The Pentagon’s new annual report on Chinese military power ignores a recent projection made by the Office of Naval Intelligence that China may be building five new ballistic missile submarines. The projection has since become a public “fact” after being spread around the world by news papers and private web sites.

Several news papers said earlier today – after the DOD report was leaked to them – that it identified the five Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear ballistic missile submarines. One senior defense official even was quoted saying that when the Chinese “develop five vessels like this, they are making a statement.”

Yet the DOD report does not say that China is building five SSBNs. In fact, it doesn’t give any number projection whatsoever. Instead, it repeats the projection from last year’s report that the first new SSBN may become operational sometime before the end of the decade.

So What Did Naval Intelligence Say?

When the news media first reported in March that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) said China is building five Jin-class SSBNs, I requested the ONI report under the Freedom of Information Act. It is always good to check the primary source. The released report consists of answers to eight questions from Seapower Magazine about the Chinese submarine force.

Although some news media described the ONI report as saying China is building five SSBNs, ONI’s language was more vague, saying that “a fleet of probably five TYPE 094 SSBNs will be built in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence.” To me this language suggested that ONI was making a projection. So I asked ONI if it could clarify whether the number five was an assumption or a fact. In other words, does ONI know that five SSBNs are under construction (or ordered), or was the sentence a projection for what China would have to build if it wanted to have a near-continuous SSBN presence at sea?

The response was: “ONI can neither confirm or [sic] deny that ‘five’ is an actual number.”

Now that’s bureaucracy! If China is building five SSBNs, and ONI’s declassified letter to Seapower Magazine says that five are under construction, why can’t ONI confirm that five are under construction?

So I sent the declassified ONI letter to the Chinese Embassy and asked if they could confirm or deny. Here is what ONI and the media say. Are you building five SSBNs or not? Sorry, came the reply, even if we wanted to help you, no one here even knows the answer to your question.

I guess lack of transparency is a problem on both sides of the Pacific.

What the DOD Report Says

Perhaps there is disagreement within the intelligence community about the Chinese SSBN program. Perhaps DOD wanted to tone down the report and decided to remove ONI’s number from the final version. ONI said that
“a TYPE 094″ could reach Initial Operating [sic] Capability (IOC) as early as 2008,” but the submarine reaching IOC is not necessarily the same as the weapon system (including the JL-2) becoming operational. The DOD report limits itself to predicting that China’s strategic nuclear forces by 2010 likely include the JL-2.

In stark contrast with previous annual reports, the new report doesn’t highlight cases of dramatic Chinse submarine operations. Earlier this year I reported that Chinese submarines actually don’t sail on very many patrols; The single Xia SSBN not at all. The new DOD report does mention the Song-class submarine that “broached the surface in close proximity” to the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk in October 2006 “in waters near Japan.” But rather than using the incident to warn about Chinese submarines pushing further and further into the Pacific, DOD uses it to talk about safety, saying it “demonstrated the importance of long-standing U.S. efforts to improve the safety of U.S. and Chinese military air and maritime assets operating near each other.”

DF-31 (Almost) Operational

Another “almost operational” new weapons system is the long-awaited DF-31, which finally has achieved what the DOD report calls “initial threat availability.” This allegedly occurred in 2006 after more than 20 years in development. DF-31 was first test flown in 1999 and most recently in September 2006. Actual operational capability will likely be achieved in the near future, if it has not already happened, the report states. The DF-31 will probably replace the DF-4 and likely be used for regional targeting against Guam, India and Russia.

DF-31A Operational in 2007?

A surprising prediction in the DOD report is that the longer-range version of the DF-31 – the DF-31A – may achieve IOC in 2007. This is surprising because there are no authoritative public reports, to my knowledge, that the DF-31A has yet been flight tested. The world has yet to see a picture – even a drawing – of the DF-31A. The missile is expected to supplement and eventually replace 20 old silo-based DF-5As that have been used to target the United States and Russia since the 1980s.

After the 2006 FAS/NRDC report (p. 58) described inconsistent DOD range maps for the DF-5A, the authors of the new DOD report (p. 19) have corrected the map which now shows the DF-5A as having a greater range than the DF-31A. The inaccurate range map became an issue in 2006 because it caused many news media to errouneously report that the new DF-31A will give China the ability to target all of the United States for the first time, although China has had the capability to do so with the DF-5/A since the early 1980s.

Other Ballistic Missiles

The DOD report states that China maintains 40-50 DF-21s, an increase in the projection from the 19-23 missiles reported in 2005 and 19-50 in 2006. The reason for the changed estimate is unknown, but could be due to deployment of more conventional DF-21s. Another possibility is the DF-21’s long-awaited taking over the role of the DF-3A. It may also indicate that the “dip” in DF-21 reported by DOD in 2005 and 2006 in fact never happened.

The build-up of short-range conventional missiles continues off Taiwan, the DOD report says, with about 900 missiles had been deployed by October 2006. With a rate of about 100 missile per year, the number may have increased to approximately 950 by now. Even so, the report observes that things have been relatively quiet in the Taiwan Strait for the past two years.

