The anti-leak procedures announced last week by the Director of National Intelligence apply specifically to intelligence community employees. But the DNI is also responsible more broadly for security policies that affect almost everyone who holds a security clearance for access to classified information, whether or not it pertains to intelligence, as well as other government employees who are candidates for “sensitive positions.”
The DNI’s role as “Security Executive Agent” was described in a March 2012 directive, according to which he is responsible for oversight of “investigations and determinations by any agency for eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position.”
The DNI’s authority extends to every individual who has or seeks access to classified information with only a handful of exceptions: the President, the Vice President, Members of Congress, Justices of the Supreme Court, and Federal judges appointed by the President.
In this capacity, the DNI is responsible for developing standardized procedures for security questionnaires, financial disclosure forms, polygraph policies and practices, and foreign travel and foreign contact reporting requirements. See “Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 1,” effective 13 March 2012.
“SEAD 1 applies to all departments and agencies performing investigations or adjudications of persons proposed for eligibility to hold a sensitive position whether or not requiring access to classified information,” said Charles B. Sowell of ODNI in congressional testimony last month. “The ODNI also led the interagency efforts to revise the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines” — which are used to evaluate a person’s loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness — “which we expect to issue later this year,” he said.
It is in the interests of the United States to appropriately protect information that needs to be protected while maintaining our participation in new discoveries to maintain our competitive advantage.
The question is not whether the capital exists (it does!), nor whether energy solutions are available (they are!), but whether we can align energy finance quickly enough to channel the right types of capital where and when it’s needed most.
Our analysis of federal AI governance across administrations shows that divergent compliance procedures and uneven institutional capacity challenge the government’s ability to deploy AI in ways that uphold public trust.
From California to New Jersey, wildfires are taking a toll—costing the United States up to $424 billion annually and displacing tens of thousands of people. Congress needs solutions.