This chronology lists selected news stories and publications by others that have made use of information and analysis from the Nuclear Information Project (numerous other examples of use of our work are not included because they were not easily available via links). To the extent possible, the documents are located on the FAS web site, but external links might go dead over time. If you need assistance to locate missing items, please contact individual project staff via the “about” page. Also check out the social media accounts of Hans Kristensen (@nukestrat, @nukestrat.bsky.social‬), Matt Korda (@mattkorda, @mattkorda.bsky.social), Eliana Johns (@elianajjohns, @elianajjohns.bsky.social), and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle (@m_knight7, @mknight.bsky.social).

2026

• Jan 6: USA Today, “Is it too late to rethink US nuclear strategy? Experts review options.”

2025

• Dec 3: Wall Street Journal, “The New Nuclear Frontier: Why Russia Is Sharing Arms With Belarus.”
• Dec 2: My Nuclear Life, “How much time does the US need to restart nuclear testing?”
• Nov 24: Deadline DR (Denmark), Interview with Hans Kristensen
• Nov 21: Center for a New American Security, “Credibility and Capability: The Future of Nuclear Stability.”
• Nov 17: The Washington Post, “What to know about China’s newly modernized nuclear arsenal.”
• Nov 16: CNN, “Last nuclear treaty between US and Russia nears expiration as Trump and Putin trade testing threats.”
• Nov 14: Sveriges Radio (Sweden), “Why Trump is triggered by Xi and Putin’s nuclear weapons.”
• Nov 13: Tovima (Greece), “The unexpected return of the nuclear race.”
• Nov 6: Newsweek, “How US Nuclear Weapons Compare to Russia and China After New Missile Tests.”
• Nov 5: The War Zone, “Experts Explain How Long It Would Take Russia To Resume Nuclear Weapons Detonation Tests.”
• Nov 5: Defense News, “Experts: Full nuclear weapons tests would backfire on US.”
• Nov 4: CNN, “US nuclear weapons testing can forever scar a nation. Just ask the Marshall Islands.”
• Oct 31: NKH World (Japan), “Nuclear disarmament expert comments on Trump’s announcement on nuclear tests.”
• Oct 31: Asia Communique, “Experts tell Asia Communique: The U.S. stands to gain little from resuming nuclear tests — while rival nuclear powers could benefit far more.”
• Oct 31: NPR, “Trump says he wants to resume nuclear testing. Here’s what that would mean.”
• Oct 31: CNN, “Trump said the US would begin testing nukes. It caught even some advisers by surprise.”
• Oct 30: The Washington Post, “Trump push to restart nuclear tests could take years, cost millions, experts say.”
• Oct 30: The New York Times, “Testing America’s Nuclear Bombs: What to Know.”
• Oct 30: The Washington Times, “Trump’s plan to resume nuke testing raises alarms.”
• Oct 30: ABC News, “Why does Trump want the Pentagon to conduct nuclear tests?”
• Oct 30: TIME, “After Russia Conducts Nuclear Weapons Tests, Trump Announces U.S. Will Restart Its Own.”
• Oct 30: Newsweek, “How US Nuclear Weapons Compare to China, Russia as Trump Orders New Tests.”
• Oct 30: Breaking Defense, “US nuclear arsenal currently safe, reliable: STRATCOM nominee.”
• Oct 30: 404 Media, “Trump Orders Nuclear Testing As Nuke Workers Go Unpaid.”
• Oct 30: CNN, “Trump instructs Pentagon to start testing nuclear weapons ‘on an equal basis’ with Russia and China.”
• Oct 30: The Independent, “Mushroom clouds over Vegas? What Trump’s nuclear weapons tests could mean for America and the world.”
• Oct 30: The War Zone, “Experts Explain How Reviving Nuclear Weapons Tests Would Actually Happen.”
• Oct 30: Business Insider, “Trump’s post on nuclear weapons testing doesn’t make a lot of sense.”
• Sep 29: The New York Times, “The Missiles Threatening Taiwan.”
• Sep 26: The Washington Post, “Has Pakistan extended its nuclear umbrella to Riyadh? No one will say.”
• Sep 25: Texas Monthly, “America’s Nuclear Arsenal Is Built in Amarillo. Workers There Have Paid a Price.”
• Sep 22: WyoFile, “Wyoming could be the ‘guinea pig’ as U.S. modernizes its nuclear weapons.”
• Sep 18: Associated Press, “Saudi Arabia signs a mutual defense pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan after Israel’s attack on Qatar.”
• Sep 16: Cowboy State Daily (Wyoming), “Nuclear Watchdog Visits Wyoming As State Prepares For Sentinel Missiles.”
• Sep 3: The Guardian, “Nuclear triad and ‘robot wolves’: parade shows off array of Chinese weapons.”
• Sep 3: Breaking Defense, “Air Force takes first Minuteman III silo offline, in milestone towards Sentinel.”
• Aug 20: The New York Times, “The Invisible Target in Iran.”
• Aug 6: DW News (Germany), “The dangerous new nuclear arms race 80 years after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.”
• Aug 6: The Julie Mason Show, “Eliana Johns on the 80th Anniversary of the Bombing of Hiroshima & Nagasaki.”
• Aug 6: Wired, “Nuclear Experts Say Mixing AI and Nuclear Weapons Is Inevitable.”
• Aug 5: The Independent, “‘Children like me had to carry bodies’: Japan A-bomb survivors urge world not to forget 80 years on.”
• Aug 5: CNN, “World marks 80 years since US dropped atomic bomb on Japan as global powers still trade nuclear threats.”
• Aug 2: Al Jazeera, “Why is Trump moving nuclear submarines after spat with Medvedev?”
• July 28: Responsible Statecraft, “The expanding gravy train for the new land-based Sentinel nuke.”
• July 22: The Guardian, “Campaigners call for Keir Starmer to say if US nuclear weapons are back in UK.”
• July 17: Nature, “How to avoid nuclear war in an era of AI and misinformation.”
• July 17: The Aviationist, “High Priority C-17 Flight Fuels Speculation About RAF Lakenheath Nuclear Mission.”
• July 13: Business Insider, “Satellite photos show how Russia is building up 5 of its secret nuclear bases.”
• July 12: NPR, “Why France and the U.K. have a new nuclear sharing agreement.”
• July 8: Newsweek, “US Nuclear Command Plane Seen Flying Over Atlantic.”
• July 5: Ralph Nader Radio Hour, “Power Unchecked.”
• June 29: The New York Times, “America Can’t Do to North Korea What It Just Did to Iran.”
• June 25: The Washington Post, “What’s making some countries daydream about nukes again?”
• June 25: Pod Save the World, “Trump Fails To Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
• June 24: The Washington Post, “Where are the world’s nuclear weapons, and who owns them?”
• June 24: Associated Press, “As it attacks Iran’s nuclear program, Israel maintains ambiguity about its own.”
• June 23: PolitiFact, “Are Iranian nuclear sites ‘obliterated,’ as Donald Trump said? Too soon to know, experts say.”
• June 23: Wired, “International Nuclear Watchdog Issues Stark Warning in Wake of US Iran Strikes.”
• June 18: The Washington Post, “Only one American can start a nuclear war: the president.”
• June 18: Axios, “U.S. Air Force offers first peek at LRSO nuclear missile.”
• June 17: The New York Times, “As Israel Targets Iran’s Nuclear Program, It Has a Secret One of Its Own.”
• June 16: SVT Nyheter (Sweden), “Photos: Here Russia is equipping a nuclear weapons base – 270 kilometers from Sweden.”
• June 16: POLITICO, “World’s nuclear disarmament era over, report warns.”
• June 13: The Washington Post, “How nuclear war could start.”
• June 13: The New York Times, “Much of Iran’s Nuclear Program Remains After Israel’s Strikes. At Least for Now.”
• June 4: The Washington Post, “Why we should worry about nuclear weapons again.”
• June 4: Reuters, “Russian War Bloggers Blame Military Command for Stunning Ukrainian Attack on Bomber Fleet.”
• June 4: TV 2 (Norway), “Revealing details of Putin’s nuclear plans.”
• May 31: The Cipher Brief, “Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric: Cold War Redux.”
• May 29: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Nuclear expert Jon Wolfsthal on the costs of US nuclear weapons programs spiraling out of control.”
• May 29: Der Spiegel, “Russia is modernizing nuclear weapons silos and is relying on German brands in the process.”
• May 27: Wall Street Journal, “Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Riles Nuclear-Armed Foes.”
• May 22: Janes, “Russia fielding nuclear air-to-air missiles, US assesses.”
• May 21: The War Zone, “Russia Fielding New Nuclear-Armed Air-To-Air Missiles: U.S. Intel.”
• May 19: The Nation, “The Return of the Nuclear Threat.”
• May 15: The New York Times, “Nuclear War Avoided, Again. But Next Time?”
• May 10: The New York Times, “Satellite Images Reveal Where Russian Nukes Could Be Stored in Belarus.”
• May 8: Times of India, “Hostility level still low, Pakistan may not hit N-button yet: Experts.”
• Apr 30: Axios, “From subs to bases, “climate change crap” has consequences for U.S. military.”
• Apr 14: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “How climate change could disrupt the construction and operations of US nuclear submarines.”
• Apr 7: The Cipher Brief, “Expert Q&A: What is the Actual State of China’s Nuclear Force?”
• Apr 3: Newsweek, “Trump Tariffs on Territory Hosting Major US Military Base Spark Confusion.”
• Mar 26: The Atlantic, “I’ve Seen How ‘America First’ Ends.”
• Mar 19: Axios, “A new nuke wave washes over the world.”
• Mar 14: Nettavisen (Norway), “Strategic bomber flies over Oslo to deter Russia.”
• Mar 13: Breaking Defense, “A nuclear Poland? Logistics, political challenges ahead of potential Warsaw deal.”
• Mar 9: The National, “UK’s nukes and fighter jets in doubt amid reliance on America.”
• Feb 28: Interesting Engineering, “US may store nuclear weapons in UK after 20-year gap, shelter spills secrets.”
• Feb 25: The War Zone, “France Eyeing Deployment Of Nuclear-Armed Rafale Fighters To Germany: Report.”
• Feb 14: The Christian Science Monitor, “Deep underground, missileers watch over America’s nuclear weapons.”
• Feb 4: VOA News, “Analysts: American Iron Dome reduces nuclear coercion but drives arms race.”
• Jan 31: CNN, “Trump wants an ‘Iron Dome’ over the US. But even a mini version in the Pacific is taking a while.”
• Jan 31: The Hoya, “Nuclear Research Associate Cautions Against Sole Presidential Authority.”
• Jan 29: NPR, “Step inside the secret lab where America tests its nukes.”
• Jan 23: The Hill, “Trump wants nuclear reduction talks with China, Russia.”
• Jan 17: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Memo to Trump: Cancel US Air Force’s Sentinel ICBM program.”
• Jan 13: Wall Street Journal, “The Bomb Is Back as the Risk of Nuclear War Enters a New Age.”

2024

• Aug 21: Newsweek, “China Responds to Top-Secret US Nuclear War Strategy.”
• Aug 21: Voice of America, “White House downplays Chinese concerns over possible US nuclear strategy change.”
• Aug 15: Newsweek, “Videos Show Russia’s Nuclear Bombers Buzzing NATO Borders.”
• Aug 13: MENAFN, “US Ill-Prepared For A Nuclear Showdown With China.”
• Aug 8: TruthOut, “As Tensions Rise Globally, Experts Call for More Nuclear Transparency.”
• Jun 7: Business Insider, “Russia’s claim that Ukraine could get nuclear-capable F-16s is baseless fearmongering, expert says.”
• Mar 14: The Economist, “India is souping up its nuclear missiles.”
• Mar 14: Foreign Policy, “Russia has moved tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, Western official confirm.”
• Mar 13: Fortune India, “Agni-5 MIRV tech can target warheads across China and Pakistan: US top scientist.”
• Feb 14: CNN, “US has new intelligence on Russian nuclear capabilities in space.”
• Feb 8: The Conversation, “Are American nuclear weapons returning to the United Kingdom?”
• Feb 3: BBC, “Nuclear Armageddon: How Close Are We?”
• Feb 1: Reuters, “Russia has no plans to deploy nuclear arms beyond Belarus, says deputy minister.”
• Jan 31: CSIS China Power, “Unpacking China’s Nuclear Modernization: A Conversation with Mr. Hans Kristensen.”
• Jan 29: Stars and Stripes, “Federal notices suggest US may bring its nuclear weapons back to England.”
• Jan 21: Truthout, “Are Nuclear-Armed Nations Entering a New Arms Race in 2024? Experts Weigh In.”
• Jan 19: Business Insider, “Russia’s use of North Korean missiles in Ukraine could be a ‘cash cow’ for Kim Jong Un, expert says.”
• Jan 18: Lawfare Chatter Podcast, “Nuclear Launch Authority in Myth and Reality, with Hans Kristensen.”
• Jan 9: Esquire, “Republicans Are In Hysterics Over Lloyd Austin’s Urinary Tract Infection.”
• Jan 8: The Drive, “Water-Filled Missiles, Silo Problems Behind China Purge: Report.”
• Jan 8: Vice, “GOP Lawmakers Reveal They Don’t Know How Launching Nukes Works Amid Defense Secretary Health Crisis.”

2023

• Dec 18: Vice: “Nuclear Threats Are Looming, And Nobody Knows How Many Nukes Are Out There.”
• Nov 20: Truthout, “Disarmament Grows More Distant as US Plans Another “Upgrade” to Nuclear Bomb.”
• Nov 16: NPR, “The U.S. has special rules for satellites over one country: Israel.”
• Nov 7: Newsweek, “What Minuteman Missile Launch Failure Means for US Nuclear Deterrence.”
• Nov 7: Vice, “Did Israel Finally Confirm It Has Nuclear Weapons by Threatening Gaza?”
• Oct 31: Vice, “The U.S. Is Building a New Nuclear ‘Gravity Bomb’, Pentagon Announces.”
• Oct 27: Defense News, “US to build new nuclear gravity bomb.”
• Oct 18: Wall Street Journal, “Satellite Images Show Russia Increasing Nuclear Capability in Belarus.”
• Oct 12: Russia Matters, “Strategic Posture Commission Report Calls For Broad Nuclear Buildup.” Reprint of FAS article.
• Oct 7: Japan Times, “The key nuclear secrets Trump allegedly leaked.”
• Oct 6: Al Jazeera, “Russia says it test-fired nuclear-capable Bulava missile from new submarine.”
• Oct 2: Union of Concerned Scientists, “Will There Be a Nuclear Buildup in Europe?”
• Sept 23: CNN, “Exclusive: Satellite images show increased activity at nuclear test sites in Russia, China and US.”
• Sept 8: The Daily Beast, “The ‘Real Nuclear Crisis’ Fear Behind a Single Pentagon Document.”
• Aug 30: BBC, “Anger over claims RAF Lakenheath could host US nuclear weapons.”
• Aug 29: The Guardian, “Airbase project could pave way for UK to host US nuclear weapons.”
• Aug 29: The Telegraph, “US could again hold nuclear weapons on British soil, documents suggest.”
• Jul 27: Today, Explained (Vox), “A third nuclear superpower.”
• July 22: Salon, “Atomic truth: Unraveling the reality behind “Oppenheimer” and nuclear weapons.”
• July 6: Reuters, “Lukashenko: I have veto over use of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus.”
• Jul 11: Reuters, “Wagner fighters neared Russian nuclear base during revolt.”
• Jun 12: Associated Press, “Watchdog: Nuclear states modernize their weapons, Chinese arsenal is growing.”
• Jun 12: Al Jazeera, “China, other states, fortify nuclear weapons arsenals: Report.”
• Jun 11: The Guardian, “Number of nuclear weapons held by major powers rising, says thinktank.”
• Apr 26: Associated Press, “Biden, Yoon warn N. Korea on nukes, unveil deterrence plan.”
• Apr 24: The Cipher Brief, “America Beefs Up Potential Response as Threat of Russian Nukes Loom.”
• Apr 19: New York Times, “3 Nuclear Superpowers, Rather Than 2, Usher In a New Strategic Era.”
• Apr 13: Washington Post, “The most shocking intel leak reveals new Chinese military advances.”
• Apr 13, ShareAmerica (US Department of State), “How NATO allies advance arms control and nonproliferation.”
• Apr 3: Newsweek, “The Risk of Nuclear War Fatigue.”
• Apr 3: Reuters, “Analysis: China’s intensifying nuclear-armed submarine patrols add complexity for U.S., allies.”
• Apr 3: Omaha World-Herald (kpvi.com), “StratCom chief Cotton warns of Russia, China nuke threat — but calmly.”
• Apr 3: The Guardian, “‘Damaged nuclear bomb’ at Dutch base was dummy weapon, Pentagon says.”
• Apr 3: Common Dreams, “Is This or Isn’t This a Photo of a Broken US Nuclear Weapon?”
• Apr 3: Tribune Express, “‘US nuclear bomb may have been damaged in accident’.”
• Apr 3: The Guardian, “US nuclear bomb may have been damaged in accident at Dutch base, report says.”
• Mar 30: Japan Times, “World’s usable nuclear arsenal rose in 2022, study says.”
• Mar 28: Time, “U.S. Skeptical of Putin’s Pledge to Put Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belarus.”
• Mar 28: Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Stops Sharing Data on Nuclear Forces With Russia.”
• Mar 28: Japan Times, “North Korea unveils smaller nuclear warheads that may fit on variety of missiles.”
• Mar 26: Reuters, “Putin says Moscow to place nuclear weapons in Belarus, US reacts cautiously.”
• Mar 25: Reuters, “Putin says Moscow to place nuclear weapons in Belarus, US reacts cautiously.”
• Feb 21: ABC News, “End of an era? What Putin’s ‘suspension’ of the New START nuclear treaty means.”
• Feb 21: Moscow Times, “Explainer: What Is New START and What Does Russia’s Suspension Mean?”
• Feb 21: Associated Press, “New START: last US-Russia arms control treaty in jeopardy.”
• Feb 21: Business Insider, “Putin put the last major nuclear arms treaty with the US on ‘life support,’ risking pulling the world back to a ‘dangerous’ time of uncontrolled arsenals, nuke experts say.”
• Feb 21: Slate, “Putin’s Newest Provocation.”
• Feb 21: CNN, “Putin pulls back from last remaining nuclear arms control pact with the US.”
• Feb 15: Montana Public Radio, “Why are there so many nuclear missiles in Montana?”
• Feb 7: Wall Street Journal, “China Has More ICBM Launchers Than U.S., American Military Reports.”
• Feb 7: ABC News, “Map: Here’s how close the Chinese spy balloon flew to the U.S. nuclear arsenal.”
• Feb 2: Newsweek, “Putin Issues Ominous Threats as Tension With West Mounts.”
• Jan 29: Indian Express, “India’s nuclear-policy shifts from Pakistan to Chinas.”
• Jan 28: Times of India, “India modernising nuke arsenal with eye on China, says American report.”
• Jan 20: Russia Matters, “Russia in Review, Jan. 13-20, 2023.”
• Jan 5: Vox, “The treaties that make the world safer are struggling.”
• Jan: Arms Control Today, “Pentagon: Chinese Nuclear Arsenal Exceeds 400 Warheads.”

2022

• Dec 26: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “The 2022 nuclear year in review: A global nuclear order in shambles.”
• Nov 17: New York Times, “The Surprising Afterlife of Unwanted Atom Bombs.”
• Nov 2: Washington Post, “Russian military leaders’ talk of nuclear attack rattles U.S. calculus.”
• Nov 1: Tom Nicholas, “The Nuclear Question America Never Answers,” The Atlantic, November 1, 2022.
• Oct 26: Politico, “U.S. speeds up plans to store upgraded nukes in Europe.”
• Oct 25: Voice of American News, “Experts: North Korea’s Expected Nuclear Missile Test Likely to Involve Miniature Warheads.”
• Oct 24: Wall Street Journal, “What We Know About How a Russian Nuclear Strike Could Play Out.”
• Oct 21: Forces News, “Is NATO’s nuclear strike badly timed?”
• Oct 17: NPR, “Russia’s nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin use it?”
• Oct 13: Business Insider, “Putin’s nuclear threats are stirring fears of a nightmare scenario. Here’s what’s in his arsenal and what could happen if he orders the unthinkable.”
• Oct 10: CNN, “North Korea says missile tests are practice for ‘tactical nuclear strikes’ on South Korea.”
• Oct 6: Washington Post, “Here are the nuclear weapons Russia has in its arsenal.”
• Oct 5: The Guardian, “Poland suggests hosting US nuclear weapons amid growing fears of Putin’s threats.”
• Oct 5: New York Times, “If Russia Uses a Nuclear Weapon, How Should The World Respond?”
• Oct 4: Washington Post, “Putin threatens nuclear war. The West must deter disaster.”
• Sep 22: The Washington Post, “Why Russia’s Nuclear Threats Are Difficult to Dismiss: QuickTake.”
• Sep 22: Al Jazeera, “Infographic: How many nuclear weapons does Russia have?”
• Sep 15: Exchange Monitor, “Mass production of refurbished nuclear weapons could begin soon, NNSA says.”
• Sep 10: Washington Examiner, “North Korea shreds America’s nuclear delusions.”
• Sep 4: Modern Diplomacy, “Lightning-Speed Deal. Germany to Purchase F-35 for Nuclear Sharing.”
• Aug 29: Aljazeera, “Infographic: The impact of nuclear tests around the world.”
• Aug 25: Task & Purpose, “The US military is still missing 6 nuclear weapons that were lost decades ago.”
• Jul 6, Reuters, “Russia’s Medvedev warns United States: messing with a nuclear power is folly.”
• Jun 22, CNN, “Why Kaliningrad, Russia’s toehold in Europe, could be the next flashpoint in its war against Ukraine.”
• Jun 19, CBC, “Might Vladimir Putin use a nuclear weapon? The calculations are changing.”
• Jun 15, Le Monde, “La Corée du Nord poursuit le renforcement de son arsenal balistique et nucléaire.”
• Jun 14, Washington Post, “Global nuclear arsenal expected to grow for first time since Cold War.”
• Jun 14: NK News, “North Korea has assembled 20 nuclear warheads, think tank estimates.”
• Jun 13: CNN, “World’s nuclear arsenals on the rise as concerns grow over China and North Korea.”
• Jun 13: Newsweek, “Risk of Nuclear Conflict at Highest Point Since Height of Cold War.”
• Jun 13: Al Jazeera, “Global stockpile of nuclear weapons expected to rise: SIPRI.”
• Jun 13: Deutsche Welle, “Nuclear weapons: Disarmament is a thing of the past.”
• Jun 13: France24, “World headed for new era of nuclear rearmament.”
• Jun 13: The Hill, “Nuclear arsenals expected to grow for first time since Cold War: think tank.”
• Jun 13: Der Spiegel, “Nuklearmächte modernisieren ihre Arsenale.”
• Jun 13: The Guardian, “Global nuclear arsenal expected to grow for first time in decades.”
• Jun 13: Associated Press, “‘Worrying trend’: Post-Cold War drop in nukes could be over.”
• Jun 12: Reuters, “Global nuclear arsenal to grow for first time since Cold War, think-tank says.”
• Jun 11: FP, “Learning to Think Nuclearly Again.”
• Apr 26: The Independent, “Ministry of Defence refuses to say whether US nukes are returning to British soil.”
• Apr 25: Omaha World-Herald, “Do we need ‘baby nukes’ launched from subs? StratCom chief says yes.”
• Apr 21: Background Briefing, interview with Ian Masters, “Putin’s Nuclear Saber-Rattling With the Launch of His Satan 2 ICBM.”
• Apr 21: CNN, “Putin rattles his ‘Satan II’ nuclear saber to hide Russian failures in Ukraine war: analysts.”
• Apr 18: Newsweek, “Putin’s Iskander Missiles Are Battle-Tested—and Can Carry Nuclear Warheads.”
• Apr 16: Business Insider, “US plan to upgrade its nuclear weapons facilities in the UK ‘quietly’ slipped into DoD military documents, says defense expert.”
• Apr 14: Business Insider, “Russia tries to scare Finland and Sweden away from NATO by threatening to deploy nukes in the Baltics, which it’s already done.”
• Apr 14: The Guardian, “Russia warns of nuclear weapons in Baltic if Sweden and Finland join Nato.”
• Apr 14, The Aviationist, “RAF Lakenheath Might Soon Host US Nuclear Weapons Again.”
• Apr 13, The Drive, “Nuclear Bombs May Be Headed Back To The United Kingdom.”
• Apr 11: Business Standard, “World’s stockpile of usable nuclear weapons is increasing, warns watchdog”
• Apr 7, Lyle Goldstein, Nikkei Asia, “U.S. should not lose focus on China’s nuclear buildup.”
• Apr 6, Zuri, “How the US monitors a nuclear attack.”
• Apr 5: New York Times, “How America Watches for a Nuclear Strike.”
• Mar 30: Seattle Times (KUOW), “‘This moment is kind of a glow up for nuclear weapons’ and Washington is playing a major role.”
• Mar 27: Business Insider, “US Air Force B-52 bombers in Europe are staying active, but less ‘in your face,’ as Russia wages war on Ukraine.”
• Mar 25: Washington Post, “Meet the nuke the U.S. keeps in Europe, waiting to not be used.”
• Mar 22: New York Times, “The Smaller Bombs That Could Turn Ukraine Into a Nuclear War Zone.”
• Mar 22: Scientific American, “How Many Nuclear Weapons Exist, and Who Has Them?”
• Mar 22: Reuters, “Fact Check: Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ long-range missile has been in development for years”
• Mar 20: La Presse, “Oui, on peut agir contre le nucléaire”
• Mar 17: Live Science, “How many nuclear weapons exist?”
• Mar 16: BBC, “Ukraine war: Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons?”
• Mar 11: SirusXM, interview with Michael Smerconish on US and Russian nuclear weapons and threats. His Twitter announcement here.
• Mar 11: Berlingske, “Han har dem i tusindvis. Han har truet med dem. Tør Putin også bruge dem? [He has thousands of them. He has threatened with them. Does Putin also dare use them?].”
• Mar 9: Business Insider, “‘All bets are off’: Russia has a massive arsenal of battlefield nukes, and there’s heated debate about whether a desperate Putin might use it.”
• Mar 9: Weekendavisen (Denmark), “Dommedagsmaskinen [The doomsday machine].”
• Mar 8: NPR, “Putin has threatened nuclear action. Here’s what Russia is actually capable of.”
• Mar 7: Zetland (Denmark), “Gå ikke i panik. Men lad os lige tale om de atomvåben [Don’t panic. But’s let’s just talk about those nuclear weapons].”
• Mar 4: Le Monde, “Comprendre la menace de l’arme nucléaire en 10 questions.”
• Mar 4: El Tiempo, “La amenaza nuclear se cierne sobre el mundo.”
• Mar 1: NPR, “As Russia’s Ukraine war intensifies, some warn nuclear escalation is possible.”
• Mar 1: Information (Denmark), “Putins raslen med atomsablen ligner et politisk motiveret træk, siger atomforsker [Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling looks like a political move, says nuclear analyst].”
• Feb 28: Los Angeles Times, “Russia’s nuclear threat explained.”
• Feb 28: Bloomberg TV, “Putin’s Nuclear Threat Is ‘Normal’ Russian Sabre-Rattling: Kristensen”
• Feb 28: Deutsche Welle, “How serious are Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats?”
• Feb 28: Truthout, “‘Low-Yield’ Nuclear Weapons Could Pose Greater Threat of Nuclear War.”
• Feb 28: France24, “Russia’s nuclear force, the world’s biggest.”
• Feb 27: New York Times, “Putin Declares a Nuclear Alert, and Biden Seeks De-escalation.”
• Feb 27: Al Jazeera, “Key questions after Putin’s nuclear announcement.”
• Feb 27: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Ukraine Update: Putin raises nuclear alert status.”
• Feb 27: Vox, “How to think about the risk of nuclear war, according to 3 experts.”
• Feb 27: Vice News, “Is There a Threat of Nuclear War with Russia? Experts Weigh In.”
• Feb 25: The Intercept, “Russia’s Ukraine War Heightens Urgency Around Biden’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy.”
• Feb 24: The Guardian, “Decision to invade Ukraine raises questions over Putin’s ‘sense of reality’.”
• Feb 19: Salon, “This is what would happen to Earth if a nuclear war broke out between the West and Russia.”
• Feb 17: Associated Press, “Satellite Photos Give A Bird’s-Eye View Of Ukraine Crisis.”
• Feb 16: New York Times, “On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk”
• Feb 16: The Atlantic, “China Now Understands What a Nuclear Rivalry Looks Like”
• Feb 7: Quincy Institute, “Achieving a Safer U.S. Nuclear Posture”
• Feb 2: Newsweek, “Exclusive: Ukraine Crisis Could Lead to Nuclear War Under New Strategy.”
• Jan 21: Inkstick, “400 Minutemen to Midnight.”
• Jan 16: The Wire China, “Open Source.”

2021

• Dec 31: Truthout, “One Year in, Biden’s Nuclear Policies Look a Lot Like Trump’s.”
• Dec 9: NPR/KUOW, “The secret world of nukes in Washington state.”
• Nov 17: Los Angeles Times, “China’s nuclear and military buildup raises the risk of conflict in Asia.”
• Nov 3: CBS, “China’s nuclear force growing faster than expected.”
• Nov 2: CNN, “China appears to be building missile silos that could launch nuclear weapons.”
• Nov 2: CNN, “Satellite images appear to show China is making significant progress developing missile silos that could eventually launch nuclear weapons.”
• Oct 29: Washington Post, “Sensors add to accuracy and power of U.S. nuclear weapons but may create new security perils.”
• Oct 29: The Center for Public Integrity, “The US Nuclear Arsenal Is Becoming More Destructive and Possibly More Risky.”
• Oct 27: Air Force Times, “The F-35 is one step closer to carrying nuclear bombs. What’s next?”
• Oct 24: iNews: “Fear of ‘devastating’ nuclear war as world’s major powers enter a new arms race.”
• Oct 5: The Hill, “US discloses size of nuclear stockpile for first time since 2018.”
• Oct 5: Associated Press, “State Department discloses number of nukes in US stockpile.”
• Sep 7: Michael Krepon, “Time to shift from the Kabul-blues to the China arms control challenge,” armscontrolwonk.com.
• Aug 27: Nature, “US achieves laser-fusion record: what it means for nuclear-weapons research.”
• Aug 26: Foreign Policy, “How Finding China’s Nuclear Sites Upset Pro-Beijing Trolls.”
• Aug 20: Malcolm Davis, “China military watch,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
• Aug 12: Financial Times (editorial), “China’s worrying build-up of missile silos.”
• Aug 7, The Economist, “Open-source intelligence challenges state monopolies on information”
• Aug 7: Financial Times, “China flexes nuclear muscle to burnish its big power credentials”
• Aug 3: Washington Post, “Commercial satellites — not U.S. intelligence — revealed China’s missile program”
• Jul 31: The Economist, “China is rapidly building new nuclear-missile silos”
• Jul 30: Omaha World-Herald, “Should StratCom worry about China’s ‘Bouncy Castles of Death’?”
• Jul 30: Washington Post, “More missile silos have been found in China. That’s an ominous sign.”
• Jul 30: Associated Press, “U.S. warns China is building more nuclear missile silos”
• Jul 29: New York Times, “The Daily: Why Is China Expanding Its Nuclear Arsenal?”
• Jul 28: BBC, “China expanding its nuclear capabilities, scientists say”
• Jul 28: CNN, “China appears to be expanding its nuclear capabilities, US researchers say in new report”
• Jul 28: Al Jazeera, “China is building a 2nd base for nuclear missiles, say analysts”
• Jul 28: Hindustan Times, “China building second nuclear missile silo field, claims report; US concerned”
• Jul 27: Yahoo News, “Disturbing find uncovered in Chinese desert”
• Jul 27: The Telegraph, “New China weapons silo base is ‘most significant expansion ever’ of Xi’s nuclear arsenal”
• Jul 27: Insider, “Scientists discover a massive field of nuclear silos in China, signaling a significant nuclear expansion in the country”
• Jul 27: The Independent, “Huge desert plot in China to ‘hold up to 110 nuclear silos’”
• Jul 27: Newsweek, “China Spotted Building 110 Secret Nuclear Missile Silos in Desert”
• Jul 27: Wall Street Journal, “China Appears to Be Building New Silos for Nuclear Missiles, Researchers Say.”
• Jul 26: New York Times, “A 2nd New Nuclear Missile Base for China, and Many Questions About Strategy.”
• Jun 29: Business Insider, “Democrats take aim at the US’s new $264 billion ICBM amid search for cash to boost the military”
• May 28: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “The UK’s new nuclear posture: What it means for the global nuclear order.” Video discussion with Heather Williams and Julian Borger. Background: UK Nuclear Notebook 2021.
• May 28: Bellingcat, “US Soldiers Expose Nuclear Weapons Secrets Via Flashcard Apps.“
• Apr 30: The Drive, “Trucks Get Parked Over Air Force Nuclear Missile Silos During Tests… Just In Case.”
• Apr 6: Steven Pifer, “Nuclear arms control in the 2020s: Key issues for the US and Russia,” Valdai Discussion Club, April 6, 2021.
• Apr 4: The Guardian (Observer editorial), “The Observer view on Boris Johnson’s plans to increase nuclear weapons.”
• Apr 2: The National Interest, “Does America Need New ICBMs (Or Any at All)?”
• Mar 30: Press The Button Podcast, “The Inherent Danger of ICBMs”
• Mar 22: Der Spiegel, “Darum bauen die USA neue Atomwaffen”
• Mar 17: Democracy Now!, “U.K. Lifts Cap on Nuclear Arsenal as U.S. Considers Plan for $100 Billion “Cold War-Era” Missile”
• Mar 14: Omaha World-Herald, “Russia, China could pose nuclear threat if arsenal isn’t rebuilt, StratCom chief says”
• Mar 10: The Daily Beast, “Scientists Are Worried About U.S. Plan to Build an ‘Outdated’ $100B Nuclear Weapon: Report”
• Mar 10: Common Dreams, “New Report to Expose War Industry Lobby Behind $264 Billion US Nuclear Missile ‘Boondoggle’”
• Mar 10: The Guardian, “‘Cold war-era weapon’: $100bn US plan to to build new nuclear missile sparks concern”
• Mar 4: POGO, “Joe Biden’s Nuclear Triad.”
• Mar 1: Associated Press YouTube, “Expert uncovers new Chinese nuclear missile sites.”
• Mar 1: Associated Press, “China said to speed up move to more survivable nuclear force.” This report was also carried on Military Times and ABC News.
• Feb 18: Business Insider, “A NATO war game had the Soviet Union readying for nuclear war in a terrifying Cold War close call, new documents show.”
• Feb 12: The Guardian, “Mike Pence’s ‘nuclear football’ was potentially at risk during Capitol riot.”
• Feb 11: Forbes.com, “Target: Iceland! Russian Bombers Practice Striking Key NATO Base.”
• Feb 8: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Why is America getting a new $100 billion nuclear weapon?”
  Feb 5: The Drive, “Majority Of Voters Don’t Want Billions Spent On New ICBMs To Overhaul America’s ‘Nuclear Sponge’”
• Feb 5: Defense News, “Majority of voters support ICBM replacement alternatives, new poll finds.”
• Jan 23: Pindex (YouTube video), “A $1.2 Trillion Plan Could Kill 98%, w Stephen fry. It’s Hidden By Coronavirus.”
• Jan 21: The Drive, “The Air Force’s New Report On Ballistic And Cruise Missiles Misses Its Target.”
• Jan 21: Forbes, “Joe Biden Could Rescue The Last Nuclear Treaty—But Don’t Expect Him To Negotiate A New One.”

2020

• Dec 29: The Drive, “Imagine Following This On The Highway: A Truckload Of Nuclear Training Bombs.”
• Dec 16: SCMP, “Is China really ready to back nuclear arms-free Southeast Asia.”
• Dec 15: Business Insider, “Here’s what happens to the ‘nuclear football’ if Trump decides to skip Biden’s inauguration.”
• Dec 14: Defense News, “Report estimates Chinese nuclear stockpile at 350 warheads.”
• Dec 11: Shepard Media, “Interview: Federation of American Scientists [on B61-12 drop test from F-35A jet].”
• Dec 10: Forbes, “The Steward of America’s Nukes Is Sending Mixed Messages About B-1 Bombers – And That’s Dangerous.”
• Nov 27: The State, “Is job-right nuclear plant in jeopardy? Biden expected to re-examine SC factory.”
• Nov 23: Kitsap Sun, “Biden signals push to extend New START nuclear arms treaty.”
• Nov 17: Star Tribune (Associated Press), “Pentagon says it shot down unarmed missile in sea-based test.”
• Nov 2: Kitsap Sun, “Will U.S., Russia extend New START nuclear weapons treaty?”
• Oct 12: Washington Post, “Threat from nuclear weapons and missiles has grown since Trump entered office.”
• Oct 11: New York Times, “Trump’s Virus Treatment Revives Questions About Unchecked Nuclear Authority.”
• Oct 11: Defense One, “North Korea Unveils ‘Very Destabilizing’ ICBM.”
• Oct 9: Business Insider, “Trump says the US nuclear arsenal is now ‘tippy top’ thanks to him, but nuke experts say he’s out of touch with reality.”
• Oct 2: Pranay Vaddi and James Acton, A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 22, 2020.
• Sep 28: Politico, “Trump administration orders assessment on bolstering nuclear warheads as talks with Russia stall.”
• Sep 10: France 24 (AFP), “Did Trump disclose secret US nuclear weapon in interview?”
• Sept 2: Fox News, “World’s nuclear capabilities are decreasing in overall numbers but growing deadlier.”
• Sept 2: Air Force Magazine, “Soofer: No New ‘Tactical’ Nukes for USAF.”
• Sept 1: CNN (AP), “Pentagon says China planning big increase in nuclear arsenal.”
• Sept 1: Reuters, “Pentagon concerned by China’s nuclear ambitions, expects warheads to double.”
• Sept 1: Wall Street Journal, “Pentagon Says China Could Double Nuclear Weapons in Decade.”
• Aug 19: Toby Dalton and Tong Zhao, “At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 19, 2020.
• Aug 6: CBC News, “75 years after Hiroshima bombing, it’s falling to descendants to keep survivors’ stories alive.”
• Aug 6: Axios. “How the world’s nuclear stockpiles have shifted since Hiroshima.”
• Aug 6: Cambridge News,  Little warning for Londoners if city came under nuclear attack.”
• Aug 6: The Drive, “This Was The Largest Conventional Explosion The United States Ever Set Off.”
• Aug 5: Washington Post, “In the 75 years since Hiroshima, nuclear testing killed untold thousands.”
• Aug 5: EurAsian Times, “China Readying Its Early Warning Radars To Check Deep-Strikes By Agni Missiles, Rafale Jets – Reports.”
• Aug 5: Business Insider, “The deadly explosion that devastated Beirut appears to have been far more powerful than the ‘Mother of All Bombs’.”
• Aug 4: Task and Purpose, “No, that mushroom cloud in Beirut doesn’t indicate a nuclear bomb went off.”
• Jul 29: Roll Call, “Trump team’s case for new nuke cites risks in current arsenal.”
• Jul 22: WION, “India’s nuclear strategy focus shifts from Pakistan to China: Report.”
• Jul: Carol Giacomo, “Getting Back On Track To Zero Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2020.
• Jun 22: Las Vegas Sun (Editorial), “President’s nuclear fantasy threatens Nevadans’ health, national security.”
• May 31: Business Insider, “India has lots of nuclear weapons: Here is what we know.”
• May 23: The Guardian, “US security officials ‘considered return to nuclear testing’ after 28-year hiatus.”
• May 4: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2020.
• Apr 23: Politico, “How the nuclear force dodged the coronavirus.”
• Apr 14: John Krzyzaniak, “How nuclear forces worldwide are dealing with the coronavirus pandemic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April14, 2020.
• Apr 10: Raw Story (AFP), “Hit by virus, Pentagon warns enemies: don’t test us.”
• Apr: James Acton, “Is It A Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity And Inadvertent Launch,” CEIP, April 2020.
• Mar 26: Deutsche Welle, “US set to upgrade controversial nukes stationed in Germany.”
• Mar 23: Newsweek, “The U.S. Military’s Behind-The-Scenes Moves To Protect Nuclear Readiness Amid Coronavirus.”
• Mar 17: National Defense Magazine, “Political Battle Brewing Over New Nuclear Program.”
• Feb 27: Defense One, “A New Nuclear Warhead? STRATCOM Chief Can’t Answer Yes Or No.”
• Feb 22: The Guardian, “Pentagon reveals deal with Britain to replace Trident.”
• Feb 12: Daily Beast, “Why Does Trump Want To Spend Billions On New Nukes.”
• Feb 12: Slate, “Trump’s Gargantuan Military Budget Is Full Of It.”
• Feb 7: Naval News, “W76-2 low yield warhead deployed on US Navy SSBN submarines.”
• Feb 6: National Interest, “Donald Trump is about to make one big giant ‘nuclear’ mistake.”
• Feb 5: The Hill, “Air Force test-launches intercontinental ballistic missile.”
• Feb 4: USNI News, “Pentagon confirms low-yield nuclear warhead on ballistic missile sub.”
• Feb 4: New York Times (AP), “U.S. adds ‘low-yield’ nuclear warhead to its submarine arsenal.”
• Feb 4: Defense News, “Trump’s new nuclear weapon has been deployed.”
• Jan 30: Politico, “It’s a MAD, MAD world.”
• Jan 30: Naval Technology, “US Navy deploys low-yield Trident W76-2 nuclear submarine warhead.”
• Jan 30: Air Force Magazine Daily Report, “US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead.”
• Jan 29: NPR, “U.S. has deployed new, small nukes on submarines, according to group.”
• Jan 29: The Drive, “Navy missile sub has begun its patrol armed with controversial low yield nukes.”
• Jan 29: The Guardian, “Deployment of new US nuclear warhead on submarine s dangerous step, critics say.”
• Jan/Feb: Tong Zhao, “Opportunities for nuclear arms control engagement with China,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2020.
• Jan 13: The Drive, “The Air Force’s B-52H Bomber Force Has Said Goodbye To Its Nuclear Bombs.”
• Jan 13: Newsweek, “With A New Weapons In Donald Trump’s Hands, The Iran Crisis Risks Going Nuclear.”
• Jan 7: Kitsap Sun, “Bangor subs to get new kind of nuclear weapon.”
• Jan 6: CNN, “Iran drives another stake into the heart of the nuclear deal.”

