a January 31 news release, Rep. Boehner and his colleagues took credit for the step. See “In Response to House Republican Request, Labor Department Makes Key Policy Change Impacting Mine Investigations”.

Sunshine Week is a broad-based initiative intended to focus public concern over the growth of official secrecy.

During the week of March 13, 2006, there will be a series of events exploring the diverse and increasing barriers that obstruct public access to government information.

Details and educational resources are available on the Sunshine Week web site.