HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AN
UNCERTAIN THREAT ENVIRONMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2016
BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. WILSON. Ladies and gentlemen, I call this briefing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to order.

I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very important hearing, on our special operations forces [SOF] in the United States Special Operations Command [SOCOM], as we review the fiscal year 2016 budget request. With evolving and persistent threats being posed by state and non-state actors, our special operation forces have never been more central, strategic, and sought after. Illegal asymmetric enemy combatants not in uniform must be stopped overseas.

From the unconventional hybrid threats of an aggressive Russia, to the troubling expansive and clandestine networks of Iran, and of course, an evolving Al Qaeda and their affiliates, now the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant known in the region as Daesh, we do indeed face an uncertain threat environment.

Our special operations forces have been engaged in heavy combat and direct action for nearly 14 continuous years. It is imperative that we properly resource, train, and equip, to now deal equally as well with the hybrid and asymmetric threats of tomorrow and do so with the looming shadow of defense sequestration.

Simply put, our national defense and security of American families depends on this. The House Armed Services Committee has consistently supported our special operation forces, providing additional authorities when warranted, authorizing additional funds for unmet critical requirements, and most recently resourcing important family support and suicide prevention programs to ensure our service men and women, our warriors and their families, are taken care of and know firsthand that humans are indeed more important than hardware.
Although our support has been consistent, it has also been accompanied by prudent oversight and robust dialogue to ensure that we do all things that are right for the overall defense of our great Nation. The commitment and sacrifice of our special operation forces is evident to all of us. We examine this budget request to ensure that we in Congress are doing everything that we think is right and necessary for those units and their families.

So, we look forward to discussing today the priorities for the U.S. Special Operations Command and our special operations forces for fiscal year 2016, and perhaps, more importantly, discussing candidly the challenges that stand before us today.

We have before us a very distinguished panel of witnesses. The Honorable Michael Lumpkin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and General Joseph Votel, the Commanding General of the United States Special Operations Command. I would like now to turn to my longtime friend and ranking member Mr. Jim Langevin from Rhode Island for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to discuss the Special Operations Command fiscal year 2016 budget request. Although our conventional forces have seen increases in dwell time over the last few years as combat operations in the Middle East change in character, special operations forces continue to experience a very high operational tempo.

The demand for SOF is high around the globe due to a variety of important missions, including counterterrorism. These operators, and the conventional forces that enable them to place their lives on the line each and every day far from home in order to keep us safe, and we should never lose sight of that sacrifice for which we are all very grateful.

This subcommittee is keenly aware of the threats that we face and the importance of SOF missions to national security, and we have acted commensurately, both in funding and unique authorities such as those provided under section 1208.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about the importance of these and other unique authorities as well as about authorities that may need to be extended in the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for fiscal year 2016. If there are any new authorities that may be required to combat ISIL or conduct operations in areas outside the Middle East, like European Command, I hope that the witnesses will make that case this afternoon.

Congressional oversight of such authorities as well as SOCOM funding is obviously very important. Our SOF personnel operate in uncertain, varying, and evolving environments that necessitate continuous assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of authorities granted. Our subcommittee has worked in the past to increase oversight through improved reporting, and I want to express my appreciation for the transparency of SOCOM. But internal oversight of SOF operations and SOCOM is just as important.
Secretary Lumpkin, we recently had the opportunity to discuss the oversight council that you established, and I would appreciate it if you could provide the subcommittee with an understanding of the council, including members, meetings, and issues of focus.

General Votel, I also look forward to hearing from you as well on the Preservation of the Force and Families initiative, among the other things under your responsibility, and I appreciate the meeting that you and I had yesterday.

As I mentioned earlier, special operations forces continue to face high operational tempo. The mental health of the operators and their families remains a priority both for you, I know, and for Secretary Lumpkin and for this Congress. Last year our subcommittee, in conjunction with the personnel subcommittee, increased funding for mental health problems for SOF due to increases in suicides. Additionally, I sponsored a provision in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA to assess the effectiveness of SOCOM’s alternative approach to mental and behavioral health in lieu of existing service programs.

General, I look forward to working with you this year to continue to support our SOF members and their families. Our goal on this front, taking care of our force and their families, are one and the same.

In closing, I want to express again my gratitude to General Votel for his service to our Nation and to Secretary Lumpkin as well for all you do for our Nation and the enduring commitment that you have to our men and women in uniform.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for convening this hearing today, and I look forward to discussion. Thank you.

Mr. Votel. Mr. Langevin, thank you very much, and we will proceed with Secretary Lumpkin. We look forward to your opening statements, of each of you, and then following that, we will have a 5-minute question period for each member as we alternate. And we are very fortunate that Kevin Gates will be maintaining the time. He is above reproach. So, we will begin with this Secretary. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD/SOLIC)

Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am glad to speak about the health and welfare of our Nation’s special operations community and our capability to meet our Nation’s most pressing national security concerns today and into the future.

Currently, our special operations force, also known as SOF, work within an environment where fiscal uncertainty challenges us to think creatively and bridge gaps between resources and U.S. national security objectives. And where the changing nature of the threats we face today demands SOF’s attention and engagement through agile authorities that enable us to remain ahead of our adversaries. Addressing how SOF will effectively operate within this environment, I would like to invite your attention to the following three topics.
Foremost, SOF is navigating a challenging fiscal environment through enhanced oversight. As the “service-like secretary” of USSOCOM, I provide oversight and supervision of SOF resources, develop SOF policies for counterterrorism to counternarcotics, and preserve and protect our special operations force. This role becomes ever more challenging in a constrained budgetary environment in which we must use limited resources efficiently and effectively so that SOF is globally postured to support the combatant commands.

With sequestration-level cuts set for fiscal year 2016 and beyond, we continue to strengthen our budget management in order to maximize taxpayers’ return on investment in SOF. In addition, we look for innovative ways to use existing resources.

Moving to my second point. SOF is most effective to handle the changing nature of threats that we face when agile authorities are available. From ISIL to pro-Russian rebel forces in Ukraine, the United States and our international partners face a diverse set of unconventional threats worldwide. Centered within the physical terrain, the human domain, information environment, and financial cyberspace. Additionally, our response efforts often require security force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive areas, where the host station demands discreet U.S. footprint. Due to its unique irregular and unconventional capabilities, SOF routinely becomes the force of choice. To this point, agile authorities maximize SOF capabilities helping support SOF operations.

Support for foreign partners is fundamental to operational success in overseas contingency operations, and U.S. financial and logistic support is necessary to ensure their continued participation. With the codification of sections 2282, 1004, and 1022 in title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Global Security Contingency Fund and the new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, we can assist our partners to address emerging threats and opportunities by building their security capacities before those threats exceed their ability to effectively respond.

However, building partner capacity takes time. Our building partnership capacity authorities do not accommodate sustainment costs, so we work closely with the State Department to ensure partner nations eventually fund and sustain these programs on their own.

Agile unallocated funding enables implementers to rapidly respond to urgent needs of partner nations more expeditiously and for a greater length of time than is possible through traditional mechanisms.

And my final point, protection and preservation of SOF is of utmost importance. Our people are the foundation of special operations, and we strive to ensure our force and their families have a support system necessary to ensure their long-term prosperity and health. Assessing our force structure, operational requirements, and capabilities at various resourcing levels, we have reshaped SOF’s operational units, elements, and platforms so that we can meet future operational requirements.

In addition, we seek to ensure the physical and mental resilience of the individuals who make up our force. Continual combat deployments combined with the demanding training regimen needed to keep the force sharp, have caused stress on the force and with their
families. As ASD SO/LIC, I will continue to support enhanced resiliency training currently being conducted through USSOCOM service component programs.

In closing, throughout the entire Department, we are committed to doing everything we can to ensure that our Nation’s SOF have the best training, equipment, and overall support that we can possibly provide. We will continue to work closely with Congress and senior policymakers across the government to ensure that we have the right policies and oversight in place, so that SOF effectively operates within the current and future environments. I thank Congress for its continuing support of our special operation initiatives, resourcing, and personnel, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found in the Appendix on page 21.]

Mr. WILSON. Secretary Lumpkin, thank you very much. General Votel.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

General VOTEL. Good afternoon, Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and other distinguished members of subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the current posture of the United States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, as we call it. I am especially pleased to be here with my OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] teammate, Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. SOCOM was created by the Congress to ensure that we always had ready and capable SOF forces to meet the Nation’s challenges. Our ability to address these challenges is due in large part to the strong support we get from the Congress, from the House Armed Services Committee, and especially from this distinguished subcommittee. Thank you very much.

I would like to start out by commenting on the amazing actions made every day by our special operations men and women. Operators, acquirers, logisticians, analysts, and many others, Active and Reserve, military and civilian, the total SOF force. Alongside our conventional force partners, the 69,000 quiet professionals of SOCOM are committed to values-based excellence and service to our Nation. They relentlessly pursue mission success, and today, roughly 7,500 of them are deployed to over 90 countries worldwide supporting geographic combatant commander requirements in named operations.

We are a force that has been heavily deployed over the last 14 years, and our military members, civilians, and their families have paid a significant price physically and emotionally serving our country. We are very appreciative of the support we have received from Congress to address the visible and invisible challenges, and we never forget that for SOCOM, people are our most important resource.

Today, the United States is faced with many challenges. The spread of technology and the diffusion of power are not only being used by responsible leaders to better societies, but unfortunately by wicked actors to orchestrate terror and violence regionally and
globally. Non-state actors like Al Qaeda and ISIL and other violent extremist organizations, menacing state actors like North Korea, and growingly coercive actors like Russia are just a few examples of the entities affecting the strategic environment in which we operate. We are equally affected by the growing use of cyber capabilities and social media which make it easy for our adversaries to communicate, coordinate, execute, and inspire their actions.

The fiscal environment is of concern as well. While SOCOM has been well supported in recent years, I remain profoundly concerned by the impact of another round of sequestration and how it not only impacts SOCOM, but more importantly, how it will affect the four services upon whom we are absolutely dependent for mission support.

To address the challenging security environment, SOF provides a portfolio of options to our national leaders and to the geographic combatant commanders. Through small footprint operations and by relying on a network of purposeful partnerships, SOF provides a comparative advantage through persistent engagement, partner enablement, network focus, and discreet rapid response to crisis situations.

While we support military operations across the spectrum, SOF capabilities are uniquely suited to operate and succeed in the gray zone between normal international competition and open conflict, and it is in this area where we see our very best opportunities to help shape the future environment.

To enable our efforts, I have established five priorities for the command. First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right people, skills, and capabilities to meet future—current and future requirements. To this end, we want to ensure effectiveness now and into the future with the very best SOF operators and support personnel enabled by the best technology and capabilities we can field. Along the way, we want to make the very best use of the unique MFP-11 [Major Force Program-11] authority that Congress has granted us.

Second, we must help our Nation win by addressing today's security challenges. We strive to provide coherent and well-integrated SOF forces for the geographic combatant commanders focused on optimizing our SOF activities. Nearly everywhere you will find SOF forces working alongside and often in support of their conventional force partners, helping accomplish our security objectives.

Third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve global understanding and awareness to create options for our leaders. We don't own the network, but we are an important part of it. In working with our partners, we will always produce the best options for our Nation.

Fourth, we have to prepare for the future security environment to ensure that SOF is ready to win in an increasingly complex world. Ultimately, our goal is to match exquisite people with cutting-edge capability and the very best ideas to help our Nation succeed against the looming challenges we will face in the future.

Finally, we must preserve our force and families to ensure their long-term wellbeing. It is this area we are especially focused on, where we are especially focused on a holistic approach to address
the invisible challenges of stress and suicide that are affecting our service members, civilians, and their family members.

In closing, I remain honored and humbled by the opportunity to command the best special operations forces in the world. I am incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members and their families. I look forward to your questions and our dialogue today.

[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General Votel, and thank both of you for being here this afternoon. We are going to begin now the 5-minute round of each member of the subcommittee, and each of us will be strictly held to 5 minutes, and Mr. Gates will maintain those—the clock.

My first question for both of you is—deals with the impacts of defense sequestration on national security and our military. I notice this has impacted even the special operations forces. And for both of you, can you provide specifics of how defense sequestration has impacted special operation forces, without a solution to defense sequestration, what damage will be done? And I am particularly concerned about readiness. And we will begin with the Secretary.

Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.

The—well, as General Votel mentioned in his opening statement, the reliance of support from the services is where we see the largest impact from where I sit is when we look at what the impacts of sequestration would have on USSOCOM. Potential of losing ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] support, impacts on modernization of our air fleet, modernization across the board on those service-supported surface common items. It will also slow our modernization across the board, and so I have real concerns about that.

We have had to, based on where we were in 2014, as we ended up divesting ourselves from program growth and combat support and combat service support, and I fear that if sequestration were to take effect in 2016, the services would divest of the support that we are now more reliant on than we would have been before. So, I see the impacts, while not direct, would be significant nonetheless.

General Votel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think where we will see some immediate impacts will be in perhaps in some of our key investment areas. That would include the procurement and recapitalization of some of our air, ground, and maritime platforms, could affect our enhancing of SOF-specific ISR capabilities that have been so effective for us, fighting some of the enemies we deal with today. It could also affect our communications infrastructure and equipment technology upon which we depend to conduct global operations, and so that is the impacts, I think, on SOCOM.

Beyond that, as I mention, I am very concerned about the impact that it has on the services. The lack of availability of air, ground, and especially maritime platforms will affect our readiness and our training exercises that we count on to be ready to deal with situations that will affect our operational effectiveness when we are conducting operations.
We depend heavily on service-provided capabilities to support us. A good example, of course, is the Navy’s helicopter capability that it has provided in the past for us which as it now goes away is a lost service-provided capability that we no longer are able to rely on.

Beyond that, we are impacted by SOF—we will be impacted by SOF-specific enhancements to service-managed programs, as they draw down some of their areas there. That will impact us, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wilson. Well, thank both of you, and indeed, I believe the members of our subcommittee share your concerns. Secretary Lumpkin, I am really grateful. I work with the Partners of the Americas program in Colombia, and we have had many exchange students. Two of my sons went to high school in Cali, Colombia, and then I have a very significant Filipino-American population in the district that I represent. And in your written statement, you indicate about the strategic engagement in both Colombia and the Philippines. What is the status and what is the future of what has been so successful in both countries?

Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you are absolutely correct. Both of those endeavors have been successful. They have been—each has been long term. We have been in Colombia since the—and supporting the government there since the mid 1980s. We developed Plan Colombia. We have invested heavily through Plan Colombia itself, and as we are on the cusp of having a peace dividend, as the peace accords between the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and ELN [National Liberation Army] and the Government of Colombia are being realized, we will see some reduction there of our support.

What does concern me is the idea of a vacuum that may be created when these insurgent groups are no longer there, and it may open itself up to transnational organized crime. So, I think we need to continue to engage decisively with the Colombians to make sure that we are providing them the support they need, in those areas have been controlled by these insurgent groups that criminal activities don’t take over.

In the Philippines, again, we have had a lengthy relationship with our Filipino partners as they work to remove the insurgents from the southern part of the country. We have—are transitioning that mission now as we built capacity there, but we have to remain engaged with them to make sure that we don’t lose the gains that we have made.

Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you. In both countries, I really wish the American people knew of the success and that success can be achieved against narcotics and terrorist and the destabilization. We now proceed to Mr. Langevin.

Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our witnesses. Secretary Lumpkin, if I could start with you. Last year you established the Special Operations Oversight Council, and I referred to that in my opening statement, to provide policy oversight and guidance to SOCOM. The council was to coordinate special operations related matters across the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service secretary staffs, and address key issues in the areas of special operations policies and operational priorities, budg-
et execution, force employment, legislative changes, and required capabilities.

So, what actions in the areas of policy and operational priorities, budget execution, force employment, proposed legislative changes, and required capabilities has the council reviewed or taken to date, and what were the results of the review of any related issues?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you very much for the question, sir. When I created the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, it wasn't to supplant any of the responsibilities that I had as driven by statute as the assistant secretary. Once I assumed office, what I quickly realized is that as USSOCOM has grown and become more complex in the nature of their operations and what they do, we were on a 20 percent manpower reduction within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. So, the scope of the work was getting more complex and my staff was shrinking. So, I needed another tool to make sure that I had in my tool bag in order to make sure I could cut across those issues within the Department, so we created the council.