2019

• Dec 20: Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Invites China for Talks on Nuclear Arms.”
• Dec 17: Reuters, “U.S. Congress pressures Trump to renew Russia arms control pact.”
• Dec 16: Gerald Brown, “Conflict and Competition: Limited Nuclear Warfare and the New Face of Deterrence,” Global Security Review, December 16, 2019.
• Dec 15: Radio Free Europe, “Can Russia And The U.S. Agree To Keep A Lid On Their Nuclear Arsenals?”
• Nov 22: KOMO News, “‘Horrific catastrophe’: What would happen to Seattle in a nuclear attack?”
• Oct 22: CNS News, “Senate Bill Seeks Alternatives to US Base in Turkey, Where Nuclear Bombs Are Housed.”
• Oct 19: Associated Press, “Some worries about nuclear weapons at Turkey base.”
• Oct 18: Newsweek, “U.S., Russia and Europe hold back-to-back nuclear war games across the globe.”
• Oct 16: CNN, “Trump appears to confirm open secret about US nuclear weapons in Turkey.”
• Oct 8: Business Insider Australia, “US officials are considering pulling nuclear weapons from Turkey, effectively severing the US-Turkey alliance.”
• Oct 5: Science Daily, “Global Climate Catastrophe If Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan.”
• Sep 13: Business Insider, “Trump keeps threatening US enemies with destructive power great  than nuclear weapons – experts say that’s ‘crazy talk’.”
• Aug 12: National Interest, “Russia has a nuclear-powered cruise missile. Yes, you read that right.”
• Aug 11: The Express (UK), “Russia radiation spike ‘caused by test of Putin’s new missile dubbed Flying Chernobyl’.”
• Aug 6: The Canary, “Former US colonel blasts end of nuclear treaty as ‘extremely dangerous’.”
• Aug 5: ARD (Das Erste), “Die Story: Das Atomwaffen-Kartell: Ende der Abrüstung? [The Story: The Nuclear Weapons Cartel: The End of Disarmament?].”
• Jul 21: ABC ‘s Future Tense, “Western Spies Face a Difficult Future: A Conversation with Matt Korda.”
• Jul 15: KPFA Flashpoints, “Matt Korda on US Nuclear Policy.”
• Jul 10: Popular Science, “North Korea’s missile program and nuclear weapons: What we know (and don’t).”
• Jul 10: The National Interest, “Super Weapon? The Air Force Wants a (New) Nuclear Armed Cruise Missile.”
  Jul 8: KTOO News (Alaska), “40 years after closure, volunteers restore historic Cold War site.”
• Jul 2: CSIS ChinaPower, “China’s Nuclear Strategy and Capabilities: A Conversation with Hans Kristensen.”
• Jun 17: Euro News, “World’s nuclear arsenal down but risk of nuclear conflict up: SIPRI.”
• Jun 17: Defense News, “Here’s how many nuclear warheads exist, and which countries own them.”
• Jun 14: TASS, “No unanimity among US intelligence community over claims of nuclear test in Russia —expert.”
• Jun 12: The National Interest, “Could a Low-Yield, Submarine-Launch Nuclear Missile Stop a Russian First Strike?”
• Jun 11: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Decision to keep nuclear weapons data classified hurts US national security.”
• Jun 6: Slate, “How Trump Could Restart the Nuclear Arms Race,”
• Jun 3: Honolulu Civil Beat, “Kauai Plays A Growing Role Testing Technology For Tomorrow’s Nuclear Weapons.”
• Jun: Arms Control Today, “U.S. Reverses Nuclear Stockpile Transparency.”
• May 20: Daily Beast, “Pass the Codes: Inside the Secret Dinners Where Congress Figures Out How to Stop a Nuclear Apocalypse.”
• May 20: Center for Public Integrity, “Survey: Most Americans Want to Curb the President’s Power to Launch Nuclear Attacks.”
• May 10: The Aviationist, “Tracking The U.S. B-52 Bombers Deploying To Qatar In Response To Iranian Threat In The Persian Gulf.”
• May 10: Defense One, The D Brief, “Shanahan, tapped; ICBMs, test-fired; Network breaches, way up; school lockdowns, soaring; And a bit more.”
• May 9: Foreign Policy, “The U.S. Can’t Escape the Middle East.”
• May 7: PRI, “Nukes? What nukes? US military’s ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy complicates activists’ trial.”
• May 4: The Telegraph, “US reversal of nuclear transparency policy puts UK in ‘awkward position’ say experts.”
• May 2: Reuters, “Special Report: China’s furtive underwater nukes test the Pentagon.”
• May: Vince Manzo, Center for Naval Analysis, “Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options After NEW START.”
• Apr 29: Lawrence Korb,”What the FY 2020 Defense Budget Gets Wrong.”
• Apr 25: National Interest, “U.S. Air Force B-52 Bombers Practiced a Nuclear Strike on Russia Last Month.”
• Apr 17: Milbank Monitor, “Small enough to use? ‘Low yield’ US nukes begin rolling off the production line.”
• Apr 15: Russia Matters, “Russia Analytical Report, April 8-15, 2019.”
• Apr 10: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Why did Defense end its contract with the legendary Jason group?”
• Apr 4: Exchange Monitor, “B83 Bomb Can Go 5-7 More Years Without Major Refurb, NNSA Says.”
• Mar 21: The Nation, “Making Nuclear Weapons Menacing Again.”
• Mar 21: Popular Mechanics, “U.S. Bombers Are Flying Over Europe, Baiting the Russian Bean.”
• Feb 26: Defense One, “Top Nuke General: Russia Is Exploiting Gaps In Key Arms-Control Treaty.”
• Feb 2: CBC, “‘Into the Wild West:’ Demise of Cold War-era nuclear arms treaty undermines global security.”
• Feb 1: NPR, “The U.S. And Russia Are Stocking Up On Missiles And Nukes For A Different Kind Of War.”
• Feb: Russia Matters, “Military and Security: New START.”
• Jan 31: Bloomberg, “With Putin and Trump in Charge, the Risk of Nuclear War Returns.”
• Jan 28: The National Interest, “China’s Missiles are a Dumb Reason for America to Quit the INF Treaty.”
• Jan 28: NPR, “Trump Administration Begins Production Of A New Nuclear Weapon.”
• Jan 28: The Guardian, “US nuclear weapons: first low-yield warheads roll off the production line.”
• Jan 25: Business Insider, “We ranked the world’s nuclear arsenals — here’s why China’s came out on top.”
• Jan 25: Warrior Maven, “Navy Stealthy Columbia Subs Launch First Patrol in 2031-With New Missile Variant.”
• Jan 24: Omaha World Herald, “Russia, China have hypersonic missile tech that U.S. can’t defend against, StratCom chief warns.”
• Jan 14: Business Insider, “Russian media threatens Europe with 200-megaton nuclear ‘doomsday’ device.”
• Jan: Atomic Reporters, “2019 Hawaii Journalism Workshop: Resource Library.”

2018

• Dec 13, The National Interest, “India has 140 Nuclear Warheads – And More Are Coming.”
• Dec 11: Quartz, “Every significant military facility in Israel and Turkey was just exposed by a Russian mapping service.”
• Dec 10: Popular Mechanics, “Oops! Mapping Service Blurs Out Military Bases, But Accidentally Locates Secret Ones.”
• Dec 7: Wall Street Journal, “Looming Demise of a nuclear treaty threatens to upend others [headline later changed to: As One Arms Treaty Falls Apart, Others Look Shakier].”
• Dec 5: Think Big, “Russia threatens ‘retaliation’ after U.S. declares plan to withdraw from arms treaty.”
• Dec 5: CNBC, “America and Russia, the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, are threatening to make more weapons. Here’s how many nukes each nation has.”
• Dec 2: Oak Ridge Today, “NNSA modernizing weapons as U.S. nuclear stockpile shrinks.”
• Nov 21: Daily Beast, “Trump, Who Loves Nukes and Hates Treaties, Is Putting Us on the Road to the Apocalypse.”
• Nov 20: Business Insider, “These are the 9 nuclear-armed countries and the 31 allies they’ve vowed to defend with the world’s most devastating weapons.”
• Nov 9: Insider, “Finland and Norway are telling airline pilots to be ready to fly without GPS and some think Russia is up to something.”
• Nov 1: The Diplomat, “India Conducts Nighttime User Trial of Agni-I Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile.”
• Oct 23: Time, “Has Trump Met the Burden of Proof for Ripping Up an Arms Deal With Russia?”
• Oct 22: KIRO-7 News, “Trump’s threat to withdraw from nuclear missile treaty alarms activists.”
• Oct 21: NPR, “President Trump Says U.S. Will Leave Arms Control Treaty With Russia.”
• Oct 19: New York Times, “U.S. to Tell Russia It Is Leaving Landmark I.N.F. Treaty.”
• Oct 19: VOX, “This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you.”
• Oct 18: Task and Purpose, “Satellite Photos Reveal A Strategic Russian Military Upgrade On NATO’s Doorstep.”
• Oct 17: CNN, “New satellite images suggest military buildup in Russia’s strategic Baltic enclave.”
• Oct 12: CNBC, “Russia hits a snag in developing a hypersonic weapon – after Putin said it was already in production.”
• Oct 5: TASS, “INF treaty compliance issues should be solved at presidential level — US expert.”
• Oct 3: Kelsey Davenport and Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Inaugural Issue: The North Korea Denuclearization Digest,” Arms Control Association, October 3, 2018. This piece was also republished by IndepthNews.net.
• Oct 2: The Guardian, “US Nato envoy’s threat to Russia: stop developing missile or we’ll ‘take it out’.”
• Sep: Tytti Erästö and Dr Tarja Cronberg, “Opposing trends: The renewed salience of nuclear weapons and nuclear abolitionism,” SIPRI, September 2018.
• Sep 14: Business Insider, “Russia reportedly warned Mattis it could use nuclear weapons in Europe, and it made him see Moscow as an ‘existential threat’ to the US.”
• Sep 6: The Free Beacon, “U.S. Lacks Nuclear Weapon for Hardened Underground Targets.” The claim in the article’s headline is incorrect.
• Sep 5: The Economic Times (India), “Pakistan could emerge as world’s 5th largest nuclear weapons state: Report.”
• Aug 23: Warrior Maven, “New Air Force B-2 “Earth Penetrating” Nuclear Weapon Changes Combat Strategy.” This article as also published in the National Interest.
• Aug 21, The Verge, “How do you find a nuclear-powered missile that’s lost at sea?”
• Aug 21: CNBC, “Russia is preparing to search for a nuclear-powered missile that was lost at sea months ago after a failed test.”
• Aug 10: Adam Ni and Bates Gill, “China’s New Missile Force: New Ambitions, New Challenges (Part 1).” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, August 10, 2018.
• Aug 6: mysanantonio.com (Business Insider), “About 14,525 nuclear weapons exist today in the arsenals of these 9 nations.”
• Aug 3: Task and Purpose, “No, A Huge Meteor Did Not Threaten A US Base With Destruction.”
• Aug 3: The Aviationist, “Report: Meteor Made 2.1 Kiloton Explosion Over Air Force Space Command Base Thule, Greenland.” This article was reprinted in the Business Insider.
• Aug 3: Metro (London), “An asteroid exploded near a US early warning radar base and we’re lucky it didn’t spark nuclear Armageddon.”
• Jul 31: Times of India (Shanakya Code blog), “Growing Chinese Nuclear Arsenal: Is China changing its doctrine?”
• Jul 27: The National Interest, “FACT CHECK: Do Russia and the U.S. Really Control 90 Percent Of The World’s Nukes?”
• Jul 24: CNBC, “There are 14,500 nuclear weapons in the world: Here are the countries that have them.”
• Jul 23: checkyourfact.org, “FACT CHECK: DO RUSSIA AND THE US CONTROL 90 PERCENT OF THE WORLD’S NUKES?” Republished in The National Interest.
• Jul 23: Business Insider, “Russia just showed off a potentially world-ending nuclear ‘doomsday’ torpedo that the US can’t stop.”
• Jul 19: Newsweek, “RUSSIA TESTS NEW ‘INVINCIBLE’ MISSILES AS PUTIN WARNS NUCLEAR TREATY WITH U.S. WILL EXPIRE.”
• Jun 19: Defense News, “Which nations increased the size of their nuclear arsenal in 2017?”
• Jun 19: 9NEWS (Australia), “Is Russia upgrading nuclear bunker?”
• Jun 18: Moscow Times, “Report: World Cup City Renovates Nuclear Weapons Bunker.”
• Jun 18: Daily Mail, “Putin upgrades nuclear weapon bunkers: Satellite images show work at storage sites as Russia escalates its stand-off with NATO.”
• Jun 18: Radio Free Europe, ” Report: Russia Rebuilding Key Weapons Storage Bunker In Kaliningrad.”
• Jun 18: South China Morning Post, “China adds to nuclear arsenal amid military modernisation drive.”
• Jun 18: Independent, “Satellite images appear to show Russia upgrading nuclear weapons bunker at Kaliningrad.”
• Jun 18: Stars and Stripes, “Russian bunkers near Poland could be storing nuclear weapons, report says.”
• Jun 18: CNN, “Russia may have upgraded nuclear bunker in Kaliningrad, report says.”
• Jun 18: The Guardian, “Kaliningrad photos appear to show Russia upgrading nuclear weapons bunker.”
• Jun 13: ABC News (Australia), “Chart of the day: Eight countries have more nuclear weapons than North Korea.”
• Jun 12: Newsweek, “WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?”
• Jun 8: Wall Street Journal, “Step One in Disarming North Korea: Knowing What’s in Kim’s Arsenal.”
• Jun 7: Williston Observer, “Will nukes accompany F-35s to Vermont?”
• Jun 4: Warrior Maven, “Pentagon Completes Draft Plans for New Low-Yield Sea-Launched Nuclear Weapon.” This article was also reprinted by Fox News.
• Jun 1: Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana, “On the 20th anniversary of the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1, 2018.
• May 26: WND, “‘Mysterious’ Cutback By Nuclear Sub Patrols.”
• May 23: Warrior Maven, “Air Force F-35 Integrates Precision-Guided B61 Mod 12 Nuclear Weapon.” This article was also reprinted by Fox News.
• May 23: Business Insider, “Russia displays massive nuclear force with a sub launching 4 missiles with the power of 160 Hiroshimas.”
• May 12: Radio Canada, “Fin de l’accord sur le nucléaire entre les États-Unis et l’Iran : et maintenant? [End of the nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran: what now?]”
• May 9: BBC, “What are nuclear weapons?”
• May 7: Asia Times, “What China wants from North Korea.”
• May: Abhijnan Raj, “Pakistan’s Sea-Base Nuclear Deterrent and its Asymmetric Escalation Strategy,” Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief No. 240, May 2018.
• Apr 26: Rick Wayman, “U.S. Charm Offensive Takes Center Stage in Geneva,” IDN-InDepthNews, April 26, 2018.
• Apr 21: Hays Daily News, “North Korea to suspend nuclear and missile tests.”
• Apr 18: Jack Thompson, “Superpower Constrained,” Strategic Trends 2018, Center for Security Studies, April 18, 2018.
• Apr 17: Eugene Rumer, “A Farewell to Arms…Control,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 17, 2018.
• Apr 6: American Military News, “China launches carrier in response to US Navy’s strike group in South China Sea.”
• Apr 2: Steve Fetter, et al., “Nuclear weapons dangers and policy options,” Physics Today, Vol. 71, No. 4, April 2, 2018.
• Mar 30: NPR, “Passport Services Will Be Missed When Russian Consulate In Seattle Closes.”
• Mar 27: Business Insider, “Beijing just flexed its navy in the South China Sea, but in a ridiculous way that the US could quickly smoke.”
• Mar 27: Defense News, “US nuclear stockpile decreasing in size, but not capability.”
• Mar 26: KUOW (Seattle), “If this Seattle building is a nest of Russian spies, why didn’t the U.S. close it sooner?”
• Mar 6: Amy Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 6, 2018.
• Mar 2: Motherboard, “Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Is ‘Batshit Crazy’.”
• Mar 2: Boston Herald, “Vladimir Putin boasts of new nuclear weapons.”
• Mar 2: New York Times, “Putin Flaunted Five Powerful Nuclear Weapons. Are They a Threat?”
• Mar 1: MSN News Observer, “The Kremlin Is Crowdsourcing Names for Putin’s New Nuclear Warheads.”
• Mar 1: Wall Street Journal, “Putin Unveils Nuclear Weapons He Claims Could Breach US Defenses.”
• Feb 26: John Mecklin, “Daniel Ellsberg on dismantling the doomsday machine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 26, 2018.
• Feb 21: Voice of America, Plugged in with Greta Van Susteren on Nuclear Posture Review.
• Feb 20: Asia Times, “Is China Really Threatening American with Nuclear Weapons?”
• Feb 17: World Net News, “U.S., Russia Both Meeting Treaty Goals.”
• Feb 12: Washington Post, “A Pentagon chart misleadingly suggests the U.S. is falling behind in a nuclear arms race.” Includes FAS’ corrected modernizations chart from the Trump Nuclear Posture Review.
• Feb 2: The Sun, “Bad Korea Move: Dona’d Trump’s nuclear report on North Korea is published with one very embarrassing error..so can YOU spot it?”
• Feb 1: Time Magazine, “Donald Trump Is Playing a Dangerous Game of Nuclear Poker.”
• Jan 26: The Nation (AFP), “New tactical nukes in US arsenal raise risks.”
• Jan 18: CNN, “India test-fired Agni-V, a nuclear-capable ICBM.”
• Jan 17: BuzzFeed, “Nuclear Anxiety Is Becoming A Hallmark of the Trump Era. Here’s What Could Happen In The Worst-Case Scenario.”
• Jan 16: Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Plans New Nuclear Weapons.” Uses FAS nuclear data in chart.
• Jan 16: Walter Pincus, The Cipher Brief, “North Korea ‘Bloody Nose’ Could Turn into Torrent.”
• Jan 14: Fox News (Associated Press), “Administration plan sees deterrence in new nuclear firepower.”
• Jan 12: Business Insider, “A leaked Pentagon document shows that the Trump administration wants to expand the US nuclear arsenal.”
• Jan 9: Daily Mail, “Trump administration will ‘increase risk of nuclear war’ with new plans to develop smaller warheads that are less destructive and a loosening of ‘first-use’ constraints, experts warn.”
• Jan 9: The Guardian, “US to loosen nuclear weapons constraints and develop more ‘useable’ warheads.”
• Jan 5: The Diplomat, “Dr. Strangelove and the Insane Reality of Nuclear Command-and-Control.”
• Jan 3: 9News, “Verify: Sure, the U.S. has a bigger ‘nuclear button.”

2017

• Dec 18: The Guardian, “US could broaden its use of nuclear weapons, Trump administration signals.”
• Nov 14: Boston Globe, “Senators scrutinize Trump’s power to launch nuclear strike.”
• Nov 14: World News Daily, “Scientists Caution Against Staging Nukes in South Korea.”
• Nov 14: Riccardo Antonucci, L’intellettuale Dissidente (Italy), “L’Anti-Impero: uno sguardo sull’armata Russa [The Anti-Empire: a look at the Russian army].”
• Nov 13: TV2000 (Italy), “Nucleare, il mondo a rischio [Nuclear, the world at risk].” Program uses FAS nuclear weapons data (begins at 13:14) and has interview with Kristensen (begins at 17:06). Interview was done in Castiglioncello in September after briefing to Pugwash-USPID conference on international security in the Trump era.
• Nov 11: Casper Star Tribune, “The Air Force may pump $5b into Cheyenne for a new generation of nuclear weapons.”
• Nov 3: CNN, “N. Korea accuses U.S. of ‘nuclear strike drill’ after bomber flights.”
• Oct 31: Milliyet.com.tr, “ABD’nin Türkiye’de 50 nükleer silahı var [US has 50 nuclear weapons in Turkey’.”
• Oct 30, Los Angeles Times, “Can Trump be trusted with the nuclear launch codes? Can any president?”
• Oct 26: New York Times, “Trump’s Nuclear Arsenal.”
• Oct 7: La Tercera (Argentina), “Director del Proyecto de Información Nuclear de la FAS: “Es poco probable que el Nobel de la Paz afecte a las políticas de Trump” [Director of the FAS Nuclear Information Project: “It is unlikely that the Nobel Peace Prize will affect Trump’s policies”].”
• Oct 6: geo.tv news (AFP), “Who are the members of the nuclear club?”
• Oct 5: National Interest, “Everything You Need to Know: Russia’s ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons.”
• Sep: Todd Harrison and Evan Linck, “Options for the Ground-Based Leg of the Nuclear Triad,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2017.
• Sep 29: iProfesional (Portugal), “¿Cuál es el país con mayor número de armas nucleares? [What is the country with the highest number of nuclear weapons?]”
• Sep 26: NBC News, “How Many Nuclear Weapons Exist? U.S. Calls for Total Elimination of Nukes.”
• Sep 25: CNN, “Where are the world’s nuclear weapons?”
• Sep 25: Times of India, “Pak nukes hidden at nine places, at risk of being stolen by terrorists.” The headline builds on our article on Pakistan’s evolving nuclear weapons infrastructure, but exaggerates and misrepresents what our article says.
• Sep 23: “Allerta Nucleare: Cosa Sono Le Nuovo Bombe USA B61-12 Destinate All’Italia. Intervista A Hans Kristensen,” interview with Franco Dinelli about the upcoming deployment of the B61-12 guided nuclear bomb in Italy, posted on Pandorata.it.
• Sep 16: The national Interest (The Buzz), “Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines: The U.S. Military’s Ultimate Weapon?”
• Sep 4: Xiahua, “Interview: Three trends observed as U.S. updates its nuclear arsenal: Expert.”
• Aug 24: PBS News Hour, “Can the president launch a nuclear strike on his own?” End of video shows FAS estimate of US nuclear warhead inventory, unfortunately without giving credits.
• Aug 21: The Edge Markets (Reuters), “What will Kim do next?”
• Aug 19: La Tercera (Chile), “Hans M. Kristensen, experto en armas nucleares: ‘Asia del Sur es una de las áreas más peligrosas’ [Hans M. Kristensen: nuclear weapons expert: “South Asia is one of the most dangerous area].“
• Aug 17: Newburgh Gazette, “Open to dialogue if North Korea ready to disarm.”
• Aug 12: 9News (NBC Denver), “Meet the researcher counting the world’s nukes.” 
• Aug 12: Montichiari Week (Italy), “Bombe atomiche a Ghedi: i segreti degli Usa [Atomic bombs in Ghedi: the secrets of the US].”
• Aug 11: info.51.ca (Canada), “美國與朝鮮若開打 恐釀二戰以來最慘重傷亡 [The United States and the DPRK if the fight between World War II after the worst casualties].”
• Aug 10: FactSheck.org, “Trump Misfires On Nuclear Weapons Boast.”
• Aug 10: CTV Your Morning (Canada), “How to Defuse North Korea Tensions.”
• Aug 10: Fiscal Times, “Here’s the Real State of the $1 Trillion U.S. Nuclear Upgrade.”
• Aug 9: Time, “Here’s how many nuclear weapons the U.S. has.”
• Aug 9: Liberation (France), “Corée du Nord : les Etats-Unis se divisent.”
• Aug 8: Washington Post, “North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say.” Includes graphic based on FAS nuclear weapons estimates.
• Aug 8: volksfreund.de, ” [Relics of the Cold War].”
• Aug 8: The Straits Times, (Singapore), “China ‘back in favor’ with Trump.”
• Aug 7: Saarbruecker Zeitung (Germany), “Wie sicher lagern die Atombomben? [How safe are the nuclear weapons?].”
• Jul 24: Toby Dalton, Dawn Herald, “How not to talk about nuclear weapons.”
• Jul 21: The Fiscal Times, “The Terrifying Nuclear War Game the US Shouldn’t Play.” The publication is a reprint under a new headline of my article The Flawed Push For New Nuclear Weapons Capabilities from June 29.
• Jul 17: ETH Zurich: “Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2017.”
• Jul 13: Hindustan Times, “India shifting nuclear focus from Pakistan, developing missiles that can hit all of China: US experts.”
• Jul 13: NDTV, “India Planning Missile To Target All of China From South Bases: US Report.”
• Jul 4: War Is Boring, “‘Super-Fuzed’ Warhead on U.S. Nuclear Subs Risk Sparking and Accidental Nuclear War.” This story is a re-run of an article that War is Boring first published on March 20, 2017.
• Jul 3: Euronews, “NATO fears could push Europe towards more nuclear weapons.”
• Jul 3: Deuche Welle, “SIPRI: Nuclear arms decline amid modernization efforts.”
• Jun 30: Russia Matters, “Review of NASIC Report 2017: Nuclear Force Developments.” This publication is a reprint of my article first published here.
• Jun 25: pressenza.com (NIRS), “At US Press Briefing, Experts Explain Why A Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Is In The Works And What It Could Achieve.”
• May 30: Newsweek, “Russia conflict with NATO and U.S. would immediately result in nuclear war, Russian lawmaker warns.”
• May 26: Center for Public Integrity, “Trump seeks to spend more on nuclear weapons but buys little added capability.”
• May 25: Popular Mechanics, “The B-52 Is Getting Out Of The Nuke Dropping Business.”
• May 22: Foxtrot Alpha, “How To Dismantle A Nuclear Weapon.”
• May 19: Fact Sheet: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Total Inventory, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Note: The fact sheet uses FAS data from before the Obama administration announced retirement of an addition 500 warheads. The updated numbers are here.
• May 10: Daily Star, “Shock warning US is plotting to nuke Russia in ‘surprise first strike’.” Highly misleading headline that does not reflect the conclusions of our article.
• May 8: Barents Observer, “Satellite images show expansion of nuclear weapons sites on Kola.”
• May 4: Adam Mount, “The Case Against New Nuclear Weapons,” Center for American Progress.
• Apr 26: Foreign Policy In Focus, “These Nuclear Breakthroughs Are Endangering The World.”
• Apr 20: Eric Heginbotham, et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent Major Drivers and Issues for the United States, RAND Corporation, April 20, 2017.
• Mar 23: Daily Beast, “Turkey’s Frightening Trifecta: ISIS, Erdogan & U.S. Nukes.”
• Mar 22: Science, “More precise U.S. nukes could raise tensions with Russia.”
• Mar 20: Fact Sheet: Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories in 2017, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. The fact sheet uses FAS data from here.
• Mar 19: Detroit News, “U.S. cuts nukes while Trump tweets for expansion.”
• Mar 19: Michael Krepon, Arms Control Wonk, “Low Yield Nuclear Weapons (Again).”
• Mar 12: Warrior (scout.com), “New US “Super-Fuze Triples the Destructive Power of Submarine Launched Nuclear Weapons.”
• Mar 10: War Is Boring, “‘Super-Fuzed’ Warhead on U.S. Nuclear Subs Risk Sparking and Accidental Nuclear War.” This article was also published in The National Interest.
• Mar 9: TASS, “US Strategic Chief says Russia’s tactical nuclear weapon arsenal outnumbers US.”
• Mar 3: Barents Observer, “Larger portion of Russia’s nukes will be on subs in Arctic waters.”
• Feb 26: Obama World-Herald, “StratCom chief Hyten: Nuclear arsenal should be modernized, not expanded.”
• Feb 24: International Business Times, “Nuclear Weapons In World: Trump Says US Needs More Nukes, But Here’s How Many We Have Now.”
• Feb 24: Reuters, “Experts Dispute Trump’s Assertion That U.S. Nuclear Arms Capability Is Lagging.”
• Feb 24: The National Interest, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Everything You Always Wanted To Know (But Were Afraid To Ask).
• Feb 23: The Intercept, “Donald Trump’s Remarks Signal He Could Start a New Nuclear Arms Race.”
• Feb 22: Washington Post, “Making America great again apparently includes Cold War-era nuclear dominance.”
• Feb 21: Ohama World-Herald, “StratCom-led exercise readies U.S., allies in face of threats.”
• Feb 16: NBC News, “Ignore That Spy Ship Off the Coast. The Russians Aren’t Coming.”
• Feb 12: Scout (Warrior), “Russian Nuclear Weapons 101.”
• Feb 12: Daily Beast, “Republicans Move to Strip Away Nuclear Test Ban Funding.”
• Feb 9: attn.com, “President Trump Denounces This Important Treaty as a ‘Bad Deal’.”
• Feb 2: Roll Call, “Pentagon Panel Urges Trump Team To Expand Nuclear Options.”
• Jan: Maj Gen Roger W. Burg, USAF (Ret.), America’s Nuclear Backbone, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
• Jan 26: Yahoo News UK, “Submarine crash in 1974 ‘could have started World War 3’ – but it was covered up.”
• Jan 20: NBC News, “Donald Trump is Getting the Nuclear Football.”
• Jan 19: FactCheck.org, “Obama and Russia’s Nuclear Stockpile.”
• Jan 19: Politico, “Trump’s nuclear wake-up call.”
• Jan 12: Popular Mechanics, “Obama Administration Cuts Back Size of Nuclear Arsenal.”
• Jan 10: Joe Cirincione, “Obama’s last chance to reduce the risk of nuclear disaster,” Politico, January 10, 2017

2016

• Dec: Gudrun Persson (ed.), Russian Military Capabilities in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016, Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), March 2016.
• Dec 1: Stars & Stripes, “On nuclear weapons, Trump face [sic] questions of modernization.”
• Nov: Dave Johnson, “Nuclear weapons in Russia’s approach to conflict,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, November 2016.
• Nov 30: Tim Street, “President Trump: Successor to the Nuclear Throne,” Oxford Research Group, November 30, 2016.
• Nov 26: Raw Story, “Which nations could be be next to join the global nuclear club?”
• Nov 25: McClatchyDC, “Trump’s finger soon will hover over the nuclear button. Will he be ready?”
• Nov 19: Hindustan Times, “‘Pak has 130-140 nuclear weapons, modifying F16s to deliver nukes’.”
• Nov 18: IBT (India), “Pakistan has 130-140 nuclear warheads, state US scientists.”
• Nov 18: NDTV (India), “Where and How Pakistan Is Storing Nuclear Weapons According To US Scientists.”
• Nov 18: WION (India), “Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile: US scientists’ report reveals defence facilities near Indian border.”
• Nov 14: Defense News, “Israel’s Strategic Fight Over New Submarines.”
• Nov 14: Pennsylvania State University Vanguard, “Nuclear Policy.”
• Nov 11: The Guardian, “Nuclear weapons: how foreign hotspots could test Trump’s finger on the trigger.”
• Nov 10: heavy.com, “Can Donald Trump Start a Nuclear War? 5 Fast Facts You Need to Know.”
• Nov 10: BuzzFeedNews, “5 Bid Decisions President Trump Must Make On Nuclear Weapons.” Article also uses FAS estimates on nuclear weapons.
• Nov 4: John DeMaggio, The Hill, “North Korea grows nuclear expense of US security.”
• Nov 3: Omaha World-Herald, “Gen. John Hyten assumes leadership of StratCom today — then he’ll confront an array of unprecedented threats.”
• Oct 31: Omaha World-Herald, “A nuclear decision: As global tension builds, voters must choose which candidate they trust with the codes.”
• Oct 28: National Public Radio, “‘A Dangerous Situation’ As U.S.-Russia Tensions Spill Over To Nuclear Pacts.”
• Oct 10: Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Why Trump Is Wrong On U.S. Nuclear Modernization.”
• Oct 4: Washington Post (Fact Checker), “Clinton, Kaine go too far in touting a nuclear deal with Russia.”
• Oct 2: Washington Times, “Israel nuclear arsenal estimate was high.”
• Sep 25: CBS (After 60), “Breaking down Russia and U.S. nuclear capabilities.”
• Sep 25: CBS News (60 Minutes), “Risk of Nuclear Attack Rises.”
• Sep 23: Economic Times (India Times), “Military failure could push Pakistan to initiate nuclear attack against India.”
• Sep 21: PolitiFact, “Hillary Clinton overstates impact of New START on Russia’s nuclear arsenal.”
• Sep 20: Times of India, “Pakistan may use tactical nuke if it’s unable to push back Indian army: Hans Kristensen.”
• Sep 19: Times of India, “Any military action by India will be condemned by Washington, says former Obama adviser.” References our 2012 report on non-strategic nuclear weapons.
• Sep 19, Dawn Stover, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Does Israel really have 200 nuclear weapons, or was Colin Powell exaggerating?”
• Sep 18: CBS News, “Analyzing the Nuclear Capabilities of the U.S.” Discussion on “After 60” after 60 Minutes feature on The New Cold War.
• Sep 14: NBC News, “U.S. Bombers Send China, Russia, North Korea a Message.”
• Sep 13: New York Times (AP), “US Flies Bombers Over SKorea in Show of Force Against North.”
• Sep 13: FactCheck.com, “Clinton Misrepresents Trump Quote.”
• Sep 9: Los Angeles Times, “North Korea’s latest nuclear test could be a key step in its weapons program.”
• Sep: Fred Kaplan, “Rethinking Nuclear Policy: Taking Stock of the Stockpile,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2016.
• Aug 29: Steinar Høibråten Hanne Breivik, Reaktordrevne fartøyer og deres eventuelle kjernevåpen en oversikt ved årsskiftet 2015/2016 [Nuclear propelled vessels and their possible nuclear weapons: An overview at the winter 2015/2016], FFI Rapport 16/01536, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), August 29, 2016.
• Aug 26: War is Boring, “The United States Is Getting More and More Irritated at Russia’s Nuke Treaty Violation.”
• Aug: Steve Pifer and James Tyson, Third-Country Nuclear Forces and Possible Measures for Multilateral Arms Control, Brookings Institution, August 2016.
• Aug 18: Radio Sputnik (Scotland), “Are US Shifting Nukes in Turkey?” In this interview I debunk the false rumor that the US has moved nuclear weapons from Turkey to Romania.
• Aug 17: Der Spiegel, “US-Präsidentschaftswahl: Angst von Trump und den Atomwaffen [US Presidential Election: Fear of Trump and Nuclear Weapons].”
• Aug 10: Scout Warrior, “Air Force 3-Star: Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missile, LRSO, Essential to Saving US Lives & Preventing Major Power War.”
• Aug 7: ozy.com, “Trump Presidency May Not Blow Up The World, Says History.”
• Aug 5: Radio Sputnik (Washington, DC), “US B61 Nuclear Upgrades Threaten International Security.”
• Aug 5: Voice of America, “How Safe are US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey?”
• Aug 4: New York Times, “Debate Over Trump’s Fitness Raises Issues of Checks on Nuclear Power.”
• Aug 3: Quartz, “Count them up: All the nuclear weapons president Donald Trump would have at his disposal.”
• Aug 3: Counterpunch, “Massive Deployment of US WMD Spotlighted by Peace Group.”
• Aug 2: Amy Woolf, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” Congressional Research Service Insight, August 2, 2016. Uses FAS estimate of US nukes in Turkey, via references to various news stories using the estimate.
• Aug 1: Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2016
• Jul 28: Jonathan Power, Jordan Times, “Too many U.S. nuclear bombs.”
• Jul 26: Crosscut, “Reminder: Puget Sound has a ton of nuclear weapons.”
• Jul 23: Los Angeles Times: “How a stockpile of America’s nuclear weapons got tangled up in a Middle East crisis.”
• Jul 20: CBC News, “How secure are NATO nukes in Turkey?”
• Jul 20: Washington Times, “Inside the Ring: Nuclear Security in Turkey.” The Turkey portion is the third item down in the article.
• Jul 20: Jyllands-Posten (Denmark), “Tyrkiet er en højrisikozone at have atomvåben i [Turkey is a high risk area for nuclear weapons storage].”
• Jul 20: Sheryl Rofer, “Are Nuclear Weapons Stored in Turkey Under Treat?,” War on the Rocks, July 20, 2016.
• Jul 20: NBC News, “Incirlik Air Base: Post-Coup Power Cut Remains at U.S. Site.”
• 20 Jul: Lawfare, “Today’s Headlines and Commentary.”
• Jul 20: Aviation News & Space Technology, “Turkey Coup Raises Questions About NATO’s B61 Nuke Posture.”
• Jul 19: TruNews, “Nuclear Caliphate.” My portion of the interview begins at 19;00 minutes.
• Jul 19: ZF (Romania), “SUA au 50 de bombe nucleare în Turcia, la baza militară blocată în timpul puciului. Mai sunt în siguranţă acolo? [50 US nuclear bombs in Turkey, military base blocked during the coup. Are the still safe there?].”
• Jul 18: A. Trevor Thrall, “The Coup and the Crackdown: Turkey and American Foreign Policy,” Cato Institute Blog, July 18, 2016.
• Jul 18: Sputnik News, “Attempted Military Coup in Turkey Puts American Nukes a Risk.”
• Jul 18: 9news.com, “Truth Test: Clinton draws contrast with Trump in two ads.”
• Jul 17: Eric Schlosser, “The H-Bombs in Turkey,” The New Yorker, July 17, 2016.
• Jul 17: The Guardian, “Turkey coup attempt raises fears over safety of US nuclear stockpile.”
• Jun 30: Tong Zhao, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent,” Carnegie-Tsinghua, June 30, 2016.
• Jun: Defense News, “2016 World Nuclear Forces.” Uses our nuclear weapons estimates from the SIPRI Yearbook in an animated graphics video.
• Jun 28: Walter Pincus, The Cipher Brief, “Financing Nuclear Modernization: Tough Decision for the Next President.”
• Jun 17: Senator Dianne Feinstein and Ellen Tauscher, “A Nuclear Weapon That America Doesn’t Need,” New York Times, June 17, 2016. Feinstein and Tauscher use my blog “Forget LRSO; JASSM-ER Can Do The Job” as the source for the new nuclear cruise missile cost estimate.
• Jun 15: The Anti Media, “Here’s What You Need to Know About the Cold War 2.0 Because It’s Already Here.” 
• Jun 14: Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” RL34248, Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2016.
• Jun 14: The Diplomat, “Does Pakistan Have More Nuclear Warheads Than India?”
• Jun 14: The Seoul Times, “N. Korea Has 10 Nukes: SIPRI.”
• Jun 13: Financial Express, “Countries possessing nuclear weapons not ready to give up arsenal: SIPRI.”
• Jun 13: Times of Israel, “Nuclear powers shrinking, modernizing arsenals – watchdog.”
• Jun 13: Sputnik International (Russia), “Global Nuclear Arsenals Decline Thanks To Russia, US.”
• Jun 13: US News & World Report, “Watchdog: Nuclear powers shrinking, modernizing arsenals.”
• Jun 13: Hindustan Times, “‘China’s nuclear arsenal is becoming bigger, more modern’.”
• Jun 13: The Express Tribune, “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to increase significantly over next 10 years: SIPRI.”
• Jun 13: Economic Times (India), “India, Pakistan nuclear arsenal on rise as it decreases slowly elsewhere.”
• Jun 13: Christian Science Monitor, “New nuclear weapons report dampens hope for global disarmament.”
• Jun 13: Radio Free Europe, “Report: U.S., Russia Slowly Reducing Nuclear Arsenals.”
• Jun 13: Deutsche Welle, “Think tank: Nuclear powers see to modernize nuclear weapons.”
• Jun 13: euronews.com, “Fewer nuclear weapons but a far cry from disarmament.”
• Jun 13: National Defense Magazine, “Analysis: It’s Time for a Reexamination of Nuclear Weapons Requirements.”
• Jun 12: Kingston Reif, “Examining the Flawed Rationale for a New Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missile,” Arms Control Association, Issue Brief, Volume 8, Issue 2, June 12, 2016.
• Jun 8: Sico van der Meer and Christine Parthemore, “Revive Arms Control and Start with Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missiles,” War on The Rocks, June 8, 2016.
• Jun 4: Jacksonville News, “Fact Check: Is Hillary Clinton responsible for ‘a massive reduction in nuclear weapons’?”
• May 31: Evan Montgomery, Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 31, 2016.
• May 31: Chicago Tribune, “Taliban leader’s killing exposes deepening U.S.-Pakistan strains.”
• May 31: Bloomberg, “Taliban Said to Kill 16 in Worst Attack Since Leader Named.”
• May 27: The Week, “How Obama talks an anti-nuke talk, walks a pro-nuke talk.”
• May 27: New York Times (editorial), “Turning Words Into a Nuclear-Free Reality.” Refers to story about new stockpile numbers.
• May 27: Fiscal Times, “Obama Calls for No Nukes, but the US Still Has Big Plans for Nuclear Weapons.”
• May 27: PRI (Public Radio International), “71 years after Hiroshima, will we see a world free from nuclear weapons soon?”
• May 27: R. Jeffrey Smith, “A former senior U.S. general again calls for abolishing the nuclear forces he once commanded,” Center for Public Integrity, May 27, 2016.
• May 27: Washington Post, “Obama calls for end to nuclear weapons, but U.S. disarmament is slowest since 1980.”
• May 27: New York Times, “Reduction of Nuclear Arsenal Has Slowed Under Obama, Report Finds.”
• May 27: TASS, “Эксперт: США замедляют темпы демонтажа списанных ядерных боеголовок [Expert: US slows down the pace of dismantling retired warheads].”
• May 27: The Guardian, “Obama has ‘failed to deliver on nuclear disarmament promises’.”
• May 27: Japan Times, “Key dates in the nuclear arms race.”
• May 26: Stephen Pifer, Defense News, “LRSO Does Not Make Sense, Nor Do Its Proposed Numbers.”
• May 26: David Wright and Lisbeth Grondlund, US News and World Report, “Easing Away From the Nuclear Trigger.”
• May 26: The Guardian, “China to send nuclear-armed submarines into the Pacific amid tensions with US.”
• May 24: Joe Cirincione, Defense One, “The Nuclear Football Goes to Japan.”
• May 20, Radio Free Europe, “New Weaponry, More Spending, Tough Rhetoric Stokes Fear of New U.S.-Russia Arms Race.”
• May: Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Operations and Escalation Dominance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2016.
• May 11: The Diplomat, “Russia Developing New Nuclear Missile Capable of Penetrating US Defenses.”
• May 11: The Daily Beast, “Russia’s New Missile Means the Nuclear Arms Race Is Back On.” The article exaggerates the importance of Russia’s nuclear modernization and misunderstands how many nuclear weapons Russia and the United States have on alert.
• May 10: Jordan Wilson, “China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 10, 2016.
• May 10: Time, “President Obama Will Bring a Mixed Nuclear Message to Hiroshima.”
• May 9: Bonnie Glaser and Matthew Funaiole, “Submerged Deterrence: China’s Struggle to Field an SSBN Fleet,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, May 9, 2016.
• May 6: The Diplomat, “Chinese Nuclear Strategist Believes China’s MIRVs Are Decoys.”
• May 3: Gael Tarleton and Joe Cirincione, “Scale back U.S. nuclear weapons and stop a new arms race,” Seattle Times, May 3, 2016. Uses FAS estimate that there are an estimated 1,350 nuclear warheads stored in Washington state, unfortunately without giving credit.
• Apr 30, KPLU (Seattle), “War And Peace: Sound Effect, Episode 68.”
• Apr 27: FactCheck.org, “Clinton Overstates Nuclear Achievement.”
• Apr: Will Saetren, “Costs of the Cold War: Rethinking the Need for a New Nuclear Cruise Missile,” Ploughshares Fund, April 2016.
• Apr 20: Peter Lee, Asia Times, “The case of the missing nukes and a disappearing US mission…in Asia.”
• Apr 19: Elisabeth Withfield, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Fuzzy math on Indian nuclear weapons.”
• Apr 18: Fiscal Times, “Why is the US Spending $1 Trillion on Nuclear Weapons?” Re-publishes my blog about Nuclear Transparency and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.
• Apr 13: Vox, “How deterrence is changing, explained by Defense Secretary Ash Carter.” Uses FAS estimates of world nuclear forces, unfortunately without giving credit.
• Apr 5: Will Lowry, “Fewer Warheads, More Spending: The Escalating Costs of Maintaining US Nuclear Weapons,” Tri-Valley CARE, April 5, 2016.
• Apr 4: Radio Free Europe, “U.S. Says Russia Increased Number of Deployed Warheads, Despite Treaty.”
• Apr 4: Moscow Times, “Russia Increases Nuclear Warheads While U.S. Decreases its Arsenal.”
• Apr 2: The Telegraph, “Nuclear Weapons: Which Countries Have What?” Video uses FAS estimate of world nuclear arsenals.
• Apr 1: Trevor Tim, The Guardian, “Obama says he’s working towards a nuclear-free world. That’s a lie.”
• Apr 1: Timeline, “Trump, wrong about so much, somehow hits a nerve about America’s willingness to use nukes.”
• Apr: Elbridge Colby and Wu Riqiang, “Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NPR Special Report 57, April 2016, pp. 21-41.
• Mar 31: William Arkin, Vice News, “America’s Nuclear Weapons in Europe Are the Nuclear Elephant in the Room.”
• Mar 29: Minute Physics, “Why You Should Care About Nukes.” This great educational video, narrated by Max Tegmark from the Future of Life Institute at MIT, uses FAS estimate of world nuclear arsenals.
• Mar 24: MacArthur Foundation, “New Commitment to Address Nuclear Threats by Reducing Availability and Use of Weapons-usable Material,” Press Release, March 24, 2016. Uses FAS estimate of more than 15,000 nuclear weapons worldwide, unfortunately without giving credit.
• Mar 23: Amy Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2016.
• Mar 11: Reuters, “Is it time for Britain to give up its nuclear weapons.”
• Mar 11: Kommersant (Russia), “Толкание плутониевого ядра [Pushing plutonium core].”
• Mar 10: Rick Wayman and Jackie Cabasso, Pressenza, “Day Four at the ICJ: Aspirational Rhetoric vs. Real Actions.”
• Mar 9: Keith Payne, “Why Do US Force Numbers Matter for Deterrence?,” National Institute for Public Policy, March 9, 2016.
• Mar 1: Andrew Krepinevich and Jacob Kohn, Rethinking Armageddon: Scenario Planning in the Second Nuclear Age, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 1, 2016.
• Mar 1: Popular Mechanics, “What We Can Tell About the Air Force’s New B-21 Bomber From Its First Official Image.”
• Feb 26: Reuters, “U.S. test-fires ICBMs to stress its power to Russia, North Korea.”
• Feb 26: Sohail Parwaz, Pakistan Today, “F-16s and Indian acrimony.”
• Feb 26: Elbridge Colby, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S.-Russian Relationship,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 26, 2016.
• Feb 24: PBS Newshour, “As Pentagon overhauls nuclear triad, critics advice caution.” Uses FAS estimate of world nuclear arsenals at the end of program, unfortunately without giving credits.
• Feb 23: The Intercept, “Obama’s Russian Rationale for $1 Trillion Nuke Plan Signals New Arms Race.”
• Feb 11: Popular Mechanics, “The Alarming History of U.S. Nuclear Accidents at Sea.”
• Feb 5: Asahi Shimbun, “U.S. Fighter from Fukuoka involved in 1959 nuclear accident in South Korea.”
• Feb: Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council, “The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture.”
• Feb 1: Scientific American, “The Comet That Battered Jupiter, and Shock Congress.”
• Jan 28: The Economist, “Daily Chart: Doomsday and the History of Nuclear Weapons.”
• Jan 23: Associated Press, “Air Force withheld nuclear mishap from Pentagon review team.”
• Jan 20: L’Espresso (Italy), “Ecco la nuova bomba H che arriverà in Italia [Here is the new H bomb that will arrived in Italy].”
• Jan 19: Reuters, “North Korea nuclear test did not increase technical capability: US.”
• Jan 15: Sputnik News, “Nobel Peace Prize-Winner Obama Sends Mixed Messages on US Nukes.” Article is based on an interview with Radio Sputnik.
• Jan 14: Vice News, “Russia Sure Seems to Be Testing a Lot of Nuclear Missiles These Days.”
• Jan 14: Paul Kerr and May Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2016.
• Jan 13: Stephen Young, Defense News, “Commentary: US Is More Secure Without New, Nuclear-armed Cruise Missile.” 
• Jan 6: Wired, “Science Can Tell if North Korea’s Test Was Really An H-Bomb.”

