International Intelligence Agreements, and Other DoD Directives
The procedures by which the U.S. Air Force establishes international agreements for the exchange of intelligence information with foreign military services were described in a new Air Force Instruction.
“Foreign military organizations being considered for inclusion in an IIA (international intelligence agreement) must clearly support U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. The foreign government must have favorable relations with the United States; a well-developed, secure intelligence service; and a stable domestic environment and military unity. Known national characteristics of the foreign government in question must fall within the guidelines of the United States national disclosure and security policy, and be reasonably expected to have adequate fiscal means, and conform to legal guidelines,” the Instruction states.
Such agreements must “Provide for mutual support (quid pro quo)” and must “Provide intelligence that would otherwise be denied to the United States.” See Air Force Instruction 14-102, International Intelligence Agreements, April 29, 2013.
Another new Department of Defense Instruction governs records management within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
“It is DoD policy,” it states, “to limit the creation of records to those essential for the efficient conduct of official business and to preserve those of continuing value while systematically eliminating all others.” See OSD Records and Information Management Program, Administrative Instruction 15, May 3, 2013.
Other noteworthy new military publications include the following.
Information Operations (IO), DoD Directive 3600.01, May 2, 2013
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DoD Directive 5134.10, May 7, 2013
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