We have had numerous meetings of leadership and working groups which have proven to be profoundly successful. We have tackled three principal issues thus far. We have tackled inter-theater airlift, support special operations forces within the different geographic combatant commands. When USSOCOM took OPCON, Operational Control, of the Theater Special Operations Commands, when they started doing these—the JCET [Joint Combined Exchange Training] training, there was issues of who was going to pay the bills. We were able to work through that process to make sure it was crosscutting within the Department and everybody was clear. Unfortunately, this is one of those where USSOCOM got the bill, but rightly so, because the JCET is 51 percent of the benefit needs to be for the SOF personnel, so that made sense.

We are also working to establish—the next topic that we took on was MILCON [military construction], and it is when should we and when should we not use MFP–11 funding for military construction. And the final one is coming up with a real definition of what is SOF-peculiar so we know where the bill should go with the services versus within USSOCOM.

Those two, we haven't finalized the results yet. We are still working, but it has proven to be very successful and gives me the ability to—the other that it really gives me the ability to do is that I walk a line at times between providing oversight and advocacy for USSOCOM.

So, what this does when I get a decision that is crosscutting and everybody is in agreement and I can clearly shift in everybody's mind from being oversight to advocate, to make sure that everything is done, and it makes it very easy for all to understand the building. So for me, that is the real benefit in addition to being able to navigate some of these sticky wickets.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you. So, you alluded to this a little bit, but how do the roles and responsibilities of the council differ from the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, SOCOM, or the military department?
Secretary LUMPKIN. Again, it is a—I look at it as a tool that informs me, that helps me make better decisions, and so I can take it to the Under Secretary of Policy, the Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary to bring resolution to any conflict. So again, it is just a tool for me, and it doesn’t supplant any of my roles or responsibilities.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you.

General Votel, as I noted in my opening statement, global demand for special operations forces obviously continues to be high. What impact has the continuous high tempo had on force readiness, training, mental health, and the like, and also, what steps is the command taking to ensure the global demand for positioning of special operations forces is met today and in the future?

General Votel. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. So, we have continued to pay a lot of attention to our PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo] of our deployed members, and we, over the last couple of years, with the support of Congress, have been able to get a good process in place where we can manage our PERSTEMPO much better now, so we understand what the deployment tempo of our people are, and we put in policies and practices in place that allow us to actually control that and manage that and understand what the impact is on the force. And so that has helped us manage the force better than perhaps we were doing that in the past.

What that is really translated into is, is our components being able to organize their forces in a manner so they could have forces that were forward deployed, deployed doing the work of the Nation. They could have forces back in recovery and they could have forces recovering, so it is kind of one-third, one-third, one-third approach is what we strive to do. And while we are not complete there in all of our components, we are definitely moving in the right direction to try to control that.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, and Mr. Langevin, we now proceed to Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for having this hearing, and thank you all for being here and for your service. My first question has to do with legal authorities and rules of engagement. Given the sensitive nature of the missions that special operations forces conduct and sometimes the fast-moving nature of those and lethal nature of those engagements, are you concerned that sometimes the need to lawyer up is just so burdensome, or that the rules of engagement are so restrictive that you find it difficult to carry out the missions properly, and if so, can we help you in that regard?

General Votel. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. The answer, from my perspective, is I don’t see that as an impediment to our operations right now. I think we have very effectively integrated operational law into our activities, and in—as in my experience, we have had the rules of engagement or we have had the process in place that has allowed us to go back and ask for the rules of engagement that are required to conduct the operations which we have been asked to undertake.

Mr. LAMBORN. Would you care to add anything to that?
Secretary Lumpkin. I agree completely. I haven’t seen an issue where we were up against a rules of engagement issue that we couldn’t resolve in a very rapid and timely manner.

Mr. Lamborn. And to have control and legal authority, is that a concern at any time?

General Votel. It is not a concern for us right now. We have been well served by the previous AUMF [authorization for use of military force], and I am hopeful that future AUMF will—I think it gives us what we need.

Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And I will just comment on that I don’t want to see restrictions on any future AUMF that do tie the hands of our military too much, so I would like to see that open-ended as much as possible.

What is the status of—and by the way, I do appreciate the 10th Special Forces Group, which is in my district at Fort Carson and Germany, great group of people. I always enjoy visiting them, and I enjoyed taking Chairman Thornberry out to see them last August, so.

What is the status of the Preservation of Force and Families program these days?

General Votel. Thanks. Let me talk about that. I think we are making significant progress in this area. The investments that we have made over the last several years with the support of Congress, I think, are making a big difference. While I still think the force is stressed, I think it is lessened than we have seen in the past. So, I have a holistic approach here that addresses the physical, spiritual, the emotional, psychological aspect of this, I think is beginning to pay off.

I think we have got a good strategy in place to address our most pressing problems, which I consider to be the invisible challenges, the stress that is leading to suicide or suicide ideations, and I think we have got a good approach to this. And we are really focused on three big objectives.

One is to empower our people by communicating to them the variety of resources that are available.

Second, is to enable them by providing as easy of access as we can to those resources so that they can take advantage of them.

And then finally is to encourage them by emphasizing that it is absolutely normal to seek care for yourself and your family and that we expect that and we encourage it and there is no stigma associated with that.

And I am—we are beginning to see indicators now that that message is sinking in and that understanding is going down into the SOCOM force.

Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, that is great to hear. I want to thank you for your service and for being here today. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Lamborn. And we now proceed to Congressman Jim Cooper of Tennessee.

Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was not here for the opening statements. I will yield to another colleague.

Mr. Wilson. Then Congressman Rich Nugent all the way from Florida.
Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank both of you for your service, and we are just up the street from you, so we appreciate it.

General Votel, in the NDAA, I will be asking for a report to explore the future of directed-energy weapons within SOCOM, and I am encouraged to see that SOCOM already is looking into directed-energy solutions, and I would just like to emphasize to you that I am going to be very, very protective of keeping your flexible and relatively agile acquisition system uninhibited if I can. For the subcommittee today, would you just give us some broad strokes of what that report would look like. In other words, you know, what would SOCOM's future plans be as relates to directed energy?

General Votel. Congressman, I will take, first of all, I will take the question for the record and we will provide you a detailed response, and we will look into the very specific capabilities.

I thank you for your continued support of our acquisition capability. You know, the advantage, I think, we have is that we can—we can very closely link the requirements of the operators to our acquisition arm, and unlike the service chiefs that you heard of yesterday, I do have a very close relationship with my acquisition authority, and because of the great authority that Congress has provided us, we are able to respond quickly.

Broadly, to your question on directed energy, we are always looking at the very best tools that we will require for the future. Certainly directed energy fits into a model that we have been proceeding against for some time which is precision and accuracy in the employment of our weapons systems, and I think that directed energy offers us a great opportunity in terms of that. So, I look forward to providing you a more detailed response on that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mr. NUGENT. Well, General, I appreciate that. Now, in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA directs a report on technology roadmap for undersea mobility, and of course, I am very interested in the full details of that report later this year, but I want to ask for maybe just a preview of just two parts of that dry combat submersible program. What requirement drives the development of a dry combat submersible, one, and in an unclassified setting, what do you need a dry combat submersible to do, if you could? And I understand this is not a classified setting so—

General Votel. Yeah. Thanks. And again, I think this probably would be best discussed in a classified setting, Congressman, but in general, what it allows us to do is, it allows us to take the full opportunity of the maritime environment to pursue the full range of missions that SOCOM does on behalf of the Nation. And that includes those sensitive activities that we do out there, and this really does provide us a very unique capability to—in place our operators or our folks at the right place to pursue the missions that we have.

So, we look forward to kind of laying that out for you in a classified setting, but I do think it allows us to take the full opportunity of the maritime environment to accomplish the missions that we are assigned.
Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. I appreciate both your comments, though, in regards to what sequestration, while may not directly affect you, but the—you know, the services that support you, it will affect, and it certainly will have an effect on you in regards to implementing your mission, and I worry about the fact that we are going to be limited in regards to being able to project that force where we need it in pinpoint accuracy if we continue with sequestration.

I know the chairman is in agreement with that. Sequestration is a cancer that is going to eat and destroy our national security, and it is one that we are all very, very invested in trying to turn around.

So, I appreciate your service, both of you. Thank you very much, and I yield back.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Nugent. We now proceed to Congressman John Garamendi of California.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and for the two witnesses, my apologies for not being here. We seem to have three Armed Services Committee subcommittees operating at the same moment, including the Coast Guard subcommittee, so—just a question. I am going to follow up. I think this is a question that, Mr. Lumpkin, you were asked, maybe Mr. Langevin asked this question. And in the operations of the special operation forces, you do different things and for different parts of the security—national security. Who winds up paying for the pieces that—where let’s say it might be a naval operation or an Army or a Marine operation, who winds up paying for these operations?

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think we have two parts of the payment issue. One of them is in how we procure equipment and things of that nature. If it is a what we call a service common item, then the service would pay that requisite bill, and then anything that was peculiar to the special operations community, we would use MFP–11, that is Major Force Program-11 funds to go ahead and pay that, whether it is to modify it or adjust it to make it useful for us the way we need it—what we need it to do.

Operations themselves, I mean, for overseas contingency operations generally come out of the Department’s OCO funding, so we have—there is funding. And so what—who is paying for the bill really kind of depends on the nature of the operation of whose OCO account it would come out of, but I can give you a detailed breakdown of that if you would like. I would be happy to take that for the record for you.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, if you would. I think this—I know this—I know that Mr. Langevin was interested in that and as am I, but yes, if you would please do that.

Secretary LUMPKIN. I will do that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. We know that in Iraq and Syria, it is anticipated that the special operations units will be used. Is that going to be—how does that get paid for, and what is the extent of that? We are going to have to deal with an AUMF here pretty quickly, at least we should, and the issue is not just the men and women that are going to be deployed, but then how much is it going to cost
us to deploy them. Mr. Lumpkin, and then, General, if you could delve into that.

Secretary Lumpkin. And those operations in Iraq and Syria, those that are going on today in support of the Iraqi Government and such are paid for through OCO, but I mean, that will be part of the breakdown that I will get you is the actual dollar figures that are being used today. We can do that.

Mr. Garamendi. It seems to me that one of the important things we ought to be considering as we deal with this AUMF is that it will be expensive, or have some expense, for the taxpayers of the United States. We need to know, at least have some really good idea how much this is going to cost us, and we also know that it is likely to be expensive for the men and women that are involved, quite possibly with death and injury. So, we need to know that also. So that is something that is on my mind. I hope it is on the rest of my colleagues’ minds also.

Finally, in the last few moments here, we spend a lot of time in other subcommittees dealing with communications. GPS [Global Positioning System] is vulnerable. What steps are being taken by the special operations that are extensively using that particular technology to deal with its interruption? Whichever one of you would like to jump into that.

General Votel. Thanks. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman. We obviously, as I mention in my opening statement, we are very concerned about the cyber environment and these different ways that people can come after our use of technologies, our use of the Internet to support us. So, in conjunction with direction we have gotten from the chairman and working along with Cyber Command, we are very much in the process of addressing our cyber protection capability, both reliant on resources that are made available to us from the Cyber Command and by elements that we will stand up within SOCOM to get after that particular problem.

So, we are very alert to the threat that you just outlined right here, and certainly GPS is something that is impacted, but certainly all of our communications and communications architecture is potentially at risk as well.

Mr. Garamendi. Much of the rest of the world is looking at what is known as advanced or eLoran systems. I would like to have some comment from you on the record about what you may be using in that regard, not just within the United States but around the world where this is actually being deployed by some people that we are very interested in. Thank you.

General Votel. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Garamendi. We now proceed to Congressman Mo Brooks of Alabama.

Mr. Brooks. Thank you for your service. As you are aware, Capitol Hill is engaged in a significant debate over the budgets. We have got the White House budget, we have got the House budget, and presumably the Senate is also working on a budget. The President’s proposed budget for national defense is $561 billion, roughly, for base defense and another $51 billion, roughly speaking, for OCO, for a total, roughly, of $612 billion. The House budget for na-
Tional defense is $523 billion for base, that being the amount set forth in the Budget Control Act, and roughly $90 billion for OCO.

To state it a little bit differently, base defense budget, President, $561, which is $38 billion more than permitted under the Budget Control Act, and the $523 billion that the House budget, at least as of this moment, represents. And on the OCO side, the President’s budget proposes $51 billion while the House is $39 billion more, OCO.

So, we have $612-, $613 billion from the two budgets being spent on national defense, but the key issue is, which is better for our national defense? For the money to be in the base or the money to be in OCO? Can you please share with me your insight on which you think is a better place to put the money and how that affects our security capabilities, and whoever wants to go first can go first.

Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question very much. The challenge we have with OCO is it is, you know, the money comes that year and you have got the year. You don’t have it in the outyears. It is not something I can sit here and plan on, so it actually increases my fiscal uncertainty. Because, I am going to buy a piece of equipment, for example, and I can’t count on I am going to have the sustainment costs in the outyears because I—it is kind of like, if I had to give an example, like buying a car and not knowing you can pay the car insurance 2 years from now or put gas in it or do the maintenance. And so, while you end up with the same dollar figure when it is done for that particular year, and I just don’t know what I have got in the future, so it is very difficult for me to plan.

So as I am looking at programatics from where I sit, I am frequently figuring what is my exit strategy if I don’t get the funding in the future to fix it. Each one will meet a very short-term need, but in the outyears, it becomes problematic when we have this reliance on OCO and don’t move it over to your base budget.

Mr. Brooks. So, you have got the adverse effect on planning and what I might infer as the adverse effect on purchasing capital goods.

Secretary Lumpkin. Exactly.

Mr. Brooks. Long term.

Secretary Lumpkin. Exactly, yes. Yes, sir.

Mr. Brooks. Okay. Anything else? Any other adverse effect? Or—General Votel?

General Votel. I would just—I would add I agree with Secretary Lumpkin in his comments that it is better in the base. I think the big advantage is that the base funding provides us certainty in a time of uncertainty as we continue moving forward in this very complex environment.

And so, I think that helps us plan better, I think it helps us make better investments long term, and then of course it gives us the best ability to sustain those programs as we move forward. So like the Secretary said, both of these will work in the short term. The base, I think, helps us for the longer term concerns.

Mr. Brooks. Let me focus on the OCO money again for just a moment. If the House were to pass a budget that spent roughly $90 billion on OCO, and giving the planning and spending inhibitions that you have just—or problems that you have just described, is all
that $90 billion have to be spent by the Department of Defense or is some of it just not going to be used because you can’t properly plan and use it?

And I don’t know the answer to these questions. That is why I am asking them.

Secretary LUMPKIN. You know, I don’t want to necessarily speculate on—but I would say there is a possibility of that that it may not all get used.

Mr. BROOKS. General Votel.

General VOTEL. I would agree. I think the disadvantage of single-year money, which OCO generally is, does create that risk that we may not build up, employ large sums of it that way. As it is right now, you know, our—we do—part of our budget, we do ask for some OCO funding and so we are able to plan for some of that, but I—again, I think I would be speculating a little bit here.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I have got roughly 15, 20 seconds left. Anything else you all would like to add that would help me decide how to vote on this issue?

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am just of the opinion that if it is important enough to do and it is part of what you should be doing every day, it should be in your base budget.

General VOTEL. I think our people deserve a certainty.

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Brooks. And at this time if there are any further questions, they can be submitted for the record.

And I would like to thank again, Mr. Secretary, General, for your being here today. I am grateful to be serving with Congressman Langevin, and at this time we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 18, 2015
STATEMENT OF
HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

BEFORE THE 114th CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

MARCH 18, 2015
Introduction

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to address you as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)). The administration and Congress have demonstrated a clear commitment to the special operations force (SOF) community, as evidenced by the strength of the SOF budget in the current fiscal year. Thank you for your support of special operations (SO) initiatives and resources.