2015

• 2015: “Does China have an effective sea-based nuclear deterrent?,” CSIS, n.d. [first accessed 2015].
• Dec 24: Channel 1 (Russia), “Пентагон рассекретил документы конца 50-х о возможном применении ядерного оружия против СССР [Pentagon declassified documents of the late 50s on the possible use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union].”
• Dec 17: Center for Public Integrity, “India’s nuclear explosive materials are vulnerable to theft, U.S. officials and experts say.” Uses FAS estimate for Indian nuclear weapons stockpile.
• Dec 14: PolitiFact, “PolitiFact Sheet: Military Spending Under Obama and Congress.”
• Dec 11: McClatchy DC, “America’s modernized nuclear arms roil diplomatic waters.”
• Dec 11: James Doyle, “Department of Energy’s disinformation undercuts US credibility, nonproliferation efforts,” The Hill, December 11, 2015.
• Dec 9: Matthew R. Costlow, “Do more nukes really mean more nuclear crises? Not necessarily,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 9, 2015.
• Dec 8: Miles Pomper, et al., Ensuring Deterrence Again Russia: The View From NATO States, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey/Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America.
• Nov 20: The Buzz (The National Interest), “America’s Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon Passes Critical Test.”
• Nov 19: Richard Woolgar-James, “China’s nuclear submarines: The end of ‘No First Use?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Uses FAS estimate for Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile but without credit.
• Nov 17: New Scientists, “Is Russia building an underwater drone to deliver a dirty bomb?”
• Nov 15: Future of Life Institute, “The Risk of Nuclear Weapons.” Uses FAS estimate of world nuclear arsenals.
• Nov 7: New York Times (editorial), “The Pakistan Nuclear Nightmare.” The paper uses FAS’ latest estimate for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, but does not credit.
• Nov 5: PBS Newshour, “America’s nuclear bomb gets a makeover.” This prime-time program includes bits from several interviews, including one with FAS program director Hans Kristensen here: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/videos/#161677
• Oct 28: World Affairs, “US Upgrade Security at Nuclear Bases Near Syria.”
• Oct 22: Reuters, “Obama meets Pakistan’s Sharif to stress nuclear worries, seek help on Taliban.”
• Oct 22: Pakistan Herald, “US to sell eight F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan: report.”
• Oct 22: Daily Pakistan, “Pakistan developing two new cruise missiles, nuclear submarine: US Think Tank.”
• Oct 22: Huffington Post (India), “Pakistan Set To Become World’s 5th Largest Nuclear Power, Says US-Based Think Tank.”
• Oct 22: International Business Times, “Indian strike on Pakistani terror camps could lead to nuclear war, say experts.”
• Oct 22: NDTV (India), “Pakistan Will Become Fifth Largest Nuclear Power By 2025: Report.”
• Oct 22: Associated Press, “Obama turns to political dimensions of Afghan war.”
• Oct 22: india.com (PTI), “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile has grown since 2011, claims US report.”
• Oct 21: New York Times, “White House Set to Sell New Fighter Jets to Pakistan in Bid to Bolster Partnership.”
• Oct 21: Deccan Herald (India), “Pakistan has 110 to 130 nukes: US report.”
• Oct 21: Times of India, “Pakistan could be 5th largest nuclear power by 2025: Report.”
• Oct 2: Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, Congressional Research Service.
• 2015: Taking the Lead, Ploughshares Fund Annual Report 2014.
• Sep 28: CNN Situation Room, “Vladimir Putin responds to reports of new U.S. nukes.”
• Sep 27: Robert Potter, “China’s Undersea Nuclear Submarine Capabilities,” IndraStra.com.
• Sep 25: ECN Magazine, “Pentagon Acknowledges Upgrading Nukes Abroad.”
• Sep 24: Sputnik News (Russia), “War of Words Unleashed: US Upgrading Nukes in EU, Agitates Russia.” The article is based on a radio interview with Kristensen.
• Sep 24: NRC Handelblad (Netherlands), “Moskou waarschuwt voor ‘verstoring nucleaire balans’ in Europa [Moscow warns of disturbing nuclear balance].” Subscription required.
• Sep 24: 444.hu (Hungary), “Washington szerint 2020 előtt tutira nem telepítenek új atomfegyvereket Németországba [Washington says nuclear weapons will deffinitely not be deployed in Germany before 2020].”
• Sep 23: Deutsche Welle, “Reports: US nuclear ‘upgrades’ in Europe.”
• Sep 22: Bundeswehr Journal (Germany), “Bald neue US-Atomwaffen am Standort Büchel? [Soon new US nuclear weapons at the Büchel site?].”
• Sep 22: Frontal-21 (ZDF, Germany), “Stationierung neuer US-Atomwaffen in Deutschland [Deployment of new US nuclear weapons in Germany].” The story includes a TV interview with Kristensen.
• Sep 22: Bild (Germany), “Neue US-Atomwaffen  in Deutschland? [New US nuclear weapons in Germany?].”
• Sep 21: Focus (Germany), “Neue US-Atomwaffen werden in Deutschland stationiert – Russland übt scharfe Kritik [New US nuclear weapons to be deployed in Germany – Russia issues sharp criticism].”
• Sep 16, Radio Free Europe, “Impasse Over U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty Hardens As Washington Threatens ‘Countermeasures’.”
• Sep 15: NATO Watch, “Upgrades At US Nuclear Bases Acknowledge Security Risk.” A reposting of my blog from September 10, 2015.
• Sep 14: Eric Heginbotham, et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017, RAND Corporation, 2015. Direct link to PDF version is here.
• Sep 11: l’Expresso (Italy), “Le bombe atomiche in Italia non sono al sicuro [Nuclear bombs in Italy are not safe].”
• Sep 10, ECN Magazine, “US Upgrades Nuclear Weapons Sites in Europe.”
• Sep 6, Defense News, “Chinese Parade Proves Xi in Charge.”
• Sep 4: Press Examiner, “DF-26 IRBM may have ASM variant, China reveals at 3 September parade.”
• Sep 3: Defense News, “China’s Parade Puts US Navy on Notice.”
• Sep 3: Times of India, “India’s nuclear posture entering dynamic new phase: report.”
• Sep 2: Military Times (Associated Press), “A preview of new gear China’s military showing off at parade.”
• Aug 28: Times of India, “In 10 Years, Pakistan will have largest N-Stockpile after US and Russia: Report.” Note: that is not FAS’ estimate. If the current trend continues, we estimate, Pakistan could in 10 years potentially have a stockpile of roughly 230 warheads, significantly fewer than the 350 projected by the Stimson report.
• Aug 27: Washington Post, “Report: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could become the world’s third-biggest.”
• Aug 27: Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2015.
• Aug 22: The National Interest, “Russia’s Blast from the Past: Beware the Tu-95 Bear Strategic Bomber.”
• Aug 18: INEWS (Rocky Mountain PBS), “Scientists Federation Insists that U.S. Is Cooking up a New Nuclear Bomb.”
• Aug 17: Politico, “Behind Putin’s nuclear threats.”
• Aug 11: Alex Littlefield and Adam Lowther, The Diplomat, “Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America.”
• Aug 8: Scott Beauchamp, Al Jazeera, “Obama’s nuclear betrayal.”
• Aug 7: Sputnik News (Russia), “US Unlikely to Apologize for Japan Nuclear Bombings Soon.”
• Aug 6: CBS (Minnesota), “Good Question: How Many Nuclear Weapons Still Exist?”
• Aug 6: Sputnik News (Russia), “Nuclear-Armed States ‘Must Eliminate’ WMD to Honor Hiroshima, Nagasaki.”
• Aug 5: Guardian, “Hiroshima and the nuclear age – a visual guide.”
• Aug 5: 1TV (Russia), “Ядерную угрозу сегодня, по мнению экспертов, всё сильнее ощущают в Европе  Смотрите оригинал материала на [The nuclear threat today, according to experts, is strongly felt in Europe].”
• Aug 4: Flight Global, “Concept of a nuclear-armed F-35C divides opinion.”
• Aug 4: Joe Cirincione, Al Jazeera, “The real nuclear danger isn’t Iran or North Korea.”
• Aug: Philip Webber and Stuart Parkinson, UK nuclear weapons: A catastrophe in the making?, Scientists for Global Responsibility, August/September 2015.
• Aug: Greg Schwartz, Freedom Magazine, “Nobody’s Free.”
• Aug: “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association.
• Jul 17: PolitiFact.com, “Cheney: Obama wants to get ‘rid of all nuclear weapons,’ has reduced U.S. nuclear capability significantly.”
• Jul 16: TASS, “Эксперт: США создают свою первую управляемую атомную авиабомбу [Expert: US to create first guided nuclear gravity bomb].”
• Jul 15: INEWS (Rocky Mountain PBS), “Reveal: Is U.S. Building New Nuclear Bombs or Simply ‘Modernizing’?”
• Jul 11: Sputnik News (Russia), “A New Arms Race? US Nuclear Test Might Trigger Response from Russia, China.”
• Jul 8: David Axe, War is Boring, “The H-6K is China’s B-52.”
• Jun 25: Adam Mount, National Interest, “Russia’s Lethal Nuclear Arsenal Gets and Upgrade: Should NATO Worry?” Also posted on Council on Foreign Relations blog.
• Jun 24: Bloomberg, “Vienna Forum Hears Warnings of a New U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Race.” Uses FAS estimate on Status of World Nuclear Forces.
• Jun 18: Dan Drollette, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Of weapons programs in Iran and Israel, and the need for journalists to report on both.”
• Jun 13: Sputnik News (Russia), “US Unlikely to Deploy Missiles to Europe.” The article was also published in Space Daily.
• Jun 9: Times of India, “India’s sensational cross-border raid.”
• Jun 4: Associated Press, “US might deploy missiles in Europe to counter Russia.”
• May 20: Voice of America, “China Advances Ballistic Missile Capability.”
• May 20: New York Times (editorial), “China Buys Into Multiple Warheads.” Uses FAS estimate for Chinese nuclear weapons.
• May 18: Business Insider, “China has outfitted missiles capable of reaching the US with multiple nuclear warheads.”
• May 18: The Diplomat, “China’s MIRVs: Sign of a Cold War to Come?” The article wrongly claims I said in my blog that the addition of MIRV represents a “major change” in China’s nuclear posture. I did not say that, but rather that it is important when seen in the context of other elements of China’s nuclear modernization, which is, far below the level underway in Russia and the United States.
• May 17: Independent (UK), “China upgrades it nuclear arsenal for first time in decades amid resistance to US interference in South China Sea dispute.” The headline is misleading because the MIRV upgrade is not the first upgrade of the Chinese nuclear arsenal in decades nor is the development directly linked to the South China Sea dispute.
• May 17: The Tribune (India), “Chinese re-engineers ballistic missile, surprises US: report.”
• May 16: NewsMax, “Report: China Added Multiple Warheads to Long-Range Weapons.”
• May 16: New York Times, “China Making Some Missile More Powerful.”
• May 12: Asia Times, “Pentagon report: China deploys MIRV missile.”
• May 10: Washington Post, “Obama’s quiet nuclear deal with China raises proliferation concerns.” Uses FAS estimate for size of Chinese nuclear stockpile without credit.
• May 9: The Hill, “How long would it take Iran to develop nukes? No one knows the answer for sure.”
• May 8: Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, Princeton University, Global Fissile Material Report 2015: Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production, Briefing to the NPT Review Conference, United Nations, New York, May 8, 2015.
• May 8: Epoch Times, “The US Is Hiding Its Nukes so Poorly, it Undermines the Point of Having Them.”
• May 5: Politi Fact Florida, “Marco Rubio says the United States is not modernizing its nuclear weapons.”
• May 5: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), “Is China Planning To Build More Missile Submarines?,” ETH Zurich. Reprints (with permission) my blog about U.S. estimates of China’s submarine production plans.
• May 1: Washington Post (Fact Checker), “Iran’s claim that Israel has 400 nuclear weapons.” References the 2014 FAS Nuclear Notebook on Israel as evidence, among others, that the Iranian claim is exaggerated.
• Apr 30: The Telegraph (UK), “General call on US and Russia to end to nuclear hair-trigger.”
• Apr 30: De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures, Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, April 2015. See also appendix.
• Apr 29: The Week, “America readies its new ‘smart’ nuke.”
• Apr 11: National Public Radio, “New START Nuke Deal With Russia May Be Aging – But It’s Not Over.”
• Ape 9: The Independent (UK), “Trident debate: There are 16,000 nuclear missiles in the world – but who has them, and does Britain really need its own arsenal?”
• Apr 6: New York Times editorial, “Nuclear Fears in South Asia.” The New York Times references a Council on Foreign Relations web page for the size of Pakistan and China’s nuclear arsenals, but the CFR web page actually is based on our estimates.
• Apr 3: MintPress News, “Time is running out for Israel’s special place in America’s heart.”
• Apr 1: Christopher Twomey, Naval Postgratuate School, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 1, 2015.
• Mar 29: i24 News, “Israel gave OK to release document on past nuclear weapons work.”
• Mar 24, John Mecklin, Foreign Policy, “Disarm and Modernize.”
• Mar 24: The Week, “America has a very expensive pan to replace very old nukes.”
• Mar 24: Tong Zhao and David Logan, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “What if China develops MIRV?“
• Mar 20: Lukasz Kulesa, “Putin’s Nuclear Bluff,” Survival, pp. 125-129.
• Mar: James E. Goodby and George P. Shultz (ed.), The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence (California: Hoover Press, 2015).
• Mar 12: The Kashmir Monitor, “Pakistan still ahead of India in arms race.”
• Mar 11: Wall Street Journal, “Saudi Nuclear Deal Raises Stakes for Iran Talks.” Article is hidden behind pay-wall but apparently uses my SIPRI data in a chart of world nuclear forces.
• Mar 11: Hindustan Times, “Does Pakistan have a bigger nuclear arsenal than India?”
• Mar 10: Business Insider (Economist), “The threat of nuclear war is higher than at any time in the past 25 years.”
• Mar 10: First Post (India), “Pakistan has more nuclear weapons than India, shows inforgraphic [inc.].”
• Mar 10: Jeffrey D. McCausland, Stimson Center, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities.”
• Mar 3: Daily Mail (UK), “Earth’s nuclear arsenal revealed: Interactive infographic lets you track growth of the world’s WMDs over 70 years.” The paper has copied and reproduced the entire Bulletin interactive web site on its own site, in violation of copyright laws.
• Mar 3: Fox News, “Mystery $55 million Air Force program sparks debate on cost.”
• Mar 2: Washington Post, “Pentagon’s $55 billion mystery plane is secret, but debate on cost is appearing.”
• Jan 30: Elbridge Colby, Center for a New American Security, “Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a Nuclear Blind Spot in the Pentagon’s New Initiative.”
• Jan 26: warisboring.com, “America Has a Very Expensive Plan to Replace Very Old Nukes.”
• Jan 21: ISN-ETHZ (Switzerland), “Rumors About Nuclear Weapons in Crimea.” Reprints FAS Strategic Security story with same title.
• Jan 17: The Week, “The dangers of our aging nuclear arsenal.”
• Jan 16, Pavel Podvig, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “What to do about Russian belligerence?”
• Jan: Alexey Arbatov, The ‘P5’ Process: Prospects for Enhancement, Deep Cuts Commission, Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 3, January 2015. Uses FAS estimate of Russian nuclear forces from SIPRI Yearbook.
• Jan 4: The Guardian, “US and Russia in danger of returning to era of nuclear rivalry.”

2014

• Dec 18: The Hill, “Could Russia’s economic meltdown lead to loose nukes?”
• Dec 17: David Wright, The Equation (Union of Concerned Scientists), “Then vs Now: Progress on Nuclear Weapons since the End of the Cold War.”
• Dec 12: SputnikNews.com, “New START Treaty Best Example of US-Russia Cooperation: Expert.”
• Dec 9: nettavisen.no (Norway), “- Nå er det høyere risiko for atomkrig [Now there is increased risk of nuclear war].”
• Dec 9: SputnikNews.com, “US, Russia Should Exclude Use of Nuclear Weapons: Experts.”
• Dec 8: Peter Mauer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, speech to Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons. Uses FAS-NRDC estimate of nuclear alert forces and analysis of slowing of nuclear reductions and widespread nuclear modernizations.
• Dec: Austrian Foreign Ministry, “Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.” Uses FAS estimate for worldwide nuclear weapons.
• Nov 14: CBS News, “Pentagon revamps nuclear arsenal after review finds systemic problems.”
• Nov: Gregory Koblentz, Council on Foreign Relations, “Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age.”
• Nov 1: New York Times, Sunday Review, “Which President Cut the Most Nukes?”
• Oct 29: technowinki.onet.pl (Poland), “Polskie F-16 na nuklearnych ćwiczeniach NATO Steadfast Noon [Polish F-16s in NATO Nuclear Exercise Steadfast Noon.”
• Oct 23: International Relations and Security Network (Switzerland), reproduces blog on New START numbers.
• Oct 17: io9.com, GOP Presidents Are More Likely To Get Rid Of Nukes Than Democrats.”
• Oct 16: Politco, “What I Say, What I do: Doves Want Nuke Cuts Back on the Agenda.” Includes statement and link to blog about stockpile reductions.
• Sep 29: Aftenposten (Norway), “Atomvåpenstater konkurrerer om å modernisere sine våpenarsenal [Nuclear-armed states compete to modernize their nuclear arsenals].”
• Sep 23: New York Times (editorial), “Backsliding on Nuclear Promises.”
• Sep 22: Washington Post, “Pakistan is eying sea-based and short-range nuclear weapons, analysts say.”
• Sep 19: Los Angeles Times, “NATO nuclear drawdown now seems unlikely.”
• Sep 4: njtoday.net, “16,300 nukes still threaten life on earth.”
• Aug 27: Business Insider, “Here’s Where We Think The World’s Nukes Are Stored – And What It Says About Global Security.” A map and a table are available here.
• Aug 19: Aftenposten (Norway), “Pusser opp atomvåpen for 70 milliarder [Refurbish Nuclear Weapons for 70 billion]”.
• Aug 12: Scientific American, “‘Ambiguous’ Warfare Buys Upgrade Time for Russia’s Military.”
• Aug 7: C4ISRnet.com, “China may be developing satellite-killing ability.”
• Aug 6: Truthout.com, “The Cost of Teaching and Old Nuclear Weapon New Tricks.”
• Aug 6: Elizabeth Zolotukhina, SITREP (globalsecurity.org), “Russia’s INF Treaty Violation: More Questions Than Answers.”
• Jul 27: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, “The threat of nuclear annihilation.” Oliver uses my chart of U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles and my blog headline about how many warheads the Obama administration have cut from the stockpile.
• Jul 21: Global Security Newswire, “Senate Bill Mandates Study of Nuclear-Arms Storage Sites.”
• Jul 4: Brescia Today, “Ghedi, 20 bombe atomiche: in case di guerra sganciate dagli italiani [20 bombs at Ghedi: to be dropped by Italy in case of war].”
• Jul 3: Notizie Geopolitiche (Italy), “La Guerra fredda non è mai finita: bombe nucleari sul suolo italiano [The Cold War never ended: nuclear bombs still on Italian soil].”
• Jul 3: Messaggero Veneto (Italy), “‘Le atomiche sono qui’: il satellite lo conferma [“The nukes are there,” the satellite confirms].”
• Jul 2: International Business Times (Italy), “Nucleare, 70 testate presenti sul territorio italiano. A nostre spese [70 nuclear bombs present on Italian soil: At our expense.”
• Jul 2: Dire (Italy), “”In Italia 70 bombe nucleari americane”: è primato europeo [70 American nuclear bombs in Italy is European record].”
• Jul 2: Giornale di Brescia (Italy), “L’Espresso conferma: 20 bombe nucleari a Ghedi [L’Expresso confirms: 20 nuclear bombs are Ghedi].”
• Jul 1: L’Espresso (Italy), “Ecco le 70 bombe nucleari in Italia [There are 70 nuclear bombs in Italy].”
• Jun 26: Christian Science Monitor, “New test could hint at nuclear weapons inspections of the future.”
• Jun 18: Global Security Newswire, “Pyongyang Propaganda Video May Offer Clues on New Cruise Missile.”
• Jun 16: Moscow Times, “U.S. and Russia Determined to Keep Nuclear Weapon Arsenal, SIPRI Says.”
• Jun 16: skynews.com.au, “World nuclear weapons in decline.”
• Jun 15: AFP/Yahoo News, “World’s nuclear arsenal reduction slows down: Stockholm institute.”
• Jun 15: Chicago Tribune, “Fewer bombs, but nuclear states ‘determined’ to keep arsenals, SIPRI.”
• Jun 11: PressTV (Iran), “Leader nuclear fatwa addresses entire world: Analyst.”
• Jun 11: Global Security Newswire, “House Bill Seeks Answers on Costs of NATO Nuclear Burden-Sharing.”
• Jun 9: Uri Misgav, Haaretz, “The nuclear threat to Israel’s economy.”
• Jun 4: P.R. Shari, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
• May: Matthew Wallin, The 21st Century Nuclear Arsenal, American Security Project, May 2014.
• May 1: Zachary Keck, The Diplomat, “State Media: China Can’t Stop the F-35.” Calls my blog on China’s emerging SSBN fleet “in-depth and deeply informative”.
• Apr: Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic Security and International Security, Deep Cuts Commission, April 2014.
• Apr 29: The Guardian, “Risk of nuclear accidents is rising, says report on near-misses.”
• Apr: Patricia Lewis, et al., Too Close for Comfort: Cases of New Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 2014.
• Apr 28: “50 Facts About Nuclear Weapons Today,” Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Brookings.
• Apr 15: Newsweek, “After Ukraine, Countries That Border Russia Start Thinking About Nuclear Deterrents.”
• Apr 12: Praveen Swami, The Hindu, “Dancing with the nuclear djinn.”
• Apr 8: military.com (AP), “US Will Cut Air Force Nuke Missile Force by 50.”
• Apr 8: Wall Street Journal, “Putin Invades, Obama Dismantles.” In addition to being facturally wrong on several points, the opinion piece distorts what I wrote in this blog.
• Mar 6: Global Security Newswire, “Experts See Russian Strides on Nuclear-Force Updates.”
• Mar [no date], indepthnews.org, “NATO and Russia Cought in Nuclear Arms Race.”
• Feb 28: Defense Tech, “Nuclear Bomb Upgrade Could Vilate Treaty.”
• Feb 28: Global Security Newswire, “‘Significant’ Alterations Seen in Updated B-61 Bomb: Report.” This article was also posted in theNational Journal.
• Feb 4: Lauren Caston, et al., The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force, RAND Corporation, February 2014.
• Feb: William S. Murray, “Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare,” in Peter Dutton, et al (Ed.)., China’s Near Sea Combat Capabilities, U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies, Vol. 11, February 2014.
• Jan 30: De Standard (Belgium), “‘België moet F-35 wel kopen’.”
• Jan 14: Trimming the Bloated Nuclear Weapons Budget, Arms Control Association, Issue Brief Vol. 5, Issue 3, January 14, 2013.
• Jan 12: Great Falls Tribune, “Navy may reduce nuke numbers: Move would give ICBMs breathing room.” Refers to FAS Nuclear Notebook published in the Bulletin of the Atomci Scientists.
• Jan 10: Financial Times, “US Nukes: Now It’s Our Turn to Catch Up to the Russians,” The headline does not reflect what I said in the interview, and the information in the table sourced as the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation appears to be derived fromthis FAS table.
• Jan 9: Seattle Times, “Judge rejects suit to halt dock addition at Trident base.”
• Jan 9: USA Today (Associated Press), “Nuclear launch officers tied to narcotics probe.”
• Jan 9: CBS News, “Chuck Hagel making rare visit to nuclear missile base.”
• Jan 7: Jon Wolfsthal, et al., The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014.
• Jan 7: Defense One, “U.S. Will Start Cutting Its Submarine Missile Launchers Next Year.”

