The Defense Intelligence Agency disclosed this week that it had funded research on warp drive, invisibility cloaking, and other areas of fringe or speculative science and engineering as part of a now-defunct program to track and identify threats from space.

From 2007 to 2012, the DIA spent $22 million on the activity, formally known as the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program. It was apparently initiated at the behest of then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, with most of the funding directed to a Nevada constituent of his. See “Glowing Auras and ‘Black Money’: The Pentagon’s Mysterious U.F.O. Program” by Helene Cooper, Ralph Blumenthal and Leslie Kean, New York Times, December 16, 2017.

Yesterday, the DIA released a list of 38 research titles funded by the program, many of which are highly conjectural and well beyond the boundaries of current science, engineering — or military intelligence. One such title, “Traversable Wormholes, Stargates, and Negative Energy,” was prepared by Dr. Eric Davis, who has also written on “psychic teleportation.”

(Dr. Davis responded vigorously to skepticism of his work in a 2006 comment to this Secrecy News post.)

The DIA list of research papers, marked for Official Use Only, was previously provided to Congress in January 2018. It was publicly released yesterday under the Freedom of Information Act.

Although many FOIA offices are closed due to the continuing shutdown of the federal government, the DIA FOIA office and at least some others in the Department of Defense are still operational.

A DIA FOIA officer noted with some exasperation that yesterday’s release of the list of research papers will, in all likelihood, prompt new FOIA requests to his Agency for each of the listed papers.

The JASON scientific advisory panel cautiously endorsed further research into what is known as Magneto-Inertial Fusion (MIF) as a step towards achieving fusion-generated electricity.

“Magneto-Inertial Fusion (MIF) is a physically plausible approach to studying controlled thermonuclear fusion in a region of parameter space that is less explored than Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) or Magnetic Confinement Fusion (MCF).”

“Despite having received ~1% the funding of MCF and ICF, MIF experiments have made rapid progress in recent years toward break-even conditions,” the JASONs said in a report to the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) late last year.

Even so, “Given the immaturity of the technologies, the future ability of fusion-generated electricity to meet commercial constraints cannot be usefully assessed. Rapidly developing infrastructures for natural gas and renewable energy sources and storage will compete with any future commercial fusion efforts.”

See Prospects for Low Cost Fusion Development, JASON Report JSR-18-011, November 2018.

The fusion report is one of two unclassified reports prepared by the JASONs in 2018. (Release of the second is pending.) The other twelve reports from last year are classified.

The New York Times recently provided an overview of fusion research in Clean, Abundant Energy: Fusion Dreams Never End by C. Claiborne Ray, January 11, 2019.

Meanwhile, the Federation of American Scientists warned that the current shutdown of federal agencies threatens many aspects of U.S. science and technology.

“The partial government shutdown is compromising the very research that is important to the health and security of our nation. Important scientific breakthroughs could be compromised or lost with each and every day that the shutdown continues,” FAS said in a January 16 letter to the White House and Congress.

“We therefore urge you to open the federal government, send researchers back to work at their agencies, and allow science to flourish throughout the United States.”

If the President were to declare a national emergency in order to justify building a “wall” on the border with Mexico, there would be certain legal authorities that he could invoke to initiate construction operations.

But the scope of those legal authorities is uncertain and would almost certainly trigger litigation to challenge their application, the Congressional Research Service said last week.

“Whether these authorities — individually or in combination — extend to the construction of a border wall would present a reviewing court with several questions of first impression,” CRS said. See Can the Department of Defense Build the Border Wall?, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 10, 2019.

On the other hand, the National Emergencies Act has been effectively invoked on two previous occasions to authorize military construction activity overseas (by Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush), CRS said in another new publication. See Military Construction Funding in the Event of a National Emergency, CRS Insight, updated January 11, 2019.

Some other noteworthy new and updated publications from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, CRS In Focus, updated January 3, 2019

How a Government Shutdown Affects Government Contracts, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 10, 2019

Defense Primer: FY2018 Department of Defense Audit Results, CRS In Focus, updated January 9, 2019

New CRS Series: Introduction to Financial Services, CRS Insight, updated January 11, 2019

Federal Grand Jury Secrecy: Legal Principles and Implications for Congressional Oversight, January 10, 2019

U.S. Sanctions on Russia, updated January 11, 2019

Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress, updated January 7, 2019

U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes, CRS In Focus, January 10, 2019

The recurring dispute over the appropriate degree of secrecy in the Department of Defense arose in a new form last week when President Trump said that certain audits and investigations that are performed by the DoD Inspector General should no longer be made public.