I am very pleased to be joined today by the commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), GEN Joe Votel, who is working to make his exceptional command even more effective, responsive and resilient. I am here to report on our ability to meet our nation’s most pressing national security concerns, now and in the future, and the health and welfare of our Nation’s special operations community. We are well-postured to meet those national security requirements, but I also want to address some of the challenges we face.
The Oversight Role of ASD (SO/LIC)

As the senior policy advisor on special operations and counterterrorism to the Secretary of Defense, I am committed to ensuring that our special operations force is well-prepared to face threats to the United States, our allies, and other international partners worldwide—not just in the current areas of active combat, but in emerging areas of instability and potential conflict around the globe such as Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Asia. Such preparation includes strategic planning for our nation’s future SOF requirements.

In my role as a “Service-like Secretary” for SOF, I serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations, counterterrorism, and counter threat finance activities and capabilities. I established and led a Special Operations Policy Oversight Council (SOPOC) to execute my responsibilities and provide policy and guidance to USSOCOM, coordinate special operations-related matters across the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and institutionalize my responsibilities as outlined in statute and Department of Defense (DoD) directives. The purpose of the council is to continuously improve policy, joint processes, and procedures that facilitate the development, integration, implementation, and sustainment of the Department’s special operations capability
efforts. There has been continued emphasis on increasing our comparative advantage in special operations capabilities during the previous three Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR). This council will provide a governance mechanism for insuring Department level oversight and implementation of the QDRs and other Department directives.

**Effective Oversight in a Changing Fiscal Environment**

One of several critical responsibilities of ASD (SO/LIC) is the supervision and oversight of special operations and other Department resources. As the nature of today’s security environment rapidly changes, our challenge is to maintain SOF’s comparative capability advantage in a constrained budgetary environment. We must wisely use our limited resources efficiently and effectively to maintain a mission ready SOF that can rapidly respond in support of combatant command requirements. Today SOF accounts for approximately 1.8% of the total Defense budget, and we continue to strengthen our budget management to maximize taxpayers’ return on investment in SOF. By leveraging the subject matter expertise of the USSOCOM, Joint Staff and the OSD staff, we have enhanced our oversight of already-established processes to ensure the best use of resources. I appreciate the $2 million appropriated in fiscal year 2015 for additional SO/LIC staffing. We
will continue to work closely with you and your staff as we implement these focused resources.

For the past two years, the Bipartisan Budget Act enabled DoD to make decisions based on policy and operational requirements. The act eased some of the DoD budget cuts that had been projected in the President’s budget requests for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Although, the conventional force has taken the brunt of these budget cuts, Services have remained steadfast in providing the critical Service-provided capabilities that enables SOF to perform their mission. We acknowledge the fact that sequestration-level cuts remain the law for fiscal year 2016 and beyond. However, if sequestration returns, or if we receive funding levels below the President’s request, we will be challenged to continue to provide enough SOF capability to respond to global security threats. This is especially challenging considering SOF’s interdependence with Service-provided capabilities.

SOF and the Conventional Force: Complementary Capabilities

I fully support the strategy of building the capacity and capabilities of the Services. I believe the complementary capabilities shared by conventional and special operation forces create strength and innovation for both. For more than a decade, we have been operating side by side in conflicts across the globe. The extensive
combat employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need
to coordinate our operations closely. Sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures
between SOF and conventional forces has resulted in increasing our collective
capabilities to execute missions across the full-spectrum of combat and non-
combat related activities.

Nevertheless, beyond major contingencies, SOF remain the force of choice for
those security force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically-sensitive
areas, and missions where the host nation demands a small footprint. SOF
continues to train partner nation special operations forces and conventional forces,
improving their capabilities to conduct counterterrorism operations. The
partnership between conventional and special operations forces is stronger than
ever, and the Services continue to complement SOF’s capabilities by providing
combat enablers that are not organic to SOF units or are not available in adequate
quantities. These service-provided capabilities and support mechanisms, including
intelligence and combat service support, are not only vital to special operations
mission success, but also to the readiness and well-being of the SOF community.
The Number One SOF Truth

The capabilities SOF bring to both combat and peacetime missions are the product of the number one SOF Truth: “Humans are more important than hardware”. As ASD (SO/LIC), it is my duty to advise and coordinate personnel issues relating to the SOF community.

Our people are the foundation of special operations, and we strive to ensure our force has the support system necessary to ensure their long-term prosperity and health. During the DoD Fiscal Year 2015 Program and Budget Review, the Department conducted a comprehensive assessment of SOF force structure, operational requirements, and capabilities at various resourcing levels. The review focused on ensuring DoD retains the special operations capabilities needed to meet current and future operational requirements.

To meet combatant command requirements overseas, we increased SOF end-strength levels and we enhanced their theater special operations commands. At home, we re-emphasized the alignment of continental United States-based SOF units with combatant commands to increase unit readiness through regionally-focused training, cultural awareness, language proficiency, operational planning,
and partner relationships. Reshaping SOF operational units, elements, and platforms in this way, prepares us to meet future operational requirements.

In addition to considering the size and shape of our force, we must ensure the physical and mental resilience of the individuals who make up our force. This is a challenge. After almost 14 years of continual combat deployments, combined with a demanding training regime needed to keep the force sharp, has caused significant stress on the force and their families. In the conventional force, the average number of deployments over the past 12 years was 1.12 times, with only 58 percent of conventional service members having any deployment history. In contrast, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of all USSOCOM personnel were deployed up to five times over the past 12 years. It is clear that this stress has taken a toll on the force. Although SOF suicide rates have had a modest decline over the past two years, there is much to be learned about the causes of suicide and effective prevention. What we know is even one suicide is one too many, and that is why your continued support of the Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program is critical to sustaining our special operations capability. While POTFF primarily benefits the special operations service member’s physical, spiritual, mental, and social needs, it provides a much-needed positive impact on SOF families as well. USSOCOM, in coordination with DoD Health Affairs, has added
behavioral health professionals, and we continue our efforts to de-mystify and de-
stigmatize behavioral healthcare within the ranks. As ASD (SO/LIC), I also
continue to support and enhance resiliency training currently being conducted
through USSOCOM service component programs. GEN Voel’s testimony will
cover this in depth, but the benefits cannot be overstated.

Another personnel issue currently under implementation is the Department’s
Women in the Service Review. ASD (SO/LIC) has supported USSOCOM’s
methodical implementation of the decisional timeline provided to Congress in
2013. We will continue to support USSOCOM as they conclude their studies and
develop gender-neutral standards. This fall, we will help prepare and inform
recommendations for Secretary Carter’s final decision.

The Continued Need for Agile Authorities

Today’s security environment is rapidly changing and constantly evolving with
new regional and global threats. To rapidly respond to these threats, the
Department must have agile and adaptable authorities to enable and facilitate both
our own and partner nations’ capabilities. Support for foreign partners is
fundamental to operational success in overseas contingency operations, and U.S.
financial and logistical support is necessary to ensure their continued participation.
We appreciate your acknowledgement of our efforts with the codification of section 1206 as a permanent Global Train and Equip (GTE) authority under section 2282 in Title X, U.S. Code. This new permanent authority is testament not only to the importance of building partnership capacity (BPC), but of our collective efforts to combat violent extremism globally.

Although BPC authorities such as GTE and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) help us address emerging threats and opportunities, it takes time to build a partner’s capacity. Once built, ensuring our partners can sustain their combating terrorism capacity beyond initial training becomes a significant priority. Neither GTE nor GSCF accommodates sustainment costs, so we work hand-in-hand with our partners at the State Department to ensure Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or a partner’s national funds are identified and used to sustain these programs. The State Department is a critical partner in the execution of both GTE and GSCF, which are both dual-key authorities.

Within GTE, DoD leads the execution of programs, and all funds are provided through Title X. Within GSCF, State leads the execution of programs and provides at least 20% of the funding, while DoD provides the remaining funds. In total, we execute approximately $325 Million annually to support our foreign partners.
through GTE, and have executed $103 Million in GSCF funds since its inception in 2011. The agile, unallocated funding afforded by these authorities enables implementers to rapidly respond to the urgent needs of partner nations more expeditiously than is possible through traditional mechanisms.

In addition to the GTE and GSCF, the Department recently designated ASD (SO/LIC) as the manager of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). This new fund allows us to conduct BPC activities at a much greater scale than ever before. This program is coming online at a critical junction in our counterterrorism campaigns across Africa and the Middle East.

Finally, there exists a nexus between criminal enterprises and terrorist activities. More and more, we are seeing the convergence between criminal networks that facilitate the movement of people, weapons, drugs, and funding within conflict zones and violent extremists who take advantage of those channels as well. The destabilizing nature of these illicit activities underpins the importance of shared security concerns and capacity building with our partners. The counter-drug authorities under section 1004 and 1022 permit SOF to provide tactical training to partner nation military and security forces for countering activities related to drug
trafficking, transnational organized crime, threat finance, and terrorism is one tool to respond to this linkage.

**Role of the 1208 Combating Terrorism Authority as Distinct from BPC**

Section 1208 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to provide support to foreign forces engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism in a wide range of operational environments, often where SOF are operating under austere conditions and require specialized support from indigenous forces or persons. This authority has been critical to our special operations counterterrorism efforts and will remain so. It provides us with the ability to apply a modest portion of our major force program (MFP)-11 budget to deliver critical enablers to select irregular forces, groups or individuals directly involved in counterterrorism efforts. I appreciate Congress' continued support for this authority since 2005, as well as the recent increase in funding and extension of the authority through 2017.

**The Future of SOF**

The large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dominated our collective national security focus for more than 13 years, but we are looking beyond that
towards the future. As our strategic challenges evolve, so too must SOF. From the persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies to an increasingly assertive Russia, there are no short-term fixes or one-size-fits-all solutions to the threats we face.

The emergence of the entity known as Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL) is one such example. Although the Department believes it has the legal authorities necessary to continue its efforts to respond to the ISIL threat, the President has noted that our nation is strongest when the Administration and Congress work together on issues as serious as the use of military force. The President’s recent Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) proposal to Congress provides necessary flexibility to successfully pursue the armed conflict against ISIL. Although at this time we do not anticipate conducting operations in countries other than Iraq or Syria, the proposal contains no geographic limitation. The proposal would also provide the flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in certain limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or SOF operations to take military action against ISIL leadership. While the fight against ISIL will not be over quickly, the proposed three-year sunset will provide the next President, Congress, and the American people an opportunity to assess the progress we have made against ISIL and evaluate these authorities again.
I look forward to working with Congress to pass a bipartisan AUMF specifically tailored to address the threat posed by ISIL.

These long-term threats require long-term, strategic thinking. To that end, Defense leadership and USSOCOM are developing a department-wide approach to employ special operations capabilities known as the Campaign Plan for Global Special Operations (CP-GSO). This campaign plan relies on SOF postured regionally, networked globally, and partnered across the interagency with international allies and partner nations to provide combatant commanders maximum flexibility to respond to emerging requirements.

**Conclusion**

In closing, we are all proud of our roles in supporting the Soldiers, Sailors, Airman, Marines, and Civilians, assigned to USSOCOM, as well as their families. We have asked much of the men and women assigned to our SOF units and their families since 9/11. We will continue to ask much of them in the future to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world with constantly evolving regional and global threats.
We are, therefore, committed to doing everything we can to ensure that these brave warriors have the best training, equipment, and overall support we can possibly provide. We will continue to work closely with Congress to ensure we have the right policies, agile authorities, and enhanced oversight structure in place to employ SOF effectively. I thank Congress for its continuing support of our men and women in uniform and their families, and look forward to your questions.
Michael D. Lumpkin
Assistant Secretary of Defense, SO/LIC,
Performing Duties, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Michael D. Lumpkin is currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. When performing the duties of USD (P), Mr. Lumpkin provides advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Mr. Lumpkin was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) on December 2, 2013, following his nomination by President Barack Obama and confirmation by the U.S. Senate.

In his role as Assistant Secretary (SO/LIC), Mr. Lumpkin is the principal advisor to the U.S. Secretary of Defense on Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. He is responsible primarily for the overall supervision, to include oversight of policy and resources, of special operations and low intensity conflict activities. These activities include: counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In his role as Assistant Secretary (SO/LIC), Mr. Lumpkin also oversees the Department of Defense counter-narcotics program, building partnership capacity initiatives and humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

Prior to his assuming duties as Assistant Secretary (SO/LIC), Mr. Lumpkin served as a Senior Executive at both the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs. His previous positions include Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for (SO/LIC), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Mr. Lumpkin has also significant experience in the private sector where he served as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at Industrial Security Alliance Partners and Executive Director of Business Development at ATI.

Mr. Lumpkin has more than 20 years of active duty military service as a US Navy SEAL where he held every leadership position from platoon commander to Team commanding officer. Mr. Lumpkin has participated in numerous campaigns and contingencies throughout the world to include both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Mr. Lumpkin holds a MA from Naval Postgraduate School in National Security Affairs. He is a recognized subspecialist in Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Western Hemisphere Affairs.
STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MARCH 18, 2015
OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today, which is my first as the 10th Commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to be here to convey our appreciation for your indispensable support and to provide an update on our nation’s special operations forces (SOF). During my remarks, I will describe USSOCOM’s posture, purpose, and mission in the context of the emerging strategic environment. I will then share my priorities and concerns, and explain how we will accomplish our assigned missions and prepare for an uncertain future.

SOF ETHIC and CULTURE

I would like to begin by commending the extraordinary efforts made by our special operations forces to keep our nation safe. USSOCOM’s highly specialized military and civilian personnel, our “quiet professionals,” are asked to respond to our nation’s most complex, demanding, and high-risk challenges. Building this skilled and specialized force is a demanding, time-intensive process. Every day, our forces put forth an extraordinary level of effort and personal sacrifice, while enduring grueling physical and mental demands to meet mission requirements. They deserve our admiration and gratitude, along with all of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. They are all part of a team doing essential work on behalf of our nation.

The SOF commitment to excellence is imperative in accomplishing what our nation has asked of these dedicated men and women – I am proud to serve as their commander. USSOCOM is a values-based organization – always mindful that our personal and professional conduct reflects not only on ourselves, but also on our nation. We will continue to earn the high level of trust that our leaders have placed in us by maintaining an open dialogue on the
challenges we face, providing our best military advice, and remaining responsible stewards of U.S. tax dollars.

**USSOCOM’s MISSION**

As you know, Congress created USSOCOM in 1987 and gave it distinct Service-like responsibilities, which makes it unique among the nine Unified Combatant Commands. Under U.S. Code Title 10, Sections 164 and 167, it is my responsibility, as the Commander of USSOCOM, to organize, train, and equip SOF for current and future challenges. Our mission is to synchronize the planning of special operations and provide SOF to support persistent, networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operations to protect and advance our nation’s interests.

As global security challenges become increasingly interconnected and interdependent, USSOCOM is investing in our own connections, deepening our relationships with the GCCs, our international partners, and with U.S. national security decision-makers at home. These relationships are helping us build common understandings of shared threats and facilitate cooperation.

In short, USSOCOM sees its role as an indispensable supporting command to our GCCs, working seamlessly with interagency and international partners to provide capabilities critical to addressing emerging problems and securing our nation’s interests. Ultimately, the best indicator of our success will be the success of the GCCs.
TODAY’S US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE

Since assuming command in August 2014, I have had the opportunity to travel to every GCC to consult with the commanders and visit with our forward deployed special operations units. I would like to give you a snapshot of U.S. SOF and the range of missions they are executing, and describe their experience as part of today’s military.

Today, our United States Special Operations Forces are comprised of over 69,000 men and women serving as operators, enablers, and support personnel. The SOF community is made up of our nation’s finest leaders and organizational teams. Within the force of “quiet professionals” are Army Special Forces, SEALs (Sea, Air, Land Teams), Air Commandos, Rangers, Night Stalker helicopter crews, Marine Raiders, civil affairs personnel, psychological operations personnel, acquisition experts, logisticians, administrators, analysts, planners, communicators, and other specialists who are instrumental in fulfilling our mission. We also rely heavily upon our Guard and Reserve units, as well as government civilians and contractors.

