Video Shows Earth-Penetrating Capability of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

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By Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie*

The capability of the new B61-12 nuclear bomb seems to continue to expand, from a simple life-extension of an existing bomb, to the first U.S. guided nuclear gravity bomb, to a nuclear earth-penetrator with increased accuracy.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) previously published pictures of the drop test from October 2015 that showed the B61-12 hitting inside the target circle but without showing the bomb penetrating underground.

But a Sandia National Laboratories video made available by the New York Times shows the B61-12 penetrating completely underground. (A longer version of the video is available at the Los Alamos Study Group web site.)

Implication of Earth-Penetration Capability

The evidence that the B61-12 can penetrate below the surface has significant implications for the types of targets that can be held at risk with the bomb. A nuclear weapon that detonates after penetrating the earth more efficiently transmits its explosive energy to the ground, thus is more effective at destroying deeply buried targets for a given nuclear yield. A detonation above ground, in contrast, results in a larger fraction of the explosive energy bouncing off the surface. Two findings of the 2005 National Academies’ study Effects of Earth-Penetrator and other Weapons are key:

“The yield required of a nuclear weapon to destroy a hard and deeply buried target is reduced by a factor of 15 to 25 by enhanced ground-shock coupling if the weapon is detonated a few meters below the surface.”


“Nuclear earth-penetrator weapons (EPWs) with a depth of penetration of 3 meters capture most of the advantage associated with the coupling of ground shock.”

Given that the length of the B61-12 is about three-and-a-half meters, and that the Sandia video shows the bomb disappearing completely beneath the surface of the Nevada desert, it appears the B61-12 will be able to achieve enhanced ground-shock coupling against underground targets in soil. We know that the B61-12 is designed to have four selectable explosive yields: 0.3 kilotons (kt), 1.5 kt, 10 kt and 50 kt. Therefore, given the National Academies’ finding, the maximum destructive potential of the B61-12 against underground targets is equivalent to the capability of a surface-burst weapon with a yield of 750 kt to 1,250 kt.

One of the bombs the Pentagon plans to retire after the B61-12 is deployed is the B83-1, which has a maximum yield of 1,200 kt.

Even at the lowest selective yield setting of only 0.3 kt, the ground-shock coupling of a B61-12 exploding a few meters underground would be equivalent to a surface-burst weapon with a yield of 4.5 kt to 7.5 kt. 

Implications of Increased Accuracy

Existing B61 versions (B61-3, -4, 7, -10) are thought to have some limited earth-penetration capability but with much less accuracy than the B61-12. The only official nuclear earth-penetrator in the U.S. arsenal, the unguided B61-11, compensates for poor accuracy with a massive yield: 400 kt. The ground-shock coupling of 400 kt, using the National Academies’ finding, is equivalent to the effect of a surface-burst of 6 Megatons (MT) to 10 MT. The B61-11 replaced the old B53, the Cold War bunker buster bomb, which had a yield of 9 MT. The B61-11 can penetrate into frozen soil; it is yet unknown if the B61-12 has a similar capability. Currently there is no life-extension planned for the B61-11, which is not part of NNSA’s so-called 3+2 stockpile plan and is expected to be phased out when it expires in the 2030s.

What makes the B61-12 special is that the B61 capability is enhanced by the increased accuracy provided by the new guided tail kit assembly, a unique feature of the new weapon. The combination of increased accuracy with earth-penetration and low-yield options provides for unique targeting capabilities. Moreover, while the B61-11 can only be delivered by the B-2 strategic bomber, the B61-12 will be integrated on virtually all nuclear-capable U.S. and NATO aircraft: B-2, LRS-B (next-generation long-range bomber), F-35A, F-16, F-15E, and PA-200 Tornado.

How accurate the B61-12 will be is a secret. In an article from 2011 we estimated the accuracy might be on the order of 30-plus meters. Back then no test drop had been conducted and we didn’t have imagery. But now we do.

We cannot see with certainty on the NNSA photo and Sandia video how accurate the November 2015 drop test was. The video and image clearly show the B61-12 impacting the ground well within a large circle. Unfortunately the imagery does not show the full circle and the low angle makes it hard to determine the diameter. But by flipping the image horizontally and combining the copy with the original, the two appear to make a nearly perfect circle. Because we know the length of the B61-12 (11.8 feet; 3.4 meters), it appears the circle has a diameter of approximately 197 feet (60 meters). Since the point of impact is well within circle (roughly one bomb length inside), the B61-12 appears to have hit less than 100 feet (30 meters) from the center of the circle (see analysis of NNSA photo below).

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Accuracy of a weapon is expressed as CEP (Circular Error Probability), which is defined as the radius of a circle centered at the target aim-point within which 50% of the weapons will fall. Formally estimating the accuracy of the B61-12 requires more information than the ground zero location of the drop test in the November 2015 event. Even so, the image indicates that at least the November 2015 drop test impacted well within the 30-meter diameter circle.

