PDF Version

114th Congress  }                                            {    Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session     }                                            {   114-573

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

                                _______
                                

  May 18, 2016.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Nunes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5077]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 5077) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2017 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon without 
amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 5077 is to authorize the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government for Fiscal Year 2017. These activities enhance the 
national security of the United States, support and assist the 
armed forces of the United States, and support the President in 
the execution of the foreign policy of the United States.

                Classified Annexes and Committee Intent

    The classified annexes to this report include the 
classified schedules of authorizations and their associated 
explanatory language. The Committee views the classified 
annexes as integral parts of this legislation. The classified 
annexes contain thorough discussions of the issues considered 
by the Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in 
the classified schedules of authorizations. The Committee 
expects that all intelligence programs discussed in the 
classified annexes to this report will follow the guidance and 
limitations set forth as associated language therein. The 
classified schedules of authorizations are incorporated 
directly into this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the 
bill. The classified annexes are available for review by all 
Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the 
requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives and rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure 
for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee, 
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the 
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information Systems 
Security Program (ISSP). The bill also authorizes funding for 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). The 
NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, as well as those intelligence, 
intelligence-related, and counterintelligence activities 
conducted by: the Central Intelligence Agency; the Department 
of Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National 
Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Departments of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of State; the 
Department of the Treasury; the Department of Energy; the 
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the 
U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Homeland Security; and the 
Drug Enforcement Administration. The Committee has exclusive 
legislative, authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction of these 
programs.

                     Committee Statement and Views

    The Fiscal Year 2017 intelligence authorization bill funds 
all U.S. intelligence activities, spanning 16 separate 
agencies. It authorizes intelligence activities that enable 
critical national security functions, including: combating the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and 
other terrorist groups; checking increasing Russian aggression; 
ensuring Iranian compliance with its obligations while 
countering Iran's malign influence in the region; monitoring an 
increasingly belligerent North Korea; countering Chinese 
provocations; defending against cyber threats; preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and stopping 
overseas threats before they reach the Homeland.
    This bill authorizes the resources necessary to face these 
challenges and provides for needed future capabilities, 
consistent with the funding constraints of the Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 2015 (BBA). The Fiscal Year 2017 authorization is 
very slightly above the President's budget request level and 
includes authorization for a full-year of Overseas Contingency 
Operations (OCO). Although the Committee believes that the 
authorized level will allow the Intelligence Community (IC) to 
meet the challenges to U.S. and global security in Fiscal Year 
2017, the constraints imposed by the BBA have forced tradeoffs 
that, while acceptable in the near term, are not sustainable 
over the long term. The Committee remains concerned that the 
funding levels set forth in current law for Fiscal Year 2018 
and beyond could prevent the IC from fully carrying out its 
missions at a time when the United States and its allies are 
facing the most significant threat environment since September 
11, 2001.
    The legislative provisions of this bill consist of changes 
to statute and direction to the IC to enable effective, 
efficient, and constitutional intelligence activities. However, 
as most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of this Committee's recommendations each 
year are found in the classified annexes to the bill. This 
year's bill funds high-priority initiatives not included in the 
President's budget request, trims requested increases that lack 
clear justifications, and reflects the Committee's 
determinations of which programs represent the best value for 
intelligence dollars in a challenging and constrained budget 
environment. Specific recommendations for the MIP are 
consistent with H.R. 4909, the Committee on Armed Services 
(HASC)-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017.

                          COMMITTEE PRIORITIES

Congressional notifications

    Section 501(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. Sec. 3091(a)(1)) requires the President to keep the 
Congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed of U.S. intelligence activities. Intelligence 
Community Directive (ICD) 112, Congressional Notification, 
states that IC elements--including within the Department of 
Defense (DoD)--shall ``keep the Congressional intelligence 
committees fully informed, in writing, of all significant 
anticipated intelligence activities, significant intelligence 
failures, significant intelligence activities, and illegal 
activities.'' ICD 112 further directs that written notification 
shall be provided to the committees no later than 14 days after 
the final determination that the activity is significant.
    However, the Committee has been frustrated by the varied 
scope, quality, and timeliness of written Congressional 
notifications from DoD and the military services, particularly 
those regarding intelligence acquisition programs and sensitive 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities. While the 
Committee appreciates the recent efforts of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to formalize guidance to 
the DoD intelligence components regarding intelligence 
notifications, and notes that DoD Instruction O-5100.94 governs 
reporting of sensitive activities, there is currently no 
comprehensive DoD policy establishing guidelines for 
notification of intelligence activities to Congress.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that $20.0 million (O&M, 
DW) of the Fiscal Year 2017 funds for Intelligence Management 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense may not be obligated 
or expended until USD(I):
    (1) Issues written guidance to the DoD and military service 
intelligence components regarding notification to Congress of 
intelligence activities; and
    (2) Certifies to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees that the DoD is in compliance with intelligence 
notification requirements as established by Section 501(a) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3091) and has 
implemented procedures consistent with ICD 112 and DoD 
Instruction O-5100.94, Oversight, Coordination, Assessment, and 
Reporting of DoD Intelligence and Intelligence Related 
Sensitive Activities.
    The certification in paragraph (2) shall also include an 
explanation of the basis for the certification, including 
criteria for determining when Congress is notified and a 
description of current and planned mechanisms for improving 
congressional notification.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board priorities

    In August 2004, Executive Order 13353 provided the 
foundation for PCLOB by creating an entity within the 
Department of Justice that would ``protect the legal rights of 
all Americans, including freedoms, civil liberties, and 
information privacy guaranteed by Federal law.'' Congress 
subsequently enacted a statutory charter for PCLOB to function 
as an independent agency. The Committee anticipates that 
PCLOB's 2014 report regarding Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will serve as a valuable 
resource during consideration of the reauthorization of Section 
702 and its impact on Americans' privacy.
    Therefore, in this light, and in light of concerns that 
have been expressed about the impact of foreign intelligence 
activities on U.S. persons, the Committee strongly encourages 
PCLOB to prioritize the privacy rights and civil liberties of 
U.S. persons in any findings, recommendations, or other reports 
stemming from its in-depth examinations of counterterrorism 
activities governed by Executive Order 12333. The Committee 
further encourages PCLOB to refrain from publishing any such 
materials in unclassified form until PCLOB has completed a 
thorough fact-finding process, and the Committee expects the IC 
will provide timely cooperation with that process.

Cost of living consideration

    The Committee is concerned with the high cost of living for 
military, civilian, and contractor personnel at overseas 
Combatant Command intelligence centers. Although the Committee 
recognizes the benefits of co-locating intelligence analysts 
with the operational commander, the intelligence centers for 
both U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM) are located over 600 miles from their Combatant 
Command headquarters. Combatant Commanders based in the United 
States regularly communicate with forward deployed units, and 
the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM intelligence centers have developed 
mechanisms to effectively employ various teleconferencing and 
virtual communication tools to ensure collaboration across 
large distances.
    The Committee is concerned that despite the utility of 
these virtual collaboration tools, DoD has not taken action to 
reduce the number of intelligence personnel stationed in high 
cost of living areas. These costs can exceed $65,000 per 
person, per year in annual cost of living allowances compared 
to the continental United States (CONUS) expenses. The 
additional costs associated with stationing intelligence 
personnel in high-cost overseas locations detract from other 
critical intelligence priorities. The Committee is further 
concerned that DoD does not adequately account for the long-run 
expense of high costs of living when selecting locations for 
intelligence facilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) to evaluate alternate mechanisms for staffing 
overseas Combatant Command intelligence centers, particularly 
those that are not co-located with Combatant Command 
headquarters, and to identify cost-savings opportunities by 
shifting personnel to lower cost locations, including CONUS.

Defense Intelligence Agency education opportunities

    DIA presently allows DIA employees to receive pay for a 
single year only while attending certain graduate degree 
programs on a full-time basis. Employees may pursue such 
opportunities at the National Intelligence University and 
similar institutions; and, in certain circumstances, also at 
public and private civilian universities. However, the one-year 
limit discourages DIA personnel from pursuing multi-year 
graduate degree programs. Expanding DIA's program to allow 
highly qualified DIA employees to pursue multi-year graduate 
degree programs from accredited civilian universities would 
further improve retention, recruitment, and foster diversity of 
thought at DIA.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DIA, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide for and fund a 
program that allows for DIA employees to attend civilian 
graduate degree programs for up to two years each, based on the 
standard length of the relevant program. Where DIA deems 
appropriate, employees may pursue academic programs extending 
beyond two years. Consistent with current practices, the 
program should be made available to at least five employees 
each year, with each employee receiving a full-time salary 
while participating in the program.
    Consistent with the direction above, each DIA participant 
shall be subject to any program approvals, service obligations, 
repayment obligations, and other requirements pertaining to 
academic programs, as prescribed by applicable laws and 
policies. No later than 180 days after the enactment of this 
Act, DIA shall brief the Committee on the status of this 
direction's implementation.

Mental health prevalence

    The Committee is committed to supporting the men and women 
of the IC, who bravely risk their lives serving their country 
as civilians in conflict zones and other dangerous locations 
around the world. These individuals often serve next to their 
military counterparts in areas of active hostilities. As such, 
they are often exposed to many of the emotional stresses 
generally associated with a tour of duty abroad. The Committee 
believes there are deficiencies and inconsistencies in the pre- 
and post-deployment mental health and wellness services 
available to civilian employees.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the National Security 
Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and DIA, no later 
than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a 
joint briefing to the congressional intelligence committees on 
the mental health screenings and related services that these 
agencies offer employees, both before and after they deploy to 
combat zones. In addition, the briefing shall include a 
description of:
    (1) Existing services available and dedicated resources;
    (2) Agency resourcing decisions for and analysis of these 
services, including the frequency of use by employees compared 
to the total number returning from deployment; and
    (3) How agencies with deployed civilian employees are 
sharing best practices and leveraging services or resources 
outside their agencies.

Study of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    It has been more than ten years since the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) was established by the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The Committee 
notes the steady expansion of the statutory functions and 
responsibilities of the DNI.
    Given its responsibilities, the DNI has traditionally been 
staffed primarily by officers with some experience in the IC. 
However, the Fiscal Year 2017 President's budget proposed a 
``large,'' new effort to hire entry-level personnel into a 
``DNI career service.'' The Committee recently learned that one 
component of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) has already extended a substantial number 
of conditional offers of employment for entry-level positions, 
and that additional components plan to identify jobs for, and 
expand recruitment of, college graduates without experience 
working in the IC.
    The Committee believes that a change of this magnitude 
should have triggered more fulsome notification to, and 
engagement with, the congressional intelligence committees. The 
Committee is also concerned that the continuing expansion of 
ODNI's responsibilities, in combination with recent entry-level 
hiring, may have diluted the role originally envisaged for the 
DNI by Congress, and is skeptical that establishing a new 
``career cadre'' represents the best way forward for ODNI. 
Training, mentoring, and developing entry-level intelligence 
officers is a mission better suited to other IC elements that 
offer a broader range of junior career opportunities.
    In Fiscal Year 2017, the Committee intends to closely 
examine the roles and functions of the DNI, with particular 
emphasis on DNI's ability to successfully fulfill its three 
principal responsibilities as defined and described by 50 
U.S.C. Sec. 3023. To assist the Committee in its efforts, the 
Committee directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to 
conduct a comprehensive review of the organization, management, 
and operations of ODNI. This review should:
    (1) Evaluate DNI's ability to fulfill its principal 
responsibilities in light of ODNI's current scope and 
structure, with particular emphasis given to the relative 
proportion of personnel and funding dedicated to those 
principal responsibilities;
    (2) Assess how ODNI might be streamlined by divesting non-
essential roles and responsibilities that could be more 
effectively and efficiently executed by other IC components or 
government agencies outside the IC;
    (3) Analyze the resource needs of the DNI with respect to 
its principal responsibilities; and
    (4) In light of the above, make recommendations regarding 
high-volume entry-level hiring and the establishment of a 
career cadre at ODNI.
    The Committee directs OMB, in conjunction with the 
President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2018, to provide the 
results of its review to the congressional intelligence 
committees.

Improving pre-publication review

    The Committee is concerned that current and former IC 
personnel have published written material without completing 
mandatory pre-publication review procedures or have rejected 
changes required by the review process, resulting in the 
publication of classified information. The Committee is 
particularly troubled by press reports suggesting that 
officials are unaware of the existence or scope of pre-
publication review requirements.
    The Committee is also aware of the perception that the pre-
publication review process can be unfair, untimely, and unduly 
onerous and that these burdens may be at least partially 
responsible for some individuals ``opting out'' of the 
mandatory review process. The Committee further understands 
that IC agencies' pre-publication review mechanisms vary, and 
that there is no binding, IC-wide guidance on the subject.
    The Committee believes that all IC personnel must be made 
aware of pre-publication review requirements and that the 
review process must yield timely, reasoned, and impartial 
decisions that are subject to appeal. The Committee also 
believes that efficiencies can be identified by limiting the 
information subject to pre-publication review, to the fullest 
extent possible, to only those materials that might reasonably 
contain or be derived from classified information obtained 
during the course of an individual's association with the IC. 
In short, the pre-publication review process should be improved 
to better incentivize compliance and to deter personnel from 
violating their commitments.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall issue an 
IC-wide policy regarding pre-publication review. The DNI shall 
transmit this policy to the congressional intelligence 
committees concurrently with its issuance. The policy should 
require each IC agency to develop and maintain a pre-
publication policy that contains, at a minimum, the following 
elements:
    (1) Identification of the individuals subject to pre-
publication review requirements (``covered individuals'');
    (2) Guidance on the types of information that must be 
submitted for pre-publication review, including regarding works 
(a) unrelated to an individual's IC employment; or (b) 
published in cooperation with a third party, e.g.--
          (i) Authored jointly by covered individuals and third 
        parties;
          (ii) Authored by covered individuals but published 
        under the name of a third party; or
          (iii) Authored by a third party but with substantial 
        input from covered individuals;
    (3) Guidance on a process by which covered individuals can 
participate in pre-publication reviews, and communicate openly 
and frequently with reviewers;
    (4) Requirements for timely responses, as well as reasoned 
edits and decisions by reviewers;
    (5) Requirements for a prompt and transparent appeal 
process;
    (6) Guidelines for the assertion of interagency equities in 
pre-publication review;
    (7) A summary of the lawful measures each agency may take 
to enforce its policy, to include civil and criminal referrals; 
and
    (8) A description of procedures for post-publication review 
of documents that are alleged or determined to reveal 
classified information but were not submitted for pre-
publication review.
    Additionally the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 
180 days after the enactment of this Act, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy 
of IC information technology efforts to improve and expedite 
pre-publication review processes, and the resources needed to 
ensure that IC elements can meet this direction.
    The Committee further directs that, no later than 270 days 
after the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall certify to the 
congressional intelligence committees that IC elements' pre-
publication review policies, non-disclosure agreements, and any 
other agreements imposing pre-publication review obligations 
that reflect the policy described above.

Open Skies Treaty

    The Committee is concerned that the Administration is not 
leveraging commercial imagery in connection with the Open Skies 
Treaty, resulting in cumbersome, obsolete, and expensive 
information sharing practices that carry unnecessary national 
security risks. The time, money, and effort the United States 
spends to coordinate with state parties to the treaty provides 
little to no valuable information to the United States, while 
permitting Russian collection over U.S. and allies' critical 
national security infrastructure.
    State parties may appreciate the valuable information they 
receive from the United States as a result of the Open Skies 
Treaty, but the United States could potentially provide more 
and better information from commercial imagery and other 
sources without the inherent risks of independent Russian 
collection.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 90 
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report to 
the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
evaluating the potential costs and benefits of providing to 
covered state parties, excluding Russia and Belarus, 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar information in lieu of 
Open Skies Treaty information.

Student loan debt report

    IC components need to be able to recruit talented young 
professionals. However, the soaring cost of college and post-
graduate education in the United States is causing many young 
people to forgo public service in favor of career opportunities 
with more competitive pay or loan forgiveness benefits.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report to 
the congressional intelligence committees on programs that seek 
to help IC personnel manage student loan debt. The report shall 
include details about each IC element's program, including loan 
forgiveness, loan repayment, and financial counseling programs; 
efforts to inform prospective and current employees about such 
programs; and the number of employees who use such programs. 
The report shall also include an analysis of the benefits and 
drawbacks of creating new programs and expanding existing 
programs, and shall identify any barriers to the establishment 
of IC-wide programs.

Workforce development partnership

    The Committee has long promoted novel recruiting, hiring 
and retention practices, especially with respect to highly 
expert, highly sought-after Science, Technology, Engineering, 
and Math (STEM) students and professionals. Despite these 
efforts, the IC continues to struggle with meeting STEM 
recruitment, hiring and retention goals inside the IC.
    The Committee is therefore encouraged to learn that the IC 
is considering new and creative practices in this regard. For 
example, the Committee was intrigued by the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory's (PNNL) budding Workforce Development 
Partnership with the CIA. Partnerships like this may allow IC 
agencies to leverage PNNL's robust employee recruiting network 
and seek out STEM students who might not otherwise consider IC 
employment.
    Similarly, to address concerns that potential hires will 
accept other job offers while awaiting clearances, NGA has a 
program to allow interim hires to work on unclassified projects 
until clearances are adjudicated. In addition, several IC 
agencies have instituted a unique pay scale for their junior 
STEM workforce. The Committee recognizes the benefits of these 
initiatives, and believes that such efforts could have wider 
applicability across the IC.
    Therefore, the Committee directs, no later than 180 days 
after the enactment of this Act, the DNI Chief Human Capital 
Officer to provide to the congressional intelligence committees 
an interagency briefing on new approaches, including outreach 
and advertising, the IC is considering or conducting to attract 
a diverse, robust STEM and IT workforce to meet the increasing 
demands in the IC.

                          DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Jurisdictional statement on defense intelligence

    Pursuant to the Rules of the House of Representatives, the 
Committee shares jurisdiction over the tactical intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of DoD with HASC. The 
Committee enjoys a collaborative relationship with HASC and 
appreciates DoD's efforts to facilitate shared oversight of the 
MIP.
    However, the Committee remains deeply concerned that many 
DoD intelligence and intelligence-related activities are 
improperly excluded from the MIP. The Committee is also 
concerned that many intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities continue to be characterized as ``battlespace 
awareness,'' ``situational awareness,'' and--especially--
``operational preparation of the environment.'' As the 
Committee observed in its report accompanying the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (H. Rpt. 111-186):

        In categorizing its clandestine activities, DoD 
        frequently labels them as `Operational Preparation of 
        the Environment' (OPE) to distinguish particular 
        operations as traditional military activities and not 
        as intelligence functions. The Committee observes, 
        though, that overuse of this term has made the 
        distinction all but meaningless. The determination as 
        to whether an operation will be categorized as an 
        intelligence activity is made on a case-by-case basis; 
        there are no clear guidelines or principles for making 
        consistent determinations. The Director of National 
        Intelligence himself has acknowledged that there is no 
        bright line between traditional intelligence missions 
        carried out by the military and the operations of the 
        CIA.
        Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations, 
        even those legitimately recognized as OPE, carry the 
        same diplomatic and national security risks as 
        traditional intelligence-gathering activities. While 
        the purpose of many such operations is to gather 
        intelligence, DOD has shown a propensity to apply the 
        OPE label where the slightest nexus of a theoretical, 
        distant military operation might one day exist. 
        Consequently, these activities often escape the 
        scrutiny of the intelligence committees, and the 
        congressional defense committees cannot be expected to 
        exercise oversight outside of their jurisdiction.

    The continued failure to subject OPE and other activities 
to Committee scrutiny precludes the Committee from fully 
executing its statutorily mandated oversight role on behalf of 
the House and the American people, including by specifically 
authorizing intelligence and intelligence-related activities as 
required by Section 504(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. Sec. 3094(e)).
    Therefore, the Committee directs DoD to ensure that the 
Committee receives proper insight and access to information 
regarding all intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of DoD, including those presently funded outside the MIP. The 
Committee further encourages DoD, in meeting this direction, to 
err on the side of inclusivity and not to withhold information 
based on arbitrary or overly technical distinctions such as 
funding source, characterization of the activities in question, 
or the fact that the activities in question may have a nexus to 
ongoing or anticipated military operations.

Non-conventional assisted recovery

    Section 1247 of H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, extends and modifies 
non-conventional assisted recovery capabilities originally 
authorized by Section 943(h) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    The Committee directs that, to the extent DoD conducts 
intelligence or intelligence-related activities pursuant to 
Section 1247 of H.R. 4909, DoD shall keep the Committee fully 
and currently informed of such activities.

Annual reports on foreign military capabilities

    H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017, updates several annual country-
specific reports to include intelligence assessments of foreign 
military capabilities. These assessments will be conducted by 
NIP- and MIP-funded components of DoD.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that, beginning in Fiscal 
Year 2017, DoD shall ensure it provides to the congressional 
intelligence committees:
    (1) The annual report on military power of the People's 
Republic of China directed by Section 1202 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended;
    (2) The annual report on military and security developments 
involving the Russian Federation directed by Section 1245 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, as 
amended; and
    (3) The annual report on military power of Iran directed by 
Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010, as amended.

Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Army

    The Committee believes the Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System-Army (DCGS-A) provides operational and tactical 
commanders with enhanced, state-of-the-art intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking, processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and connectivity 
to the defense intelligence information enterprise. DCGS-A is a 
critical tool for enabling military intelligence warfighters to 
process, fuse, and exploit data. In the past, the Army has 
struggled to keep pace for pre-deployment and in-theater 
training for DCGS-A. However, training for military 
intelligence analysts must be prioritized in the pre-deployment 
readiness cycle to ensure that those using this intelligence 
tool can effectively utilize its capabilities.
    The Army has fielded over 95 percent of DCGS-A Increment 1 
systems, with mixed results and often negative feedback from 
the users. The Army is in the process of fielding Increment 1, 
Release 2, which will address many of the initial concerns and 
deficiencies of Increment 1. The Committee remains concerned 
that the Army has not sufficiently planned for user training in 
support of the release of Increment 1, Release 2 to operational 
users.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Army, no later than 90 
days after the enactment of this Act, to submit a plan to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on how the 
Army will fully incorporate DCGS-A training into the readiness 
cycle for Army personnel. The plan should specifically address 
any lessons learned from the fielding of DCGS-A Increment 1 and 
any ongoing corrective actions to improve the roll-out of 
Increment 1, Release 2.

Distributed Common Ground/Surface System-Air Force

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee supports the 
move toward an open architecture standard for the Distributed 
Common Ground/Surface System-Air Force (DCGS-AF). However, 
current program documentation on specific program milestones is 
lacking, and it remains unclear how the Air Force will 
effectively leverage an open architecture without additional 
changes in contracting strategy for applications on the new 
architecture.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force, by January 
9, 2017, to provide a briefing to the Committee and to HASC 
outlining the strategic roadmap of how and when the Air Force 
will achieve an open architecture, including key milestones and 
decision points and timelines for addressing the 
recommendations from the 2015 Operational Test and Evaluation 
report on the DCGS-AF system. The roadmap should also include a 
strategy for improving contracting mechanisms to better 
leverage and utilize multiple vendors under the open 
architecture construct.

Common controller for unmanned aircraft systems

    The Committee supports the Army's efforts to develop a 
common controller for the RQ-7A/B Shadow and the RQ-11B Raven 
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles. However, the Committee is 
concerned that the Army is not collaborating with the Marine 
Corps on similar efforts to develop a ground controller for the 
Marine Corps family of tactical unmanned aerial systems (UAS), 
including the RQ-11B Raven, the RQ-12A Wasp, and the RQ-20A 
Puma.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Army and the Marine 
Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), no later than 90 days after 
the enactment of this Act, to jointly submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees on the 
feasibility of developing a common controller for all Brigade 
and Below UAS airframes, as well as U.S. Marine Corps small 
unit UAS. The report should address the potential performance 
and operational benefits of a common controller, anticipated 
development costs, and anticipated life-cycle cost savings of a 
common controller.

Conditions for repeal of report on unmanned aerial systems

    The committee report accompanying H.R. 4909, the HASC-
passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 
(H. Rpt. 114-537), proposes to repeal the reporting requirement 
on the challenges facing UAS, which was directed by the 
committee report accompanying the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (H. Rpt. 110-652). The 
Committee has found the report to be of value, but recognizes 
that there are other avenues to convey the information it 
contains in a more timely and relevant fashion.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DoD to ensure the 
Committee continues to receive pertinent updates regarding 
DoD's efforts to address UAS acquisition and interoperability 
challenges. The Committee further directs DoD, no later than 90 
days after the enactment of this Act, to brief the Committee 
regarding its proposed plan to keep the Committee fully and 
currently informed regarding UAS issues.

MQ-9 Improvements

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that 
DoD is pursuing a variety of improvement initiatives for 
additional capability for the MQ-9 UAS, including the 
development and testing of innovative anti-icing technologies 
that allow the MQ-9 to cruise in light icing and visible 
moisture.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF), in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Air Force 
Air Combat Command, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), to brief the Committee in addition to HASC 
no later than October 1, 2016, on DoD's efforts to field an 
anti-icing capability for the MQ-9.