The Nuclear Weapons Forecast

The DOD report does not give actual numbers for its projection of Chinese nuclear forces. It doesn’t repeat the 2001 CIA projection of 75-100 warheads primarily targeted against the United States by 2015, or mention the earlier DOD projection of 60 ICBMs primarily targeted against the United States by 2010. The new DOD report only lists the types of weapons it expect will make up the Chinese strategic nuclear arsenal by 2010: DF-4, DF-5A, DF-21, DF-31, DF-31A, JL-1, JL-2 and nuclear cruise missiles.

Depending on how many of each of the older weapon types that will remain, and how many of the new types China will actually produce and deploy in the next three years, I carefully estimate that the DOD list for 2010 translates into a Chinese arsenal of some 150-200 deployed nuclear warheads. The intelligence community does not appear to think that any of the new missiles will be equipped with multiple warheads.

Chinese Nuclear Policy

The DOD report continues previous years’ assessments of Chinese nuclear policy but now concludes that China’s no-first-use nuclear policy is “ambiguous.” The reason is that Chinese “doctrinal material” includes “additional missions for China’s nuclear forces,” DOD says, such as deterrence of conventional attacks against the Chinese mainland, reinforcing China’s great power status, and increasing its freedom of action by limiting the extent to which others can coerce China. A vigorous Chinese debate about the future role of nuclear weapons, combined with the “introduction of more capable and survivable nuclear systems in greater numbers suggest Beijing may be exploring the implications of China’s evolving force structure, and the new options that force structure may provide,” DOD states.

FAS and NRDC Almost Mentioned

The DOD report describes many more interesting statements than can be mentioned here, but one is a vague reference to the work FAS and NRDC did in 2006 where we analyzed commercial satellite photos of Chinese military facilities, including the nuclear submarine base at Jianggezhuang. In response to this (and several other cases), the DOD report describes, Chinese authorities warned that “foreigners who illegally survey, gather and publish geographical information on China will be severely punished.” DOD’s assessment of this series of events is that it “may indicate that China is attempting to lay the groundwork to extend the concept of the ‘information blockade’ into space.” Watch out DigitalGlobe; your QuickBird satellite may be next.

Background: Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning | Chinese Nuclear Forces Guide | Office of Naval Intelligence Letter

Despite frequent complains about lack of transparency in Chinese military planning, a new report from the Office of Naval Intelligence – recently described in the Washington Times and subsequently released to the Federation of American Scientists in response to a Freedom of Information Act request – boasts a high degree of knowledge about meticulous details of the Chinese navy’s operations, training, personnel and regulations.

The details in the report China’s Navy 2007 are many but unfortunately largely superfluous to the main answers many want to hear from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and other intelligence agencies: How are Chinese naval forces and operations evolving, and what do the changes mean?

Questionable Reporting

Unfortunately, some have already (mis)used the ONI report to hype fear that China is rising and out to get us. One example is the Washington Times, which last week described the report findings in a highly selective manner. Despite many unknowns about China’s military modernization and intentions, the paper’s description only included excerpts that indicate a threat or worrisome development. Moreover, the paper appears to have distorted the ONI report’s description of the Chinese submarine force’s importance: “China’s submarine forces are given ‘first priority’ of all branches of the navy, it states.”

But that’s not what the ONI report states. In fact, “first priority” as quoted by the Washington Times does not appear in the report at all. What the report says is very different: “The PLA Navy’s submarine forces…are generally listed as first in protocol order among the PLAN’s five branches.”

Being listed first in the protocol order is not the same as being the “first priority” of all the navy branches. According to the RAND Cooperation’s reference book The People’s Liberation Army as Organization:

What the ONI Report Does (and Doesn’t) Say

In contrast with the threat-focused style of the Washington Times reporting, the ONI report purports to have a much broader objective to “better understand the world’s fastest growing maritime power and its means of naval action and thereby foster a better understanding of China’s Navy.” The report observes up front that the enhanced naval power sought by China “is meant to answer global changes in the nature of warfare and domestic concerns about continued economic prosperity.” The drive to build a military component to protect the means of economic development, ONI states, “is one of the most prevalent historical reasons for building a blue water naval capability.”

Part of what has triggered the Chinese modernization is the extraordinary military capabilities that the United States have developed and deployed and demonstrated over the past two decades. The point is not that the United States is to blame and China just an innocent victim, but that all military modernization influences potential adversaries.

To that end the most interesting aspect about the ONI report may not be so much what it says but what it leaves out. Missing are many of the key developments that most concern US military planners and lawmakers, and many of the developments that are ignored by those who hype the Chinese “threat.”

For example, the ONI report does not include new information about the size of the Chinese navy. Instead it reprints a brief overview from the 2006 DOD report Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Nor does the ONI report describe the construction of several new types of submarines, including the Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine and the Type 094 ballistic missile submarine.