Our SOF are deployed to more than 80 countries worldwide, filling GCC requirements and supporting 10 named operations. In addition to the nearly 3,500 personnel we have stationed forward, we also have over 7,000 service members deployed in support of a variety of GCC requirements on any given day. These requirements span the range of our core activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. From working with indigenous forces and local governments to improve local security, to high-risk counterterrorism operations – SOF are in vital roles performing essential tasks. They provide critical linkages to our security partners and must be prepared to handle a wide range of contingencies, despite a small footprint in their areas of responsibility. These missions are often complicated, demanding, and high-risk.
Because of the unique skill set SOF possess, we are seeing increasing demand for these units across the GCCs. The typical operator is older than counterparts in the conventional forces, has attended multiple advanced tactical schools, and has received specialized cultural and language training. This depth of experience and range of expertise has been in high demand since 9/11. Over the last 14 years, the average service member in SOF has deployed between 4 to 10 times—with most toward the higher end of that range—and has frequently had less than 12 months at home between deployments. About 50% of our force is married with children and have sacrificed a great deal of time with their families. High operational tempo has put a strain on both our operators and their families, and most, if not all, of our SOF operators have lost friends both overseas and at home. Our SOF warriors have performed their duties superbly, but not without stress or loss; we have sustained over 2,500 wounded and killed in action. We now have approximately 7,500 members in our SOF Wounded Warrior program, many of them due to the “invisible wounds” of traumatic stress. We have a great deal of work to do to ensure these men and women receive proper care.

On the positive side, the pressure exerted over this time has created a self-confident, mature, knowledgeable, and agile force that has a greater awareness of what is important to our nation. The range of experience and expertise in special operations forces make them uniquely suited to deal with many of the complex challenges we see emerging in the security environment.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

We are living in a hyper-connected world; the spread of technology into an increasing number of cultures and societies is driving change in the strategic environment. The Cold War suppressed political mobilization in a variety of ways. The removal of those constraints, coupled with technology, is creating both challenges and opportunities. Adversaries can now easily
access tools that range from advanced weapons systems and cyber capabilities to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are providing an expanding variety of coercive options. Yet we also see opportunities emerging as networked populations are seeking improvements in governance, security, and economic opportunity. Power and influence are now diffusing to a range of actors, both state and non-state, who have not traditionally wielded it. Many governments are struggling to adjust to the new realities. For the foreseeable future, instability will be driven by conflicts within and across state boundaries as much as it will be driven by conflicts between states themselves.

Within states, it is becoming much easier for aggrieved populations to network, organize, and demand change to the status quo; we have seen this in a number of locations across the world. Populations are increasingly challenging the legitimacy of their governments and demanding change on a range of issues. Governments unwilling or unable to accommodate change will face increasing pressure from dissatisfied segments of their populations. Traditional responses to control these situations may provide temporary respite, but too often fail to address the underlying grievances, which can lead to further instability.

Across state boundaries, violent non-state actors such as ISIL are exploiting local grievances among populations to advance their own horrific ends. Their methods routinely violate international norms and challenge regional governments’ capabilities to respond. These groups rely upon their ability to build common identities with sub-sets of disaffected populations and magnify the potential for violence. Other non-state actors have more criminal inclinations and avoid law enforcement while building their power and influence.

Between states, technological advancement is providing rising powers more options to pursue their interests. In some cases, countries are seeking to expand their claims of sovereignty
outside of recognized borders. In other cases, they are sponsoring and relying upon non-state actors to act on their behalf abroad. Traditional approaches to deterrence are increasingly inadequate – particularly as some states are becoming adept at avoiding conventional military responses while advancing their interests through a combination of coercion, targeted violence, and exploitation of local issues. Russia is taking this approach and is systematically undermining neighboring governments and complicating international responses to its aggressive actions.

There are two clear implications of these environmental conditions. First, the diffusion of power is decreasing the ability of any state, acting alone, to control outcomes unilaterally. Globalization has created networked challenges on a massive scale. Only by working with a variety of security partners can we begin to address these issues.

Second, our success in this environment will be determined by our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional peace-or-war construct. Actors taking a “gray zone” approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. In this “gray zone,” we are confronted with ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts defy our traditional views of war and require us to invest time and effort in ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and authorities to safeguard U.S. interests.

SOF’s ROLE in this ENVIRONMENT
If the environment is populated with potential adversaries who are adept at avoiding our conventional advantages, then we must be prepared to respond with appropriate tools. The traditional rules of conflict are changing – our ability to influence outcomes is not solely based on our aggregate military capability. Our success will increasingly be determined by our ability to respond with a range of capabilities while becoming more attuned to the intricacies involved in an evolving landscape of relationships.

U.S. Special Operations Forces provide a portfolio of options to deal with complex security challenges. We are uniquely able to operate in a variety of environments to support strategic progress in achieving national security objectives. Our comparative advantage in this environment is built upon three pillars: 1) persistent engagement, 2) enabling partners, and 3) discreet action.

First, we conduct persistent engagement in a variety of strategically important locations with a small-footprint approach that integrates a network of partners. This engagement allows us to nurture relationships prior to conflict. Our language and cultural expertise in these regions help us facilitate stability and counter malign influence with and through local security forces. Although SOF excel at short-notice missions under politically-sensitive conditions, we are most effective when we deliberately build inroads over time with partners who share our interests. This engagement allows SOF to buy time to prevent conflict in the first place.

Second, we integrate and enable both conventional forces and interagency capabilities. On a daily basis, SOF are assisting the GCCs across and between their areas of responsibility to address issues that are not constrained by borders. When crises escalate, SOF develop critical understanding, influence and relationships that aid conventional force entry into theater. The close working relationships we have built with GCCs are essential in ensuring we are able to
properly support and augment their operations. Today’s crises will not be resolved by a military-only approach; instead, the nature of these challenges demands a whole-of-government response. SOF play an important supporting, but not decisive, role. We continue to explore how we can better augment the capabilities of the interagency to support the National Security Strategy.

Third, USSOCOM provides the ability to conduct discreet action against our most immediate threats. Regardless of our efforts to build stability and favorably shape outcomes, the need remains for an effective crisis response and a robust, proactive counterterrorism program. For these cases, we must maintain the ability to conduct operations under politically-sensitive conditions. This capability provides a tailored military response that reduces the associated strategic risks and the likelihood of conflict escalation. We are continuing to disrupt the violent actions of extremist organizations in conjunction with conventional forces, the interagency, and our international SOF partners. These three pillars help us provide lower-risk, timely, and tailored options to deal with the growing variety of security problems in today’s world.

**USSOCOM and its PARTNERS**

As an organization that deals with crises that occur in the “gray zone,” I believe USSOCOM has an important role to play in facilitating interagency discussion. For example, we hosted senior policymakers last year from across the interagency to discuss options to address transnational organized criminal networks. Just this past February, we hosted a similar event in Tampa on behalf of the National Counterterrorism Center to discuss the strategy to counter ISIL. Challenges such as these will continue to evolve – and so must our approach to dealing with them.
Unconventional strategies are increasingly becoming a feature of the security environment. I believe it is time for us to have an in-depth discussion on how we can best support our national interests in these situations. Adversaries employing these strategies attempt to maximize their coercive influence while limiting their risk of serious retribution. They are becoming adept at avoiding crossing thresholds that would clearly justify the use of conventional military force. Destabilizing a government is becoming easier through non-attributable methods that are relatively cheap and easy to employ. Our success will therefore depend upon our ability to act with and through regional partners, leveraging all instruments of national power, to counter destabilizing influences.

Cyber threats are an increasingly common component of unconventional strategies for which we must develop a more comprehensive approach. Our ever-growing reliance on information infrastructure makes us vulnerable to attacks; the same is true for many governments around the world, to include our potential adversaries. Simultaneously, there are a variety of areas in which we must become more proficient to fully realize the potential of cyber capabilities. I believe the interagency needs to maintain a continuing focus on this area.

Social media is another component of unconventional strategies, and the security environment in general, that is playing a central role in recruiting individuals to causes. We must therefore develop our ability to interact with key influencers through this medium, or else risk blinding ourselves to this important conduit of information and influence in unfolding crises. We all must view this space as a routine operational area; it is redefining how humans interact. Our success in leveraging these tools will be determined by how well we cultivate the networks in which we participate; it is important to note that these are not “our” networks – the very nature
of these relationship tools is decentralized and participatory, rather than centrally controlled. We require new thinking on this subject.

We stand ready to support interagency efforts to work through these challenges. Though there are military components to countering and deterring unconventional challenges, whole-of-government strategies are essential for building lasting stability and safeguarding U.S. interests.

**DEVELOPING SOF for the SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

Through close collaboration with Congress, I hope to optimize the allocation of our resources to develop the capabilities, capacities, and authorities required by the GCCs. While this emerging security environment will increase the demand for SOF, we are most effective when we integrate our efforts with the GCCs, Services, and the interagency. In order to strengthen SOF posture and capabilities, I have established five priorities for USSOCOM. Focusing on these priorities will enhance our ability to address the range of conventional and unconventional challenges that are increasingly characterizing the security environment.

First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right people, skills, and capabilities to meet current requirements as well as those that will emerge in the future. As we face both fiscal and security challenges, we must balance the readiness of the current force with investment in future capabilities. Critical to this balance is ensuring that we maintain superior selection, training, education, and talent management for our people. In turn, our people must be supported by timely development, acquisition, and sustainment of both Service-provided and special operations-peculiar equipment.

Recognizing that humans are more important than hardware – our first SOF Truth – we must invest wisely in our people to develop the right talents our force requires. Over the past 14
years we have evolved our approach to consistently produce operators who possess the attributes and competencies we require. Developing language and cultural expertise is essential to our ability to operate in complex situations to promote the security of the U.S. and its allies. Operational success for SOF often depends on being able to establish relationships with key partners. The strength of these relationships is founded on culturally attuned, regionally trained operators interacting directly with foreign officials and security forces in their language. USSOCOM and its Components continue to strengthen and rebalance regional capabilities to provide appropriate expertise.

We have a shared responsibility with the Services for developing our special operations forces and we are partnering with them on ways we can better assess and manage talent. USSOCOM has the responsibility for ensuring the combat readiness of its forces while the Services have broad authority for career development, so we are working on improving how we collaboratively prepare SOF for the challenges they face. Yet reliance on the Services is not limited to recruitment and development of our operators. The readiness of USSOCOM, the Services, and Functional Combatant Commands are inextricably linked as SOF relies heavily on Service training, logistics, facilities, and operational enablers such as cyber networks, global distribution, and global patient movement. Service and Functional Combatant Commanders’ support will remain a critical requirement as USSOCOM continues to deploy SOF to meet increasing GCC demand.

In terms of funding, our readiness has remained relatively stable over the past four years through a combination of consistent base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, which has allowed USSOCOM to fulfill the most critical GCC demands. Although the majority of our efforts have focused on the CENTCOM AOR, our current budget shifts efforts to improve
support to all GCCs in accordance with strategic guidance. As we begin to focus more heavily on emerging networked threats around the world, we are aligning resources to maintain current readiness through joint training and exercises, operational unit readiness and training activities, and flying hours. Our training exercises include a strong focus on building Service, interagency, and international interoperability. We remain heavily reliant upon OCO funding, which has been essential for responding to today’s threats, and appreciate the continued support of Congress in this matter.

Second, we must help our nation win in today’s challenges and contribute to keeping the nation safe. The challenges faced by the United States and our allies require unprecedented agility and understanding. We must prioritize and synchronize SOF activities to protect our nation’s interests as the challenges grow more numerous and complex. To accomplish this, we must continue to invest in a diverse portfolio of SOF capabilities that meet both the immediate and long-term needs of the GCCs and complements the capabilities of the Services, the interagency, and our international partners.

DoD guidance identifies USSOCOM as the synchronizer for the planning and provision of special operations capabilities in support of the GCC. To meet this guidance, we are in the process of coordinating with the Services, the Department, and the GCCs to collaboratively develop a campaign plan for global special operations. The plan is intended to help optimize and prioritize our support globally, promote ongoing efforts to strengthen international partnerships and will ultimately improve our ability to support the GCCs by providing coherent options and recommendations for SOF employment.

Authorities such as Section 1208 play a critical role in ensuring we can provide a more comprehensive set of options for security challenges by leveraging the capabilities of local
security partners. They also help ensure we retain access and influence in regions where we do not maintain a large military presence. We appreciate your continued support for this authority. Going forward, we will work with Congress to ensure we have the right authorities and programs in place to properly support the GCCs.

Third, we are continuing to build relationships with international and domestic partners through sustained security cooperation, expanded communication architectures, and liaison activities. These partnerships allow us to share the burden of managing conflicts and enhance regional capabilities that can respond to threats at their origin. Over the past few years, USSOCOM has prioritized strengthening the network of military, interagency, and international partners across the globe, through liaison exchange, and a multinational communications infrastructure. These relationships build common understandings of shared threats and facilitate cooperation.

Efforts such as our Special Operations Liaison Officers, or SOLOs, are helping us build this network of international partners. Now present in embassies in 15 nations and operating in every geographic combatant command area of responsibility, SOLOs help us facilitate coordination across GCC boundaries to address challenges that span the globe. We also have liaison officers from 13 partner nations that work with us at our Headquarters in Tampa. Similarly, our Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) help us interface more effectively with the interagency. By increasing transparency, communication, and collaboration with our partners, we maximize the effectiveness of our collective action against shared problem sets. USSOCOM will continue to invest in these relationships so that our network development outpaces that of threat networks.
The relationships USSOCOM has strengthened and the communications architecture we have put in place allow us to coordinate with coalition partners on matters such as hostage rescue, the movement of foreign fighters, international training, and developing the capabilities for responding to shared threats. In January of this year, USSOCOM organized a dialogue that brought together senior military representatives from 20 nations, as well as the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and NATO Special Operations Headquarters, to discuss common security challenges and opportunities for collective action.

Our expanded support to the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) is another key effort that is helping us further develop our regional capabilities and expertise. This support includes extending the necessary communications infrastructure and providing key operations support capabilities such as Civil-Military Engagement, and ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination. We are working closely with the GCCs to determine how we can best support their operational needs. We have realigned approximately 800 USSOCOM billets to push more capability forward to the TSOCs in areas such as planning, intelligence, analysis, and communications. We will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely with our network of allies and partners, and to encourage constructive defense cooperation.

As we operate with and through a growing network of global partners, we will continually reassess relationships based on mission prioritization and ensure we maintain the proper security protocols. As an enterprise, USSOCOM understands the reality that what happens in Latin America affects Africa, which affects Europe, and so on. With a global approach – working with international partners to coordinate activities and share critical
information – we can more effectively deal with global challenges. In my opinion, this network is an essential capability in adapting to the emerging challenges to our interests.

Fourth, we must prepare for the future by investing in SOF that are able to win in an increasingly complex world. To do so, we must be innovators of strategic options. We will focus on developing the total Special Operations Force through concepts, training, doctrine, education, and research that are future-oriented and challenge our current operational constructs. These concepts, in concert with robust experimentation and a rigorous capability analysis and development process, will ensure we are prepared for an uncertain and dynamic future. Ultimately, preparing for the future is about ensuring that we match the right people and capabilities with the very best ideas to address our most pressing problems.

In today’s environment, our effectiveness is directly tied to our ability to operate with domestic and international partners. We, as a joint force, must continue to institutionalize interoperability, integration, and interdependence between conventional forces and special operations forces through doctrine, training, and operational deployments. A key aspect of building interoperability is through USSOCOM’s participation in Service Title 10 and Chairman of the Joint Staff sponsored war games and experiments. These events provide a critical venue for building partnerships with Service, interagency, and international partners to address some of the most pressing challenges facing our nation as we look to the future. We will also continue to use USSOCOM events to advance our efforts to institutionalize whole-of-government approaches.

Programmatic keys to preparing SOF for the future are a continued emphasis on enhancing the overall capabilities of the SOF operator; fielding new and recapitalized air, ground, and maritime platforms; enhancing our SOF-specific ISR capabilities; and continuing to
invest in new communications infrastructure and equipment technology that allow us to share information more effectively and integrate our activities. We will work to ensure we are developing the right technologies, equipment, and capabilities required for the future SOF operator.

USSOCOM’s tailored and streamlined rapid acquisition processes, supported by Congress and enabled through the oversight of ASD(SO/EIC) and USD(AT&L), have delivered critical capabilities to the battlefield, in weeks and months, instead of years. For example, in 2014, conducting combat evaluations allowed us to develop and deliver advanced weapons and cutting-edge Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors for our SOF MQ-9 unmanned aircraft that had immediate impact on the battlefield. USSOCOM also successfully responded to an urgent operational requirement to increase ballistic protection on its fleet of CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. In less than six months, USSOCOM, working alongside the Army and Navy, acquired lightweight armored panels and modified its fleet of Ospreys.