“We’re fighting wars, and they’re doing reports and releasing it to the public? Now, the public means the enemy,” the President said at a January 2 cabinet meeting. “The enemy reads those reports; they study every line of it. Those reports should be private reports. Let him do a report, but they should be private reports and be locked up.”

It is not clear what the President had in mind. Did he have reason to think that US military operations had been damaged by publication of Inspector General reports? Was he now directing the Secretary of Defense to classify such reports, regardless of their specific contents? Was he suggesting the need for a new exemption from the Freedom of Information Act to prevent their disclosure?

Or was this simply an expression of presidential pique with no practical consequence? Thus far, there has been no sign of any change to DoD publication policy in response to the President’s remarks.

Meanwhile, Rep. Adam Smith, the incoming chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, reiterated his view to the contrary that the Pentagon needs to be more forthcoming with information, not less.

“As Chairman, I will work with my colleagues to promote transparency and Congressional oversight, enhance military readiness, combat inefficiency and waste at DOD, advance green technology in defense and address the threat climate change poses to our national security, fight for an inclusive military, and move towards a responsible approach to nuclear weapons,” he said on January 4. (And, he wrote earlier, “Constant misinformation from the president is a real problem in a democratic society.”)

There are indications that some Pentagon officials may be receptive to Chairman Smith’s concerns.

After reporters complained about the growing use of “For Official Use Only” markings to restrict access to information, Under Secretary of Defense (acquisition and sustainment) Ellen Lord responded that “I understand the need, the requirement” for transparency, “and I will put out guidance to make everything open to the public to the degree we can.” See “Pentagon’s Chief Weapons Buyer Promises Less Secrecy in Reports” by Anthony Capaccio, Bloomberg, January 4.

While secrecy in the Department of Defense has increased noticeably in the Trump Administration, the Pentagon remains an astonishingly prolific publisher of military information, issuing dozens or hundreds of directives, manuals, reports and other publications each day. Most are the product of routine bureaucratic churning, and are of little if any significance, but some have broader interest or appeal. Here are a few that caught our eye.

Techniques for Visual Information Operations, ATP 6-02.40, US Army, January 3, 2019

Military Diving Operations: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, ATP 3-34.84, January 2, 2019

DoD support to non-contiguous States and territories in response to disasters, threats, and emergencies, report to Congress, n.d. (Nov. 2018)

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 6 December 2018

DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program (STIP), DoD Instruction 3200.12, August 22, 2013, Incorporating Change 3, Effective December 17, 2018

The latter document directs that “DoD will maximize the free flow of scientific and engineering information developed by or for DoD to the public.”

“The President does not need the concurrence of either his military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the launch of nuclear weapons,” the Congressional Research Service reminded readers last month in an updated “defense primer” on “Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.”

The CRS defense primer series consists of two-page introductions to a variety of basic military and intelligence topics. The primers do not generally present information that is altogether new to specialists, but they are a convenient way to increase national security literacy among non-specialist members of Congress and the public.

Recently updated items in the series include the following.

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018

Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Procurement, CRS In Focus, updated December 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Information Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 18, 2018

Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, CRS In Focus, updated December 18, 2018

Defense Primer: President’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, CRS In Focus, updated December 17, 2018

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Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

The Special Counsel Investigation After the Attorney General’s Resignation, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 2, 2019

Government Expenditures on Defense Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet, updated December 19, 2018

Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 2, 2019

DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission–An Overview, CRS In Focus, updated December 19, 2018

New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China, CRS In Focus, December 17, 2018

Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies, updated December 19, 2018

Two years ago, the House Intelligence Committee asked the Director of National Intelligence to improve the government’s controversial policy on reviewing books, articles and speeches by current and former intelligence employees prior to their publication, so as to make the process more uniform, timely and fair.

That has still not been accomplished, but a new policy is on the way, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

“An IC-wide policy on prepublication review is being formulated and is forthcoming,” wrote ODNI FOIA Chief Sally A. Nicholson on November 20. “However, it is not completed as of today’s date.”

In 2016, the House Intelligence Committee reported that it is “aware of the perception that the pre-publication review process can be unfair, untimely, and unduly onerous and that these burdens may be at least partially responsible for some individuals ‘opting out’ of the mandatory review process. The Committee further understands that IC agencies’ pre-publication review mechanisms vary, and that there is no binding, IC-wide guidance on the subject.”