2013

• Dec: Jakob Hedenskog, et al., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2013, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), December 2013.
• Dec: Michael Krepon and Julia Thomson, Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in SouthAsia, The Stimson Center, December 2013.
• Dec 19: Voice of America: “Chinese Military’s Secret to Success: European Engineering.”
• Dec 17: Lisbeth Grondlund, Union of Concerned Scientists, “How Many Nuclear Weapons Does the U.S. Have? Don’t Ask Congress.”
• Dec 5: ABC News, “Cold War: Putin Talks Tough Over US Arctic Rivalvy.”
• Dec 1: Nikolai Sokov, Arms Control Wonk, “Allegations of Russian Arms Control Cheating are Unfounded, But a Good Reason to Revisit Treaty Options.”
• Nov 21: Global Security Newswire, “Annual U.S. Congress Report on China is Curiously Light on Nuclear Arms Info.”
• Nov 21: Richard Weitz, INS (Switzerland), “Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization and Its Arms Control Implications.”
• Nov 20: Epoch Times, “China’s Nuclear Submarines Are Less Than Advertised.”
• Nov 19: Associated Press, “Nuclear Weapons.” Second graphic (Nuclear World: Coountry Stockpiles and the Doomsday Clock) uses FAS data on wok nuclear stockpiles from our September Nuclear Notebook.
• Nov 10: Voice of Russia, “US to upgrade old nukes in Europe to ‘all-in-one’ bombs.”
• Nov 6: Der Spiegel, “Nuclear Arsenal: US To Turn Old Bombs Into All-Purpose Weapons.”
• Nov 6: Rutland Herald, “Rutland makes China’s best list – as nuke targets.”
• Nov 5: Flashpoints (The Diplomat), “State Media Boasts of China’s Ability to Nuke US Cities.”
• Oct: Gary Schaub, Adjusting the Architecture: Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation in NATO, Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, October 2013.
• Oct: Global Fissile Material Report 2013, International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013.
• Oct: Stephen J. Cimbala, “Missile Defense and Nuclear Deterrence: Moving Deterrence, or Backward?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2013, pp. 73-87.
• Oct 22: Information (Denmark), “Eksperter frygter amerikansk atomvåbenulykke [Experts fear U.S. nuclear weapons accident.”
• Oct 18: Der Spiegel, “Militärtechnik: Experten werfen US-Regierung Entwicklung neuer Atomwaffen vor.”
• Oct 10: Reuters, “Western powers talk nuclear disarmament, upgrade what’s left.”
• Oct 3: RIA Novosti, “Slow START: US Increases Deployed Nuclear Forces – Scientists.”
• Oct 3: National Journal, “Updated New START Data Showing Larger U.S. Stockpile Not Alarming: Experts.”
• Oct 3: Slate.com, “The U.S. Increased Its NUclear Forces Over the Last Six Months.”
• Oct 3: Jon Harper, Asahi Shimbun, “Analysis: China’s nuke build-up is a concern, but a nuclear-armed Japan is not the answer.”
• Oct: Don’t Bank on the Bomb: A Global Report on the Financing of Nuclear Weapons Producers, IKV Pax Christi & ICAN, October 2013.
• Sep 29: La Tercera (Chile), “Discusión de tema nuclear reabre debate sobre cantidad y seguridad de arsenales.”
• Sep 26: Japan Times, “Iran tries to shift scrutiny to Israeli nuclear weapons.”
• Sep 25: Huffington Post, “Scrutiny Of Iran’s Nuclear Program Likely To Highlight Israel’s Secret Atomic Weapons Stockpile.”
• Sep 25: News-Sentinel (AP), “Iran tries to shine light on Israeli nukes.”
• Sep 22: Ohama World-Herald, “Clock is ticking on aging B61 bomb, StratCom chief says.”
• Sep 20: RT (Russia Today), “UN nuclear meeting rejects Arab push for Israel to join weapons pact.”
• Sep 18: Times of India, “India’s development of ICBMs likely to fuel arms race with China.”
• Sep 18: The Standard (Hong Kong), “Syria and nukes on agenda for Obama-Netanyahu chat.”
• Sep 16: PressTV (Iran), “US report confirms Israel has at least 80 nuclear warheads.”
• Sep 16: Russia Today, “Israel has about 80 nukes, can about tripple inventory – report.”
• Sep 15: La Times, “Israel has 80 nuclear warheads, canmake 115-190 more, report says.”
• Sep 15: Israel Hayom, “‘Israel suspended nuclear weapons production in 2004’.”
• Sep 14: Haaretz (Israel), “Israel froze production of nuclear warheads in 2004, foreign experts say.”
• Sep 13: Mondiaal Nieuws (Belgium), Opinion, “Time to go! Kernwapens weg uit België [TIme to go! Nuclear Weapons Out of Belgium].”
• Sep 13: De Morgen (Belgium), “Boosheid om het geheime kernwapenakkoord van Defensie [Anger about the secret nuclear weapons agreement by defense ministry].”
• Sep 13: De Morgen (Belgium), “Leterme: “Geen weet van modernisering kernwapens [Leterme: No one knows about modernization].”
• Sep 13: RIA Novosti (Germany), “Nato-Länder wollen US-Kernwaffen auf ihrem Territorium modernisieren – Medien [NATO countries want to modernize US nuclear weapons on their territory].”
• Sep 13: De Redactie (Belgium), “‘Mogelijk akkoord staat haaks op alle afspraken’ [‘Possible agreement is contrary to all agreements’].”
• Sep 13: HLN (Belgium), “Kleine Brogel krijgt nieuwe en moderne kernwapens [Kleine Brogel gets new and modern nuclear weapons].”
• Sep 13: Knack (Belgium), “Tegen 2020 worden atoombommen in Kleine Brogel gemoderniseerd [By 2020 the nuclear bombs at Kleine Brogel will be modernized].”
• Sep 13: De Standard (Belgium), “Nieuwe kernwapens voor Kleine Brogel [New nuclear weapons for Kleine Brogel].”
• Sep 13: Mondiaal Nieuws (Belgium), “‘Tegen 2020 worden atoombommen uit Kleine Brogel gemoderniseerd’ [By 2020 atomic bombs from Kleine Brogel modernized].”
• Sep 13: Limburg (Belgium), “Nieuwe kernwapens op militaire basis Kleine-Brogel [New nuclear weapons on Kleine Brogel air base].”
• Sep 13: Le Soir (Belgium), “«De nouvelles armes nucléaires à Kleine-Brogel» [New Nuclear Weapons at Kleine Brogel].”
• Sep: James Acton, Silver Bullet: Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2013.
• Sep 12: nos.nl (the Netherlands), “Minister Hennis wil niets zeggen over mogelijke nieuwe kernwapens [Minister Hennis to say anything about possible new nuclear weapons].”
• Sep 12: nos.nl (the Netherlands), “Oppositie: opheldering kernwapens [Opposition: clarification about nuclear weapons].”
• Sep 12: Trouw (the Netherlands), “‘Nederland akkoord met nieuw kernwapen op basis Volkel’ [The Netherlands agree to new nuclear weapons at Volkel Air Base.]”
• Sep 12: Knack (Belgium), “Geheim akkoord over nieuwe kernwapens voor Kleine Brogel [Secret agreement about new nuclear weapons for Kleine Brogel].”
• Sep 12: KRO Brandpunt Reporter (the Netherlands), “De Nederlandse atoombom [The Dutch Nuclear Bomb].”
• Sep 12: DutchNews.nl, “US and NL agreed in 2010 to update nuclear bombs, tv show claims.”
• Sep 3: The Economic Times (India), “Pakistan says it has robust control system for nuclear arsenal.” The article appears to use FAS estimate of approximately 120 Pakistani nuclear weapons, but without giving credit.
• Sep 3: Washington Post, “Top-secret U.S. intelligence files show new levels of distrust of Pakistan.” The article appears to use FAS estimate of approximately 120 Pakistani nuclear weapons, but without giving credit.
• Sep 2: Flashpoint (The Diplomat), “Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles: Past and Present.”
• Aug 28: Omroep Brabant (the Netherlands), “Brandpunt Reporter: ‘Atoombommen Volkel paar keer per jaar heen en weer gevlogen’ [Brandpunt Reporter: ‘Nuclear bombs at Volkel flown back and forth a couple of times a year].”
• Aug 28: Omroep Brabant (the Netherlands), “Angst voor nucleaire ramp Volkel reëel [Fear of nuclear disaster at Volkel real].”
• Aug 25: Tom Nichols (Naval War College), The National Interest, “The Coming Nuclear War with…the Soviet Union?”
• Aug 20: Vladimir Dvorkin, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, “There Is a Need To Object. INF Treaty — Rudiments of Cold War.”
• Aug 19: Military Times,”Unit that failed nuclear missile inspection raring for second chance.”
• Aug 9: CNN, “The ‘radical’ nuclear missile test that made history.”
• Jul 26: Pavel Zolotarev, et al., “Russia and the USA at the Crossroads: Obama’s Initiatives and Russia’s Reaction,” Russian International Affairs Council, July 26, 2013.
• Jul: Security Briefing Book, Fifth Edition, Truman National Security Project, July, 2013.
• Jul 23: Anniston Star, “Rogers amendment pushes back at Obama nuke cuts.”
• Jul 16: Brookings Institution, Up Front Blog, “Allegations of Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Violation – Where’s the Beef?”
• Jul 12: Congressional Research Service, “The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions.”
• Jul 11: Global Security Newswire, “New Intel Report Mum on Prior Nuclear Estimates.”
• Jul 9: Huntington News, “Still Preparing For Nuclear War.”
• Jul 6: Lawrence Krauss, The New York Times, “Lettin Go of Our Nukes.”
• Jun 30: IDN-InDepthNews, “ObamaMagic is Gone – Caution Outweighs Zeal.”
• Jun 21: Global Security Newswire, “Fresh U.S. Nuclear Guidance Relies on Some Cold War Elements.”
• Jun 20: NBC News, “Obama’s nuke-reduction goal is just the start of a slow process.”
• Jun 19: CNN, “Does cutting U.S. nukes really matter.”
• Jun 19: Washington Times, “In Brandenburg speech, Obama modifies old campaign goal of ‘a world without nuclear weapons.”
• Jun 18: Japan Times, Michael Richardson, “Cruise missile threat in Asia.”
• Jun 5: Daily Mail (AP), “‘Poor leadership, long hours and no career prospects’: U.S. Air Force crews with finger on the trigger of nuclear missiles complain of morale-sapping pressures.”
• Jun 4: US News & World Report, “Buying Submarines in an Age of Austerity.”
• Jun 4: Associated Press, “Nuclear missile crews cite morale-sapping pressures.”
• Jun 4: Asia News Network, “China defends use of nuclear warheads.”
• Jun 4: China Daily, “Warhead stockpile ‘defensive’.”
• Jun 3: Deutche Welle, “Asia countries pile up nuclear arms.”
• Jun 3: Bloomberg, “China’s Nuclear Stockpile Grows as India Matches Pakistan Rise.”
• Jun 3: Times of Israel, “Israel now has 80 nuclear warheads, report says.”
• Jun 3: Times of India, “Nuclear weapons: India keeps pace with Pakistan, but focuses on China.”
• Jun: Arms Control Today, “Pentagon Sees China Progressing on SLBM.”
• May 31: Der Spiegel, “US-Analyse zu Nordkorea: Kims Langstreckenraketen angeblich einsatzbereit.”
• May 30: Global Security Newswire, “North Korea, China Pursuing Nuke-Ready Cruise Missiles: Air Force.”
• May 28: forbes.com, “Nuclear Weapons: How Few Is Too Few?”
• May 16: breakingdefense.com, “Navy Sub Chief Rebuts Critics Claims On SSBN-X; Don’t Cut Our Boats.”
• May 16: Rear Adm. Richard Beckenridge, “Navy Responds to Debate Over the Size of the SSBN Force,” Navy Live, May 16, 2013. The director of the U.S. Navy Undersea Warfare office responds to my blog about U.S. SSBN deterrent patrols.
• May 8: Eastasia Review, “Russia Bidding Farewell To Soviet Nukes – Analysis.”
• May 7: Scientific American, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads Set to Get a Facelift.”
• May 7: Nature, “US warheads to get facelift.”
• May 3: Frank Pabian, “Making discoveries in virtual worlds via the Cloud,” Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, May 3, 2013.
• May 3: The Diplomat, “Could New SSBN Program ‘Sink’ U.S. Navy?”
• May: Michael D. Swaine, et al., China’s Military & the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2013.
• Apr: Stephanie Spies and John Warden, Forging a Consensus for a Sustainable U.S. Nuclear Posture, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2013.
• Apr 21: The Guardian, “Obama acused of nuclear U-turn as guided weapons plan emerges.”
• Apr 18: Barry Watts, Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 18, 2013.
• Apr 13: Wall Street Journal, “U.S.-China Nuclear Silence Leaves a Void.” Uses FAS estimate of Chinese nuclear forces.
• Apr 12: Huffington Post (Reuters), “‘Speculative’ Pentagon Report on North Korea’s Nuclear Missile Sparks Fear as Officials Urge Skepticism.”
• Apr 11: armscontrolwonk.com, “For your (North Korea) reading pleasure.”
• Apr 11: Reuters, “Pentagon says North Korea can likely launch nuclear missile.”
• Apr 10: Congressional Research Service, “Next Steps in U.S. Arms Control With Russia: Issues for Congress.”
• Apr: Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Implementation of the Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-On Actions Adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Disarmament Actions 1-11, 2013 Monitoring Report, Monterey Institute, April 2013.
• Apr 2: DefenseTech.org, “Blast hints at North Korea’s nuke.”
• Apr: Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, The Great Strategic Triangle, Carnegie Moscow Center, April 2013.
• Mar: Fact Sheet: Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories in 2013, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
• Mar 21: CNN World, “Nuclear weapons: Who has what?”
• Mar 14: Wired, “That’s No Train! Air Force Eyes Subway For Nuclear Missiles.”
• Mar 12, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations, Center for Strategic and Internaitonal Studies, March 2013.
• Mar 7: IISS Voices, “Why China sent its aircraft carrier to Qingdao.”
• Mar 6: Andrew F. Krepinevich, “U.S. Nuclear Requirements in an Era of Defense Austerity,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
• Mar 6: The Diplomat, “For America’s Military: Less Nukes.”
• Mar 4: Washington Post, “Budget cuts and bombs.” Uses “85 percent” eduction, which for U.S. stockpile appears to come from this FAS article.
• Mar 1: Turkey Wonk, “The Sequester and Future Nuclear Weapons in Turkey.”
• Feb 27, Global Security Newswire, “Nuclear Arms Count Might Have Fallen by Hundreds Under Obama.”
• Feb 26: Global Zero, “Get the Facts.” The newly revamped web site appears to use FAS estimates for world nuclear forces, but without credits.
• Feb 22: Jonathan Medalia, et al., Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations, Congressional Research Service, February 22, 2013.
• Feb 21: Eurasia Review, “High-Alert Nukes As If The Cold War Didn’t End – Analysis.”
• Feb 17: Eurasia Review, “Managing India’s Missile Aspirations – Analysis.”
• Feb 15: American Security Blog Flashpoint Blog, “A Nuclear Arsenal for the 21st Century.”
• Feb 14: Global Security Newswire, “Russia Might Still Use Sea-Fired Nuclear Cruise Missiles.”
• Feb 14: David Hoffman, Foreign Policy, “Sounds of Silence.”
• Feb 14: LiveScience, “Experts: North Korea Years From a Bomb.”
• Feb 14: nuclear-news.net, “Cutting down on risk of nuclear weapons that are on alert.”
• Feb 13: Foreign Policy, “How does America’s nuclear arsenal stack up against North Korea’s?”
• Feb 12: TV-2 Nyhederne at 22:00 Hours (Denmark).
• Feb 12: New York Times, “A Secretive Country Gives Countries Few Clues to Judge Its Nuclear Program.”
• Feb 8: R. Jeffrey Smith, Center for Public Integrity, “Obama administration embraces major new nuclear weapons cuts.”
• Jan 26: PRESSTV (Iran), “Obama against chinese nuclear great wall.”
• Jan 25: Discovery News, “3 Reasons N. Korea Can’t Nuke the U.S. (Yet).”
• Jan 22: David Hoffman, Foreign Policy, “Is nuclear arms control dead?”
• Jan 18: Times of India (TNN), “Pakistan has world’s fastest growing nuclear stockpile.”
• Jan 17: Steven Pifer, “Nuclear Arms Control: Another New START,” in Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Brook, Brookings Institution, January 17, 2013. The chaprter uses FAS estimates in Trimming Nuclear Excess for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.
• Jan 13: actualidad.rt.com (Russia Today in Spanish), “Pánico nuclear: EE.UU. busca neutralizar el revelado arsenal atómico de China.”
• Jan 9: Financial Times, “The Price of Deterrence.” The interactive graphics (“The Trident decision: Options for replacing Trident“) uses FAS estimates for world nuclear forces from SIPRI Yearbook. Note: the estimates have since been updated here.
• Jan 6: Defense News, “New U.S. Law Seeks Answers on Chinese Nuke Tunnels.”

2012

• Dec 25: bloomberg.com (editorial), “Better Nuclear Bombs for a Safer World.” Refers to my B61-12 blog as an example of “well meaning but misguided” arms control advocates.
• Dec 20: Jeffrey Lewis, armcsontrolwonk.com, “Subcritical Experiments.”
• Dec 18: Global Security Newswire, “Russia, U.S. Slow Rate of Nuclear Drawdowns, Report Says.”
• Dec 18: Independent European Daily Express (UK), “Rate of U.S., Russian Nuclear Disarmament ‘slowing’.”
• Dec 17: Washington Post, “How many nukes does it take to be safe?”
• Dec 14: freebeacon.com, “Number the Nukes.”
• Dec 6: swissinfo.ch, “Swiss engange in UN disarmament effort.”
• Nov: Ramy Srour, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: B61 Bombs and US-Russian Relations,” Instituto di Ricerche Internationazionali, Archivio Disarmo, November 2012.
• Nov 15: Global Secuity Newswire, “U.S. Should Seek Nuke Talks With China, Congressional Report Says.”
• Nov 14: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Report to Congress.
• Nov 13: Popular Mechanics, “What China’s Nuclear Missile Subs Mean for the U.S.”
• Nov 13: Tom Z. Collina, Foreign Policy, “Red Balloon: Is China Inflating the China Threat.”
• Nov 7: Dunya Buletini (Turkey), “Almanya’da ABD nükleer bombaları korkutuyor! [U.S. nuclear bomb scares in Germany].”
• Nov 6: MDR (Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk) FAKT (Germany), “US-Atombomben in Deutschland nicht brandsicher” [U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany not fireproof]. Direct link to television program.
• Oct: Frank Miller, “The Need for a Strong U.S. Deterrent in the 21st Century,” The Submarine Industrial Base Council, n.d. [2012].
• Oct 22: politifact.com, “Mitt Romney says Pakistan is on path to overtake the U.S. in nuclear weapons.”
• Oct 12: Steven Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms, Brookings Institution, October 12, 2012.
• Oct 14: Guardian (global security blog), “Cuba 50 years on – and the lessons for Iran.”
• Oct 12: New Scientists, “Threatwatch: Can we really spot covert nuclear tests?”
• Oct 12: scienceblog.com, “New Weapons Detail Reveals True Depth of Cuban Missile Crisis.”
• Oct 9: RIA Novosti, “NATO Members to Discuss Alliance’s Nuclear Policy.” Uses FAS estimate of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe but doesn’t credit.
• Oct 4: DiscoveryNews, “What’s up with Israel’s Nuke Program.”
• October: Critical Nuclear Choices for the Next Administration, American Security Project, October 2012.
• Oct 3: Project on Government Secretary, “Inspector General Warns of Budget Overruns in Nuke Refurbishment.”
• Oct 3: Voice of America (Moscow), “США и Россия раскрыли ядерные карты.”
• Oct 2: Albuquerque Journal, “Report: Nuke Refurbishing Behind Scedule.”
• Sep 25: Global Security Newswire, “Five Nations Believed to Hold Nonstrategic Nuclear Bombs, Experts Say.”
• Sep 19: Discovery News, “What is mystery weapon from 1981?”
• Sep 16: Washingon Post, “The B61 bomb: A case study in costs and needs.”
• Sep 13: Inside the Pentagon, “State Department’s Draft Report on Nuclear-Arsenal Cuts Prompts Debate.” Requires subscription.
• Sep 13: Global Security Newswire, “Seeking Kremlin Engagement, NATO Weighs Next Nuclear Posture Steps.”
• Sep 12: Arms Control Now (Oliver Meier), “No german pledge on nuclear-capable aircraft modernization.”
• Sep 7: Global Security Newswire, “Chinese Communist Newspaper Urges Bolstering Nuclear Deterrent.”
• Sep 5: Foreign Policy (Tom Hundley), “Race to the End.” Uses FAS estimate for the number of Chinese nuclear warheads but doesn’t credit.
• Sep 5: Pakistan Tribune, “India far behind Pakistan, China in nuclear technology: experts.” The article refers to our 2012 Nuclear Notebook on India but the headline hypes what we say in the article.
• Sep 4: India Today, “India’s nuclear arsenal failed by ‘unreliable’ missiles.” The article refers to our 2012 Nuclear Notebook on India but the headline is misleading for what we actually say in the article.
• Sep 3: Daily Mail Online (India), “India’s nuclear arsenal failed by ‘dud’ missiles.” The article refers to our 2012 Nuclear Notebook on India but the headline is misleading for what we actually say in the article.
• Aug 31: armscontrolwonk.com (Michael Krepon), “Worth the Wait.”
• Aug 27: Foreign Policy (Stephen Walt), “Inflating the China Threat.” Uses FAS estimate for the number of Chinese nuclear warheads but doesn’t credit.
• Aug 23: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. General Discounts Projections of Massive Chinese Nuke Stockpile.”
• Aug 23: Washington Free Beacon, “Chinese missile tests continue.”
• Aug 22: Global Seurity Newswire, “Jury Out: Do Advanced Conventional Weapons Make Nuclear War More Likely?”
• Aug 19: Washington Post (editorial), “Exploding Costs.”
• Aug 8: IDN-InDepthNews, “Halting Pakistan-India Nuclear Arms Race.”
• Aug 6: Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Nuclear Bomb’s Cost Increases Draw Congressional Scrutiny.”
• Aug 3: Global Security Newswire, “Pentagon Official Blames U.S. Bomb Cost Hike on ‘Incomplete’ DOD Agency Estimate.”
• Aug 3: China Brief (Jamestown Foundation), “Waypoint or Destination? The Jin-Class Submarine and China’s Quest for Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence.”
• Aug 1: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Senate Panel Curbs Navy Efforts to Add Missile to Attack Submarines.”
• Jul 24: Economic Times (India), “India currently has 80 to 100 nuclear warheads: US esperts.”
• Jul 11: huffingtonpost.com, “Los Alamos Underestimates Radiaiton Leak Risk.”
• Jun 18: Washington Post blog, “West cuts nuclear warheads as it negotiates with Iran.” Uses FAS estimates produced for SIPRI.
• Jun 14: Times of India, “PM takes stock of nuclear arsenal.” Uses FAS estimates produced for SIPRI.
• Jun 6: Deuche Welle, “SIPRI report shows fewer – but newer – nuclear weapons.’ Uses FAS estimates produced for SIPRI.
• Jun 6: William Hartung and Christine Anderson, Bombs Versus Budgets: Inside the Nuclear Weapons Lobby (Center for INtwernational Policy, June 2012).
• Jun 5: Press TV (India), “2200 nuclear weapons in state of high operational alert: Report.”
• Jun 5: The Telegraph, “India and Pakistan ‘escalate nuclear arms race’.” Uses data from 2012 SIPRI Yearbook.
• Jun 4: Der Spiegel, “`Atomwaffen werden weniger – und moderner” [Fewer nuclear weapons – and more modern].Uses worldwide overview of nuclear forces from latest SIPRI yearbook.
• May 23: SES Turkey, “Turkey Supports Nuclear Status Quo in NATO.”
• May 16: Der Spiegel, “US Nuclear Weapons Upgrades: Experts Report Massive Cost Increase.”
• May 12: armscontrolwonk.com, Extending Deterrence from the Triad.”
• May 11: Global Security Newswire, “B-61 Bomb Project Expense Projection Hits $6 Billion, Report Says,”
• May 11: Miles Pomper, et al., “Delaying Decisions: NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review,” NTI, May 11, 2012.
• May: Ted Seay, “Escalation by Default: The Future of NATO Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” European Leadership Network, May 2012.
• May 11: Global Security Newswire, “NATO Should Use Summit to Address U.S. Tactical Nukes in Europe, Experts Say.”
• May 10: Global Security Newswire, “Cost Worries Could Derail Plan for Next Bomber to be Unmanned, General Says.”
• May 10: Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional Reserarch Service, May 10, 2012.
• May 8: David Hoffman, “The little nukes that got away – again,” Foreign Policy.
• May 4: Haaretz (Israel), “Israel’s atomic arsenal could fall victim to a new U.S. nuclear policy.”
• May 4: defpro.daily, “Steps Needed to Break Stalemate on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.”
• May 4: Nato Watch, “Moving Beyond the NUclear tatus Quo in Europe.”
• Apr: S. Samuel C. Rajiv, Deterrence in the Shadow of Terror: US Nuclear Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11, Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis (India).
• Apr 27: Saarländische Zeitung (online), Germany, “Atomwaffenexpert zu Besuch in Berlin.”
• Apr 17: huffingtonpost.com, “ICBM Coalition Of Rural Senators Fights Nuclear Weapons Cuts.”
• Apr: George Perkovich, et al., Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO, Carnegie Endowment, April 2012.
• Mar 27: huffingtonpost.com, “Barack Obama’s Broken Nuclear Promises Undermine Success.”
• Mar 26: BBC News, “Which countries have nuclear weapons.”
• Mar 15: Jeffrey Lewis, armscontrolwonk.com, “Honest Johns in Korea.”
• Mar 15: huffingtonpost.com, “Meet the Bangor 5.”
• Feb: Toby Fenwick, Dropping the Bomb: a post Trident future, CentreForum, February 2012.
• Feb 27, Boston Globe, “Smart Nuclear Reduction,” The opinion piece appears to rely on my blog about republican disarmers but it confuses warhead catories and the warhead numbers are off.
• Feb 22: Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” February 22, 2012.
• Feb 22: Bradenton Herald (McClatchy-Tribune News Service), “Just how many nuclear weapons should be enough?”
• Feb 18: National Public Radio (AP), “Boldest Nuclear Cutters Recently? It’s Been GOP.” Also carried in Seattle Times and Pakistan’sDaily Times.
• Feb 17: James Traub, Foreign Policy, “Fumbling the Nuclear Football.”
• Feb 15: Mother Jones, “Nuclear Weapons on a Highway Near You.” Advised the magazine on locations on nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered naval vessels.
• Feb 14: Congressional Reseaech Service, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, February 14, 2012.
• Feb 14: Associated Press, “AP NewsBreak: US weighing steep nuclear arms cuts.”
• Feb 6: Adam Weinstein, Mother Jones, “Obama’s Golden Nuclear Option.”
• Feb: Addressing Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces, Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, Carnegie Endowment, February 2010.
• Jan 29: Pervez Hoodbhoy, The Tribune (Pakistan), “Pakistan’s rush for more bombs – why?”
• Jan 27: Global Security Newswire, “Pentagon Unveils New Plan for Conventional Submarine-Based Ballistic Missile.”
• Jan 25: Voice of America, “Обама: политика экономики” [Obama: The Politics of Economics].
• Jan 20: Arms Control Association panel, “Briefing on the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: Issues and Policy Options.”
• Jan 19: Stephen Pifer, “Nuclear Arms Control in 2012,” Brookings Institution, January 2012.
• Jan 19: military.com, “New Strategy Could Presage Smaller US Nuclear Arsenal.”
• Jan 18: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Energy Department Plans to Waste Billions of Dollars on Unneeded Los Alamos Lab Facility, Project on Government Oversight, January 18, 2012.
• Jan 16: Indian Express, “Nukes only for strategic purpose: Army chief.”
• Jan 8: Seattle Times, “Plan for new Navy wharf at Bangor fires up nuke debate.”

2011

• Dec 20: Reuters, “Timeline on Iran bomb narrows, but barely.”
• Dec 19: Washington Post, “Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.” The graphic, which accompanies this article, uses FAS estimates of worldwide nuclear weapons inventories.
• Dec 13: Vox Populi, “Professor’s study on China’s nuclear arsenal draws heated reaction.”
• Dec 2: AFP, “US experts skeptical over China nucler force report.”
• Nov 30: Washington Post, “Georgetown students shed light on China’s tunnel system for nuclear weapons.”
• Nov 30: Vatan (Turkey), “‘Türk nükleer bombaları’ Ceylan taşıyacak.”
• Nov 28: Haberturk (Turkey), “Türkiye’deki nükleer silah sayısı azaldı” [Reduction of Nuclear Weapons in Turkey].

• Nov 23: Washington Post, “Medvedev threatens to target US missile shield in Europe if no deal is reached.”
• Nov 8: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Blueprint for New Nuclear Arms Cuts Expected by Year’s End.”
• Nov 4: Fact Sheet: U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs, Arms Control Association. Uses FAS estimate on U.S. nuclear force levels without giving credit.
• Nov 4: Global Security Newswire, “China Seen Deploying New Nuke-Ready Ballistic Missiles.”
• Nov 4: Times of India, “Panic over China’s four new nuclear missiles.”
• Oct 30: Ian Kerns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, Discussion Paper 1 of the BASIC Trident Commission, October 30, 2011.
• Oct 28: Proceso (Mexico), “Estados Unidos: Adiós a la bomba B53″ [United States: Good Bye to the B53 bomb].
• Oct 28: Global Security Newswire, “Some Nuclear Experts Question Ramp-up in U.S. Tritium Production.”
• Oct 27: Washington Post, “U.S. keeps major lead over Russia in nuclear weapons.”
• Oct 26: Voice of America, “US-Russian nuclear surprises.”
• Oct 26: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Release New START Nuke Data.”
• Oct 26: military.com (Associated Press), “Biggest US Nuclear Bomb Dismantled in Texas.”
• Oct 26: USA Today, “U.S.-made ‘monster’ nuclear warhead B53 dismantled.”
• Oct 25: National Public Radio, “Cold War Bomb to be Dismantled.”
• Oct 25: Ekstra Bladet (Denmark), “Splitter verdens kraftigste atombombe ad” [Taking apart the world’s largest nuclear bomb].
• Oct 25: ABC News, “US dismantles last of big Cold War nuclear bombs.”
• Oct 25: Fox News (Associated Press), “US’s most powerful nuclear bomb being dismantled.”
• Oct 25: AFP, “US dismantles last big Cold War nuclear bomb.”
• Oct 25: San Francisco Chronicle (Associated Press), “US’s most powerful nuclear bomb being dismantled.”
• Oct 25: Daily Mail (UK). “Dismantling the mega-nuke.”
• Oct: Fiona Cunningham and Rory Medcalf, The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relations, Lowy Institute, October 2011.
• Oct 24: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. to Finish Disassembling Massive Nukes.”
• Oct 24: wired.com (Danger Room), “Last Nuclear ‘Monster Weapon’ Gets Dismantled.”
• Oct 24: Wall Street Journal, “How many nukes does China have?”
• Oct 17: Global Security Newswire, “Experts Divided on Impact to U.S. of Russia, China Nuke Modernization.”
• Oct 11: Huffington Post, “Global Zero Nuclear Summit Aims to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons Worldwide.”
• 2011: Ola Dahlman, et al., Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban (New York: Springer, 2011).
• Oct 3: IDN-InDepthNews.info (India), “Nuke-Free World Optimism Fading Away.”
• Sep 20: Albuquerque Journal, “Upgrading a Nuke With No Test Drive.
• Sep 20: Global Security Newswire, “Experts Question Indications of U.S. Nuclear “Hedge” Force Cuts.
• Sep 20: International Business Times, “China Launches Anti-Missile Military Weapon Raises Queries from Pentagon.”
• Sep 16: Albuquerque Journal, “The more qwe change our stockpile, the less we know it.
• Sep 13: New Scientists, “Laser fusion trio team up to develop clean power.”
• Sep: James Acton and Michael Gerson, Beyond New START: Advancing U.S. National Security Through Arms Control with Russia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2011.
• Sep: Fissile Materials Working Group, interactive map. Uses estimates generated by FAS for world nuclear weapons arsenals and reproduced by the Ploughshares Fund and in the SIPRI Yearbook.
• Aug 23: Michael Krepon, armscontrolwonk.com, “Fail Safe.”
• Aug: Oliver Meier, Revising NATO’s Nuclear Posture: The Way Forward (ACA, BASIC, IFSH, August 2011).
• Aug 9: ABC Late NIght (Australia), interview on the occasion of Nagazaki Day.
• Aug 5: ABC One Plus One (Australia), interview on the occasion of Hiroshima Day.
• Aug 5: Lowy Institute (Australia), “5-minute Lowy Lunch: Obama’s nukes.”
• Aug 2: Dr. Phillip Karber, China’s Underground Great Wall: Challenge for Nuclear Arms Control, Asia Arms Control Project, Georgetown University, August 2, 2011.
• Jul 28: Asian Scientist, “Report by Atomic Scientists Underscore Rise of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.”
• Jul 20: Global Security Newswire, “Experts: NATO Should Limit Role of Nukes, Remove U.S. Warheads.”
• Spring 2011: Pavel Podvig, Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization, IFRI, July 2011.
• Jul 8: Global Security Newswire, “Mullen: Pakistani Nuclear Controls Should Avert Any Insider Threat.”
• Jul 7: DailyIndia.com (ANI), “‘Politically Unstable’ Pakistan has world’s fastest-growing nuclear stockpile: Experts.”
• Jul 1: Global Security Newswire, “Pakistan Seen as Having Fastest Expanding Nuke Stockpile.”
• Jul 1: Indian Express, “Pak has fastest growing n-arsenal: US study.”
• Jun: Joseph Cirincione, Strategic Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons, New America Foundation, June 2011.
• Jun 29: CNN (Situation Room), “Iran Testing Potential Nuclear Missile?”
• Jun 28: Andrew Cottey, Multilaterizing Nuclear Arms Control: An Agenda for the P5, BASIC, June 28, 2011.
• Jun 25: Scientific American, “Is Karazai’s Accusation that Coalition Forces are Polluting Afghanistan with Nuclear Material Accurate or an Over-Reaction?”
• Jun 20: Ariel Cohen, et al., “Reset Regret: Obama’s Cols War-Style Arms Control Undermines U.S.-Ruissian Relations,” Heritage Foundation. Uses but misrepresents our estimate from January 2010 of Russian nuclear forces by suggesting, which we don’t, that Russia has nuclear artillery shells and and nuclear land mines. Our 2011 estimate is available here.
• Jun: Bruce Blair and Matthew Brown, World Spending on Nuclear Weapons Surpasses $1 Trillion Per Decade, Nuclear Weapons Cost Study, Global Zero Technical Report, June 2011.
• Jun 16: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Nuke Overhaul Seen Adding New Abilities.”
• Jun 16: inosmi.ru (Bloomberg), ” Модернизация ядерных бомб может разозлить Россию [Modernization of nuclear bomb may irritate Russia].”
• Jun 15: Bloomberg, “Nuclear Bomb Overhaul May Counter Obama Pledge, Anger Russia.”
• June: Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” in CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4, Issue 6, pp. 4-7.
• Jun 8: The Australian, “South Asia nuclear weapons race hots up.”
• Jun 7: livemint.com (Wall Street Journal), “India, Pakistan continue to build nuclear weapons capacity: report.” Uses data from new SIPRI Yearbook.
• Jun 3: Voice of Russia, “START-3 Interim Report.”
• Summer 2011: Col David J. Baylor, USAF, “Considerations for a US Nuclear Force Structure below a 1,000-Warhead Limit,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2011, Vol. 5, No. 2, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
• Jun 1: Global Security Newswire, “Pakistan Seen Readying to Cross Nuclear Threshold.”
• May 29: Times of India, “Short-range nukes show Pak targeting Indian forces: Expert.”
• May 27: Baker Spring and Ariel Cohen, Beware the Next  U.S.-Russian Arms Control Treaty, Heritage Foundation, May 27, 2011.
• May 24: India Today, “How safe is Pak nuclear arsenal?”
• May 21: The Sydney Morning Herald, “India may axpand nuclear program, says top adviser.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate of Indian nuclear stockpile but without credits.
• May 20: National Journal, “U.S. Nuclear Agency Releases Strategic Plan for Next Decade.”
• May 19: Global Security Newswire, “Former officials call for U.S., Russian nuclear transparency.”
• May 16: Gregory Kulacki, China’s Nuclear Arsenal: Status and Evolution, Union of Concerned Scientists, allthingsnuclear.org.
• May 15: Newsweek, “Pakistan’s Nucear Surge.”
• May 8, Times of India, “China least potent among N-powers, says Harvard study.” Uses but does not credit FAS/NRDC estimate of Chinese nuclear arsenal.
• May 5: Reuters, “Analysis: Count bin Laden have Reached Pakistan Nuclear Sites?”
• May 4: U.S. Strategic Nucler Forces: Background, Developments and Issues, Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2011.
• Apr: Steven Pifer, The United States, NATO’s Strategic Concept, and Nuclear Issues, ACA/BASIC/IFSH, April 2011.
• Apr: Mustafa Kibaroglu, Turkey, NATO & Nuclear Sharing: Prospects After NATO’s Lisbon Summit, ACA/BASIC/IFSH, April 2011.
• Apr 26: Time Magazine Battleland Blog, “NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: Here to Stay.”
• Apr 7: Gobal Security Newswire, U.S. Nuke Technology to Make British Trident Missile More Accurate.”  The article makes use of, but doesn’t credit, information first published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog.
• Apr 6: Guardian, “Trident more effective with US arming device, tests suggest.” The article makes use of, but doesn’t credit, information first published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog.
• Apr 2: Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog (The Guardian), “‘Destabilizing’ Trident warhead already being tested in US,”
• Mar: Alexei Arbatov, Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control, Carnegie Endowment, Moscow, March 2011.
• Mar: James Acton, Low Numbers: A Ptractical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, D.C., March 2011.
• Mar 31: Defence Professionals, “Report: What NATO Countries Think About Tactical Nukes.”
• Feb: Fredrik Lindvall, et al., The Baltic Approach: A Next Step? Prospects for an Arms Control Regime for Sub-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), February 2011.
• Feb 21: Andrei Zargorski, Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics and Arms Control, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, February 2011.
• Feb 19: Korea Joongang Daily, “U.S. has plan to hit WMD in north.” The article in several places misrepresents my 2009 reportObama and the Nuclear War Plan.
• Feb 10: Associated Press, “Expert: Pakistan building 4th plutonium reactor.”
• Feb 7: AFP, “Russia rebuffs U.S. call for quick arms talk.” Includes grap using FAS/NRDC estimates, but confuses “stockpiled” and “deployed” number of weapons.
• Feb 4: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Navy Rejected Key Command’s Specs for Next Nuclear-Armed Vessel.”
• Feb 2: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service.
• Feb 1: The Times of India, “At 100, Pak ahead in N-arsenal.”
• Jan 31: Voice of America, “Report Says Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal Tops 100.”
• Jan 30: Washington Post, “Pakistan doubles its nuclear arsenal.”
• Jan 19: AFP, “Russian puts brakes on further nuclear cutbacks.”
• Jan 16: Global Security Newswire, “Tactical Nukes in Europe a ‘Tiny Fraction” of Cold War Arsenal, Report Says.”
• Jan 14: Global Security Newswire, “Top Diplomat Says Arms Control Revived After New START Passage.”
• Jan 12: Associated Press, “Gates gets tour of Chinese nuclear base.”
• Jan 6: Global Security Newswire, “China Reaffirms ‘No First Use’ Nuke Role.”

2010

• Dec 29: Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books, International Panel on Fissile Materials.
• Dec 25: Washington Post, “Military strength eludes China, which looks overseas for arms.”
• Dec 22, monstersandcritics.com (DPA), “Analysis: New START offers ‘modest’ nuclear reductions.”
• Dec 22: New York Times, “Senate Works on Treaty Amendments to Draw G.O.P. Votes.”
• Dec 22, Washington Post, “Senate poised to ratify new U.S.-Russia nuclear weapons treaty; vote would be major foreign-policy victory for Obama” (uses FAS/NRDC estimates in graph).
• Dec 22: Wall Street Journal, “Nuclear Arms Pact is Poised to Pass.”
• Dec 21: New York Times, “Arms Treaty With Russia Headed to Ratification.”
• Dec 21: Global Security Newswire, “Navy Said Likely to Back New Design for Ballistic Missile Submarine.”
• Dec 20: Miami Herald (McClatchy Newspapers), “McConnell slams START, but facts don’t back him up.”
• Dec 19: Senator John Kerry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on New START. Uses FAS/NRDC estimates of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
• Dec 16: redorbit.com, “Federation of American Scientists Urges Nuclear Weapons Treaty Before New Year.”
• Dec 15: Senator Dianne Feinstein, “New START Treaty,” Congressional Record.
• Dec 9, Bob Alvarez, The Huffington Post, “Time for Nuclear Savings Bonds?”
• Dec 1: CNN, “WikiLeaks: Heated debate in Germany over nuclear weapons on its soil.”
• Dec: Michael Izbicki (ENS, USN), “What’s Wrong with America’s Nuclear Hawks?,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2010, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 134-143.
• Nov 30: Voice of America (Russia), “Гонка вооружений: старая угроза на новый лад [The arms race: the old threat in a new way].”
•  Nov 27: Kitsap Sun, “Navy’s Trident Nuclear Warheads Hit the Highway, Bound for Texas.”

• Nov 26: Information (Denmark), “Obama må begrave sin vision om en atomvåbenfri verden” [Obama must bury his vision of a nuclear free world].
• Nov 24: Global Security Newswire, “NATO Sets Basis for Tactical Nuclear Cutbacks, But Path Remains Uncertain.”
• Nov 21: Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog, The Guardian, “NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons: the new doctrine.”
• Nov 20, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Los Angeles Times, “Indefensible.”
• Nov 19, New York Times, “Cost and Goals at Center of Arms Treaty Debate.”
• Nov 19: James Traub, Foreign Affairs, “The Bomb Squad.”
• Nov 11: The Economist, “Fewer dragons, more snakes.”
• Nov 11: A. H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief NUmber 61, November 11, 2011.
• Nov 10: David Hoffman, Foreign Affairs, “The Nuclear Excess.”
• Nov: Micah Zenco, Toward Deeper Reductions in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons (Council on Foreign Relations, November 2010).
• Nov: Jeffrey Lewis, Managing the Dangers from Pakistan’s Nuclear Stockpile (New America Foundation, November 2010).
• Oct 28: Russia Today, “Oops! US Air Force Looses 50 Nukes.”
• Oct 28: USA Today, “‘Glitch’ took US nuclear missiles offline.”
• Oct 14: The Guardian, “Germany demands Nato show greater commitment to nuclear disarmament.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe without credits.
• Oct 12: Global Security Newswire, “NATO Defense, Diplomatic Chiefs to Mull Strategy Document.”
• Oct 10: The Telegraph, “Pakistan’s nuclear arms push angers America.”
• Oct 7: Time Magazine, “NATO Ponders What to Do with Its Nuclear Weapons.”

