(Updated below)

The potential threat to commercial aircraft from hostile use of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (Man Portable Air Defense Systems, or MANPADS) still does not have a satisfactory technological solution, the Department of Homeland Security said in a new report to Congress.

“It is feasible to transition selected military [defense] technology to the commercial aviation environment, but it is challenging from a logistics, cost, export control, and, to some extent, from a liability perspective,” the DHS report said.

“Additional design, development, test, and actual operation [of counter-MANPADS technology] in the commercial environment is needed to improve reliability, reduce drag and weight, incorporate technology protection, [and] enhance producibility….”

See “Department of Homeland Security Counter-MANPADS Program Summary, Report to Congress Detailing Phases I and II Findings of the Counter-MANPADS Program,” DHS Science and Technology Directorate, July 31, 2006.

[Update 08/11/06: At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, Secrecy News has taken this report off-line.]

The new DHS assessment, which has not previously been made available to the public, was first reported by the Associated Press.

See “Airline Anti-Missile System Years Away” by Leslie Miller, Associated Press, July 31.

Extensive background on MANPADS proliferation prepared by Matthew Schroeder of the FAS Arms Sales Monitoring Project is available here.

“Congress needs to keep in mind that onboard anti-missile systems are not a panacea; they only protect planes from a small sub-category of threats, and provide no protection for Americans flying on foreign airliners that aren’t equipped with the systems,” Mr. Schroeder said. “If Congress goes this route, they need to redouble non- and counter-proliferation efforts.”

Numerous new reports of the Congressional Research Service on subjects of public interest and concern have been issued lately. Yet by design, they are not made readily available to the public. They include the following.

“The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice” (pdf), updated July 25, 2006.

“Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Military Commissions in the ‘Global War on Terrorism'” (pdf), July 6, 2006.

“Military Tribunals: Historical Patterns and Lessons” (pdf), July 9, 2004.

“Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses” (pdf), updated July 31, 2006.

“Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy” (pdf), updated July 25, 2006.

“Lebanon” (pdf), updated July 24, 2006.

“European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism” (pdf), July 24, 2006.

“China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues” (pdf), updated July 17, 2006.

“Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT)” (pdf), July 14, 2006.

“North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States” (pdf), updated July 6, 2006.

“International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy” (pdf), updated June 27, 2006.

Senator Christopher Bond (R-Missouri) introduced legislation today to criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

“We need to send a message that leaks will not be tolerated and give prosecutors a modern and appropriate tool to go after those who do leak,” he said.

The new Bond bill is identical to the controversial anti-leak legislation sponsored by Senator Richard Shelby in the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act that was vetoed by President Clinton in November 2000.

See “Bond Legislation Targets Intelligence Leaks,” August 2.

Meanwhile, a new U.S. intelligence policy on unauthorized disclosures of classified information is pending, the Director of National Intelligence said last week in a progress report.

“The DOJ and ODNI are … working closely on leaks issues,” he wrote (at page 8). “In March 2006 the ODNI issued policies to consolidate IC reporting of leaks and is now preparing to issue a Community-wide directive on [unauthorized] disclosures.”

The National Security Whistleblowers Coalition disclosed last week that former NSA employee Russell Tice had been summoned to appear before a grand jury investigating the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. See related background, including a copy of the grand jury summons, on the Coalition web site here.

Mr. Tice and other national security whistleblowers testified before the House Committee on Government Reform last February, and the record of that hearing has just been published.

See “National Security Whistleblowers in the post-9/11 Era: Lost in a Labyrinth and Facing Subtle Retaliation,” February 14, 2006.

(Updated below)

The names of foreign countries that are being considered for deployment of U.S. missile defense systems are unclassified but nevertheless should be kept secret, the Missile Defense Agency ordered (pdf) last year.

“There are many operational and political sensitivities that require varying levels of protection as we consider possible deployments,” wrote MDA Deputy Director Gen. Marvin K. McNamara.

“Therefore, I am requiring that potential host nations being studied or considered by MDA for operational deployments not be identified by country or city name in any form on Unclassified computer systems…..”

