[NOTE: The Federation of American Scientists is delighted to have a Scoville Fellow this year, Ms. Katarzyna (Kasia) Bzdak. Kasia reads the Polish language press and, in particular, follows the ongoing political debate about the US missile defense deployment in Poland. This is her second blog entry on the subject; the first was written before the last Polish elections. The following is her report on the missile defense decision as seen from the Polish side.]

In recent weeks, Polish-US missile defense negotiations have seemingly progressed after a lull following elections in Poland last October. The Polish election changed the style and substance of the debates significantly, as the administration of staunchly pro-American Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski was ousted by the Civic Platform (PO), headed by current Prime Minister Donald Tusk. While Kaczynski supported the deployment of US missile defense components (10 interceptor missiles) on Polish soil without reservation throughout the campaign, Tusk promised to toughen negotiations with the United States, work to gain concessions for continued Polish support of US military operations and foreign policy, and improve relations with Russia, which is viscerally opposed to the deployment.

In the most recent round of negotiations on the future of the interceptor deployment, beginning in January, the Tusk administration stuck to its campaign promises and focused its efforts on attaining concessions from the US in the military realm. According to a number of Polish sources, the ruling coalition in Poland and most Polish experts agree that the deployment of interceptors to Poland will reduce Polish security. The Polish negotiating team has thus pursued a policy of linkage in negotiations, stressing that Poland will not accept missile defense components without concomitant upgrades to Polish security. The Polish government has consistently argued that it needs a military upgrade, particularly in anti-aircraft capabilities, to counteract the Russian threat to target Poland with nuclear forces if the interceptors are deployed.

In response to these concerns, Warsaw has reportedly sought two major concessions in recent negotiations: bilateral aid in military modernization (including an antiballistic/antiaircraft missile system) and a US security guarantee akin to the agreements the US has with Israel or Turkey. In a January visit to Washington, Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, managed to successfully link missile defense negotiations to US aid in Polish military modernization, something the US consistently refused during previous rounds of negotiations. Prime Minister Donald Tusk made a follow-up trip in early March, which led to an ostensible breakthrough in negotiations: President Bush made a public commitment to develop a substantive plan to modernize Polish forces before the end of his term in office. Although the specifics of this modernization plan remain unclear, several Polish media sources have reported that the government wants an upgrade to its anti-aircraft capacities. Polish negotiators have pinpointed 17 specific areas of the military that the US could modernize and have specifically requested the deployment of either THAAD or PATRIOT antiballistic and antiaircraft missiles.

Despite these recent developments, the interceptor deployment is not a done deal. A number of significant obstacles may very well impede US-Polish negotiations. First and perhaps most critically, is the fact that the majority of the Polish public is opposed to missile defense, and that even supporters of the deployment may be unsatisfied with the nebulous offer the US has put on the table. According to recent polling conducted by the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, 55% of Poles oppose the deployment of interceptors in Poland altogether. Furthermore, it is widely believed that Poland has taken too soft a line during negotiations, and received little for its consistent support of US foreign and defense policy.

The Polish public continues to associate the Polish position on missile defense with visa waivers and other US concessions. Three-quarters of Poles consider the visa issue vis-à-vis the US as “important” or “very important,” and about 1 out of 3 respondents think that lifting visa restrictions is the most important concession Polish negotiators should strive for in the missile defense negotiations. In comparison, less than one in five Poles thought long-term military aid should be the key goal for negotiators. This is significant because Prime Minister Tusk recently stated that he is not going to broach the visa issue yet again with the United States during missile defense negotiations. Thus, the tenuous agreement on modernization may prove to be domestically unpopular, and may curtail the administration’s ability to see it through (particularly since the Polish parliament would likely have to vote on all or at least part of an eventual agreement).

Also, the Tusk administration has maintained, fitting with their strategy of linkage in negotiations, that it will not accept any deal that undermines Polish security in the aggregate. Therefore, the devil may be in the details, and the specifics of the modernization plan may very well make or break the deployment deal, particularly given public opposition to the plan. If Polish negotiators feel that the US is not willing to invest enough into Poland’s anti-aircraft capabilities, or is unable to appease Russia and prevent her from targeting Poland with nuclear weapons, they may very well opt out of the deal. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice indicated in March that the US needs three months to even develop a modernization plan, so these details (and the Polish response) are forthcoming.