Little is known in public about the accuracy of nuclear gravity bombs. But information previously released by the U.S. Air Force to Kristensen under the Freedom of Information Act states that drop tests in the late-1990s normally achieved an accuracy of 380 feet (116 meters) for both high- and low-altitude releases and occasionally down to around 300 feet (91 meters) for low-altitude bombing runs.

In other words, although formal and more comprehensive data is missing, the November 2015 drop test indicates a B61-12 performance three times more accurate than existing non-guided gravity bombs.

That increased accuracy and earth-penetration capability will allow strike planners to chose lower selectable yields than are needed with the accuracy of current B61 and B83 bombs to destroy the same targets. Selecting lower yields will reduce the radioactive fallout from an attack, a feature that would make a B61-12 attack more attractive to military planners and less controversial to political decision makers.


The ability of the B61-12 to penetrate below the surface before detonating as seen on the video will further increase the capability against underground targets, especially when combined with the improved accuracy. This opens up a range of options for destroying underground targets with lower selectable nuclear yield settings than with the bombs in the current arsenal. We believe this constitutes an enhanced military capability that is in conflict with the Obama administration’s stated policy not to develop new capabilities for nuclear weapons.

The New York Times article is well written because it captures the contradiction between the denial by some officials (in this case NNSA’s Madelyn Creedon) that the B61-12 has new military capabilities while others (in this case former under secretary of defense for policy James Miller) seem to think it is a good thing that it does.

To that end the article is astute because it quotes the White House pledge not to pursue new military capabilities:

“The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military mission or new capabilities for nuclear weapons.”

…instead of using the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report formulation:

“The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.”

This is important because the NPR formulation is a little less clear and is being used by some officials and defense contractors to argue that the pledge not to pursue new military missions or new military capabilities only refers to the warhead itself and not nuclear weapons in general. That may seem pedantic so the White House statement helps clarify, in case anyone is confused, that the policy indeed applies to “weapons” and not just “warheads.”

The officials who claim the B61-12 will not have new military capabilities say so because the United States already has the capability to hold at risk surface and underground targets, or to the fact that the warhead within the bomb –the so-called “physics package” –remains the same Cold War design. But the combination of increased accuracy and limited earth-penetrating capability allow the B61-12 to threaten below-ground structures with less radioactive fallout. That is a new military capability.

Back in 2011, before the B61-12 development program had progressed to the point of no return, FAS sent a letter to the White House and the Office of the Secretary of Defense pointing out the contradiction with the administration’s policy and implications for nuclear strategy. They never responded.

Worrying about the Bomb

The B61-12 earth-penetration capability may be less than the existing B61-11 earth-penetrator and the accuracy less than a conventional GPS-guided smart bomb, but the Sandia video shows a versatile new weapon that is intended for deployment on both strategic and non-strategic aircraft in the United States and Europe.

Such a capability begs the question of which targets in which countries are envisioned for B61-12 missions, and under what circumstances could use of such a weapon be ordered by the President? The National Academies’ study also found that earth penetration by a nuclear weapon could not contain the effects of the nuclear explosion, and that casualties would likely be the same as if the weapon were detonated at the surface of the earth. These findings particularly speak to the implications of dropping the B61-12 on a bunker located underneath a city.

Moreover, the significant improvements being made to non-nuclear earth-penetrators begs the question why it is necessary to enhance the capabilities of the B61 gravity bomb in the first place.

Both the United State and Russia (and the other nuclear-armed states) have extensive and expensive nuclear force modernization programs underway. What we are seeing today lies somewhere between parallel efforts to refurbish Cold War arsenals and the emergence of a new arms competition fueled by enhancements to existing weapons or production of new or significantly modified types. These enhancements are being developed without nuclear test explosions.

Inevitably the most important capabilities for nuclear deterrent forces are stability, control and safety – daily operational procedures embodying restraint, and strong channels of communication between nuclear weapon states with safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. This area needs a lot of work right now as US-Russian relations continue to fray, already triggering calls from some analysts to further enhance nuclear weapons.

The Sandia video of the B61-12 slipping into the earth like a hot knife into butter doesn’t make the situation better.

* Matthew McKinzie is the nuclear program director at the Natural Resources Defense Council.

The research for this publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the New Land Foundation, and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

31 thoughts on “Video Shows Earth-Penetrating Capability of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

  1. This is a warfighting weapon, not a symbolic deterrent.

    Do we really want 180 of these in Europe from 2020 or so, mated digitally to the stealthy F-35 attack aircraft?

