The notion that the U.S. should strengthen the military capabilities of foreign partners so that they could assume increased responsibility for regional security is critically examined in a major new report from the Congressional Research Service.

The approach known as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) “has increased in prominence within U.S. strategy, arguably becoming a central pillar of U.S. national security and foreign policy in recent years,” based on the premise that strengthening fragile foreign security institutions abroad will have benefits for U.S. national security.

But despite the growing centrality of BPC, “it remains unclear whether building the capacity of foreign security forces is an effective way to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives,” the CRS report said.

In fact, “Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban over Konduz, as well as the collapse of U.S.-trained and equipped forces in Iraq and Syria in the face of the Islamic State, have called into question whether these BPC programs can achieve their desired effects.”

“Do BPC programs and activities actually advance U.S. national security interests? If so, when? If not, why not?”

One short answer is that “Within the case studies explored, BPC was least effective as a tool for allowing the United States to extract itself from conflict (victory in war/war termination). However, it was most effective as a tool for building interpersonal and institutional linkages, and for alliance building.”

But the purpose of the CRS report was not to simply announce analytic conclusions. Rather, it should “be used as a starting point for further debate and analysis on the subject. There are no clear-cut answers at present. Considerably more intellectual spade work could be undertaken to clarify the conceptual underpinnings of BPC efforts, and whether, and when, BPC is an appropriate tool for advancing U.S. strategic goals.”

Notably, “This report differs from many other CRS products, as it is intended to assist Congress with its oversight responsibilities by helping it think critically about BPC and related programs. Accordingly, it raises more questions than it answers. Among the most important: are BPC shortcomings due to execution issues? Or are they due to BPC being an inappropriate way to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives?”

A copy of the report was obtained by Secrecy News. See What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress, December 18, 2015.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that were issued last week include the following.

Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, updated December 17, 2015

Firearms Eligibility for Foreign Nationals in the United States, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 18, 2015

New Circuit Split: Seventh Circuit Rules that Unlawfully Present Aliens with “Extensive Ties” to the United States Have Second Amendment Rights, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 17, 2015

You Win Some, You Lose Some: the Complicated Legal Status of Daily Fantasy Sports, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 18, 2015

Employer Wellness Programs and Genetic Information: Frequently Asked Questions, December 17, 2015

Nationwide Injunctions: Recent Rulings Raise Questions about Nationwide Reach of a Single Federal Court, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 16, 2015

IRS Proposes Controversial Regulations Regarding Charity Donors’ SSNs, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 16, 2015

First Spoofing Conviction Gives Teeth to Dodd-Frank in Prosecuting Commodities Violations, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 15, 2015

Women and the Selective Service, CRS Insight, December 15, 2015

FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, updated December 17, 2015

Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, updated December 17, 2015

Australia: Background and U.S. Relations, updated December 14, 2015

Military terms and symbols that are used by the U.S. Army have been compiled in an updated reference manual, along with acronyms and abbreviations. See ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, December 2015.

Intended to foster a common vocabulary, the manual can also help outsiders to interpret distinctive Army expressions and patterns of speech.

The manual devotes several chapters to “military symbology.”

“A military symbol is a graphic representation of a unit, equipment, installation, activity, control measure, or tactical task relevant to military operations that is used for planning or to represent the common operational picture on a map, display, or overlay.”

“The symbology chapters (chapters 3 through 10) provide detailed requirements for composing and constructing symbols. The rules for building a set of military symbols allow enough flexibility for users to create any symbol to meet their operational needs,” the manual said.

A newly updated Department of Defense publication affirms the importance of public outreach, not simply as a gesture towards democratic governance, but also as an instrument of operational utility.

“The US military has an obligation to communicate with its members and the US public, and it is in the national interest to communicate with international publics,” the DoD doctrinal publication said.

“The proactive release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences puts joint operations in context, facilitates informed perceptions about military operations, undermines adversarial propaganda, and helps achieve national, strategic, and operational objectives.” See Public Affairs, Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, Joint Staff, November 17, 2015.