Likewise, the ONI report begins with reprinting portions of two Chinese government documents, one of which states that the Chinese navy’s “capability of nuclear counter-attacks has also been enhanced.” This refers to China’s current possession of a single Xia-class ballistic missile submarine, but the ONI leaves out any information about what that enhancement actually is.

The other Chinese government statement used describes that the Chinese navy is “enhancing its capabilities in…nuclear counterattacks.” This is a hint that China is building a new class (Type 094 or Jin-class) of ballistic missile submarines that will be equipped with the long-range Julang-2 ballistic missile. Yet the ONI report does not give any details about the status of those programs much less what they mean for the Chinese navy or Chinese intentions.

In addition, the ONI report contains a very detailed description of the various categories of training used by the Chinese submarine force, yet it doesn’t mention submarine patrols with one word. The omission is curious because the report describes that Chinese submarines in the late 1970s began conducting independent sustained operations in the Pacific, and that “long-range navigation training is an important overall type of training for submarines.” So why leave out the important fact that the number of patrols have declined since 2000 rather than increased with the acquisition of more capable submarines?

To that end, the ONI report describes how the “basic hands-on and crisis-management training for strategic-missile submarines that cannot be conducted while the submarine is navigating underwater for long periods of time must be conducted on shore.” Yet it leaves out the important piece of information that China’s missile submarine Xia has never conducted a patrol.

Apparently, too little transparency is not only a problem in the Chinese military.

Balanced Reporting

One week before the Washington Times hyped the ONI report, the nominated commander of Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee where he dismissed alarmist reports of recent gains in Chinese submarine development.

“If the reports are fairly accurate, they are well behind us technologically. We enjoy significant advantages across the spectrum of defensive and offensive systems, in particular undersea warfare,” he said according to Taipei Times. In an interview with the paper, Keating added: “Should it become necessary for us to put our forces [in harm’s way], the development of Chinese submarines are [sic] a concern to us, but it is hardly an insurmountable concern.”

Admiral Keating’s testimony was not covered by the Washington Times.

Breaking the cycle of military modernizations that trigger military modernizations is perhaps the biggest challenge in US-Chinese relations. Balanced reporting is another.

Background: China’s Navy 2007 | China Naval Modernization | FAS/NRDC Report

China’s entire submarine fleet conducted only two patrols in 2006, according to information declassified by the U.S. Navy and obtained by the Federation of American Scientists under the Freedom of Information Act. The low patrol rate follows a drop from an all-time high of only six patrols in 2000 to none in 2005. China’s single sea-launched ballistic missile submarine Xia, the data shows, has never conducted a deterrent patrol.

The low level of Chinese submarine patrols is a curious contrast to warnings by the Pentagon, some private institutes and news media that China is expanding its submarine operations deeper into the Pacific. Although Chinese submarines occasionally venture into the waters around Japan and Taiwan, the fleet is surprisingly inactive.

Since 1981, the first year for which patrol data is available, the Chinese submarine force has conducted an average of less than two patrols per year. The highest number of annual patrols conducted since 1981 was six patrols in 2000. In four years (1982, 1990, 1993 and 2005), no patrols were conducted at all. Over the 25-year period, the trend is that patrols have only increased from one per year to approximately 2.8 patrols per year.

Chinese Submarine Patrols 1981-2006

The entire Chinese submarine fleet conducts less than three patrols per year on average. The ballistic missile submarine Xia has never conducted a deterrent patrol.

So What is a Patrol?

The Navy has refused to tell FAS what a “patrol” is, saying doing so “would divulge methods and sources.” So interpretation of the data comes with a great deal of uncertainty. But the Defense Department’s unclassified Dictionary of Military Terms (JP 1-02) and earlier versions provide some hints by listing the following five definitions:

* Antisubmarine patrol: The systematic and continuing investigation of an
area or along a line to detect or hamper submarines, used when the direction
of submarine movement can be established.

* Inshore patrol: A naval defense patrol operating generally within a naval
defense coastal area and comprising all elements of harbor defenses, the
coastal lookout system, patrol craft supporting bases, aircraft, and Coast
Guard stations.

* Offshore patrol: A naval defense patrol operating in the outer areas of
navigable coastal waters. It is a part of the naval local defense forces
consisting of naval ships and aircraft and operates outside those areas
assigned to the inshore patrol.

* Patrol: A detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose
of gathering information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping up,
or security mission.

* Submarine patrol area: A restricted area established to allow submarine
operations: a. unimpeded by the operation of, or possible attack from, friendly
forces in wartime; b. without submerged mutual interference in peacetime.

If one assumes that U.S. Naval Intelligence’s use of the term “patrol” follows the DOD’s definitions, then the declassified patrol data suggests that Chinese general purpose submarines in 2006 twice conducted investigations to detect other submarines, participated in naval defense operations in coastal or outside coastal areas, or deployed for the purpose of gathering information or harassing. That implies an almost dormant submarine fleet.