Air Force Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
        Reconnaissance fleet

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is aware that 
the Air Force's critical manned Command, Control, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) aircraft are high-
demand assets facing low availability rates, end-of-life 
issues, and growing sustainment costs. The committee is 
supportive of the Air Force's plan to replace the Joint 
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) fleet with an 
affordable commercially available platform under a full and 
open competition. The Committee believes that, when 
recapitalizing the remainder of the manned C2ISR fleet, the Air 
Force should use a similar acquisition strategy as the one used 
with JSTARS, and consider a full and open competition.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air 
Force to provide, no later than September 1, 2016, a briefing 
to the Committee--in addition to HASC--on the Air Force's 
current plans for recapitalization of its C2ISR aircraft.

Autonomous undersea vehicles

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is aware that 
the Department of the Navy is performing a gap analysis of 
autonomous undersea vehicle requirements ``to determine the 
inventory requirements of 2025 and beyond.'' In addition, the 
Committee is aware that the Secretary of the Navy is developing 
an unmanned systems roadmap strategy in 2016 to help inform 
future inventory requirements and investment decisions. The 
Committee remains interested in maintaining a significant peer 
advantage in the undersea domain and believes autonomous 
undersea vehicles represent an asymmetric opportunity to 
leverage atypical intelligence capabilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy 
to provide, no later than February 1, 2017, a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees--in addition to the 
congressional defense committees--that details the Unmanned 
Systems roadmap strategy and the program objective memorandum 
2018 investment strategy to obtain such a capability.

Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike and related programs

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is encouraged 
that DoD has completed its review of the Unmanned Carrier 
Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program and has 
decided to move forward with a slight variation that will 
include airborne tanking as an additional requirement. The 
Committee, however, is concerned that modifications such as 
expanding requirements create inefficiencies and delays in the 
DoD's major system acquisitions process.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of 
the United States, no later than March 1, 2017, to provide a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees in addition 
to the congressional defense committees--on the Navy's carrier 
based unmanned aircraft acquisition programs. The report shall 
include the following:
    (1) The Navy's requirements and acquisition strategy for 
the programs, including whether the strategies are consistent 
with acquisition management best practices identified by the 
Comptroller General;
    (2) The extent to which the programs have established and 
are meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals, including 
test plans and progress; and
    (3) The extent to which critical technologies are mature; 
system and subsystem designs are stable; and manufacturing 
processes are understood and have demonstrated capability to 
produce reliable, high-quality systems efficiently.

Translated foreign military and technical writings

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that 
DoD's strategy and programmatic decision-making are informed by 
an understanding of foreign military and technical writings. 
However, the Committee is concerned that these translated 
writings are not widely disseminated or easily accessible 
within either DoD or the broader community of analysts 
supporting and informing U.S. defense strategy and policy.
    Therefore, the committee directs SECDEF, no later than July 
15, 2016, to provide a briefing to the Committee--in addition 
to HASC--on the policies governing the access and dissemination 
of translated foreign military and technical writings. The 
briefing should also address the following elements:
    (1) Policies and guidelines governing the access and 
dissemination of translated writings;
    (2) Policies and guidelines governing the releasability of 
translated writings, including release authorities;
    (3) Organizations and resources currently dedicated to the 
translation and dissemination of such writings; and
    (4) Options to make translated writings more accessible 
within DoD and to the public, including identification of 
policy changes and resources required for each option.

Comptroller General assessment of deployable identity management

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that 
DoD has used biometrics and forensics to successfully identify, 
target, and disrupt terrorists and enemy combatants. The 
Committee further notes that DoD has taken steps to establish 
expeditionary biometrics and forensics as enduring capabilities 
in the base budget. The Committee is concerned, however, that 
these funding levels may not be adequate to sustain current and 
future validated mission requirements.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of 
the United States to assess DoD's process for determining and 
validating its future expeditionary biometrics and forensics 
requirements, as well as actions DoD has taken to ensure that 
its expeditionary biometrics and forensics capabilities, 
including materiel solutions, trained personnel, and funding, 
are available to meet current and future requirements. The 
Committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide, 
no later than March 1, 2017, a briefing to the Committee--in 
addition to HASC--on the Comptroller General's preliminary 
findings.

Social media analytics supporting battlespace awareness

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is concerned 
with DoD's ability to effectively monitor and utilize social 
media analytic tools.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, 
no later than February 15, 2017, to conduct and provide a 
briefing to the Committee--in addition to HASC--regarding an 
assessment of the current policy directives on how defense 
entities use such social media tools.

Language training

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee believes that 
foreign language proficiency, including immersive regional and 
cultural training, is a major force multiplier and a key 
component of national intelligence and defense. The Committee 
further believes that DoD should examine whether training for 
U.S. service members in Russian language, regional expertise, 
and culture are sufficient to ensure service members deploying 
to Eastern Europe are prepared to effectively fulfill mission 
requirements.
    Therefore, the Committee urges the Director of the Defense 
Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) to 
assess the need for additional courses in Russian language, 
regional expertise, and culture training. Additionally, the 
Committee directs the Director of the DLNSEO, no later than 
September 30, 2016, to provide a briefing to the Committee--in 
addition to HASC--on the feasibility and estimated costs of 
these opportunities and provide a suggested list of developing 
countries prioritized for engagement and instruction.

Domestic source of traveling wave tubes

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is concerned 
with the use of foreign-made components in the most sensitive 
national security programs. Specifically, the Committee is 
aware that traveling wave tubes (TWTs) of non-U.S. manufacture 
are being used in critical satellite and guided missile 
programs.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, 
in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
no later than March 1, 2017, to provide a briefing to the 
Committee--in addition to HASC--on the risks of non-U.S. TWTs 
in national security programs.

Enduring high-resolution geospatial data

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is aware that 
the DoD has been utilizing sophisticated three-dimensional 
high-resolution light detection and ranging (LIDAR) systems to 
provide geospatial data for tactical users in theaters of 
hostilities. The Committee believes that these tactical systems 
are vital to supporting urgent, in-theater operational forces 
in the successful execution of their missions. However, the 
Committee is concerned that reliance on OCO funds prevented 
USSOCOM and the Army from properly ensuring that such 
capabilities are included in the base budget request.
    Therefore the Committee directs the Commander, USSOCOM, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no later than November 1, 2016, to 
conduct a review of these activities and the capabilities 
supporting them, and to provide a briefing regarding this 
review to the Committee--in addition to HASC.

Internet of Things

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee is concerned 
that, despite mitigation efforts, DoD may remain vulnerable 
based on its reliance on non-defense networks, such as those 
from defense industrial base partners or allies. These 
challenges will grow more pronounced with the increasing 
prevalence of web-connected devices, commonly referred to as 
the Internet of Things (IoT).
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of 
the United States to assess DoD's planning and management for 
the security impact and challenges that the IoT will present to 
DoD. The Committee further directs the Comptroller General to 
provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence and 
defense committees, no later than March 1, 2017, on the 
preliminary results of this assessment.

Strategy for assured access to trusted microelectronics

    Consistent with Section 231 of H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 
ensuring the integrity of the U.S. supply chain has been, and 
continues to be, a matter of intense Committee interest. 
Although the Committee's concerns extend to all links in the 
supply chain, it is especially concerned with microelectronic 
components employed within materials developed or purchased by 
IC elements within DoD.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that USD(I), no later than 
one year after the enactment of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, submit to the 
congressional intelligence--in addition to the congressional 
defense committees--a strategy to ensure that the IC elements 
within DoD have ensured access to trusted microelectronics by 
no later than September 30, 2020. The strategy be submitted in 
unclassified form but may include a classified annex. It shall 
include the following elements:
    (1) Definitions of the various levels of trust required by 
classes of DoD systems;
    (2) Means of classifying systems of DoD based on the level 
of trust such systems are required to maintain with respect to 
microelectronics;
    (3) Means by which trust in microelectronics can be 
assured;
    (4) Means to increase the supplier base for assured 
microelectronics to ensure multiple supply pathways;
    (5) An assessment of the microelectronics needs of DoD in 
future years, including the need for trusted, radiation-
hardened microelectronics;
    (6) An assessment of the microelectronic needs of DoD that 
may not be fulfilled by entities outside DoD; and
    (7) The resources required to assure access to trusted 
microelectronics, including infrastructure and investments in 
science and technology.
    Additionally, consistent with the committee report 
accompanying H.R. 4909, the HASC-passed National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the 
Committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States, 
no later than March 30, 2017, to provide to the Committee--in 
addition to HASC--a report that evaluates how selected 
commercial microelectronics businesses provide trusted 
microelectronics to the U.S. government.
    In its report, the Comptroller General should address the 
following:
    (1) How selected commercial companies incorporate trust 
into their leading-edge microelectronics, including techniques 
to protect intellectual property and prevent malicious content 
in devices; and (2) The extent to which DoD could implement 
these commercial practices, and any challenges associated with 
implementing such practices for defense systems.

                             CYBERSECURITY

Review of dual-hatting relationship

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee supports 
further evaluation of the dual-hatting of a single individual 
as both Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and 
Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) if USCYBERCOM 
is established as a combatant command under the Unified Command 
Plan.
    Therefore, the Committee directs SECDEF, no later than 
November 1, 2016, to provide a briefing to the Committee--in 
addition to HASC--on a review and assessment of the dual-
hatting of DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM. This review should 
address:
    (1) Roles and responsibilities, including intelligence 
authorities, of both USCYBERCOM and NSA;
    (2) Assessment of the current impact of the dual-hatting 
relationship, including both advantages and disadvantages;
    (3) Recommendations on courses of action for separating the 
dual-hatting of DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM, if 
appropriate;
    (4) Suggested timelines for carrying out such courses of 
action, if appropriate; and
    (5) Recommendations for legislative actions as necessary.
    The Committee further believes that a decision to terminate 
the dual-hatting of the DIRNSA and Commander, CYBERCOM, should 
prompt a further review of NSA's organization. The Committee 
seeks to promote the efficient and effective execution of NSA's 
national intelligence mission. Specifically, the Committee 
believes that the organization of NSA should be examined to 
account for the evolution of its mission since its 
establishment, the current structure of the IC, and the fact 
that NSA is predominantly NIP-funded.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DNI, no later than October 
1, 2016, to conduct an assessment and provide a briefing to the 
Committee on options to better align the structure, budgetary 
procedures, and oversight of NSA with its national intelligence 
mission. This assessment should include an evaluation of the 
merits of transitioning NSA to civilian leadership appointed by 
the DNI in lieu of military leadership appointed by SECDEF.

Comptroller General assessment of the management and measurement of 
        cyber activities

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that a 
single major cyber incident could have significant impact on 
DoD, including loss of confidence in national security, loss of 
national security or personal identifiable information, and the 
inability to conduct military operations.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of 
the United States to assess the Department of Defense's 
management and measurement of progress in protecting its own 
networks, systems, and information, and, no later than April 
15, 2017, to provide to the congressional intelligence 
committees--in addition to the HASC and the Senate Armed 
Services Committee--a report on the findings of such 
assessment.

Acquisition security improvement

    The Committee remains concerned about supply chain and 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the IC. The Committee believes 
the IC should implement a more comprehensive approach to 
address these vulnerabilities, particularly during the 
acquisition process. However, ICD 801, the IC guideline 
governing the acquisition process, is outdated and must be 
revised to reflect current risks. In particular, despite 
issuance of ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, in 2013, ICD 
801 has not been updated to reflect this policy nor does it 
include consideration of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
mitigation.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to review and consider 
amendments to ICD 801 to better reflect and anticipate supply 
chain and cybersecurity risks and threats, as well as outline 
policies to mitigate both risks and threats. In particular, the 
review should examine whether to:
    (1) Expand risk management criteria in the acquisition 
process to include cyber and supply chain threats;
    (2) Require counterintelligence and security assessments as 
part of the acquisition and procurement process;
    (3) Propose and adopt new education requirements for 
acquisition professionals on cyber and supply chain threats; 
and
    (4) Factor in the cost of cyber and supply chain security.

Cyber information sharing and customer feedback

    The Committee commends NSA's new policies and procedures to 
facilitate greater information sharing of cyber threat 
indicators and defensive measures with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) at the unclassified level.
    With the recent enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 
which encourages greater information sharing between private 
sector stakeholders, as well as with government entities, the 
Committee believes the next step is to ensure the entire IC is 
working to disseminate timely, actionable information to 
private sector stakeholders so they can better protect their 
information technology networks. The vast majority of U.S. 
networks reside in the private sector, and it is good 
governance to ensure that those networks are safe and secure 
for the general public.
    The Committee appreciates that the IC has begun efforts to 
increase unclassified cyber threat sharing. Because an increase 
in the quantity of reporting does not necessarily indicate 
effectiveness or usefulness, this Committee continues to 
monitor the quality of the information distributed.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that the DNI, no later 
than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence committees on IC-wide efforts to 
share more information with DHS for further dissemination to 
the private sector. This briefing shall specifically address 
types of information shared, metrics on output, tabulation of 
low output producing agencies, recommendations on how low 
output agencies can increase sharing, timeliness of information 
shared, and average total time it takes for information to 
transit the system.
    The Committee also directs the DNI, in coordination with 
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), to conduct a 
survey of government and private sector participants of the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC). The survey shall be anonymous, provide an accurate 
assessment of the usefulness and timeliness of the data 
received, and determine if customers are satisfied with 
intelligence briefings on threat actors impacting their 
specific industry. The DNI shall provide to the congressional 
intelligence and homeland security committees, no later than 
one year after the enactment of this Act, an unclassified 
report detailing the results of this survey.

Cybersecurity expertise at national labs

    The Committee believes that the Department of Energy (DOE) 
National Labs represent a unique and invaluable resource for 
the government and the IC in particular.
    Therefore, the Committee directs, no later than 180 days 
after the enactment of this Act, DHS I&A, in coordination with 
DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN), to 
provide to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
on the current utilization of National Lab expertise by DHS 
I&A. In addition, this report should address opportunities to 
increase DHS I&A's utilization of cybersecurity expertise of 
the National Labs as well as the budgetary implications of 
taking advantage of these potential opportunities.

Cybersecurity courses for Centers of Academic Excellence

    The Committee is concerned by a recent analysis from a 
security firm, which determined that not one of the nation's 
leading undergraduate computer science programs requires 
students to take a cybersecurity course before graduating. 
Cybersecurity depends on IC professionals having a strong 
understanding of the cyber threat and how to mitigate it--which 
in turn requires a strong academic background. NSA and DHS co-
sponsor the Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) in Cyber 
Defense program, which includes an emphasis on basic 
cybersecurity. Nevertheless, even some CAE-designated 
institutions lack cybersecurity course prerequisites in their 
computer science curricula.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on improving 
cybersecurity training within NIP-funded undergraduate and 
graduate computer science programs. The report should 
specifically address:
    (1) The potential advantages and disadvantages of 
conditioning an institution's receipt of such funds on its 
computer science program's requiring cybersecurity as a 
precondition to graduation;
    (2) How CAE programs might bolster cybersecurity 
educational requirements; and
    (3) Recommendations to support the goal of ensuring that 
federally-funded computer science programs properly equip 
students to confront future cybersecurity challenges.

                                 SPACE

Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee supports 
integrated interagency efforts, such as Joint Interagency 
Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC), intended to protect 
and defend critical national space capabilities in response to 
increasing counterspace threats from potential foreign 
adversaries. The Committee is also aware that it is unclear how 
the JICSpOC or its capabilities will be used after Fiscal Year 
2016.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination 
with DoD, to provide, no later than January 15, 2017, a 
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees that addresses:
    (1) The future objectives, strategy, and resources planned 
for the JICSpOC;
    (2) How these activities will be complementary to or 
integrated with U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations 
Center (JSpOC) and the National Reconnaissance Operations 
Center; and
    (3) A review of the costs and benefits of maintaining a 
separate JSpOC and JICSpOC as well as the optimal location to 
perform the related activities.

Space defense and protection

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee remains 
concerned about the growing and serious risk that foreign 
counterspace threats pose to the U.S. national security posture 
and believes that the National Research Council (NRC) provided 
useful guidance in addressing this challenge in its December 
2015 study, as directed by Section 912 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination 
with DoD, to provide a briefing to the congressional 
intelligence and defense committees, no later than December 1, 
2016, on the actions taken, if any, in response to the NRC's 
findings and recommendations.

Plan for strengthening outer space cooperation with Japan

    Consistent with the committee report accompanying H.R. 
4909, the HASC-passed National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (H. Rpt. 114-537), the Committee notes that 
the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United 
States and the Government of Japan issued in April 2015 
included important openness to cooperation in several areas, 
including those utilizing outer space.
    Therefore, the Committee directs SECDEF and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Secretary 
of State and the DNI, no later than April 1, 2017, to jointly 
submit to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a report outlining the 
opportunities to improve U.S.-Japan cooperation in outer space.

              Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes

    On April 29, 2016, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill H.R. 5077 favorably reported.
    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 5077. Mr. Himes offered an amendment that would 
permit the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to 
access covert action information related to protecting the 
United States from terrorism. He subsequently withdrew the 
amendment.
    The Committee considered the classified Fiscal Year 2017 
schedule of authorizations, which it adopted by a voice vote.
    Chairman Nunes then moved to make the classified Fiscal 
Year 2017 schedule of authorizations available for members of 
the House to review. The motion was agreed to by a recorded 
vote of 20 ayes to 0 noes:

        Voting aye: Mr. Nunes (chairman), Mr. Miller, Mr. 
        Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, 
        Mr. Pompeo, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Turner, Mr. Wenstrup, 
        Mr. Stewart, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Himes, Ms. Sewell, Mr. 
        Carson, Ms. Speier, Mr. Quigley, Mr. Swalwell, and Mr. 
        Murphy.
        Voting no: None
    The Committee then agreed to a motion by the Chairman to 
favorably report the bill H.R. 5077 to the House, including by 
reference the classified schedules of authorizations. The 
motion was agreed to by a voice vote.

        Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment


Section 1--Short title; table of contents

    Section 1 lists the title and the table of contents of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (the Act).

Section 2--Definitions

    Section 2 defines the terms ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' and the ``Intelligence Community'' (IC) that will 
be used in the Act

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the U.S. Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2017.

Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the amounts authorized to be 
appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities and the personnel levels for Fiscal Year 2017 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 provides that the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) may authorize employment of civilian 
personnel in Fiscal Year 2017 in excess of the number of 
authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three percent 
of the total limit applicable to each IC element under Section 
102. The DNI may do so only if necessary to the performance of 
important intelligence functions.

Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the 
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA 
for Fiscal Year 2017.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201--Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2017 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS


Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 303--Authorization of appropriations for Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board

    Section 303 requires funds available to the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) to be obligated or 
expended during a fiscal year only if such funds were 
specifically authorized by Congress for that fiscal year, and 
authorizes the full amount of the Administration's budget 
request for PCLOB for Fiscal Year 2017.

Section 304--Modification of certain whistleblowing procedures

    Section 304 amends current law, including the Intelligence 
Community Whistleblower Protection Act (IC WPA), to provide for 
the direct transmission to Congress by IC inspectors general 
(IGs) of whistleblower complaints containing classified 
information.

Section 305--Reports on major defense intelligence acquisition programs

    Section 305 requires milestone decision authorities to 
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
with reports on major defense intelligence acquisition programs 
at each milestone approval through initial operating capability 
or full operating capability, as applicable.

Section 306--Modifications to certain requirements for construction of 
        facilities

    Section 306 amends and clarifies existing law regarding the 
requirements for inclusion in the Administration's annual 
budget request and notification to the congressional 
intelligence committees of projects for the construction of 
facilities for the primary use of IC personnel.

Section 307--Information on Activities of Privacy and Civil Liberties 
        Oversight Board

    Section 307 requires PCLOB to keep Congress and relevant IC 
elements fully and currently informed of its activities.

Section 308--Clarification of authorization of certain activities of 
        the Department of Energy

    Section 308 authorizes funds appropriated for Fiscal Year 
2016 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the Department of Energy.

Section 309--Technical correction to Executive Schedule

    Section 309 contains a technical correction regarding the 
annual rate of basic pay for the Director of the National 
Counter Proliferation Center.

Section 310--Maximum amount charged for declassification reviews

    Section 310 prohibits the head of an element of the IC from 
charging reproduction fees for a mandatory declassification 
review in excess of reproduction fees that the head would 
charge for a request for information under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). It also permits agency heads to waive 
processing fees for declassification reviews in the same manner 
as for FOIA.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401--Analyses and impact statements by Director of National 
        Intelligence regarding actions by Committee on Foreign 
        Investment in the United States

    Section 401 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, after the completion of a review or an 
investigation of a covered transaction, the threat analysis 
previously provided to the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS) pertaining to such transaction. It 
also directs the DNI to provide the committees with impact 
statements when the DNI determines that a covered transaction 
will have an operational impact on the IC.

Section 402--National Counterintelligence and Security Center

    Section 402 renames the National Counterintelligence 
Executive as the ``National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center,'' with conforming amendments.
    Section 403--Assistance for governmental entities and 
private entities in recognizing online violent extremist 
content
    Section 403 requires the DNI to publish on a publicly 
available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols, 
insignia, and other markings commonly associated with, or 
adopted by, State Department-designated foreign terrorist 
organizations.

       SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 411--Enhanced death benefits for employees of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 411 authorizes the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to pay death benefits substantially 
similar to those authorized for members of the Foreign Service, 
and requires the Director to submit implementing regulations to 
the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 412--Pay and retirement authorities of the Inspector General of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 412 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 to permit the CIA Inspector General (IG) to designate an 
officer or employee as a law enforcement officer for purposes 
of pay and retirement benefits, if such officer or employee is 
appointed to a position with responsibility for investigating 
suspected offenses against the criminal laws of the United 
States. This section may not be construed to confer on the CIA 
IG, or any other officer or employee of CIA, any police or law 
enforcement or internal security functions or authorities.

Section 413--Clarification of authority, direction, and control over 
        the information assurance directorate of the National Security 
        Agency

    Section 413 restores authority, direction, and control over 
the Information Assurance Directorate of the National Security 
Agency to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Section 414--Living quarters allowance for employees of the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 414 prohibits the receipt of a living quarters 
allowance by any civilian employee of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency who is assigned to a directorate of a geographic 
combatant command that is headquartered outside of the United 
States. It applies starting with the pay period beginning on or 
after one year following enactment of the Act.

Section 415--Plan on assumption of certain weather missions by the 
        National Reconnaissance Office

    Section 415 requires the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office to develop a plan to carry out certain 
space-based environmental monitoring missions currently 
performed by the Air Force. It also authorizes certain pre-
acquisition activities and directs that an independent cost 
estimate be submitted to the congressional intelligence and 
defense committees.

Section 416--Modernization of security clearance information technology 
        architecture

    Section 416 requires the DNI to assist the Secretary of 
Defense in developing and implementing--and issuing guidance 
relating to a modernization of DoD's security clearance 
information technology architecture.

 TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO 
                               BAY, CUBA


Section 501--Declassification of information on past terrorist 
        activities of detainees transferred from United States Naval 
        Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, after signing of Executive Order 
        13492

    Section 501 requires the DNI to conduct a prompt 
declassification review--and, once declassified, make available 
to the public intelligence reports prepared by the National 
Counterterrorism Center prior to Periodic Review Board sessions 
or detainee transfers on the past terrorist activities of 
individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, who were transferred or released after the signing 
of Executive Order 13492.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS


Section 601--Report on intelligence community employees detailed to 
        National Security Council

    Section 601 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report listing, by year, the number 
of employees of an element of the IC who have been detailed to 
the National Security Council during each of the previous ten 
years.

Section 602--Intelligence community reporting to Congress on foreign 
        fighter flows

    Section 602 directs DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on foreign fighter flows to 
and from terrorist safe havens abroad.

Section 603--Report on information relating to academic programs, 
        scholarships, fellowships, and internships sponsored, 
        administered, or used by the intelligence community

    Section 603 directs DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report regarding IC information 
collection on certain academic programs, scholarships, 
fellowships, and internships sponsored, administered, or used 
by the intelligence community.

Section 604--Report on cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United 
        States and maritime shipping

    Section 604 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United States and 
maritime shipping.

Section 605--Report on counter-messaging activities

    Section 605 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the counter-
messaging activities of the Department of Homeland Security 
with respect to the Islamic State and other extremist groups.

Section 606--Report on reprisals against contractors of the 
        intelligence community

    Section 606 directs the IC IG to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on known or 
suspected reprisals made against employees of contractors of 
elements of the IC, and to make any appropriate 
recommendations.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple 
hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 
5077. The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects 
conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight 
activity.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of H.R. 5077 are to authorize the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government for Fiscal Year 2017. These activities 
enhance the national security of the United States, support and 
assist the armed forces of the United States, and support the 
President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United 
States.
    The classified annex that accompanies this report reflects 
in great detail the Committee's specific performance goals and 
objectives at the programmatic level with respect to classified 
programs.