USSOCOM is also focusing on improving acquisition processes to support an adaptable strategy by leveraging its network of partnerships with Services, the interagency, industry, academia, and international partners. The Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) is an example of our emphasis on acquisition process innovation. The effort is designed to deliver a test-ready combat suit prototype that protects our operators at their most vulnerable point. Through the use of a small joint acquisition task force and rapid prototyping events, TALOS is leveraging close relationships between operators, acquirers, and technologists to achieve greater results than could be accomplished through traditional acquisition processes. This approach is also helping us “spin off” technologies from the larger TALOS effort that are improving our capabilities at an accelerated rate. Continued Congressional support of USSOCOM’s acquisition
of SOF-peculiar capability and our commitment to innovative process improvement is imperative to our continued ability to meet the needs of the warfighter.

As we prepare for the future, we remain very concerned about the detrimental effects of sequestration; drastic cuts to the Services will have severe impacts on our own ability to support the GCCs. A great deal of USSOCOM’s procurement is focused on SOF-specific enhancements to Service-managed programs. Therefore, SOF buying power is directly connected to Service investments. Even with a steady base budget for USSOCOM, our capabilities can still be reduced through cuts to programs that we depend upon. A major reprioritization of these programs will require us to reassess our own investments. Increased demand for SOF across the GCCs combined with increased pressure on Service budgets may compromise our capabilities. Internally, we are working hard to refine our programmatic decisions to build our buying power and prepare for the future.

Another important area of future development for SOF is emerging from the Women in Service Review. Women have served in SOF for years in Intelligence, Military Information Support and Civil Affairs units, female engagement teams, cultural support teams, and Air Force Special Operations aviation roles. Approximately two-thirds of our positions are currently integrated. USSOCOM is sponsoring several research efforts to assess possible impacts on unit performance to facilitate further successful integrations. We are also working in close coordination with the Services to develop recommendations for further integration.

Fifth, we must preserve our force and families, providing for their short- and long-term well-being. People – military, civilian, and families – are our most important asset. We always take care of our people, but after 13 years of war, their resiliency and readiness is a primary concern. We must leverage every resource available – SOF, Service, and community resources –
to ensure our people are prepared for the demanding tasks we ask them to execute. At the same time, we must pay particular attention to the often invisible challenges that our people and their families face, and ensure that the SOF culture is one that fosters understanding and support.

In order to preserve our special operations force and families, we are focusing on four areas: human, psychological, spiritual, and family/social performance. In each area, we are taking steps to improve the long-term health of our force. These initiatives are not intended to supplant the Services’ efforts in providing for the welfare of military members and their families; but rather to provide SOF and their families with access to services that meet their unique needs and complement Service-provided programs. Given the high frequency of combat deployments, high-stake missions, and extraordinarily demanding environments in which the force operates, SOF and their families have been under unprecedented levels of stress; it is imperative to address the effects of more than 13 years of combat operations.

There are two specific areas that fall under preserving our force and families that I would like to discuss in more detail: suicides and personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO. On the first subject, our goal is to do everything possible to eliminate the incidence of suicide in the forces and in our families. We have indications that our efforts in the four areas I mentioned are making a difference by alleviating conditions that contribute to suicide. There are now higher self-referral rates and our leadership is improving its ability to recognize important warning signs and provide tools to intervene more effectively. We are moving in the right direction in changing our culture when it comes to seeking psychological help, but still have work to do. This effort will continue until seeking help is considered normal and expected by everyone. We are grateful for the support Congress has provided to address this challenge.
The second area I would like to mention is PERSTEMPO, which is the rate at which we deploy our forces. Our policy is aimed at ensuring the physical, mental and operational readiness and resiliency of assigned forces. In 2010 a study was commissioned to examine the effects of a decade of continuous combat operations on the SOF community. The study identified one primary source of ongoing stress: the lack of predictability resulting from a demanding operational tempo exacerbated by significant time spent away from home for training. Predictability is a key component of building resilience. USSOCOM’s PERSTEMPO policy is designed to improve operational readiness and retention by allowing commanders to evaluate and balance mission requirements with the needs of our service members. The intent is to enable the Commanders at the lowest level to better monitor the use of assigned forces and make informed risk decisions that help protect them from overuse, which will also improve mission success. Ultimately, managing PERSTEMPO is about ensuring the long-term health of the force and mission readiness while continuing to meet our global mission requirements.

The preservation of our force and families is vitally important in the preservation of capabilities that the nation depends upon to respond to crises in an unpredictable environment. Ensuring we properly care for those from whom we expect so much will allow us to meet important requirements from the GCCs. As our people keep faith with our nation, we will keep faith with them, now and in the future.

**WORKING with CONGRESS**

I look forward to working with Congress to explore how we can best enable our SOF operators to prepare for the complex situations we ask them to deal with on a daily basis. Your oversight, support, and partnership will ultimately help us provide better service to our nation.
The fiscal situation requires the Department to make hard choices about the allocation of our resources. It is imperative that this process occurs with a clear understanding of impacts. We depend upon the Services and Functional Combatant Commands to provide us with key capabilities; most SOF operations require non-SOF support. As we adjust to the changing demands in the operating environment, we must work to ensure we are building the broadest possible portfolio of options for our national security decision-makers through the innovation of low-cost, small-footprint, and highly flexible SOF capabilities.

**CLOSING**

In closing, I thank you for providing me with this opportunity to discuss these issues that are critical to the health of our Special Operations Forces and our ability to support the National Security Strategy. I also thank you for your continued support of our SOF personnel and their families; the tremendous demands we have placed upon them requires a continued commitment to provide for their well-being and support their mission success.
**General Joseph L. Votel**  
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

General Joseph L. Votel attended the United States Military Academy and was commissioned in 1980 as an Army Infantry Officer. His initial assignments were to the 3d Infantry Division in Germany where he served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, Battalion Adjutant and Rifle Company Commander.

Following this tour, he was assigned to Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe-Naples, Italy, and the NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Sarajevo. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Light) at Fort Drum, N.Y., and was subsequently selected to command the 1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Ga. Following attendance at the Army War College, General Votel commanded the 75th Ranger Regiment and participated in Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.

As a general officer, General Votel served in the Pentagon as the Director of the Army and Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Task Force and subsequently as the Deputy Director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization established under the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He also served as the Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82nd Airborne Division / CJTF 82, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, and was subsequently assigned as the Deputy Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. His most recent assignment was as the Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command.

General Votel is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, United States Army Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College.
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

March 18, 2015
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT

General VoTelo. USSOCOM is committed to remaining on the cutting edge of technology to provide the best tools to meet the operational needs of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Directed energy (DE) remains a technology of interest for meeting these capability needs. DE offers the advantage of ultra-precision and rapid target engagement, but has significant systems engineering, platform integration and operational policy challenges.

USSOCOM has operational requirements in several mission areas where DE capabilities have potential applicability. The June 2012, “Capability Production Document for AC–130 J,” includes an objective key performance parameter that calls for the system to provide “the capability to incorporate future DE weapons, to include lethal and non-lethal variations.”

USSOCOM has executed, funded and/or endorsed several development programs for DE systems in the last 20 years. Only one classified DE system is currently fielded by USSOCOM and being used in SOF operations. The Services have fielded laser dazzler systems to some SOF under Service acquisition programs. USSOCOM is currently assessing other DE capabilities for SOF operational use. One current initiative includes a DE development effort funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) that is being assessed against sensitive SOF user requirements and concepts of employment (CONEMP). USSOCOM has initiated assessment of the potential use of DE as an operational capability for a future upgrade of some AC–130J aircraft. USSOCOM is also assessing DE as a future capability for vehicle- or vessel-mounted systems to address approved operational requirements. These efforts are currently in the technology assessment stage, and specific development or acquisition plans or timelines have not yet been developed.

Unfortunately, the majority of USSOCOM’s DE development programs have been terminated prior to fielding. For example, USSOCOM recently terminated three JIEDDO-funded DE development programs due to insufficient technology maturity. The cancelled DE development programs for SOF have failed to meet user requirements for one of the following two reasons: failure to meet technical performance thresholds (e.g., power output, operating time, target effects); and/or inadequate systems engineering to allow them to operate under the required CONEMP in SOF operational environments (e.g., ruggedization, resiliency, platform integration).

DE shows promise for a variety of missions and target sets if the technical performance, system engineering and platform integration challenges can be resolved. USSOCOM is highly dependent on the Department of Defense research and development communities to address these DE development and systems engineering challenges, as well as foster a robust DE industrial base to provide any future capabilities to SOF. As DE technology matures, additional emphasis needs to be placed on the systems engineering challenges it poses for integration into operational platforms for use in combat environments. Given the complexity of integrating DE on the platforms listed, it is USSOCOM’s intent to leverage Service/Agency development, and serve as early adopters once the technology and its system engineering challenges have matured. [See page 12.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Secretary Lumpkin. As a general rule for operations, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) funds the deployment and sustainment of its forces. However, for each operation, the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) will normally designate a lead service to provide common logistics support for all other service units participating in the operation, including in the planning and execution phases.

These assignments of responsibility can be for multiple common logistics functions and different locations within the area of responsibility. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, USSOCOM funded deployment, temporary duty costs, sustainment, and SOF-peculiar requirements. While the Army, as the designated lead service in Afghanistan, provided the necessary com-
mon logistics, service-common communications, and installation support for SOF in Afghanistan. These activities are typically funded through the Department’s Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriation when applicable. [See page 13.]

General Votel. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is not investigating eLoran (long-range aid to navigation) as a back-up system for flight operations in GPS-denied environments. Our aircraft already have navigation system redundancies that allow the aircrew to select from multiple navigation sources for both system redundancy, and for operation in denied or degraded environments. While eLoran does provide GPS back-up, it does not provide world-wide capability in the areas of interest for USSOCOM. Although eLoran may provide a navigational back-up capability in the future, the lower fidelity information provided would not be sufficient for USSOCOM needs. USSOCOM supports GPS hardening and software architecture fixes to their fleet of aircraft to mitigate our specific GPS vulnerabilities. [See page 14.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 18, 2015
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. Many of our potential adversaries have become very adept at manipulating the information environment to radicalize, recruit and gain support for their cause. That requires a robust, concerted and strategic effort to counter those messages and kill the ideas that drive their extremist movement movements. Do we have a strategy for attacking adversarial messaging and propaganda? What tools do you have at your disposal to counter those sorts of messages? Where do you see gaps in our capabilities that you think we should be trying to address?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Without going into sensitive or classified activities, the Department through the Geographic Combatant Commands executes counter adversarial messaging activities directed at specific threats. The Department’s actions support overarching U.S. Government strategies, such as the Strategy to Counter ISIL, which includes a specific counter-messaging line of effort.

A critical DOD influence activity is the employment of Military Information Support Teams to work with U.S. Embassy country teams and partner nations’ militaries in support of Combatant Commanders’ objectives. In these activities, the Department uses the most appropriate technology based upon assessments of common mediums for a target audience.

The main challenge today is the size and pace of communications in social media, as the information environment has moved beyond static websites to instantaneously accessible social media.

A recently completed Joint Staff Capability Based Assessment identified the challenges to influencing adversary and adversary-related audiences in a social media-dominated internet environment. The study outlined requirements for increasing DOD’s capability, and directed USSOCOM to develop solutions within its Military Information Support Operations (MISO) force. As we identify, develop and demonstrate the effectiveness of new concepts and tools to achieve influence effects, we will continue the dialogue with the Committee.

Mr. WILSON. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we withdraw forces, and beyond 2015? Can you outline for the committee any resourcing concerns if high numbers of SOF are required? Can you provide an update on some of the options being discussed and how you are planning for those options?

Secretary LUMPKIN. Over the next 18 months, U.S. SOF will continue prosecuting the counterterrorism mission against the remnants of AQ and other terrorists who threaten our interests and our people. U.S. SOF will also as contribute to the train, advise, and assist mission with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Through these efforts, our aim is to build durable gains that will contribute to a robust, enduring counterterrorism partnership with the Afghans. There are approximately 2,000 U.S. SOF in Afghanistan. This force level will be maintained through 2015. As the President stated during President Ghani’s visit to the U.S in March, the specific trajectory of the 2016 drawdown will be established later this year. We are currently reviewing potential SOF requirements for 2016 and in 2017. As part of this review, I will work with the Joint Staff and our military commanders to determine future SOF requirements in Afghanistan.

Mr. WILSON. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues growth for SOCOM to more that 69,900 personnel. With declining budgets, how will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure we are not choosing quantity over quality?

Secretary LUMPKIN. USSOCOM’s end strength at approximately 70K represents a balanced force to meet special operations requirements. We will not have undermanned or under-equipped units at the FY16 budget request level of funding. However, at the BCA level of funding, we might have to make reductions depending on the amount of OCO available, but we will maintain a balanced force. We continually review this through USSOCOM readiness reports and during our annual DOD Program Budget Review (PBR). We will continue to apply rigorous selection criteria for induction of members into SOF in order to maintain quality capabilities.

Mr. WILSON. Are you concerned that cuts being made to the Services could impact our special operations capabilities? Please outline your largest concerns in this area and discuss what is being done to minimize risk.
Secretary Lumpkin. Yes, I am concerned over Service reductions because of the significant Service-provided capabilities that support Special Operations Forces (SOF), especially in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), tactical fixed and rotary-wing lift, combat service support, and maritime platforms. Services are determining impacts if Budget Control Act (BCA) level of funding becomes a reality, but these impacts are still being evaluated. Any reductions in Service budgets will require reliance on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds in order for SOF to maintain adequate readiness. SOF readiness is directly linked to and dependent on Service readiness support for training ranges, training facilities, and service common equipment maintenance schedules—especially at depot level. In addition, SOF is dependent on the Services for modernization schedules. One of my greatest concerns is that the AMC–130J recapitalization schedule may be delayed if Air Force funding is reduced. Another concern is that maritime platforms to support SOF may not be available if the Navy budget is reduced. This could require USSOCOM to contract for additional leased vessels. Finally, I have significant reservations that SOF will have adequate ISR support available if Air Force funding is reduced.

Mr. Wilson. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions?

Secretary Lumpkin. (1) Today, women serve in a wide variety of Special Operations career fields such as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Air Force Special Operations aviation. As a requirement of the Women in Service Review (WISR), USSOCOM Service Components are reviewing and validating standards for SOF occupational specialties. Once these standards are implemented, those who are best qualified will serve—including women.

USSOCOM has made significant progress integrating women into previously closed positions and units. Most of this progress has occurred in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command component, because of a previous policy preventing women from serving below the brigade level in combat arms. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) is now open to women—all pilot, crew chief, and enabler positions opened as of July 23, 2014. The one exception is the Army’s Fire Support Specialist Military Occupational Specialty positions that are still closed by the Army, pending a review. The first two female pilots graduated from the 160th SOAR Selection and Assessment program in September and November 2014, and the first female crew chief graduated from the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation training program in December 2014.

Congress also approved our latest notification packet on November 18, 2014, to open enabler positions down to battalion level in 1st Special Forces Command and the Special Warfare Center and School.

(2) USSOCOM is conducting the WISR effort in three phases. The first phase involved a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) analyses and was completed in the spring of 2014. The second phase was a series of cultural and sociological studies of unit and social cohesion and combat effectiveness of SOF tactical units if females were integrated. These studies are currently under final review. The third phase is training standards validation and is currently underway. Each service component is analyzing its training standards to ensure they accurately reflect occupational/mission requirements. Once validated, these standards will be gender-neutral.

This summer, the USSOCOM commander will collaborate with the services in order to decide the best way forward for the SOCOM enterprise. His recommendation will go forward to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late September of 2015 and ultimately to the Secretary of Defense in advance of a January 2016 deadline.

Mr. Wilson. What does SOF expect to divest—or get rid of—in the FY16 budget request and for the next few years? Without divestitures or reductions in some areas, how will you ensure that we are not building a hollow force that we cannot afford?