The Song Incident

One of the two patrols conducted in 2006 appears to have been the widely reported surfacing of a Song-class diesel-electric submarine near the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk in the South China Sea. The news media and pundits dramatized the incident as an example of China expanding its submarine operations, the Chinese government downplayed the reports as inaccurate, and the Pentagon said the media made too much of the incident.

“The bottom line is that […] they’re deploying them further and more frequently,” Defense News quoted an expert on the Chinese Navy at the National Defense University saying. China might even have a decisive submarine surge capability in 20 years, another pundit argued. “They are building a blue-water navy,” yet another expert warned. A politician in Taiwan thought it raises questions about “whether the U.S. in losing its military edge in the Western Pacific,” and commentators in both Taipei and Washington concluded that the incident showed that Taiwan needs to buy more submarines.

The Pentagon’s 2006 report Military Power of the People’s Republic of China stated that China was working on establishing a “first” or “second island chain” strategy for its naval forces, and that “Chinese forces have increased operations beyond China’s borders and coastal waters.” This may be the case for surface ships, but to illustrate the development the Pentagon highlighted “the highly publicized 2004 intrusion of a HAN-class nuclear submarine in Japanese territorial waters during operations far into the western Pacific Ocean.” DOD did not mention that the intrusion was one of only three patrols conducted by the entire Chinese submarine force in 2004, and that no patrols at all were conducted in 2005.

The U.S.-China Commission established by Congress after reports about Chinese spying, stated in 2006 that China is pursuing measures to try to “control” the seas in the Western Pacific, although “controlling” the seas is a daunting technological and operational task, and that China continues to “expand” its submarine force.

The Shrinking Chinese Submarine Fleet

Although China is modernizing its submarine force, it is not “expanding” it. Since the mid-1980s, the force has been in steady decline from nearly 120 boats to roughly 55 operational submarines today. The U.S. Navy expects the force will level out around 40 boats in the next decade.

The Shrinking Chinese Submarine Fleet

The Chinese submarine fleet has declined by approximately 50 percent since the mid-1980s, mainly due to retirement of old and obsolete classes. Construction of new classes is underway but is not anticipated to lead to an increase, as the U.S. Navy expects the fleet will level out at around 40 submarines in the next decade.

The decline of the submarine fleet is part of a transition where large older classes are being phased out and replaced with newer but less numerous submarine classes. The new submarines are more capable than the ones they replace, but the modernization has not resulted in an increase in the number of submarine patrols. On the contrary, during the period between 2000 and 2006, when China acquired a dozen new Kilo and Song class submarines, the number of patrols declined from six to two (with no patrols at all in 2005).

Implications

The implications of the low patrol rate are significant. The total operational experience for the entire Chinese submarine force is only 49 patrols in 25 years, corresponding to each submarine conducting an average of one patrol every third year.

As a result, Chinese submarine crews appear to have relatively little operational experience and consequently limited skills in operating their boats safely and competently. It suggests that the tactical skills that would be needed for the Chinese submarine force to operate effectively in a war may be limited.

China continues – at least for now – to use its submarine force as a coastal defense force.

Background: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning

In a major foreign policy blunder, China reportedly has conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test. First reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology, China allegedly used a medium-range ballistic missile to launch an unknown payload that slammed into the Feng Yun (FY-1C) polar-orbit weather satellite approximately 865 km (537 miles) above the earth on January 11.

China has long called for international talks to set limits on military space activities, but this has been rejected by the Bush administration, which also wants to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. On January 11, the same day China conducted the test, a senior State Department official told an Air Force military space conference that “there is no arms race in space that needs to be addressed” by arms control treaties.

The Chinese test is a surprise but not unexpected. Both the United States and Russia have worked on ASAT weapons for decades, and it was almost inevitable that China would follow in their footsteps. The Department of Defense stated in 2006 report on Chinese military forces:

“Beijing continues to pursue an offensive anti-satellite system. China can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. However, there are many risks associated with this method, and potentially adverse consequences from the use of nuclear weapons. Evidence exists that China is improving its situational awareness in space, which will give it the ability to track and identify most satellites. Such capability will allow for the deconfliction of Chinese satellites, and would also be required for offensive actions. At least one of the satellite attack systems appears to be a groundbased laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.”

Others have suggested that Chinese ASAT capabilities were still far from deployment, but last week’s test suggests that China has made more progress than previously thought.

So What Now?

There will certainly be people who see the Chinese test as confirmation that the United States should rush to develop and potentially deploy ASAT weapons. And it is also likely to further deepen the military distrust between China and the United States. But it is important for national and international security that we think more sophisticated about this challenge and develop policies and options that increase security for all.

The first thing the Chinese test should teach us is that there now is an incipient arms race in space that urgently needs to be intercepted. With last week’s test, China has severely weakened its own status in the push for international limitations on military space activities. Yet the test may also serve to galvanize international efforts to prevent an arms race in space.

The second lesson is that the Bush administration’s rejection of limitations on military space activities has been a national security failure because it has granted China the legal freedom to test an ASAT weapon. ASAT weapons are a threat not only in war but also in peace because debris from ASAT tests endangers other military satellites as well as civilian satellites that are vital for monitoring atmospheric and environmental developments on Earth.