The public affairs function described in the new publication encompasses most interactions between the Department and the public. It includes all the various ways that the Pentagon tells its own story to the world.

The new iteration of JP 3-61, which supersedes the 2010 edition and is about 50% longer than the prior edition from 2005, describes a hierarchy of “Public Affairs Postures”, ranging from active, affirmative disclosure of information all the way to nondisclosure and absolute unresponsiveness (Appendix B).

“Active release” is appropriate “for those plans and activities where it is necessary and/or desirable to be as proactive and transparent as possible in communicating on a subject to include actively soliciting for media and public attention.” Examples include “announcing a personnel policy change” or “promoting an air show.”

Active disclosure can be modulated and limited to a “restricted release” when necessary. Under yet more sensitive conditions, DoD Public Affairs will not initiate disclosure on its own but will adopt a posture of “response to query,” answering questions if and when asked.

Finally, a public affairs posture of “no response” is available “for those plans and activities that due to [classification] and other sensitivities we will not offer any information on, even when directly requested.” Examples include “ongoing special operations” and “capabilities that are classified.”

The new publication also ventures definitions of four categories of interviews that are sometimes confused or misunderstood: On the record, background, deep background, and off the record (Chapter I, p. I-8).

While military deception (MILDEC) to mislead adversaries is an integral part of military operations, it would be counterproductive to employ public affairs (PA) for that purpose, the DoD doctrine says. “PA resources cannot be used as MILDEC capability because such use would undermine the legitimacy of the office and destroy future trust in PA messages” (page II-9).

In any event, “Official information should be approved for release prior to dissemination to the public,” the publication states.

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Another newly updated DoD doctrinal publication addresses Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Joint Publication 3-68, 17 November 2015).

It notes in passing that “The Department of Justice maintains a world-wide database of biometric data that could be used to positively identify and support security screening of individuals seeking evacuation, if necessary” (page II-8).

There are “substantial gaps” in the ability of the Department of Defense to counter Islamic State propaganda and messaging, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) informed Congress earlier this year.

But now Congress has moved to narrow some of those gaps.

Until recently, the Pentagon’s authority to act in this area had been deliberately curtailed by Congress in order to preserve a civilian lead role for the State Department’s public diplomacy program.

“Congress has expressed concern with DOD engaging violent extremist propaganda on the Internet, except in limited ways,” wrote General Joseph L. Votel, the SOCOM Commander, in newly published responses to questions for the record from a March 18, 2015 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee (at page 69).

“They [Congress] tend to view… efforts to influence civilians outside an area of conflict as Public Diplomacy, the responsibility of the Department of State or Broadcasting Board of Governors.”

By contrast, “We [at US Special Operations Command] believe there is a complementary role for the Department of Defense in this space which acknowledges the need for a civilian lead, but allows DOD to pursue appropriate missions, such as counter-recruitment and reducing the flow of foreign fighters,” he wrote.

General Votel suggested that “An explicit directive from Congress outlining the necessity of DOD to engage in this space would greatly enhance our ability to respond.”

Now he has it.

Without much fanfare, something like the directive from Congress that General Votel requested was included in the FY2016 defense authorization bill that was signed into law by President Obama on November 25:

“The Secretary of Defense should develop creative and agile concepts, technologies, and strategies across all available media to most effectively reach target audiences, to counter and degrade the ability of adversaries and potential adversaries to persuade, inspire, and recruit inside areas of hostilities or in other areas in direct support of the objectives of commanders.”

That statement was incorporated in Section 1056 of the 2016 Defense Authorization Act, which also directed DOD to perform a series of technology demonstrations to advance its ability “to shape the informational environment.”

Even with the requested authority, however, DOD is poorly equipped to respond to Islamic State propaganda online, General Votel told the House Armed Services Committee.