Secretary Lumpkin. In each program budget cycle, the Department conducts extensive reviews of current and new capability requirements. As part of this analysis, it is determined what programs can be divested or reduced in order to support any new initiatives or meet emerging threats or trends. We saw this most clearly during the FY15 budget review and made some difficult decisions that will carry forward through FY 2016. For example, in FY2015 and FY2016, USSOCOM will divest some programmed growth in Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and Civil Affairs. In addition, in FY2015 and FY2016 we restructured active component Army Special Forces Groups to realign manpower and force structure to more effectively meet the challenges of a changing security environment. We also are divesting older platforms such as the MC–130P and AC–130H that will be replaced with newer, more
Mr. WILSON. Special Operations Forces and the Intelligence Community have experienced an unprecedented integration of both operational and analytical activities. SOCOM has also considerably expanded its funding of intelligence capabilities and activities. While details are classified—can you discuss this integration and are there any concerns? Can you discuss how the Department conducts appropriate oversight of these sensitive activities?

Secretary LUMPKRIN. We provide oversight of sensitive activities in concert with OUSD(I) and the Director of Intelligence Oversight in operational, resource, and acquisition processes. We are continuing to work to strengthen the oversight of those processes. For example, working with OUSD(I), we provide a Congressional report each quarter that provides detailed information and updates on these activities. This year we are working closely in conjunction with OUSD(I) to strengthen that process.

During the Department’s Program Budget Review process, we work closely with USSOCOM, OUSD(I) and OUSD(AT&L) to ensure that our efforts complement each other and avoid redundancy or unnecessary duplication. We are also in the process of identifying gaps and strengthening the SOF requirements process with Joint Staff and OUSD(I).

Details of these oversight processes will be found in the upcoming report by the Department on USSOCOM Intelligence in response to Section 1625 of the FY15 NDAA.

Mr. WILSON. Looking across the globe and considering the threat of transnational terrorism—what are your largest concerns? Where are we assuming risk in our current strategies? Are we postured to counter these threats?

Secretary LUMPKRIN. Since the 2001 attacks we have made considerable gains against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates around the world, and there are continuous efforts to disrupt imminent threats to the United States. Nevertheless, the combination of poor governance and the resilience of ideologies that promote violence have allowed for the continuous recruitment of fighters and supporters. This, in turn, has contributed to political turmoil and deteriorating security conditions in parts of the Middle East and Africa. Terrorist groups continue to exploit these conditions to establish sanctuaries, recruit fighters, and plot attacks against the United States, our allies, and partners.

In addition to the emergence of new threats in a rapidly changing security environment, I remain concerned by the ideological appeal of terrorist groups to certain segments of society in their local areas and abroad. Defeating these threats will require the efforts of many parts of our government and the international community. Our current strategies ensure we do so by aligning military activities, which depend on continued investments in capabilities, with the efforts of our inter-agency and foreign government partners in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, military, capacity building, and homeland security.

Mr. WILSON. Do our forces and Geographic Combatant Commanders have the authorities they need to mitigate current and future transnational terrorist threats? What changes would you recommend, including potential changes to the AUMF?

Secretary LUMPKRIN. While we have authorities to achieve our counter terrorism objectives, the Department continuously reviews existing authorities and resources to ensure we are postured to address emergent threats in a rapidly changing security environment. For instance, the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a regional and transnational threat prompted the President to seek a bipartisan Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) specifically tailored to address ISIL. We continue support revisions and an eventual repeal of the 2001 AUMF, but believe our focus and priority is on securing passage of an ISIL-specific AUMF.

Mr. WILSON. Do our Special Operations Forces have all of the authorities they need to counter the influence of Russian actions and aggression in Eastern Europe, or Iranian influence in the Middle East? What specific role do you see Special Operations playing in this area?

Secretary LUMPKRIN. Our forces have the authorities necessary to carry out their assigned missions. We constantly reevaluate our authorities given the dynamic threat environment. Generally, in the context of countering the Russian and Iranian influence within their respective regions, Special Operations Forces (SOF) could work within a larger whole of government approach to bolster our allies and partners by playing key roles in conducting security force assistance, and building the capacity of our partners to resist such aggression. Moreover, SOF are essential in helping counter the negative narratives and propaganda of an adversary through information operations, primarily through Military Information Support Teams. If we
determine we have an authority gap, we will work with Congress to identify possible solutions.

Mr. Wilson. A great deal has been written and said about the relationship between Special Operations Forces and the CIA. What is your opinion of how the CIA and SOF should share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given respective strengths and weaknesses? What coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA-DOD operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement?

Secretary Lumpkin. With respect to our counterterrorism plans, policies, and operations, the CIA and DOD work in concert within our distinct statutory authorities and policy guidance where applicable, to improve the whole of government approach in attaining national objectives. Each organization possesses specific strengths that can be leveraged to support other organizations. Regular staff interaction facilitates the development of solutions to the full suite of issues related to counterterrorism plans, policies, and operations.

SO/LIC conducts oversight of the Department’s special operations activities with an understanding that these activities should be complementary, but not duplicative, of efforts taken by the CIA. The division of responsibility varies by issue and the dynamics of particular areas of operations; but the Department has the right people and policies in place to ensure intelligence and military operations reinforce each other.

The Department continues to seek improvement of cooperation and coordination through increased communication and information sharing. Additional information sharing and clarity on responsibilities and operations reduces redundancy to preserve our precious resources.

Mr. Wilson. What changes can you recommend to the present set of Security Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global Security Contingency Fund? Are these the right types of authorities to satisfy future Geographic Combatant Commander requirements to develop partner nation capabilities?

Secretary Lumpkin. I believe our current Security Force Assistance (SFA) authorities are appropriate for achieving the limited set of objectives for which they were designed. The 1206 “train and equip” program, for example, has enabled the Department of Defense to provide partner nations capabilities to conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations. However, we continue to look at ways to accelerate current material solutions to our partnership capacity efforts, which sometimes limit Geographic Combatant Commanders’ ability to act expeditiously.

The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) has provided additional resources and flexibility, and the additional $2.1 billion included in the President’s FY16 budget request would enable us to satisfy foreseeable Geographical Combatant Command requirements appropriate to the CTPF mission-set.

I would point out, however, that both 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) are tailored in their scope, and there may be specific areas in which security force assistance is needed that 1206 and GSCF do not adequately address. As you know, my responsibilities are focused on special operations and low intensity conflict; other elements of the Department are better suited to respond to the adequacy of SFA authorities for the full array of partner nation requirements.

Mr. Wilson. A recent report on Special Operations Forces by the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, “the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict has difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command’s policy and resources as directed by law.” Do you agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM?

Secretary Lumpkin. I do not agree with that assertion. We are able to meet our statutory oversight responsibilities and we do so. My office has policy oversight of USSOCOM budget and resourcing, in accordance with well-established Departmental processes. I have a dedicated directorate within SOLIC to perform these functions. I also leverage the subject matter expertise of the Joint Staff and relevant offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as experts in personnel, intelligence, and acquisition matters, to assist me. Moreover, I recognize that many other organizations within the Department have an active role to play in the oversight of SOCOM. To that end, I created and chair the Special Operations Policy Oversight Committee (SOPOC), which brings together all SOCOM stakeholders periodically to address key contemporary issues. I am pleased to say that the SOPOC has received strong support and participation from the service secretaries, relevant OSD offices, the Joint Staff, and SOCOM leaders, and has helped me to continue to meet my statutory obligations.

Mr. Wilson. Many of our potential adversaries have become very adept at manipulating the information environment to radicalize, recruit and gain support their
cause. That requires a robust, concerted and strategic effort to counter those messages and kill the ideas that drive their extremist movement movements. Do we have a strategy for attacking adversarial messaging and propaganda? What tools do you have at your disposal to counter those sorts of messages? Where do you see gaps in our capabilities that you think we should be trying to address?

General Votel. USSOCOM has not developed its own counter-ISIL messaging strategy; it supports activities such as Line of Effort (LOE) #6 “Expose ISIL’s True Nature” of the U.S. Government’s (USG) strategy developed by the National Security Council Staff. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has provided influence planning expertise to the Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy and the National Counter Terrorism Center, which co-chair the implementation of LOE #6.

Congress has expressed concern with DOD engaging violent extremist propaganda on the Internet, except in very limited ways. They tend to view the Internet as a strategic platform and efforts to influence civilians outside an area of conflict as Public Diplomacy, the responsibility of the Department of State or Broadcasting Board of Governors. We believe there is a complimentary role for the Department of Defense (DOD) in this space which acknowledges the need for a civilian lead, but allows DOD to pursue appropriate missions, such as counter-recruitment and reducing the flow of foreign fighters. This can be done in a coordinated manner as part of the whole of government effort without militarizing U.S. foreign policy. An explicit directive from Congress outlining the necessity of DOD to engage in this space would greatly enhance our ability to respond.

USSOCOM’s primary tool for countering adversarial messaging is its Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Soldiers and various activities. These Special Operations Forces (SOF)-trained Soldiers support Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) with forces specially trained in using information to modify foreign audiences’ behavior. Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) deploy to various Embassies around the globe to assist in the achievement of GCC Theater Campaign objectives as well as advance Chief of Mission goals. The current MISO force structure supports the persistent deployment of about 20–30 MISTs. Additionally, MISO planners support all GCCs with the capability to monitor, track, analyze, and provide recommendations for the most effective way of engaging in the extremist debate. Other MISO activities include Senior Military Engagement Program (SMEP) which facilitates mil-to-mil engagement via digital and print magazines through discussion of strategic issues affecting regional partners within a GCC Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Two substantial gaps exist; one has already been identified in the third paragraph regarding elimination of DOD permissions to engage online to counter violent extremists’ narratives and recruitment. Another gap exists in the MISO community’s ability to operate on social media and the Internet, due to a lack of organic capability. This shortfall, and the requirement to integrate indigenous language and cultural capability, has necessitated the use of contractors. DOD will reduce, but not eliminate, reliance on contracted capabilities through its current efforts to update doctrine, expand training and implement technical and material solutions to improve the Department’s ability to effectively operate in the social media and broader online information space.

Finally, the ability to rapidly respond to adversarial messaging and propaganda, particularly with offensive cyberspace operations to deny, disrupt, degrade or corrupt those messages, requires an Execute Order (EXORD) and is limited by current U.S. government policies. The review and approval process for conducting offensive cyberspace operations is lengthy, time consuming and held at the highest levels of government. However, a rapid response is frequently required in order to effectively counter the message because cyber targets can be fleeting, access is dynamic, and attribution can be difficult to determine. Additionally, international standards and laws do not exist for defining sovereignty in cyberspace.

Mr. Wilson. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we withdraw forces, and beyond 2015?

General Votel. Aligned with Commander Resolute Support’s (COM RS) functionally-based Security Force Assistance (SFA) framework, U.S. and Coalition Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to advise Afghan Special Security Force (ASSF) partners on critical enablers like aviation, logistics, intelligence, and command and control. This functional framework is designed to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan and Coalition) problem solving effort and enduring relationships. While the overall force draws down, SOF will remain relatively robust in order to advise and ensure sustainability of the ASSF.

The NATO Special Operations Command Command-Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (NSOCC–A/SOJTF–A) has five (5) Special Oper-
ations Advisory Groups (SOAGs) focused on mentoring and advising our ASSF partners to ensure they can command, control, maintain, and sustain their tactical units spread across the country. These special military and police units are our most capable partners in the Counterterrorism (CT) fight. In order to ensure our ASSF partners continue to take the fight to our enemies, U.S. SOF must continue advising at the tactical level even as we draw down our forces. We must show our continued commitment to Afghan security efforts in order to maintain the mutually beneficial relationships we need to meet U.S. objectives in the region.

Mr. Wilson. Can you outline for the committee any resourcing concerns if high numbers of SOF are required?

General Votel. There are very limited resourcing concerns from the SOF/Major Force Program (MFP) 11 perspective depending on how high the SOF numbers go. The only relevant concern is when the number of SOF supporting this effort increases to the extent that the amplified competition for resources in terms of personnel, equipment, and funding is allocated to support other global priorities.

Another concern specifically applies to equipment. Current resourcing projections include funding to continue retrograde, redeployment, and material reduction of SOF peculiar equipment. There may be a need for additional resourcing if we are required to send equipment back into theater to support higher SOF numbers. The concern increases over time in 2016 as a continued reduction in personnel and equipment would require additional shipping of equipment in an environment with limited reception and distribution capacity and capability.

More importantly would be a continued conventional force support to SOF. The greatest concern going forward is ensuring adequate resourcing and necessary authorities exist to support all of the non-SOF peculiar requirements in theater generated by a larger number of SOF such as basing, fuel and ammunition.

Mr. Wilson. Can you provide an update on some of the options being discussed and how you are planning for those options?

General Votel. The ASSF will be the central mechanism to ensuring “relative stability” over the next few years. Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) formations are already conducting unilateral security operations and are integrating across the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) enterprise. However, they still require continued Special Operations Train, Advise and Assist (SOF TAA), especially in the areas of logistics and command and control. The Afghan Local Police (ALP), while not part of the ASSF, are integral to Afghanistan’s enduring layered security architecture. They have proven to be the Taliban’s most formidable obstacle to regaining influence and power, and merit continued SOF TAA at the ALP headquarters level. Several ASSF development efforts will need to extend beyond 2016. Three specific programs that warrant extension due to the critical/unique capabilities they provide: the Special Mission Wing (SMW) PC–12 and Mi-17 program, the ASSF Intelligence Enterprise, and Ktah Khas (KKA).

The continued development of these command and control mechanisms is critical and will require continued support at the ministerial and operational levels to ensure appropriate support to and utilization of ASSF. By the end of 2016, we expect to make significant improvements to the enabling functions of the ASSF, particularly their abilities to force generate; sustain the force; plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns; and harness intelligence capabilities and processes. This is critical to U.S. interests as we will be reliant upon ASSF to conduct missions to combat terrorists in Afghanistan and deny them safe haven.

Thwarting the Taliban is not an ANSF mission alone; this will continue to be a collective effort. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) must demonstrate to the Afghan people that it is the clear cut, better governing option. The Taliban can only be decisively defeated if their popular support is comprehensively eroded away. Therefore, we will continue working with State Department, USAID, other U.S. Government (USG) and coalition partners in Afghanistan to legitimize GIRoA.

Mr. Wilson. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues growth for SOCOM to more that 69,900 personnel. With declining budgets, how will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure we are not choosing quantity over quality?

General Votel. USSOCOM’s end strength at approximately 70K represents a balanced force to meet special operations requirements. We will not have under-manned or under-equipped units at the FY16 budget request level of funding. However, at the Budget Control Act (BCA) level of funding, we might have to make some reductions depending on the amount of OCO available, but we will maintain a balanced force. We continually review this through USSOCOM readiness reports and during the annual Department Program Budget Review (PBR). We will continue to
apply rigorous selection criteria for induction of members into Special Operations Forces (SOF) to maintain quality personnel.

Mr. WILSON. Are you concerned that cuts being made to the Services could impact our special operations capabilities? Please outline your largest concerns in this area and discuss what is being done to minimize risk.

General Votel. There are many potential impacts that would affect Special Operations Capabilities including personnel, training, schooling, equipment and deployments. Specific examples follow:

Naval Special Warfare (NSW): There will be reductions in service provided by air mobility. Budget reductions will impact NSW's ability to conduct Seal Deliver Vehicle (SDV) training at the unit level and certification-to-deploy training at off-island training sites. Training at these sites is required as a result of limited on-island training in Hawaii and the unavailability of cold-water training environments to certify a SDV Platoon in accordance with mission essential tasks. NSW is currently conducting MFP-11 FYDP planning to address long-term reductions.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC): A shortfall in Military Training Specific Allotment (MTSA) will curtail mandatory education and adversely impact the morale, professional development and career advancement of our officers and enlisted force. USASOC will not be able to meet the requirements to train Army Special Forces Soldiers as directed by Department of the Army. Duty position-required training and TDY en-route to meet readiness requirements will not be met. Authorized training to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, HQDA will cease due to the reductions. USASOC will compete for available resources during HQDA budget office mid-year review data call.