                       Unfunded Mandate Statement

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.
                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, May 11, 2016.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5077, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is William Ma.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Keith Hall.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 5077--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017

    Summary: H.R. 5077 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2017 for intelligence activities of the U.S. 
government, the Intelligence Community Management Account 
(ICMA), the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System (CIARDS), and the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB).
    CBO does not provide estimates for classified programs; 
therefore, this estimate addresses only the unclassified 
aspects of the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that 
implementing the unclassified provisions of the bill would cost 
$521 million over the 2017-2021 period, subject to 
appropriation of the specified amounts.
    In addition, enacting the bill also would affect direct 
spending and revenues by allowing the Inspector General of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to designate certain 
employees as law enforcement officers; therefore, pay-as-you 
procedures apply. However, CBO estimates that those effects 
would not be significant over the 2017-2026 period.
    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5077 would not increase 
net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four 
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027.
    H.R. 5077 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    Estimated Costs to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary effects of H.R. 5077 are shown in the following 
table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget 
function 050 (national defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                          2017-
                                                        2017      2018      2019      2020      2021      2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
 
Intelligence Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level.............................       519         0         0         0         0       519
    Estimated Outlays...............................       337       145        18         8         3       511
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board:
    Authorization Level.............................        10         0         0         0         0        10
    Estimated Outlays...............................         7         3         0         0         0        10
    Total Increases:
        Estimated Authorization Level...............       529         0         0         0         0       529
        Estimated Outlays...........................       344       148        18         8         3       521
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 
5077 will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 2017, 
that the specified amounts will be appropriated, and that 
outlays will follow historical spending patterns for existing 
or similar programs.

Spending subject to appropriation

    Intelligence Community Management Account. Section 104 
would authorize the appropriation of nearly $519 million for 
fiscal year 2017 for the ICMA. That amount is about 3 percent 
higher (or $13 million more) than the amount appropriated for 
that account for fiscal year 2016. The ICMA is the principal 
source of funding for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and for managing the intelligence agencies. CBO 
estimates that implementing section 104 would cost $511 million 
over the 2017-2021 period.
    Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Section 303 
would authorize an appropriation of about $10 million for 
fiscal year 2017 for the PCLOB to perform its statutory 
functions. The PCLOB is an independent agency within the 
executive branch responsible for ensuring that measures taken 
by the federal government to combat terrorism are balanced 
against the need to protect privacy and civil liberties. The 
specified amount authorized for 2017 is less than the $21 
million provided in 2016; however, that amount included two-
year funding to cover relocation costs the Board will 
experience as it vacates its current facility in 2016, occupies 
an interim space, and moves into new offices in 2017. CBO 
estimates that implementing section 303 would cost $10 million 
over the 2017-2021 period.
    Living Quarters Allowance (LQA). Section 414 would prohibit 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from paying LQA to any of 
its employees assigned to a directorate of a combatant command 
that has its headquarters located outside of the United States. 
Two combatant commands meet that condition--U.S. European 
Command and U.S. Africa Command and both are headquartered in 
Stuttgart, Germany.
    LQA is used as an incentive to recruit eligible individuals 
for assignments overseas. Annual rates are determined by the 
Department of State and are based on location, employee grade, 
and family size. For 2016, annual LQA rates published for 
Stuttgart, Germany, range from $32,700 to $41,800 for employees 
without families and from $39,200 to $42,300 for employees with 
families. The with family rates may also be increased by 
between 10 percent and 30 percent for employees with larger 
families.
    Eliminating LQA payments to those DIA employees would 
decrease the amount the agency pays for LQA. However, on the 
basis of information from DIA, CBO expects that, in the absence 
of such payments, the affected employees would be more likely 
to request and receive permission to cut short their tours of 
duty by several years and return to the United States earlier 
than they otherwise would. The resulting increase in relocation 
costs the average cost to move an employee's household to or 
from an overseas location is about $75,000--would, in CBO's 
estimation, largely offset any savings that would result from 
eliminating LQA payments. Thus, CBO estimates that implementing 
this provision would have an insignificant net effect on 
personnel costs.

Direct spending and revenues

    Law Enforcement Officials. Section 412 would allow the CIA 
Inspector General to designate individuals performing certain 
investigative functions as law enforcement officers (LEOs) for 
purposes of pay and retirement benefits. The average difference 
between a LEO and a non-LEO retirement annuity is about $25,000 
per year. LEOs are also required to contribute 0.5 percent more 
of their salaries toward their future retirement annuities than 
non-LEOs (such employee contributions are recorded in the 
budget as revenues). Based on information from the CIA and the 
Office of Management and Budget, CBO estimates that the 
increase in revenues and direct spending under this provision 
would not be significant over the 2017-2026 period.
    Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System. Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $514 
million for CIARDS for fiscal year 2017 to maintain the proper 
funding level for operating that retirement and disability 
system. Appropriations to CIARDS are treated as direct spending 
in the budget and are projected to continue in CBO's baseline. 
Therefore, CBO does not ascribe any additional cost to this 
provision.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 5077 
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or 
tribal governments.
    Increase in long-term direct spending and deficits: CBO 
estimates that enacting H.R. 5077 would not increase net direct 
spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 
10-year periods beginning in 2027.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: William Ma; impact on 
state, local, and tribal governments; Jon Sperl; impact on the 
private sector: Paige Piper-Bach.
    Estimate approved by: H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                  Statement on Congressional Earmarks

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as 
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

        INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                Subtitle F--Privacy and Civil Liberties

SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  (a) In General.--There is established as an independent 
agency within the executive branch a Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (referred to in this section as the 
``Board'').
  (b) Findings.--Consistent with the report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) In conducting the war on terrorism, the 
        Government may need additional powers and may need to 
        enhance the use of its existing powers.
          (2) This shift of power and authority to the 
        Government calls for an enhanced system of checks and 
        balances to protect the precious liberties that are 
        vital to our way of life and to ensure that the 
        Government uses its powers for the purposes for which 
        the powers were given.
          (3) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
        the United States correctly concluded that ``The choice 
        between security and liberty is a false choice, as 
        nothing is more likely to endanger America's liberties 
        than the success of a terrorist attack at home. Our 
        history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. 
        Yet, if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values 
        that we are struggling to defend.''.
  (c) Purpose.--The Board shall--
          (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch 
        takes to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring 
        that the need for such actions is balanced with the 
        need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and
          (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately 
        considered in the development and implementation of 
        laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to 
        protect the Nation against terrorism.
  (d) Functions.--
          (1) Advice and counsel on policy development and 
        implementation.--The Board shall--
                  (A) review proposed legislation, regulations, 
                and policies related to efforts to protect the 
                Nation from terrorism, including the 
                development and adoption of information sharing 
                guidelines under subsections (d) and (f) of 
                section 1016;
                  (B) review the implementation of new and 
                existing legislation, regulations, and policies 
                related to efforts to protect the Nation from 
                terrorism, including the implementation of 
                information sharing guidelines under 
                subsections (d) and (f) of section 1016;
                  (C) advise the President and the departments, 
                agencies, and elements of the executive branch 
                to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are 
                appropriately considered in the development and 
                implementation of such legislation, 
                regulations, policies, and guidelines; and
                  (D) in providing advice on proposals to 
                retain or enhance a particular governmental 
                power, consider whether the department, agency, 
                or element of the executive branch has 
                established--
                          (i) that the need for the power is 
                        balanced with the need to protect 
                        privacy and civil liberties;
                          (ii) that there is adequate 
                        supervision of the use by the executive 
                        branch of the power to ensure 
                        protection of privacy and civil 
                        liberties; and
                          (iii) that there are adequate 
                        guidelines and oversight to properly 
                        confine its use.
          (2) Oversight.--The Board shall continually review--
                  (A) the regulations, policies, and 
                procedures, and the implementation of the 
                regulations, policies, and procedures, of the 
                departments, agencies, and elements of the 
                executive branch relating to efforts to protect 
                the Nation from terrorism to ensure that 
                privacy and civil liberties are protected;
                  (B) the information sharing practices of the 
                departments, agencies, and elements of the 
                executive branch relating to efforts to protect 
                the Nation from terrorism to determine whether 
                they appropriately protect privacy and civil 
                liberties and adhere to the information sharing 
                guidelines issued or developed under 
                subsections (d) and (f) of section 1016 and to 
                other governing laws, regulations, and policies 
                regarding privacy and civil liberties; and
                  (C) other actions by the executive branch 
                relating to efforts to protect the Nation from 
                terrorism to determine whether such actions--
                          (i) appropriately protect privacy and 
                        civil liberties; and
                          (ii) are consistent with governing 
                        laws, regulations, and policies 
                        regarding privacy and civil liberties.
          (3) Relationship with privacy and civil liberties 
        officers.--The Board shall--
                  (A) receive and review reports and other 
                information from privacy officers and civil 
                liberties officers under section 1062;
                  (B) when appropriate, make recommendations to 
                such privacy officers and civil liberties 
                officers regarding their activities; and
                  (C) when appropriate, coordinate the 
                activities of such privacy officers and civil 
                liberties officers on relevant interagency 
                matters.
          (4) Testimony.--The members of the Board shall appear 
        and testify before Congress upon request.
          (5) Information.--
                  (A) Activities.--In addition to the reports 
                submitted to Congress under subsection 
                (e)(1)(B), the Board shall ensure that each 
                official and congressional committee specified 
                in subparagraph (B) is kept fully and currently 
                informed of the activities of the Board, 
                including any significant anticipated 
                activities.
                  (B) Officials and congressional committees 
                specified.--The officials and congressional 
                committees specified in this subparagraph are 
                the following:
                          (i) The Director of National 
                        Intelligence.
                          (ii) The head of any element of the 
                        intelligence community (as defined in 
                        section 3(4) of the National Security 
                        Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)) the 
                        activities of which are, or are 
                        anticipated to be, the subject of the 
                        review or advice of the Board.
                          (iii) The Permanent Select Committee 
                        on Intelligence of the House of 
                        Representatives and the Select 
                        Committee on Intelligence of the 
                        Senate.
  (e) Reports.--
          (1) In general.--The Board shall--
                  (A) receive and review reports from privacy 
                officers and civil liberties officers under 
                section 1062; and
                  (B) periodically submit, not less than 
                semiannually, reports--
                          (i)(I) to the appropriate committees 
                        of Congress, including the Committee on 
                        the Judiciary of the Senate, the 
                        Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
                        of Representatives, the Committee on 
                        Homeland Security and Governmental 
                        Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on 
                        Homeland Security of the House of 
                        Representatives, the Committee on 
                        Oversight and Government Reform of the 
                        House of Representatives, the Select 
                        Committee on Intelligence of the 
                        Senate, and the Permanent Select 
                        Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                        of Representatives; and
                          (II) to the President; and
                          (ii) which shall be in unclassified 
                        form to the greatest extent possible, 
                        with a classified annex where 
                        necessary.
          (2) Contents.--Not less than 2 reports submitted each 
        year under paragraph (1)(B) shall include--
                  (A) a description of the major activities of 
                the Board during the preceding period;
                  (B) information on the findings, conclusions, 
                and recommendations of the Board resulting from 
                its advice and oversight functions under 
                subsection (d);
                  (C) the minority views on any findings, 
                conclusions, and recommendations of the Board 
                resulting from its advice and oversight 
                functions under subsection (d);
                  (D) each proposal reviewed by the Board under 
                subsection (d)(1) that--
                          (i) the Board advised against 
                        implementation; and
                          (ii) notwithstanding such advice, 
                        actions were taken to implement; and
                  (E) for the preceding period, any requests 
                submitted under subsection (g)(1)(D) for the 
                issuance of subpoenas that were modified or 
                denied by the Attorney General.
  (f) Informing the Public.--The Board shall--
          (1) make its reports, including its reports to 
        Congress, available to the public to the greatest 
        extent that is consistent with the protection of 
        classified information and applicable law; and
          (2) hold public hearings and otherwise inform the 
        public of its activities, as appropriate and in a 
        manner consistent with the protection of classified 
        information and applicable law.
  (g) Access to Information.--
          (1) Authorization.--If determined by the Board to be 
        necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this 
        section, the Board is authorized to--
                  (A) have access from any department, agency, 
                or element of the executive branch, or any 
                Federal officer or employee of any such 
                department, agency, or element, to all relevant 
                records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, 
                papers, recommendations, or other relevant 
                material, including classified information 
                consistent with applicable law;
                  (B) interview, take statements from, or take 
                public testimony from personnel of any 
                department, agency, or element of the executive 
                branch, or any Federal officer or employee of 
                any such department, agency, or element;
                  (C) request information or assistance from 
                any State, tribal, or local government; and
                  (D) at the direction of a majority of the 
                members of the Board, submit a written request 
                to the Attorney General of the United States 
                that the Attorney General require, by subpoena, 
                persons (other than departments, agencies, and 
                elements of the executive branch) to produce 
                any relevant information, documents, reports, 
                answers, records, accounts, papers, and other 
                documentary or testimonial evidence.
          (2) Review of subpoena request.--
                  (A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after 
                the date of receipt of a request by the Board 
                under paragraph (1)(D), the Attorney General 
                shall--
                          (i) issue the subpoena as requested; 
                        or
                          (ii) provide the Board, in writing, 
                        with an explanation of the grounds on 
                        which the subpoena request has been 
                        modified or denied.
                  (B) Notification.--If a subpoena request is 
                modified or denied under subparagraph (A)(ii), 
                the Attorney General shall, not later than 30 
                days after the date of that modification or 
                denial, notify the Committee on the Judiciary 
                of the Senate and the Committee on the 
                Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
          (3) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of 
        contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued pursuant 
        to paragraph (1)(D), the United States district court 
        for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed 
        person resides, is served, or may be found may issue an 
        order requiring such person to produce the evidence 
        required by such subpoena.
          (4) Agency cooperation.--Whenever information or 
        assistance requested under subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
        paragraph (1) is, in the judgment of the Board, 
        unreasonably refused or not provided, the Board shall 
        report the circumstances to the head of the department, 
        agency, or element concerned without delay. The head of 
        the department, agency, or element concerned shall 
        ensure that the Board is given access to the 
        information, assistance, material, or personnel the 
        Board determines to be necessary to carry out its 
        functions.
          (5) Access.--Nothing in this section shall be 
        construed to authorize the Board, or any agent thereof, 
        to gain access to information regarding an activity 
        covered by section 503(a) of the National Security Act 
        of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093(a)).
  (h) Membership.--
          (1) Members.--The Board shall be composed of a full-
        time chairman and 4 additional members, who shall be 
        appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
        consent of the Senate.
          (2) Qualifications.--Members of the Board shall be 
        selected solely on the basis of their professional 
        qualifications, achievements, public stature, expertise 
        in civil liberties and privacy, and relevant 
        experience, and without regard to political 
        affiliation, but in no event shall more than 3 members 
        of the Board be members of the same political party. 
        The President shall, before appointing an individual 
        who is not a member of the same political party as the 
        President, consult with the leadership of that party, 
        if any, in the Senate and House of Representatives.
          (3) Incompatible office.--An individual appointed to 
        the Board may not, while serving on the Board, be an 
        elected official, officer, or employee of the Federal 
        Government, other than in the capacity as a member of 
        the Board.
          (4) Term.--Each member of the Board shall serve a 
        term of 6 years, except that--
                  (A) a member appointed to a term of office 
                after the commencement of such term may serve 
                under such appointment only for the remainder 
                of such term; and
                  (B) upon the expiration of the term of office 
                of a member, the member shall continue to serve 
                until the member's successor has been appointed 
                and qualified, except that no member may serve 
                under this subparagraph--
                          (i) for more than 60 days when 
                        Congress is in session unless a 
                        nomination to fill the vacancy shall 
                        have been submitted to the Senate; or
                          (ii) after the adjournment sine die 
                        of the session of the Senate in which 
                        such nomination is submitted.
          (5) Quorum and meetings.--The Board shall meet upon 
        the call of the chairman or a majority of its members. 
        Three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
  (i) Compensation and Travel Expenses.--
          (1) Compensation.--
                  (A) Chairman.--The chairman of the Board 
                shall be compensated at the rate of pay payable 
                for a position at level III of the Executive 
                Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United 
                States Code.
                  (B) Members.--Each member of the Board shall 
                be compensated at a rate of pay payable for a 
                position at level IV of the Executive Schedule 
                under section 5315 of title 5, United States 
                Code, for each day during which that member is 
                engaged in the actual performance of the duties 
                of the Board.
          (2) Travel expenses.--Members of the Board shall be 
        allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
        subsistence, at rates authorized for persons employed 
        intermittently by the Government under section 5703(b) 
        of title 5, United States Code, while away from their 
        homes or regular places of business in the performance 
        of services for the Board.
  (j) Staff.--
          (1) Appointment and compensation.--The chairman of 
        the Board, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the 
        Board, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a 
        full-time executive director and such other personnel 
        as may be necessary to enable the Board to carry out 
        its functions, without regard to the provisions of 
        title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in 
        the competitive service, and without regard to the 
        provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 
        53 of such title relating to classification and General 
        Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed 
        under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that 
        payable for a position at level V of the Executive 
        Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States 
        Code.
          (2) Detailees.--Any Federal employee may be detailed 
        to the Board without reimbursement from the Board, and 
        such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and 
        privileges of the detailee's regular employment without 
        interruption.
          (3) Consultant services.--The Board may procure the 
        temporary or intermittent services of experts and 
        consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, 
        United States Code, at rates that do not exceed the 
        daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level 
        IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such 
        title.
  (k) Security Clearances.--
          (1) In general.--The appropriate departments, 
        agencies, and elements of the executive branch shall 
        cooperate with the Board to expeditiously provide the 
        Board members and staff with appropriate security 
        clearances to the extent possible under existing 
        procedures and requirements.
          (2) Rules and procedures.--After consultation with 
        the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the 
        Director of National Intelligence, the Board shall 
        adopt rules and procedures of the Board for physical, 
        communications, computer, document, personnel, and 
        other security relating to carrying out the functions 
        of the Board.
  (l) Treatment as Agency, Not as Advisory Committee.--The 
Board--
          (1) is an agency (as defined in section 551(1) of 
        title 5, United States Code); and
          (2) is not an advisory committee (as defined in 
        section 3(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
        U.S.C. App.)).
  [(m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated to carry out this section amounts as 
follows:
          [(1) For fiscal year 2008, $5,000,000.
          [(2) For fiscal year 2009, $6,650,000.
          [(3) For fiscal year 2010, $8,300,000.
          [(4) For fiscal year 2011, $10,000,000.
          [(5) For fiscal year 2012 and each subsequent fiscal 
        year, such sums as may be necessary.]
  (m) Funding.--
          (1) Specific authorization required.--Appropriated 
        funds available to the Board may be obligated or 
        expended to carry out activities under this section 
        only if such funds were specifically authorized by 
        Congress for use for such activities for such fiscal 
        year.
          (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``specifically authorized by Congress'' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 504(e) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094(e)).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     TITLE III--SECURITY CLEARANCES