• Sep 30: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. May Disable Some Submarine-Based Nuclear Arms Capacity.”
• Sep 27: Global Security Newswire, “Proposed Ballistic-Missile Submarine Nears Pentagon Review.”
• Sep 27: Fred Kaplan, Time Magazine, “No More Nukes?”
• Sep 22: Global Security Newswire, “Senate Panel Again Cuts Funds for Conventional Trident Missile.”
• Sep 14: Global Security Newswire, “NNSA Chief Sees Opportunity, Challenge in Merging Two Warhead Updates.”
• Sep 1: Bruce Blair, et al., “Smaller and Safer: A New Plan for Nuclear Postures,” Foreign Affairs, Technical Appendix, September 1, 2010, p. 56.
• Aug 26: Steven Andreasen, Malcolm Chalmers and Isabelle Williams, “NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Is a New Consensus Possible?,” RUSI, August 24, 2010.
• Aug 26: Jacob Kipp, “Russian Drivers of Russia’s Nuclear Force Posture,” NPEC, August 26, 2010.
• Aug: Samuel Black, “The Changing Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Threats from 1970 to 2010,” Stimson Center, August 2010.
• Aug 17: Global Security Newswire, “Nations Look Increasingly to U.S. Conventional Forces for Deterrence.”
• Aug 10: Global Security Newswire, “Future Navy Submarine to Stick With Nuclear Mission.”
• Aug 8: Times of India, “India lags behind Pakistan in nuclear armoury: US expert.”
• Aug 6: Moeed Yusuf and Ashley Pandya, The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia: A Reality Check, United States Institute for Peace, August 6, 2010.
• Aug 2: Times of India (TNN), “Pak has as much fissile material as India: Report.”
• Jul 30: Time, “Britain Takes Another Look at Its Nuclear Subs.”
• Jul 16: Jane’s Defence Weekly, “US nuclear stewardship plan could herald stockpile reduction.”
• Jul 15: Washington Post, “Obama plan outlines reductions in U.S. nuclear arsenal.”
• Jul 15: Los Angeles Times, “U.S. plans to increase nuclear spending.”
• Jul 15: China Post (Taiwan), “Obama plans to cut up to 40 percent of nukes in U.S.”
• Jul 14, Baltimore Sun Blog, “Even as Obama plan reduces nuclear arsenal, overall spending increases.”
• Jul 14: CSIS poniblogger’s blog, “Obama Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan Details Stockpile Cuts, Infrastructure Investments.”
• Jul 13: Associated Press, “Obama plans to cut up to 40 percent of nukes.”
• Jul 13: Wired News, “Fewer Nukes, More Cash: Energy Dep’t Wants $175 Billion for Weapons Complex.”
• Jul 13: UPI, “DOE plan to cut nuke weapons by 40 percent.”
• Jul 13: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Details Planned Nuclear Stockpile Cut, Funding Priorities.’
• Jul 10: S D Pradhan, Times of India, “Growing Chinese Nuclear Power.”
• Jun 29: Discovery News, “Recycles Missiles Tapped to Launch Satellites.”
• Spring: Jing-dong Yuan, Chinese Perceptions of the Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Prospects and Potential Problems in Disarmament(French Institute for Interntional Relations (IFRI), Spring 2010).
• Jun: Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” Arms Control Today, June 2010.
• Jun 13: Associated Press, “Air Force nuclear squadron in NM passes inspection.”
• Jun 3: The Times of India, “Pakistan’s nuke arsenal bigger than India’s.”
• Jun 3: Strategic Security Newswire, “Eight Nations Hold 7,540 Deployed Nukes, Report Finds.”
• May: Reducing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament (New Jersey: Princeton University, International Panel on Fissile Materials, May 2010).
• May: Malcolm Chalmers, Nuclear Narratives: Reflections on Declaratory Policy (London: RUSI, 2010)
• May 18: Global Security Newswire (Albuquerque Journal), NNSA Seeks $40M for Nuke Refurbishment Study.”
• May 12: Reuters, “Russia says may lift veil on nuclear arsenal.”
• May 10: Guardian (Associated Press), “Outdated, unwanted, US nuke hang on in Europe.” The article extensively relies on FAS/NRDC estimates but without giving credit.
• May 5: Associated Press, “Private sleuths once pierced nuclear veil.”
• May 5: Global Security Newswire, “Russia Seen Under Pressure to Disclose Arsenal Details.”
• May 4: Science Magazine, “U.S. Reveals 5113 Nukes in Stockpile, Estimate by ‘Nuclear Geek’ Was Off by Only 87.”
• May 4: The Guardian (Jualian Borger’s Global Security Blog), “Coming clean on nuclear weapons.”
• May 4: Bloomberg Businessweek, “Iran Faces Pressure to Prove Peaceful Aims of Nuclear Program.”
• May 4: Los  Angeles Times, “U.S. discloses size of nuclear arsenal.”
• May 3: New York Times, “Europe Lacks Plan on Nuclear Arms.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe but without giving credit.
• May 4: Washington Post (AP), “US says it has 5,113 nuclear warheads.”
• May: Tara McKelvey, Boston Review, “A New Start: Prospects for Obama’s ‘Global Zero’.”
• Apr 29: Periodismo Humano (Spain), “EEUU guarda en Europa 200 bombas atómicas.”
• Apr 28: David Hoffman, Foreign Policy, “Obama’s Atomic Choices.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. non-deployed nuclear weapons, but without giving credit.
• Apr 26: Lt. Col. Michael Byrne, CDR Douglas Edson and Lt. Col. Andrea Hlosek, American Diplomacy, “A Nuclear Weapons Free NATO.”
• Apr 25: Daily Kos, “No “Reset Button” for Tactical Nuclear Weapons.”
• Apr 23; Washington Post, “NATO seeks limits on plan for nuclear disarmament.”
• Apr 22: New York Times, “U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts.”
• Apr 22: Washington Post, “NATO ministers want disarmament, within limits.”
• Apr 22: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe but without giving credit.
• Apr 22, Assocated Press, “Clinton reaffirms US commitment to defend Europe.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe but without giving credit.
• Apr 22: Washington Post, “NATO ministers to discuss U.S. nuclear arms.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe but without giving credit.
• Apr: KLS Review (Malaysia), three interviews relating to China, April 2010. Requires subscription.
• Apr: Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2010, Project on Managing the Atom, April 2010.
• Apr 15: Dallas News, “Arms treaty to bring more work Pantex’s way.”
• Apr 15: Julien Mercille, Asia Times Online, “New treaty is a slow start.”
• Apr 14: Russia Today, “Keeping Pandora’s box shut.”
• Apr 13: Russia Today, “Nuclear summit addresses a post-Cold War world.”
• Apr 13: U.S. News & World Report, “A Change for U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Hans Kristensen on nuclear war planning and non-proliferation.”
• Apr 13: CNN Newsroom, 9 AM EST, Nuclear Summit coverage. Uses FAS map for estimated locations of nuclear weapons.
• Apr 13: Global Security Newswire, “Norway, Poland Urge Talks on Tactical Nukes in Europe.”
• Apr 13: Focus Online (Germany), “In Deutschland gelagerte US-Atombomben rücken in Blickpunkt.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe but apparently without giving credit.
• Apr 12: CNN The Situation Room, “President Obama Holds Nuke Summit.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimated for world nuclear weapons.
• Apr 12: Globe and Mail (Canada), “Q&A: Hans Kristensen, nuclear arms expert.”
• Apr 12: Discovery News, “Nuclear Summit 2010: It’s Kind of a Big Deal.”
• Apr 11: David Hoffman, Washington Post, “Despite new START, the U.S. and Russia still have too many nuclear weapons.”
• Apr 10: Yonhap News Agency (South Korea), “N. Korea has up to 6 nuclear weapons: Clinton.” For our actual weapons estimates, gohere.
• Apr 8: Jonathan Shell, CNN, “Nuclear balance of terror must end.”
• Apr 8: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, U.S.. Non-Strategic Nuclear  Weapons in Europe: A Fundamental NATO Debate, April 8, 2010.
• Apr 8: New York Times, “With Arms Pact, Disarmament Challenge Remains.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for warhead levels.
• Apr 8: Associated Press: “Nuclear treaty would cut only long-range arms.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for warhead levels.
• Apr 7: physicstoday.org, “Obama’s nuclear posture review.”
• Apr 7: Washington Post, “New nuclear arms policy shows limits U.S. faces.”
• Apr 7: Time, “Obama’s Nuclear Strategy: What’s Different?”
• Apr 6: Globe and Mail (Canada), “Obama’s new nuclear strategy maintains first-strike option.”
• Apr 1: Air Force Times, “New treaty could trim nuclear role of bombers.”
• Mar: Union of Concerned Scientists, “New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Factsheet.”
• Mar 30: New York Times, “Arms Control May Be Different Things on Paper and on the Ground.”
• Mar 30: Time Magazine, “U.S.-Russia Nuke Treaty: Small Step on a Long Road.”
• Mar 29: Global Security Newswire, “China Weighs Engaging With U.S. on Nuclear Posture.”
• Mar 27: Washington Post, “U.S., Russia agree to nuclear arms control treaty.”
• Mar 26: Politico (in frederiksburg.com), “Lab chiefs share nuke safety doubts.”
• Mar 26: Los Angeles Times, “Russian, US presidents to finalize arms treaty, set date for signin.”
• Mar 25: New York Times, “Treaty Advances Obama’s Nuclear Vision.”
• Mar 25: Associated Press, “Treaty to cut US-Russia nukes; signing in 2 weeks.”
• Mar 24: Russia Today (The Alyona Show), “A New START.”
• Mar 22: Asian Tribune, “Pakistan lobbying hard for n-deal akin to India-US pact.”
• Mar: Gregory Kulacki, Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture, Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2010.
• Mar 22: Interfax (Russia), “”Если договор СНВ не будет подписан до мая, это станет плохим сигналом.” A not very good Google translation is here.
• Mar 20: ABC News, “What’s the Point of Nuclear Weapons on Instant Alert?”
• Mar 18: Breitbart (Kyodo News), “U.S. Air Force includes frozen nuke project in draft FY2011 budget+.”
• Mar: Malcolm Calmers and Simon Lunn, NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, Royal United Services Institute, March 2010.
• Mar 15: Der Spiegel Online, “Washington Mulls Modernization of Aging Bombs.”
• Mar 14: armscontrolwonk.com, “NATO’s Nuclear Opacity.”
• Mar 14: Associated Press, “US cautious on removing nuclear arms from Europe.”
• Mar 12: Mark Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Stoage and Handling System, Project 2049 Institute, March 12, 2010.
• Mar 11: National Public Radio, All Things Considered, “Japan Confirms Secret Nuclear Pacts With U.S.”
• Mar 11: Global Security Newswire, “China Seen Building Long-Range Missiles for Conventional Strikes.”
• Mar 11: Space War (AFP), “Top campaigner scoffs at Euro noises on US nukes.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and size of global arsenal, but without giving credit.
• Mar 9: Global Security Newswire, “Pentagon Eyes More Than $800 Million for New Nuclear Cruise Missile.”
• Mar 6: Washington Post, “Obama must decide degree to which U.S. swears off nuclear weapons.”
• Mar 4: mil.huanqiu.com, “谷歌地球曝光094核潜发射筒打开状态图.”
• Mar 3: Sydney Morning Herald (AFP), “US nuclear arms treaty stalls over Russian demands.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for U.S. nuclear forces, but without giving credit.
• Mar 3: Stars and Stripes, “NATO allies want U.S. nuclear weapons out of Europe.”
• Mar 3: Globe and Mail, “Nuclear cuts, yes, but still plenty of U.S. bombs.”
• Mar: Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association, “Elimate NATO’s Nuclear Relics,” Arms Control Today, March 2010″ Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, but without giving credit.
• Mar 2: Space War (AFP), “Five NATO nations call for nuclear rethink.” Uses earlier FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, but without giving credit.
• Mar 2: Russia Today, “US reducing nukes, arsenal to remain strong.”
• Mar 2: Johan Bergenäs, World Politics Review, “Bombs Away: Removing Tactical Nukes from Europe.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for US nuclear weapons in Europe but without giving credit.
• Mar 1: Global Security Newswire, “Obama Team Might Speed Up Disassembly of Older Nuclear Warheads.”
• Mar 1: AFP, “Obama plans ‘dramatic reductions’ in US nuclear weapons.”
• Mar 1: Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog, The Guardian Online, “Living up to nuclear expectations.’
• Mar 1: Adam B. Lowther, Air Force Research Institute, “Should the United States Maintain the Nuclear Triad?,” Air & Space Power Journal, March 1, 2010.
• Feb: Christopher A. Preble, From Triad to Dyad, Nuclear Proliferation Update, Cato Institute, February 2010. Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. nuclear warheads but without giving credit.
• Feb: NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent and its Relevance in the 21st Century, NATO Defence College, Senior Course 115, February 2010.
• Feb 28: The Guardian/Observer, “Barack Obama orders new nuclear review amid growing feud.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for US nuclear weapons in Europe without giving credits.
• Feb 27: FUTUR QUANTIQUE (France), “Des missiles de croisière nucléaires destinés à qui?”
• Feb 25: Der Spiegel Online, “German Foreign Minister Pushes for NATO Nuclear Drawdown.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe without giving credits.
• Feb 25: The Cable (Foreign Policy), “Nuclear Posture Review delayed until mid to late March.”
• Feb 25: Pavel Podvig, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “What to do about tactical nuclear weapons.”
• Feb 22: The Guardian, “Five Nato states to urge removal of US nuclear arms in Europe.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for nuclear weapons in Europe, but without credits.
• Feb 22, Global Security Newswire, “Nuclear Agency Officials Defend Rate of Warhead Dismantlement.”
• Feb 22: Greg Thielmann, Arms Control Association, “New START Verification: Fitting the Means to the Ends.”
• Feb 20: AFP, “Allied bid for Obama to remove US European nuclear stockpil.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for nuclear weapons in Europe but doesn’t credit.
• Feb 17: Global Security Newswire, “Peace Activists Trespass at Belgian Base Housing U.S. Nukes.”
• Feb 16: Der Spiegel, “Ex-NATO Head Robertson Skeptical of Removing Nukes from Germany.” The article as well as Mr. Robertson uses FAS/NRDC estimates for the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and for Russian non-strategic weapons.
• Feb 15: James Carroll, The Boston Globe, “Nuclear sites vulnerable to break-ins.”
• Feb 11: Los Angeles Times (AP), “Official: Problems at Air Force nuclear weapons site in New Mexico were administrative.”
• Feb 10: Washington Post (AP), “Air Force decertifies nuclear warheads unit in NM.”
• Feb 10: Los Angeles Times (AP), “Squadron that handles nuclear warheads at New Mexico base is decertified by Air Force.”
• Feb 10, David J. Baylor, Lt Col, USAF, Considerations for U.S. Nuclear Force Structure Below a 1,000 Warhead Limit (Alabama: Air War College, Air University, February 10, 2010).
• Feb 9: Inside Defense, “Defense Officials Defer To NATO On Fate of U.S. Nuclear Arms in Europe.” Requires subscription.
• Feb 8: Franklin Miller, et al., Germany Opens Pandora’s Box, Centre for European Reform, February 8, 2009.
• Feb 8: Inside the Air Force, “Kirtland AFB unit loses nuclear mission.
• Feb 4: AOL News, “Belgian Activists Breach Security Around US Nukes.”
• Feb 4, RTBF (Belgium), “Des pacifistes filment leur incursion à Kleine Brogel.”
• Feb 4: De Morgen (Belgium), “Bomspotters op Kleine-Brogel filmden inval.”
• Feb 3: Washington Post, “Obama budget seeks 13.4 percent increase for National Nuclear Security Administration.”
• Feb 2: Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, New York Times/International Herald Tribune, “Next, the Tactical Nukes.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for non-strategic nuclear weapons.
• Jan: Simon Saradzhyan, Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability? (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, December 2010).
• Jan 25: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Should Embrace Using Nukes for Nuclear Threat Only, Experts Say.”
• Jan 19: Global Security Newswire, “Nuclear Bomb Update Effort Slowed by Posture Review, Science Studies.”
• Jan 18: Air Force Times, “Report backs end of bombers’ nuclear role.”
• Jan 13: Taiwan News, “China says missile defense system test successful.”
• Jan 12: The Telegraph, “China tests new technology to shoot down missiles in mid-air.”
• Jan 12: The Guardian, “China ‘successfully tests missile interceptor.
• Jan 12: Time (AP), “China: Missile Defense System Test Successful.”
• Jan 7: Global Security Newswire, “U.S., British Might Share Firing Device to Update Nuclear Arms.”
• Jan 7: Time Magazine, “Obama’s Nuclear Arms Pledge Hits Stumbling Block.”
• Jan 4: Los Angeles. “Obama’s nuclear-free vision mired in debate.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for US nuclear arsenal and deployment in Europe without credits.

2009

• Fall: Dennis Gormley, MIIS, The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions. Dealing with American Conventional Superiority, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, fall 2009.
• Dec: Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. Widely uses FAS/NRDC estimates for strategic and non-strategic warhead numbers.
• Dec 27: Chicago Tribune, “Obama’s Nuke-Free Vision Drawing Fire.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for US nuclear arsenal without credits.
• Dec 22: Greg Thielmann with Luke Champlia, Arms Control Association, “Dealing With Long-Range Missile Threats: It’s All About Russia.”
• Dec 18: Russian Today, “Nuclear limbo? No new START.”
• Dec: Dana J. Johnson, et al., Triad, Dyad, Monad? Shaping the U.S. Nuclear Force for the Future, Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies.
• Dec 11: arstechnica.com, “Google opens satellite images, tools, to study deforestation.”
• Dec 7: Yonhap News Agency (South Korea), “N. Korea not yet developed nuke delivery system: expert.”
• Dec 2: Time.com, “What to Do About Europe’s Secret Nukes.”
• Dec: James Acton, “Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve,” in Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.
• Nov 30: Defense News, “China’s Subs Getting Quieter: But Still Louder Than Older Russian Submarines.”
• Nov 30: Global Security Newswire, “South Korean President Proposes Nuclear Summit With Kim Jong Il.”
• Nov 27: The Malaysian Insider, “The ‘secret’ US-Japan pact with loaded content.”
• Nov 23: Bob Van Der Zwaan and Tom Sauer, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Time to reconsider U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.”Uses FAS/NRDC estimates for US nuclear weapons in Europe without credit, and misrepresents data.
• Nov 23: Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey.”
• Nov 17: The Faster Insider, “How Nukes Are Like Toys Still in Their Box on ‘Antiques Roadshow’.”
• Nov 24, armscontrolwonk.com, “China’s Noisy New Boomer.”
• Nov 23: Reuters, “U.S., Russia study ways to extend START verification.”
• Nov 23: Kyodo News (Japan), “Japan lobbied for robust nuclear umbrella before power shift.”
• Nov 22: Daily Kos, “Playing Chess With Russia: An Update on the New START Agreement.”
• Nov 17: RTT News (India), “Pakistan Possesses More Nuclear Weapons Than India: Report.”
• Nov 16: Army Times, “237 nuke handling deficiencies cited since 2001.”
• Nov 16: Global Security Newswire, “Russia, U.S. Expect New Nuke Treaty in December.”
• Nov 14: Russia Today, “‘Deep nuke cuts impossible unless other nuclear states join US and Russia’.”
• Nov 13: Washington Post, “A nuclear power’s act of proliferation.”
• Nov 10: Russia Today, “‘Russian and US both have huge interest in signaling the Cold War is over’.”
• Nov 7: Asahi Shimbun, “Japan in call to U.S. to retain nukes.”
• Nov 6: The Guardian, “Germans press for removal of US nuclear weapons in Europe.” The article cites FAS research on the U.S. nuclear deployment in Europe, but without credits.
• Nov 4: Global Security Newswire, “Multilateral Input Needed on German Plan for U.S. Nukes, NATO Head Says.”
• Nov: Masa Takubo, Arms Control Today, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Japan, the U.S., and ‘Sole Purpose’”
• Fall: Michael Krepon, The French Institute of International Relations, “Numerology in the Second Nuclear Age.”
• Oct 29: International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2009.” FAS and NRDC produced the worldwide list of nuclear weapons storage locations. An inventory narrative from the report is here.
• Oct 28: Russia Today, “US will welcome request to withdraw nukes from Germany.”
• Oct 28: New York Times, “Ridding Germany of U.S. Nuclear Weapon.” The article unfurtunately lists the number of nuclear bombs in Europe as 480 bombs (the number in 2001), instead of the current number of approximately 200.
• Oct 25: Deutche Welle, “Experts support Westerwelle’s quest to rid Germany of US nuclear arms.”
• Oct 23: Associated Press, “Pakistan: Bomber kills 7 near military complex.”
• Oct 22: defence.professionals (Germany), “New German administration likely to ask US to remove remaining nuclear weapons from Germany.”
• Oct 20, Global Security Newswire, “Russia, U.S. Urged to Address Nuclear Alert Postures.”
• Oct 20: Washington Post, “Lowering the alert levels in U.S. and Russia.”
• Oct 17: German Times, “Forgotten Bombs.”
• Oct 13: Huffington Post (Joe Cirincione), “Will Japan Go Nuclear?”
• Oct 12: India Daily, “Will Israel and India allow unsecured Pakistani nukes in the wake of audacious weekend assault by Islamic militants on Pakistan’s army headquarters?”
• Oct 12: Associated Press, “Security of Pakistan nuclear weapons questioned.”
• Oct 7: Mitsuo Takai, UPI Asia, “U.S.-China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday.”
• Oct 1: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Sea-Based Missiles Seen as “Core” Nukes, Maybe at ICBM Expense.”
• Oct: Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, Arms Control Today, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons.”
• Sep 25: China Daily, “Nuke-free world urged.”
• Sep 22: Live Science, “Why It’s So Hard to Make Nuclear Weapons.”
• Sep 21: Associated Press (Beijing), “China says military arsenal comparable with West.”
• Sep 14: Outlook India, “‘Not A Fizzle, But Certainly Not What India Claims’.”
• Sep 11: Yonhap News (South Korea), “N. Korea appears to have 10 nuclear warheads: report.” The article headline misrepresents ourestimate.
• Sep 9: The Canberra Times, “Folly in India’s nuclear ways.”
• Sep 8: New York Times, “Pentagon Checks Arsenal in Race for Nuclear Treaty.”
• Sep 8: Global Security Newswire, “Pakistan Seeks Additional Nuclear-Weapon Capabilities, Analysts Assert.”
• Sep 6: Times of India, “May have to revisit nuclear no-first use policy: Army chief.”
• Sep 4: UPI, “Pakistan denies nuclear arsenal claim.”
• Sep 3: The Telegraph (UK), “Pakistan ‘developing’ advanced nuclear technology.”
• Sep 2: DNAIndia (PTI), “Army chief says Pakistan going ‘beyond nuclear deterrence’.”
• Sep 2: TimesNow.tv (India), “Army chief slams Pak for ‘secret nuclear expansion’.” Video of Indian Army chief statement here.
• Sep 2: Economic Times (India), “‘Pak busy increasing nuke stockpile’.”
• Sep 2: TimesNow.tv (India), “Debate: How should we respond to Pak’s nuclearisation?” (includes lengthy TV debate).
• Sep 1: India Today, “Pak nuclear storage site on satellite map.”
• Sep 1: Deccan Herald (Indian), “‘Pak enhancing its nuclear weapons capabilities’.”
• Sep 1: Times of India, “Pak’s ‘India specific’ nuke arsenal exposed.”
• Sep 1: IBN (India), “Pak increasing nuclear weapons: US scientist.”
• Sep: Sekai Magazine (Japan), “被爆国日本は核軍縮の足かせとなるのか.”
• Sep: Paul Schulte, “Alliance Requirements for Deterrence: Capabilities and Options for the Next Decade,” Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 4, Monterey Postgratuate School, September 2009.
• Aug 27: Global Security Newswire. “Pentagon Vetting Could Delay Warhead Modernization Plan.”
• Aug 26: C-SPAN, “U.S. Nuclear Policy.” [Note: The start of the video overlaps with another program. The FAS meeting starts about 2.5 minutes into the video.]
• Aug 21: Slate, “Will the Pentagon Thwart Obama’s Dream of Zero?”
• Aug 21: Nezavisimaya Gazeta (ng.ru), “For the collapse of Russia, and after…” The article makes extensive use of information on this FAS Strategic Security Blog but without giving credit.
• Aug 18: Global Security Newswire, “Inside Obama Administration, a Tug of War Over Nuclear Warheads.”
• Aug 5: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes, State Department Official Says.”
• Aug 3: bgfactor.org (Russia), “От 1945 г. САЩ са произвели 66 500 атомни бомби и ядрени бойни глави” [Since 1945 the United States Built 66,500 Nuclear Weapons].
• Aug: Svend Aage Christensen, “The Marshal’s Baton: There is no bomb, there was no bomb, they were not looking for a bomb,” Danish Institute for International Studies, August 2009.
• Aug: Physics Today, “Obama and Medvedev set new limits on nuclear arsenals; further cuts likely.”
• Jul 29: De Morgen (Belgium), “Tactische kernwapens hebben geen nut meer in Europa.”
• Jul 28: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Defense Official Skeptical of Revising Nuclear Deterrence Strategy.”
• Jul: Dennis Gormley, et al., “Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership,” Monterey Institute. Study prepared for the Policy Planning Staff Foreign Office, Federal Republic of Germany.
• Jul 10: xinjunshi.com (China), “中印对峙:中国大量最新杀手锏被逼提前服役!” [Google translation: Confrontation between China and India: China’s trump card forced a large number of up-to-date service in advance!].
• Jul 9: San Francisco Chronicle (op-ed by Senator Feinstein), “Russian nuclear agreement a good start.”
• Jul 9: Asia Times Online, “Mixed signals over Chinese missiles.”
• Jul 9: CIGI (Canada), “Thank goodness the nuclear accountants are back.”
• Jul 8: Nukes of Hazards Blog, “Keith Payne vs. Keith Payne.”
• Jul 8: Politics Daily, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About.”
• Jul 8: The Sun Daily (Malaysia), “‘Joe One’ sparks nuclear arms race.”
• Jul 8: USA Today, “U.S., Russia settle on nuclear arsenal cuts.”
• Jul 7: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Arms Control Proponents Laud Obama-Medvedev Pact as ‘Progress’.”
• Jul, NHK (Japan), “No More Hibakusha.” Uses estimates for nuclear weapons.
• Jun-Jul: Scott Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 163-182.
• Jun 30: Global Security Newswire, “‘Global Zero’ Backers Propose U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cuts to 1,000 by 2018.”
• Jun 29, segye.com (South Korea), columnish, “Urgent Need for Action.” The columnist says FAS estimates Israel has 100-200 nuclear weapons of which about 10 percent ar thermonuclar. The actual estimate is around 80 warheads.
• Jun 24: New Scientists, “Bombers vs verifiers: A nuclear race worth winning.”
• Jun 16: Associated Press, “China acknowledges incident between sub, US ship.”
• Jun 12: Jamestown Foundation, Andrew S. Erickson, Michael S. Chase, “China’s SSBN Forces: Transitioning to the Next Generation.”
• Jun 11: Reuters, “North Korea, Iran joined on missile work: U.S. general.”
• Jun 10: Global Security Newswire, “Talk of U.S. Plans to Secure Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Called ‘Wildly Hypothetical’.” Refers to our warhead estimate for Pakistan.
• Jun 10: Global Security Newswire, “Iran Could Put U.S. in Missile Range by 2015, Air Force Report Warns.”
• June: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, “An Undersea Deterrent?”
• Spring: Disarmament Policy (Acronym Institute), “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons.”
• May 30: National Journal Magazine, “Road To Zero Nukes Remains Fraught.”
• May 28: The Australian, “Beijing’s missile stockpile growing.” The article uses our warhead estimates, while describing a new Jane’s report that appears to recycle old news about China’s nuclear modernization.
• May 26: Rolling Stone, “Another North Korean Dud?”
• May 26: New York Times, “North Korean Nuclear Claim Draws Global Criticism.”
• May 26: New York Times, “Seismic Readings From North Korea Blast Appear to Point to a Small Nuclear Test.”
• May 25: ABC News, “U.S. reacts to N.K. nuclear tests.” You’ll have to wait for the commercial to end.
• May 25: wirednews.com, “North Korea’s Nuke: How Big?”
• North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test, UN Council to Meet Today.”
• May 24, Taipei Times, “China calls on US, Russia to cut their nuclear arsenals.”
• May 15: Congressional Research Service, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues.”
• May 15, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Holds Blueprint for Securing Pakistani Nukes, Sources Say.” Uses our estimate for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, but doesn’t credit.
• May 15: Trend News (Azerbaijan), “Inaccuracy in counting nuclear warheads can complicate U.S.-Russia negotiations: expert.”
• May 13: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Needs 15 Years to Dismantle Retired Warheads; Backlog Could Increase Under Obama.”Refers to FAS/NRDC dismantling estimate described in USA Today article but cuts out FAS.
• U.S. warhead disposal in 15-year backlog.”
• May 7: Toronto Star, “Pakistan calls fears over nuclear security overblown.”
• May 6: William Perrry, et al., American’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, May 6, 2009. The report uses our estimates in its list of estimated world nuclear warhead arsenals (p. 111).
• May 6: Global Security Newswire, “U.S., Russia Could Discuss Nonstrategic Nuke Cutbacks After START Talks.”
• May 5: Paul Bernstein (SAIC), “The Evolution of United States Nuclear Strategy and War Planning1945-2000 – A Primer,” unpublished briefing to MORS (Military Operations Research Society) Nuclear Online Workshop.
• May 1: National Security Archive, “‘How Much is Enough?’: The U.S. Navy and ‘Finite Deterrence’.”
• May: Steven Pifer, “Beyond START: Negotiating the Next Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions,” Brookings Institution.
• Apr: William Perry, et al., U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2009.
• Apr 28: Associated Press (on yahoo news), “Russia: START replacement talks set for May.” Uses estimates for U.S. and Russia deployed strategic nuclear forces, but without credit.
• Apr 27: Global Security Newswire, “New U.S. Global Strike Command to Juggle Nuclear, Conventional Missions.”
• Apr 18: Wall Street Journal, “China, Friend or Foe?”
• Apr 17: Pravda, “Russia’s nuclear attack on U.S. may start with major banks.”
• Apr 17: RIA Novosti, “12 Russian targets for U.S. nuclear missiles.”
• Apr 16: bigness.ru, “Ядерный удар по США должен начаться с банков.”
• Apr 16: RIA Novosti (comment), “Pentagon’s new concept: what will Russia respond with?”
• Apr 16: RIA Novosti, “Senior Russian senator hits out at U.S. nuclear deterrence report.”
• Apr 15: Russia Today, “An alternative nuclear posture?” FAS’s Hans Kristensen interview about FAS/NRDC study on a new nuclear policy toward elimination of nuclear weapons.
• Apr 15: Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman, Russian Duma International Affairs Committee (on Russia Today). Kosachev and journalist misrepresent FAS/NRDC study by suggesting it recommends retargeting US nuclear forces against Russian industry.
• Apr 15: Aleksandr Pikaev (on Russia Today), ““Russia needs its intellectual response to US scientists’ nuclear report’.” Interview is onyoutube.com.
• Apr 15: Russia Today, “Nuclear deterrent needs reform – US think tank.”
• Apr 15: Kommersant (Russia), “U.S. scientists pinpoint new nuclear targets for President Obama.”
• Apr 15: Pravda, “U.S. retargets nuclear missiles to 12 Russian economic facilities.” This news report is highly misleading by misrepresenting what the study says.
• Apr 15: RIA Novosti, “U.S. experts propose minimal deterrence nuclear targeting policy.”
• Apr 14: Washington Post, “Report Urges Updating of Nuclear Weapons Policy.”
• Apr 10: Global Security Newswire,”Nuclear Analysts Propose ‘Minimal Deterrence’ Force Numbering 500 Warheads.”
• Apr 10: IRNA (Iran), “German FM urges removal of US atomic weapons from Germany.”
• Apr 10: RTBF (Belgium), “Steinmeier pour un retrait des armes nucléaires américaines d’Allemagne.”
• Apr 9: Global Security Newswire, “Nuclear Arsenal Reductions Face Serious Obstacles, Experts Say.”
• Apr 9: Time Magazine, “Reducing Nuclear Weapons: How Much Is Possible?”
• Apr 8: Science Daily, “Nuclear Policy On The Path Toward Nuclear Disarmament: New Report.”
• Apr 8: rightsidenews.com, “New Report Recommends Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Nuclear Disarmament.”
• Apr 6: CNN Situation Room, “Ridding the World of Nuclear Weapons.”
• Apr 6: Der Spiegel, “Abrüstungsplan entfacht Debatte um US-Atomwaffen in Deutschland.” Uses FAS/NRDC estimate for U.S. weapons in Europe, but credits secondary source. 
• Apr 4: Secret Défense (Liberation, France), “Otan: le retour de la défense collective.” Uses estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe in speculating that President Obama’s Prague speech would announce (which it didn’t) the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.
• Apr 1: Chuck Hagel, et al., Op-Ed, Financial Times, “Scrapping Nuclear Arms is Now Realpolitik.” Uses estimate for total nuclear weapons.
• Apr: Stimson Center, Unlocking the Road to Zero: China and India.
• Apr: Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Arms Control in the Obama Administration,” in Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 2, Naval Postgraduate School, April 2009.
• Mar 30: World Council of Churches, Appeal to NATO. Letter includes estimate for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
• Mar 28: Associated Press (Moscow), “Hitting reset: US, Russia face tough nuclear talks.”
• Mar 24: New York Times (editorial), “Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms.” Uses estimate for nuclear weapons in Europe, but without credits.
• Mar 23: International Herald Tribune, “France will compensate victims of nuclear tests.” Uses older estimate as “last year’s” estimate of French nuclear forces; the updated estimate is here.
• Mar 23: New York Times, “France Agrees to Pay Nuclear Test Victim.” Uses older estimate as “last year’s” estimate of French nuclear forces; the updated estimate is here.
• Mar 22: chinanews.com.cn, “美核潜艇巡航频繁 “8010核战计划”指向中俄(图).” Google translation here. Refers to AP story on March 16, 2009, about FAS blog on U.S. ballistic missile submarine patrols.
• Mar 20: Global Security Newswire, “Quickly Interpreting North Korea Launch Could Prove Difficult, U.S. General Says.”
• Mar 16: Russia Today, “For the U.S. Submarine Fleet, It’s Still a Cold War.”
• Mar 16: Tapped (The American Prospect), “It’s 3 AM; Do You Know Where Your Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine Is?”
• Mar 16: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Missile Submarines Sustain Active Schedule.”
• Mar 16: Defense Professionals (def.pro.com), “U.S. Strategic Submarine Patrols Continue at Near Cold War Tempo.”
• Mar 16: Manila Standard Today (Philippines), “US, China send warships to Spratlys.”
• Mar 12: International Herald Tribune, “U.S. vessel’s standoff with Chinese sub ‘dangerous,’ analyst says.”
• Mar 12: Associated Press, “China’s top diplomat visiting Obama at White House.”
• Mar 12: The Virginian-Pilot, “Destroyer escorting ship involved in US-China incident.”
• Mar 12: Associate Press (Beijing), “China demands end of US Navy surveillance.”
• Mar 12: Taipei Times, “Taiwan ‘driving Chinese military goals’.”
• Mar 11: MarineBuzz.com, “China Warns U.S.Navy Ocean Surveillance Ship to Stay Away from Hainan Island.”
• Mar 11: Irish Times, “China accuses US navy ship of breaking maritime laws.”
• Mar 11: USA Today, “China demands end of US Navy surveillance.”
• Mar 11: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Subwatching Ship Claims Chinese Harassment.”
• Mar 10: USA Today, “Bad parallels seen in Chinese naval clash.”
• Mar 10: Der Spiegel Online, “China testet Obamas Entschlossenheit.”
• Mar 10: Los Angels Times, “China says U.S. provoked naval confrontation.”
• Mar 3: The Numbers Guy (Wall Street Journal Blog), “The Crash Calculations.”
• Mar 3: IEEE Spectrum, “What About The Nukes?”
• Feb: Carnegie Endowment, “World Nuclear Arsenals 2009.”
• Feb 27: Global Security Newswire, “Top U.S. General Spurns Obama Pledge to Reduce Nuclear Alert Posture.”
• Feb 24: Dominion Post editorial (New Zealand), “Editorial: Cut the bluster in nuclear talk.”
• Feb 22: StrategyPage.com, “The Russian Navy Crawls Out Of The Cellar.” Uses data from blog on Russian submarine patrols without (as usual) referencing the source.
• Feb 20, Time, “The nuclear risk: How long will our luck hold.”
• Feb 19: Time, “Why we should still fear a nuclear war.”
• Feb 18: Global Security Newswire, “Russia Restores Nuclear-Armed Submarine Patrols.”
• Feb 18: STRATFOR, “Geopolitical Diary: A Sign of Russia’s Renewed Confidence.”
• Feb 16: Time, “Did France’s Secrecy Cause a Nuclear Submarine Collision?”
• Feb 13: Washington Post, “U.S. Ahead of Moscow Treaty in Reducing its Nuclear Arsenal.”
• Feb 13: barentsobserver.com, “Only seven nuclear submarine patrols in 2008.”
• Feb 11: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Meets Moscow Treaty Nuclear Reduction Commitment Three Years Early.”
• Feb 11: Air Force Times, “Schwartz, Donley to talk nukes with lawmakers.”
• Feb 7: Indian Express, “China’s submarine patrols raise eyebrows in India.”
• Feb 6: China Journal (Wall Street Journal blog), “From the Depths: China Invests in Submarines.”
• Feb 5: Macau Daily Times, “China increases submarine patrols, says US report.”
• Feb 4: DOD Buzz, “China Doubles Sub Patrols; Threat Increase?”
• Feb 4: STRATFOR, “China: More Submarine Activity.”
• Feb 4: inquerer.net (Philippines), “China increases submarine patrols.”
• Feb 4:The Straits Times (Singapore, “China ops submarine patrols.”
• Feb 4: Jongo News (Shanghai/Hong Kong), “China increases submarine patrols – report.”
• Feb 4: Asia One News, “China ops submarine patrols.”
• Feb 4: Asia Times, “Beijing wants it both ways in space.”
• Feb 3: spacewar.com, “China increases submarine patrols – report.”
• Feb 3: Yahoo News, “China increases submarine patrols – report.”
• Feb 3: France 24, “China increases submarine patrols – report.”
• Feb 3: AFP, “China increases submarine patrols – report.”
• Feb 3: UPI, “China conducting far more sub patrols.”
• Feb 2: Omaha World-Herald, “Omaha has rivals for 2 commands.”
• Feb 1: AFP, “Obama, Pentagon pull in different directions on no nukes goal.”
• Jan 26: Global Security Newswire, “China Shows Nuclear Transparency in New Report.”
• Jan 26: Time Magazine, “Obama’s nuclear war.” The article’s graphic of the global nuclear balance uses estimates developed by FAS and NRDC but without giving credit.
• Jan 17: Asia Times Online, “Smart power play in Pyongyang.”
• Jan 16: scienceline.org, “Battling Over Aging Nuclear Warheads.”
• Jan 14: Air Force Times, “62nd Airlift Wing passes nuclear inspection.”
• Jan 13: Seattle Post Intelligencer (seattlepi.com), “McChord boasts high-grade nuclear airlift team.”
• Jan 9: Air Force Times, “Reports: Air Force worst in dealing with nukes.”
• Jan 6: nuclearweaponsfree.org, “Cold War “baggage” passed on to Obama.”
• Jan: Stephen Schwartz and Deepti Choubey, Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