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): At the end of FY13 and beginning of FY14 the furlough and sequestration actions had some measurable negative affect on AFSOC C–130 aircraft program. Because of that, AFSOC C–130 aircrafts were being pushed 45–60 days behind at the depot for maintenance, which is past the 16 month requirement and the deliveries were late by 30 days. The lateness continues because the maintainers are not allowed to work overtime due to no funding.

Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC): The unforeseen impacts would affect the use of the USMC ranges due to lack of funding for the range operators and support personnel.

Rotary Wing Support: In recent years, U.S. Navy (USN) provided dedicated Rotary Wing support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) through a USN–SOCOM memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that provided for the employment of two Navy Reserve H–60 squadrons. Specifically, the squadrons supported both our Components and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOCs) in operational and training support. As a result of Service budget cuts concerning these two Reserve Squadrons, the Navy requested no funds for FY–16, with divestiture to be completed by the end of the fiscal year.

Contract support to SOF enterprise. Contracting support is one of the key logistics enablers that SOF relies on the Services to provide. Due to the force reductions tied to the current budget reductions the Army is targeting to increase the number of Soldiers filling Contracting Military Occupation Specialties (MOSs). Contracting support is a critical operational need that is expected to grow with Campaign Plan Global Special Operations (CP–GSO) expanded persistent presence in support of Geographic Combatant Commands’ SOF requirements.

Mr. WILSON. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions?

General Votel. (1) Women serve in a wide variety of operations and in career fields such as Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Air Force Special Operations aviation. As part of the Women in Service Review (WISR), USSOCOM Components are reviewing and validating standards of SOF occupational specialties to ensure they are operationally relevant, occupational specific and applied in a gender-neutral manner. Once these standards are implemented, those who are best qualified will serve—including women.

USSOCOM has made significant progress integrating women into previously closed positions and units. Since Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule (DGCAR) in January 2013, USSOCOM, in coordination with the Services, has opened over 7000 position to include the 180th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). Most of this progress has occurred in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command component because of DCAR which prevented women from serving below the brigade level in combat arms and Service assignment policies. Army Directive 2015–08 (Expanding Positions in Open Occupations for the Assignment of Female Soldiers within U.S. Army Special Operations Command) opened the majority of the positions within U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The entire 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-
ment is now open—all pilot, crew chief, and enabler positions opened as of July 23, 2014 (except 13F which is still a closed MOS in the Army). Currently there are three female pilots and one female crew chief serving in the 160th SOAR.

Congress approved our latest notification packet on November 18, 2014 to open enabler positions down to battalion level in 1st Special Forces Command and the Special Warfare Center and School. The remaining positions closed to women in SOF are in closed occupations such as SEAL, Special Forces (18 series), the 75th Ranger Regiment, and enabler positions attached to SOF tactical units or that require an additional skill identifier from a closed school such as Army Ranger School.

(2) USSOCOM is conducting the WISR effort in three phases. The first phase involved a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPP–P) analysis and was completed in the spring of 2014. The second phase consists of cultural and sociological studies focusing on unit, social and task cohesion in SOF tactical units. The studies were conducted by RAND, Joint Special Operations University and Kansas University. The third phase is standards validation and is currently underway. Each service component analyzes training standards to ensure they accurately reflect occupational/mission requirements, which includes third party support (Naval Health and Research Center, Office of Personnel Management) to provide non-biased job analysis and scientific data to ensure standards are operationally valid and occupational specific. Once validated, the standards will be implemented in a gender neutral manner. Lastly, the USSOCOM commander will collaborate with the services in order to decide the best way forward for the SOCOM enterprise. His recommendation will go forward to the SECDEF, in coordination with the Services, in September 2015. Assignment of women to newly opened positions will be accomplished through coordination with the Services and in accordance with Service assignment policies and procedures.

Mr. WILSON. What does SOF expect to divest—or get rid of—in the FY16 budget request and for the next few years? Without divestitures or reductions in some areas, how will you ensure that we are not building a hollow force that we cannot afford?

General Votel, United States Special Operations Command remains committed to maintaining a balanced, capable force. Capability requirements, both current and new, are subjected to comprehensive reviews and analysis. As part of these reviews, it is determined what programs can be divested or reduced in order to support any new initiative. In addition to exploring potential divestitures or reductions, we are also recapitalizing older platforms such as the MC–130P and AC–130H in a one-for-one replacement with newer, more capable platforms (MC–130J and AC–130J). Other reductions and divestitures from previous years will be continue to be evident in the FY16 budget request. These include the planned divestiture of MQ–1 Predators from 24–10 by the end of FY16, the reduction of C–145A (M–28) platforms from 16 to 5 while retaining pilot proficiency and currency at the Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) squadrons, and continuing realignment of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) forces from Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) to smaller Operational Detachment Golfs (ODG) and supporting detachments to better meet evolving Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) requirements. These recapitalizations, divestitures, reductions and realignments in the FY16 budget request ensure we continue to maintain a capable and balanced force ready to protect the Nation’s vital interests.

Mr. WILSON. Special Operations Forces and the Intelligence Community have experienced an unprecedented integration of both operational and analytical activities. SOCOM has also considerably expanded its funding of intelligence capabilities and activities. While details are classified—can you discuss this integration and are there any concerns? Can you discuss how the Department conducts appropriate oversight of these sensitive activities?

General Votel. At current, we do not have concerns with the level of integration between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the intelligence community (IC). Our interagency relationships are strong and we, in the SOF community, are always interested in opportunities to improve communication, coordination, collaboration, and integration with our IC partners.

USSOCOM and the greater SOF enterprise places an emphasis on communicating, coordinating, collaborating, and, where applicable, integrating with our Intelligence Community partners both in our operational and analytical activities. These partnerships allow us to share the burden of managing conflicts and enhancing capabilities that allow us all to formulate and implement a better whole-of-government response.

At the operational to strategic level, the preponderance of intelligence consumed by Special Operations units is collected, processed, exploited and disseminated by
other U.S. Government (USG)/Department of Defense (DOD) elements across the IC. SOF intelligence analysts communicate and coordinate daily with IC partners on all aspects of intelligence collection, analysis, and production to mitigate and avoid duplication of effort and ensure compliance with established IC directives.

Additionally, to further reduce duplicity and redundancy, U.S. SOCOM maintains a team of interagency liaisons throughout the SOF enterprise and provides SOF liaisons to many interagency headquarters. These relationships help facilitate better de-confliction and synchronization of intelligence in support of SOF operations, and assist in providing situational awareness of overseas events and activities. The main focus is to ensure the most efficient and effective use of intelligence professionals, systems, and resources in order to deliver timely information to SOF.

Only when the pre-existing IC data is exhausted, the intelligence and operational requirements are SOF niche, or compressed timelines associated with special operations will SOF solely rely on our dedicated tactical organic collection and analysis. However, even in these cases, SOF intelligence operations and analysis is coordinated fully with the necessary IC partners.

Oversight of SOF intelligence and intelligence-related capabilities is shared by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and the recently re-designated Department of Defense Senior Intelligence Oversight Official (DOD SIOO).

Federal law and Executive Order (EO) assigned specific oversight requirements to the USD(I), the ASD(SO/LIC), and the SIOO regarding the employment of SOF. These requirements are amplified by DOD policies. The below chart (Figure 1) identifies both policy and funding responsibilities.

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![Figure 1. (U) Oversight Responsibilities.](image)

Because the House Rule X(j)(1)(c) definition of intelligence activities includes "clandestine activities" and spans both intelligence and Special Operations traditional military sensitive activities, the USD(I), the ASD(SO/LIC), and the SIOO each exercise oversight of special operations organizations based on the activities that these operational elements conduct.

The following chart outlines the key questions that enables USD(I), ASD(SO/LIC), and SIOO to understand the activity and how the elements were funded and developed. This chart (Figure 2) also frames how USD(I), ASD(SO/LIC), and SIOO cooperate to ensure oversight between all three entities.
Mr. WILSON. Given the nature of diminishing resources and budget constraints, what is the current and future status of the Command’s Global SOF Network initiative?

General Votel. In an era of constrained budgets, pursuing an international network approach is more important than ever. When Admiral McRaven initially described his vision for a “global SOF network” in January 2013, he based it on analysis of national strategic guidance, and it encompassed three distinct objectives:

— Strengthen the global network of SOF, U.S. government partners, and partner nations
— Provide Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Chiefs of Mission with improved special operations capacity, and
— Align structures, processes, and authorities to enable that network.

USSOCOM described this network approach and the function of each node in a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which was endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2013.

As national security challenges and threats are increasingly global and interconnected, USSOCOM continues to prioritize a globally networked approach to addressing them. That is why in my posture statement designated “building relationships” as one of my top priorities. While moving away from the terminology “global SOF network,” USSOCOM is continuing to build relationships and strengthen its international network, through sustained security cooperation, expanded communication architectures and liaison activities.

Below are some updates on initiatives related to building relationships. These initiatives do not entail requests for additional resources, but rather shift existing resources.

- USSOCOM now has SOF representatives from 13 different nations working at its headquarters. Liaison/exchange positions are established upon completion of a Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and each individual country, as authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. USSOCOM currently hosts special operations international liaison and exchange officers from: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Jordan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Officers from Italy, Singapore, and Poland are expected to be assigned within the coming months.

- These partner nation SOF representatives work in a section of the headquarters specifically modified to ensure security of information while enabling multi-national collaboration, the J3-International (J3–I) Division. The J3–I offices are colocated within the headquarters in close proximity to other J3 office spaces. The space was renovated in 2014 to ensure that there was a purpose-built area in full compliance with applicable U.S. law, policy, and intelligence community directives for international coordination.

- As a complement to integrating SOF representatives into USSOCOM headquarters, USSOCOM assigns U.S. officers as Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) to key SOF partners across the globe. Currently, there are 15 SOLOs assigned to U.S. Embassies abroad with locations in every geographic
area of responsibility. The intent of the SOLO program is to maintain enduring presence with select partner nation SOF in order to support the development of key SOF partners, prepare for future contingencies, and build mutually beneficial relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command priorities.

- A communications infrastructure is imperative in supporting the international network and partnership initiatives. USSOCOM is capitalizing on the capabilities provided by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) through its U.S. Battlefield Information Collaboration and Exploitation System (US BICES) for SECRET Releasable collaboration and the Defense Information Support Agency’s (DISA) All Partner Access Network (APAN) for unclassified collaboration. Enterprise systems like APAN and BICES ensure broad collaboration and information exchange capabilities are available to USSOCOM and accredited partner nations to enable the global network approach to function effectively. NOTE: Additional unclassified capabilities are required to address USSOCOM and GCC’s requirements to collaborate and communicate sensitive, but classified information at an enterprise level. USSOCOM is actively working through multiple OSD agencies to ensure these requirements are met in a timely manner.

These initiatives have demonstrated value and return on investment, most recently exemplified by the rapid employment of partner nation SOF to support U.S. Central Command’s Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.

Through this networked approach, USSOCOM can support partners in a region where they may be better positioned to achieve shared desired outcomes, due to historic, political, or geographic relationships. By enabling and working with SOF partners, USSOCOM can share the burden of managing conflicts and work together to increase capabilities of regional partners, to provide security solutions to meet threats at their origin.

This is the network approach in action—providing national decision-makers the opportunity to pursue multinational, tailored efforts that best meet the specific problem set, context, and preference of regional partners. Not to mention, this approach enables the U.S. to collectively shoulder resource requirements with partners in an era of constrained defense budgets.

Mr. WILSON. The February 2013 Unified Campaign Plan assigned theater special operations commands as sub-unified commands to SOCOM rather than the geographic combatant commands. Please explain why the UCP was changed.

a. Do you plan to expand the theater special-operations commands and, if so, how much and for what purposes?

b. How will you coordinate future activities with the geographic combatant commands?

General Votel. The proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) will improve USSOCOM’s ability to prioritize, deploy and balance global Special Operation Forces (SOF) requirements in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). It will allow USSOCOM to shift SOF, with the concurrence of the GCC Commanders, globally to meet rapidly evolving requirements.

The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities, and force structure for unified combatant commands, delineates Area of Responsibility (AOR) boundaries for GCCs, and specifies responsibilities for Functional Combatant Commands (FCCs). The UCP currently states “Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks.” The changes we seek broadens USSOCOM’s role to include synchronizing the employment of global SOF operations; the proposed language reads “CDRUSSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing the planning and employment of special operations globally, and will do so in coordination with other combatant commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate U.S. Government agencies.” This change will improve our ability to prioritize, deploy and balance SOF requirements and will codify how we posture SOF to meet requirements within and across GCCs.

The Secretary of Defense uses the “Forces For” Memorandum and Unified Command Assignment Tables to assign and allocate forces to GCCs and FCCs. The changes reflected in the February 11, 2013 memorandum formally assigned USSOCOM combatant command (COCOM) authority of the Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) and forward stationed SOF, making USSOCOM responsible for the readiness and training of all SOF regardless of assignment location. However, having COCOM of the TSOCs does not change the Operational Command (OPCON) relationships between the GCCs and SOF assigned to their AORs. The GCCs retain OPCON authority of the TSOCs and remain the Supported Command with USSOCOM as the Supporting Command.

To support and implement the “Forces For” memorandum, the Department transferred baseline TSOC Headquarters (HQ) resources from the GCC/Service Major
Force Program (MFP–2) accounts to USSOCOM (MFP–11) during the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget cycle. This transfer included funding and manpower associated with TSOC training, mission support and planning, communications/IT, personnel, headquarters management, and command and control (C2) activities.

USSOCOM’s FY 2016 Budget Request also includes additional resource and manpower adjustments that will better enable the TSOCs to optimize their ability to address GCC requirements. Additional manpower, critical Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), and other operational support will improve TSOC structure, C2 capabilities, and provide flexibility to meet emerging requirements. These enhancements support USSOCOM’s intent to provide an equally capable TSOC to each GCC. Manpower adjustments include the internal realignment of over 800 military and civilian positions (across FY14–20), from Headquarters USSOCOM and its Service Components, to the TSOCs to provide command and control and other operational support activities. In FY 2016, additional O&M was provided to enable these personnel to support the TSOC mission.

The proposed changes to the UCP regarding USSOCOM synchronizer responsibilities and the assignment of COCOM authority to USSOCOM in the Forces For memorandnum does not change USSOCOM’s obligation and commitment to support the GCCs by providing them a SOF capabilities through the TSOCs. However, it does enhance USSOCOM’s ability to support the GCCs by tailoring SOF capability and capacity of the TSOCs to meet the operational demands of the GCC commanders in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). To balance global special operation activities, USSOCOM is implementing a synchronization and prioritization framework to develop recommendations for DOD-level decisions that prioritize special operations, actions, and activities such that GCCs/TSOCs—who will be active participants in the process—understand how USSOCOM will address priorities for SOF; where and why USSOCOM intends to recommend allocation of special operation resources; and what resources GCCs can reasonably expect for planning.

Mr. WILSON. U.S. Northern Command recently established Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH). Please discuss how SOCOM has helped resource this command and how SOCOM is working with this particular theater special operations command (TSOC). Are there any issues with Special Operations Forces working within a domestic framework?

General Votel. SOCOM has helped resourcing this command by:

Total “start-up” funding obligated for SOCNORTH is $6.1M (MFP–2) and $3.8M (MFP–11) from both FY 2013 and FY 2014. Additionally, SOCOM has budgeted $250K in MFP–11 O&M funding to support SOCNORTH in FY15.

The Air Force, at the behest of SOCOM, funded a $6.1M renovation (less C4I costs) of Hangar 104 to provide SOCNORTH an interim facility. SOCNORTH’s anticipated move-in date is late April/early May 2015.

SOCNORTH has been designated by Commander, USNORTHCOM as the supported command for all counter terrorism related activities, and specialized support of federal law enforcement within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

SOCNORTH will support federal law enforcement agencies tasked to provide the capacity, expertise, and the global focus against threat networks supporting USNORTHCOM plans.

SOCNORTH continues to thicken its network of partners, improving its understanding and building relationships, while establishing processes with the U.S. interagency and other partners through engagements and exercises.

Mr. WILSON. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced technology requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield? a. As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the need for non-lethal (NL) or directed energy (DE) weapons increase? b. How are you managing to stay ahead in research and development while your budget in this area has steadily declined over the past several fiscal years? c. What role does the Combating Terrorism and Technical Support Office (CTTSO) play in filling SOF technology requirements?