The third lesson the Chinese ASAT test should teach us is that the claim made by the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that U.S. pursuit of overwhelming capabilities (including in space) will somehow “dissuade” other countries from developing similar capabilities is a counterproductive and dangerous fallacy.

What is needed now is a combination of military constraint and reenergized political efforts:

First, China must refrain from further ASAT weapon testing and instead reaffirm its support for peaceful use of space.

Second, the United States and Russia must resist the temptation to resume their own ASAT testing programs.

Third, the Congress must review U.S. space policy in light of the new development.

Fourth, the Bush administration must abandon its opposition to limitations on the use of space and begin bilateral and international discussions on rules for military and civilian activities in space.

Background: Chinese Space | UCS Space Weapons Overview

(Updated January 3, 2007)

North Korea may have gotten all the attention, but all the nuclear weapon states were busy flight-testing ballistic missiles for their nuclear weapons during 2006. According to a preliminary count, eight countries launched more than 28 ballistic missiles of 23 types in 26 different events.

Unlike the failed North Korean Taepo Dong 2 launch, most other ballistic missile tests were successful. Russia and India also experienced missile failures, but the United States demonstrated a very reliable capability including the 117th consecutive successful launch of the Trident II D5 sea-launched ballistic missile.

The busy ballistic missile flight testing represents yet another double standard in international security, and suggests that initiatives are needed to limit not only proliferating countries from developing ballistic missiles but also find ways to curtail the programs of the existing nuclear powers.

The ballistic missile flight tests involved weapons ranging from 10-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles down to single-warhead short-range ballistic missiles. Most of the flight tests, however, involved long-range ballistic missiles and the United States, Russia and France also launched sea-launched ballistic missiles (see table below).

The Putin government’s reaffirmation of the importance of strategic nuclear forces to Russian national security was tainted by the failure of three consecutive launches of the new Bulava missile, but tests of five other missile types shows that Russia still has effective missile forces.

Along with China, Russia’s efforts continue to have an important influence on U.S. nuclear planning, and the eight Minuteman III and Trident II missiles launched in 2006 were intended to ensure a nuclear capability second to none. The first ICBM flight-test signaled the start of the deployment of the W87 warhead on the Minuteman III force.

China’s launch of the (very) long-awaited DF-31 ICBM and India’s attempts to test launch the Agni III raised new concerns because of the role the weapons likely will play in the two countries’ targeting of each other. But during a visit to India in June 2006, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, downplayed at least the Indian issue saying other countries in the region also have tested missiles. In a statement that North Korea would probably find useful to use, Gen. Pace explained that “the fact that a country is testing something like a missile is not destabilizing” as long as it is “designed for defense, and then are intended for use for defense, and they have competence in their ability to use those weapons for defense, it is a stabilizing event.”

But since all “defensive” ballistic missiles have very offensive capabilities, and since no nation plans it defense based on intentions and statements anyway but on the offensive capabilities of potential adversaries, Gen. Pace’s explanation seemed disingenuous and out of sync with the warnings about North Korean, Iranian and Chinese ballistic missile developments.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) seeks to limit the proliferation of ballistic missiles, but that vision seems undercut by the busy ballistic missile launch schedule demonstrated by the nuclear weapon states in 2006. Some MTCR member countries have launched the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation initiative in an attempt to establish a norm against ballistic missiles, and have called on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible.

All the nuclear weapons states portray their own nuclear ballistic missile developments as stabalizing and fully in compliance with their pledge under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. But fast-flying ballistic missiles are inherently destablizing because of their vulnerability to attack may trigger use early on in a conflict. And the busy missile testing in 2006 suggests that the “good faith” is wearing a little thin.

An incipient nuclear arms race is emerging between China and the United States, according to a new report published today by the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council.

The 250-page report, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, outlines the status and possible future development of China’s nuclear weapons, describes the history of U.S. nuclear targeting of China, and simulates nuclear strike scenarios between the two nuclear powers.

Both countries are pointing to the other as an excuse to modernize nuclear forces. In the United States the report finds that the Pentagon, the intelligence community, congressional committees, private institutes and the news media frequently overstate Chinese capabilities or present dramatic new developments out of context to underscore a threat.

China, for its part, cloaks its nuclear forces in a veil of secrecy, which creates suspicion and fear in other countries about Chinese intentions.

The report, which is based on analysis of declassified and unclassified U.S. government documents as well as commercial satellite images of Chinese installations, urges both countries to take steps to halt and reverse the tension and military build-up.

China’s Nuclear Forces

The report estimates that China has a stockpile of approximately 200 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 140 are deployed. About 100 of the warheads are for use by ballistic missiles while 40 are bombs for delivery by aircraft.