The Committee specified its own view of what a new, improved policy should entail, including a clear statement of the scope of the policy, with requirements for timely responses and procedures for appealing adverse decisions.

“The Committee believes that all IC personnel must be made aware of pre-publication review requirements and that the review process must yield timely, reasoned, and impartial decisions that are subject to appeal. The Committee also believes that efficiencies can be identified by limiting the information subject to pre-publication review, to the fullest extent possible, to only those materials that might reasonably contain or be derived from classified information obtained during the course of an individual’s association with the IC. In short, the pre-publication review process should be improved to better incentivize compliance and to deter personnel from violating their commitments,” the Committee wrote in its report on the FY 2017 intelligence authorization act.

Until the new IC-wide policy is promulgated, current and former ODNI employees must comply with ODNI’s existing pre-publication review policy, last revised in 2014.

“Correct unclassified sourcing is critical in executing pre-publication review,” that 2014 policy states. “ODNI personnel must not use sourcing that comes from known leaks, or unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information. The use of such information in a publication can confirm the validity of an unauthorized disclosure and cause further harm to national security. ODNI personnel are not authorized to use anonymous sourcing.”

Other intelligence agency personnel are subject to the rules issued by their respective agencies.

One of the most vexatious aspects of the system of granting security clearances for access to classified information has been the reluctance of some government agencies to recognize the validity of clearances approved by other agencies, and to require new investigations and adjudications of previously cleared personnel.

A new directive from the Director of National Intelligence seeks to finally resolve this longstanding problem by mandating “reciprocity,” or mutual acceptance of security clearances issued by other agencies. See Reciprocity of Background Investigations and National Security Adjudications, Security Executive Agent Directive 7, November 9, 2018.

With certain exceptions, “Agencies shall accept national security eligibility adjudications conducted by an authorized adjudicative agency at the same or higher level,” DNI Daniel R. Coats wrote.

“Background investigations and national security eligibility adjudications, conducted by an authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency, respectively, shall be reciprocally accepted for all covered individuals,” again with certain exceptions.

In most cases, cleared personnel would not be required to fill out a new security clearance questionnaire or to undergo a new background investigation in order for their clearances to be recognized and accepted by another agency.

(Reciprocity refers to mutual recognition by agencies of an individual’s eligibility for access to classified information. Whether the individual also has the requisite “need to know” the information requires a separate determination.)

Security clearance reciprocity is an elusive policy goal that has been pursued since the Clinton Administration, if not longer.

A 2004 study by the Defense Personnel Research Center investigated the failure to fully implement reciprocity at that time and attributed it to issues of “turf and trust.”

“Virtually all respondents agreed that beneath the lack of complete reciprocity there is a certain lack of trust based on fear.” See Security Clearance Reciprocity: A Progress Report, PERSEREC, April 2004.

A new bill introduced by Sen. Mark Warner (D-VA) would require reporting on the number of individuals whose clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally recognized after they move to a new agency or department. See “Vice Chairman Warner Introduces Legislation to Revamp Security Clearance Process,” news release, December 6.

Noteworthy new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Background and Selected Options for Further Reform, December 4, 2018

The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice, updated December 11, 2018

U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview, December 6, 2018

U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, updated December 6, 2018

Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues, December 7, 2018

Venue: A Legal Analysis of Where a Federal Crime May Be Tried, updated December 6, 2018

Debt and Deficits: Spending, Revenue, and Economic Growth, CRS In Focus, December 4, 2018

U.S. Gun Policy: Framework and Major Issues, CRS In Focus, December 3, 2018

Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, updated December 7, 2018

Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions, CRS In Focus, updated December 4, 2018

Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, updated December 10, 2018

The US has imposed several categories of sanctions on Russia in response to malicious or objectionable Russian activity. A new report from the Congressional Research Service provides an overview of US sanction tools and authorities, and their application to the case of Russia. It also discusses the various sanction regimes, their targets, their effectiveness, and the countersanctions that Russia has introduced. See U.S. Sanctions on Russia, November 28, 2018.

