DoD Inspector General Reviews Detainee Abuse Investigations
The Department of Defense did a poor job of investigating and addressing reports of detainee abuse committed in Iraq by U.S. military personnel, according to a newly declassified report (pdf) of the DoD Inspector General.
“Allegations of detainee abuse were not consistently reported, investigated, or managed in an effective, systematic, and timely manner,” the IG found.
“Reports of detainee abuse by special mission unit task force personnel dated back to June 2003, but we believe it took the publicized abuse at Abu Ghraib [in spring 2004]… to elevate the issue to the Flag Officer level.”
“There are many well-documented reasons why detention and interrogation operations were overwhelmed [including] … inconsistent training; a critical shortage of skilled interrogators, translators, and guard force personnel; and the external influence of special operations forces and OGAs [other government agencies, a euphemism for the CIA].”
The August 2006 Inspector General report, originally classified Secret, was released in redacted form last week.
See “Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse,” DoD Inspector General, August 25, 2006.
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