Given the almost complete lack of information from Chinese authorities about the size and composition of the stockpile, the FAS/NRDC estimate largely builds on analysis of declassified and unclassified assessments produced by U.S. government agencies over the years. Those assessments have been fraught with inaccuracy and inconsistency, the report finds, with a strong predisposition towards making worst-case predictions for stockpile size, weapons range and deployment.

This tendency continues today, and the report takes issue with the core prediction made by the intelligence community that says that the number of Chinese warheads primarily targeted against the continental United States will increase from 20 today to 75-100 warheads by 2015. The prediction assumes 40-55 new DF-31A missiles will be deployed over the next nine years in addition to the DF-31 and JL-2 missiles, a questionable estimate given that the DF-31A has not even been flight tested.

Chinese Submarines

The report discloses for the first time the number of patrols that Chinese submarines conduct each year. The capability of the Chinese submarines fleet is a hot issue following news media reports earlier this months about a Chinese submarine surfacing undetected near the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battlegroup off Okinawa, claims by the Pentagon that the Chinese navy is expanding its reach deep into the Pacific, and the U.S. Congress’ US-China Commission reporting earlier this month that China “continues to expand” its submarine fleet.

Yet the FAS-NRDC report shows that the Chinese submarine fleet is in steep decline from 120 submarines in the mid-1980s and expected by the U.S. navy to level out around 40 submarines in the next decade. The report shows that Chinese submarines rarely sail on patrol, that the entire submarine fleet in average conducts two patrols per year, that the most patrols conducted in a single year were six (in 2000), and that no patrols were conducted at all in 2005.

The report also reveals that China’s single ballistic missile submarine has never sailed on a nuclear deterrent patrol.

US Nuclear Targeting of China

Through analysis of declassified Pentagon documents, the report finds that U.S. nuclear targeting of China in the past has been considerably more prominent than normally assumed in the public debate. During the 1970s, for example, half of the major nuclear attack options in the U.S. strategic nuclear war plan were aimed at China.

After a hiatus in the 1980s precipitated by a joint U.S.-Chinese stand against the Soviet Union, U.S. nuclear targeting of China has increased after the end of the Cold War. The U.S. navy now bases the majority of its ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific, modernizing their nuclear missiles, and forward-deploying strategic bombers to Guam.

Nuclear Simulations

The report also presents the result of number of simulated nuclear strike scenarios between the two countries, showing that both have more than adequate capability to deter each other. The simulations are striking because they show that regardless of whether the strike is an imprecise Chinese “countervalue” attack on cities, or a highly accurate U.S. “counterforce” attack on military facilities, the result would be tens of millions of innocent civilian casualties.

A Chinese attack with 20 ICBMs would result in as many as 40 million casualties, the report estimates, and blanket large portions of the United States and Canada with radioactive fallout. Likewise, a limited and highly accurate U.S. nuclear attack on China’s 20 long-range ballistic missile silos would result in as many as 11 million casualties and scatter radioactive fallout across three Chinese provinces.

Take Google Earth Trip of Chinese Military Facilities

Download the FAS-NRDC Google Earth file here.

Making use of the unique capabilities of the free Google Earth program, FAS and NRDC have designed a virtual trip of selected nuclear and military facilities in China. Here is how to use it:

1. Download Google Earth onto your computer.
2. Click here or on the link below the map above to download the FAS-NRDC Google Earth file. The program will ask you to either open in Google Earth or download to your hard drive.
3. When Google Earth has finished loading on your computer, make sure the check-box “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning” in the “Places” window to the left is checked to activate the placemarks.
4. Click once on the first placemark (“Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning”) to open the text “bubble” with information.
5. If all the placemarks have not opened automatically, click the “plus-box” to the left of the “check-box” in the “Places” window.
6. Those placemarks with an icon that looks like the Google Earth logo or a file-folder contain additional sub-placemarks. Click on the “plus-box” to open each folder. Note that some air bases contain sub-placemarks for each aircraft.
7. Double-click on each consecutive placemark to zoom in on each facility. Don’t forget to use the “tilt” and “rotate” functions of Google Earth to get a better view.
8. The last two folders contain graphic displays of nuclear strike simulations. These simulations are explained in detail in the Chapter 4 of the report (download from here).

Download: Full Report | Individual Chapters | Google Earth Map

The annual report published Monday by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is different – kind of toned-down – compared with the report published in 2005. The Commission hasn’t gone soft on China, and the report continues the strong critique of China that has characterized the Commission since it was established in 2000. But much of the stronger language from the 2005 report, and many of the more questionable claims about Chinese nuclear weapons capabilities, did not make it into the new report.

The toning-down of the report follows reports earlier this year that the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military capabilities was also softened before publication. A call to the US-China Commission office about why the changes were made was not answered.

Noticeable changes in the 2006 report compared with last year include:

* Deletion of the top recommendation that Congress should “encourage increasing U.S. military capabilities in the Western Pacific in response to growing Chinese capabilities.” This blunt call for an arms race is replaced in the new report with a recommendation that DOD includes in its annual report on China’s military power “an assessment of U.S. weapon systems, force structure, basing, doctrine, and tactics in order to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the region” to ensure that the Pentagon can beat the Chinese in a war.