General Votel. a. The withdraw of General Purpose Forces from major combat in Afghanistan will not increase the need for non-lethal (NL) or directed energy (DE) weapons for SOF. SOF operations outside of declared areas of armed conflict (ODTAC) are typically politically sensitive and require ultra-precision for target engagement and direct action. All types of NL and lethal technologies that enable ultra-precision for SOF target engagement and direct action will be needed. These technologies include focused and tailored effects for kinetic weapons, as well as NL and DE weapons. NL weapons include a variety of technologies that produce specific
types of target effects. DE is a type of weapons technology that can produce lethal or non-lethal target effects, depending on the DE parameters and target vulnerabilities. DE weapons offer the advantage of ultra-precision and rapid target engagement, but have significant systems engineering, platform integration, and operational policy challenges. NL weapons may offer advantages for use in politically sensitive offensive operations that limit or restrict the use of lethal force, or when U.S. forces, non-combatants and/or hostages may in close proximity to enemy targets.

b. USSOCOM will continue to leverage Service, Agency, and Department of Energy technology development investments, limiting Major Force Program Eleven (MFP-11) resources on SOF-unique development and system modification efforts. Through a deliberate campaign to share SOF capability needs, we have been able to influence and benefit greatly from the work already being done. For some technologies, such as precision munitions and DE, USSOCOM is highly reliant on larger Service development investments. Because of the technological challenges with NL and DE weapons, USSOCOM’s intent is to leverage Service/Agency-level investment and serve as early adopters once the technologies and system engineering challenges mature.

More emphasis for longer-range airborne, ground and maritime NL weapons capabilities to support offensive operations is needed to support SOF capability needs. More emphasis on systems engineering early in the development process is needed for DE weapons to make them more viable options for SOF. Other advanced technologies of interest to SOF include: advanced seekers for munitions to improve the probability of kill against fast, erratically maneuvering targets; non-lethal personnel immobilization; signature reduction technologies (multispectral, acoustic); strength and endurance enhancement; night vision; unbreakable/unjammable, encrypted, low probability to detect/low probability of intercept communications; long-range non-lethal vehicle stopping; clandestine non-lethal vessel stopping; clandestine non-lethal equipment and facility disablement/defeat; full spectrum threat platform defense (aircraft, vehicle, vessel); combined effects weapons; advanced offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; tethered sensors for target detection, identification and engagement in all weather conditions; clandestine tagging, tracking, and locating; intelligence data trend detection, extraction and display; weapons of mass destruction render safe; chemical and biological agent defeat.

c. The CTTSO has funded technology development projects and established Memoranda of Agreement with Partner Nations for technology development information sharing to support SOF counterterrorism (CT) capability needs. CTTSO plays an important role in taking operational needs from our SOF components and rapidly producing usable prototypes to help refine requirements for SOF operators. CTTSO hosts yearly reviews to identify user needs that are able to be addressed through mature technologies typically within 12–18 months. The CTTSO also offers a viable program to support weapons technology development for SOF CT operations that falls outside the criteria for the Joint NL Weapons Program. Recent changes in DOD NL weapons policy limits the NL weapons definition to only weapons that have immediate, predictable target effects that are intended to be relatively reversible and return the target to its pre-engagement function. CTTSO offers USSOCOM an avenue to pursue legal, treaty-compliant weapons technologies that are neither intended to produce relatively reversible nor lethal target effects.

Mr. WILSON. Can you update the committee on SOOCOM’s intelligence functions, requirements, and initiatives? What specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements do you have?

General Votel. a. USSOCOM’s Intelligence Functions: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) assign specific tasks and missions to allocated Special Operations Forces (SOF); in turn, SOF conduct activities that are different from conventional military missions. These activities and missions have unique intelligence requirements that require special capabilities for collection. Where conventional forces are often most focused on the operational to strategic level of intelligence, special operations require the most precise and specific level of detailed tactical information possible in order to ensure mission success. A distinct analytic capability, based on unique SOF collection requirements, is required to ensure SOF receive tailored, detailed, and timely intelligence. In order to execute DOD’s mandate as part of national strategy and policy, SOF must assess current and future threats within each GCC’s area of responsibility and posture to minimize of defeat those threats. This requires a deeper level and finer resolution of analysis covering social networks, human identity, political environment, economics/business and organizational networks.

b. USSOCOM’s Intelligence Requirements: Since 2011, operational requirements for SOF ISR and Service ISR support to SOF have grown between 10% and 14%
per year while available ISR sourcing solutions have declined, with the sharpest de-
crease (36%) from FY14 to FY15. While we cannot accurately predict the growth of
SOF ISR requirements over time, it is apparent that the global demand for SOF
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will continue to
grow over the next several years.
c. **USSOCOM’s Intelligence Initiatives:**
   1. **Continued Interagency Coordination:** USSOCOM maintains a close-knit rela-
tionship with the U.S. Government partners in the Intelligence Community (IC).
   However, SOF niche requirements and the compressed timelines associated with
special operations do require dedicated tactical organic collection and analysis as
part of the SOF enterprise. Extensive coordination is done between agencies and in-
depth research accomplished to ensure compliance with established procedures. SOF
intelligence analysts communicate daily with IC partners on all aspects of intel-
ligence production to mitigate and avoid duplication of effort in the production cycle.
   2. **USSOCOM ISR Roadmap:** The ISR Roadmap outlines analysis of the com-
mand’s overarching plan for ISR. It compares projected requirements against pro-
grammed resources, identifying investment strategies and characterizing gaps be-
tween SOF and service plans. The fundamental pillar of this roadmap is the shift
in ISR terminology, which characterizes varying levels of capability across the four
legs of the ISR pyramid: platforms, sensors, data transport, and processing, exploi-
tation, and dissemination (PED). This differentiation between levels of ISR capa-
bility is critical to the Roadmap as it enables commanders to better articulate what
they need. This refined terminology enables USSOCOM to make better resourcing
and acquisition decisions.

Mr. WILSON. What manned and unmanned ISR systems are you investing in, and
why? How do you coordinate with the Services in these areas?

General VOTEL. a. **USSOCOM ISR Investments:**
   1. Airborne ISR (AISR) manned and unmanned platforms have been operating in
mostly permissive threat environments and good weather conditions. Manned plat-
forms have been used to help mitigate the impacts of poor weather to effective ISR,
but come with limited endurance. SOF’s global mission and emerging threats dictate
that SOF AISR must be able to operate in non-permissive, hostile, or sensitive areas
where our current platform inventory cannot operate without risk of compromise.
   2. Through analysis supporting the development of the ISR Roadmap, shortfalls
in tactical/organic capability were identified to support theater SOF missions. In re-
sponse to those gaps, two distinctly different UAS capabilities are being pursued to
provide a collection capability for the Theater Special Operations Commands
(TSOCs); the Multi-Mission Tactical UAS and the Army Group III UAS. These two
systems will provide an unmanned option to meet TSOC collection requirements.
Following the decision to retain the U–28, USSOCOM initiated a Next Generation
AISR study as part of the development of an Initial Capabilities Document identi-
fying the requirements of the manned AISR platform to replace the U–28.
   b. **USSOCOM-Service ISR Coordination:** Coordination with the Services is con-
ducted through a variety of opportunities including individual Key Leader Engage-
ments, SOCOM-Service Warfighter Talks, submission of Integrated Priority Lists,
participation in OSD and Joint Staff Battlespace Awareness meetings and integra-
tion forums, and review and coordination of Joint Capability Integration Develop-
ment System requirement documentation.

Mr. WILSON. What role does your J2 (Intelligence) Director play in identifying and
filling those unique requirements?

General VOTEL. a. Within USSOCOM J2, the J24 Intelligence Capabilities and
Requirements Division oversees the Intelligence Portfolio and manages J2 respon-
sibilities for the identification, evaluation, and validation of SOF-peculiar intel-
ligence related requirements as well as providing resourcing advocacy on behalf of
the SOF intelligence network. The J2 utilizes data calls, Defense Readiness Report-
ing System, and integrated priority lists (IPL) submissions in addition to leading
multiple requirements forums, including the SOF ISR Council, to conduct planning,
analysis, development, and implementation of TSOC and Component intelligence re-
quirements in accordance with Special Operations Forces Capability Integration De-
velopment (SOF CIDS) Authority. Additionally, the J2 oversees critical intelligence
capability initiatives that require formal documentation and validation through the
SOF CIDS and Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board
(SOCREB) processes.
   b. **USSOCOM, as authorized by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), is designated the Joint Capabilities Board and has delegation of authority
to approve and pursue Special Operations Capabilities. This authority is recognized
by the Joint Staff and the Services and supported by the Department. When
USSOCOM validates its Requirements it does so with the authority of the JS and JROC.

c. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum 179–09 (dtd: 2 Nov 09) approved USSOCOM’s SOCREB designation as the Special Operations Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). The SOCREB manages and approves all Special Operations-Peculiar capability documents designated below the Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) of JROC Interest. Having the authorities to approve Special Operations-Peculiar capability documents also gives SOCOM the responsibility for certifications and/or endorsements of all documents designated JCB Interest and below.

d. In the cases where the Joint Staff has responsibility (JROC Interest) for certification and endorsements, and the JROC has validation authority, USSOCOM documents will be endorsed by the SOCREB, the Joint Staff organization will certify, endorse, or waive each item, and provide an associated memo to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper to support staffing and validation.

Mr. WILSON. How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements?

General Votel. a. Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) intelligence requirements are resourced in accordance with authoritative guidance outlined in DODD 5100.03, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), USSOCOM Capabilities and Planning Guidance (CPG), and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Preparation Instructions (PPI). TSOC’s intelligence requirements are assessed to ensure they are SOF-peculiar, supported by validated requirements, and satisfy USSOCOM’s highest priorities.

b. TSOC’s intelligence requirements appropriate for DIA MIP funding are submitting through the Intelligence POM (IPOM) process, whereas TSOC intelligence requirements that meet SOF current and future mission requirements are submitted through the POM process are resourced with MFP–11 and MFP–3. Validated TSOC intelligence priority shortfalls may be supported and resourced through annual unfunded requirement (UFR) process.

Mr. WILSON. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s new Defense Clandestine Service?

General Votel. USSOCOM’s relationship to DIA/DCS is similar to that of the military services. Specific details were provided at a classified level in response to House Appropriations Committee–Defense (HAC–D) requests for information (RFIs) on 27 Aug 2014 by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. USSOCOM provided additional information in response to RFIs from the House Appropriations Committee on Surveys and Investigations (HAC S&I).

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

Mr. HUNTER. General Votel, I’m aware that almost every Army Special Operations unit under your command is requesting a commercially available product to fill capability gaps in their intelligence requirements. These units are saying that the current program of record does not meet their operational needs. Given the information and the obvious failure of DCGS-SOF to provide this capability, how do you plan to hold program managers and staff accountable to the tax payer and the men and women under your command that expect a working system?

General Votel. Special operations personnel have always had a high demand for advanced analytical capabilities to understand and target enemy networks. During the course of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, some special operations units relied on capabilities provided by Palantir to meet these requirements. In 2009 USSOCOM directed that Palantir be used as an interim solution for advanced analytics. To date, USSOCOM has invested over $30M in fielding Palantir for Special Operations Forces (SOF). This interim solution continues to deliver advanced analytical capabilities to our operators and intelligence personnel and makes a difference on the battlefield. USSOCOM continues to field Palantir to units supporting counter-ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria. However, the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act directed all DCGS programs to openly compete requirements for commercial solutions. Therefore, USSOCOM released an All-Source Analytic Environment (ASAE) Request for Proposal to industry to create a long-term program of record solution to address these requirements. USSOCOM is currently in vendor source selection for this program, and will look to employ the best solution as part of DCGS–SOF.

DCGS–SOF continues to provide Full Motion Video Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (FMV PED) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) enablers to SOF. These capabilities are fully fielded and employed every day. Deployed operators and
intelligence personnel don't need to request the DCGS–SOF Enterprise SOF Data Layer, because it is already there providing access to key information.

The program manager and the entire DCGS–SOF team are keenly aware of the need to deliver capability to the operator and value to the taxpayer. Since 2008, the DCGS–SOF team has been providing exceptional capability to the SOF operator supporting the FMV PED and SIGINT missions. Over the long term, the team is committed to maintaining an advanced analytic capability that delivers on targeting enemy networks. DCGS–SOF will remain the overarching program we use to deliver outstanding intelligence capability to our special operators around the globe.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS

Mr. Brooks. What is the status of FY15 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) execution?

Secretary Lumpkin. First, thank you for making the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) available to the Department of Defense to provide additional support and assistance to partner nation security forces for counterterrorism and crisis response activities. Since my designation as the Department’s fund manager in February of this year, I have been overseeing the development of an implementation strategy that provides support in an efficient and effective manner.

On February 24, 2015, and March 16, 2015, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its intent to transfer $220.5 million and $279.5 million, respectively, from the fund to Operation and Maintenance accounts to provide immediate assistance to vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrians and groups for the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2015. The Syria Train and Equip program consists of four inter-related efforts to train and equip, sustain, and increase the numbers of appropriately vetted Syrian opposition forces.

Additionally, the Department has developed partnership concepts for five regions in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) areas of responsibility: the Levant, Yemen, the Lake Chad Basin, Sahel-Maghreb, and East Africa. Interagency review of these papers was completed on Friday, April 3. The concepts will serve as the strategic foundation for the development of program-level proposals to support counterterrorism and crisis response activities in each of the five regions. These activities may include partner nation capacity building, U.S. forces enabling support, and other activities authorized under a number of different authorities available to the Department.

USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM planners have begun developing program-level proposals to support each of the five partnership concepts. These proposals are currently being reviewed to identify which can be executed in FY 2015, and which should be scheduled for execution in FY 2016. Programs to support the partnership concept for Yemen will be delayed until the security and political situation there improves sufficiently.

Mr. Brooks. What are the Department’s priorities and the process for allies and the Services to request FY15 CTPF funding?

Secretary Lumpkin. In determining Department of Defense (DOD) priorities for Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) funding that are consistent with the new authority, we have worked closely with an interagency counterterrorism board in developing a governance mechanism that uses the National Strategy for Counterterrorism Tier Focus Areas as a foundation for our effort. We determined that these focus areas, that are used to inform regional and functional CT strategies, would be appropriate in developing strategies and programs to be funded under the CTPF. Additionally, we excluded Tier Focus Areas that are already well-funded; for example, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Using the Tier Focus Areas as a starting point, SOLIC leadership oversaw the development of strategic-level partnership concepts for five regions in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) areas of responsibility: the Levant, Yemen, the Lake Chad Basin, Sahel-Maghreb, and East Africa. These concepts were developed in close coordination with USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, the Joint Staff, relevant regional and functional offices within OSD Policy, and DOD Comptroller. They were subsequently reviewed by other departments and agencies through an NSC-led interagency review process that concluded on April 3, 2015.

Now that these concepts are finalized, they will serve as the strategic foundation for the development of program-level proposals to support CT and crisis response activities in each of the five regions. Country teams have been working closely with partner nation militaries to identify capability gaps and assess current and future absorptive capacity. Based on that information, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM
will submit program-level proposals to support each of the five partnership concepts. These program-level proposals will be analyzed and prioritized based on their urgency and executability.

Mr. BROOKS. When will the committee receive the Department’s reprogramming requests for use of FY15 CTPF?

Secretary LUMPKIN. On February 24, 2015, and March 16, 2015, the Department notified Congress of its intent to transfer $220.5 million and $279.5 million, respectively, from the fund to Operation and Maintenance accounts to continue to provide immediate assistance to vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups for the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2015.

I anticipate that the Department will submit other reprogramming requests within the next 60 days to fund other programs of assistance identified to support partner and U.S. counterterrorism and crisis response activities, as program-level proposals are approved. As part of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) proposal review process, CTPF stakeholders are determining which proposals can be executed in FY 2015, and which should be scheduled for execution in FY 2016.

Mr. BROOKS. Has the Department released the detailed FY16 CTPF budget justification material? If not, does it plan to release the FY16 CTPF justification details?

Secretary LUMPKIN. The Department of Defense released the fiscal year 2016 Counterrorism Partnerships Fund budget justification material on Monday, April 6, 2015.