2008

• Dec 25: The Nation (Pakistan), “‘Indian missiles can trigger N-conflict’.”
• Dec 21: Air Force Times, “Kehler: NSI failures part of solution.”
• Dec 16: Global Security Newswire, “World Faces ‘Cascade of Proliferation,’ Report Says.”
• Dec: Air Force Magazine, “A Flagging Nuclear ‘Enterprise’.” (Lists warhead estimates, which since 2001 has been produced jointly by NRDC and Kristensen (since 2005 with FAS)).
• Dec 4: bianet.org (Turkey), “İncirlik Üssü Gerçekleri.”
• Dec 3: Joe Cirincione/Boston Globe, “Need cash? Cut nuclear weapons budget.” (Uses warhead estimates).
• Dec 1: Focus Storia (Italy), “L’Arma Totale.” (Subscription required)
• Dec: WMD Insights, “China’s Strategic Modernization: Balancing Assessments.”
• Nov 17: Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress/Ploughshares Fund, November 17, 2008).
• Nov 7: Global Security Newswire, “Strategic Arms Funds Tilt Conventional in 2009.”
• Nov 3: Global Security Newswire, “Gates Nuclear Speech Fails to Sway Opponents.”
• Oct 29: Global Security Newswire, “Gates Sees Stark Choice on Nuke Tests, Modernization.”
• Oct 28: Las Vegas Sun (editorial), “Nuclear Weapons: Plans to revamp the nation’s arsenal should be carefully reviewed by Congress.”
• Oct 27: K L Security Review (Malaysia), “‘China’s Strategic Modernization.’ Will the Report Trigger a New Cold War Between China and the United States?”
• Oct 26: Associated Press, “U.S. Considering Implications of Nuclear Decline.”
• Oct 23: Japan Times, “’58 Taiwan Strait Crisis Saw Nukes in Okinawa.”
• Oct 9: TheTelegraph (UK), “US told to increase nuclear arsenal as China threat looms.”
• Oct 7: Inside the Air Force, “New Focus on Nukes.”
• Sep 29: wired.com, “Report: Time for a New Arms Race With China.”
• Sep 29: Omaha World-Herald, “Nuclear readiness high on StratCom chief’s agenda.”
• Sep 26: news.de (Germany), “«Atomwaffen verleihen Prestige».”
• Sep 26: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Air Force Might Modify Nuclear Bomb.”
• Sep 25: objektifhaber.com (Turkey), “İNCİRLİK GÜVENLİ DEĞİL.”
• U.S. Nuclear Arms Paper Underlines Need for RRW.”
• Sep 12: OnlineOpinion.com.au, “Is the Navy talking up China’s nuclear submarine threat?”
• Sep: Arms Control Today, “NATO Mulls Nuke Modernization, Security.”
• Aug 29: Congressional Research Service, “Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views.”
• Aug 12: ISN Security Watch (Switzerland), “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Game.”
• Aug 5: Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues”
• Jul 23: Air Force Times, “Minot’s latest alarm: napping with launch codes.”
• Jul 22: Wired News, “Pentagon Kills Russian Nuclear Strike Plan.”
• Jul 21: Discover, “CanYou Spot the Chinese Nuclear Sub?” (Describes discovery of Jin-class, but without giving credit).
• Jul 21: Global Security Newswire, “No Need for U.S. Nukes In Europe, Observers Say.”
• Jul 17: Global Security Newswire, “Navy Eyes New Weapon for Global Strike, Missile Defense.”
• Jul 2: Evrensel (Turkey), “İncirlik’in önemi İran’a yakın olması .”
• Jul 2: Global Security Newswire (NTI), “Netherlands Disputes U.S. Nuclear Security Report.”
• Jul 2: Washington Post, “Air Force Finds Lax Nuclear Security.”
• Jul 1: Der Spiegel, “Berlin Holds on to Obsolete Weapons.”
• Jul 1: Stars and Stripes, “110 B-61 warheads reported moved from RAF Lakenheath.”
• Jul: Joint Forces Quarterly, “China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities.”
• Jul: Center for Defense Information, “An Examination of the Pentagon’s Prompt Global Strike Program: Rationale, Implementation, and Risks”
• Jul: James Rickard, “Sun Tzu, Nuclear Weapons and China’s Grand Strategy,” in Strategic Insights, Volume VII, Issue 3, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2008.
• Jun 30: Turkish Daily News, “Incirlik becomes major host for American nuclear weapons.”
• Jun 28: East Anglian Daily Times, “‘We’re staying put’, say air base chiefs.”
• Jun 28: Stars and Stripes, “U.S. nukes moved from Lakenheath, official claims.”
• Jun 27: Pugwash, “Pugwash Urges Removal of All NATO Nuclear Weapons.”
• Jun 27: Jerusalem Post, “Watchdog group: US nukes reportedly withdrawn from UK base.”
• Jun 27: BBC, “US weapons ‘withdrawn’ from base.”
• Jun 27: Star Tribune, op-ed, “Steve Andreasen: With nuclear weapons, a lot can go wrong.” Uses information from blog without crediting.
• Jun 27: East Anglian Daily Times, “Future of American air base at risk.”
• Jun 27: The Scotsman, “US nuclear weapons ‘leave British soil at last’ after half a century of controversy.”
• Jun 27: AFP, “US withdraws nuclear bombs from Britain: report.”
• Jun 27: The Times, “Last US nuclear weapons ‘withdrawn from UK’.”
• Jun 26: STRATFOR, “Nuclear Weapons: The Question of Relevance in the 21st Century.”
• Jun 26: Press TV (Iran), “US withdraws nuclear bombs from UK.”
• Jun 26: UPI, “Germany wants U.S. to remove nukes.”
• Jun 26: East Anglian Daily Times (UK), “Nuclear weapons removed from Suffolk.”
• Jun 26: The Telegraph (UK), “America removes nuclear weapons from Britain after 50 years.”
• Jun 26: Reuters, “U.S. pulls nuclear weapons from U.K.”
• Jun 26: The Guardian, “US removes it nuclear weapons from Britain.”
• Jun 24: Daily Times (Pakistan), “German Opp says US nuclear bombs must go.”
• Jun 23: Air Force Times, “German politicians seek nuclear weapon removal.”
• Jun 23, Reuters, “U.S. report shows gaps in European nuclear security.”
• Jun 23: ZDF (German National TV), “Wie sicher sind US-Atombomben in Deutschland?” (background)
• Jun 23: ZDF (German National TV), lead story in prime time evening news.
• Jun 23: International Herald Tribune, “German parties press U.S. to withdraw nuclear arms.”
• Jun 23: AFP (Brussels), “Security of US nuclear arms in Europe is not our problem: NATO.”
• Jun 23: Deutsche Welle, “Politicians Urge Removal of US Nuclear Weapons From Germany.”
• Jun 23: Der Spiegel, “German Politicians Want Nukes out of Europe.”
• Jun 23: Air Force Times, “Russia’s nuclear interest revived.”
• Jun 22: RAI News 24 (Italy), “Rapporto Usaf: le basi europee e italiane con armi nucleari Usa non sono sicure.”
• Jun 23: Partito Democratico (Italy), “Il Pentagono contro le proprie basi in Europa.”
• Jun 22: La Repubblica (Italy), “Usa, allarme basi nucleari ‘In Italia sono a rischio’.”
• Jun 21, Associated Press, “Report: European nuclear facilities need security upgrades.”
• Jun 21: Qui Brescia (Italy), “Ghedi, testate atomiche a rischio.”
• Jun 21, AFP, “Security lacking at nuclear weapons sites in Europe: US report.”
• Jun 21, Alalam (Iran), “Memo: US Nukes in Europe Not Secure.”
• Jun 21, Deutsche Welle, “European Nuclear Weapons Sites Lack Security, Says US Report.”
• Jun 21, Megachip.com (Italy), “USAF Report: “Most” Nuclear Weapon Sites In Europe Do Not Meet US Security Requirements” (reprints entire blog).
• Jun 21, De Morgen (Belgium), “Kleine Brogel.” (editorial or comment)
• Jun 21, De Morgen (Belgium), “Kleine Brogel niet veilig.”
• Jun 21: Stars and Stripes, “Air Force investigators: Most European bases with nukes lacking in security.”
• Jun 20, Belga (Belgian), “Kernwapens Kleine Brogel ? Niet goed beveiligd ?” (Belgian TV)
• Jun 20, De Standaard (Belgium), “Defensie reageert niet op Amerikaanse rapport nucleaire sites.”
• Jun 20, hbvl.be (Belgium), “Defensie reageert verveeld op veiligheidsrapport Kleine Brogel.”
• Jun 20: Der Spiegel, “Sicherheitmängel in europäischen Atomwaffenlagern.”
• Jun 19, LeVif.be (Belgium), “Des sites nucléaires US en Europe ne satisfont pas aux normes.”
• Review Questions Security Over U.S. Nukes in Europe.”
• Jun 19, De Standaard (Belgium), “Amerikaanse nucleaire sites in Europa voldoen niet aan normen.”
• Jun 19, Time Magazine, “Are US Nukes in Europe Security.”
• Jun 9: FederalTimes.com, “Roadrunner breaks computer speed barrier.”
• May 31: Washington Post, “Air Force Unit’s Nuclear Weapons Security Is ‘Unacceptable’.”
• May 30: Air Force Times, “Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection.” Also reproduced in USA Today.
• May 21: NewsMax.com, “Massive New Chinese Missile Base Uncovered.”
• May 20: Associated Press, “China: Earthquake buried 32 sources of radiation.” 
• May 19: CNN, morning news report on Chinese earth quake.
• May 18: Monster and Critics, “Military nuclear facilities safe in quake zone, China says.”
• May 18: MSN India, “Chinese threat to India mounting?”
• May 17: Associated Press, “US monitoring China’s nuclear sites after quake.”
• May 17: Associated Press (Beijing), “China on alert for nuclear accidents after quake.”
• May 17: Peter Coates Int Blog, “Chinese and American Information Campaigns.” This blogger accuses FAS of getting help from the US Defense Intelligence Agency to produce the recent article about a Chinese missile site.
• May 17: The Hindu, “China missile base larger than expected: study”
• May 17: Indian Express, “China upgrading n-missile launch site nearest to India.”
• May 16, Times of India, “Massive Chinese missile site uncovered.”
• May 16, Washington Times, Inside the Ring, “China base.”
• May 16: International Herald Tribune, “Western experts monitor China’s nuclear sites for signs of damage.”
• May 16: New York Times, “Western experts monitos China’s nuclear sites for signs of earthquake damage.”
• May 16: DNA (India), “Chinese nuclear missile base has north India in sight.”
• May 16, Daily Times (Pakistan), “Satellite reveals extensive missile site in China: analyst.”
• May 15: Focus News (AFP), “Extensive missile site in China revealed by satellite: analyst.”
• May 13: Christian Science Monitor, “Global scrutiny follows reports of Chinese nuclear base.”
• May 9: National Public Radio, “China’s Underground Submarine Base Scrutinized.”
• May 9: Press Trust of India, “Navy to keep watch on Chinese nuclear submarine movements.”
• May 8: Rediff.com (India), “About those Chinese military capabilities.” Comments to claims made in this article.
• May 8: InformationWeek, “Google Among Sites Under Investigation In China For Illegal Mapping.”
• May 6: ARS Technica, “Upset by sensitive images, China cracks down on online maps.”
• May 5: Pravda, “US intelligence notices less activity in Russian nuclear submarines.”
• May 5: Thaindian News (Thailand), “India concerned at China’s growing n-submarine fleet.”
• May 3: The Sunday Express (India), “China’s new n-submarine base sets off alarm bells.”
• April 30: Japan Today, “China deploys new nuke-powered sub.”
• April 30: Kyodo News (Japan), “China deploys new nuke-powered sub at E. China Sea base.”
• April 29: guidemoscow.com, “Submarine patrols in 2007.”
• April 29: L’Association des Réservistes de la Marine, “Les SNLE russes ont effectué seulement 3 patrouilles de dissuasion en 2007.”
• April 28: Middle East Times, “Russia ‘no longer uses’ nukes sub deterrent.”
• April 29: United Press International, “Russia ‘no longer uses” nukes sub deterrent.”
• Apr 10: Peace Talk (Ploughshares Fund), “Lessons from the nuclear fly-by.”
• Apr 7: military.com, “Lessons From the Accidental Nuke Flyby.”
• Apr 3: Washington Observer, “五角大楼摆“乌龙”，核误运暴露台湾“核野心”？”
• Mar 31: Air Force Times, “Lost ballistic fuses spark investigations.”
• Mar 27: Air Force Times, “Details emerging on how fuses got to Taiwan.”
• Mar 27: The China Post (AFP), “Fuse components the brain of thermonuclear weapon: expert.”
• Mar 26: AFP, “US sent Taiwan nuclear missile components by mistake.”
• Mar 26: Aljazeera.net, “US admits Taiwan nuclear error.”
• Mar 26: Air Force Times, “ICBM fuses mistakenly sent to Taiwan in 2006.”
• Mar 22: The New York Times (AP), “Sarkozy Dedicates Nuclear Submarine.”
• Mar 21: International Herald Tribune (AP), “Sarkozy says France will cut nuclear arsenal.” Slightly different version here.
• Mar 18: San Francisco Chronicle, “Livermore: Major cuts planned at nuclear labs” (uses research but doesn’t credit).
• Mar 8: New Scientist, “Trident missiles delayed by mystery ingredient” (requires password, but full version is here).
• Mar 7: Global Security Newswire, “Chinese Nuke Arsenal Spiked Since 2006, Report Shows”
• Mar 7: Wired News, “Secret Ingredient Delays Missile Upgrade.”
• Mar 6: Global Security Newswire, “U.S. General Calls for Faster Action on Reliable Replacement Warhead.”
• Mar 4: Fox News (AP), “Commander: Update US Nuclear Arsenal.”
• Feb 28: Global Security Newswire, “Air Force Omits Nuke Error from 2007 Incident List.”
• Feb 26: Air Force Times, “Nuclear safety slipped for years before Minot.”
• Feb 25: Taipei Times, “PRC still expanding sub fleet: analysts.”
• Feb 25: International Herald Tribune, “Chinese Submarine Fleet is Growing, Analysts Say.”
• Feb 24: New York Times, “Chinese Submarine Fleet is Growing, Analysts Say.” A letter to the editor has been sent to correct errors, and will be linked when it appears.
• Feb 22: Popular Mechanics, “3 Things We Learned From the Accidental US Nuke Flyby.”
• Feb 20: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, Congressional Research Service, updated February 20, 2008.
• Feb 15: KSLA News 12: “Mixed Signals on Barksdale AFB’s Nuclear Weapons Safety.” The video broadcast is available.
• Feb 14: Daily Kos, “Nukes on a plane and why they got there.”
• Feb 12: Air Force Times, “237 nukes handling deficiencies cited since 2001.”
• Feb 7: International Herald Tribune, “U.S. military officials wary of China’s expanding fleet of submarines.”
• Feb 4: Air Force Times, “Minot chief sets bar high after nuke gaffe.”
• Feb 2: Dickinson Press, “Commander says ‘goal is perfection’ after nuclear gaffe.”
• Feb 2: Ian Anthony, SPIRI, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in NATO.”
• Feb: Noam Ophir, “The Core of the Matter: US Doctrine on Nuclear Weapons Use, 1988-2008,” in Strategic Assessment, Vol. 10, No. 4, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, February 2008.
• Jan 23: U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, Congressional Research Service, updated January 23, 2008.
• Jan 16: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, updated January 16, 2008.
• Jan 13: Tampa Tribune, “Nuclear Bombs Down, Risk the Same.”
• Jan 9: Wired News, “China’s Subs: Six Patrols in 2007.”
• Jan 8: Global Security Newswire (NTI), “Chinese missile submarines remained quite in 2007.”
• Jan 8: GovernmentExecutive.com, “China’s largely inactive submarine fleet stirs.” Article listed as “today’s most popular.”

2007 and earlier

Project news examples from 2007 and previous years are available here.

Early next year the Obama administration, with eager backing from hardliners in Congress, is expected to commit the U.S. taxpayers to a bill of $20 billion to $30 billion for a new nuclear weapon the United States doesn’t need: the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) air-launched cruise missile.

The new nuclear cruise missile will not be able to threaten targets that cannot be threatened with other existing nuclear weapons. And the Air Force is fielding thousands of new conventional cruise missiles that provide all the standoff capability needed to keep bombers out of harms way, shoot holes in enemy air-defenses, and destroy fixed and mobile soft, medium and hard targets with high accuracy – the same missions defense officials say the LRSO is needed for.

But cool-headed thinking about defense needs and priorities has flown out the window. Instead the Obama administration appears to have been seduced (or sedated) by an army of lobbyists from the defense industry, nuclear laboratories, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, defense hawks in Congressional committees, and academic Cold Warriors, who all have financial, institutional, career, or political interests in getting approval of the new nuclear cruise missile.

LRSO proponents argue for the new nuclear cruise missile as if we were back in the late-1970s when there were no long-range, highly accurate conventional cruise missiles. But that situation has changed so dramatically over the past three decades that advanced conventional weapons have now eroded the need for a nuclear cruise missile.

That reality presents President Obama with a unique opportunity: because the new nuclear cruise missile is redundant for deterrence and unnecessary for warfighting requirements, it is the first opportunity for the administration to do what the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy all called for: use advanced conventional weapons to reduce the role of and reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.

Muddled Mission Claims

Defense officials have made a wide range of claims for why a new nuclear cruise missile is needed, ranging from tactical use against air-defense systems, rapid re-alerting, generic deterrence, escalation-control, to we-need-a-new-one-because-we-have-an-old-one. In a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee in 2014, Nuclear Weapons Council chairman Frank Kendall provided one of the most authoritative – and interesting – justifications. After reminding the lawmakers that DOD “has an established military requirement for a nuclear capable stand-off cruise missile for the bomber leg of the U.S. Triad,” Kendall further explained:

Nuclear capable bombers with effective stand-off weapons assure our allies and provide a unique and important dimension of U.S. nuclear deterrence in the face of increasingly sophisticated adversary air defenses. The bomber’s stand-off capability with a modern cruise missile will provide a credible capability to penetrate advanced air defenses with multiple weapons attacking from multiple azimuths. Beyond deterrence, an LRSO-armed bomber force provides the President with uniquely flexible options in an extreme crisis, particularly the ability to signal intent and control escalation, long-standing core elements of U.S. nuclear strategy.

Nuclear Weapons Chair Frank Kendall says the LRSO is needed for deterrence and warfighting missions

The “Beyond deterrence” wording is interesting because it suggests that what precedes it is about deterrence and what follows it is not. It essentially says that flying around with bombers with nuclear cruise missiles that can shoot through air-defense systems will deter adversaries (and assure Allies), but if it doesn’t then firing all those nuclear cruise missiles will give the President lots of options to blow things up. And that should calm things down.

But this is where the LRSO mission gets muddled. Because although nuclear cruise missiles could potentially penetrate those air-defenses, so can conventional cruise missiles to hold at risk the same targets. And because it would be much harder for the President to authorize use of nuclear cruise missiles, he would in reality have considerably fewer options with the LRSO than with conventional cruise missiles.

The “options” that Kendall referred to are essentially just different ways to blow up facilities that U.S. planners have decided are important to the adversary. Yet LRSO provides no “unique” capability to blow up a target that cannot be done by existing or planned conventional long-range cruise missiles or, to the limited extent a nuclear warhead is needed to do the job, by other nuclear weapons such as ICBMs, SLBMs, or gravity bombs.

So what’s missing from the LRSO mission justification is why it would matter to an adversary that the United States would not blow up his facilities with nuclear cruise missiles but instead with conventional cruise missiles or other nuclear weapons. And why would it matter so much that the adversary would conclude: “Aha, the United States does not have a nuclear cruise missile, only thousands of very accurate conventional cruise missiles, hundreds of long-range ballistic missiles with thousands of nuclear warheads, and five dozen stealthy bombers with B61-12 guided nuclear bombs that can and will damage my forces or destroy my country. Now is my chance to attack!”

Some defense leaders confuse the need for the nuclear LRSO with broader defense requirements, as illustrated by this statement reportedly made by STRATCOM commander Adm. Haney at the Army & Navy Club in 2014.

A favorite phrase for defense officials these days is that nuclear weapons, including a new air-launched cruise missile, are needed to “convince adversaries they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conflict, and that restraint is a better option.” The scenario behind this statement is that an aggressor, for example Russia attacking a NATO country with conventional forces, is pushed back by superior U.S. conventional forces and therefore considers escalating to limited use of nuclear weapons to defeat U.S. forces or compel the United States to cease its counterattack on Russian forces.

Unless the United States has flexible regional nuclear forces such as the LRSO that can be used in a limited fashion similar to the aggressor’s escalation, so the thinking goes, the United States might be self-deterred from using more powerful strategic weapons in response, incapable of responding “in kind,” and thus fail to de-escalate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its Allies. Therefore, some analysts have begun to argue (here and here), the United States needs to develop nuclear weapons that have lower yields and appear more useable for limited scenarios.

The argument has an appealing logic – the same dangerous logic that fueled the Cold War for four decades. It carries with it the potential of worsening the very situation it purports to counter by increasing reliance on nuclear weapons and further stimulating development of regional nuclear warfighting scenarios. While promising to reduce the risk of nuclear use, the result would likely be the opposite.

It also ignores that existing U.S. nuclear forces already have considerable regional flexibility, yield variations, and are getting even better. And it glosses over the fact that U.S. military planners over the past three decades, while fully aware of modernizations in nuclear adversaries and a significant disparity with Russian non-strategic nuclear forces, nonetheless have continued to unilaterally eliminate all land- and sea-based non-strategic nuclear forces that used to serve many of the missions the advocates now say require more regionally tailored nuclear weapons.

Some senior defense officials have also started linking the LRSO justification to recent Russian behavior. Brian McKeon, the Pentagon’s principal deputy defense under secretary for policy, told Congress earlier this month that the Pentagon is “investing in technologies that will be most relevant to Russia’s provocations,” including “the long-range bomber, the new long-range standoff cruise missile…”

Last Time The Air Force Wanted A New Nuclear Cruise Missile…

Such advocacy for the LRSO is like playing a recording from the 1970s when defense officials were urging Congress to pay for nuclear cruise missiles. Back then the justifications were the same: provide bombers with standoff capability, shoot holes in air-defense systems, and provide the President with flexible regional options to hold targets at risk that are important to the adversary. And just as today, many of the justification were not essential or exaggerated.

With a range of more than 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles), the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM; AGM-86B) was seen as the answer to protecting bombers by holding targets at risk from well beyond the reach of Soviet advanced air-defense systems. After the first test flights in 1979, the ALCM became operational in December 1982 and more than 1,700 ALCMs were produced between 1980 and 1986. But a need for a long-range cruise missile that could actually be used in the real world soon resulted in conversion of hundreds of the ALCMs to conventional CALCMs (AGM-86C) that have since been used in half a dozen wars.

Billions were spent on the nuclear Advanced Cruise Missile for capabilities that had little operational significance. The weapon was retired in 2008.

No sooner had the ALCM entered service before the Air Force started saying the more capable Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM; AGM-129A) was needed: Soviet advanced air-defense systems expected in the 1990s would be able to destroy the ALCMs and the bombers carrying them. Sounds familiar? The initial plan was to produce 2,000 ACMs but the program was cut back to 460 missiles that were produced between 1990 and 1993.

The Air Force described the ACM as a “subsonic, low-observable air-to-surface strategic nuclear missile with significant range, accuracy, and survivability improvements over the ALCM.” And the missile had specifically been “designed to evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike heavily defended, hardened targets at any location within an enemy’s territory.” A fact sheet on the Air Force’s web site still describes the unique capabilities:

 When the threat is deep and heavily defended, the AGM-129A delivers the proven effectiveness of a cruise missile enhanced by stealth technology. Launched in quantities against enemy targets, the ACM’s difficulty to detect, flight characteristics and range result in high probability that enemy targets will be eliminated.

The AGM-129A’s external shape is optimized for low observables characteristics and includes forward swept wings and control surfaces, a flush air intake and a flat exhaust. These, combined with radar-absorbing material and several other features, result in a missile that is virtually impossible to detect on radar.

The AGM-129A offers improved flexibility in target selection over other cruise missiles. Missiles are guided using a combination of inertial navigation and terrain contour matching enhanced with highly accurate speed updates provided by a laser Doppler velocimeter. These, combined with small size, low-altitude flight capability and a highly efficient fuel control system, give the United States a lethal deterrent capability well into the 21st century.

Yet only 17 months after the ACM first become operational in January 1991, a classified GAO review concluded that “the range requirement for [the] ACM offers only a small improvement over the older ALCM and that the accuracy improvement offered does not appear to have real operational significance.”

Even so, ACM production continued for another year and the Air Force kept the missile in the arsenal for another decade-and-a-half. Finally, in 2008, after more than $6 billion spent on developing, producing, and deploying the missile, the ACM was unilaterally retired by the Bush administration. Although not until after a dramatic breakdown of Air Force nuclear command and control in August 2007 resulted in six ACMs with warheads installed being flown on a B-52 across the United States without the Air Force knowing about it.

It is somewhat ironic that after the ACM was retired, the Air Force official who was given the ceremonial honor to crush the last of the unneeded missiles was none other than Brig. Gen. Garrett Harencak, then commander of the Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB. The following year Harencak was promoted to Maj. Gen. and Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A-10) at the Pentagon where he became a staunch and sometimes bombastic advocate for the LRSO. Harencak has since been “promoted” to commander of the Air Force Recruiting Service in Texas.

The last Advanced Cruise Missile is destroyed by Brig. Gen. Jarrett Harencak in 2012, then commander of the Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB, before he became a primary Air Force advocate for the LRSO.

JASSM-ER: Deterrence Without “N”

The ALCM and ACM were acquired in a different age. LRSO advocates appear to argue for the weapon as if they were still back in the 1970s when the military didn’t have long-range conventional cruise missiles.

Today it does and those conventional weapons are getting so effective, so numerous, and so widely deployed that they can hold at risk the same targets and fulfill the same targeting missions that advocates say the LRSO is needed for. Moreover, the conventional missiles can do the mission without radioactive fallout or the political consequences from nuclear use that would limit any President’s options.

Curiously, defense officials use very similar descriptions when they describe the missions and virtues of the nuclear LRSO and the new conventional long-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER; AGM-158B). In many cases one could swap the names and you wouldn’t know the difference. The LRSO seems to offer no unique or essential capabilities that the JASSM-ER cannot provide:

2015 LRSO Mission Capabilities

The Pentagon describes the JASSM as a next-generation cruise missile “enabling the United States Air Force (USAF) to destroy the enemy’s war-sustaining capabilities from outside its area air defenses. It is precise, lethal, survivable, flexible, and adverse-weather capable.” Armed with a 1000-pound class, hardened, penetrating warhead with a robust blast fragmentation capability, the JASSM’s “inherent accuracy” (3 meters or less using the Imaging Infrared seeker and less than 13 meters with GPS/INS guidance only) “reduces the number of weapons and sorties required to destroy a target.”

The concept of operations (CONOPS) for JASSM states “employment will occur primarily in the early stages of conflict before air superiority is established, and in the later stages of conflict against high value targets remaining heavily defended. JASSM can also be employed in those cases where, due to rules of engagement/political constraints, high value, point targets must be attacked from international airspace. JASSM may be employed independently or the missile may be used as part of a composite package.”

Full-scale production of the JASSM-ER was authorized in 2014 and the weapon is already deployed on B-1 bombers, each of which can carry 24 missiles – more than the maximum number of ALCMs carried on a B-52H. Over the next decade JASSM-ER will be integrated on nearly all primary strategic and tactical aircraft – including the B-52H. Operational units equipped with the missile will, according to DOD, employ the JASSM-ER against high-value or highly defended targets from outside the lethal range of many threats in order to:

• Destroy targets with minimal risk to flight crews and support air dominance in the theater;
• Strike a variety of targets greater than 500 miles away;
• Execute missions using automated preplanning or manual pre-launch retargeting planning;
• Attack a wide range of targets including soft, medium, and very hard (not deeply buried) targets.

The new long-range JASSM-ER standoff cruise missile is already operational on the B-1 bombers (seen here in 2014 drop-test) and will be added to nearly all bombers and fighter-bombers. A sea-based version will also have land-attack capabilities. A shorter-range version (AGM-158A) is being sold to European and Pacific allies.

Says Kenneth Brandy, the JASSM-ER test director at the 337^th Test and Evaluation Squadron: “While other long range weapons may have the capability of reaching targets within the same range, they are not as survivable as the low observable JASSM-ER…The stealth design of the missile allows it to survive through high-threat, well-defended enemy airspace. The B-1’s effectiveness is increased because high-priority targets deeper into heavily defended areas are now vulnerable.”

Indeed, the JASSM-ER is “specifically designed to penetrate air defense systems,” according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JASSM-ER is already now being integrated into STRATCOM’s global strike exercises alongside nuclear weapons. During the Global Lightning exercise in May 2014, for example, B-52s at Barksdale AFB loaded JASSM-ER (see below). And in September 2015, two JASSM-ER equipped B-1 bomb wings were transferred from Air Combat Command (ACC) to Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) control to operate more closely alongside the nuclear B-2 and B-52H bombers in long-range strike operations.

A JASSM-ER is loaded onto the wing pylon of a B-52H bomber at Barksdale AFB during STRATCOM’s Global Lightning exercise in May 2014.

As if the Air Force’s JASSM-ER were not enough, the missile is also being converted into a naval long-range anti-ship cruise missile known as LRASM (Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile; AGM-158C) that in addition to sinking ships will also have land-attack capabilities. The LRASM will be launched from the Mk41 Vertical Launch System on cruisers and destroyers and is also being integrated onto B-1 bombers and carrier-based FA-18 aircraft.

In case anyone doubts who the target is, this Lockheed-Martin illustration shows the LRASM honing in on a Russian Slava-class cruiser.

A Clear Pledge To Reduce Nuclear Role

The considerable standoff targeting capabilities offered by the JASSM-ER and LRASM, as well as the Navy’s existing Tactical Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, and the enhanced deterrence capability they provide fit well with U.S. policy to use advanced conventional weapons to reduce the role of and reliance on nuclear weapons in regional scenarios.

The intent to reduce the role of and reliance on nuclear weapons has been clearly stated in key defense planning documents issued by the administration over the past five years: the February 2012 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and the June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy.

According to the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, “Against nuclear-armed states, regional deterrence will necessarily include a nuclear component (whether forward-deployed or not). But the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in these regional deterrence architectures can be reduced by increasing the role of missile defenses and other capabilities.” (Emphasis added.)

The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review explained further that “new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent…make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” (Emphasis added.)

The April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report added more texture by stating that, while nuclear weapons are still as important, “fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years – including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries – enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet today’s most pressing security challenges.” (Emphasis added.)

Most recently, in June 2013, the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United State “narrows U.S. nuclear strategy to focus on only those objectives and missions that are necessary for deterrence in the 21st century,” and in doing so, “takes further steps toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our security strategy.” The guidance directs the Department of Defense “to strengthen non-nuclear capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks,” and specifically “to conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make these objectives and effects achievable.” (Emphasis added.)

The Employment Strategy emphasizes that, “Although they are not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning for non-nuclear strike options is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.” (Emphasis added.)

The pledge to reduce the role of and reliance on nuclear weapons has not risen from a naive unilateral nuclear disarmament gesture but as a consequence of decades of revolutionary advancement of conventional weapons. Those non-nuclear strike capabilities have increased even further since the NPR and the employment guidance were published and will increase even more in the decades ahead as the JASSM-ER and LRASM are integrated onto more and more platforms.

Conclusions and Recommendations

President Obama is facing a crucial decision: whether to approve or cancel the Air Force’s new Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear air-launched cruise missile. The decision will be his last chance as president to demonstrate that the United States is serious about reducing the role of and reliance on nuclear weapons in its defense strategy.

The President’s decision will also have to take into consideration whether the administration is serious about the pledge it made in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, that “Life Extension Programs (LEPs)…will not…provide for new military capabilities.” The LRSO will most certainly have new military capabilities compared with the ALCM it is intended to replace.

In their arguments for why the President should approve the LRSO, proponents have so far not presented a single mission that cannot be performed by advanced conventional weapons or other nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal.

Indeed, a review of many dozens of official statements, documents, a news media articles revealed that proponents argue for the LRSO as if they were back in the late-1970s arguing for the ALCM at a time when conventional long-range cruise missiles did not exist. As a result, LRSO proponents confuse the need for a standoff capability with the need for a nuclear standoff capability.

Yet in the more than three decades that have passed since the ALCM was approved, a revolution in non-nuclear military technology has produced a wide range of conventional weapons and strategic effects capabilities that can now do many of the targeting missions that nuclear weapons previously served. Indeed, the Navy and Army have already retired all their non-strategic nuclear weapons and today rely on conventional weapons for those missions.

Now it’s the Air Force’s turn; advanced conventional cruise missiles can now serve the role that nuclear air-launched cruise missiles used to serve: hold at risk heavily defended strategic and tactical targets at a range far beyond the reach of modern and anticipated air-defense systems. The Navy already has its Tactical Tomahawk widely deployed on ships and submarines, and now the Air Force is following with deployment of thousands of long-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM-ER) on bombers and fighter-bombers. The conventional missiles will in fact provide the President with more (and better) options than he has with a nuclear air-launched cruise missile; it will be a more credible deterrent.

This reality seems to not exist for LRSO advocates who argue from a point of doctrine instead of strategy. And for some the obsession with getting the nuclear cruise missile appears to have become more important than the mission itself. STRATCOM commander Adm. Cecil Haney reportedly argued recently that getting the LRSO “is just as important as having a future bomber.” It is perhaps understandable that a defense contractor can get too greedy but defense officials need to get their priorities straight.

The President needs to cut through the LRSO sales pitch and do what the NPR and employment guidance call for: reduce the role of and reliance on nuclear weapons by canceling the LRSO and instead focus bomber standoff strike capabilities on conventional cruise missiles. Doing so will neither unilaterally disarm the United States, undermine the nuclear Triad, nor abandon the Allies.

Now is your chance Mr. President – otherwise what was all the talk about reducing the role of nuclear weapons for?

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen

With a series of highly advertised sea- and air-launched cruise missile attacks against targets in Syria, the Russian government has demonstrated that it doesn’t have a military need for the controversial ground-launched cruise missile that the United States has accused Russia of developing and test-launching in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.

Moreover, President Vladimir Putin has now publicly confirmed (what everyone suspected) that the sea- and air-launched cruise missiles can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads and, therefore, can hold the same targets at risk. (Click here to download the Russian Ministry of Defense’s drawing providing the Kalibr capabilities.)

The United States has publicly accused Russia of violating the INF treaty by developing, producing, and test-launching a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) to a distance of 500 kilometers (310 miles) or more. The U.S. government has not publicly identified the missile, which has allowed the Russian government to “play dumb” and pretend it doesn’t know what the U.S. government is talking about.

The lack of specificity has also allowed widespread speculations in the news media and on private web sites (this included) about which missile is the culprit.

As a result, U.S. government officials have now started to be a little more explicit about what the Russian missile is not. Instead, it is described as a new “state-of-the-art” ground-launched cruise missile that has been developed, produced, test-launched – but not yet deployed.

Whether or not one believes the U.S. accusation or the Russian denial, the latest cruise missile attacks in Syria demonstrate that there is no military need for Russia to develop a ground-launched cruise missile. The Kalibr SLCM finally gives Russia a long-range conventional SLCM similar to the Tomahawk SLCM the U.S. navy has been deploying since the 1980s.

What The INF Violation Is Not

Although the U.S. government has yet to publicly identify the GLCM by name, it has gradually responded to speculations about what it might be by providing more and more details about what the GLCM is not. Recently two senior U.S. officials privately explained about the INF violation that:

• it is not the R-500 cruise missile (Iskander-K);
• it is not the RS-26 road-mobile ballistic missile;
• it is not a sea-launched cruise missile test-launched from a ground launcher;
• it is not an air-launched cruise missile test-launched from a ground launcher;
• it is not a technical mistake;
• it is not one or two test slips;
• it is in development but has not yet been deployed.

Rose Gottemoeller, the U.S. under secretary of state for and international security, said in response to a question at the Brookings Institution in December 2014: “It is a ground-launched cruise missile. It is neither of the systems that you raised. It’s not the Iskander. It is not the other one, X-100. Is that what it is? Yeah, I’ve seen some of those reflections in the press and it’s not that one.” [The question was in fact about the X-101, sometimes used as a designation for the air-launched Kh-101, a conventional missile that also exists in a nuclear version known as the Kh-102.]

The explicit ruling out of the Iskander as an INF violation is important because numerous news media and private web sites over the past several years have claimed that the ballistic missile (SS-26; Iskander-M) has a range of 500 km (310 miles), possibly more. Such a range would be a violation of the INF. In contrast, the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) has consistently listed the range as 300 km (186 miles). Likewise, the cruise missile known as Iskander-K (apparently the R-500) has also been widely rumored to have a range that violates the INF, some saying 2,000 km (1,243 miles) and some even up to 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles). But Gottemoeller’s statement seems to undercut such rumors.

Gottemoeller told Congress in December 2015 that “we had no information or indication as of 2008 that the Russian Federation was violating the treaty. That information emerged in 2011.” And she repeated that “this it is not a technicality, a one off event, or a case of mistaken identity,” such as a SLCM launched from land.

Instead, U.S. officials have begun to be more explicit about the GLCM, saying that it involves “a state-of-the-art ground-launched cruise missile that Russia has tested at ranges capable of threatening most of [the] European continent and out allies in Northeast Asia” (emphasis added). Apparently, the “state-of-the-art” phrase is intended to underscore that the missile is new and not something else mistaken for a GLCM.

Some believe the GLCM may be the 9M729 missile, and unidentified U.S. government sources say the missile is designated SSC-X-8 by the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Forget GLCM: Kalibr SLCM Can Do The Job

Whatever the GLCM is, the Russian cruise missile attacks on Syria over the past two months demonstrate that the Russian military doesn’t need the GLCM. Instead, existing sea- and air-launched cruise missiles can hold at risk the same targets. U.S. intelligence officials say the GLCM has been test-launched to about the same range as the Kalibr SLCM.

Following the launch from the Kilo-II class submarine in the Mediterranean Sea on December 9, Putin publicly confirmed that the Kalibr SLCM (as well as the Kh-101 ALCM) is nuclear-capable. “Both the Calibre [sic] missiles and the Kh-101 [sic] rockets can be equipped either with conventional or special nuclear warheads.” (The Kh-101 is the conventional version of the new air-launched cruise missile, which is called Kh-102 when equipped with a nuclear warhead.)

The conventional Kalibr version used in Syria appears to have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles). It is possible, but unknown, that the nuclear version has a longer range, possibly more than 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles). The existing nuclear land-attack sea-launched cruise missile (SS-N-21) has a range of more than 2,800 kilometers (the same as the old AS-15 air-launched cruise missile).

The Russian navy is planning to deploy the Kalibr widely on ships and submarines in all its five fleets: the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula; the Baltic Sea Fleet in Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg; the Black Sea Fleet bases in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk; the Caspian Sea Fleet in Makhachkala; and the Pacific Fleet bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.

The Russian navy is already bragging about the Kalibr. After the Kalibr strike from the Caspian Sea, Vice Admiral Viktor Bursuk, the Russian navy’s deputy Commander-in-Chief, warned NATO: “The range of these missiles allows us to say that ships operating from the Black Sea will be able to engage targets located quite a long distance away, a circumstance which has come as an unpleasant surprise to counties that are members of the NATO block.”

With a range of 2,000 kilometers the Russian navy could target facilities in all European NATO countries without even leaving port (except Spain and Portugal), most of the Middle East, as well as Japan, South Korea, and northeast China including Beijing (see map below).

As a result of the capabilities provided by the Kalibr and other new conventional cruise missiles, we will probably see many of Russia’s old Soviet-era nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles retiring over the next decade.

The nuclear Kalibr land-attack version will probably be used to equip select attack submarines such as the Severodvinsk (Yasen) class, similar to the existing nuclear land-attack cruise missile (SS-N-21), which is carried by the Akula, Sierra, and Victor-III attack submarines, but not other submarines or surface ships.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Now that Russia has demonstrated the capability of its new sea- and air-launched conventional long-range cruise missiles – and announced that they can also carry nuclear warheads – it has demonstrated that there is no military need for a long-range ground-launched cruise missile as well.

This provides Russia with an opportunity to remove confusion about its compliance with the INF treaty by scrapping the illegal and unnecessary ground-launched cruise missile project.

Doing so would save money at home and begin the slow and long process of repairing international relations.

Moreover, Russia’s widespread and growing deployment of new conventional long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles raises questions about the need for the Russian navy to continue to deploy nuclear cruise missiles. Russia’s existing five nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21 and SS-N-22) were all developed at a time when long-range conventional missiles were non-existent or inadequate.

Those days are gone, as demonstrated by the recent cruise missile attacks, and Russia should now follow the U.S. example from 2011 when it scrapped its nuclear Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile. Doing so would reduce excess types and numbers of nuclear weapons.

Background:

• Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
• Status of World Nuclear Forces, 2015

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

The new Polish government caused a stir last weekend when deputy defense minister Tomasz Szatkowski said during an interview with Polsat News 2 that Poland was taking “concrete steps” to consider joining NATO’s so-called nuclear sharing program.

The program is a controversial arrangement where the United States makes nuclear weapons available for use by a handful of non-nuclear NATO countries.

The Polish Ministry of Defense quickly issued a denial saying Poland “is not engaged in any work aimed at joining NATO’s nuclear sharing program.”

Mr. Szatkowski’s statement, the Ministry said, “should be seen in the context of recent remarks made by serious Western think tanks, which point to deficits in NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability on its eastern flank.”

No Smoke Without A Fire

NATO has stated that it has no plans or intensions to deploy nuclear weapons further east in new NATO countries. Despite the Polish denial, however, Mr. Szatkowski’s statement didn’t come out of thin air but reflects deepening discussions within NATO about how the alliance should adjust its nuclear posture in Europe in response to Russia’s recent military operations and statements.

Only a few weeks ago senior U.K. officials said NATO was actively considering whether to reinstate nuclear escalation exercises in Europe to counter Russia. “Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has done conventional exercising and nuclear exercising, both, but not exercised the transition from one to the other,” said Sir Adam Thomson, the British permanent representative to NATO. That recommendation is now being looked at he said and added: “It is safe to say the UK does see merit in making sure we know how, as an Alliance, to transition up the escalatory ladder in order to strengthen our deterrence.” Defence Secretary Michael Fallon added: “We have to know how they fit together, nuclear and conventional.”

The British statements followed preliminary NATO discussion in June and more formal talks in October after warnings in February that Russia was adjusting its nuclear posture. Back then Fallon explained there were three concerns: “first that they (the Russians) may have lowered the threshold for use of nuclear. Secondly, they seem to be integrating nuclear with conventional forces in a rather threatening way and [third]… at a time of fiscal pressure they are keeping up their expenditure on modernizing their nuclear forces.”

While the diplomats in public are talking about considerations, the military has already begun to adjust the nuclear posture. As part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, a new set of military operations and exercises recently created to provide “a unified response to revanchist Russia,” U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has quietly “forged a link between STRATCOM Bomber Assurance and Deterrence missions to NATO regional exercises” to beef up the NATO nuclear deterrence mission.

One of the first examples of this new “link” was Operation Polar Growl, a bomber exercise in April where four B-52 bombers took off from the United States and flew a non-stop strike mission over the North Pole and North Sea. The bombers did not carry nuclear weapons on the exercise but were equipped to carry a total of 80 air-launched cruise missiles with a total explosive power equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima bombs – a subtle warning to Putin not seen since the Cold War.

Two B-52 bombers take off from Barksdale AFB on April 1, 2015 as part of Exercise Polar Growl over the North Pole and North Sea.

Conclusions and Recommendations

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, increased military operations, and explicit nuclear threats, General Philip Breedlove, the head of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO’s military commander, told the US Congress that the crisis in Europe is “not based on the nuclear piece. That’s not what worries me.” And U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter declared that “In our response [to Russia], we will not rely on the Cold War play book.”

Yet NATO is starting to adjust its nuclear posture in Europe in ways that seem similar (but far from identical) to the Cold War play book: increased reliance on U.S. nuclear forces, adjustment of strategy and planning, more exercises and rotational deployments of nuclear-capable forces.

The statement by Polish deputy defense minister Tomasz Szatkowski is but the latest sign of that development.

It is unlikely that NATO will broaden its nuclear sharing arrangement to include Poland. It is already a member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group where it participates and votes on issues related to NATO nuclear planning. And Poland already participates in the so-called SNOWCAT program where it contributes non-nuclear capabilities in support of the nuclear mission in Europe but is not directly nuclear tasked. Last year we saw Polish F-16s participate in NATO’s nuclear strike exercise for the first time in SNOWCAT role.

Taking this one step further for Poland to become part of the nuclear sharing arrangement similar to Belgium, Germany, Holland, Italy and Turkey that store US nuclear weapons on their territory, equip their national jets and train their national pilots with the capability to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons, would be an unnecessary and counterproductive overreaction to Putin’s unacceptable military escapades.

It would worsen, not improve, security in Europe, waste resources that are needed for conventional forces, and deepen the political and military crisis between NATO and Russia. It would be akin to Russia deciding to provide nuclear weapons for Belarusian fighter jets.

Moreover, while the existing nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO (all of which are bi-lateral arrangements between the United States and the host country) date back from before the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into effect and therefore was accepted by the treaty regime, broadening the arrangement to Poland (or anyone else) would be a new situation and therefore a violation of the NPT.

Yet some NATO officials, former government officials, and academics, have been trying for years to persuade NATO to increase – or at least not reduce – reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe. For them, Putin’s actions represent a refreshing opportunity to get what they wanted anyway. The NATO Summit in Warsaw next summer is expected to decide on how far to go.

NATO should reject attempts to reinvigorate the nuclear posture in Europe and instead focus its military planning where it matters: enhancing conventional capabilities (to the extent it doesn’t further increase Russian reliance on nuclear weapons) with U.S. nuclear forces (and to a lesser extent those of Britain and France) providing an assured nuclear retaliatory capability in the background.