SEC. 3001. SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``agency'' means--
                  (A) an executive agency (as that term is 
                defined in section 105 of title 5, United 
                States Code);
                  (B) a military department (as that term is 
                defined in section 102 of title 5, United 
                States Code); and
                  (C) an element of the intelligence community.
          (2) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' 
        means an agency designated by the head of the agency 
        selected pursuant to subsection (b) to conduct a 
        counterintelligence investigation or investigation of 
        persons who are proposed for access to classified 
        information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy 
        the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such 
        information.
          (3) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means 
        an agency authorized by law, regulation, or direction 
        of the Director of National Intelligence to determine 
        eligibility for access to classified information in 
        accordance with Executive Order 12968.
          (4) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means--
                  (A) a government program designated as a 
                Special Access Program (as that term is defined 
                in section 4.1(h) of Executive Order 12958 or 
                any successor Executive order); or
                  (B) a government program that applies 
                restrictions required for--
                          (i) restricted data (as that term is 
                        defined in section 11 y. of the Atomic 
                        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)); 
                        or
                          (ii) other information commonly 
                        referred to as ``sensitive 
                        compartmented information''.
          (5) The term ``current investigation file'' means, 
        with respect to a security clearance, a file on an 
        investigation or adjudication that has been conducted 
        during--
                  (A) the 5-year period beginning on the date 
                the security clearance was granted, in the case 
                of a Top Secret Clearance, or the date access 
                was granted to a highly sensitive program;
                  (B) the 10-year period beginning on the date 
                the security clearance was granted in the case 
                of a Secret Clearance; and
                  (C) the 15-year period beginning on the date 
                the security clearance was granted in the case 
                of a Confidential Clearance.
          (6) The term ``personnel security investigation'' 
        means any investigation required for the purpose of 
        determining the eligibility of any military, civilian, 
        or government contractor personnel to access classified 
        information.
          (7) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means 
        investigations conducted for the purpose of updating a 
        previously completed background investigation--
                  (A) every 5 years in the case of a top secret 
                clearance or access to a highly sensitive 
                program;
                  (B) every 10 years in the case of a secret 
                clearance; or
                  (C) every 15 years in the case of a 
                Confidential Clearance.
          (8) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
        means--
                  (A) the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence and the Committees on Armed 
                Services, Homeland Security, Government Reform, 
                and the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
                the Committees on Armed Services, Homeland 
                Security and Governmental Affairs, and the 
                Judiciary of the Senate.
          (9) Access determination.--The term ``access 
        determination'' means the determination regarding 
        whether an employee--
                  (A) is eligible for access to classified 
                information in accordance with Executive Order 
                12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access 
                to classified information), or any successor 
                thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. 
                Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified 
                information with industry), or any successor 
                thereto; and
                  (B) possesses a need to know under such an 
                Order.
  (b) Selection of Entity.--Except as otherwise provided, not 
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall select a single department, agency, or 
element of the executive branch to be responsible for--
          (1) directing day-to-day oversight of investigations 
        and adjudications for personnel security clearances, 
        including for highly sensitive programs, throughout the 
        United States Government;
          (2) developing and implementing uniform and 
        consistent policies and procedures to ensure the 
        effective, efficient, and timely completion of security 
        clearances and determinations for access to highly 
        sensitive programs, including the standardization of 
        security questionnaires, financial disclosure 
        requirements for security clearance applicants, and 
        polygraph policies and procedures;
          (3) serving as the final authority to designate an 
        authorized investigative agency or authorized 
        adjudicative agency;
          (4) ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to 
        classified information among the agencies of the United 
        States Government, including acting as the final 
        authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving 
        the reciprocity of security clearances and access to 
        highly sensitive programs pursuant to subsection (d);
          (5) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
        sufficient resources are available in each agency to 
        achieve clearance and investigative program goals;
          (6) reviewing and coordinating the development of 
        tools and techniques for enhancing the conduct of 
        investigations and granting of clearances; and
          (7) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2014, and consistent with subsection (j)--
                  (A) developing policies and procedures that 
                permit, to the extent practicable, individuals 
                alleging reprisal for having made a protected 
                disclosure (provided the individual does not 
                disclose classified information or other 
                information contrary to law) to appeal any 
                action affecting an employee's access to 
                classified information and to retain their 
                government employment status while such 
                challenge is pending; and
                  (B) developing and implementing uniform and 
                consistent policies and procedures to ensure 
                proper protections during the process for 
                denying, suspending, or revoking a security 
                clearance or access to classified information 
                following a protected disclosure, including the 
                ability to appeal such a denial, suspension, or 
                revocation, except that there shall be no 
                appeal of an agency's suspension of a security 
                clearance or access determination for purposes 
                of conducting an investigation, if that 
                suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the 
                head of the agency or a designee of the head of 
                the agency certifies that a longer suspension 
                is needed before a final decision on denial or 
                revocation to prevent imminent harm to the 
                national security.
  (c) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1) 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, in consultation with the head of the entity selected 
pursuant to subsection (b), select a single agency of the 
executive branch to conduct, to the maximum extent practicable, 
security clearance investigations of employees and contractor 
personnel of the United States Government who require access to 
classified information and to provide and maintain all security 
clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. The head 
of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) may designate 
other agencies to conduct such investigations if the head of 
the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers it 
appropriate for national security and efficiency purposes.
  (2) The agency selected under paragraph (1) shall--
          (A) take all necessary actions to carry out the 
        requirements of this section, including entering into a 
        memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying 
        out responsibilities relating to security clearances or 
        security clearance investigations before the date of 
        the enactment of this Act;
          (B) as soon as practicable, integrate reporting of 
        security clearance applications, security clearance 
        investigations, and determinations of eligibility for 
        security clearances, with the database required by 
        subsection (e); and
          (C) ensure that security clearance investigations are 
        conducted in accordance with uniform standards and 
        requirements established under subsection (b), 
        including uniform security questionnaires and financial 
        disclosure requirements.
  (d) Reciprocity of Security Clearance and Access 
Determinations.--(1) All security clearance background 
investigations and determinations completed by an authorized 
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be 
accepted by all agencies.
  (2) All security clearance background investigations 
initiated by an authorized investigative agency shall be 
transferable to any other authorized investigative agency.
  (3)(A) An authorized investigative agency or authorized 
adjudicative agency may not establish additional investigative 
or adjudicative requirements (other than requirements for the 
conduct of a polygraph examination) that exceed requirements 
specified in Executive Orders establishing security 
requirements for access to classified information without the 
approval of the head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b).
  (B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the head of the entity 
selected pursuant to subsection (b) may establish such 
additional requirements as the head of such entity considers 
necessary for national security purposes.
  (4) An authorized investigative agency or authorized 
adjudicative agency may not conduct an investigation for 
purposes of determining whether to grant a security clearance 
to an individual where a current investigation or clearance of 
equal level already exists or has been granted by another 
authorized adjudicative agency.
  (5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) may disallow the reciprocal recognition of an individual 
security clearance by an agency under this section on a case-
by-case basis if the head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b) determines that such action is necessary for 
national security purposes.
  (6) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) shall establish a review procedure by which agencies can 
seek review of actions required under this section.
  (e) Database on Security Clearances.--(1) Not later than 12 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall, in 
cooperation with the heads of the entities selected pursuant to 
subsections (b) and (c), establish and commence operating and 
maintaining an integrated, secure, database into which 
appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or 
revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to 
military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be 
entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative 
agencies.
  (2) The database under this subsection shall function to 
integrate information from existing Federal clearance tracking 
systems from other authorized investigative and adjudicative 
agencies into a single consolidated database.
  (3) Each authorized investigative or adjudicative agency 
shall check the database under this subsection to determine 
whether an individual the agency has identified as requiring a 
security clearance has already been granted or denied a 
security clearance, or has had a security clearance revoked, by 
any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency.
  (4) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) shall evaluate the extent to which an agency is submitting 
information to, and requesting information from, the database 
under this subsection as part of a determination of whether to 
certify the agency as an authorized investigative agency or 
authorized adjudicative agency.
  (5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) may authorize an agency to withhold information about 
certain individuals from the database under this subsection if 
the head of the entity considers it necessary for national 
security purposes.
  (f) Evaluation of Use of Available Technology in Clearance 
Investigations and Adjudications.--(1) The head of the entity 
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall evaluate the use of 
available information technology and databases to expedite 
investigative and adjudicative processes for all and to verify 
standard information submitted as part of an application for a 
security clearance.
  (2) The evaluation shall assess the application of the 
technologies described in paragraph (1) for--
          (A) granting interim clearances to applicants at the 
        secret, top secret, and special access program levels 
        before the completion of the appropriate full 
        investigation;
          (B) expediting investigations and adjudications of 
        security clearances, including verification of 
        information submitted by the applicant;
          (C) ongoing verification of suitability of personnel 
        with security clearances in effect for continued access 
        to classified information;
          (D) use of such technologies to augment periodic 
        reinvestigations;
          (E) assessing the impact of the use of such 
        technologies on the rights of applicants to verify, 
        correct, or challenge information obtained through such 
        technologies; and
          (F) such other purposes as the head of the entity 
        selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers 
        appropriate.
  (3) An individual subject to verification utilizing the 
technology described in paragraph (1) shall be notified of such 
verification, shall provide consent to such use, and shall have 
access to data being verified in order to correct errors or 
challenge information the individual believes is incorrect.
  (4) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall submit to the President and the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of 
the evaluation, including recommendations on the use of 
technologies described in paragraph (1).
  (g) Reduction in Length of Personnel Security Clearance 
Process.--(1) The head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall, within 90 days of selection under that 
subsection, develop, in consultation with the appropriate 
committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency, 
a plan to reduce the length of the personnel security clearance 
process.
  (2)(A) To the extent practical the plan under paragraph (1) 
shall require that each authorized adjudicative agency make a 
determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a 
personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days after 
the date of receipt of the completed application for a security 
clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such 60-day 
average period shall include--
          (i) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete 
        the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
          (ii) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete 
        the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
  (B) Determinations on clearances not made within 60 days 
shall be made without delay.
  (3)(A) The plan under paragraph (1) shall take effect 5 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (B) During the period beginning on a date not later than 2 
years after the date after the enactment of this Act and ending 
on the date on which the plan under paragraph (1) takes effect, 
each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination 
on at least 80 percent of all applications for a personnel 
security clearance pursuant to this section within an average 
of 120 days after the date of receipt of the application for a 
security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such 
120-day average period shall include--
          (i) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete 
        the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
          (ii) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete 
        the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
  (h) Reports.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2006, and 
annually thereafter through 2011, the head of the entity 
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the progress 
made during the preceding year toward meeting the requirements 
of this section.
  (2) Each report shall include, for the period covered by such 
report--
          (A) the periods of time required by the authorized 
        investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative 
        agencies for conducting investigations, adjudicating 
        cases, and granting clearances, from date of submission 
        to ultimate disposition and notification to the subject 
        and the subject's employer;
          (B) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and 
        timely functioning of the requirements of this section; 
        and
          (C) such other information or recommendations as the 
        head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) 
        considers appropriate.
  (i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 
2005 and each fiscal year thereafter for the implementation, 
maintenance, and operation of the database required by 
subsection (e).
  (j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access 
Determinations.--
          (1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority over 
        personnel security clearance or access determinations 
        shall not take or fail to take, or threaten to take or 
        fail to take, any action with respect to any employee's 
        security clearance or access determination in 
        retaliation for--
                  (A) any lawful disclosure of information to 
                the Director of National Intelligence (or an 
                employee designated by the Director of National 
                Intelligence for such purpose) or the head of 
                the employing agency (or employee designated by 
                the head of that agency for such purpose) by an 
                employee that the employee reasonably believes 
                evidences--
                          (i) a violation of any Federal law, 
                        rule, or regulation; or
                          (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross 
                        waste of funds, an abuse of authority, 
                        or a substantial and specific danger to 
                        public health or safety;
                  (B) any lawful disclosure to the Inspector 
                General of an agency or another employee 
                designated by the head of the agency to receive 
                such disclosures, of information which the 
                employee reasonably believes evidences--
                          (i) a violation of any Federal law, 
                        rule, or regulation; or
                          (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross 
                        waste of funds, an abuse of authority, 
                        or a substantial and specific danger to 
                        public health or safety;
                  (C) any lawful disclosure that complies 
                with--
                          (i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (h) 
                        of section 8H of the Inspector General 
                        Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
                          (ii) [subparagraphs (A), (D), and 
                        (H)] subparagraphs (A), (C), and (G) of 
                        section 17(d)(5) of the Central 
                        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
                        U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
                          (iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) 
                        of section 103H(k)(5) of the National 
                        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
                        3033(k)(5)); and
                  (D) if the actions do not result in the 
                employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing 
                information specifically required by Executive 
                order to be kept classified in the interest of 
                national defense or the conduct of foreign 
                affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction 
                with--
                          (i) the exercise of any appeal, 
                        complaint, or grievance right granted 
                        by any law, rule, or regulation;
                          (ii) testimony for or otherwise 
                        lawfully assisting any individual in 
                        the exercise of any right referred to 
                        in clause (i); or
                          (iii) cooperation with or disclosing 
                        information to the Inspector General of 
                        an agency, in accordance with 
                        applicable provisions of law in 
                        connection with an audit, inspection, 
                        or investigation conducted by the 
                        Inspector General.
          (2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the 
        protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph 
        (1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of 
        information from Congress or the taking of any 
        personnel action against an employee who lawfully 
        discloses information to Congress.
          (3) Disclosures.--
                  (A) In general.--A disclosure shall not be 
                excluded from paragraph (1) because--
                          (i) the disclosure was made to a 
                        person, including a supervisor, who 
                        participated in an activity that the 
                        employee reasonably believed to be 
                        covered by paragraph (1)(A)(ii);
                          (ii) the disclosure revealed 
                        information that had been previously 
                        disclosed;
                          (iii) the disclosure was not made in 
                        writing;
                          (iv) the disclosure was made while 
                        the employee was off duty; or
                          (v) of the amount of time which has 
                        passed since the occurrence of the 
                        events described in the disclosure.
                  (B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made 
                during the normal course of duties of an 
                employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded 
                from paragraph (1) if any employee who has 
                authority to take, direct others to take, 
                recommend, or approve any personnel action with 
                respect to the employee making the disclosure, 
                took, failed to take, or threatened to take or 
                fail to take a personnel action with respect to 
                that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.
          (4) Agency adjudication.--
                  (A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or 
                former employee who believes that he or she has 
                been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by 
                paragraph (1) may, within 90 days after the 
                issuance of notice of such decision, appeal 
                that decision within the agency of that 
                employee or former employee through proceedings 
                authorized by subsection (b)(7), except that 
                there shall be no appeal of an agency's 
                suspension of a security clearance or access 
                determination for purposes of conducting an 
                investigation, if that suspension lasts not 
                longer than 1 year (or a longer period in 
                accordance with a certification made under 
                subsection (b)(7)).
                  (B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of 
                proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A), 
                it is determined that the adverse security 
                clearance or access determination violated 
                paragraph (1), the agency shall take specific 
                corrective action to return the employee or 
                former employee, as nearly as practicable and 
                reasonable, to the position such employee or 
                former employee would have held had the 
                violation not occurred. Such corrective action 
                may include back pay and related benefits, 
                travel expenses, and compensatory damages not 
                to exceed $300,000.
                  (C) Contributing factor.--In determining 
                whether the adverse security clearance or 
                access determination violated paragraph (1), 
                the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was 
                violated if a disclosure described in paragraph 
                (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse 
                security clearance or access determination 
                taken against the individual, unless the agency 
                demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence 
                that it would have taken the same action in the 
                absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost 
                deference to the agency's assessment of the 
                particular threat to the national security 
                interests of the United States in the instant 
                matter.
          (5) Appellate review of security clearance access 
        determinations by director of national intelligence.--
                  (A) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving 
                notice of an adverse final agency determination 
                under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an 
                employee or former employee may appeal that 
                determination in accordance with the procedures 
                established under subparagraph (B).
                  (B) Policies and procedures.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
                Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, 
                shall develop and implement policies and 
                procedures for adjudicating the appeals 
                authorized by subparagraph (A).
                  (C) Congressional notification.--Consistent 
                with the protection of sources and methods, at 
                the time the Director of National Intelligence 
                issues an order regarding an appeal pursuant to 
                the policies and procedures established by this 
                paragraph, the Director of National 
                Intelligence shall notify the congressional 
                intelligence committees.
          (6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall 
        be construed to permit or require judicial review of 
        any--
                  (A) agency action under this section; or
                  (B) action of the appellate review procedures 
                established under paragraph (5).
          (7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a 
        private cause of action to challenge the merits of a 
        security clearance determination.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                     INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
  Sec. 8H. (a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the 
National Reconnaissance Office, or the National Security 
Agency, including any such employee who is assigned or detailed 
to a combatant command or other element of the Federal 
Government, or of a contractor of any of those Agencies, who 
intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with 
respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or 
information to the Inspector General of the Department of 
Defense (or designee).
  (B) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, 
an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the 
intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the 
intelligence community, who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community.
  (C) An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or of 
a contractor of the Bureau, who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of 
the Department of Justice (or designee).
  (D) Any other employee of, or contractor to, an executive 
agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President 
under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, 
to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, who intends to 
report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to 
an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to 
the appropriate Inspector General (or designee) under this Act, 
section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, or 
section 103H(k) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3033(k)).
  (2) If a designee of an Inspector General under this section 
receives a complaint or information of an employee with respect 
to an urgent concern, that designee shall report the complaint 
or information to the Inspector General within 7 calendar days 
of receipt.
  (3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the 
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security 
Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Defense for purposes of this section.
  (b)[(1) Not] Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day 
period beginning on the date of receipt of an employee 
complaint or information under subsection (a), the Inspector 
General shall determine whether the complaint or information 
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the 
Inspector General shall transmit [to the head of the 
establishment] to the intelligence committees notice of that 
determination, together with the complaint or information.
  [(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a 
complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would 
create a conflict of interest for the head of the 
establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the 
complaint or information to the Inspector General with that 
determination and the Inspector General shall make the 
transmission to the Director of National Intelligence and, if 
the establishment is within the Department of Defense, to the 
Secretary of Defense. In such a case, the requirements of this 
section for the head of the establishment apply to each 
recipient of the Inspector General's transmission.]
  [(c) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General 
under subsection (b), the head of the establishment shall, 
within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such 
transmittal to the intelligence committees, together with any 
comments the head of the establishment considers appropriate.]
  [(d)] (c)(1) If the Inspector General does not find credible 
under subsection (b) a complaint or information submitted to 
the Inspector General under subsection (a), or does not 
transmit the complaint or information to [the head of the 
establishment] the intelligence committees in accurate form 
under subsection (b), the employee (subject to paragraph (2)) 
may submit the complaint or information to Congress by 
contacting either or both of the intelligence committees 
directly.
  (2) The employee may contact the intelligence committees 
directly as described in paragraph (1) only if the employee--
          (A) before making such a contact, furnishes to [the 
        head of the establishment, through the Inspector 
        General,] the Inspector General a statement of the 
        employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
        employee's intent to contact the intelligence 
        committees directly; and
          (B) obtains and follows from [the head of the 
        establishment, through the Inspector General,] the 
        Inspector General, in consultation with the head of the 
        establishment, direction on how to contact the 
        intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate 
        security practices.
  (3) A member or employee of one of the intelligence 
committees who receives a complaint or information under 
paragraph (1) does so in that member or employee's official 
capacity as a member or employee of that committee.
  [(e)] (d) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
reports a complaint or information under this section of each 
action taken under this section with respect to the complaint 
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 
days after any such action is taken.
  [(f)] (e) An action taken by the head of an establishment or 
an Inspector General under [subsections (a) through (e)] 
subsections (a) through (d) shall not be subject to judicial 
review.
  [(g)] (f)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National 
Security Agency shall each submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees each year a report that sets forth the 
following:
          (A) The personnel and funds requested by such 
        Inspector General for the fiscal year beginning in such 
        year for the activities of the office of such Inspector 
        General in such fiscal year.
          (B) The plan of such Inspector General for such 
        activities, including the programs and activities 
        scheduled for review by the office of such Inspector 
        General during such fiscal year.
          (C) An assessment of the current ability of such 
        Inspector General to hire and retain qualified 
        personnel for the office of such Inspector General.
          (D) Any matters that such Inspector General considers 
        appropriate regarding the independence and 
        effectiveness of the office of such Inspector General.
  (2) The submittal date for a report under paragraph (1) each 
year shall be the date provided in section 507 of the National 
Security Act of 1947.
  (3) In this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' shall have the meaning given that term in section 
3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).
  [(h)] (g) An individual who has submitted a complaint or 
information to an Inspector General under this section may 
notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of 
either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has 
made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of 
the date on which such submission was made.
  [(i)] (h) In this section:
          (1) The term ``urgent concern'' means any of the 
        following:
                  (A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, 
                violation of law or Executive order, or 
                deficiency relating to the funding, 
                administration, or operations of an 
                intelligence activity involving classified 
                information, but does not include differences 
                of opinions concerning public policy matters.
                  (B) A false statement to Congress, or a 
                willful withholding from Congress, on an issue 
                of material fact relating to the funding, 
                administration, or operation of an intelligence 
                activity.
                  (C) An action, including a personnel action 
                described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, 
                United States Code, constituting reprisal or 
                threat of reprisal prohibited under section 
                7(c) in response to an employee's reporting an 
                urgent concern in accordance with this section.
          (2) The term ``intelligence committees'' means the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
        of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                   [authority to pay death gratuities

  [Sec. 11. (a)(1) The Director may pay a gratuity to the 
surviving dependents of any officer or employee of the Agency 
who dies as a result of injuries (other than from disease) 
sustained outside the United States and whose death--
          [(A) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities; 
        or
          [(B) occurred in connection with an intelligence 
        activity having a substantial element of risk.
  [(2) The provisions of this subsection shall apply with 
respect to deaths occurring after June 30, 1974.
  [(b) Any payment under subsection (a)--
          [(1) shall be in an amount equal to the amount of the 
        annual salary of the officer or employee concerned at 
        the time of death;
          [(2) shall be considered a gift and shall be in lieu 
        of payment of any lesser death gratuity authorized by 
        any other Federal law; and
          [(3) shall be made under the same conditions as apply 
        to payments authorized by section 14 of the Act of 
        August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2679a).]

        BENEFITS AVAILABLE IN EVENT OF THE DEATH OF AN EMPLOYEE

  Sec. 11. (a) Authority.--The Director may pay death benefits 
substantially similar to those authorized for members of the 
Foreign Service pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 
U.S.C. 3901 et seq.) or any other provision of law. The 
Director may adjust the eligibility for death benefits as 
necessary to meet the unique requirements of the mission of the 
Agency.
  (b) Regulations.--Regulations issued pursuant to this section 
shall be submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate before such regulations 
take effect.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.

  (a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
          (1) create an objective and effective office, 
        appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
        conduct independently inspections, investigations, and 
        audits relating to programs and operations of the 
        Agency;
          (2) provide leadership and recommend policies 
        designed to promote economy, efficiency, and 
        effectiveness in the administration of such programs 
        and operations, and detect fraud and abuse in such 
        programs and operations;
          (3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully 
        and currently informed about problems and deficiencies 
        relating to the administration of such programs and 
        operations, and the necessity for and the progress of 
        corrective actions; and
          (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure 
        that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and 
        the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        (hereafter in this section referred to collectively as 
        the ``intelligence committees'') are kept similarly 
        informed of significant problems and deficiencies as 
        well as the necessity for and the progress of 
        corrective actions,
there is hereby established in the Agency an Office of 
Inspector General (hereafter in this section referred to as the 
``Office'').
  (b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall be at 
the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. This appointment shall be made without regard to 
political affiliation and shall be on the basis of integrity 
and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial 
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or 
investigation. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis 
of compliance with the security standards of the Agency and 
prior experience in the field of foreign intelligence.
  (2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
under the general supervision of the Director.
  (3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from 
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection, 
or investigation if the Director determines that such 
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security 
interests of the United States.
  (4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph (3), 
he shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the 
reasons for the exercise of such power within seven days to the 
intelligence committees. The Director shall advise the 
Inspector General at the time such report is submitted, and, to 
the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy 
of any such report. In such cases, the Inspector General may 
submit such comments to the intelligence committees that he 
considers appropriate.
  (5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States 
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney 
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by 
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal 
criminal law that involve a program or operation of the Agency, 
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the 
Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. 
A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the Director.
  (6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by 
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to 
the intelligence committees the reasons for any such removal 
not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such 
removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other 
than transfer or removal.
  (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and 
responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this 
section--
          (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
        conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
        inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the 
        programs and operations of the Agency to ensure they 
        are conducted efficiently and in accordance with 
        applicable law and regulations;
          (2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed 
        concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and 
        other serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that 
        may occur in such programs and operations, and to 
        report the progress made in implementing corrective 
        action;
          (3) to take due regard for the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of 
        all reports issued by the Office, and, to the extent 
        consistent with the purpose and objective of such 
        reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to 
        minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and 
        methods described in such reports; and
          (4) in the execution of his responsibilities, to 
        comply with generally accepted government auditing 
        standards.
  (d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or 
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to 
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) The Inspector General shall, 
not later than October 31 and April 30 of each year, prepare 
and submit to the Director a classified semiannual report 
summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately 
preceding six-month periods ending September 30 and March 31, 
respectively. Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such 
reports to the intelligence committees with any comments he may 
deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a 
list of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, 
review, or audit conducted during the reporting period and--
          (A) a description of significant problems, abuses, 
        and deficiencies relating to the administration of 
        programs and operations of the Agency identified by the 
        Office during the reporting period;
          (B) a description of the recommendations for 
        corrective action made by the Office during the 
        reporting period with respect to significant problems, 
        abuses, or deficiencies identified in subparagraph (A);
          (C) a statement of whether corrective action has been 
        completed on each significant recommendation described 
        in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where 
        corrective action has been completed, a description of 
        such corrective action;
          (D) a certification that the Inspector General has 
        had full and direct access to all information relevant 
        to the performance of his functions;
          (E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector 
        General during the reporting period; and
          (F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may 
        wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy 
        and efficiency in the administration of programs and 
        operations undertaken by the Agency, and to detect and 
        eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and 
        operations.
  (2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or 
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the 
administration of programs or operations. The Director shall 
transmit such report to the intelligence committees within 
seven calendar days, together with any comments he considers 
appropriate.
  (3) In the event that--
          (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        differences with the Director affecting the execution 
        of the Inspector General's duties or responsibilities;
          (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried 
        out by the Inspector General should focus on any 
        current or former Agency official who--
                  (i) holds or held a position in the Agency 
                that is subject to appointment by the 
                President, by and with the advice and consent 
                of the Senate, including such a position held 
                on an acting basis; or
                  (ii) holds or held the position in the 
                Agency, including such a position held on an 
                acting basis, of--
                          (I) Deputy Director;
                          (II) Associate Deputy Director;
                          (III) Director of the National 
                        Clandestine Service;
                          (IV) Director of Intelligence;
                          (V) Director of Support; or
                          (VI) Director of Science and 
                        Technology.
          (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector 
        General to the Department of Justice on possible 
        criminal conduct by a current or former Agency official 
        described or referred to in subparagraph (B);
          (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving 
        prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any of the 
        officials described in subparagraph (B); or
          (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all 
        possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant 
        documentary information in the course of an 
        investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a 
report on such matter to the intelligence committees.
  (4) Pursuant to Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, 
the Director shall submit to the intelligence committees any 
report or findings and recommendations of an inspection, 
investigation, or audit conducted by the office which has been 
requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either 
committee.
  (5)(A) An employee of the Agency, or of a contractor to the 
Agency, who intends to report to Congress a complaint or 
information with respect to an urgent concern may report such 
complaint or information to the Inspector General.
  (B)[(i) Not] Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day 
period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a 
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector 
General shall determine whether the complaint or information 
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the 
Inspector General shall transmit [to the Director] to the 
intelligence committees notice of that determination, together 
with the complaint or information.
  [(ii) If the Director determines that a complaint or 
information transmitted under paragraph (1) would create a 
conflict of interest for the Director, the Director shall 
return the complaint or information to the Inspector General 
with that determination and the Inspector General shall make 
the transmission to the Director of National Intelligence. In 
such a case, the requirements of this subsection for the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency apply to the 
Director of National Intelligence]
  [(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General 
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar 
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the 
intelligence committees, together with any comments the 
Director considers appropriate.]
  [(D)] (C)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible 
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted 
under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or 
information to [the Director] the intelligence committees in 
accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to 
clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to 
Congress by contacting either or both of the intelligence 
committees directly.
  (ii) The employee may contact the intelligence committees 
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
          (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to [the 
        Director, through the Inspector General,] the Inspector 
        General a statement of the employee's complaint or 
        information and notice of the employee's intent to 
        contact the intelligence committees directly; and
          (II) obtains and follows from [the Director, through 
        the Inspector General,] the Inspector General, in 
        consultation with the Director, direction on how to 
        contact the intelligence committees in accordance with 
        appropriate security practices.
  (iii) A member or employee of one of the intelligence 
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause 
(i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a 
member or employee of that committee.
  [(E)] (D) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph 
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall 
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is 
taken.
  [(F)] (E) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector 
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial 
review.
  [(G)] (F) In this paragraph:
          (i) The term ``urgent concern'' means any of the 
        following:
                  (I) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, 
                violation of law or Executive order, or 
                deficiency relating to the funding, 
                administration, or operations of an 
                intelligence activity involving classified 
                information, but does not include differences 
                of opinions concerning public policy matters.
                  (II) A false statement to Congress, or a 
                willful withholding from Congress, on an issue 
                of material fact relating to the funding, 
                administration, or operation of an intelligence 
                activity.
                  (III) An action, including a personnel action 
                described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, 
                United States Code, constituting reprisal or 
                threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection 
                (e)(3)(B) in response to an employee's 
                reporting an urgent concern in accordance with 
                this paragraph.
          (ii) The term ``intelligence committees'' means the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
        of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate.
  [(H)] (G) An individual who has submitted a complaint or 
information to the Inspector General under this section may 
notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of 
either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has 
made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on 
which such submission was made.
  (e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector 
General shall have direct and prompt access to the Director 
when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of 
his duties.
  (2) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee 
or any employee of a contractor of the Agency whose testimony 
is needed for the performance of his duties. In addition, he 
shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, 
reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material 
which relate to the programs and operations with respect to 
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this 
section. Failure on the part of any employee or contractor to 
cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for 
appropriate administrative actions by the Director, to include 
loss of employment or the termination of an existing 
contractual relationship.
  (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
investigate complaints or information from any person 
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such 
complaint or information has been received from an employee of 
the Agency--
          (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the 
        identity of the employee without the consent of the 
        employee, unless the Inspector General determines that 
        such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the 
        investigation or the disclosure is made to an official 
        of the Department of Justice responsible for 
        determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; 
        and
          (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint or providing such 
        information may be taken by any employee of the Agency 
        in a position to take such actions, unless the 
        complaint was made or the information was disclosed 
        with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
        disregard for its truth or falsity.
  (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer 
to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, 
whenever necessary in the performance of his duties, which oath 
affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or 
before an employee of the Office designated by the Inspector 
General shall have the same force and effect as if administered 
or taken by or before an officer having a seal.
  (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of 
all information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including 
electronically stored information or any tangible thing) and 
documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties 
and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
  (B) In the case of Government agencies, the Inspector General 
shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose 
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by 
subpoenas.
  (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for or on 
behalf of any other element or component of the Agency.
  (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena 
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable 
by order of any appropriate district court of the United 
States.
  (6) The Inspector General shall be provided with appropriate 
and adequate office space at central and field office 
locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, 
maintenance services, and communications facilities and 
services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
  (7)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and 
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry 
out his functions. In making such selections, the Inspector 
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the 
requisite training and experience to enable him to carry out 
his duties effectively. In this regard, the Inspector General 
shall create within his organization a career cadre of 
sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and 
objectivity needed for the effective performance of his duties.
  (B) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources 
allocated by the Director, the Inspector General has final 
approval of--
          (i) the selection of internal and external candidates 
        for employment with the Office of Inspector General; 
        and
          (ii) all other personnel decisions concerning 
        personnel permanently assigned to the Office of 
        Inspector General, including selection and appointment 
        to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all 
        security-based determinations that are not within the 
        authority of a head of other Central Intelligence 
        Agency offices.
  (C)(i) The Inspector General may designate an officer or 
employee appointed in accordance with subparagraph (A) as a law 
enforcement officer solely for purposes of subchapter III of 
chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, if 
such officer or employee is appointed to a position with 
responsibility for investigating suspected offenses against the 
criminal laws of the United States.
  (ii) In carrying out clause (i), the Inspector General shall 
ensure that any authority under such clause is exercised in a 
manner consistent with section 3307 of title 5, United States 
Code, as it relates to law enforcement officers.
  (iii) For purposes of applying sections 3307(d), 8335(b), and 
8425(b) of title 5, United States Code, the Inspector General 
may exercise the functions, powers, and duties of an agency 
head or appointing authority with respect to the Office.
  (8)(A) The Inspector General shall--
          (i) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who 
        shall report to the Inspector General; or
          (ii) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by 
        and directly reporting to another Inspector General or 
        the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
  (B) The counsel appointed or obtained under subparagraph (A) 
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may 
prescribe.
  (9)(A) The Inspector General may request such information or 
assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and 
responsibilities of the Inspector General provided by this 
section from any Federal, State, or local governmental agency 
or unit thereof.
  (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance from a department or agency of the Federal 
Government, the head of the department or agency involved, 
insofar as practicable and not in contravention of any existing 
statutory restriction or regulation of such department or 
agency, shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an 
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
  (C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to provide any 
new authority to the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct 
intelligence activity in the United States.
  (D) In this paragraph, the term ``State'' means each of the 
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
and any territory or possession of the United States.
  (f) Separate Budget Account.--(1) Beginning with fiscal year 
1991, and in accordance with procedures to be issued by the 
Director of National Intelligence in consultation with the 
intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall include in the National Intelligence Program budget a 
separate account for the Office of Inspector General 
established pursuant to this section.
  (2) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General shall 
transmit a budget estimate and request through the Director to 
the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such 
fiscal year--
          (A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations 
        of the Inspector General;
          (B) the amount requested for all training 
        requirements of the Inspector General, including a 
        certification from the Inspector General that the 
        amount requested is sufficient to fund all training 
        requirements for the Office; and
          (C) the amount requested to support the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, 
        including a justification for such amount.
  (3) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a 
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
include for such fiscal year--
          (A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency;
          (B) the amount requested for Inspector General 
        training;
          (C) the amount requested to support the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
          (D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, 
        with respect to such proposed budget.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives for each fiscal year--
          (A) a separate statement of the budget estimate 
        transmitted pursuant to paragraph (2);
          (B) the amount requested by the Director of National 
        Intelligence for the Inspector General pursuant to 
        paragraph (3)(A);
          (C) the amount requested by the Director of National 
        Intelligence for training of personnel of the Office of 
        the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (3)(B);
          (D) the amount requested by the Director of National 
        Intelligence for support for the Council of the 
        Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency pursuant 
        to paragraph (3)(C); and
          (E) the comments of the Inspector General under 
        paragraph (3)(D), if any, on the amounts requested 
        pursuant to paragraph (3), including whether such 
        amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector 
        General from performing the duties of the Office.
  (g) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office the 
office of the Agency referred to as the ``Office of Inspector 
General.'' The personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, 
property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, 
authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, 
used, arising from, or available to such ``Office of Inspector 
General'' are hereby transferred to the Office established 
pursuant to this section.
  (h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the 
homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website 
information relating to the Office of the Inspector General 
including methods to contact the Inspector General.
  (2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be 
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related 
to the Office of the Inspector General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