* Deletion of the erroneous claim that China’s next-generation long-range nuclear ballistic missiles will carry multiple warheads. In last year’s report, this claim was based on two non-authoritative sources: a Heritage Foundation brochure and a Japanese news paper article. The U.S. intelligence community, in contrast, has consistently stated that the missiles will be equipped with single warheads.

* Deletion of the erroneous claim that the Chinese navy has nuclear-armed anti-ship cruise missiles.

* The section “Expansion of China’s Nuclear Forces” is now simply called “Missiles.”

While it is a positive development that the Commission has made these changes, the 2006 report by no means looses sight of the Commission’s mandate to report on China’s military modernization and force deployments. Yet there are several claims in the 2006 report that stand out:

* A big one is that China is said to be pursuing measures to “control” the seas in the “Western Pacific.” But as anyone with just a little knowledge of naval operations understands, gaining “control” over an area requires superior capabilities, something China simply does not have now nor is likely to acquire in the foreseeable future. It is one thing to try to achieve “control” of a limited coastal area between China and Taiwan, but quite another to achieve it in the “Western Pacific” as the Commission says.

* Another claim is that China “continues to improve its older intercontinental ballistic missiles,” which, although true, forgets to mention that this particular improvement of the DF-5 missile has been underway since the 1980s and is now finally nearing completion. Slow and long-term is typical for Chinese nuclear programs.

* The Commission also claims that a new missile currently under development – the DF-31A – “will be the first Chinese ICBM capable of hitting Washington, DC.” Not so, unless the U.S. intelligence community has been wrong or lying for 30 years. According to numerous declassified documents, unclassified official reports and official statements made by the intelligence community, China has been targeting all of the United States with the DF-5 since the early 1980s. But the suggestion that DF-31A has a longer range than DF-5 echoes information contained in the 2006 DOD report on China’s military forces. A map in that report showed a DF-5 range considerably shorter than shown on a map in the 2005 DOD report. Whether the U.S. intelligence community has decreased its estimate for the DF-5 range or simply made an error (that everyone keeps repeating) is unknown.

* The Commission report also claims that China “continues to expand” its submarine fleet, when, in fact, it is not. On the contrary, China’s submarine fleet is in sharp decline, down from approximately 120 boats in the mid-1980s to about 60 today. While the Commission report focuses on highlighting China’s acquisition of new submarines, U.S. Naval Intelligence anticipates that the Chinese submarine fleet will level out at around 40 boats.

Over the past two years, military-to-military contact has increased between China and the United states, not least thanks for the efforts of Admiral William J. Fallon, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Likewise, U.S. Strategic Command has begun direct conversions with its Chinese counterpart about the role of nuclear weapons. The U.S.-China Commission report acknowledges this development, but complains that the military-to-military contacts “may disproportionally benefit the” Chinese by increasing their knowledge of U.S. military capabilities.

To ensure that the United States doesn’t t fall behind, the Commission has a solution: increase U.S. spying against China. This is a curious recommendation, given that allegations about Chinese spying against the United States is what gave birth to the U.S.-China Commission in the first place.

The overall impression I get from the Commission’s report is that it spends too much time on reporting dramatic new developments and too little time on analyzing what its all means. To that end it is important not only to get the facts right but also to describe them in context. China is modernizing its military forces – as are virtually all of its neighbors including the United States. All these players are engaged in a dangerous game of deterrence that creates fear and suspicion and triggers requirements for better weapons and bolder war plans.

The challenge for the United States and its allies in the region is not, as the Commission seems to believe, to continue to deploy more and better weapons to counter China’s military modernization, but to figure out how to create a foreign policy that ends the mistrust.

China has test launched a DF-31 long-range ballistic missile, according to a report by the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. The missile was said to have been launched from the Wuzhai launch site on Monday night.

The DF-31 has been under development since the 1980s and Monday’s flight test appears to be the sixth flight test of the missile since 1999. The U.S. Department of Defense predicted in 2002 that the DF-31 would be deployed “before mid-decade,” but that didn’t happen. The current DOD prediction is that deployment may happen this year. Some web sites erroneously say the missile is already operational.

The DF-31 forms the core of China’s current modernization of long-range nuclear ballistic missiles. Two modifications of the DF-31 are under development. The road-mobile DF-31A has a longer range (possibly up to 12,000 km), and the 8,000+ km range Julang-2 is intended to arm China’s next generation of ballistic missile submarines (Jin-class).

There is considerable confusion and uncertainty about the capability of the DF-31. Early reports predicted a range of at least 8,000 km (4,875 miles), but the latest DOD estimate is 7,250+ km (4,500+ miles). China has not yet tested the DF-31 to the full range reported by the DOD. Tuesday’s test launch impacted in the Takla Makan Desert some 2,500 km west of Wuzhai. If the range is 7,250+, the DF-31 will not be able to target the entire continental United States, only the most northwestern parts. Its main role may be against Russia, India, as well as U.S. facilities in the Pacific including Hawaii and Guam.