      1. Bluffing is when you say you will do something but you actually do not have the INTENTION of doing it. If you do not have the capacity to do it and this is known, it is a very poor bluff indeed. On the other hand, just because you have the capacity does not mean that you are not bluffing or that your bluff will not be called.
        What is almost universally overlooked in discussions of deterrence is the prevalence of bluffing and the mutual understanding not to call the bluff. Call it: mutual assured aggrandizement.

    1. I’d say so. It might deter the man who, in 2000, wrote what evolved into Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” policy. It certainly would give us more proportionate responses to precision attacks with nuclear devices not presently covered by New START (and which might be covered by the INF Treaty if it weren’t effectively a dead letter).

  2. It gives us the capability to stop Iran’s underground nuclear bomb factory instantly if ever needed. Put a B61-12 down on each entrance and VOILA! They can’t EVER make any (MORE).

    1. Dont you find it wrong to advocate for the use of a nuke to stop another country from having nukes? What gives the nuclear club rights over others to have nukes?

          1. Compare the countries that have nukes or are developing them. Then ask yourself which of those countries want to wipe out outer countries like the U.S. and Israel. Then ask yourself should these countries have nukes? It’s not tough guy. You’re comparing all countries equally and you should not.

  3. Is it known whether the B61-12 actually has body strakes? Drawings show them, but I haven’t yet found a photograph that does. This might have some modest significance, since, as I understand it, the strakes on JDAMs function as miniwings and extend the range and maneuverability of the bomb, thus the “launch acceptability region” for the carrier aircraft.

  4. It doesn’t really matter in the grand scheme of things, if these bombs are simply duds–because their nuclear components (what the Air Force likes to call the “physics package”) are 40 years old. Nuclear warheads were supposed to have an average service life of 20 years. The reason we built so many during the Cold War was to replace old ones. Its possible to recycle the nuke components to build “used-new” weapons, but I do not believe we are doing that. We are simply expecting the original, late 60s/early 70s vintage W61 warheads to soldier on–magically–for the foreseeable future. I hare the (official) confidence of the DoE that have sufficient ways of testing our weapons’ functionality without actual live tests. The question is what happens when the weapons start failing these tests? Great–you’ve proved they don’t work. So, what is the replacement?

    Oh, wait . . . I get it–that’s the point! Duh! There is no replacement! Unilateral disarmament by neglect–brilliant!

    Meanwhile all the other nuclear powers have built new weapons and new warheads since the late 90s. Britain and France are no longer–but their weapons and warheads are less than 20 years old. Meanwhile, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia and China continue to build new weapons and warheads without abandon.

    1. There are a couple of misperceptions in your comment that I’d like to address. The first is the perception that the US bombs are duds because they are old. An intended service life of 20 years doesn’t mean that the weapon expires at that age but that different aging-related effects may begin to influence reliability. That is not the case because their reliability is monitored, re-certified, and if necessary fixed. The intended service life was more a result of the turnover of weapons during the Cold War where new weapons were developed and deployed all the time. After the end of the Cold War, the United States stopped live nuclear testing and instead switches to a stockpile stewardship program designed to monitor and, if needed, fix existing warheads and extend their service life instead of building new ones. The first full-scale life-extension program was the W76, one of the Navy’s two warheads on its ballistic missiles. This, the most numerous warhead in the stockpile, is now more than half-way through a full-scale production of roughly 1,600 W76-1 warheads, the name of the life-extended version. That life-extension gives the warhead 30 more years before it has to go back for another life-extension, according to the National Nuclear Security Administration.

      If the life-extended versions turn out to be duds sometime in the future due to some completely unexpected surprise, I suspect the United States could relatively quickly produce a new nuclear warhead. But everyone I have talked to in the military, nuclear laboratories, congressional staffers, even people who were skeptical in the 1990s that stockpile stewardship could be done without live nuclear testing, today sound very confident that it is not necessary to build new nuclear warheads but that the existing (and modified) types can be life-extended with confidence. It does require some restraint, however, so that modifications don’t evolve too far from the originally tested design.

      As for the other nuclear-armed states, the reason they continue to build new nuclear warheads is because they don’t (yet) have a stockpile stewardship program advanced enough to extend existing warheads. That doesn’t mean they have a strategic advantage, only that they maintain their deterrent in a different way. And I certainly don’t hear anyone in this country who want to swop the US stockpile stewardship program-based nuclear enterprise with the Russian or Chinese systems. On the contrary, US Strategic Command and the nuclear laboratories continue to certify to the president that the nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable – even 24 years after the last US nuclear test and last (completely) new nuclear weapon was delivered (W88).

  5. Good article on the B-61-12. I think that due to secret limitations that much more is available from this good weapon. A possibility may be a rocket assist in the vertical direction to equal or exceed the incoming velocity of a missile and greatly enhance the penetration of the Iranian mountains. also, multiple hits in the very same hole can literally mine to the center of the earth. This is just one tool when it becomes necessary to contain or destroy an adversaries determination to hide from us.