Another issue of significance is that Polish negotiators have not hedged against the election of a Democrat to office in the Fall. Although President Bush has promised to come up with a modernization plan before the end of his tenure, any agreements he makes are contingent on the approval of his successor. The Polish negotiating team has not consulted with either of the Democratic candidates for office, who are certain to be less enthusiastic about the deployment. Some commentators have even suggested that this omission may be purposeful, i.e., that the Polish negotiating team wants to strengthen its image as a staunch US ally through amicable talks while stalling any real progress on the plan as it waits out the end of Bush’s tenure.

In sum, while negotiations have seemingly progressed, the future of the missile defense component deployment in Poland remains uncertain. Political realities in Poland and strategic calculations are certain to influence the Tusk administration’s position, and the coming US election will also be critical. It remains to be seen what will develop, but what is certain is that the United States will have to pay a steep price for Polish acquiescence.

On Thursday, famed arms merchant Victor Bout was arrested at a Thai hotel on charges of selling weapons to Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a 40-year-old insurgent group known for drug trafficking and terrorist attacks. In recent years, Bout and his affiliates have been accused of arranging illicit arms transfers in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and elsewhere.

The name “Victor Bout” has become synonymous with the large, clandestine arms shipments that have fueled devastating civil wars in developing countries, and the extreme difficulty of shutting down the global, ever-shifting networks that orchestrate these transfers. His arrest puts arms traffickers on notice that the days of impunity may be coming to an end.

The arrest could have significant practical implications as well, depending on the outcome of the case against Bout and the quantity and quality of information about his network acquired by authorities as a result of his arrest. If Bout is tried and convicted, and information collected along the way leads to the arrest and conviction of other key members of his global network – two big “ifs” – his arrest could indeed “mar[k] the end of the reign of one of the world’s most wanted arms traffickers,” as claimed by US Attorney Michael Garcia.

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At a press briefing on Wednesday, John Rood, the Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, fielded questions about the Bush Administration’s new Export Control Directive – the latest attempt to reduce delays and inefficiencies in the State Department’s export control system. If implemented properly, some of the proposals could help to address long-standing staffing shortages, jurisdictional issues, and Information Technology (IT) problems. Improvements in these areas could help to reduce licensing delays, which, in turn, could alleviate pressure on the State Department to relax export controls.
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[NOTE: The Federation of American Scientists is delighted to have a Scoville Fellow this year, Ms. Katarzyna (Kasia) Bzdak. Kasia comes to FAS from Columbia University has been following the Polish language press since before the recent national elections there and submitted this report on the political status of the US missile defense deployment.]

Although the recent election in Poland promised to bring change in the style of Polish foreign policy, it was not a definitive referendum on the future of US missile defense components on Polish territory. The outgoing ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), lead by former Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, supported the deployment of US interceptors in Poland wholeheartedly during its tenure and during the campaign. The victorious Civic Platform (PO), conversely, failed to clearly articulate a position on the missile defense shield, and seemed to hedge its position on what the US would concede to Poland for its participation in the program. Reports in the Polish press directly following the election suggested that certain concessions from the United States—the transfer of short and medium-missile defense systems, relaxed visa restriction, or economic investments—could induce the Civic Platform’s consent. More recent reports in the Polish press, however, suggest that the PO has tempered its enthusiasm for the project, and negotiations with the United States have been postponed pending discussions with Poland’s neighbors, including Russia. Nonetheless, given the dual-executive system codified in Poland’s constitution, President Lech Kaczynski (former PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s twin, biologically and ideologically, and a leader of PiS) will continue to wield substantial power in Polish foreign policy, so the effect of the PO’s potential change of heart remains dubious.
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A new Congressional Research Service report on “U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan” recently obtained by the FAS provides a succinct overview of recent U.S. arms sales to General Pervez Musharraf’s regime, the tumultous fifty-year history of US security assistance to Pakistan, and presidential authority to stop such sales. The release of the report coincides with a worsening political crisis in Pakistan and growing Congressional and public discontent over the United States’ multi-billion dollar military aid program for General Musharraf’s beseiged and increasingly authoritarian regime.
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In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the FAS, the Department of Homeland Security has released a December 2005 report to Congress on the status of DHS’s efforts to counter the threat from man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to commercial airliners.