The November 22, 2005 MDA memorandum on “Protection of Information Regarding Operational Deployments” was obtained by Nick Schwellenbach of the Project on Government Oversight and is available here.

In an email message also obtained by POGO, an MDA security manager paraphrased the policy this way: “Information regarding operational deployments should be treated as ‘Secret’ for political purposes and, for that reason, the information is to be sent encrypted or by SIPRNET.”

What is at issue here, explained Victoria Samson of the Center for Defense Information, is the location of the third site for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is still under conideration.

But not everyone got the word.

In a March 20, 2006 briefing (pdf) by MDA Director Gen. Trey Obering, obtained by Ms. Samson, three countries are identified as possible candidates for the third ground-based site: the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and Poland. See “Missile Defense Program Update” (at slide 35).

Official controls on unclassified information have mushroomed in recent years. An interagency task force that conducted an inventory of so-called Sensitive But Unclassified control markings recently identified 164 distinct marking systems for controlling unclassified information, according to Grace Mastalli, who co-chaired the task force.

Update: The March 20 Obering briefing was presented at an MDA/AIAA briefing in Washington, DC. It was previously reported by Inside Missile Defense, which noted the identification of the UK as a candidate country for the third GMD site, and also made the briefing available to readers.

A bipartisan bill introduced in the House would require the House Intelligence Committee to disclose information on intelligence activities to other congressional committees, as long as such disclosure did not reveal sensitive intelligence sources or methods.

“In order to exercise proper oversight, House committees need all pertinent information and, unfortunately, that process isn’t functioning as it was intended to,” said Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ), who introduced the bill.

“We should not have to rely on the morning paper to learn about secret government programs, particularly when we sit on committees that are charged with overseeing such programs,” said Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA), a co-sponsor.

See the “Intelligence Oversight Act” (H.R. 5954) here.

In a move that may enhance its legislative prospects, the bill has been referred to the House Rules Committee rather than to the House Intelligence Committee, UPI’s Shaun Waterman reported (h/t POGO).

Some noteworthy congressional documents that have recently been published include the following.

“The Need to Know: Information Sharing Lessons for Disaster Response,” House Committee on Government Reform, March 30, 2006.

“Plane Clothes: Lack of Anonymity at the Federal Air Marshal Service Compromises Aviation and National Security” (pdf), House Judiciary Committee investigative report, May 25, 2006.

“The Terrorist Threat from Shoulder-Fired Missiles” (pdf), House Committee on International Relations, March 30, 2006.

The Department of Defense recently published its annual report on counterproliferation, an overview of U.S. government programs to detect, prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

See “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee” (pdf), Volume I, Executive Summary, May 2006.

See also the related “Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress” (8.5 MB pdf), March 2006.

Published sources on stealthy satellites were compiled in “A Stealth Satellite Sourcebook” by independent researcher Allen Thomson, available here (pdf).

An earlier compilation on the French GRAVES (Grande Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatial) space surveillance system, also by Mr. Thomson, may be found here (pdf).

New reports of the Congressional Research Service, not readily available to the public, include the following:

“India-U.S. Relations” (pdf), updated July 31, 2006.

“Pakistan-U.S. Relations” (pdf), updated July 27, 2006.

Some intriguing new details of U.S. intelligence policy were disclosed in two reports on the implementation of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that were issued yesterday by the House Intelligence Committee and by the Director of National Intelligence.

Beyond broad conclusions on the status of intelligence reform, each report voiced numerous passing observations of interest, both favorable and critical.