“Another gap exists in [DOD’s] ability to operate on social media and the Internet, due to a lack of organic capability” in relevant languages and culture, not to mention a compelling alternative vision that would appeal to Islamic State recruits. The Department will be forced to rely on contractors, even as it pursues efforts to “improve the Department’s ability to effectively operate in the social media and broader online information space.”

And even with a mature capacity to act, DOD’s role in counter-propaganda would still be hampered by current policy when it comes to offensive cyber operations, for which high-level permission is required, he said.

“The ability to rapidly respond to adversarial messaging and propaganda, particularly with offensive cyberspace operations to deny, disrupt, degrade or corrupt those messages, requires an Execute Order (EXORD) and is limited by current U.S. government policies.”

“The review and approval process for conducting offensive cyberspace operations is lengthy, time consuming and held at the highest levels of government,” Gen. Votel wrote. “However, a rapid response is frequently required in order to effectively counter the message because cyber targets can be fleeting, access is dynamic, and attribution can be difficult to determine.”

No immediate solution to that policy problem is at hand, as far as is known.

The difficulty that the U.S. government has had in confronting the Islamic State on the level of messaging, influence or propaganda is more than an embarrassing bureaucratic snafu; it has also tended to expedite the resort to violent military action.

“Overmatched online, the United States has turned to lethal force,” wrote Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet of the Washington Post, in a remarkable account of the Islamic State media campaign. (“Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine,” November 20).

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The House Armed Services Committee now produces the most informative hearing volumes of any congressional committee in the national security domain. Beyond the transcripts of the hearings themselves, which are of varying degrees of interest, the published volumes typically include additional questions that elicit substantive new information in the form of agency responses to questions for the record.

The new hearing volume on US Special Operations Command notes, for example:

*    USSOCOM currently deploys 20-30 Military Information Support Teams to embassies around the world. They are comprised of forces “specially trained in using information to modify foreign audiences’ behavior” [page 69].

*    “Only one classified DE [directed energy] system is currently fielded by USSOCOM and being used in SOF operations” [page 61]. Other directed energy technology development programs have failed to meet expectations.

*    Advanced technologies of interest to SOCOM include: signature reduction technologies; strength and endurance enhancement; unbreakable/unjammable, encrypted, low probability to detect/low probability of intercept communications; long-range non-lethal vehicle stopping; clandestine non-lethal equipment and facility disablement/defeat; advanced offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; weapons of mass destruction render safe; chemical and biological agent defeat [page 77].

Another recently published House Armed Services Committee hearing volume is “Cyber Operations: Improving the Military Cybersecurity Posture in an Uncertain Threat Environment.”

 

For moral, legal, and tactical reasons, it is U.S. Army policy to protect civilians during military operations, a newly updated Army publication explains.

“To the extent possible, civilian populations (including those loyal to the enemy) must be protected from the effects of combat. In addition to humanitarian reasons and the need to comply with the law of war, excessive civilian casualties create political pressure that limits freedom of action of Army units. Civilian harm creates ill will among the population, with lasting repercussions that impair post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.”

And yet sometimes that policy will fail.

“Leaders anticipate that, despite their best efforts to prevent them, civilian casualty incidents occur. Similarly, mass atrocities may occur even if commanders take all possible steps to preclude them. Systems should be established in advance to respond to civilian casualty incidents; these include reporting, tracking, investigation, public response, and making amends to families and communities through the recognition of harm, appropriate compensation, and apologies and dignifying gestures if necessary.”

The necessity and the near-impossibility of employing violence in a way that minimizes its unintended effects on the civilian population are recurring themes in the new Army document.

See Protection of Civilians, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, October 29, 2015.

Since 2010, the U.S. Army has cut 80,000 soldiers from its ranks. It plans to complete a further reduction of 40,000 more by the end of fiscal year 2017, for an overall 21 percent reduction of Army active forces down to 450,000 soldiers.