     * * * * * * *

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 103F. National Counterintelligence Executive.]
Sec. 103F. Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
          Center.
     * * * * * * *

           Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 506K. Reports on major defense intelligence acquisition programs at 
          each milestone approval.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     responsibilities and authorities of the director of national 
                              intelligence

  Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director 
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that 
national intelligence is provided--
          (A) to the President;
          (B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the 
        executive branch;
          (C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
        senior military commanders;
          (D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and 
        the committees thereof; and
          (E) to such other persons as the Director of National 
        Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
  (2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, 
independent of political considerations, and based upon all 
sources available to the intelligence community and other 
appropriate entities.
  (b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the 
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have 
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to 
the national security which is collected by any Federal 
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise 
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed 
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests 
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (A) based on intelligence priorities set by the 
        President, provide to the heads of departments 
        containing agencies or organizations within the 
        intelligence community, and to the heads of such 
        agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the 
        National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such 
        agencies and organizations;
          (B) based on budget proposals provided to the 
        Director of National Intelligence by the heads of 
        agencies and organizations within the intelligence 
        community and the heads of their respective departments 
        and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the 
        Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and 
        determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence 
        Program budget; and
          (C) present such consolidated National Intelligence 
        Program budget, together with any comments from the 
        heads of departments containing agencies or 
        organizations within the intelligence community, to the 
        President for approval.
  (2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph 
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the 
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National 
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall 
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated 
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any 
successor program or programs.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each 
element of the intelligence community that is not within the 
National Intelligence Program.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities.
  (5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be 
responsible for managing appropriations for the National 
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation 
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments 
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence 
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate 
supporting information) to the head of the department 
containing an agency or organization receiving any such 
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
  (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to 
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence 
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for 
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community 
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate 
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or 
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence 
Program in an expeditious manner.
  (C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the 
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence 
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community that manage programs and activities that are part of 
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and 
evaluations.
  (6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this 
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of 
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a 
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding 
implementation of this section.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the 
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after 
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller 
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent 
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying 
out the National Intelligence Program.
  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under 
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or 
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of 
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures 
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or 
any successor program or programs.
  (2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, 
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram 
funds appropriated for a program within the National 
Intelligence Program--
          (A) to another such program;
          (B) to other departments or agencies of the United 
        States Government for the development and fielding of 
        systems of common concern related to the collection, 
        processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination 
        of intelligence information; or
          (C) to a program funded by appropriations not within 
        the National Intelligence Program to address critical 
        gaps in intelligence information sharing or access 
        capabilities.
  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
          (A) with the approval of the Director of the Office 
        of Management and Budget; and
          (B) after consultation with the heads of departments 
        containing agencies or organizations within the 
        intelligence community to the extent such agencies or 
        organizations are affected, and, in the case of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with 
        the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in 
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and 
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and 
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual 
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under 
this subsection only if--
          (i) the funds are being transferred to an activity 
        that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
          (ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an 
        emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or 
        increases efficiency;
          (iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve 
        a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for 
        Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence 
        or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency;
          (iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a 
        cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of 
        any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the 
        National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
                  (I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
                  (II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts 
                available to a department or agency under the 
                National Intelligence Program; and
          (v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate 
        an acquisition program.
  (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph 
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the 
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by 
the head of the department involved or the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central 
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
  (6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection 
shall remain available for the same period as the 
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
  (7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this 
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing 
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the 
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or 
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate 
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report 
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In 
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be 
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds 
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the 
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required 
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the 
date of the enactment of this subsection.
  (e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other 
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first 
twelve months after establishment of a new national 
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence, 
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional 
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may 
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of 
the intelligence community to such center.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly 
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to 
this paragraph to--
          (i) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
        and the House of Representatives;
          (iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed 
        Services of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives.
  (C) The Director shall include in any notice under 
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
  (2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the 
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the 
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the 
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel 
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to 
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
  (B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph 
only if--
          (i) the personnel are being transferred to an 
        activity that is a higher priority intelligence 
        activity; and
          (ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves 
        program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
  (C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly 
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to 
this paragraph to--
          (i) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed 
        Services of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives.
  (D) The Director shall include in any notice under 
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
  (3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent 
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such 
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time 
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes 
described in subparagraph (B).
  (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of 
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position 
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of 
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance 
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community 
to enable such element to increase the total number of 
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
          (i) during a period in which a permanent employee of 
        such element is absent to participate in critical 
        language training; or
          (ii) to accept a permanent employee of another 
        element of the intelligence community to provide 
        language-capable services.
  (C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a 
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
  (D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the 
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall 
include a description of--
          (i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the 
        Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by 
        each element of the intelligence community;
          (ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled 
        or partially fulfilled through the use of such 
        transfers; and
          (iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
  (4) It is the sense of Congress that--
          (A) the nature of the national security threats 
        facing the United States will continue to challenge the 
        intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly 
        to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging 
        and unforeseen requirements;
          (B) both the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be 
        necessary should be fully and properly supported with 
        appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the 
        President's yearly budget requests adequately support 
        those needs; and
          (C) the President should utilize all legal and 
        administrative discretion to ensure that the Director 
        of National Intelligence and all other elements of the 
        intelligence community have the necessary resources and 
        procedures to respond promptly and effectively to 
        emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
  (f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall--
          (i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance 
        for the intelligence community to ensure timely and 
        effective collection, processing, analysis, and 
        dissemination (including access by users to collected 
        data consistent with applicable law and, as 
        appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection 
        (b) and analytic products generated by or within the 
        intelligence community) of national intelligence;
          (ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and 
        manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, 
        production, and dissemination of national intelligence 
        by elements of the intelligence community, including--
                  (I) approving requirements (including those 
                requirements responding to needs provided by 
                consumers) for collection and analysis; and
                  (II) resolving conflicts in collection 
                requirements and in the tasking of national 
                collection assets of the elements of the 
                intelligence community; and
          (iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence 
        elements of those agencies and departments not within 
        the National Intelligence Program.
  (B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
          (i) insofar as the President so directs;
          (ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A), 
        insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking 
        authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by 
        the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
        Intelligence; or
          (iii) to the direct dissemination of information to 
        State government and local government officials and 
        private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and 
        892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121, 
        482).
  (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the 
National Counterterrorism Center, the National 
Counterproliferation Center, and the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, and may establish such 
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines 
necessary.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe, 
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of 
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective 
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the 
intelligence community that--
          (i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details 
        of personnel to national intelligence centers, and 
        between elements of the intelligence community;
          (ii) set standards for education, training, and 
        career development of personnel of the intelligence 
        community;
          (iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and 
        retention by the intelligence community of highly 
        qualified individuals for the effective conduct of 
        intelligence activities;
          (iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence 
        community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the 
        collection and analysis of intelligence through the 
        recruitment and training of women, minorities, and 
        individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and 
        linguistic backgrounds;
          (v) make service in more than one element of the 
        intelligence community a condition of promotion to such 
        positions within the intelligence community as the 
        Director shall specify; and
          (vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence 
        community personnel who are responsible for 
        intelligence community-wide matters.
  (B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be 
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable 
to members of the uniformed services.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure 
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States 
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such 
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community 
through the host executive departments that manage the programs 
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence 
Program.
  (5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the 
intelligence community.
  (6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish 
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence 
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide 
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information 
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under 
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and 
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the 
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake 
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant 
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the 
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a 
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability 
review of an element of the intelligence community or the 
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or 
deficiency within the intelligence community.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and 
procedures for conducting an accountability review under 
subparagraph (A).
  (C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
the findings of an accountability review conducted under 
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for 
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the 
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such 
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of 
personnel.
  (ii) If the head of such element does not implement a 
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head 
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the 
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
  (D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed 
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
  (8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform such 
other functions as the President may direct.
  (9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the 
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
  (g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure 
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information 
within the intelligence community consistent with national 
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence 
shall--
          (A) establish uniform security standards and 
        procedures;
          (B) establish common information technology 
        standards, protocols, and interfaces;
          (C) ensure development of information technology 
        systems that include multi-level security and 
        intelligence integration capabilities;
          (D) establish policies and procedures to resolve 
        conflicts between the need to share intelligence 
        information and the need to protect intelligence 
        sources and methods;
          (E) develop an enterprise architecture for the 
        intelligence community and ensure that elements of the 
        intelligence community comply with such architecture;
          (F) have procurement approval authority over all 
        enterprise architecture-related information technology 
        items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
                  (G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 
                13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified 
                national security information) (or any 
                subsequent corresponding executive order), and 
                part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal 
                Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding 
                regulation), establish--
                          (i) guidance to standardize, in 
                        appropriate cases, the formats for 
                        classified and unclassified 
                        intelligence products created by 
                        elements of the intelligence community 
                        for purposes of promoting the sharing 
                        of intelligence products; and
                          (ii) policies and procedures 
                        requiring the increased use, in 
                        appropriate cases, and including 
                        portion markings, of the classification 
                        of portions of information within one 
                        intelligence product.
  (2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National 
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully 
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
  (3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the 
specific written agreement of the head of the department or 
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be 
considered to have met any obligation to provide any 
information, report, assessment, or other material (including 
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or 
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information, 
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of 
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely 
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or 
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the 
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability 
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence 
community consistent with the protection of the national 
security of the United States.
  (h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of 
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national 
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (1) implement policies and procedures--
                  (A) to encourage sound analytic methods and 
                tradecraft throughout the elements of the 
                intelligence community;
                  (B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all 
                sources available; and
                  (C) to ensure that the elements of the 
                intelligence community regularly conduct 
                competitive analysis of analytic products, 
                whether such products are produced by or 
                disseminated to such elements;
          (2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence 
        analysis is appropriately proportional to resource 
        allocation for intelligence collection systems and 
        operations in order to maximize analysis of all 
        collected data;
          (3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are 
        fully considered and brought to the attention of 
        policymakers; and
          (4) ensure that sufficient relationships are 
        established between intelligence collectors and 
        analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the 
        needs of analysts.
  (i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The 
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence 
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
  (2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the 
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the 
intelligence community for the following purposes:
          (A) Classification of information under applicable 
        law, Executive orders, or other Presidential 
        directives.
          (B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both 
        in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
          (C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a 
        way that source information is removed to allow for 
        dissemination at the lowest level of classification 
        possible or in unclassified form to the extent 
        practicable.
  (3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given 
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence.
  (j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The 
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of 
the President, shall--
          (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for 
        the grant of access to sensitive compartmented 
        information to any officer or employee of any agency or 
        department of the United States and to employees of 
        contractors of those agencies or departments;
          (2) ensure the consistent implementation of those 
        standards and procedures throughout such agencies and 
        departments;
          (3) ensure that security clearances granted by 
        individual elements of the intelligence community are 
        recognized by all elements of the intelligence 
        community, and under contracts entered into by those 
        agencies;
          (4) ensure that the process for investigation and 
        adjudication of an application for access to sensitive 
        compartmented information is performed in the most 
        expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable 
        standards for national security;
          (5) ensure that the background of each employee or 
        officer of an element of the intelligence community, 
        each contractor to an element of the intelligence 
        community, and each individual employee of such a 
        contractor who has been determined to be eligible for 
        access to classified information is monitored on a 
        continual basis under standards developed by the 
        Director, including with respect to the frequency of 
        evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such 
        employee or officer of an element of the intelligence 
        community, such contractor, or such individual employee 
        to such a contractor to determine whether such employee 
        or officer of an element of the intelligence community, 
        such contractor, and such individual employee of such a 
        contractor continues to meet the requirements for 
        eligibility for access to classified information; and
          (6) develop procedures to require information sharing 
        between elements of the intelligence community 
        concerning potentially derogatory security information 
        regarding an employee or officer of an element of the 
        intelligence community, a contractor to an element of 
        the intelligence community, or an individual employee 
        of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of 
        such employee or officer of an element of the 
        intelligence community, such contractor, or such 
        individual employee of such a contractor for a security 
        clearance.
  (k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the 
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with 
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the 
coordination of the relationships between elements of the 
intelligence community and the intelligence or security 
services of foreign governments or international organizations 
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national 
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine 
means.
  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by 
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of 
the intelligence community to serve--
          (i) on the staff of the Director of National 
        Intelligence;
          (ii) on the staff of the national intelligence 
        centers;
          (iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center; and
          (iv) in other positions in support of the 
        intelligence community management functions of the 
        Director.
  (B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial 
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as 
the Director considers appropriate.
  (2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are 
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under 
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at 
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element 
who are not so assigned or detailed.
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
paragraph.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe 
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the 
intelligence community through various elements of the 
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order 
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such 
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, 
users, and capabilities.
  (B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may 
include the following:
          (i) The establishment of special occupational 
        categories involving service, over the course of a 
        career, in more than one element of the intelligence 
        community.
          (ii) The provision of rewards for service in 
        positions undertaking analysis and planning of 
        operations involving two or more elements of the 
        intelligence community.
          (iii) The establishment of requirements for 
        education, training, service, and evaluation for 
        service involving more than one element of the 
        intelligence community.
  (C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms 
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent 
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the 
intelligence community the joint officer management policies 
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and 
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 
99-433).
  (4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and 
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect 
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who 
are members of the uniformed services.
  (B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and 
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with 
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned 
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the 
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be 
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training 
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed 
services.
  (C) The personnel policies and programs developed and 
implemented under this subsection with respect to law 
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section 
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the 
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or, 
through the applicable chain of command, to control the 
activities of such law enforcement officers.
  (D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall 
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint 
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title 
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
  (m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In 
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the 
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to 
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the 
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other 
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment 
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same 
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to 
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same 
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence 
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the 
enactment of this subsection.
  (n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out 
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the 
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition 
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other 
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act 
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
  (2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred 
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National 
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency 
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts 
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall 
be final.
  (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of 
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion, 
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a 
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
  (C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) 
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of 
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph 
(1).
  (D) Each determination or decision required by an authority 
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon 
written findings made by the official making such determination 
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be 
available within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the 
date of such determination or decision.
  (4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph 
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the 
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an 
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than 
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
  (B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) 
until--
          (i) the head of such element (without delegation) 
        submits to the Director of National Intelligence a 
        written request that includes--
                  (I) a description of such authority requested 
                to be exercised;
                  (II) an explanation of the need for such 
                authority, including an explanation of the 
                reasons that other authorities are 
                insufficient; and
                  (III) a certification that the mission of 
                such element would be--
                          (aa) impaired if such authority is 
                        not exercised; or
                          (bb) significantly and measurably 
                        enhanced if such authority is 
                        exercised; and
          (ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a 
        written authorization that includes--
                  (I) a description of the authority referred 
                to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be 
                exercised; and
                  (II) a justification to support the exercise 
                of such authority.
  (C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority 
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an 
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of 
acquisitions described in the request and authorization 
referred to in subparagraph (B).
  (D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the 
intelligence community located within one of the departments 
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of 
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures 
established by the head of such department.
  (ii) The departments described in this clause are the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department 
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
  (E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in 
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of 
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National 
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such 
an authority for not more than 6 years.
  (ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the 
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not 
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National 
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension 
period of not more than 6 years.
  (F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the 
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the 
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E) 
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
  (G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
          (i) to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        notification of an authorization to exercise an 
        authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an 
        extension of such authorization that includes the 
        written authorization referred to in subparagraph 
        (B)(ii); and
          (ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and 
        Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise 
        an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an 
        acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed 
        $50,000,000 annually.
  (H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority 
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a 
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request 
or authorization.
  (I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or 
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence 
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
  (o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
take into account the views of a head of a department 
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence 
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the 
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the 
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the 
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the 
intelligence community that are within the Department of 
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs 
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the 
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are 
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other 
Federal departments and agencies.
  (q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence 
program within the National Intelligence Program for the 
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall--
          (A) require the development and implementation of a 
        program management plan that includes cost, schedule, 
        and performance goals and program milestone criteria, 
        except that with respect to Department of Defense 
        programs the Director shall consult with the Secretary 
        of Defense;
          (B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, 
        except that with respect to Department of Defense 
        programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision 
        authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the 
        designee of the Secretary; and
          (C) periodically--
                  (i) review and assess the progress made 
                toward the achievement of the goals and 
                milestones established in such plan; and
                  (ii) submit to Congress a report on the 
                results of such review and assessment.
  (2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a 
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall 
resolve the conflict.
  (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the 
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate 
to any other official any authority to perform the 
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
  (4) In this subsection:
          (A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect 
        to the acquisition of a major system, means a program 
        that--
                  (i) is carried out to acquire such major 
                system for an element of the intelligence 
                community; and
                  (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts 
                available for the National Intelligence 
                Program.
          (B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and 
        Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
  (r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of 
departments and agencies of the United States Government 
containing elements within the intelligence community and with 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the 
performance by the elements of the intelligence community 
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as 
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which 
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can 
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
  (s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) 
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other 
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the 
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence 
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a 
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or 
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in 
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions 
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at 
the discretion of the head of the department or agency 
employing the individual in a position covered by such 
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any 
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence 
when granting such authority.
  (2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or 
exercised only--
          (A) with respect to a position that requires an 
        extremely high level of expertise and is critical to 
        successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
          (B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an 
        individual exceptionally well qualified for the 
        position.
  (3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of 
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate 
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written 
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as 
otherwise authorized by law.
  (4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of 
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate 
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written 
approval of the President in response to a request by the 
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by 
law.
  (5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a 
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days 
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the 
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
  (B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director 
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection 
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the 
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30 
days after the date on which such head exercises such 
authority.
  (t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National 
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the 
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may 
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence 
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer 
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same 
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded 
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
  (2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank 
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National 
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the 
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or 
officer is classified information (as defined in section 
606(1)).
  (u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the 
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations 
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the 
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if 
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance 
thereof.
  (v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence 
of the head of the covered department concerned and in 
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, may--
          (A) convert competitive service positions, and the 
        incumbents of such positions, within an element of the 
        intelligence community in such department, to excepted 
        service positions as the Director of National 
        Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the 
        intelligence functions of such element; and
          (B) establish new positions in the excepted service 
        within an element of the intelligence community in such 
        department, if the Director of National Intelligence 
        determines such positions are necessary to carry out 
        the intelligence functions of such element.
  (2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the 
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under 
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion. 
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the 
position may be converted to the excepted service.
          (3) A covered department may appoint an individual to 
        a position converted or established pursuant to this 
        subsection without regard to the civil-service laws, 
        including parts II and III of title 5, United States 
        Code.
  (4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means 
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
  (w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence 
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the 
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall 
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's 
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, 
including interactions with other countries of proliferation 
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or 
missile-related transfers to such countries.
  (x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The 
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains 
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
          (1) ensure that--
                  (A) any contractor to an element of the 
                intelligence community with access to a 
                classified network or classified information 
                develops and operates a security plan that is 
                consistent with standards established by the 
                Director of National Intelligence for 
                intelligence community networks; and
                  (B) each contract awarded by an element of 
                the intelligence community includes provisions 
                requiring the contractor comply with such plan 
                and such standards;
          (2) conduct periodic assessments of each security 
        plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such 
        security plan complies with the requirements of such 
        paragraph; and
          (3) ensure that the insider threat detection 
        capabilities and insider threat policies of the 
        intelligence community apply to facilities of 
        contractors with access to a classified network.