Another confusion concerns the payload. Despite widespread speculation among private analysts and media that the new missiles will carry multiple warheads, the U.S. intelligence community anticipates that all three missile types will carry a single warhead each.

Later this month (September), FAS and the Natural Resources Defense Council will publish a joint report about Chinese nuclear forces and U.S. nuclear targeting of China. The report uses high-resolution satellite images and declassified documents to describe the nuclear relationship between China and the United States.

See also: Elusive Chinese Submarine Cave Spotted | Nuclear Notebook on Chinese Nuclear Forces

The Air Force has published a new report about the threat from ballistic and cruise missiles. The new report, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, presents the Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s (NASIC) assessment of current and emerging weapon systems deployed or under development by Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Syria and others.

Among the news in the report is a different and higher estimate for China’s future nuclear arsenal than was presented in the previous NASIC report from 2003. Whereas the previous assessment stated that China in 15 years will have 75-100 warheads on ICBMs capable of reaching the United States, the 2006 report states that this number will be “well over 100” warheads. NASIC also believes that a new Chinese cruise missile under development will have nuclear capability.

Also new is that NASIC reports that the Indian Agni I ballistic missile has not yet been deployed despite claims by the Indian government that the weapon was “inducted” into the Indian Army in 2004. Contrary to claims made by some media and experts, the NASIC report states that the Indian Bramos cruise missile does not have a nuclear capability. The Babur cruise missile under development by Pakistan, however, is assessed to have a nuclear capability.

A copy of the report, which was published in March 2006 and recently obtained by the Federation of American Scientists, is available in full along with previous versions here.

The Pentagon yesterday released its annual warning of the growing Chinese military threat. This year’s version continues the refrain from previous years and reiterates the conclusion from the recent Quadrennial Defense Review that China now is seen as the top large-scale military threat to the United States.

The signs of a Chinese threat are all there: An increasing defense budget that may equal half of ours in 20 years, new long-range mobile nuclear missiles that will be harder for us to destroy, an increase in the number of nuclear warheads that can hit the United States to perhaps as much as two percent of the warheads we can hit them with, new cruise missiles similar to the hundreds of cruise missile we have deployed in the region for decades, warships that may be able to disturb the unhindered operations of our carrier battle groups and surface action groups, a handful of nuclear-powered attack submarines that our 30 nuclear-powered attack submarines in the Pacific will have to sink too, more fighters and bombers that will be harder for the hundreds of advanced fighters we have deployed in the region for decades to shoot down.

This year’s Pentagon report dedicates more space than previous versions to discussing the big unknown: will China abandon its policy not to use nuclear weapons first? Of cause, there is “no evidence that this doctrine has actually changed” and China’s senior leadership assured Rumsfeld in 2005 that it “will not change,” the report states. Yet the attention this issue gets in the report suggests that the Pentagon suspects a change is underway. The circle of “military and civilian national security professionals” that discuss the value of the no-first-use policy “is broader than previously assessed,” the report hints.

Just imagine if China had a nuclear policy like the United States: a first-use nuclear doctrine with highly-accurate flexible nuclear forces on high alert, many of them forward deployed, capable of conducting a decapitating preemptive first strike. That would be highly destabilizing.

So let’s try not to get to that situation. Unfortunately, after having targeted China for 50 years, the Pentagon is reacting to China’s military modernization in the old-fashioned way: moving the majority of its nuclear ballistic missile submarines into the Pacific, increasing the number of attack submarines operating in the region, and forward-deploying bombers and cruise missiles to Guam. It has even built a whole new war plan, known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 5077, according to Willliam Arkin, to defend Taiwan which includes options for attacks on the Chinese mainland, even the potential use of nuclear weapons.

Last time we got into this tit-for-tat game with a large military power it took 50 years, trillions of dollars, and several nuclear crises to get out. The Pentagon’s report on China’s military modernization should warn us that it is important that the White House and Congress take charge of U.S.-Chinese relations so we avoid a new Cold War in the Pacific.

See also: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006 | China’s Nuclear Submarine Cave

The Chinese nuclear stockpile appears to be only half as big as previously thought, according to a new overview published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Up to 130 warheads may be deployed out of a total stockpile of some 200 warheads. Several new weapon systems are under development which the Pentagon says could increase the arsenal in the future, but past US intelligence projections have proven highly inflated and inaccurate. The new overview will be followed by a more detailed report published by the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council this spring.

See also: Chinese Nuclear Submarine Cave Discovered

Hans M. Kristensen and two analysts from the Natural Resources Defense Council examine the debate over China’s modernization of its nuclear forces, review the composition and possible future development of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, describe past and current U.S. nuclear targeting of China, and use government software to simulate the effects of Chinese and U.S. of nuclear attacks. The report (PDF) concludes that both countries use the other as an excuse to modernize their nuclear forces, and recommends that urgent steps are needed by both sides to halt and reverse a nuclear arms race.

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