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have been withheld from broad public distribution include the following.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, updated November 3, 2015

The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, updated November 3, 2015

Iran Sanctions, updated November 3, 2015

Tropical Storm? The Supreme Court Considers Double Jeopardy and the Sovereign Status of Puerto Rico, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 4, 2015

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015: Adjustments to the Budget Control Act of 2011, CRS Insight, November 6, 2015

You Win Some You Lose Some… New Second Amendment Rulings, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 5, 2015

Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2015, updated November 3, 2015

Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2015, updated November 3, 2015

The Future of Internet Governance: Should the U.S. Relinquish Its Authority Over ICANN?, updated November 3, 2015

Social Security and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Provisions in the Proposed Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2015, November 3, 2015

U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues, updated November 3, 2015

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated November 5, 2015

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, updated November 4, 2015

By Hans M. Kristensen

General James Cartwright, the former commander of U.S. Strategic Command and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed in an interview with PBS Newshour that the increased accuracy of the new guided B61-12 nuclear bomb could make the weapon “more useable” to the president or national-security making process.

GEN. JAMES CARTWRIGHT (RET.), Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command: If I can drive down the yield, drive down, therefore, the likelihood of fallout, et cetera, does that make it more usable in the eyes of some — some president or national security decision-making process? And the answer is, it likely could be more usable.

Cartwright’s confirmation follows General Norton Schwartz, the former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, who in 2014 assessed that the increased accuracy would have implications for how the military thinks about using the B61. “Without a doubt. Improved accuracy and lower yield is a desired military capability. Without a question,” he said.

In an article in 2011 I first described the potential effects the increased accuracy provided by the new guided tail kit and the option to select lower yields in nuclear strike could have for nuclear planning and the perception of how useable nuclear weapons are. I also discuss this in an interview on the PBS Newshour program.

In contrast to the enhanced military capabilities offered by the increased accuracy of the B61-12, and its potential impact on nuclear planning confirmed by generals Cartwright and Schwartz, it is U.S. nuclear policy that nuclear weapons “Life Extension Programs…will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities,” as stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.

The effect of the B61-12 modernization will be most dramatic in Europe where less accurate older B61s are currently deployed at six bases in five countries for delivery by older aircraft. The first B61-12 is scheduled to roll off the assembly line in 2020 and enter the stockpile in 2024 after which some of the estimated 480 bombs to be built and, under current policy, would be deployed to Europe for deliver by the new F-35A Lightning II fifth-generation fighter-bomber and (for a while) older aircraft.

For background information, see:

• B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes
• General Confirms Enhanced Targeting Capabilities of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb
• Upgrades At US Nuclear Bases Acknowledge Security Risk

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

In our latest FAS Nuclear Notebook we estimate that Pakistan now has 110-130 warheads in its nuclear arsenal. This is an increase of about 20 warheads from the 90-110-warhead level we estimated in our previous Pakistani Notebook in 2011.

The Notebook is published as Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is arriving in Washington D.C. for a state visit and foreign minister Aizaz Chaudhry acknowledged for the record what everybody already knew: that Pakistan has developed “low-yield, tactical” nuclear weapons.

The warhead increase is due to several developments in the past four years: Deployment (or near-deployment) of two new short-range ballistic missiles (including the one Chaudhry was probably thinking about: the NASR) and a new medium-range ballistic missile. Moreover, development is underway of two extended-range ballistic missiles and two cruise missiles that will require production of additional warheads.

If the current trend continues, we estimate that Pakistan a decade from now could potentially have a stockpile of 220-250 warheads, which would make Pakistan the world’s fifth largest nuclear power. We do not believe that Pakistan has the capacity to increase its stockpile to 350 warheads, as has been suggested by some.

Pakistan’s archenemy, India, is also modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal. For an overview of India’s nuclear arsenal, see here.

With both Pakistan and India engaged in rapid and broad buildup of their nuclear arsenals, it is essential that their governments, as well as other state leaders, increase efforts to limit the nuclear arms competition that is in full swing in South Asian.

Note: The Notebook version on the Bulletin web site has two typos that are being fixed. Until that happens, a corrected version can be downloaded from here.

For more information:

• Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015
• Indian nuclear forces, 2015

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

By Hans M. Kristensen

[Updated January 26, 2016] In an op-ed in the Washington Post, William Perry and Andy Weber last week called for canceling the Air Force’s new nuclear air-launched cruise missile.

The op-ed challenged what many see as an important component of the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad of strategic weapons and a central element of U.S. nuclear strategy.

The recommendation to cancel the new cruise missile – known as the LRSO for Long-Range Standoff weapon – is all the more noteworthy because it comes from William Perry, known to some as “ALCM Bill,” who was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997, and as President Carter’s undersecretary of defense for research and engineering in the late-1970s and early-1980s was in charge of developing the nuclear air-launched cruise missile the LRSO is intended to replace.

And his co-author, Andy Weber, was assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs from 2009 to 2014, during which he served as director of the Nuclear Weapons Council for five-plus years – the very time period the plans to build the LRSO emerged [note: the need to replace the ALCM was decided by DOD during the Bush administration in 2007].

Obviously, Perry and Weber are not impressed by the arguments presented by the Air Force, STRATCOM, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the nuclear laboratories, defense hawks in Congress, and an army or former defense officials and contractors for why the United States should spend $15 billion to $20 billion on a new nuclear cruise missile.

Those arguments seem to have evolved very little since the 1970s. A survey of statements made by defense officials over the past few years for why the LRSO is needed reveals a concoction of justifications ranging from good-old warfighting scenarios of using nuclear weapons to blast holes in enemy air defenses to “the old missile is getting old, therefore we need a new one.”

LRSO: What Is It Good For?

When I wrote about the LRSO in 2013, the Air Force had only said a few things in public about why the weapon was needed. Since then, defense officials have piled on justifications in numerous public statements.

Those statements (see table below) describe an LRSO mission heavily influenced by nuclear warfighting scenarios. This involves deploying nuclear bombers “whenever and wherever we want” with large numbers of LRSOs onboard that “multiplies the number of penetrating targets each bomber presents to an adversary” and “imposes an extremely difficult, multi-azimuth air defense problem on our potential adversaries.” By providing “flexible and effective stand-off capabilities in the most challenging area denial environments” to “effectively conduct global strike operations” at will, the LRSO “maximally expands the accessible space of targets that can be held at risk,” including shooting “holes and gaps [in enemy air defenses] to allow a penetrating bomber to get in” to be able to “do direct attacks anywhere on the planet to hold any place at risk” whether it be in “limited or large scale” nuclear strike scenarios.

 

 

It seems clear from many of these statements that the LRSO is not merely a retaliatory capability but very much seen as an offensive nuclear strike weapon that is intended for use in the early phases of a conflict even before long-range ballistic missiles are used. In a briefing from 2014, Major General Garrett Harencak, until September this year the assistant chief of staff for Air Force strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, described a “nuclear use” phase before actual nuclear war during which bombers would use nuclear weapons against regional and near-peer adversaries (see image below).

Although the LRSO is normally presented as a strategic weapon, the public descriptions by U.S. officials of limited regional scenarios sound very much like a tactical nuclear weapon to be used in a general military campaign alongside conventional weapons. “I can make holes and gaps” in air defenses, Air Force Global Strike commander Lieutenant General Stephen Wilson explained in 2014, “to allow a penetrating bomber to get in.” Indeed, an Air Force briefing slide from 2011 shows the LRSO launched from a next-generation bomber against air defenses to allow a next-generation penetrator launched from the same bomber to attack an underground target (see image below).

Use of bombers with LRSO in a pre-nuclear war phase is part of an increasing focus on regional nuclear strike scenarios. “We are increasing DOD’s focus on planning and posture to deter nuclear use in escalating regional conflicts,” according to Robert Scher, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. “The goal of strengthening regional deterrence cuts across both the strategic stability and extended deterrence and assurance missions to which our nuclear forces contribute.” The efforts include development of “enhanced planning to ensure options for the President in addressing the regional deterrence challenge.” (Emphasis added.)

The Pentagon appears to be using the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons employment policy to enhance strike options and plans in these regional scenarios. “The regional deterrence challenge may be the ‘least unlikely’ of the nuclear scenarios for which the United States must prepare,” Elaine Bunn, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, told the Senate last year. And “continuing to enhance our planning and options for addressing it is at the heart of aligning U.S. nuclear employment policy and plans with today’s strategic environment.” (Emphasis added.)

Cruise Missile Dilemma: Nuclear Versus Conventional

The arguments used to justify the LRSO sound like the United States has little else with which to hold targets at risk. But bomber standoff and targeting capabilities today are vastly superior to those of the late-1970s and early-1980s when the ALCM was developed. Not only are non-nuclear cruise missiles proliferating in numbers and deliver platforms, the Air Force itself seems to prefer them over nuclear cruise missiles.

The Air Force plan to buy 1,000-1,100 LRSOs represents a significant increase of more than 40 percent over the current inventory of 575 ALCMs. Armed with the W80-4 warhead, the LRSO will not only be integrated onto the B-52H that currently carries the ALCM, but also onto the B-2A and the next-generation bomber (LRS-B).

Assuming the LRSO force will have the same number of warheads (approximately 528) as the current ALCM force, the roughly 180 missiles that would be lost in flight tests over a 30-year lifespan does not explain what the remaining 300-400 missiles would be used for.

Air Force Global Strike Command appears to hint that the extra missiles might be used for a conventional LRSO. “We fully intend to develop a conventional version of the LRSO as a future spiral to the nuclear variant.” Yet a lot of other conventional cruise missiles and standoff weapons are already in development – some even making their way onto smaller aircraft such as F-16 fighter-bombers – and Congress is unlikely to pay for yet another conventional air-launched cruise missile.

It is a curious dilemma for the Air Force: it needs the LRSO to help justify the long-range bomber program, but it prefers to spend its money on conventional standoff weapons that are much more flexible and – in contras to the LRSO – can actually be used. The trend is that new conventional standoff weapons are gradually pushing the nuclear cruise missiles off the bombers. To reduce the nuclear load-out under the New START Treaty and prioritize conventional weapons, the Air Force is currently converting stripping the B-52H of its excess capability to carry the ALCM internally in the bomb bay. a total of 44 sets of Common Strategic Rotary Launchers (CSRLs) are being modified to Conventional Rotary Launchers (CRLs). This will give the B-52H the capability to deliver the non-nuclear Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and its 1,100-kilometer (648 miles) extended range variant JASSM-ER (AGM-158B), weapons that are more useful for deterrent missions than a nuclear cruise missile. Once completed in 2018, each remaining nuclear-capable B-52H will only be capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles externally: 12 missiles under the wings compared with a total of 20 today.

While the B-52H will lose the capability to carry nuclear cruise missiles internally, The JASSM in contrast will be integrated for both internal and external carriage. As a result, each B-52H will be equipped to carry up to 20 JASSM, of which as many as 16 can be JASSM-ER. Moreover, while only 46 B-52H will be nuclear-capable, all remaining 76 B-52Hs in the inventory will be back fitted for JASSM. An interim JASSM-ER capability is planned for 2017 – nearly a decade before the LRSO is scheduled to be deployed – providing essentially the same standoff capability (although with less range).

The B-2A Spirit stealth-bomber cannot currently carry ALCMs but the Air Force says but will be fitted to carry the LRSO internally in addition to the new B61-12 guided nuclear bomb. The B-2A, which is scheduled to fly until the 2050s, is also scheduled to be back-fitted with the JASSM-ER.

The next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) will also be equipped with the LRSO (probably 16 internally) in addition to the B61-12, and probably also the JASSM-ER. Once it begins to enter the force after 2025, the LRS-B will probably replace the B-52H in the nuclear mission on a one-for-one basis.

Approximately 5,000 JASSMs are planned, including more than 2,900 JASSM-ERs. Although the nuclear LRSO has a “significantly” greater range than the JASSM-ER (probably 2,500-3,000 kilometers), the conventional missile will still enable the bomber to attack from well beyond air-defense range against soft, medium, and very hard (not deeply buried) targets.

JASSM-ER has been integrated on the B-1B bomber that recently was incorporated into Air Force Global Strike Command alongside B-2A and B-52H bombers. After it is added to the B-52H and B-2A, the JASSM will also be added to F-15E and F-16 fighter-bombers and possibly also to some navy aircraft. Several European countries have already bought JASSM for their fighter-bombers (Poland and Finland).

Clearly, conventional standoff missiles rather than the LRSO appear to be the priority of the Air Force.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In their op-ed, Perry and Weber describe the justification that was used during the Cold War for developing the existing cruise missile, the ALCM (AGM-86B). “At that time, the United States needed the cruise missile to keep the aging B-52, which is quite vulnerable to enemy air defense systems, in the nuclear mission until the more effective B-2 replaced it. The B-52 could safely launch the long-range cruise missile far from Soviet air defenses. We needed large numbers of air-launched nuclear cruise missiles to be able to overwhelm Soviet air defenses and thus help offset NATO’s conventional-force inferiority in Europe,” they write.

The anti-air defense mission that justified development of a nuclear ALCM during the Cold War is no longer relevant. According to Perry and Weber, “such a posture no longer reflects the reality of today’s U.S. conventional military dominance.”

They are right. All U.S. bombers, as well as many fighter-bombers, are scheduled to be equipped with long-rang conventional cruise missiles that provide sufficient capability against the same air-defense targets that LRSO proponents argue require a standoff nuclear cruise missile on the next-generation bomber.

Canceling the LRSO would be an appropriate way to demonstrate implementation of the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons employment strategy from 2013 that directed the Pentagon to “undertake concrete steps toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” and “conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options.”

Instead, statements by defense officials reveal a worrisome level of warfighting thinking behind the LRSO mission that risks dragging U.S. nuclear planning back into Cold War thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Instead of implementing the guidance and use advanced conventional weapons to “make holes and gaps” in air defenses, the LRSO mission appears to entertain ideas about using nuclear weapons against regional and near-peer adversaries in the name of extended deterrence and escalation control before actual nuclear war.

Although bombers armed with nuclear gravity bombs can be used to signal to adversaries in a crisis, loading the aircraft with long-range nuclear cruise missiles that can slip unseen under the radar in a surprise attack is inherently destabilizing. This dilemma is exacerbated by the large upload-capability of the bombers that are not normally on alert with nuclear weapons. Pentagon officials will normally warn that re-alerting nuclear weapons onto launchers in a crisis is dangerous, but in the case of LRSO they seem to relish the option to “provide a rapid and flexible hedge against changes in the strategic environment.”

Perry and Weber’s recommendation to cancel the unnecessary and dangerous LRSO is both wise and bold. The strategic situation has changed fundamentally, conventional capabilities can do most of the mission, and arguments for the LRSO seem to be a mixture of Cold War strategy and general nuclear doctrinal mumbo jumbo. Some people in the Obama administration will certainly listen (as will many that have already left). Others will argue that even if they wanted to cancel LRSO, they have little room to maneuver given a hostile Congress, Russia’s return as an official threat, and China’s military modernization and posturing in the South China Sea.

Moreover, the development of the LRSO and its W80-4 warhead is already well underway and rapidly approaching the point of no return. The decision to replace the ALCM with the LRSO was reaffirmed by the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Airborne Strategic Deterrence Capability Based Assessment, and the Initial Capability Document. The LRSO Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study is already complete and has been approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force signed the Draft Capabilities Development Document in February 2014. LRSO was selected by the assistance secretary of the Air Force for acquisition (SAF/AQ) as a pilot program for “Bending the Cost Curve,” a new acquisition initiative to make weapons programs more affordable (although with a cost of $15 billion to $20 billion that curve seems to point pretty much straight up). The critical Milestone A decision is expected in early 2016, and program spending will ramp up in 2017 as full-scale development begins with $1.8 billion programmed through 2020.

Similarly, development of the W80-4 warhead for the LRSO is well underway with $1.9 billion programmed through 2020. Warhead development is in Phase 6.2 with first production unit scheduled for 2025.

If national security and rational defense planning – not institutional turf and inertia – determined the U.S. nuclear weapons modernization program, then the LRSO would be canceled. At least Perry and Weber had the guts to call for it.

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Mordechai Vanunu, who revealed aspects of Israel’s nuclear weapons program to the press three decades ago and served a lengthy prison term as a result, is again entangled with Israeli legal authorities over the contents of a recent TV interview. See “Nuclear Whistle-blower Vanunu Arrested Over Channel 2 Interview,” Haaretz, September 10.

Vanunu should be allowed to emigrate from Israel, as he has requested, wrote Charles D. Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists, and Frank von Hippel of Princeton University.

“We realize that Vanunu’s past actions are susceptible to different interpretations, including negative interpretations, and that he in fact violated the laws of the State of Israel. But the essential fact is that upon conviction he served his full sentence in prison, as he was required to do. Under the circumstances, we believe it is unjust for Israel to continue to punish him over and over for the same crime,” Ferguson and von Hippel wrote in an October 12 letter to the Government of Israel.

The majority of all nuclear experts and diplomats, as well as aspiring nuclear and policy students, must have their eyes set on North Korea’s slowly but steadily expanding nuclear weapons program, as well as the recent updates on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. North Korea has disregarded all issued warnings to carry out nuclear tests and claims to have nuclear weapons capable of striking the United States. Other nations have considered North Korea’s actions as signs of hostility but still have shown willingness to restart nuclear talks. Iran under President Hassan Rouhani was able to come to terms with the P5+1 group that includes six world powers, namely, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany. They successfully negotiated the JCPOA after almost a decade of conciliation efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program to one with only peaceful purposes. The JCPOA is also significant because of the effect the deal will have on the Iranian economy; following its implementation, billions of dollars will be unfrozen. The deal promotes objectives central to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as promises to stimulate democracy, potentially bringing stability to the region. The deal with Iran and the companion JCPOA could open up opportunities for nations (like North Korea) to stabilize their regions in exchange for assistance in growing a peaceful nuclear program. In this article, key elements of the JCPOA are addressed, along with issues that demand attention for a deal with North Korea. Our hope is that the information provided will serve as a reference and stepping stone for the international nuclear community to resume discussions with North Korea.

The JCPOA

The so-called “Iran Deal,” an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 group of nations, and the European Union. The deal helps to promote the three objectives of the NPT, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Groundwork for the agreement was founded in the Joint Plan of Action – a temporary agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group that was signed in late 2013. The nuclear talks became most meaningful when Hassan Rouhani came to power in 2013 as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It took almost twenty months for the negotiation parties to come to a final “Framework Agreement” in April 2015.

Iran was ensnared in a heavy load of sanctions beginning in 2006 that subsequently contributed to sinking its economy over the last decade. Yet by 2013, Iran had about 20,000 centrifuges that could be used to enrich uranium, an increase from a mere few hundred in 2002. (A uranium enrichment facility can either be used to make low-enriched uranium, typically 3 to 5 percent in the fissile isotope uranium-235, or highly-enriched uranium, greater than 20 percent U-235 and that could be useful for nuclear weapons.) Furthermore, Iran had developed a heavy water reactor in Arak that (once operational) could produce plutonium, a uranium conversion plant in Isfahan, a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, a military site in Parchin, and an underground enrichment plant in Fordow. As Iran has latent capability to pursue either the uranium enrichment or plutonium (the most sought after nuclear material through which it is realistic to fabricate a nuclear weapon) routes to build a nuclear weapon, the agreement, which addresses both routes, has major significance in the global community that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Under the agreement, Iran has agreed to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for lifting imposed sanctions, which would help to revive its economy. These restrictions demand verification by which Iran would have to cooperate with inquiries and monitoring requirements. In addition, Iran’s past nuclear activities would be investigated (various sites could be inspected and environmental samples could be taken). Following these assessments, continuous monitoring would be required to maintain established knowledge that no clandestine activities are taking place. This will leverage the assistance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to keep a lookout for any import or export of dual-use technology. In particular, the agreement calls for a so-called “white” procurement channel to be created to monitor Iran’s acquisition of technologies for its nuclear program.

Key elements of the Iran deal are: a. Reduction of centrifuges to only 6104 – while only 5060 are allowed to enrich uranium over the next 10 years; b. Centrifuges will only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent (useful for fueling the commercial nuclear power plant at Bushehr) for 15 years; c. No new uranium enrichment facilities will be built; d. Stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium will be either blended down or sold; e. Only 300 kg of low-enriched uranium will be stockpiled for 15 years; f. Extension of the breakout time to about a year from the current status of two to three months for 10 years; g. The Fordow facility, located about 200 feet underground, would stop enriching uranium for at least 15 years; h. Current facilities will be maintained but modified to ensure the breakout time of about one year (such as the heavy water reactor in Arak); i. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear “watch-dog” for the United Nations, will gain access to all of Iran’s facilities, including the military site in Parchin, to conclude an absence of weapons related activities; and j. The sanctions will be lifted in phases as the listed requirements are met. However, if Iran is found violating any obligations, the sanctions will be reinstated immediately.

The requirements in the Iran deal have been placed to lessen its nuclear program to a peaceful one and to increase the breakout time to about one year for the next 10 years. This would not only help other nations (as the deal will keep Iran from producing a nuclear weapon and bring stability and security to the region) but also Iran, who seeks to revive its economy and continue its peaceful nuclear program while maintaining sovereignty of their nation.

North Korea

On the other hand, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions started early in the 1950s, soon after the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. North Korea’s close rapport with the Soviet Union led to a nuclear cooperation agreement, signed in 1959. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union supplied the first research reactor, the IRT-2000. This became the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea’s major nuclear site, which has several facilities to support the North Korean nuclear program. In 1974, the IRT-2000 reactor was upgraded to a power level of 8 MW_th (megawatt-thermal).^{1 2} A year later in 1975, North Korea installed the Isotope Production Laboratory (“Radiochemistry Laboratory”) to carry out small-scale reprocessing operations. Moreover, North Korea in the 1970s performed various activities such as: the indigenous construction of Yongbyon’s second research reactor, uranium mining operations at various locations near Sunchon and Pyongsan, and installation of ore-processing and fuel rod-fabrication plants in Yongbyon. They also began construction on their first electricity-producing reactor in 1985, which was based on the United Kingdom’s declassified information regarding the Calder Hall 50 MWe (megawatt-electric) reactor design.

North Korea was a part of the NPT for about two decades, from its ratification by the government in 1985 until its withdrawal in 2003. [North Korea had first begun to withdraw in 1993, but when the dialogue commenced directly with the United States, they later suspended this action (with only one day left on the intent to withdraw).] Due in part to diplomacy between former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994. However, the Agreed Framework dissolved in 2002 after President George W. Bush named the country as part of the “axis of evil.” Following its withdrawal, North Korea still showed readiness in freezing its nuclear program in exchange for various concessions. The nuclear talks between North Korea and world powers were recurring, as they never found a common ground, including the Six-Party talks in which South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, the United States, and North Korea were involved. In fact, the last time Six-Party talks were held was six years ago in 2009, despite numerous efforts to resume them.

“On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, despite warnings by the country’s principal economic benefactors, China and South Korea, not to proceed,” states Marcus Nolan, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. ³ According to Nolan, “the pre-test conventional wisdom was that a North Korean nuclear test would result in sanctions with dramatic economic consequences.” Five days later, the UN imposed economic sanctions on North Korea, with the passing of Resolution 1718. What is compelling to note, according to Nolan, is that “there is no statistical evidence that the nuclear test and subsequent sanctions had any impact on North Korean trade.” Nolan’s analysis of the trade data suggests that “for better or worse, North Korea correctly calculated that the penalties for nuclear action, at least in this primary sphere, would be trivial to the point of being undetectable – potentially establishing a very unwelcome precedent with respect both to the country’s future behavior and to the behavior of potential emulators.” Following the very first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea carried out two more tests in 2009 and 2013. “Sanctions won’t bring North Korea to its knees,” said Kim Keun-sik, a specialist on North Korea at Kyungnam University in Seoul. “The North knows this very well, from having lived with economic sanctions of one sort or another for the past 60 years.” ⁴ Does this mean the sanctions are not firm? The answer may be debatable, but the nuclear tests do demonstrate their failure. According to recent reports, activities at the Yongbyon reactor and Radiochemistry Laboratory are proceeding swiftly and it is assumed that the country is gearing up for a fourth nuclear test. This suggests that either sanctions needs to be more robust, which paves a pathway for serious nuclear talks, or North Korea is simply not interested in nuclear talks.

The Across-the-Board Treaty

The Iran Deal has been the hot topic in nonproliferation for various and obvious reasons, but two key questions remain: 1.) Is the deal apt to restrain Iran from advancing further in its nuclear weapons technology? 2.) And would the world see the deal through to successful implementation? The easy answer is that the world powers will know almost immediately whether restraints will take effect because of important milestones within the next six months, but the long-term implementation is more complicated. However, according to various experts, the JCPOA is the best that world powers can achieve given the competing interests among the negotiating parties. Moreover, we argue that this deal can act as a benchmark for many other countries like India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan that seek to expand or preserve their nuclear weapons capabilities. The challenge is how to craft deals with these other nuclear-armed states that will not lead to further proliferation or buildup of their nuclear arsenals.

One of the main reasons why North Korea has been able to operate in such a hostile manner in the past is the failure of sanctions. As part of the 1718 resolution of the UN Security Council, an embargo was imposed on exports of heavy weapons, dual-use items, and luxury goods to North Korea, as well as on the exportation of heavy weapons systems from North Korea, though the administration of the sanctions was left to each individual-sanctioning countries. “Russia, for example, defined luxury goods so narrowly (e.g., fur coats costing more than $9,637 and watches costing nearly $2,000) that the effect of the sanctions was questionable,” says Nolan. It is the sanctions themselves that can be the first step in bringing a country to the bargaining table; then, offering some concessions can lead to the meaningful and significant decisions. In this case, it appears North Korea was never cornered-off in yielding them. Most analysts, including Kim Keun-sik, suggest that the most effective measures are “those that target the lifestyle of North Korean leaders: financial sanctions aimed at ending all banking transactions related to North Korea’s weapons trade, and halting most grants and loans. This would effectively freeze many of the North’s overseas bank accounts, cutting off the funds that the North Korean leader has used to secure the cognac, Swiss watches, and other luxury items needed to buy the loyalty of his country’s elite.”

Another dimension to the issue of imposed sanctions is the support North Korea has received from China, who has been their primary trading partner and has provided them with food and energy. In fact, China supported the 1718 resolution only when the sanctions were reduced – less than severe, as they fear the regime collapse and subsequent, refugee invasion across their border. This is the key reason why China has played an important role in the Six-Party talks. However, following the third nuclear test in 2013, China’s patience with North Korea appeared to run out, as they imposed new sanctions and called for nuclear talks. In fact, a forum is planning to be held by a think-tank, the China Institute of International Studies, and backed by the Chinese government. ⁵ Academics and experts from the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea (Six-Party) will be attending with the intent to restart the nuclear talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to a recent report, the United States and China have also discussed ways to boost the sanctions.

A deal with North Korea could potentially be realized once the sanctions are applied in an effective manner, such that loopholes that have previously allowed shortcutting of sanctions are henceforth closed off. Specifically, sanctions will only be effective if China is on board with the other major powers. China has been lenient in the past while dealing with North Korea, as they fear the ripple effects that could be triggered by the sanctions. China can be a part of the enforcement, provided additional world powers offers their support in terms of finance and manpower to maintain the law and order in China’s territory by the border, as they fear the refugee invasion. Furthermore, China has personal interest to reform North Korea. Thus, an assertion from other world powers that they will help to reestablish government in North Korea could strongly sway China.

Once these firm sanctions are enforced, the prime factors, which will be of utmost importance to address during the deal, are hereby listed for diplomats and nuclear experts for their perusal: a. The IRT-2000 reactor was upgraded to use a weapons-usable, highly-enriched uranium fuel containing 80% U-235 by weight (from the original that used only low-enriched uranium fuel, 10% U-235 by weight); b. The reactor modeled after the UK’s Calder Hall was a gas-graphite design that is of concern for proliferation – it uses natural uranium fuel, making it self-reliant on North Korea’s indigenous uranium and able to allow for production of weapons-grade plutonium; c. In the 1970s, the Radiochemistry Laboratory was used to separate 300-mg of plutonium from the irradiated IRT-2000 fuel. This information was not revealed until 1992 to the IAEA and requires significant attention; d. North Korea had initiated the construction of a second 50 MWe reactor, but the specific details were unclear as to its origin and therefore need to be examined; e. According to the IAEA, the activities at the Yongbyon site suggest that the country houses uranium enrichment centrifuges that could help create a uranium-based bomb; f. North Korea was constructing another light-water reactor in the vicinity of Yongbyon that may have become operational; and g. Recent reports indicate a large amount of activity being carried out at the Yongbyon and Pyongsan sites, possibly meaning they are preparing for another nuclear detonation test. ^{6 7}

Presently, the Iran deal has been finalized and the hard task of implementation is underway; yet the activities carried out by North Korea demand valuable attention as well. The aforementioned issues will be vital points of discussion between the world powers during their negotiations with North Korea to curtail their nuclear activities. However, the sanctions need to be effective a priori in order for North Korea to be genuine during the bargaining process. Here, China plays an important role in the implementation of sanctions, as they have been so far submissive due to fear of potential hullabaloo effects. An assertion (moreover, an undertaking) from other world powers that their manpower and funds are accessible for mitigating any ripple effects of harsh sanctions will ensure China’s full backing to boost the efforts against North Korea.

Summary

In this article, Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs have been outlined, as well as the central factors of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Further, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and a summary of obstacles that will need to be overcome are detailed – a possible pathway to negotiate with North Korea has been presented with the caveat that it will be extremely challenging to implement effective controls on the North Korean nuclear program (given the hermetic and hostile behaviors of the North Korean government). In the near future, one can anticipate the implementation of the Iran deal, which will have a great impact in the global community and especially the greater Middle Eastern region. In return, the Iranian economy will have tens of billions of dollars unfrozen and ready to be spent, while promoting NPT objectives, as well as bringing stability to the region. In many ways, the Iran deal could act as a stepping stone in establishing a similar relationship with countries such as India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan, but given that these nations are already nuclear-armed, the challenges to creating agreements for them are much tougher than for Iran. Such agreements have the potential to further bolster the pillars of the NPT regime: safeguards and verification, safety and security, and science and technology.

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Manit Shah is a Ph. D. Candidate in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University and is a part of the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). His fields of interest are Nuclear Safeguards and Security, and Radiation Detectors. He plans to graduate by May 2016 and is on a job hunt.

Jose Trevino is a Ph. D. Student in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University and is also a part of the NSSPI. He has interests in Health Physics and Emergency Response. He plans to graduate by May 2016 and hoping to join Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Roadside bombs were devastating to American troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The press has categorized the moment prior to such an explosion as “left of boom,” and that following the explosion as “right of boom.” Defense Department analyst, Benjamin E. Schwartz, has chosen to title his book about nuclear terrorism, Right of Boom. While capturing the mystery of the weapon’s origin, the title does little to convey the enormity or complexity of the issue being addressed.

This obscure reference adds to a list of euphemisms that shield readers from the shock of confronting nuclear terrorism head on. Homeland Security refers to a nuclear bomb fabricated by a terrorist as an IND (Improvised nuclear device). President Obama has named a series of World Summits on nuclear terrorism, “Nuclear Security Summits.” International affairs analysts and commentators refer to potential perpetrators of nuclear terrorism as non-state actors. The “T-word” is too often hidden in obfuscation and awkward verbal constructs. It is difficult to come to grips with what is perhaps the world’s most serious threat, when a verbal veil shields us from apocalyptic implications.

For more than forty years, serious commentators have drawn public attention to the possibility that terrorists, a.k.a. non-state actors, might detonate a nuclear weapon in a major American metropolitan location, but few have grappled with the question of what action should be taken by America’s President in response to such an attack by a perpetrator whose identity may not be known. Schwartz shares his thoughts with us on the forces that might drive the President to take dramatic action, knowing that it is predicated on a web of conjectures and guesses, rather than on hard intelligence and evidence. He also explores possible unilateral and multilateral actions that might prevent future additional attacks, as well as new world government initiatives for the control of atomic materials. By introducing these hypothetical situations of extreme complexity, Schwartz has made a valuable contribution to civil discourse. He lifts the rock under which these issues have been addressed by security specialists and government agencies that are out of view of the general public. However, he only provides a peek under the rock, rather than a robust examination of the issues.

Schwartz does grapple with the implications of an existential threat to the nation coming from a non-state entity. The norms of international relations go out the window when it is impossible for a government to protect itself through government-to-government relations. Even when dealing with the drug cartels of Colombia and of Mexico, the United States coordinates its efforts through the governments of those countries; but given the extreme threat of a nuclear weapon, if rogue gangs of nuclear terrorists were operating in Mexico, it is likely that the U.S. government would not hesitate to take unilateral action across international borders, much like the drone attacks in the frontier areas of Pakistan or the military operation that captured and killed Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, alliances needed to confront nuclear terrorism might take the form of collaboration with militias that have only a loose affiliation with nation states. Such new forms of international security liaison are emerging as the United States increasingly relies on the efforts of Kurdish and Shiite militias in combat against ISIS.

Schwartz is strongest when he explores the logical non-traditional opportunities for action and weakest when he seeks to draw wisdom from nineteenth century accounts of dealing with the likes of Comanche warriors of the Great Plains and Pashtun tribes of the Khyber Pass. His efforts of gaining guidance in dealing with unprecedented terrorist groups by learning from experiences in historic guerrilla warfare encounters lack credibility.

Right of Boom makes a particularly valuable contribution to discourse about the threat of nuclear terrorism by reviewing a key section of the 2004 book¹ by Graham Allison, entitled, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. Dr. Allison was the founding Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and a former assistant secretary of defense under President Clinton. Allison ably summarized the dangers and potential policy initiatives in 2004, when he wrote:

The centerpiece of a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism must be to deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons or materials. To do this we must shape a new international security order according to a doctrine of “Three No’s”:

1. No Loose Nukes;
2. No New Nascent Nukes; and
3. No New Nuclear Weapons States.

The first “No” refers to insecure weapons or materials that could be detonated in a weapon. The second refers to capacity to develop new nuclear weapons material such as enriched uranium or purified plutonium. The third goes beyond the development of fissile materials to the design and development of operational new weapons. Schwartz details how each of these three barriers has been breached within the past decade. This road to instability has been paved by North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran. Schwartz makes it resoundingly clear that the mechanisms for preventing the catastrophe described by Allison need to be reviewed and recast.

Schwartz frames his discussions in the hypothetical context of a Hiroshima-type bomb, known as Little Boy, being detonated on the ground by terrorists in Washington, D.C., but with the executive branch of government having been out of harm’s way. The President is, thus, in a position to deal with needed actions of response and restructuring. He argues that the President must take military action, even if he or she is ignorant of the origin of the nuclear attack. While not completely convincing, his exposition is engaging.

Schwartz speculates other anticipated outcomes following a nuclear terrorist attack that echo post-World War II ideas about international control, including the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan of 1946. While thought-provoking, those ideas, which did not gain traction back then, are still not compelling today.

In order for readers to take the threat of nuclear terrorism seriously, they need to understand how such a cataclysmic event could occur in the first place. For the vast majority of readers, nuclear realities are quite remote and unknown. Most individuals make an implicit assumption that the many layers of security that have evolved since 9/11 adequately protect society from the development of rogue nuclear weapons. Even if there is not full clarity on the issue, there is most likely a vague understanding in the minds of most that the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima required an enterprise, the Manhattan Project, and that it was perhaps the greatest scientific, militaristic, and industrial undertaking in human history. How then, could an equivalent of that Hiroshima bomb arrive in a truck at the corner of 18th and K Streets in Washington, DC, delivered by a team of perpetrators, perhaps no larger than the team of nineteen jihadists who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11?

Schwartz does a poor job of providing a clear description, for a layperson, regarding the plausibility of nuclear terrorism. He provides some history about the development of nuclear weapons, the subsequent declassification of the designs and knowledge needed for weapons production, and the 1966 case study of how three young scientists, without nuclear background, successfully designed a Nagasaki type weapon at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as an exercise to demonstrate national vulnerability.

His only reference to the Hiroshima bomb design, which would be the likely objective of a terrorist plot, is inserted as a passing phrase in the commentary about the Lawrence Livermore exercise. He states that the three young scientists “… quickly rejected designing a gun-type bomb like Little Boy, which would have used a sawed-off howitzer to crash two pieces of fissile material together, judging it to be too easy and unworthy of their time.” (P.42-43)

It is precisely the ease of both designing and building a Little Boy model that makes nuclear terrorism so feasible! The trio of young scientists succeeded in designing a Nagasaki bomb, known as Fat Man, but did not attempt to actually build one. Schwartz neglects to mention that the Little Boy design uses enriched uranium for its explosive power (which is only mildly radioactive and easy to fabricate into a weapon) while Fat Man uses plutonium (that is quite radioactive and difficult to fabricate into a weapon).

Schwartz identifies uranium 235 as a form of uranium that undergoes fission and he notes that uranium 238, which has three more neutrons in its nucleus, is a much more common form of the element. In the ore that is mined, there are ninety-nine atoms of uranium 238 for every one of uranium 235. Schwartz does not clearly state that bomb fabrication requires enrichment levels of uranium 235, which brings the composition of that component from 1% to 90%. Uranium composed of 90% uranium 235 atoms is known as “Highly Enriched Uranium” (HEU). One way of producing this bomb grade material is with the use of centrifuges. The quality and quantity of their centrifuges has been a key issue of negotiations with Iran.

Graham Allison, in Nuclear Terrorism, provides a clear and concise explanation of the Little Boy design:

If enough Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is at hand (approximately 140 pounds), a gun-type design is simple to plan, build, and detonate. In its basic form, a “bullet” (about 56 pounds) of HEU is fired down a gun barrel into a hollowed HEU “target” (about 85 pounds) fastened to the other end of the barrel. Fused together, the two pieces of HEU form a supercritical mass and detonate. The gun in the Hiroshima bomb was a 76.2-millimeter antiaircraft barrel, 6.5 inches wide, 6 feet long, and weighing about 1,000 pounds. A smokeless powder called cordite, normally found in conventional artillery pieces, was used to propel the 56-pound HEU bullet into the 85-pound HEU target. The main attractions of the gun-type weapon are simplicity and reliability. Manhattan Project scientists were so confident about this design that they persuaded military authorities to drop the bomb, untested, on Hiroshima. South Africa also used this model in building its covert nuclear arsenal (in 1977) without even conducting a test. If terrorists develop an elementary nuclear weapon of their own, they will almost certainly use this design. (P85-86)

The general public also needs to understand that U235 is only mildly radioactive. It can be handled safely and is hard to detect. In 2002, ABC News smuggled bars of uranium into ports on both the West Coast and East Coast without being discovered. Furthermore, the amount needed for a weapon can be carried in a container no larger than a soccer ball. Uranium is one of the most dense elements (about 70% more dense than lead). Therefore, 140 pounds can easily be hidden in an automobile that is entering the country or in a shipment of plumbing supplies. While an improvised terrorist bomb could probably be smuggled into the country disguised as an electric generator or embedded in a shipment of granite or other building material stones, its weight of more than a thousand pounds presents challenges. It would be much easier to bring in said soccer ball volume, distributed into smaller packages, and then assemble the weapon in a nondescript machine shop. ABC News transported 15 pounds of depleted uranium in a 12-ounce soda can. Depleted uranium, by definition, contains less U-235 proportionally than natural uranium but has a similar radiation signature.

The largest hurdle for nuclear terrorists is obtaining enriched uranium. Graham Allison does an excellent job of detailing opportunities for terrorists to obtain highly enriched uranium. His book identifies the potential sources of highly-enriched uranium from the many research reactors around the world that were once promoted by President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program. Other sources include the inadequately guarded storage sites found throughout the former Soviet Union. These sites attracted agents from rogue states and terrorist organizations in the 1990s. How much of the material from unsecured facilities that has entered the black market at that time is unknown, however many examples of black market transactions have been discovered and pose as continued challenges for international inspectors today.

There is a colossal amount of HEU present in various forms around the world. At the end of 2012, an authoritative study² estimated that there was as much as 1500 tons (3 million pounds). However, great uncertainty exists about the quantity located in Russia. That ambiguity translates directly into possible vulnerability for theft or diversion of HEU. The estimated total supply of HEU could provide fuel for twenty thousand Hiroshima-type gun nuclear weapons. If only a tenth of one percent of this material went missing, it could be used to fabricate 20 improvised nuclear weapons.