The report, which Congress required as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, sheds new light on several key DHS counter-MANPADS efforts, including airport vulnerability assessments, contingency plans for MANPADS attacks, and intelligence sharing and law enforcement training. These efforts are part of a multi-faceted U.S. campaign to deprive terrorists of access to these weapons and mitigate the threat from missiles that are already in terrorist arsenals.
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The latest report from the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia contains additional information about the shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles used by Islamic insurgents to shoot down a Belarusian cargo aircraft in March. Below is an excerpt from the UN report:

On 23 March 2007, at approximately 1700 hours, an IL-76 cargo plane
belonging to Transaviaexport, a Belarusian company, was shot down after a missile
fired by Shabaab fighters hit the left wing. The plane, with 11 crewmembers and
passengers, was hit at low altitude following take-off. It had earlier delivered
logistics and spare parts for another aircraft that had made an emergency landing at
Mogadishu International Airport. The missile used to shoot down the plane was an
SA-18 (MANPAD, Man Portable Air Defence System). The SA-18 was reported to
be part of a consignment of six SA-18s that had been delivered by Eritrea to
ICU/Shabaab. Two missiles were fired at the plane; one hit the target and the other
missed. The Monitoring Group showed the Committee a video of the actual firing of
the missile, during the midterm briefing on 27 April 2007.

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At a press briefing on Monday, Assistant Secretary of State John Rood elaborated on the Bush Administration’s latest attempt to secure license-free defense exports to the UK, a contentious issue that sparked a bruising battle between the administration and House Republicans three years ago. This time the exemptions are packaged in the form of a Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT), the stated goal of which is to “improve transatlantic defence information sharing by reducing the barriers to exchanges of defence goods, services and information between the US and UK.” By pursuing a treaty, the administration avoids another confrontation with the House, but it remains to be seen whether the Democrat-controlled Senate will tolerate what appears to be an end-run around their colleagues, especially given the administration’s apparent failure to adequately consult either chamber before negotiating the treaty.
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Note: After this entry was posted, the Associated Press revealed that the item in question is actually a 20-year-old expended AT-4 anti-tank missile launcher that posed no threat.

This morning a woman from Jersey City discovered a “missile” lying in the grass on her front lawn. Niranjana Besai showed the missile to her neighbor, who told CBS 2 News that at first he thought the 6-foot-long item was just a pipe. Upon closer inspection, he concluded that it looked like the missile launchers he’d seen on TV. The New Jersey television station said that their “sources” told them that the “device is the type used ot shoot shoulder-fired rockets and is capable of taking down an aircraft.”

Little else is known about the item, but initial descriptions are consistent with the physical appearance of many man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), the launch tubes of which are approximately 5 to 6 feet long and look a bit like a pipe. Private ownership of MANPADS is ilegal in the United States, and the version used by the US military – the Stinger missile – is one of the most tighly guarded weapons in its arsenals. If the item is indeed a MANPADS, it would have profound national security and policy implications.
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On Friday, the Washington Post posted an Associated Press story with a video still of a man in civilian clothes holding what appears to be an advanced SA-18 Igla man-portable air defense system (MANPADS).* To date, the only MANPADS reported to be in the arsenals of the Somali insurgents were the less sophisticated SA-7.** The video was reportedly obtained by the Associated Press from an individual associated with Shabab, the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which controlled much of Somalia before it was routed by Ethiopian troops in December 2006. Last October, UN investigators reported that the ICU had received six weapons shipments containing several dozen shoulder-fired missiles.
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In a report released this week by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), FAS analyst Matt Schroeder provides an unprecedented look at global efforts to counter the terrorist threat from Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). The report, which appears as an appendix in this year’s edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, goes beyond mainstream media coverage of counter-MANPADS efforts (i.e. the myopic focus on anti-missile systems) by providing detailed summaries of oft-ignored but critically important programs to secure MANPADS inventories, destroy surplus missiles, collect missiles from the black market, and strengthen export controls. Also assessed are the strengths and limitations of the various anti-missile systems that are currently being considered for installation on commercial airliners and at airports. The appendix concludes with a list of recommendations for expanding and strengthening international counter-MANPADS efforts.
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The FAS has acquired, via a Freedom of Information Act request, additional information about a cache of “22 surface-to-air missiles” discovered by Coalition Forces north of Baghdad on 4 January 2006. According to the responsive document – a redacted entry from a database maintained by Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) – the missiles were SA-13 “Gopher” surface-to-air missiles. The SA-13 is a short-range, low altitude, infra-red seeking missile that is typically launched from a pedestal mounted on the back of an armored vehicle. The weapons cache, which included 5000 rounds of 32 mm cannon ammunition, was located with a mine detector and appeared at the time to have been “emplaced in the last 2 weeks.” It is unclear from the DoD documents if the missiles were operational or who they belonged to.
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