
chemical and biological weapons,
iran’s nuclear program
Christopher A. Bidwell, JD is a Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy at FAS. He recently retired from the U.S. Navy where his last key assignment was as National Security Counselor at an internal DoD think tank (DTRA-ASCO) dedicated to the study of WMD and Nonproliferation issues. Bidwell is also an accomplished civilian litigation attorney and has focused his efforts on the interplay between law and WMD for the last several years.
He is especially knowledgeable on issues related to attribution, deterrence, WMD free zones, sanctions, anticipatory self-defense and the Middle East region in general. He has lectured/spoken at several universities and academic fora throughout the world on nonproliferation issues and has taught courses on nonproliferation at Georgetown University.
Bidwell is an active member of the California Bar and currently serves as Chair of the Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Interest Group of the American Society of International Law.
With 2000 nuclear weapons on alert, far more powerful than the first bomb tested in the Jornada Del Muerto during the Trinity Test 80 years ago, our world has been fundamentally altered.
As the United States continues nuclear modernization on all legs of its nuclear triad through the creation of new variants of warheads, missiles, and delivery platforms, examining the effects of nuclear weapons production on the public is ever more pressing.
While it is reasonable for governments to keep the most sensitive aspects of nuclear policies secret, the rights of their citizens to have access to general knowledge about these issues is equally valid so they may know about the consequences to themselves and their country.
Nearly one year after the Pentagon certified the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program to continue after it incurred critical cost and schedule overruns, the new nuclear missile could once again be in trouble.
The goal of this Task Force report is to offer findings and make recommendations regarding nonproliferation monitoring and verification in general; our observations are grounded in large part on the Task Force’s continued attention to nonproliferation developments such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Iran, nuclear developments in North […]
Most of the world (including the U.S.) seems to be relieved now that there is affirmative progress towards eliminating Syria’s ghastly chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles, thereby avoiding (at least for now) a military strike that no one really wanted to undertake. The Syrian government has announced that it will soon join the Organization for the […]