            office of the director of national intelligence

  Sec. 103. (a) Office of Director of National Intelligence.--
There is an Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence is to assist the Director of National 
Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of 
the Director under this Act and other applicable provisions of 
law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by 
the President or by law.
  (c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence is composed of the following:
          (1) The Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Principal Deputy Director of National 
        Intelligence.
          (3) Any Deputy Director of National Intelligence 
        appointed under section 103A.
          (4) The National Intelligence Council.
          (5) The General Counsel.
          (6) The Civil Liberties Protection Officer.
          (7) The Director of Science and Technology.
          (8) The [National Counterintelligence Executive 
        (including the Office of the National 
        Counterintelligence Executive)] Director of the 
        National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
          (9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community.
          (10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
        Community.
          (11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center.
          (12) The Director of the National Counter 
        Proliferation Center.
          (13) The Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community.
          (14) Such other offices and officials as may be 
        established by law or the Director may establish or 
        designate in the Office, including national 
        intelligence centers.
  (d) Staff.--(1) To assist the Director of National 
Intelligence in fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of 
the Director, the Director shall employ and utilize in the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence a professional 
staff having an expertise in matters relating to such duties 
and responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and 
appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.
  (2) The staff of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence under paragraph (1) shall include the staff of the 
Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
Community Management that is transferred to the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence under section 1091 of the 
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
  (e) Temporary Filling of Vacancies.--With respect to filling 
temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (other than that of the 
Director of National Intelligence), section 3345(a)(3) of title 
5, United States Code, may be applied--
          (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by 
        substituting ``an element of the intelligence 
        community, as that term is defined in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        401a(4)),'' for ``such Executive agency''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting ``the 
        intelligence community'' for ``such agency''.
  (f) Location of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington 
metropolitan region, as that term is defined in section 8301 of 
title 40, United States Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  [national counterintelligence executive]  director of the national 
                counterintelligence and security center

  Sec. 103F. (a) [National Counterintelligence Executive] 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center.--The [National Counterintelligence Executive] Director 
of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center under 
section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 
(title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402b et seq.) is a 
component of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (b) Duties.--The [National Counterintelligence Executive] 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center shall perform the duties provided in the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and such other 
duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National 
Intelligence or specified by law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            inspector general of the intelligence community

  Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community.
  (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community is--
          (1) to create an objective and effective office, 
        appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
        conduct independent investigations, inspections, 
        audits, and reviews on programs and activities within 
        the responsibility and authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence;
          (2) to provide leadership and coordination and 
        recommend policies for activities designed--
                  (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and 
                effectiveness in the administration and 
                implementation of such programs and activities; 
                and
                  (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in 
                such programs and activities;
          (3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of 
        National Intelligence fully and currently informed 
        about--
                  (A) problems and deficiencies relating to the 
                administration of programs and activities 
                within the responsibility and authority of the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions; and
          (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to 
        ensure that the congressional intelligence committees 
        are kept similarly informed of--
                  (A) significant problems and deficiencies 
                relating to programs and activities within the 
                responsibility and authority of the Director of 
                National Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions.
  (c) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--(1) 
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
Inspector General shall be made--
          (A) without regard to political affiliation;
          (B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with 
        security standards of the intelligence community, and 
        prior experience in the field of intelligence or 
        national security; and
          (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in 
        accounting, financial analysis, law, management 
        analysis, public administration, or investigations.
  (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
under the general supervision of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by 
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to 
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the 
removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of 
such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other 
than transfer or removal.
  (d) Assistant Inspectors General.--Subject to the policies of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit 
        who shall have the responsibility for supervising the 
        performance of auditing activities relating to programs 
        and activities within the responsibility and authority 
        of the Director;
          (2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for 
        Investigations who shall have the responsibility for 
        supervising the performance of investigative activities 
        relating to such programs and activities; and
          (3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that, 
        in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary 
        to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
  (e) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and 
responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community--
          (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
        conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
        investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews 
        relating to programs and activities within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence;
          (2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence 
        fully and currently informed concerning violations of 
        law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems, 
        abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and 
        activities within the responsibility and authority of 
        the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning 
        such problems, and to report on the progress made in 
        implementing such corrective action;
          (3) to take due regard for the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of 
        all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to 
        the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of 
        such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate 
        to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and 
        methods described in such reports; and
          (4) in the execution of the duties and 
        responsibilities under this section, to comply with 
        generally accepted government auditing.
  (f) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if 
the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
  (2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the 
Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the 
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons 
for the exercise of such authority.
  (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the 
time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the 
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such 
statement.
  (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which 
the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
Inspector General considers appropriate.
  (g) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to 
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any 
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
Inspector General.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the 
limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and 
reports relating to the administration of the programs and 
activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the 
Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General, 
necessary or desirable.
  (B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, 
or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the 
intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  (C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs 
and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has 
responsibilities under this section.
  (D) The level of classification or compartmentation of 
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient 
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any 
materials under subparagraph (C).
  (E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director, 
another appropriate official of the intelligence community, 
shall take appropriate administrative actions against an 
employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the 
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the 
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss 
of employment or the termination of an existing contractual 
relationship.
  (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or 
information from any person concerning the existence of an 
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the 
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of 
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of 
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger 
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or 
information has been received from an employee of the 
intelligence community--
          (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the 
        identity of the employee without the consent of the 
        employee, unless the Inspector General determines that 
        such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the 
        investigation or the disclosure is made to an official 
        of the Department of Justice responsible for 
        determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken, 
        and this provision shall qualify as a withholding 
        statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of 
        title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the 
        ``Freedom of Information Act''); and
          (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such 
        information to the Inspector General may be taken by 
        any employee in a position to take such actions, unless 
        the complaint was made or the information was disclosed 
        with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
        disregard for its truth or falsity.
  (4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to 
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or 
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit 
when administered or taken by or before an employee of the 
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force 
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an 
officer having a seal.
  (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of 
all information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including 
electronically stored information, as well as any tangible 
thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of 
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
  (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements 
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall 
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose 
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by 
subpoenas.
  (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on 
behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence 
community, including the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena 
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable 
by order of any appropriate district court of the United 
States.
  (6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized 
by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for 
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum 
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General 
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
  (7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such 
amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into 
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, 
and other services with public agencies and with private 
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this section.
  (h) Coordination Among Inspectors General.--(1)(A) In the 
event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an 
investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an 
inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element 
of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall 
expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general 
shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review 
to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the 
inspectors general.
  (B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph 
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the 
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General 
Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a 
dispute between an inspector general within a department or 
agency of the United States Government and the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been 
resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors 
general shall submit the question to the Director of National 
Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency 
for resolution.
  (2)(A) There is established the Intelligence Community 
Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory 
or administrative inspectors general with oversight 
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
  (B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph 
(A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any 
inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing 
its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that 
may be of common interest and discussing questions about 
jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract 
personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents, 
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of 
assistance to more than one of its members.
  (3) The inspector general conducting an investigation, 
inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall 
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to 
conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who 
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review.
  (i) Counsel to the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who 
        shall report to the Inspector General; or
          (B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and 
        directly reporting to another inspector general or the 
        Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
  (2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1) 
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may 
prescribe.
  (j) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office 
space at central and field office locations, together with such 
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and 
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for 
the operation of such offices.
  (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall 
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may 
be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of 
the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that 
any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has 
security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such 
officer or employee.
  (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees 
have the requisite training and experience to enable the 
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector 
General effectively.
  (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre 
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and 
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  (3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources 
allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Inspector General has final approval of--
          (A) the selection of internal and external candidates 
        for employment with the Office of the Inspector 
        General; and
          (B) all other personnel decisions concerning 
        personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the 
        Inspector General, including selection and appointment 
        to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all 
        security-based determinations that are not within the 
        authority of a head of a component of the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence.
  (4)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such 
information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out 
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from 
any Federal, State (as defined in section 804), or local 
governmental agency or unit thereof.
  (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal 
Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, 
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable 
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction 
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to 
the Inspector General, such information or assistance.
  (C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, 
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the 
intelligence community and in coordination with that element's 
inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as 
authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, 
audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place 
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the 
duties of the Inspector General.
  (k) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and 
April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of 
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, 
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of 
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period 
ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion 
of the report involving a component of a department of the 
United States Government to the head of that department 
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a 
minimum, the following:
          (i) A list of the title or subject of each 
        investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted 
        during the period covered by such report.
          (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, 
        and deficiencies relating to the administration of 
        programs and activities of the intelligence community 
        within the responsibility and authority of the Director 
        of National Intelligence, and in the relationships 
        between elements of the intelligence community, 
        identified by the Inspector General during the period 
        covered by such report.
          (iii) A description of the recommendations for 
        corrective action made by the Inspector General during 
        the period covered by such report with respect to 
        significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
        identified in clause (ii).
          (iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action 
        has been completed on each significant recommendation 
        described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a 
        case where corrective action has been completed, a 
        description of such corrective action.
          (v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector 
        General has had full and direct access to all 
        information relevant to the performance of the 
        functions of the Inspector General.
          (vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector 
        General during the period covered by such report.
          (vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General 
        considers appropriate for legislation to promote 
        economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
        administration and implementation of programs and 
        activities within the responsibility and authority of 
        the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect 
        and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and 
        activities.
  (C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a 
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the 
report to the congressional intelligence committees together 
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The 
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of 
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of the 
report involving a component of such department simultaneously 
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the 
responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional 
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with 
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The 
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of 
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of each 
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, 
or deficiency related to a component of such department 
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
  (3)(A) In the event that--
          (i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        differences with the Director affecting the execution 
        of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector 
        General;
          (ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review 
        carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any 
        current or former intelligence community official who--
                  (I) holds or held a position in an element of 
                the intelligence community that is subject to 
                appointment by the President, whether or not by 
                and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
                including such a position held on an acting 
                basis;
                  (II) holds or held a position in an element 
                of the intelligence community, including a 
                position held on an acting basis, that is 
                appointed by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; or
                  (III) holds or held a position as head of an 
                element of the intelligence community or a 
                position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of 
                section 106;
          (iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector 
        General to the Department of Justice on possible 
        criminal conduct by a current or former official 
        described in clause (ii);
          (iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving 
        prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current 
        or former official described in clause (ii); or
          (v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all 
        possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant 
        documentary information in the course of an 
        investigation, inspection, audit, or review,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a 
report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such 
matter.
  (B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of 
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with 
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government 
any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves 
an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by 
the Inspector General focused on any current or former official 
of a component of such department simultaneously with 
submission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (4) The Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any report or findings and 
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review conducted by the office which has been requested by the 
Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either 
committee.
  (5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of 
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to 
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
  (B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period 
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a 
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector 
General shall determine whether the complaint or information 
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the 
Inspector General shall transmit [to the Director] to the 
congressional intelligence committees a notice of that 
determination, together with the complaint or information.
  [(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General 
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar 
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the 
congressional intelligence committees, together with any 
comments the Director considers appropriate.]
  [(D)] (C)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible 
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted 
under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or 
information to [the Director] the congressional intelligence 
committees in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the 
employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or 
information to Congress by contacting either or both of the 
congressional intelligence committees directly.
  (ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence 
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the 
employee--
          (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to [the 
        Director, through the Inspector General,] the Inspector 
        General a statement of the employee's complaint or 
        information and notice of the employee's intent to 
        contact the congressional intelligence committees 
        directly; and
          (II) obtains and follows from [the Director, through 
        the Inspector General,] the Inspector General, in 
        consultation with the Director, direction on how to 
        contact the congressional intelligence committees in 
        accordance with appropriate security practices.
  (iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional 
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information 
under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee's 
official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
  [(E)] (D) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph 
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall 
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is 
taken.
  [(F)] (E) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector 
General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial 
review.
  [(G)] (F) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' 
means any of the following:
          (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation 
        of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to 
        the funding, administration, or operation of an 
        intelligence activity within the responsibility and 
        authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
        involving classified information, but does not include 
        differences of opinions concerning public policy 
        matters.
          (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
        withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
        relating to the funding, administration, or operation 
        of an intelligence activity.
          (iii) An action, including a personnel action 
        described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United 
        States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of 
        reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this 
        section in response to an employee's reporting an 
        urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
  [(H)] (G) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
the protections afforded to an employee under section 17(d) of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) 
or section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.).
  [(I)] (H) An individual who has submitted a complaint or 
information to the Inspector General under this section may 
notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence 
committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of 
the fact that such individual has made a submission to the 
Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was 
made.
  (6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States 
Code, the Inspector General shall expeditiously report to the 
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint 
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of 
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an 
element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships 
between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent 
with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General 
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each 
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
  (l) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the 
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an 
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to 
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other 
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating 
to such element.
  (m) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the 
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence 
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget 
a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community.
  (n) Budget.--(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate 
and request to the Director of National Intelligence that 
specifies for such fiscal year--
          (A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations 
        of the Inspector General;
          (B) the amount requested for all training 
        requirements of the Inspector General, including a 
        certification from the Inspector General that the 
        amount requested is sufficient to fund all training 
        requirements for the Office of the Inspector General; 
        and
          (C) the amount requested to support the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, 
        including a justification for such amount.
  (2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a 
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
include for such fiscal year--
          (A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community;
          (B) the amount requested for Inspector General 
        training;
          (C) the amount requested to support the Council of 
        the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
          (D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, 
        with respect to such proposed budget.
  (3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal 
year--
          (A) a separate statement of the budget estimate 
        transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);
          (B) the amount requested by the Director for the 
        Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
          (C) the amount requested by the Director for the 
        training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector 
        General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);
          (D) the amount requested by the Director for support 
        for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
        and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and
          (E) the comments of the Inspector General under 
        paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested 
        pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such 
        amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector 
        General from performing the duties of the Office of the 
        Inspector General.
  (o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of 
the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including 
methods to contact the Inspector General.
  (2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be 
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related 
to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 506K. REPORTS ON MAJOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
                    AT EACH MILESTONE APPROVAL.

  (a) Report on Milestone A.--Not later than 15 days after 
granting Milestone A or equivalent approval for a major defense 
intelligence acquisition program, the milestone decision 
authority for the program shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report containing a brief summary of 
the following:
          (1) The estimated cost and schedule for the program 
        established by the military department concerned, 
        including--
                  (A) the dollar values estimated for the 
                program acquisition unit cost and total life-
                cycle cost; and
                  (B) the planned dates for each program 
                milestone and initial operational capability.
          (2) The independent estimated cost for the program 
        established pursuant to section 2334(a)(6) of title 10, 
        United States Code, and any independent estimated 
        schedule for the program, including--
                  (A) the dollar values estimated for the 
                program acquisition unit cost and total life-
                cycle cost; and
                  (B) the planned dates for each program 
                milestone and initial operational capability.
          (3) A summary of the technical risks, including 
        cybersecurity risks and supply chain risks, associated 
        with the program, as determined by the military 
        department concerned, including identification of any 
        critical technologies that need to be matured.
          (4) A summary of the sufficiency review conducted by 
        the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
        of the Department of Defense of the analysis of 
        alternatives performed for the program (as referred to 
        in section 2366a(b)(6) of such title).
          (5) Any other information the milestone decision 
        authority considers relevant.
  (b) Report on Milestone B.--Not later than 15 days after 
granting Milestone B or equivalent approval for a major defense 
intelligence acquisition program, the milestone decision 
authority for the program shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report containing a brief summary of 
the following:
          (1) The estimated cost and schedule for the program 
        established by the military department concerned, 
        including--
                  (A) the dollar values estimated for the 
                program acquisition unit cost, average 
                procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle 
                cost; and
                  (B) the planned dates for each program 
                milestone, initial operational test and 
                evaluation, and initial operational capability.
          (2) The independent estimated cost for the program 
        established pursuant to section 2334(a)(6) of title 10, 
        United States Code, and any independent estimated 
        schedule for the program, including--
                  (A) the dollar values estimated for the 
                program acquisition unit cost, average 
                procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle 
                cost; and
                  (B) the planned dates for each program 
                milestone, initial operational test and 
                evaluation, and initial operational capability.
          (3) A summary of the technical risks, including 
        cybersecurity risks and supply chain risks, associated 
        with the program, as determined by the military 
        department concerned, including identification of any 
        critical technologies that have not been successfully 
        demonstrated in a relevant environment.
          (4) A summary of the sufficiency review conducted by 
        the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
        of the analysis of alternatives performed for the 
        program pursuant to section 2366a(b)(6) of such title.
          (5) A statement of whether the preliminary design 
        review for the program described in section 2366b(a)(1) 
        of such title has been completed.
          (6) Any other information the milestone decision 
        authority considers relevant.
  (c) Report on Milestone C.--Not later than 15 days after 
granting Milestone C or equivalent approval for a major defense 
intelligence acquisition program, the milestone decision 
authority for the program shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report containing a brief summary of 
the following:
          (1) The estimated cost and schedule for the program 
        established by the military department concerned, 
        including--
                  (A) the dollar values estimated for the 
                program acquisition unit cost, average 
                procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle 
                cost; and
                  (B) the planned dates for initial operational 
                test and evaluation and initial operational 
                capability.
          (2) The independent estimated cost for the program 
        established pursuant to section 2334(a)(6) of title 10, 
        United States Code, and any independent estimated 
        schedule for the program, including--
                  (A) the dollar values estimated for the 
                program acquisition unit cost, average 
                procurement unit cost, and total life-cycle 
                cost; and
                  (B) the planned dates for initial operational 
                test and evaluation and initial operational 
                capability.
          (3) The cost and schedule estimates approved by the 
        milestone decision authority for the program.
          (4) A summary of the production, manufacturing, and 
        fielding risks, including cybersecurity risks and 
        supply chain risks, associated with the program.
          (5) Any other information the milestone decision 
        authority considers relevant.
  (d) Initial Operating Capability or Full Operating 
Capability.--Not later than 15 days after a major defense 
intelligence acquisition program reaches initial operating 
capability or full operating capability, the milestone decision 
authority for the program shall notify the appropriate 
congressional committees of the program reaching such 
capability.
  (e) Additional Information.--At the request of any of the 
appropriate congressional committees, the milestone decision 
authority shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees further information or underlying documentation for 
the information in a report submitted under subsection (a), 
(b), or (c), including the independent cost and schedule 
estimates and the independent technical risk assessments 
referred to in those subsections.
  (f) Nonduplication of Effort.--If any information required 
under this section has been included in another report or 
assessment previously submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees under sections 506A, 506C, or 506E, the 
milestone decision authority may provide a list of such reports 
and assessments at the time of submitting a report required 
under this section instead of including such information in 
such report.
  (g) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means the congressional intelligence committees and the 
        congressional defense committees (as defined in section 
        101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).
          (2) The term ``major defense intelligence acquisition 
        program'' means a major defense acquisition program (as 
        defined in section 2430 of title 10, United States 
        Code) that relates to intelligence or intelligence-
        related activities.
          (3) The term ``Milestone A approval'' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 2366a(d) of title 10, United 
        States Code.
          (4) The terms ``Milestone B approval'' and 
        ``Milestone C approval'' have the meaning given those 
        terms in section 2366(e) of such title.
          (5) The term ``milestone decision authority'' has the 
        meaning given that term in section 2366a(d) of such 
        title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


   SECTION 8131 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1995



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
  [Sec. 8131. (a) No project for the construction of any 
facility, or improvement to any facility, having an estimated 
Federal cost in excess of $300,000, may be undertaken in any 
fiscal year unless specifically identified as a separate item 
in the President's annual fiscal year budget request or 
otherwise specifically authorized and appropriated if such 
facility or improvement would be used primarily by personnel of 
the intelligence community.
  [(b) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence 
community'' has the same meaning given that term in section 
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE VI--CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 602. LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES TO BE USED PRIMARILY 
                    BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in subsection 
        (b), no project for the construction of any facility to 
        be used primarily by personnel of any component of the 
        intelligence community which has an estimated Federal 
        cost in excess of $5,000,000 may be undertaken in any 
        fiscal year unless such project is specifically 
        identified as a separate item in the President's annual 
        fiscal year budget request and is specifically 
        authorized by the Congress.
          (2) Notification.--In the case of a project for the 
        construction of any facility to be used primarily by 
        personnel of any component of the intelligence 
        community which has an estimated Federal cost greater 
        than $1,000,000 but less than $5,000,000, or where any 
        [improvement project to] project for the improvement, 
        repair, or modification of such a facility has an 
        estimated Federal cost greater than $1,000,000, the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall submit a 
        notification to the intelligence committees 
        specifically identifying such project.
  (b) Exception.--
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (a) but 
        subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), a project for the 
        construction of a facility to be used primarily by 
        personnel of any component of the intelligence 
        community may be carried out if the Secretary of 
        Defense and the Director of National Intelligence 
        jointly determine--
                  (A) that the project is vital to the national 
                security or to the protection of health, 
                safety, or the quality of the environment, and
                  (B) that the requirement for the project is 
                so urgent that deferral of the project for 
                inclusion in the next Act authorizing 
                appropriations for the intelligence community 
                would be inconsistent with national security or 
                the protection of health, safety, or 
                environmental quality, as the case may be.
          (2) Report.--(A) When a decision is made to carry out 
        a construction project under this subsection, the 
        Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
        Intelligence jointly shall submit a report in writing 
        to the appropriate committees of Congress on that 
        decision. Each such report shall include (i) the 
        justification for the project and the current estimate 
        of the cost of the project, (ii) the justification for 
        carrying out the project under this subsection, and 
        (iii) a statement of the source of the funds to be used 
        to carry out the project. The project may then be 
        carried out only after the end of the 7-day period 
        beginning on the date the notification is received by 
        such committees.
          (B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a project 
        referred to in paragraph (1) may begin on the date the 
        notification is received by the appropriate committees 
        of Congress under that paragraph if the Director of 
        National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense 
        jointly determine that--
                  (i) an emergency exists with respect to the 
                national security or the protection of health, 
                safety, or environmental quality; and
                  (ii) any delay in the commencement of the 
                project would harm any or all of those 
                interests.
          (3) Projects primarily for cia.--If a project 
        referred to in paragraph (1) is primarily for the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency shall make the 
        determination and submit the report required by 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
          (4) Limitation.--A project carried out under this 
        subsection shall be carried out within the total amount 
        of funds appropriated for intelligence and 
        intelligence-related activities that have not been 
        obligated.
  (c) Application.--This section shall not apply to any project 
which is subject to subsection (a)(1)(A) or (c) of section 601.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5313. Positions at level II

  Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
          Deputy Secretary of Defense.
          Deputy Secretary of State.
          Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 
        Resources.
          Administrator, Agency for International Development.
          Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
        Administration.
          Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
          Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.
          Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Management.
          Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.
          Deputy Secretary of Transportation.
          Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
          Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.
          Director of the Office of Science and Technology.
          Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
          Secretary of the Air Force.
          Secretary of the Army.
          Secretary of the Navy.
          Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
          Director of the National Science Foundation.
          Deputy Attorney General.
          Deputy Secretary of Energy.
          Deputy Secretary of Agriculture.
          Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
          Administrator, Federal Highway Administration.
          Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
          Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
        Technology, and Logistics.
          Deputy Secretary of Labor.
          Deputy Director of the Office of Management and 
        Budget.
          Independent Members, Thrift Depositor Protection 
        Oversight Board.
          Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services.
          Deputy Secretary of the Interior.
          Deputy Secretary of Education.
          Deputy Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
          Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management 
        and Budget.
          Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
          Deputy Commissioner of Social Security, Social 
        Security Administration.
          Administrator of the Community Development Financial 
        Institutions Fund.
          Deputy Director of National Drug Control Policy.
          Members, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
        System.
          Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy.
          Chief Executive Officer, Millennium Challenge 
        Corporation.
          Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
          Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
          [Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
        Center.]
          Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
        Agency.
          Federal Transit Administrator.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                     DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE VII--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    authority to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers

  Sec. 721. (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the 
following definitions shall apply:
          (1) Committee; chairperson.--The terms ``Committee'' 
        and ``chairperson'' mean the Committee on Foreign 
        Investment in the United States and the chairperson 
        thereof, respectively.
          (2) Control.--The term ``control'' has the meaning 
        given to such term in regulations which the Committee 
        shall prescribe.
          (3) Covered transaction.--The term ``covered 
        transaction'' means any merger, acquisition, or 
        takeover that is proposed or pending after August 23, 
        1988, by or with any foreign person which could result 
        in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate 
        commerce in the United States.
          (4) Foreign government-controlled transaction.--The 
        term ``foreign government-controlled transaction'' 
        means any covered transaction that could result in the 
        control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in 
        the United States by a foreign government or an entity 
        controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign 
        government.
          (5) Clarification.--The term ``national security'' 
        shall be construed so as to include those issues 
        relating to ``homeland security'', including its 
        application to critical infrastructure.
          (6) Critical infrastructure.--The term ``critical 
        infrastructure'' means, subject to rules issued under 
        this section, systems and assets, whether physical or 
        virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
        incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets 
        would have a debilitating impact on national security.
          (7) Critical technologies.--The term ``critical 
        technologies'' means critical technology, critical 
        components, or critical technology items essential to 
        national defense, identified pursuant to this section, 
        subject to regulations issued at the direction of the 
        President, in accordance with subsection (h).
          (8) Lead agency.--The term ``lead agency'' means the 
        agency, or agencies, designated as the lead agency or 
        agencies pursuant to subsection (k)(5) for the review 
        of a transaction.
  (b) National Security Reviews and Investigations.--
          (1) National security reviews.--
                  (A) In general.--Upon receiving written 
                notification under subparagraph (C) of any 
                covered transaction, or pursuant to a 
                unilateral notification initiated under 
                subparagraph (D) with respect to any covered 
                transaction, the President, acting through the 
                Committee--
                          (i) shall review the covered 
                        transaction to determine the effects of 
                        the transaction on the national 
                        security of the United States; and
                          (ii) shall consider the factors 
                        specified in subsection (f) for such 
                        purpose, as appropriate.
                  (B) Control by foreign government.--If the 
                Committee determines that the covered 
                transaction is a foreign government-controlled 
                transaction, the Committee shall conduct an 
                investigation of the transaction under 
                paragraph (2).
                  (C) Written notice.--
                          (i) In general.--Any party or parties 
                        to any covered transaction may initiate 
                        a review of the transaction under this 
                        paragraph by submitting a written 
                        notice of the transaction to the 
                        Chairperson of the Committee.
                          (ii) Withdrawal of notice.--No 
                        covered transaction for which a notice 
                        was submitted under clause (i) may be 
                        withdrawn from review, unless a written 
                        request for such withdrawal is 
                        submitted to the Committee by any party 
                        to the transaction and approved by the 
                        Committee.
                          (iii) Continuing discussions.--A 
                        request for withdrawal under clause 
                        (ii) shall not be construed to preclude 
                        any party to the covered transaction 
                        from continuing informal discussions 
                        with the Committee or any member 
                        thereof regarding possible resubmission 
                        for review pursuant to this paragraph.
                  (D) Unilateral initiation of review.--Subject 
                to subparagraph (F), the President or the 
                Committee may initiate a review under 
                subparagraph (A) of--
                          (i) any covered transaction;
                          (ii) any covered transaction that has 
                        previously been reviewed or 
                        investigated under this section, if any 
                        party to the transaction submitted 
                        false or misleading material 
                        information to the Committee in 
                        connection with the review or 
                        investigation or omitted material 
                        information, including material 
                        documents, from information submitted 
                        to the Committee; or
                          (iii) any covered transaction that 
                        has previously been reviewed or 
                        investigated under this section, if--
                                  (I) any party to the 
                                transaction or the entity 
                                resulting from consummation of 
                                the transaction intentionally 
                                materially breaches a 
                                mitigation agreement or 
                                condition described in 
                                subsection (l)(1)(A);
                                  (II) such breach is certified 
                                to the Committee by the lead 
                                department or agency monitoring 
                                and enforcing such agreement or 
                                condition as an intentional 
                                material breach; and
                                  (III) the Committee 
                                determines that there are no 
                                other remedies or enforcement 
                                tools available to address such 
                                breach.
                  (E) Timing.--Any review under this paragraph 
                shall be completed before the end of the 30-day 
                period beginning on the date of the acceptance 
                of written notice under subparagraph (C) by the 
                chairperson, or beginning on the date of the 
                initiation of the review in accordance with 
                subparagraph (D), as applicable.
                  (F) Limit on delegation of certain 
                authority.--The authority of the Committee to 
                initiate a review under subparagraph (D) may 
                not be delegated to any person, other than the 
                Deputy Secretary or an appropriate Under 
                Secretary of the department or agency 
                represented on the Committee.
          (2) National security investigations.--
                  (A) In general.--In each case described in 
                subparagraph (B), the Committee shall 
                immediately conduct an investigation of the 
                effects of a covered transaction on the 
                national security of the United States, and 
                take any necessary actions in connection with 
                the transaction to protect the national 
                security of the United States.
                  (B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall 
                apply in each case in which--
                          (i) a review of a covered transaction 
                        under paragraph (1) results in a 
                        determination that--
                                  (I) the transaction threatens 
                                to impair the national security 
                                of the United States and that 
                                threat has not been mitigated 
                                during or prior to the review 
                                of a covered transaction under 
                                paragraph (1);
                                  (II) the transaction is a 
                                foreign government-controlled 
                                transaction; or
                                  (III) the transaction would 
                                result in control of any 
                                critical infrastructure of or 
                                within the United States by or 
                                on behalf of any foreign 
                                person, if the Committee 
                                determines that the transaction 
                                could impair national security, 
                                and that such impairment to 
                                national security has not been 
                                mitigated by assurances 
                                provided or renewed with the 
                                approval of the Committee, as 
                                described in subsection (l), 
                                during the review period under 
                                paragraph (1); or
                          (ii) the lead agency recommends, and 
                        the Committee concurs, that an 
                        investigation be undertaken.
                  (C) Timing.--Any investigation under 
                subparagraph (A) shall be completed before the 
                end of the 45-day period beginning on the date 
                on which the investigation commenced.
                  (D) Exception.--
                          (i) In general.--Notwithstanding 
                        subparagraph (B)(i), an investigation 
                        of a foreign government-controlled 
                        transaction described in subclause (II) 
                        of subparagraph (B)(i) or a transaction 
                        involving critical infrastructure 
                        described in subclause (III) of 
                        subparagraph (B)(i) shall not be 
                        required under this paragraph, if the 
                        Secretary of the Treasury and the head 
                        of the lead agency jointly determine, 
                        on the basis of the review of the 
                        transaction under paragraph (1), that 
                        the transaction will not impair the 
                        national security of the United States.
                          (ii) Nondelegation.--The authority of 
                        the Secretary or the head of an agency 
                        referred to in clause (i) may not be 
                        delegated to any person, other than the 
                        Deputy Secretary of the Treasury or the 
                        deputy head (or the equivalent thereof) 
                        of the lead agency, respectively.
                  (E) Guidance on certain transactions with 
                national security implications.--The 
                Chairperson shall, not later than 180 days 
                after the effective date of the Foreign 
                Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 
                publish in the Federal Register guidance on the 
                types of transactions that the Committee has 
                reviewed and that have presented national 
                security considerations, including transactions 
                that may constitute covered transactions that 
                would result in control of critical 
                infrastructure relating to United States 
                national security by a foreign government or an 
                entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a 
                foreign government.
          (3) Certifications to congress.--
                  (A) Certified notice at completion of 
                review.--Upon completion of a review under 
                subsection (b) that concludes action under this 
                section, the chairperson and the head of the 
                lead agency shall transmit a certified notice 
                to the members of Congress specified in 
                subparagraph (C)(iii).
                  (B) Certified report at completion of 
                investigation.--As soon as is practicable after 
                completion of an investigation under subsection 
                (b) that concludes action under this section, 
                the chairperson and the head of the lead agency 
                shall transmit to the members of Congress 
                specified in subparagraph (C)(iii) a certified 
                written report (consistent with the 
                requirements of subsection (c)) on the results 
                of the investigation, unless the matter under 
                investigation has been sent to the President 
                for decision.
                  (C) Certification procedures.--
                          (i) In general.--Each certified 
                        notice and report required under 
                        subparagraphs (A) and (B), 
                        respectively, shall be submitted to the 
                        members of Congress specified in clause 
                        (iii), and shall include--
                                  (I) a description of the 
                                actions taken by the Committee 
                                with respect to the 
                                transaction; and
                                  (II) identification of the 
                                determinative factors 
                                considered under subsection 
                                (f).
                          (ii) Content of certification.--Each 
                        certified notice and report required 
                        under subparagraphs (A) and (B), 
                        respectively, shall be signed by the 
                        chairperson and the head of the lead 
                        agency, and shall state that, in the 
                        determination of the Committee, there 
                        are no unresolved national security 
                        concerns with the transaction that is 
                        the subject of the notice or report.
                          (iii) Members of congress.--Each 
                        certified notice and report required 
                        under subparagraphs (A) and (B), 
                        respectively, shall be transmitted--
                                  (I) to the Majority Leader 
                                and the Minority Leader of the 
                                Senate;
                                  (II) to the chair and ranking 
                                member of the Committee on 
                                Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                                Affairs of the Senate and of 
                                any committee of the Senate 
                                having oversight over the lead 
                                agency;
                                  (III) to the Speaker and the 
                                Minority Leader of the House of 
                                Representatives;
                                  (IV) to the chair and ranking 
                                member of the Committee on 
                                Financial Services of the House 
                                of Representatives and of any 
                                committee of the House of 
                                Representatives having 
                                oversight over the lead agency; 
                                and
                                  (V) with respect to covered 
                                transactions involving critical 
                                infrastructure, to the members 
                                of the Senate from the State in 
                                which the principal place of 
                                business of the acquired United 
                                States person is located, and 
                                the member from the 
                                Congressional District in which 
                                such principal place of 
                                business is located.
                          (iv) Signatures; limit on 
                        delegation.--
                                  (I) In general.--Each 
                                certified notice and report 
                                required under subparagraphs 
                                (A) and (B), respectively, 
                                shall be signed by the 
                                chairperson and the head of the 
                                lead agency, which signature 
                                requirement may only be 
                                delegated in accordance with 
                                subclause (II).
                                  (II) Limitation on delegation 
                                of certifications.--The 
                                chairperson and the head of the 
                                lead agency may delegate the 
                                signature requirement under 
                                subclause (I)--
                                          (aa) only to an 
                                        appropriate employee of 
                                        the Department of the 
                                        Treasury (in the case 
                                        of the Secretary of the 
                                        Treasury) or to an 
                                        appropriate employee of 
                                        the lead agency (in the 
                                        case of the lead 
                                        agency) who was 
                                        appointed by the 
                                        President, by and with 
                                        the advice and consent 
                                        of the Senate, with 
                                        respect to any notice 
                                        provided under 
                                        paragraph (1) following 
                                        the completion of a 
                                        review under this 
                                        section; or
                                          (bb) only to a Deputy 
                                        Secretary of the 
                                        Treasury (in the case 
                                        of the Secretary of the 
                                        Treasury) or a person 
                                        serving in the Deputy 
                                        position or the 
                                        equivalent thereof at 
                                        the lead agency (in the 
                                        case of the lead 
                                        agency), with respect 
                                        to any report provided 
                                        under subparagraph (B) 
                                        following an 
                                        investigation under 
                                        this section.
          (4) Analysis by director of national intelligence.--
                  (A) In general.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence shall expeditiously carry out a 
                thorough analysis of any threat to the national 
                security of the United States posed by any 
                covered transaction. The Director of National 
                Intelligence shall also seek and incorporate 
                the views of all affected or appropriate 
                intelligence agencies with respect to the 
                transaction.
                  (B) Timing.--The analysis required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall be provided by the 
                Director of National Intelligence to the 
                Committee not later than 20 days after the date 
                on which notice of the transaction is accepted 
                by the Committee under paragraph (1)(C), but 
                such analysis may be supplemented or amended, 
                as the Director considers necessary or 
                appropriate, or upon a request for additional 
                information by the Committee. The Director may 
                begin the analysis at any time prior to 
                acceptance of the notice, in accordance with 
                otherwise applicable law.
                  (C) Interaction with intelligence 
                community.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence 
                community remains engaged in the collection, 
                analysis, and dissemination to the Committee of 
                any additional relevant information that may 
                become available during the course of any 
                investigation conducted under subsection (b) 
                with respect to a transaction.
                  (D) Independent role of director.--The 
                Director of National Intelligence shall be a 
                nonvoting, ex officio member of the Committee, 
                and shall be provided with all notices received 
                by the Committee under paragraph (1)(C) 
                regarding covered transactions, but shall serve 
                no policy role on the Committee, other than to 
                provide analysis under subparagraphs (A) and 
                (C) in connection with a covered transaction.
                  (E) Submission to congressional intelligence 
                committees.--Not later than 5 days after the 
                completion of a review or an investigation of a 
                covered transaction under this subsection that 
                concludes action under this section, the 
                Director shall submit to the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
                Representatives and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate an analysis under 
                subparagraph (A) relating to such covered 
                transaction previously provided to the 
                Committee, including any supplements or 
                amendments to such analysis made by the 
                Director.
                  (F) Impact statements.--Not later than 60 
                days after the completion of a review or an 
                investigation of a covered transaction under 
                this subsection that concludes action under 
                this section, the Director shall determine 
                whether the covered transaction will have an 
                operational impact on the intelligence 
                community, and, if so, shall submit a report on 
                such impact to the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
                and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate. Each such report shall--
                          (i) describe the operational impact 
                        of the covered transaction on the 
                        intelligence community; and
                          (ii) describe any actions that have 
                        been or will be taken to mitigate such 
                        impact.
          (5) Submission of additional information.--No 
        provision of this subsection shall be construed as 
        prohibiting any party to a covered transaction from 
        submitting additional information concerning the 
        transaction, including any proposed restructuring of 
        the transaction or any modifications to any agreements 
        in connection with the transaction, while any review or 
        investigation of the transaction is ongoing.
          (6) Notice of results to parties.--The Committee 
        shall notify the parties to a covered transaction of 
        the results of a review or investigation under this 
        section, promptly upon completion of all action under 
        this section.
          (7) Regulations.--Regulations prescribed under this 
        section shall include standard procedures for--
                  (A) submitting any notice of a covered 
                transaction to the Committee;
                  (B) submitting a request to withdraw a 
                covered transaction from review;
                  (C) resubmitting a notice of a covered 
                transaction that was previously withdrawn from 
                review; and
                  (D) providing notice of the results of a 
                review or investigation to the parties to the 
                covered transaction, upon completion of all 
                action under this section.
  (c) Confidentiality of Information.--Any information or 
documentary material filed with the President or the 
President's designee pursuant to this section shall be exempt 
from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States 
Code, and no such information or documentary material may be 
made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or 
judicial action or proceeding. Nothing in this subsection shall 
be construed to prevent disclosure to either House of Congress 
or to any duly authorized committee or subcommittee of the 
Congress.
  (d) Action by the President.--
          (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (4), the 
        President may take such action for such time as the 
        President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit 
        any covered transaction that threatens to impair the 
        national security of the United States.
          (2) Announcement by the president.--The President 
        shall announce the decision on whether or not to take 
        action pursuant to paragraph (1) not later than 15 days 
        after the date on which an investigation described in 
        subsection (b) is completed.
          (3) Enforcement.--The President may direct the 
        Attorney General of the United States to seek 
        appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the 
        district courts of the United States, in order to 
        implement and enforce this subsection.
          (4) Findings of the president.--The President may 
        exercise the authority conferred by paragraph (1), only 
        if the President finds that--
                  (A) there is credible evidence that leads the 
                President to believe that the foreign interest 
                exercising control might take action that 
                threatens to impair the national security; and
                  (B) provisions of law, other than this 
                section and the International Emergency 
                Economic Powers Act, do not, in the judgment of 
                the President, provide adequate and appropriate 
                authority for the President to protect the 
                national security in the matter before the 
                President.
          (5) Factors to be considered.--For purposes of 
        determining whether to take action under paragraph (1), 
        the President shall consider, among other factors each 
        of the factors described in subsection (f), as 
        appropriate.
  (e) Actions and Findings Nonreviewable.--The actions of the 
President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) and the 
findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d) 
shall not be subject to judicial review.
  (f) Factors To Be Considered.--For purposes of this section, 
the President or the President's designee may, taking into 
account the requirements of national security, consider--
          (1) domestic production needed for projected national 
        defense requirements,
          (2) the capability and capacity of domestic 
        industries to meet national defense requirements, 
        including the availability of human resources, 
        products, technology, materials, and other supplies and 
        services,
          (3) the control of domestic industries and commercial 
        activity by foreign citizens as it affects the 
        capability and capacity of the United States to meet 
        the requirements of national security,
          (4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending 
        transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or 
        technology to any country--
                  (A) identified by the Secretary of State--
                          (i) under section 6(j) of the Export 
                        Administration Act of 1979, as a 
                        country that supports terrorism;
                          (ii) under section 6(l) of the Export 
                        Administration Act of 1979, as a 
                        country of concern regarding missile 
                        proliferation; or
                          (iii) under section 6(m) of the 
                        Export Administration Act of 1979, as a 
                        country of concern regarding the 
                        proliferation of chemical and 
                        biological weapons;
                  (B) identified by the Secretary of Defense as 
                posing a potential regional military threat to 
                the interests of the United States; or
                  (C) listed under section 309(c) of the 
                Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 on the 
                ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country 
                List'' (15 C.F.R. Part 778, Supplement No. 4) 
                or any successor list;
          (5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending 
        transaction on United States international 
        technological leadership in areas affecting United 
        States national security;
          (6) the potential national security-related effects 
        on United States critical infrastructure, including 
        major energy assets;
          (7) the potential national security-related effects 
        on United States critical technologies;
          (8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign 
        government-controlled transaction, as determined under 
        subsection (b)(1)(B);
          (9) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to 
        transactions requiring an investigation under 
        subsection (b)(1)(B), a review of the current 
        assessment of--
                  (A) the adherence of the subject country to 
                nonproliferation control regimes, including 
                treaties and multilateral supply guidelines, 
                which shall draw on, but not be limited to, the 
                annual report on ``Adherence to and Compliance 
                with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and 
                Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'' 
                required by section 403 of the Arms Control and 
                Disarmament Act;
                  (B) the relationship of such country with the 
                United States, specifically on its record on 
                cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, which 
                shall draw on, but not be limited to, the 
                report of the President to Congress under 
                section 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and 
                Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; and
                  (C) the potential for transshipment or 
                diversion of technologies with military 
                applications, including an analysis of national 
                export control laws and regulations;
          (10) the long-term projection of United States 
        requirements for sources of energy and other critical 
        resources and material; and
          (11) such other factors as the President or the 
        Committee may determine to be appropriate, generally or 
        in connection with a specific review or investigation.
  (g) Additional Information to Congress; Confidentiality.--
          (1) Briefing requirement on request.--The Committee 
        shall, upon request from any Member of Congress 
        specified in subsection (b)(3)(C)(iii), promptly 
        provide briefings on a covered transaction for which 
        all action has concluded under this section, or on 
        compliance with a mitigation agreement or condition 
        imposed with respect to such transaction, on a 
        classified basis, if deemed necessary by the 
        sensitivity of the information. Briefings under this 
        paragraph may be provided to the congressional staff of 
        such a Member of Congress having appropriate security 
        clearance.
          (2) Application of confidentiality provisions.--
                  (A) In general.--The disclosure of 
                information under this subsection shall be 
                consistent with the requirements of subsection 
                (c). Members of Congress and staff of either 
                House of Congress or any committee of Congress, 
                shall be subject to the same limitations on 
                disclosure of information as are applicable 
                under subsection (c).
                  (B) Proprietary information.--Proprietary 
                information which can be associated with a 
                particular party to a covered transaction shall 
                be furnished in accordance with subparagraph 
                (A) only to a committee of Congress, and only 
                when the committee provides assurances of 
                confidentiality, unless such party otherwise 
                consents in writing to such disclosure.
  (h) Regulations.--
          (1) In general.--The President shall direct, subject 
        to notice and comment, the issuance of regulations to 
        carry out this section.
          (2) Effective date.--Regulations issued under this 
        section shall become effective not later than 180 days 
        after the effective date of the Foreign Investment and 
        National Security Act of 2007.
          (3) Content.--Regulations issued under this 
        subsection shall--
                  (A) provide for the imposition of civil 
                penalties for any violation of this section, 
                including any mitigation agreement entered into 
                or conditions imposed pursuant to subsection 
                (l);
                  (B) to the extent possible--
                          (i) minimize paperwork burdens; and
                          (ii) coordinate reporting 
                        requirements under this section with 
                        reporting requirements under any other 
                        provision of Federal law; and
                  (C) provide for an appropriate role for the 
                Secretary of Labor with respect to mitigation 
                agreements.
  (i) Effect on Other Law.--No provision of this section shall 
be construed as altering or affecting any other authority, 
process, regulation, investigation, enforcement measure, or 
review provided by or established under any other provision of 
Federal law, including the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, or any other authority of the President or the 
Congress under the Constitution of the United States.
  (j) Technology Risk Assessments.--In any case in which an 
assessment of the risk of diversion of defense critical 
technology is performed by a designee of the President, a copy 
of such assessment shall be provided to any other designee of 
the President responsible for reviewing or investigating a 
merger, acquisition, or takeover under this section.
  (k) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.--
          (1) Establishment.--The Committee on Foreign 
        Investment in the United States, established pursuant 
        to Executive Order No. 11858, shall be a multi agency 
        committee to carry out this section and such other 
        assignments as the President may designate.
          (2) Membership.--The Committee shall be comprised of 
        the following members or the designee of any such 
        member:
                  (A) The Secretary of the Treasury.
                  (B) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
                  (C) The Secretary of Commerce.
                  (D) The Secretary of Defense.
                  (E) The Secretary of State.
                  (F) The Attorney General of the United 
                States.
                  (G) The Secretary of Energy.
                  (H) The Secretary of Labor (nonvoting, ex 
                officio).
                  (I) The Director of National Intelligence 
                (nonvoting, ex officio).
                  (J) The heads of any other executive 
                department, agency, or office, as the President 
                determines appropriate, generally or on a case-
                by-case basis.
          (3) Chairperson.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
        serve as the chairperson of the Committee.
          (4) Assistant secretary for the department of the 
        treasury.--There shall be established an additional 
        position of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who 
        shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
        advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant 
        Secretary appointed under this paragraph shall report 
        directly to the Undersecretary of the Treasury for 
        International Affairs. The duties of the Assistant 
        Secretary shall include duties related to the Committee 
        on Foreign Investment in the United States, as 
        delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury under this 
        section.
          (5) Designation of lead agency.--The Secretary of the 
        Treasury shall designate, as appropriate, a member or 
        members of the Committee to be the lead agency or 
        agencies on behalf of the Committee--
                  (A) for each covered transaction, and for 
                negotiating any mitigation agreements or other 
                conditions necessary to protect national 
                security; and
                  (B) for all matters related to the monitoring 
                of the completed transaction, to ensure 
                compliance with such agreements or conditions 
                and with this section.
          (6) Other members.--The chairperson shall consult 
        with the heads of such other Federal departments, 
        agencies, and independent establishments in any review 
        or investigation under subsection (a), as the 
        chairperson determines to be appropriate, on the basis 
        of the facts and circumstances of the covered 
        transaction under review or investigation (or the 
        designee of any such department or agency head).
          (7) Meetings.--The Committee shall meet upon the 
        direction of the President or upon the call of the 
        chairperson, without regard to section 552b of title 5, 
        United States Code (if otherwise applicable).
  (l) Mitigation, Tracking, and Postconsummation Monitoring and 
Enforcement.--
          (1) Mitigation.--
                  (A) In general.--The Committee or a lead 
                agency may, on behalf of the Committee, 
                negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce 
                any agreement or condition with any party to 
                the covered transaction in order to mitigate 
                any threat to the national security of the 
                United States that arises as a result of the 
                covered transaction.
                  (B) Risk-based analysis required.--Any 
                agreement entered into or condition imposed 
                under subparagraph (A) shall be based on a 
                risk-based analysis, conducted by the 
                Committee, of the threat to national security 
                of the covered transaction.
          (2) Tracking authority for withdrawn notices.--
                  (A) In general.--If any written notice of a 
                covered transaction that was submitted to the 
                Committee under this section is withdrawn 
                before any review or investigation by the 
                Committee under subsection (b) is completed, 
                the Committee shall establish, as appropriate--
                          (i) interim protections to address 
                        specific concerns with such transaction 
                        that have been raised in connection 
                        with any such review or investigation 
                        pending any resubmission of any written 
                        notice under this section with respect 
                        to such transaction and further action 
                        by the President under this section;
                          (ii) specific time frames for 
                        resubmitting any such written notice; 
                        and
                          (iii) a process for tracking any 
                        actions that may be taken by any party 
                        to the transaction, in connection with 
                        the transaction, before the notice 
                        referred to in clause (ii) is 
                        resubmitted.
                  (B) Designation of agency.--The lead agency, 
                other than any entity of the intelligence 
                community (as defined in the National Security 
                Act of 1947), shall, on behalf of the 
                Committee, ensure that the requirements of 
                subparagraph (A) with respect to any covered 
                transaction that is subject to such 
                subparagraph are met.
          (3) Negotiation, modification, monitoring, and 
        enforcement.--
                  (A) Designation of lead agency.--The lead 
                agency shall negotiate, modify, monitor, and 
                enforce, on behalf of the Committee, any 
                agreement entered into or condition imposed 
                under paragraph (1) with respect to a covered 
                transaction, based on the expertise with and 
                knowledge of the issues related to such 
                transaction on the part of the designated 
                department or agency. Nothing in this paragraph 
                shall prohibit other departments or agencies in 
                assisting the lead agency in carrying out the 
                purposes of this paragraph.
                  (B) Reporting by designated agency.--
                          (i) Modification reports.--The lead 
                        agency in connection with any agreement 
                        entered into or condition imposed with 
                        respect to a covered transaction 
                        shall--
                                  (I) provide periodic reports 
                                to the Committee on any 
                                material modification to any 
                                such agreement or condition 
                                imposed with respect to the 
                                transaction; and
                                  (II) ensure that any material 
                                modification to any such 
                                agreement or condition is 
                                reported to the Director of 
                                National Intelligence, the 
                                Attorney General of the United 
                                States, and any other Federal 
                                department or agency that may 
                                have a material interest in 
                                such modification.
                          (ii) Compliance.--The Committee shall 
                        develop and agree upon methods for 
                        evaluating compliance with any 
                        agreement entered into or condition 
                        imposed with respect to a covered 
                        transaction that will allow the 
                        Committee to adequately assure 
                        compliance, without--
                                  (I) unnecessarily diverting 
                                Committee resources from 
                                assessing any new covered 
                                transaction for which a written 
                                notice has been filed pursuant 
                                to subsection (b)(1)(C), and if 
                                necessary, reaching a 
                                mitigation agreement with or 
                                imposing a condition on a party 
                                to such covered transaction or 
                                any covered transaction for 
                                which a review has been 
                                reopened for any reason; or
                                  (II) placing unnecessary 
                                burdens on a party to a covered 
                                transaction.
  (m) Annual Report to Congress.--
          (1) In general.--The chairperson shall transmit a 
        report to the chairman and ranking member of the 
        committee of jurisdiction in the Senate and the House 
        of Representatives, before July 31 of each year on all 
        of the reviews and investigations of covered 
        transactions completed under subsection (b) during the 
        12-month period covered by the report.
          (2) Contents of report relating to covered 
        transactions.--The annual report under paragraph (1) 
        shall contain the following information, with respect 
        to each covered transaction, for the reporting period:
                  (A) A list of all notices filed and all 
                reviews or investigations completed during the 
                period, with basic information on each party to 
                the transaction, the nature of the business 
                activities or products of all pertinent 
                persons, along with information about any 
                withdrawal from the process, and any decision 
                or action by the President under this section.
                  (B) Specific, cumulative, and, as 
                appropriate, trend information on the numbers 
                of filings, investigations, withdrawals, and 
                decisions or actions by the President under 
                this section.
                  (C) Cumulative and, as appropriate, trend 
                information on the business sectors involved in 
                the filings which have been made, and the 
                countries from which the investments have 
                originated.
                  (D) Information on whether companies that 
                withdrew notices to the Committee in accordance 
                with subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii) have later 
                refiled such notices, or, alternatively, 
                abandoned the transaction.
                  (E) The types of security arrangements and 
                conditions the Committee has used to mitigate 
                national security concerns about a transaction, 
                including a discussion of the methods that the 
                Committee and any lead agency are using to 
                determine compliance with such arrangements or 
                conditions.
                  (F) A detailed discussion of all perceived 
                adverse effects of covered transactions on the 
                national security or critical infrastructure of 
                the United States that the Committee will take 
                into account in its deliberations during the 
                period before delivery of the next report, to 
                the extent possible.
          (3) Contents of report relating to critical 
        technologies.--
                  (A) In general.--In order to assist Congress 
                in its oversight responsibilities with respect 
                to this section, the President and such 
                agencies as the President shall designate shall 
                include in the annual report submitted under 
                paragraph (1)--
                          (i) an evaluation of whether there is 
                        credible evidence of a coordinated 
                        strategy by 1 or more countries or 
                        companies to acquire United States 
                        companies involved in research, 
                        development, or production of critical 
                        technologies for which the United 
                        States is a leading producer; and
                          (ii) an evaluation of whether there 
                        are industrial espionage activities 
                        directed or directly assisted by 
                        foreign governments against private 
                        United States companies aimed at 
                        obtaining commercial secrets related to 
                        critical technologies.
                  (B) Release of unclassified study.--All 
                appropriate portions of the annual report under 
                paragraph (1) may be classified. An 
                unclassified version of the report, as 
                appropriate, consistent with safeguarding 
                national security and privacy, shall be made 
                available to the public.
  (n) Certification of Notices and Assurances.--Each notice, 
and any followup information, submitted under this section and 
regulations prescribed under this section to the President or 
the Committee by a party to a covered transaction, and any 
information submitted by any such party in connection with any 
action for which a report is required pursuant to paragraph 
(3)(B) of subsection (l), with respect to the implementation of 
any mitigation agreement or condition described in paragraph 
(1)(A) of subsection (l), or any material change in 
circumstances, shall be accompanied by a written statement by 
the chief executive officer or the designee of the person 
required to submit such notice or information certifying that, 
to the best of the knowledge and belief of that person--
          (1) the notice or information submitted fully 
        complies with the requirements of this section or such 
        regulation, agreement, or condition; and
          (2) the notice or information is accurate and 
        complete in all material respects.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


              COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 902. [NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE]  DIRECTOR OF THE 
                    NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER.

  [(a) Establishment.--(1) There shall be a National 
Counterintelligence Executive, who shall be appointed by the 
Director of National Intelligence.
  [(2) It is the sense of Congress that the Director of 
National Intelligence should seek the views of the Attorney 
General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in selecting an individual for appointment 
as the Executive.]
  (a) Establishment.--There shall be a Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center (referred to in this 
section as ``the Director''), who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (b) Mission.--The mission of the [National 
Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be to serve as 
the head of national counterintelligence for the United States 
Government.
  (c) Duties.--Subject to the direction and control of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the duties of the [National 
Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center are as follows:
          (1) To carry out the mission referred to in 
        subsection (b).
          (2) To act as chairperson of the National 
        Counterintelligence Policy Board under section 811 of 
        the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act 
        of 1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. 
        402a), as amended by section 903 of this Act.
          (3) To act as head of the [Office of the National 
        Counterintelligence Executive] National 
        Counterintelligence and Security Center under section 
        904.
          (4) To participate as an observer on such boards, 
        committees, and entities of the executive branch as the 
        Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate 
        for the discharge of the mission and functions of the 
        Executive and the [Office of the National 
        Counterintelligence Executive] National 
        Counterintelligence and Security Center under section 
        904.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 904. [OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE]  
                    NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER.

  (a) Establishment.--There shall be an [Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive] National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center.
  (b) Head [of Office] Center.--The [National 
Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be the head of 
the [Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
  (c) Location [of Office] Center.--The [Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive] National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center shall be located in the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence.
  (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of the 
[National Counterintelligence Executive] Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the functions 
of the [Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be as 
follows:
          (1) National threat identification and prioritization 
        assessment.--Subject to subsection (e), in consultation 
        with appropriate department and agencies of the United 
        States Government, and private sector entities, to 
        produce a strategic planning assessment of the 
        counterintelligence requirements of the United States 
        to be known as the National Threat Identification and 
        Prioritization Assessment.
          (2) National counterintelligence strategy.--
                  (A) Requirement to produce.--Subject to 
                subsection (e), in consultation with 
                appropriate department and agencies of the 
                United States Government, and private sector 
                entities, and based on the most current 
                National Threat Identification and 
                Prioritization Assessment under paragraph (1), 
                to produce a strategy for the 
                counterintelligence programs and activities of 
                the United States Government to be known as the 
                National Counterintelligence Strategy.
                  (B) Revision and requirement.--The National 
                Counterintelligence Strategy shall be revised 
                or updated at least once every three years and 
                shall be aligned with the strategy and policies 
                of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (3) Implementation of national counterintelligence 
        strategy.--To evaluate on an ongoing basis the 
        implementation of the National Counterintelligence 
        Strategy and to submit to the President periodic 
        reports on such evaluation, including a discussion of 
        any shortfalls in the implementation of the Strategy 
        and recommendations for remedies for such shortfalls.
          (4) National counterintelligence strategic 
        analyses.--As directed by the Director of National 
        Intelligence and in consultation with appropriate 
        elements of the departments and agencies of the United 
        States Government, to oversee and coordinate the 
        production of strategic analyses of counterintelligence 
        matters, including the production of 
        counterintelligence damage assessments and assessments 
        of lessons learned from counterintelligence activities.
          (5) National counterintelligence program budget.--In 
        consultation with the Director of National 
        Intelligence--
                  (A) to coordinate the development of budgets 
                and resource allocation plans for the 
                counterintelligence programs and activities of 
                the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau 
                of Investigation, the Central Intelligence 
                Agency, and other appropriate elements of the 
                United States Government;
                  (B) to ensure that the budgets and resource 
                allocation plans developed under subparagraph 
                (A) address the objectives and priorities for 
                counterintelligence under the National 
                Counterintelligence Strategy; and
                  (C) to submit to the National Security 
                Council periodic reports on the activities 
                undertaken [by the Office] by the Center under 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B).
          (6) National counterintelligence collection and 
        targeting coordination.--To develop priorities for 
        counterintelligence investigations and operations, and 
        for collection of counterintelligence, for purposes of 
        the National Counterintelligence Strategy, except [that 
        the Office] that the Center may not--
                  (A) carry out any counterintelligence 
                investigations or operations; or
                  (B) establish its own contacts, or carry out 
                its own activities, with foreign intelligence 
                services.
          (7) National counterintelligence outreach, watch, and 
        warning.--
                  (A) Counterintelligence vulnerability 
                surveys.--To carry out and coordinate surveys 
                of the vulnerability of the United States 
                Government, and the private sector, to 
                intelligence threats in order to identify the 
                areas, programs, and activities that require 
                protection from such threats.
                  (B) Outreach.--To carry out and coordinate 
                outreach programs and activities on 
                counterintelligence to other elements of the 
                United States Government, and the private 
                sector, and to coordinate the dissemination to 
                the public of warnings on intelligence threats 
                to the United States.
                  (C) Research and development.--To ensure that 
                research and development programs and 
                activities of the United States Government, and 
                the private sector, direct attention to the 
                needs of the counterintelligence community for 
                technologies, products, and services.
                  (D) Training and professional development.--
                To develop policies and standards for training 
                and professional development of individuals 
                engaged in counterintelligence activities and 
                to manage the conduct of joint training 
                exercises for such personnel.
  (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National 
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under subsection 
(d)(1), and any modification of such assessment, shall not go 
into effect until approved by the President.
  (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under subsection 
(d)(2), and any modification of such strategy, shall not go 
into effect until approved by the President.
  (3) The [National Counterintelligence Executive] Director of 
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees each 
National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, 
or modification thereof, and each National Counterintelligence 
Strategy, or modification thereof, approved under this section.
  (4) In this subsection, the term ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' means--
          (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
          (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
        the House of Representatives.
  (f) Personnel.--(1) Personnel of the [Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive] National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center may consist of personnel employed [by the 
Office] by the Center or personnel on detail from any other 
department, agency, or element of the Federal Government. Any 
such detail may be on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, 
at the election of the head of the agency detailing such 
personnel.
  (2) Notwithstanding section 104(d) or any other provision of 
law limiting the period of the detail of personnel on a 
nonreimbursable basis, the detail of an officer or employee of 
United States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph 
(1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be for any period in excess 
of one year that the [National Counterintelligence Executive] 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center and the head of the department, agency, or element 
concerned consider appropriate.
  (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain Administrative 
Laws.--The files [of the Office] of the Center shall be treated 
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for 
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under 
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as 
operational files of an element of the Agency.
  (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location [of the Office] of 
the Center of the [National Counterintelligence Executive] 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence shall not be construed as affecting access by 
Congress, or any committee of Congress, to--
          (1) any information, document, record, or paper in 
        the possession [of the Office] of the Center; or
          (2) any personnel [of the Office] of the Center.
  (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed 
as affecting the authority of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, 
the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as provided or specified under the National 
Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


       COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS ACT OF 1994



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE VIII--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 811. COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  (a) Establishment of Counterintelligence Policy Board.--There 
is established within the executive branch of Government a 
National Counterintelligence Policy Board (in this section 
referred to as the ``Board''). The Board shall report to the 
President through the National Security Council.
  (b) Chairperson.--[The National Counterintelligence 
Executive] The Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center under section 902 of the Counterintelligence 
Enhancement Act of 2002 shall serve as the chairperson of the 
Board.
  (c) Membership.--The membership of the National 
Counterintelligence Policy Board shall consist of the 
following:
          (1) [The National Counterintelligence Executive] The 
        Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
        Security Center.
          (2) Senior personnel of departments and elements of 
        the United States Government, appointed by the head of 
        the department or element concerned, as follows:
                  (A) The Department of Justice, including the 
                Federal Bureau of Investigation.
                  (B) The Department of Defense, including the 
                Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                  (C) The Department of State.
                  (D) The Department of Energy.
                  (E) The Central Intelligence Agency.
                  (F) Any other department, agency, or element 
                of the United States Government specified by 
                the President.
  (d) Functions and Discharge of Functions.--(1) The Board 
shall--
                  (A) serve as the principal mechanism for--
                          (i) developing policies and 
                        procedures for the approval of the 
                        President to govern the conduct of 
                        counterintelligence activities; and
                          (ii) upon the direction of the 
                        President, resolving conflicts that 
                        arise between elements of the 
                        Government conducting such activities; 
                        and
                  (B) act as an interagency working group to--
                          (i) ensure the discussion and review 
                        of matters relating to the 
                        implementation of the 
                        Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 
                        2002; and
                          (ii) provide advice [to the National 
                        Counterintelligence Executive] to the 
                        Director of the National 
                        Counterintelligence and Security Center 
                        on priorities in the implementation of 
                        the National Counterintelligence 
                        Strategy produced by the [Office of the 
                        National Counterintelligence Executive] 
                        National Counterintelligence and 
                        Security Center under section 904(e)(2) 
                        of that Act.
          (2) The Board may, for purposes of carrying out its 
        functions under this section, establish such 
        interagency boards and working groups as the Board 
        considers appropriate.
  (e) Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters With the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--(1) Except as provided in 
paragraph (5), the head of each department or agency within the 
executive branch shall ensure that--
          (A) the Federal Bureau of Investigation is advised 
        immediately of any information, regardless of its 
        origin, which indicates that classified information is 
        being, or may have been, disclosed in an unauthorized 
        manner to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
        power;
          (B) following a report made pursuant to subparagraph 
        (A), the Federal Bureau of Investigation is consulted 
        with respect to all subsequent actions which may be 
        undertaken by the department or agency concerned to 
        determine the source of such loss or compromise; and
          (C) where, after appropriate consultation with the 
        department or agency concerned, the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation undertakes investigative activities to 
        determine the source of the loss or compromise, the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation is given complete and 
        timely access to the employees and records of the 
        department or agency concerned for purposes of such 
        investigative activities.
  (2) Except as provided in paragraph (5), the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall ensure that espionage 
information obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
pertaining to the personnel, operations, or information of 
departments or agencies of the executive branch, is provided 
through appropriate channels in a timely manner to the 
department or agency concerned, and that such departments or 
agencies are consulted in a timely manner with respect to 
espionage investigations undertaken by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation which involve the personnel, operations, or 
information of such department or agency.
  (3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
shall submit to the head of the department or agency concerned 
a written assessment of the potential impact of the actions of 
the department or agency on a counterintelligence 
investigation.
  (B) The head of the department or agency concerned shall--
          (i) use an assessment under subparagraph (A) as an 
        aid in determining whether, and under what 
        circumstances, the subject of an investigation under 
        paragraph (1) should be left in place for investigative 
        purposes; and
          (ii) notify in writing the Director of the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation of such determination.
  (C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the head of the department or agency concerned shall continue 
to consult, as appropriate, to review the status of an 
investigation covered by this paragraph, and to reassess, as 
appropriate, a determination of the head of the department or 
agency concerned to leave a subject in place for investigative 
purposes.
  (4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify 
appropriate officials within the executive branch, including 
the head of the department or agency concerned, of the 
commencement of a full field espionage investigation with 
respect to an employee within the executive branch.
  (B) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph 
examination, interrogate, or otherwise take any action that is 
likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under 
subparagraph (A) of an investigation described in that 
subparagraph without prior coordination and consultation with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
  (5) Where essential to meet extraordinary circumstances 
affecting vital national security interests of the United 
States, the President may on a case-by-case basis waive the 
requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3), as they apply to 
the head of a particular department or agency, or the Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such waiver shall be in 
writing and shall fully state the justification for such 
waiver. Within thirty days, the President shall notify the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives that such waiver has been issued, and at that 
time or as soon as national security considerations permit, 
provide these committees with a complete explanation of the 
circumstances which necessitated such waiver.
  (6) Nothing in this section may be construed to alter the 
existingjurisdictional arrangements between the Federal Bureau 
of Investigationand the Department of Defense with respect to 
investigationsof persons subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice,nor to impose additional reporting 
requirements upon the Departmentof Defense with respect to such 
investigations beyondthose required by existing law and 
executive branch policy.
  (7) As used in this section, the terms ``foreign power'' and 
``agent of a foreign power'' have the same meanings as set 
forth in sections 101 (a) and (b), respectively, of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Subtitle C--Counterintelligence

SEC. 341. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new section:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (2) The table of contents contained in the first section of 
such Act is amended in the items relating to title XI by adding 
at the end the following new item:

     * * * * * * *''.
  (b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage 
Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the 
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, and in 
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, acting 
through the [Office of the National Counterintelligence 
Executive] National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 
shall establish policies and procedures to assist the Attorney 
General in the consideration of intelligence and national 
security-related equities in the development of charging 
documents and related pleadings in espionage prosecutions.
          * * * * * * *
                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

          * * * * * * *

                    SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW

          * * * * * * *

            PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS

          * * * * * * *

             CHAPTER 4--OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

          * * * * * * *

Sec. 142. Chief Information Officer

  (a) There is a Chief Information Officer of the Department of 
Defense.
  (b)(1) The Chief Information Officer of the Department of 
Defense--
          (A) is the Chief Information Officer of the 
        Department of Defense for the purposes of sections 
        3506(a)(2) and 3544(a)(3) of title 44;
          (B) has the responsibilities and duties specified in 
        section 11315 of title 40[;]; and
          (C) has the responsibilities specified for the Chief 
        Information Officer in sections 2222, 2223(a), and 2224 
        of this title[; and].
          [(D) exercises authority, direction, and control over 
        the Information Assurance Directorate of the National 
        Security Agency.]
  (2) The Chief Information Officer shall perform such 
additional duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of 
Defense may prescribe.
  (c) The Chief Information Officer takes precedence in the 
Department of Defense with the officials serving in positions 
specified in section 131(b)(4) of this title. The officials 
serving in positions specified in section 131(b)(4) and the 
Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense take 
precedence among themselves in the order prescribed by the 
Secretary of Defense.
          * * * * * * *

                   Disclosure of Directed Rule Making

    H.R. 5077 does not specifically direct any rule makings 
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 551.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    H.R. 5077 does not duplicate or reauthorize an established 
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of 
another Federal program, a program that was included in any 
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress 
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program 
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    The Intelligence Committee advanced the bipartisan 
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 
by unanimous voice vote.
    The annual IAA ensures that the programs and activities of 
the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), including Department of 
Defense (DoD) intelligence elements, are authorized in law and 
optimally resourced to protect the nation from threats at home 
and abroad. Equally important, this critical piece of 
legislation also ensures rigorous congressional oversight of 
the IC, including over its most sensitive aspects.
    This year's IAA is comprehensive, detailed, and 
thoughtfully-considered. It authorizes intelligence funding in 
the Base budget at a level nearly equal to the FY17 President's 
Budget request, which is approximately the same as the FY16 
enacted budget level. The Overseas Contingency Operations 
authorization is roughly 1.5% above the request.
    The bill provides substantial and appropriate oversight of 
the IC by trimming unnecessary funding and reprioritizing 
resource allocation; adding money to underfunded programs; and 
providing congressional direction to improve processes, gain 
efficiencies, and ensure greater transparency and 
accountability within the IC. It also fences significant 
amounts of funding to better ensure continuous IC 
accountability throughout the year.
    Specifically, the FY17 IAA:
          a. Emphasizes the need to focus on long-term threats, 
        such as those from an increasingly aggressive China, 
        Russia, and North Korea, while maintaining focus on the 
        immediate threats posed by terrorism and the security 
        challenges in the Middle East, North Africa, and South 
        Asia;
          b. Protects our most vital capabilities, whether in 
        space, cyberspace, on land or at sea, as well as our 
        most invaluable resources--our IC professionals--
        against growing threats across domains;
          c. Leverages and promotes commercial capabilities, 
        while investing in the most advanced technologies that 
        do not yet have commercial application;
          d. Promotes greater capacity-building among key 
        partners and allies to further leverage shared 
        resources and competencies, and advances more strategic 
        approaches to these efforts;
          e. Emphasizes the importance of recruiting, 
        developing, and retaining the most effective and 
        diverse workforce to answer the increasingly complex 
        challenges facing the IC and the defense intelligence 
        enterprise;
          f. Continues to support HUMINT, a critical 
        intelligence mission;
          g. Promotes, through resources and direction, 
        enhanced cyber security for our nation's most critical 
        systems; and
          h. Ensures thorough oversight of surveillance 
        capabilities.
    In light of whistleblower allegations that intelligence was 
inappropriately influenced or distorted at CENTCOM, this year's 
bill also includes provisions aimed at better ensuring the 
integrity of DoD intelligence analysis. Additionally, this 
year's IAA improves the procedure for IC whistleblowers to 
report complaints to Congress.
    The Minority remains committed to a strong counterterrorism 
posture, but also to a more transparent one. Accordingly, the 
Minority reiterates the need for the release of substantial 
data on the total number of combatants and noncombatant 
civilians who may have been killed or injured as a result of 
counterterrorism action. Ranking Member Schiff continues to 
highlight this issue within the Committee and to the 
Administration.
    The Minority is pleased that the IAA fully funds and, for 
the first time, specifically authorizes the activities of the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an entity 
tasked with ensuring that U.S. counterterrorism programs 
advance national security while appropriately safeguarding 
civil liberties. However, the Minority will remain vigilant to 
ensure that the Committee does not seek to constrain PCLOB 
authorities in the future--particularly in light of last year's 
provision to curtail its jurisdiction over U.S. Covert Action 
programs, which this year Representative Himes tried to reverse 
through an amendment. The Minority continues to demonstrate its 
strong support for this important and independent body, and to 
oppose efforts to limit is role in overseeing counterterrorism 
activities.
    Unlike last year's IAA, this year's bill omits odious 
transfer restrictions from the detention center at Guantanamo 
Bay. This year's IAA, however, calls for a declassification 
review of certain intelligence products regarding terrorist 
acts committed by transferred detainees before their arrival at 
Guantanamo Bay. The only detainees covered by the 
declassification provision, however, are those transferred 
since President Obama took office, disregarding the roughly 500 
detainees transferred or released by the prior administration--
detainees whose recidivism rates generally remain far higher 
than any transferred or released under President Obama.
    Additionally, this year's IAA unfortunately does not fund 
the President's request to enhance intelligence analysis on the 
serious national security implications of climate change. Food 
and water scarcity, and vast population displacement, are 
inevitable features of unchecked climate change and therefore 
will prove to be tremendous drivers of global instability, 
which the IC needs to better anticipate and understand.
    Despite these specific weaknesses, the House Intelligence 
Committee reached bipartisan agreement on this year's IAA, 
which includes several key provisions championed by Minority 
Members, including:
          a. Mr. Himes's provision to improve the timeliness 
        and fairness of the prepublication review process 
        throughout the IC, by calling for uniform guidance to 
        ensure that reviews only block publication of 
        appropriately classified material, and that employees 
        at each IC element receive impartial and expeditious 
        reviews of their works;
          b. Ms. Sewell's language on investment in ``Centers 
        of Academic Excellence'' programs, helping to guarantee 
        that a diverse array of students can take part in IC 
        internships, and her requirement to collect data to 
        evaluate the IC's federally-funded academic programs;
          c. Mr. Carson's provision requiring the IC to publish 
        insignia commonly associated with terrorist 
        organizations to assist public and private entities in 
        swiftly removing terrorist content online; his 
        provision on cooperation and de-confliction between the 
        departments of Homeland Security and State regarding 
        countering violent extremism programs; and his 
        requirement to have the Committee receive information 
        on the operational impacts of foreign investment in the 
        United States;
          d. Ms. Speier's provisions to: (a) standardize 
        declassification photocopying fees across the IC to 
        promote increased availability of information and 
        enhance transparency; (b) expand access to graduate 
        education programs at the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
        (c) obtain information on the mental health resilience 
        programs available to IC civilians returning from tours 
        in combat zones; and (d) study reprisals taken against 
        IC contractors who make disclosures that would be 
        legally protected if made by IC employees;
          e. Mr. Quigley's language to continue support to 
        security services in Ukraine;
          f. Mr. Swalwell's provision to track foreign 
        fighters, his requirement to analyze the status of loan 
        forgiveness and debt counseling programs in the IC, and 
        his provision to better understand how the departments 
        of Homeland Security and Energy take advantage of the 
        expertise resident at our National Labs; and
          g. Mr. Murphy's provisions to: (a) provide a report 
        detailing cybersecurity threats to, or vulnerabilities 
        in, systems employed by seaports and transshipment 
        hubs, including efforts to improve our preparedness and 
        response to a cyber attack; (b) improve intelligence 
        reporting with respect to Iran's compliance with the 
        Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; and (c) requires a 
        report on the security threats emanating from maritime 
        smuggling routes and ways to better cooperate with 
        other nations to mitigate these threats.
    The Minority strongly supports this year's Intelligence 
Authorization Act. It will further ensure that the IC, 
including DoD's intelligence components, are appropriately 
resourced and authorized to address an increasingly complex 
security environment, while safeguarding civil liberties and 
privacy.

                                            Adam B. Schiff,
                                                    Ranking Member.
                                         Luis V. Gutierrez.
                                            James A. Himes.
                                           Terri A. Sewell.
                                              Andre Carson.
                                             Jackie Speier.
                                              Mike Quigley.
                                             Eric Swalwell.
                                            Patrick Murphy.