The report of the House Intelligence Committee noted the following, for example:

“Many of the major acquisition programs at the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have cost taxpayers billions of dollars in cost overruns and schedule delays.” (p. 14)

“The National Intelligence Council is… making more use of external experts from academia and think tanks to prepare certain parts of a National Intelligence Estimate.” (p. 16)

“The National Counterterrorism Center … advised that out of the universe of information available on terrorist targets, the National Counterterrorism Center, the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligence Task Force – Counterterrorism were all analyzing approximately the same ten percent.” (p. 17)

A newly established Analytic Resources Catalog provides “the names and other identifying information such as home agency and areas of expertise for all analysts in the Community.” (p. 19) The DNI report added that “The Catalog contains information on 17,000 IC analysts throughout the IC, including current assignment, professional experience, academic background, language ability, and other biographical information.” (DNI, p. 5)

“We are concerned that individuals with [key] skill sets are not being hired because they may not conform to current hiring policy and standards. Subcommittee members and staff heard startling accounts of very qualified applicants being turned away because their diverse backgrounds do not permit them to successfully complete the rigid and antiquated applicant processing model of a ‘Cold War’ era.” (p. 24)

“The Open Source Center is in the midst of a major acquisition for a large-scale internet exploitation capability…. So far this year, there has been a significant increase in open source entries that have been included in the President’s Daily Brief.” (p. 34)

The report also provided new information on developments in intelligence analysis, intelligence reform at the FBI, the production of the President’s Daily Brief, and more. See the full report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight here.

The report of the Director of National Intelligence addressed many of the same topics, though without the criticism or frustration expressed in the House report, and with some additional details.

For example, the DNI has established what sounds like a knock-off of the JASON defense advisory group:

“One new ODNI-sponsored external outreach event is the Summer Hard Problem Initiative, a series of intensive summer studies that will bring together outside experts to address challenging analytic problems.” (p. 5)

And changes to national security classification policy in intelligence may be on the horizon:

“Several new ODNI classification policies are currently in the final stages of review, but more significant shifts may be required. If so, the DNI’s classification and declassification authorities may require strengthening. The ODNI is currently engaged with the NSC in examining the possibility of broader change.” (p. 8)

See the full DNI report here.

Reciprocity in security clearances — meaning the acceptance by one agency of a security clearance granted by another agency, and vice versa — has been an elusive security policy goal for well over a decade. But lately it has become the subject of increased attention.

“The Director [of National Intelligence] has done little to ensure the reciprocal recognition of security clearances within the [Intelligence] Community,” the House Intelligence Committee complained in its new report (pdf).

“It def[ies] common sense… that it takes months to transfer clearances for an individual who will work in the exact same space but transfer from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to the CIA,” the House report said.

A July 17 memo from the Office of Management and Budget addresses the problem of reciprocity in highly restricted “special access programs,” and provides a checklist of permitted exceptions to reciprocity.

The Department of Defense and Department of Energy have each issued new directives lately on reciprocal recognition of security clearances.

The Freedom of Information Act “continues to be a valuable tool for citizens to obtain information about the operation and decisions of the federal government,” the Government Accountability Office reported at a July 26 House hearing.

“Since 2002, agencies have received increasing numbers of requests and have also continued to increase the number of requests that they process. In addition, agencies continue to grant most requests in full. However, the rate of increase in pending requests is accelerating,” the GAO concluded in its testimony (pdf), which provided substantial new data on individual agency FOIA practices.

Critical assessments of FOIA policy were also presented by Patrice McDermott of OpenTheGovernment.org and by Tonda Rush of the Sunshine in Government Initiative. Dan Metcalfe presented the viewpoint of the Department of Justice at the hearing, which also featured Senator Patrick Leahy, Sen. John Cornyn, and Rep. Brad Sherman.

See the prepared statements from “Implementing FOIA– Does the Bush Administration’s Executive Order Improve Processing?” hearing before the Subcommittee on Government Management of the House Government Reform Committee, July 26, here.

On July 24, a federal court told the National Reconnaissance Office that it could not use the “operational files” exemption to withhold its Congressional Budget Justification Book from processing under the FOIA.

But on July 25, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency denied a FOIA request for a copy of its Congressional Budget Justification Book. Why? Because, NGA said, it is an “operational file” that is exempt from FOIA processing. Sigh. An appeal was filed explaining that this claim has been found unlawful.

See, relatedly, “Judge: Spy satellite budget can be FOIA-ed,” by Shaun Waterman, United Press International, July 27.