  6. That we need strong defense capabilities is not in dispute. Yet, as I watch the ever spiraling expense and sophisticated thought that goes into to developing these ‘tools,’ I cannot help but think that we(meaning all humans) are truly insane. To utilize all this intelligence to develop ever mor finely tuned methods of destruction and pollution seems an egregious and woeful waste of talent. Would that we could bring these minds to bear on solving the more pressing problems of environmental destruction, chemical pollution, overpopulation, greed, tendency to control….
    It’s very sad. I see no end to it.

    1. Do you really think Russia wants to become involved in any type of nuclear exchange because of some agreement or request of a client state? I don’t see that as a likely scenario. The Russian leader would be exposing his/her own population to a horrific response, putting his/her own future as leader in jeopardy.

  7. If you are someone like Saddam who had a German engineered bunker (that withstood much of the blast against it), then these dial-a-nuke could sound like a good idea to someone like past President Bush. The problem is not so much a single use, as the obvious escalation potential. If a country is nuke bombed and turns to Russia to have a “small” nuke returned, the potential for escalation is enormous.

    1. The promise of nuclear deterrence (as opposed to everyday deterrence) is that all drawn lines will be respected, without expection. If a line is crossed, nuclear deterrence has fundamentally failed.
      The flip-side of nuclear deterrence is nuclear warfighting, in that it is premised on nuclear deterrence failing. The concept is that preparedness for nuclear warfighting is what makes nuclear deterrence not fail.
      Believe in that if you want!
      But the crucial question is where you drawn the lines. The only clear and reliable line is against nuclear weapon attack itself (AKA sole purpose or no first use). All other lines are traps that get one into delusional (and expensive) discussions like these!

  8. I really don’t understand all of the concern and complaints about the B61-12. It is a smart decision to build this bomb for many reasons. It reduces the number of gravity bombs. It will allow the retirement of the largest active weapon in the arsenal. And it consolidates all of the capabilities of the other gravity bombs into one package. The real issue is that arms control advocates will always look to disarm for any reason.

  9. What a stretch…. It’s a 1000lb dart falling into the alluvium desert of Nevada…. Did you expect it to bounce? Just because it plowed into the earth doesn’t mean it survived. If the B61-12 was meant to be a penetrator, the air force would be talking about retiring the b61-11.

  10. The B61 gravity bomb should be immediately removed from Europe, where 180 of these weapons are kept in Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey.

  11. Re: accuracy. The shiny “target” at center point is NOT the final aim point! Somewhere below grade, say 10 meters, is the final target point.

    But, the bomb is coming in at about 40′ angle.

    Assume: target is BELOW ground grade level, then the bomb test in photo is headed into the earth a mere 16 m path to dead center, with a left offset of about 2-5 m. This last number is the error!

  12. A smaller (yeald) and more accurate warhead (which goes off under the ground) that may just kill a few hundred people MUST be WAY better than wiping out tens of millions of people with a more powerful above ground detonation to achieve the same result wouldn’t one agree? Man kind have always been in conflict with its self because of power and greed, there is enough resources on Earth for all but there is an Angle on this planet that wants death.

    1. Limiting human suffering is always preferable. But this is about nuclear weapons intended never to be used, not conventional war-fighting weapons. Increased accuracy has always resulted in some lowering of the yield on nuclear weapons but it is a very risky business to make nuclear weapons too useable. Remember: they’re supposed to be hard to use, not easier. As for our destiny, yes, there are plenty of resources for all if we learn how to use them sustainably and share. The only Angle on this planet is what’s in our mind: we make our own destiny.

  13. I think you must weigh the likelihood of vastly more human suffering if we do nothing to stop nuclear proliferation by NK and Iran. Authoritarian regimes that have promised to destroy other countries. These are rogue nations that mustn’t be allowed to have this capability.

    1. The B61-12 will do nothing to “stop nuclear proliferation by NK and Iran.” Iran’s nuclear program has been halted and scaled back via the international Iran deal (JCPOA), which the Trump administration unwisely decided to de-certify. NK is racing forward in part because refusal to talk with them and excessive military treats have fueled their defiance and determination to build nuclear weapons. NK is no longer a proliferation challenge; it is a deterrence and arms control challenge. B61-12 will not improved the situation; only talks and defusing of military tensions will.

    2. No one is suggesting to “do nothing” but unless efforts get underway early it can be much harder to push back later. Yet the Iran deal shows it is sometimes possible to freeze – even scale back – capabilities. Plus even authoritarian regimes have interests and can be influenced. Regime survival tends to be one priority so threatening actions that they would be concerned could threaten leaders personally can sometimes have an effect. As for North Korea, they are already a nuclear-armed state and cannot be undone unless they agree, which for now seems unlikely. So we have to figure out a way to co-exist with and manage an imperfect situation.

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