The reductions in force were described in a July 2015 report to Congress that was released last week under the Freedom of Information Act. See Department of the Army, Notification to Congress on the Permanent Reduction of Sizable Numbers of Members of the Armed Forces, 10 July 2015.

“Nearly every Army installation will experience reductions of some size,” the report indicated. Six installations will be reduced by more than 1,000 Soldiers: Fort Benning (Georgia), Fort Bliss (Texas), Fort Hood (Texas), Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (Alaska), Joint Base Lewis-McChord (Washington), and Schofield Barracks (Hawaii).

The report “includes an evaluation of the local economic, strategic, and operational consequences of the reductions at these six installations.”

Additional reductions in the civilian Army workforce are expected to total around 17,000 by FY 2019.

“The Army will continue to be a force that can deploy and sustain capabilities across the range of military operations anywhere in the world on short notice,” the report said.

However, “force structure reductions and the resulting impacts on installation populations could be significant to both military communities and to the defense posture of our nation,” it concluded.

The newly-released Army report was also discussed in “Army Bases Bleed, Then BRAC Comes” by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Breaking Defense, October 21.

The history, status and possible future of current Army combat vehicles were examined in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress, October 15, 2015.

Before the Department of Defense can use an unmanned aerial system within the United States for domestic operations such as search and rescue missions or disaster response, specific authorization from the Secretary of Defense is necessary.

However, if DoD wants to use a UAS to help control domestic civil disturbances (such as a riot or insurrection), then further authorization from the President of the United State is required.

The patchwork of legal authorities and requirements for domestic military missions is presented in a newly updated DoD manual on Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

Military support to civil authorities may be prompted by a variety of natural disasters and emergencies, including wildfires, earthquakes, floods, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear accidents or attacks, and — a new addition — cyber incidents. But such domestic missions have their own peculiar characteristics.

“Operations conducted by the US military in the homeland and US territories are very different from operations conducted overseas,” the DoD manual says, particularly since they are executed “under the authority and within the limitations of federal, state, and local laws.”

In particular, “For fear of military encroachment on civil authority and domestic governance, the PCA [Posse Comitatus Act] and policy limit DOD support to LEA [Law Enforcement Agencies],” the manual says.

More specifically, “DOD directives prohibit interdicting vehicles, searches and seizures, arrest, and similar activities (e.g., apprehension, stop, and frisk). Furthermore, engaging in questioning potential witnesses; using force or threats to do so, except in self-defense or defense of others; collecting evidence; forensic testing; and surveillance or pursuit of individuals or vehicles is prohibited.”

On the other hand, “the Insurrection Act permits the POTUS [President of the United States] to use armed forces under a limited set of specific circumstances and subject to certain limitations.”

(The President has used the authority under the Insurrection Act twice in recent history. In September 1989 the President ordered federal troops to the US Virgin Islands to restore order in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. In April 1992 the President ordered federal troops to restore order in Los Angeles during riots following the Rodney King verdict.)

The updated manual includes a new appendix presenting a matrix of domestic military missions along with the relevant approval authority and policy guidance.

For the first time, the manual includes “cyberspace-related incidents” among the circumstances that may trigger military involvement in domestic matters.

“Large-scale cyber incidents may overwhelm government and private-sector resources by disrupting the internet and taxing critical infrastructure information systems. Complications from disruptions of this magnitude may threaten lives, property, the economy, and national security…. State and local networks operating in a disrupted or degraded environment may require DOD assistance.”

See Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, September 2015.

The authorized use of DoD unmanned aerial systems in domestic operations is described in Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Policy Memorandum 15-002, February 17, 2015.

The Department of Defense plans to complete the establishment of a new Cyber Mission Force made up of 133 teams of more than 6000 “cyber operators” by 2018, and it’s already nearly halfway there.

From FY2014-2018, DoD intends to spend $1.878 billion dollars to pay for the Cyber Missions Force consisting of approximately 6100 individuals in the four military services, DoD said in response to a question for the record that was published in a congressional hearing volume last month.