Other new and updated products from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Iran Sanctions, updated November 28, 2018

The “National Security Exception” and the World Trade Organization, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 28, 2018

U.S. Tariff Policy: Overview, CRS In Focus, November 28, 2018

District Court Temporarily Blocks Implementation of Asylum Restrictions on Unlawful Entrants at the Southern Border, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 27, 2018

The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis, CRS In Focus, November 27, 2018

Brexit at a Pivotal Moment, CRS Insight, November 28, 2018

Revisiting the Doubling Effort: Trends in Federal Funding for Basic Research in the Physical Sciences and Engineering, CRS Insight, November 27, 2018

Administration of the House of Representatives: Actions Taken During a New Congress and Following a Majority Change, CRS In Focus, November 26, 2018

Electing the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Frequently Asked Questions, updated November 26, 2018

Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, CRS In Focus, updated November 14, 2018

Defense Primer: RDT&E, CRS In Focus, updated November 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Congress’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces, CRS In Focus, updated November 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Legal Authorities for the Use of Military Forces, CRS In Focus, updated November 13, 2018

Turkey’s pending procurement of a Russian surface to air missile system would jeopardize its status in NATO, and disrupt other aspects of US military relations with that country, the Department of Defense told Congress.

“The U.S. Government has made clear to the Turkish Government that purchasing the S-400 [surface to air missile system] would have unavoidable negative consequences for U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations, as well as Turkey’s role in NATO,” DoD said in an unclassified summary of a classified report to Congress.

See DoD report to Congress on Status of the U.S. Relationship with the Republic of Turkey (unclassified summary), November 2018.

The report was obtained and reported by Bloomberg News. See “Turkey’s F-35 Role at Risk If It Buys From Russia, Pentagon Warns” by Tony Capaccio, November 28, 2018.

The US Army has issued updated guidance on military funerals that notably emphasizes freedom of religion and individual choice.

“The Army requires the capability to provide RS [religious support] across austere and isolated locations which accommodates service members’ right to the free exercise of religion and supports resiliency efforts to sustain service members in combat.”

“RS is comprehensive because every individual personally defines what constitutes RS. While not every religious need of every Soldier can be met, chaplains and religious affairs specialists seek to meet as many needs as possible.”

“Due to the religious diversity of the nation and Army, all chaplains must know the funeral practices and religious requirements of various faith groups in the military.”

“Wherever they are conducted, and regardless of the tasks or order of events, military funerals and memorial events pay tribute to those who have honorably served the nation. Each final tribute draws from national, military, and religious traditions, not routinely nor impersonally, but profoundly and with compassion.”

See Religious Support to Funerals and Memorial Events, ATP 1-05.02, November 2018.

Several short introductions to basic aspects of U.S. military policy have recently been updated by the Congressional Research Service. Intended for congressional consumers, they may also be useful to others.

Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces, CRS In Focus, updated November 16, 2018

Defense Primer: Special Operations Forces, CRS In Focus, updated November 16, 2018

Defense Primer: Navigating the NDAA, CRS In Focus, updated November 16, 2018

Defense Primer: Defense Appropriations Process, CRS In Focus, updated November 16, 2018

Defense Primer: Department of the Army and Army Command Structure, CRS In Focus, updated November 16, 2018

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It is hard even for attentive members of the public to fully comprehend the U.S. military budget.

“The scale of spending alone makes it hard to grasp. Public understanding of the costs of war is further limited by secrecy, faulty accounting, and the deferral of current costs,” I argued recently in a short paper for the Costs of War Project at Brown University. See The Costs of War: Obstacles to Public Understanding, November 14, 2018.

Neta C. Crawford of Brown University estimated the post-9/11 costs of war at $5.9 trillion through FY 2019.

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Other noteworthy new releases from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

The Global Research and Development Landscape and Implications for the Department of Defense, updated November 8, 2018

U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, updated November 20, 2018

United States and Saudi Arabia Energy Relations, CRS In Focus, November 19, 2018

Global Human Rights: Multilateral Bodies & U.S. Participation, CRS In Focus, updated November 23, 2018

The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, updated November 15, 2018

Immigration: “Recalcitrant” Countries and the Use of Visa Sanctions to Encourage Cooperation with Alien Removals, CRS In Focus, November 15, 2018

Infrastructure Investment and the Federal Government, CRS In Focus, updated November 19, 2018

Insulin Products and the Cost of Diabetes Treatment, CRS In Focus, November 19, 2018

Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research and Development, and Policy Considerations, updated November 19, 2018

What Role Might the Federal Government Play in Law Enforcement Reform?, CRS In Focus, updated November 16, 2018

Who Can Serve as Acting Attorney General, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 15, 2018