Allison describes a particularly egregious case from Kazakhstan where 1,278 pounds of highly enriched uranium were discovered in an abandoned warehouse that was secured only with a single padlock. That material had been collected for shipment to Russia as fuel for nuclear submarines. During the break-up of the Soviet Union, its existence was overlooked (or so it would appear). It is possible that some material was removed and sold to agents from Iraq, Iran, or elsewhere, but there is no public knowledge of that happening. Action was taken by the United States to purchase the material for use in power reactors. In 1994, removal was accomplished in a secret operation known as Project Sapphire, in which teams of U.S. experts packed and transported the materials to the Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In 2014, the twentieth anniversary of Project Sapphire was celebrated, but the task of securing highly enriched uranium in the former Soviet Union has yet to be finalized.

Allison further writes that Pakistan (in 2004) was probably producing enough HEU to fuel five to ten new bombs each year. While Allison was concerned with the possibility that some of that material might be diverted, that possibility was exposed as a major U.S. concern in 2010. The Guardian reported on November 30th of that year that Wikileaks revealed that in early 2010, the American Ambassador in Islamabad, Anne Patterson, had cabled to Washington: “Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.”

Theft or diversion of HEU from production facilities is not unprecedented. Allison describes theft from a Russian enrichment plant in 1992, which was discovered in an unrelated police action. A famous case published in the March 9, 2014 issue of the New Yorker magazine and discussed in an excellent article by Eric Schlosser involved suspected diversion, in the 1960s, of hundreds of pounds of HEU from a commercial enrichment facility in Pennsylvania to Israel.

Given that large amounts of material that would fuel a Hiroshima-equivalent gun-type weapon are within reach of potential terrorists and successful acquisition of the material is quite plausible, the question remains as to whom might take such an action. Schwartz makes reference to al-Qaeda and to terrorists in general, but does not try to be specific regarding potential nuclear perpetrators.

Allison devotes a chapter of his book to the identification of potential nuclear terrorists, some of whom have actively explored acquisition of fissile material. Included in his overview are al-Qaeda, Chechen separatists, and Aum Shinrikyo. The Aum group, after failing in its attempts to purchase nuclear warheads, initiated a deadly sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995.

Another excellent, comprehensive book³ dealing with nuclear terrorism is The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), by Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with contributing authors Amy Sands, Leonard Spector, and Fred Wehling. Ferguson and Potter explore a number of these issues in great detail. Their discussion of potential perpetrators has a prescient section on apocalyptic groups. They refer to “…certain Jewish or Islamic extremists or factions of the Christian identity movement, whose faith entails a deep belief in the need to cleanse and purify the world via violent upheaval to eliminate non believers.” Given the success of ISIS in acquiring domination over large cities and vast financial resources, their potential for producing a gun-type Hiroshima bomb exceeds any prior threat from a terrorist organization. While attacks on Europe or the United States by ISIS do not appear to be imminent, the use of nuclear weapons to attack Shiites in Iran or Jews in Israel could easily become priorities on their agenda.

In recent years, scant attention has been paid to the possibility that apocalyptic groups or other potential terrorists based in the United States might engage in nuclear terrorism. The most horrific bombing by an American was the detonation of explosives by Timothy McVeigh at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 that killed 168 people. McVeigh was driven, not by religious belief, but by a passion to avenge actions by the federal government at Waco Texas and Ruby Ridge. These confrontations of armed citizens with federal agencies promoted the militia movement to which McVeigh adhered.

While predating McVeigh, nuclear weapons designer, Ted Taylor, became obsessed with the possibility of nuclear terrorism being initiated by an American terrorist. Taylor was the quintessential embodiment of an obsessed inventor-scientist. All those around him tolerated Taylor’s idiosyncrasies due to his exceptional brilliance. After receiving an undergraduate degree in physics from Cal Tech, he studied for a PhD at the University of California, Berkeley where J. Robert Oppenheimer had established the first American theoretical physics research group of international prominence. Taylor was unable to complete PhD studies there, because he refused to pursue course work in required fields of physics that did not interest him. However, Oppenheimer recognized his genius for creative thought and facilitated his appointment to the post-war theoretical physics staff at Los Alamos in 1948, where he became the leading designer of nuclear weapons. His accomplishments included the creation of the largest fission bomb that was ever assembled and tested, the 500 Kiloton Super Oralloy Bomb, which was thirty-five times more powerful than the Hiroshima Bomb.

The design area in which Taylor confounded the experts was in the conceptualization of small nuclear weapons. His ability to model very small nuclear weapons led to the production for use by the U.S. Army in 1961, of a tripod mounted recoilless rifle known as the Davy Crockett that fired a warhead with the explosive capacity of only 250 tons of TNT (equal to one sixtieth of the Hiroshima bomb). This weapon, which could be deployed and fired by two soldiers on foot, was produced for use against Soviet armored units, but had quite limited distribution.

A leading 20th Century theoretical physicist, Freeman Dyson, is quoted as saying, “Ted (Taylor) taught me everything I know about bombs. He was the man who had made bombs small and cheap.”

Taylor’s deep insights into the ease with which nuclear weapons could be assembled led him to resign from Los Alamos in 1956 and focus his energy on alerting society to the threat of nuclear terrorism. He became acutely aware of how the U.S. Government had contracted out the development, handling, and storage of highly-enriched uranium to commercial suppliers. He observed directly that the security and the procedures for handling and shipping at these facilities were extremely insecure. After trying to promote safeguards through efforts within the nuclear establishment, he decided, in the late 1960s, that he should alert the public to these dangers and promote public policy initiatives. In 1972, he obtained a grant from the Ford Foundation for a thorough study of existing materials that might be diverted into fabricating a clandestine nuclear bomb. Together with Mason Willrich, a social scientist, they published a book in 1974 entitled, Nuclear Theft: Risk and Safeguards (Ballinger). During this same period, he travelled throughout the United States speaking about the issue. Taylor’s efforts attracted the writer, John McPhee, who then asked to accompany him. In 1973, McPhee wrote a book⁴ about Taylor and his efforts to minimize the risks of nuclear terrorism entitled, The Curve of Binding Energy, from which Schwartz quotes a particularly startling prediction:

“’I think we have to live with the expectation,’ remarked a Los Alamos atomic engineer in 1973, “’that once every four or five years a nuclear explosion will take place and kill a lot of people.’ This statement is cited in John McPhee’s The Curve of Binding Energy, which detailed concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors over forty years ago.”

Schwartz then continues with: “While exaggeration may mislead the credulous and offend the perceptive, neither the absence of a precedent for nuclear terrorism nor the intelligence failure regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD program changes the growing threat.”

While Schwartz gives lip service to the “growing threat” of nuclear terrorism, his book does little to assuage the credulous or to convince the perceptive of the seriousness of such a threat. The fact that he has engaged in this serious analysis of government policy for the aftermath of a nuclear terrorist attack is testimony to the fact that he is does not think that the issue is merely Chicken Little’s exaggerated concern. Certainly, his work as a Defense Department analyst lends gravitas to his posture on this subject.

It is worth reflecting how much traction the effort to call attention to nuclear terrorism has attained within the past 40+ years. The most immediate example of a serious concern for Schwartz’ scenario of a terrorist nuclear weapon being detonated in Washington, DC, is a 120 page report⁵ from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Homeland Security entitled, Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism – the National Capital Region. The report summarizes studies, implemented in 2011, by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Applied Research Associates on civil defense response to the detonation of a terrorist nuclear device. Unlike the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki that were detonated at about 1900 feet, the improvised nuclear weapons hypothesized in this study would explode at ground level. The consequence of a ground level explosion is that a crater would be forced from the ground carrying significant amounts of deadly radioactive debris that would then be dispersed over a range of perhaps 20 miles in length and a mile or two in width. Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not experience this characteristic “fallout” of radioactive debris.

The model that is discussed hypothesizes a 10-kiloton (Hiroshima was 15 kiloton) explosion at ground level at the intersection of K Street NW and 16th Street NW using the actual weather observed at that location on February 14, 2009. This in-depth analysis includes a summary of the effects of the explosion on the infrastructure of the city as well as on the population – including blast, fire, and radiation damage. There are detailed recommendations regarding how, where, and when to shelter from radiation, and assessments of evacuation scenarios. Public health issues are evaluated, including the anticipated post-explosion capacity of hospitals and health care workers to deal with needs of the population. Such a blast would produce nearly total death and destruction for an area about one mile in radius around ground zero and high levels of destruction out to about an area with a three-mile radius. Fallout with serious radiation consequences could impact regions as far as twenty miles from ground zero.

Homeland Security is engaged in studies of major metropolitan areas in the United States and shares these analyses and recommendations with police, firefighters, and other first responders, including emergency medical teams. In this literature, the word “terrorist” is rarely used and the amount of information and advice provided to the public is minimal. The weapon is almost always referred to as an “Improvised Nuclear Device” and its size seems to be standardized at 10 kiloton.

It appears that government agencies are concerned enough about nuclear terrorism to study their impact on physical environments and on human populations. However, the Right of Boom is unique in addressing the political impact and possible retaliatory action. But Schwarz is only addressing the simplest of potential scenarios. What if an explosion in Washington, DC, were accompanied by a blackmail threat that if certain actions were not taken by the United States, other bombs that were already in place would be detonated?

Another possibility would be that bombs were detonated simultaneously in several cities – possibly Washington, New York, and Los Angeles. The challenge of trying to anticipate such a catastrophe is mind boggling, yet, if one bomb were possible, three would be almost equally as feasible. It may be that such studies are taking place out of the public view. Even the Homeland Security studies, that are readily available on the Internet, are not proactively disseminated to the public.

During the height of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war led to Civil Defense exercises being held throughout the country. While these might not have been entirely realistic, they did prepare civilian populations for the possibility of nuclear conflict. Yet today, while nuclear terrorism may be just as likely, little is shared with the public – regarding either policy considerations or physical realities.

There is at least one instance of important advice that could potentially save many thousands of lives that is known to Homeland Security and FEMA, but is not distributed to the public: in the event of a terrorist nuclear event, the population affected should stay in whatever building they might be located in with positioning away from exterior windows, walls and ceilings. Homeland Security refers to this action as “Sheltering in Place.” The fact is that almost any building structure would shield against the type of radiation that most likely to be present, and that this radiation would dissipate significantly after a few days. By staying indoors for several days, chances of survival would be greatly increased. A practical consequence of this approach is that, following the first days after an attack, parents and children should not seek to be reunited if the children are in school and the parents are elsewhere. A strong concern for this issue was expressed in the 2004 report on terrorism planning after a “dirty bomb” attack issued by the New York Academy of Medicine⁶.

Lack of public dissemination of practical information, such as this, is partially attributed to the fear of alarming the general population, as well as a deep skepticism, among many, that such an event could even happen. Government policy sustains nuclear terrorism as an invisible topic, lying outside of conscious consideration.

While Homeland Security and FEMA are actively engaged in preparations for an act of nuclear terrorism, the scope of their planning is limited to responding to the physical, medical, and radiological impact of an IND. The Right of Boom comes close to exploring the larger social and political consequences but ultimately fails to do so. Questions that remain unexplored here and elsewhere are the impact on the nation’s economic, transportation, communications, and other fundamental systems that underpin the functioning of society. When one considers the ways in which 9/11, with the deaths of approximately 3,000 civilians, transformed society, it is difficult to image how the deaths of 30,000 or 300,000 civilians might alter the basic framework of civil order. It is difficult to even frame the questions. The enormity of this threat may be a significant contributing factor that keeps it out of public discourse. Examples of the issue being ducked are all too frequent.

Recently, both The Economist and Foreign Policy magazines featured cover stories focused on nuclear weapons (March 7th-13th, 2015 and March-April 2015, respectively). The Economist sums things up with, “But for now the best that can be achieved is to search for ways to restore effective deterrence, bear down on proliferation, and get back to the dogged grind of arms-control negotiations between the main nuclear powers.” Foreign Policy deals more with the active nuclear weapons refurbishing programs that are taking place in the United States, Russia, and China and how these activities might prompt countries that now adhere to the Non Proliferation Treaty to withdraw. Neither of these overview reports mentions the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors.

Even a long-time analyst of nuclear weapons issues, Professor Paul Bracken of Yale, eschews reference to nuclear terrorism in his otherwise insightful book⁷, The Second Nuclear Era: Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics (MacMillan, 2012). He bemoans the failure of U.S. strategists to reshape thinking that goes beyond a cold war framework, to grapple with a much more complex, multipolar world. Yet he limits his consideration of terrorists to that of agents for nuclear powers, rather than as independent non-state operatives.

It is striking that those who are worried about an improvised nuclear device exploding in an American city are noteworthy individuals who know the most about the subject: Theodore Taylor, the most capable of the post WWII nuclear weapons designers; Graham Allison, a former undersecretary of defense; Charles Ferguson, the current president of the Federation of American Scientists, and Benjamin Schwartz, an analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. Following the knowledge trail to the deepest level of national intelligence, we find that the President of the United States is perhaps the most concerned individual of all. Michael Crowley wrote⁸ in Time Magazine on March 26, 2014, Yes, Obama Really is Worried About a Manhattan Nuke. He quotes the president saying, “I continue to be much more concerned, when it comes to our security, with the prospect of a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan.”

One might wonder if this statement by Obama is an isolated comment or a deeply ingrained belief that underlies his thinking and strategic approach to governance. By examining his record of policy statements and executive actions of the past six years, one sees that this is his core belief.

Obama most likely became educated about nuclear issues during his time in the Senate. He rubbed shoulders with Senator Sam Nunn, who has probably been the most influential publically-elected official concerned with nuclear issues (in general) and nuclear terrorism (in particular), prior to the emergence of Barack Obama. Less than three months after his first inauguration in 2009, he delivered a historic speech⁹ on nuclear weapons in Hradcany Square in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic.

The speech was comprehensive in addressing issues of stockpiles of the major nuclear nations, the need to eliminate proliferation in additional states, and the need to curb developments in Iran and North Korea. However, it is noteworthy that he dealt at length with issues of nuclear terrorism. He stated, “…we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.”

President Obama renders the threat explicit: “One nuclear weapon exploded in one city – be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague – could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be — for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival.”

He also does not minimize the chances of such an event-taking place: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal one.”

It is amazing that this Paul Revere-style alert and the call for action given by the President of the United States on the world stage could just as well have been an oration by Chicken Little. Perhaps if the President himself had failed to follow up, it might explain the lack of attention by commentators, think tanks, talking heads, and loquacious pundits. Certainly, the Right of Boom fails to build on the solid case made by President Obama.

But the President has not neglected this topic; far from it. While in Prague, he laid out an agenda and has assiduously adhered to it ever since. His Prague address called for efforts to expand cooperation with Russia and to seek new partnerships to lock down the fissile materials that enable nuclear weapons. He identified comprehensive areas of concern:

We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year.

President Obama organized a summit meeting in Washington, DC, in 2010 that was attended by 38 heads of state. This was the largest gathering of heads of state called by a U.S. president since the organizational meeting for the United Nations in 1945. He then held follow-up summits in 2012 in Seoul, Korea and in 2014 in The Hague, The Netherlands. A fourth summit will be held March 31- April 1, 2016, at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in Washington, DC. These historic gatherings of large numbers of heads of state have taken place with remarkably little publicity or comment from politicians or the public. Typically, news media have reported during the time of the meetings, but there has been virtually no mention of the activities that these summits have generated. Since the programs were referred to as “Nuclear Security Summits,” they probably generated much less interest than if they had been headlined as “Nuclear Terrorism Summits,” (which, in fact, is a far more accurate title).

Stemming from these summit meetings have been numerous working groups that pursue targeted goals during the intervals between the meetings. These meetings have been conducted using an innovative approach to international diplomacy that seems to be grounded in a philosophy of achieving what is possible and not being stymied by the usual impediments to negotiated agreements. The working groups bring together countries that have mutual concerns and they work to create implementable policy statements – (but start with no predetermined format, structure, or reporting mechanism). In an attempt to stimulate creativity and new leadership, the participants are not assigned by their governments, specific titles, or rank, but by their relevant expertise. They are given the titles of “Sherpa” and “Sous-Sherpa.” The very title, which is associated with providing assistance to mountain climbers, sets a positive tone. Another innovative break with tradition and creative use of language is to refer to the statements that are produced as “gift baskets.” These gift baskets have resulted in many countries pledging to take further action and applying peer pressure on other countries to take action.

As of April 2015, there are 15 groups¹⁰ working to create these gift baskets. The number of countries that come together range from four in the group focused on reducing the use of HEU for the production of medical isotopes to thirty-five seeking to strengthen nuclear security implementation. The latter group has been working to integrate IAEA nuclear security policies into national rules and regulations.

Some of the other topics being addressed include the security of fissile material transportation, the security of radiological materials, forensics in nuclear security, and the promotion of countries becoming free of HEU. The elimination, since 2009, of all HEU from 12 countries has been a major accomplishment, particularly the removal of all HEU from the Ukraine, which was announced in March of 2012.

While Schwartz gives passing mention to the Nuclear Security Summits, he fails to recognize the innovative approach pursued by “gift basket” diplomacy or the successes that have resulted from that approach. Furthermore, the Nuclear Security Summit initiative has created a framework for approaching nuclear terrorism that would have applications following a terrorist nuclear detonation in an American city. Schwartz does not include that framework in his analysis of potential “right of boom” government actions.

More significant than the limited scope of Schwartz’ scenario’s vision regarding retaliation and new international security norms is his complete neglect of the horrific domestic situation that the President and his advisors would need to confront. Certainly the President would need to explain to the American public how he or she would respond to the perpetrators, but it could be argued that the American public’s main concern would be maintenance of civil society. Schwartz presents a hypothetical transcript of an address by the President to the American people in which he notes that he is speaking on his own authority that is enhanced by the advice of the cabinet and the consent of Congress. However, in that address, there is no mention of the deaths, devastation, interruption of commerce, breakdowns in communications, overwhelming strains on transportation systems, medical infrastructure, outbreaks of civil disorder, and general fear and hysteria that must be sweeping the country.

Perhaps it is asking too much for The Right of Boom to carry that load in addition to introducing the challenges of international actions, plans, and policy. Yet, its scenario – which may leave many readers incredulous regarding the actions that it does address, is rendered more unbelievable by its neglect of these obvious civil society considerations.

All of these issues were addressed in the article, “The Day After, Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City,”¹¹ by Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May, and William J. Perry published in the Autumn 2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly (P. 19 This trio of authors had deep knowledge about how nuclear terrorism might manifest itself and what the resulting consequences would be. Aston B. Carter is currently the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Michael M. May was a long time director of the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons development laboratory, and William J. Perry served as Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration. These heavyweights wrote:

As grim a prospect as this scenario (a terrorist nuclear explosion in a U.S. city) is for policymakers to contemplate, a failure to develop a comprehensive contingency plan and inform the American public, where appropriate, about its particulars will only serve to amplify the devastating impact of a nuclear attack on a U.S. city…

In considering the actions that need to be taken on the “Day After”, they take more seriously than Schwartz the possibility of actual follow-on attacks, as well as the threat of follow-on attacks. Their short article refers to the physical impact of blast, radiation, problems regarding evacuation, medical care, civil unrest, etc. There is also a brief section dealing with retaliation and deterrence. It is surprising that Schwartz does not reference this precursor article that was written by such authoritative individuals.

A direct extension of the “Day After” article is an essay¹² by Richard L. Garwin entitled, “A Nuclear Explosion in a City or an Attack on a Nuclear Reactor,” that was included in the Summer 2010 issue of The Bridge, a publication of the National Academy of Engineering, within a special installment, “Nuclear Dangers.” Garwin has been a senior advisor for many years to the highest levels of the U.S. government on nuclear weapons policy and other technologies that are relevant to U.S. military and security affairs. In 1950, when Garwin was 22 years old, he turned the concepts developed by Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam for the hydrogen bomb into engineering and assembly specifications that produced the first manmade thermonuclear explosion at Enewetak Atoll in the Pacific Ocean in 1952.

Garwin’s essay parallels that of Carter, May, and Perry, (in which he has a lengthy quote). Garwin is explicit that he is hypothesizing a terrorist-improvised nuclear device that uses highly-enriched uranium and the Hiroshima gun design. This IND, like all the other imagined weapons, has a yield of between 10 and 15 kilotons. It is worth noting that everyone who addresses the issue of a terrorist nuclear weapon and who has knowledge of the underlying technology chooses to focus on a device of about 10 KT. Garwin also notes that the scenario he addresses, “…was the focus of President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 12-13, 2010 (White House 2010).”

Garwin also emphasizes a point of great concern, made by the trio, with the following quote from the “Day After” article:

The federal government should stop pretending that state and local officials will be able to control the situation on the Day After. The pretense persists in Washington planning for the Day After that its role is to ‘support’ governors and mayors, who will retain authority and responsibility in the affected area. While this is a reasonable application of our federal system to small and medium-sized emergencies, it is not appropriate for large disasters like a nuclear detonation.

Since we witness the same pretense being operative in 2015, it is unfortunate that Schwartz did not bring this issue to the forefront. The current situation finds Homeland Security engaged in detailed Day After studies for different locations and in providing guidance and training for first responders in major cities, yet there is almost no information being shared, by either federal or local agencies, with the public.

The only exception, known to this reviewer at least, is the extensive efforts of the Ventura County California Department of Public Health. That office published¹³ the 243 page, “Ventura County Nuclear Explosion Response Plan,” on August 8, 2011 and has ongoing activities addressing this civil defense challenge. The premise of the Ventura County plan is that the terrorist 10KT explosion would take place in Los Angeles County, that being a more attractive target for terrorists. The population, economic, transportation, port, and other infrastructure targets of Los Angeles County are all more significant than in Ventura County. However, since it is contiguous to Los Angeles County, Ventura County would likely experience significant radioactive fallout. In addition uncontrolled mass evacuation would confront Ventura County. Throughout the region there would likely be hysteria, looting, and civil disorder.  Additionally, the support resources of medical, police, and firefighter first responders would be called upon to aid in the response and recovery operations in Los Angeles County. The Ventura County plan examines short term, intermediate term, and long-term coordination issues for first responders, as well as guidelines for the civilian population. The plan calls for education and coordination efforts that are needed in anticipation of a nuclear disaster. It points out that many more lives will be lost and the impact of the attack will be much greater if society is not prepared and well- informed. In spite of this obvious reality, there is almost no attention to informing the American public about these matters.

The level of detail in the Ventura County Plan is impressive and somewhat shocking. For example, it includes guidelines on dealing with the large numbers of dead bodies that will need to be identified and disposed of. There are recommendations such as the creation of temporary burial sites in “trenches at least 5 feet deep and at least 50 yards from water sources.” They recommend that bodies be at least 2 feet apart and in “one layer only.”

The report also outlines the psychological impact of the disaster including anxiety, anger, depression, and lethargy. It notes that the fear, disorientation, and misleading notions will be introduced by the lack of understanding about the ongoing impact of radiation exposure. The report notes that Ventura County has elected to develop a Trauma Response Network to respond to large-scale emotional and psychological needs of the general public.

In its section on rage and hoarding, there is every indication that violence will erupt. The report notes that looting and other violent acts are more likely in settings where there are high crime rates and youth gangs. These conditions are met in Ventura County and among the evacuees arriving from Los Angeles County. While they note that, “The Federal government has a massive food shortage program of canned goods located in salt caves near Kansas City,” supplies will likely run out before federal authorities would be able to transport the stored food to where it would be needed. They also enunciate a likely need for “supervised looting” in which government authorities seize private warehouses and distribute food.

The Ventura County plan estimates that two million people will arrive from Los Angeles County bringing almost seven hundred thousand pet dogs and cats. The problems of radioactive contamination of pets and the fact that Red Cross shelters will not accept house pets are addressed. Burial of large numbers of dead animals is also included in the Ventura County plan. While the plan quantifies the number of pets likely to be carried by evacuees, there is no estimate for the number of pets that will become troublesome following the death of their owners.

One of the few examples of pets in a disaster zone is the experience in Rwanda, where more than 800,000 people were massacred during a 100-day period. When Paul Kagame led a military expedition into Rwanda from Uganda, he found packs of dogs eating the corpses that were everywhere and ordered his troops to shoot all of the dogs.

The level of detail in the Ventura County report reinforces the certainty that immediate Federal action will be needed following a nuclear terrorist attack. The problems of medical care, food availability, law enforcement, and general chaos will require federal resources and personnel.  Clearly, the issues that will be faced by the President on the Day After will be far more diverse and complex than portrayed in the scenario presented in Right of Boom.

Commentary about nuclear terrorism includes issues of prevention and preparation on the “left of boom” and issues of response, retaliation, and prevention of a repeat attack on the “right of boom.” Schwartz has chosen to develop a case for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism and the retaliation aspect of post attack actions. In so doing, he has made a valuable contribution to public discourse on an issue that has received little attention. Since the post attack actions of the executive branch of government will be occupied, if not overwhelmed, by the excruciating challenges of coping with domestic challenges and needs, his bland scenario, with its transcript of the President’s first post attack address to the nation, is not plausible. His focus on international initiatives to prevent follow-on nuclear terrorism would have benefited from explicit recognition of President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit diplomacy with the establishment of fifteen working groups that are attempting to deal with precisely these issues. By moving from a laissez faire, “gift basket” form of diplomacy to a more coercive approach of engagement, the outlines of a specific agenda for the “New Order,” that he imagines, might emerge.

While it is difficult to calculate the odds that there will be a nuclear terrorist attack on a U.S. city, the grim reality is that, if it were to happen, if would transform life as we know it. It appears that those who are best informed on the issue assess the probability as high. This is a threat that poses a serious concern to the President of the United States, former secretaries of defense, former undersecretaries and high-level advisors in the department of defense, and former lead designers and development managers of nuclear weapons. One wonders what conclusions the bookie, Jimmy the Greek, would have drawn from this consensus among experts.

In the 1950s and 60s the threat of nuclear war between the two superpowers stimulated intense discussion and debate. Many books were written, both fiction and non-fiction. Movies were produced, songs and poems were written, and civil defense drills were conducted. Some of this activity was profound and some of it was silly, but we are thankful that nothing happened to threaten our existence. Currently, nuclear terrorism receives little attention and is often viewed with skepticism. Right of Boom by Benjamin E. Schwartz is a welcome addition to the public airing of these issues.

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Edward A. Friedman is Professor Emeritus of Technology Management at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, NJ. His undergraduate and graduate degrees in physics are from MIT and Columbia University, respectively. He teaches courses at Stevens on nuclear weapons issues. He holds an Honorary Doctor of Science degree in Mathematics from Sofia University in Bulgaria and he received a medal from King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan for his work in educational development at Kabul University in the 1970s.

General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb (Praeger, 2016) provides the first full narrative describing General Marshall’s crucial role in the first decade of nuclear weapons that included the Manhattan Project, the use of the atomic bomb on Japan, and their management during the early years of the Cold War.

Marshall is best known today as the architect of the plan for Europe’s recovery in the aftermath of World War II—the Marshall Plan. He also earned acclaim as the master strategist of the Allied victory in World War II. Marshall mobilized and equipped the Army and Air Force under a single command, serving as the primary conduit for information between the Army and the Air Force, as well as the president and secretary of war. As Army Chief of Staff during World War II, he developed a close working relationship with Admiral Earnest King, Chief of Naval Operations; worked with Congress and leaders of industry on funding and producing resources for the war; and developed and implemented the successful strategy the Allies pursued in fighting the war. Last but not least of his responsibilities was the production of the atomic bomb.

The Beginnings

An early morning phone call to General Marshall and a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt led to Marshall’s little known, nonetheless critical, role in the development and use of the atomic bomb. The call, received at 3:00 a.m. on September 1, 1939, informed Marshall that German dive bombers had attacked Warsaw. The letter signed by noted physicist Albert Einstein and delivered a month later, informed Roosevelt of the possibility of producing an enormously powerful bomb using a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.

As Marshall hung up the phone, he told his drowsy wife, “Well, it’s come.” He dressed quickly and went to his office. Later that day he would be sworn in as Army chief of staff while German troops marched into Poland in a blitzkrieg that launched World War II.

Nearly one year before, German scientists had observed that bombarding uranium atoms with neutrons caused them to split into smaller elements, releasing a tremendous amount of energy. This fission of a uranium atom also generates additional neutrons, which can then split other uranium atoms to produce a nuclear chain reaction. Physicists in many countries recognized this rapid chain reaction in uranium could produce a powerful atomic bomb. Among them was Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, who realized that the Germans in particular were in an excellent position to produce an atomic bomb. Szilard, like Albert Einstein, had immigrated to the United States to escape Nazi persecution. He believed the U.S. government should be alerted to this possibility. He reasoned that Einstein, a renowned scientist, would be in a position to gain the attention of the U.S. government. So, on July 12, 1939, he visited Einstein at his home on Long Island to discuss the prospect of a U.S. atomic bomb. Szilard’s explanation of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium surprised Einstein, who had not followed recent developments in nuclear physics. Einstein pondered this new revelation and then slowly remarked, “I haven’t thought about that at all.”¹ He realized that nuclear fission was the conversion of mass to energy (a demonstration of his famous 1905 E=mc2 equation).

In the letter, which was delivered October 4, 1939, Einstein warned the president that the Germans might be developing a game-changing bomb, and he raised the prospect of the United States building a weapon of its own. Roosevelt immediately approved the establishment of a committee to investigate the feasibility of the United States producing such a weapon, and Marshall’s remarkable career took a significant turn.

Marshall’s direct involvement with nuclear weapons came two years after these initial communications of 1939, when the president appointed him to the Top Policy Group, established to provide Marshall with advice on atomic energy. Little did Marshall realize that the atomic bomb would hasten the end of the war, dramatically alter the future of warfare, and profoundly influence the post-war world. As a soldier who came of age in the era that saw both trench warfare and the implementation of new technologies on the battlefield, Marshall was skeptical, but open, to the possibilities this new weapon presented. Almost a decade later, as secretary of state and secretary of defense, he confronted profound issues related to nuclear weapons.

Expanding the size of the Army, training new draftees, reorganizing the command structure, and acquiring the necessary materials and equipment had required strong leadership within both the military and Congress. In guiding these efforts, Marshall had gained the confidence of the president, advisor Harry Hopkins, Stimson, and the Army officer corps. He also acquired the respect of congressmen during his numerous committee appearances in support of the funds requested for the mobilization. Thus, despite the demands of these critical assignments, it was not surprising the president appointed Marshall to the influential policy group for atomic power.

As a member of the Top Policy Group, General Marshall was privy to the reports and plans for expanding the project. In 1943, when research indicated that the United States could produce a bomb, the Army assumed responsibility for its production. That meant Marshall, as Army chief of staff, became responsible for the massive effort known as the Manhattan Project, (that built the atomic bombs dropped on Japan). His oversight of the Army’s budget allowed him to divert funds necessary to initiate the project. Later, his reputation and influence were instrumental in securing approval for additional funding from congressmen who were told only that the project was important for winning the war. When the bomb emerged as a weapon that might end the war in the Pacific, he advised Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President Harry Truman regarding its use on Japan. This decision shortened the war and unleashed the specter of nuclear holocaust on the world.²

The Manhattan Project

Marshall and Stimson oversaw the largest scientific project in history. From 1942 to 1946, an estimated 500,000 people were involved in producing the bombs, only a few of whom knew the objective of the project. According to one estimate, the Manhattan project cost $2.2 billion (approximately $30 billion in 2014 dollars) from 1942 to 1946.³

The project encompassed a nationwide system of production plants and laboratories.   The Clinton Engineering Works at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, used sequence thermal diffusion, electromagnetic separation, and gaseous diffusion methods to enrich uranium in order to produce the concentrated, fissile uranium-235 required for the bomb. (Natural uranium has less than one percent uranium-235 and more than 99 percent non-fissile uranium-238, and nuclear explosives typically require a uranium mixture with 80 percent or more concentration in uranium-235.) Nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington, produced small amounts of plutonium-239, which were separated from spent reactor fuel by chemical means. These fissile materials were then sent to Los Alamos, New Mexico, where they were transformed into the critical components of the first atomic bombs. In addition to these major installations, many other industries and laboratories throughout the U.S. contributed to the Project.

In early June 1945, the uranium and plutonium were fashioned into components for the atomic bombs nicknamed “Little Boy” (the uranium-235 bomb) and “Fat Man” (the plutonium-239 weapon). Because there was only enough enriched uranium for one “Little Boy” and its design was simpler than that of “Fat Man,” it was not tested. The weapons designers were confident in the simple gun type mechanism to trigger the bomb. One of the two available “Fat Man” weapons was used to test the more complicated implosion method of detonation on July 16 at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

Leslie Groves

In one key move, Marshall assigned Colonel Leslie Groves to manage the project and then provided him with the required resources to carry it through. The cooperation between the dynamic Groves and the reserved Marshall was critical in directing the largest scientific project in history, which produced the atomic bomb in less than two years.

Groves first met General Marshall when he reported with a group of officers for duty with the War Department General Staff in June 1939. Marshall appreciated Groves’ management skills and wanted to keep him at the War Department in Washington. Although Groves had little direct contact with Marshall, he appreciated the fact that Groves had turned down a transfer from Washington to engineering duty.

Groves was given full authority to create the organizational structure and lines of command for the project, which became an independent command, no longer held accountable to the Corps of Engineers. He reported directly to Marshall and Stimson. This structure worked well due to the relationship between Groves and his superiors during the three-year project. The relationship of mutual trust, support, and respect is reflected in a post-war interview where Groves stated:

One reason why we were so successful was non-interference from above. General Marshall never interfered with anything that was going on. He didn’t ask for regular reports; he saw me whenever I wanted to see him and his instructions were very clear. Never once did I have to talk about the approval for money appropriations. ⁴

Marshall’s Leadership

Marshall’s directional genius included the ability to foster collaboration among groups with disparate interests. As Army chief of staff, he worked with Allied military leaders and heads of state to implement strategies for defeating the Axis. This talent was also critical to the success of the Manhattan Project. Marshall insured cooperation between the Army and the scientists, obtained funds from Congress while keeping their intended use a secret, and supported Groves’ forceful management style. Marshall and Stimson provided continuity for the atomic program during the transition of presidential leadership from Roosevelt to Truman.

Marshall’s influence on decisions leading to the use of the atomic bomb on Japan was as important as that of President Truman’s two top advisors, Stimson and Secretary of State James Byrnes. Marshall’s wise counsel influenced the views of Truman and his advisors as they weighed options for ending the war. Marshall provided valued advice on military issues, including the impact of the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war, the pros and cons of an invasion of the Japanese homeland, and the conditions for a Japanese surrender.

Uncertainty

As the war continued in the Pacific, Marshall and Stimson wrestled with the issues surrounding the use of the bomb on Japan and its implications for the post-war world. They often discussed the political and diplomatic issues associated with Japan’s surrender and Russia’s involvement in the Pacific theater. Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt and Churchill at the February 1945 Yalta Conference to enter the war against Japan within 90 days after Germany’s surrender. Marshall recognized the major role that the Soviet army could play in defeating Germany and believed it would also be valuable in the conquest of Japan. He thought Russian engagement of the Japanese on the Chinese mainland would keep Japan from moving troops to the home islands. He also noted that the Russians could invade Manchuria whenever they wished, thus allowing them to benefit from the surrender terms.

Still, Marshall kept his focus on military planning, leaving Stimson to manage the politics and diplomacy associated with the bomb. As the end of the war in the Pacific drew closer, allied military actions were dependent on Japan’s acceptance of the terms of surrender. Marshall understood that there was a choice between obtaining Japan’s unconditional surrender at a time when the nation’s morale was at a low point, and an invasion accompanied by Soviet intervention.⁵ He also considered the bomb as a possible means of “shocking the nation into surrender.”

Marshall was not certain that the strategic use of the bomb on a Japanese city would end the war and he believed an invasion was a real possibility. If necessary, he believed that additional atomic bombs could be used as tactical weapons to support the invasion. The low estimates of the explosive power of the bomb that Marshall received from Groves, as well as the wide range of estimates from the Project’s scientists, led him to doubt its strategic value⁶  Given this uncertainty, Marshall maintained his conviction that in the absence of a diplomatic solution, allied troops would have to occupy the Japanese home islands to insure the nation’s complete capitulation. If an invasion became necessary, he believed Soviet entry into the war with Japan would be most helpful.

Military Options

With the future of the bomb still uncertain, Marshall, as operative head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, heard proposals from the Army Air Forces and Navy for forcing Japan to surrender. Naval planners felt that a tight blockade would force the Japanese into capitulation, while the Air Force leaders favored bombing them into submission. Marshall maintained that invasion of the home islands would be necessary, given the resistance encountered on Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Moreover, the resilience of the Japanese to the intense bombing of their cities reinforced his position. He remained a conventional soldier who felt an invasion would be necessary to conquer an enemy. Nevertheless, he viewed the atomic bomb as a possible means of ending the war to avoid an invasion.

Marshall supported a strategy to apply increasing pressure on Japan. It included an immediate increase in conventional bombing and a tightened naval blockade, followed by Russian entry into the war in August and use of the atomic bomb when it became available. If these actions failed to produce surrender, Kyushu would be invaded on November 1, followed by Honshu in March 1946. Marshall left the decision to use the bomb to the president. He told Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy “whether we should drop the bomb on Japan was a matter for the president to decide, not the chief of staff, since it was not a military question.⁷ He maintained his position of civilian control of nuclear weapons after the war.

Japan’s Surrender

By the end of July 1945, leaders in the United States and Japan remained deadlocked on the means of ending the war. The options for the United States were either a costly invasion to force a quick surrender or the continuation of the bombing and blockade, which came with the risk of losing the American peoples’ support for the war. Japan’s choices were to seek terms of surrender that left the emperor on the throne or to offer fierce resistance, in the hopes that the American public would become weary of the war and accept surrender terms favorable to Japan. The atomic bomb changed the game for both nations.

As a result of the successful Trinity test on July 16 at Alamogordo, New Mexico,  U.S. leaders activated plans for dropping the two existing atomic bombs on Japanese cities. At the Potsdam Conference, Groves informed Marshall about preparations for the bombing missions. MAGIC intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and military communications indicated to the allies that the Japanese leaders remained divided on the means of ending the war. On July 25, Marshall approved the missions for the atomic bombing of Japan.

While at dinner with his family at the Army-Navy Club on August 6, Groves received the first report that the mission to Hiroshima had left on schedule. He immediately returned to his office to await further developments. Around 11:15 pm, Colonel Frank McCarthy, Marshall’s aide, called Groves to say that the general wanted to know if there was any news on the strike. Groves responded that there was none. Shortly after McCarthy’s call, Groves received the coded strike message from General Farrell on Tinian. The mission’s crew reported:

Results clear cut, successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than New Mexico tests. Conditions normal in airplane following the delivery.⁸

As soon as the message was decoded, an excited Groves phoned McCarthy, who then gave Marshall the news and received Marshall’s tempered response, “Thank you very much for calling me.”

Japan announced its surrender on August 15, 1945, six days after a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki.

Marshall’s Nuclear Legacy

After the war, Truman’s selection of Marshall first as secretary of state and then as secretary of defense reflected his confidence in Marshall’s judgment and leadership. In these positions, Marshall continued to confront issues involving nuclear weapons, including the Berlin crisis, the Korean War, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He believed that these weapons did not alleviate the need for a large conventional army and, while defending their use to end the war with Japan, he did not favor utilizing them in future wars. In an address to the United Nations assembly on September 17, 1948, he stated:

For the achievement of international security, and the well-being of the peoples of the world, it is necessary that the United Nations press forward on many fronts. Among these are the control of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and has perhaps the highest priority if we are to remove the specter of a war of annihilation.⁹

As a conventional warrior, Marshall was skeptical of revolutionary technology in waging war. His view changed with the successful deployment of the atomic bomb on Japan. Inherently distrustful of wonder weapons, he nevertheless supported the Manhattan Project. Unsure that the atomic bomb would negate the need for invading Japan, he was surprised when it shocked the Japanese into surrendering. He believed the use of the atomic bomb ended the war, but realized that it posed a threat to the future of the world.

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Dr. Frank A. Settle, professor emeritus of chemistry, Washington and Lee University and director of the ALSOS Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, was professor of chemistry at the Virginia Military Institute from 1964 to 1992. Before coming to W&L in 1998, he was a visiting professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, a consultant at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a program officer at the National Science Foundation. He is a co-author of Instrumental Methods of Analysis and the editor of The Handbook of Instrumental Analytical Techniques. He has published extensively in scientific, educational, and trade journals. At W&L he developed and taught courses on nuclear history, nuclear power, and weapons of mass destruction for liberal arts majors. This article contains excerpts from his new book, researched at the Marshall Library, General George C. Marshall and the Atomic Bomb to be published by Prager in spring 2016.