“This effort began in October 2013 and today we have 3100 personnel assigned to 58 of the 133 teams,” or nearly 50% of the intended capacity, DoD wrote in response to a question from Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA) of the House Armed Services Committee. The response was included in the published record of a February 26, 2015 Committee hearing (page 67).

The DoD Cyber Mission Force was described in an April 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy and in April 2015 testimony by Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach:

“The Department of Defense has three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) defend DoD information networks to assure DoD missions, (2) defend the United States against cyberattacks of significant consequence, and (3) provide full-spectrum cyber options to support contingency plans and military operations,” Mr. Rosenbach said.

“To carry out these missions, we are building the Cyber Mission Force and equipping it with the appropriate tools and infrastructure to operate in cyberspace. Once fully manned, trained, and equipped in Fiscal Year 2018, these 133 teams will execute USCYBERCOM’s three primary missions with nearly 6,200 military and civilian personnel,” Mr. Rosenbach said at an April 14 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The new Cyber Mission Force will naturally have both defensive and offensive characteristics.

“Congressman, we are building these cyber teams… in order to, one, protect ourselves from cyber attacks,” said Adm. Cecil D. Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command. “We are being probed on a daily basis by a variety of different actors.”

“The protection side is one thing,” said Rep. Larsen at the February hearing of the House Armed Services Committee. “What about the other side?”

“The other aspect of it, we are distributing these forces out to the various combatant commands so that they can be integrated into our overall joint military force capability,” Adm. Haney replied.

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“Worldwide Cyber Threats” was the subject of an open hearing of the House Intelligence Committee on Thursday.

The foreign intrusions suffered by U.S. government and private networks have yielded some useful lessons, said Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper.

“Of late, unauthorized disclosures and foreign defensive improvements have cost us some technical accesses, but we are also deriving valuable new insight from cyber security investigations of incidents caused by foreign actors and new means of aggregating and processing big data. Those avenues will help offset some more traditional collection modes that are obsolescent,” he told the Committee.

Through its international security assistance programs, the United States advances its foreign policy agenda, exercises influence, sometimes wreaks havoc or abets abusive conduct, and now and then does good things.

Security assistance refers to a variety of programs involving arms sales abroad, military training of foreign security services, and other defense-related activities.

A new non-profit website called Security Assistance Monitor presents “all publicly available data on U.S. foreign security assistance programs worldwide from 2000 to the present.”

It is a project of the Center for International Policy, with the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Project on Middle East Democracy, and Washington Office of Latin America.

Richly documented and handsomely presented, it is an impressive new resource for journalists and students of international security policy.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is a related but distinct concept. Both involve support to foreign governments, but unlike security assistance, FID may include U.S. military operations as well as other forms of non-military aid.

FID “involves application of the instruments of U.S. national power in support of a foreign nation confronted by threats,” according to a new U.S. Army manual that explores the issue in depth. See Foreign Internal Defense, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.2, August 19, 2015.

“FID may include financial, intelligence, and law enforcement assistance” as well as military support in some cases. “The fundamental goal is to prevent a downward spiral of instability by forestalling and defeating threats and by working to correct conditions that may prompt violence.”

The U.S. Air Force last week issued updated guidance both to foster and to limit contacts with Chinese military personnel, based in part on classified Defense Department directives.

“With the rise of PRC influence in the international community and the increasing capabilities of the Chinese military, Air Force military-to-military relationship with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is becoming more crucial than before,” the Air Force document stated.

See Conduct of USAF Contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Government of the Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC, Air Force Instruction 16-118, August 5, 2015.

The Instruction provides a framework for conducting reciprocal US-PRC visits to each other’s military installations.

“The success of these visits, whether US or PRC-led, directly affects relationships between the US and the PRC, as well as our relationships with our allies and partners, and is thereby important in support of national and regional politico-military objectives.”

But the Instruction also identifies numerous topical areas that are likely to be off-limits for USAF-PRC military contacts.

“[P]rohibited contacts… may involve: force projection operations, nuclear operations, advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations, advanced logistical operations, chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, joint war-fighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare, military space operations, other advanced capabilities of the armed forces, arms sales or military-related technology transfers, release of classified or restricted information, and access to a DoD laboratory.”

The new USAF Instruction implements two classified DoD Instructions, which have not been released: Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) C-2000.23, Conduct of DoD Contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and DoDI S-2000.24, Conduct of DoD Contacts with the Government of Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC.

The Congressional Research Service produced a related report on U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, updated October 27, 2014.

The environmental impacts of military operations are increasingly becoming factors in the planning and execution of military activities.

“The military has a new appreciation for the interdependence between military missions, the global community, and the environment,” according to a newly revised and reissued Army doctrinal manual. See Environmental Considerations, ATP 3-34.5, August 10, 2015.

Of course, military operations by their nature are not environment-friendly. “The primary mission of the military is to fight and win wars. Warfare is destructive to humans and to the natural environment.”

Even so, environmental impacts of military action can be limited and managed up to a point, the Army manual says. “Integrating environmental considerations into the planning process helps to identify, prevent, and mitigate potential threats to the environment (including those that affect historical and cultural resources) and environmental threats to personnel.”

This is not a matter of sentimentality or political correctness, the manual emphasizes, but of military self-interest and tactical necessity. “Integrating environmental considerations into operations will benefit FHP [force health protection, i.e. the health of U.S. and allied soldiers]. Environmental degradation jeopardizes the well-being of the local population and can undermine HN [host nation] support for U.S. policies.”

“Environmental damage created by U.S. forces conducting operations, however unintentional (such as the damage to Babylon), may be used as a weapon in the public information campaign against U.S. operations and can undermine U.S. strategic objectives,” the manual says.

Establishment of a U.S. military base in Iraq’s historic city of Babylon in 2003 caused “major damage” to surviving antiquities at the site, the Washington Post and other news organizations reported.

As a rule, U.S. Air Force personnel should not employ physical violence against news reporters who disobey their instructions, newly updated Air Force guidance says.

If reporters are present at the scene of an accident or incident in which Air Force classified information is exposed, Air Force officials should “explain the situation and ask the media to cooperate.”

But “Do not use force if media representatives refuse to cooperate unless declared an NDA [National Defense Area],” the Air Force guidance advises.

“If photographs are taken after a warning is issued, Air Force officials must ask civilian law enforcement authorities to stop further photography of the exposed classified information and to collect all materials with that coverage.”

However, “If no civilian law enforcement authorities are on the scene and media representatives take unauthorized pictures, do not seize the materials or hold the photographer.” Rather, the senior Air Force official at the scene should “immediately contact the managing editor or news director” of the news organization and “request the return of media coverage having suspected classified information.”

That is one of the scenarios envisioned in a newly updated Air Force Instruction 35-104 on “Media Operations,” dated 13 July 2015.

The Instruction generally favors constructive engagement with the news media, both on principle and out of self-interest.

“Releasing official information through the media can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interest and policies, as well as mitigate any adverse effects from unofficial, misinformed, or hostile sources,” the Instruction states.

Of course, Air Force personnel are directed “not [to] release classified information” to members of the news media. Interestingly, however, the new Instruction also says that there are “circumstances when exposure to sensitive or classified information is allowed.”

“The commander may grant access [to sensitive or classified information] if the reporter agrees to a security and policy review of the communication product. Agreement to a security and policy review in exchange for this type of access is strictly voluntary; however, if a reporter does not agree, then access to sensitive information may be denied. If a reporter agrees to a security and policy review, it will be conducted solely to ensure that sensitive or classified information is not included in the product.”

In general, “the primary responsibility for protecting classified information lies with the Air Force, not the reporter, and the reporter can justifiably refuse any requests for prior review,” the Air Force Instruction said.